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InnsbruckFlyer
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AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 01, 2019 7:24 am

Today is the 10th anniversary of Air France 447. The Guardian just posted an article with footage of the wreckage:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/ ... fter-crash

Very interesting.

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LAX772LR
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 01, 2019 6:57 pm

Such a freaky occurrence, and so sad the outcome.

RIP
I myself, suspect a more prosaic motive... ~Thranduil
 
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ikolkyo
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 01, 2019 9:14 pm

Can’t believe it’s already been a decade.
 
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LAX772LR
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 01, 2019 11:34 pm

ikolkyo wrote:
Can’t believe it’s already been a decade.

It's also the 20th anniversary of AA1420 (the S80 crash at LIT) :eek:
I myself, suspect a more prosaic motive... ~Thranduil
 
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lydh
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 12:29 am

When I taught English in Shanghai later that year, a (French) student of mine revealed that his best friend had died in that crash. What was especially sad is that he'd had a lifelong fear of flying, and he'd been coming home from his first long haul trip.
 
ltbewr
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 1:02 am

Apparently the new documentary with the video of the search will only be available in the USA via Amazon Prime customers. I wish it was available on some cable channel I get.
No doubt the French government made a strong effort to seek the remains of AF 447 and its passengers, but unlike MH 447. the searchers has a somewhat better idea of the general location where they could be found, including finding a major part, in particular the vertical stabilizer located shortly before the loss of AF 447. There was also that the area of the flight around the time of the loss was facing serious thunderstorms and was know to have instability. Fortunately the locating of the remains of AF447 meant the locating of the FDA and VDR and thus able to determine the probable cause of its loss.
 
747WanSui
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 1:24 am

It amazes me how regulators failed to act on aircraft tracking in the aftermath of AF447 - had they done so, they would probably have found MH370’s main wreckage by now.
Long live the Boeing 747!
 
Thibault973
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 1:36 am

I remember it like it was yesterday. Back then AF had 2 flights from GIG on most days, AF443 operated by a 744 and AF 447 with the 332. As I was scheduled to fly on AF447 about a month after the accident, I immediately changed my flight to be on the 744 flight instead. I remember telling the agent that I was scared to fly the 332 after all that was being said in the media with the pitot tube being blamed at the time and she answered that I wasn't the only one and that the boeing flight was going out full with a lot of passenger avoiding the 332. They ended up letting me changing my flight at no extra cost.
 
DenverTed
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 2:41 am

Would that accident have happened with a yoke control? Not that I know it is better or worse, but I think that is a fair question to ask. And, what is the best and safest control system?
 
RickNRoll
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 3:01 am

LAX772LR wrote:
ikolkyo wrote:
Can’t believe it’s already been a decade.

It's also the 20th anniversary of AA1420 (the S80 crash at LIT) :eek:


And the first moon landing is coming up.
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 3:19 am

DenverTed wrote:
Would that accident have happened with a yoke control? Not that I know it is better or worse, but I think that is a fair question to ask. And, what is the best and safest control system?


The stall they got into would have happened with either control system. Whether the crew or the captain could have more quickly identified the situation with yokes is debatable, to say the least. Yanking back at optimum flight level, getting 2000+fpm climb and not recognizing that wasn’t gonna end well was the problem.

GF
 
tu204
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 7:41 am

DenverTed wrote:
Would that accident have happened with a yoke control? Not that I know it is better or worse, but I think that is a fair question to ask. And, what is the best and safest control system?


I believe so. The other crewmember would have seen the fact that the moron in control was pulling back during their 3 minutes in freefall. Listen the the CVR. They have a Eureka moment falling through FL060 where the PF says "I've been pulling the entire time" or something like that and the Capt obviously does a facepalm, but too late.

Something that I like about the MS-21 is that from what I understand, the sidesticks have reverse feedback and show the position that the other pilot is moving it to.
I do not dream about movie stars, they must dream about me for I am real and they are not. - Alexander Popov
 
tu204
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 7:45 am

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
Would that accident have happened with a yoke control? Not that I know it is better or worse, but I think that is a fair question to ask. And, what is the best and safest control system?


The stall they got into would have happened with either control system. Whether the crew or the captain could have more quickly identified the situation with yokes is debatable, to say the least. Yanking back at optimum flight level, getting 2000+fpm climb and not recognizing that wasn’t gonna end well was the problem.

GF


The problem is teaching pilots to be computer operators. They had no clue how to fly the damn thing in Direct Law!

Same with the Aeroflot SSJ a month back. If you want to introduce jets with such systems, please feel free to give "pilots" practice in the Sim with these systems INOP.
I do not dream about movie stars, they must dream about me for I am real and they are not. - Alexander Popov
 
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LAX772LR
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 11:02 am

747WanSui wrote:
It amazes me how regulators failed to act on aircraft tracking in the aftermath of AF447 - had they done so, they would probably have found MH370’s main wreckage by now.

So true.... and even today, for that matter. :mad:
I myself, suspect a more prosaic motive... ~Thranduil
 
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longhauler
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 12:35 pm

One of the main outcomes of this accident was a review of the way transport pilots were trained. Full stalls and recoveries were never performed. It was always assumed that once a stall indication started (either a stick shaker or "stall stall" warning), if a recovery was actioned, that was enough.

I remember after AF447, we all had to do full stalls and recoveries in the simulator. It was the first time in decades since I had seen and done one. It was especially hard in an Airbus, as some protections had to be disabled. But honestly, I was astounded.

From a full stall, to a very touchy recovery (you had to be careful as it could stall again easily), it was not uncommon to lose as much as 15,000 feet! If you look at the altitude at which AF447 started the encounter, you see they really didn't have much time. If you add the confusion as to what was actually happening, it was a sad chain of events.
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emiratesdriver
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 2:30 pm

Simple pitch and power would mean everyone would be alive today.
 
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longhauler
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 3:41 pm

emiratesdriver wrote:
Simple pitch and power would mean everyone would be alive today.

If you mean ease the nose down gently and leave the power OFF, then you are correct. Otherwise, it is not that simple ... and a delicate balance.

That is what became apparent in the simulator. If you put power up too soon, before the elevators had great effectiveness (they wouldn't at slow speed) then the nose would pitch up, putting you into a deeper stall and more altitude would be lost.

It certainly was an eye opener. In some cases the nose would not come down until thrust was at idle.
Just because I stopped arguing, doesn't mean I think you are right. It just means I gave up!
 
LY777
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 3:58 pm

Thibault973 wrote:
I remember it like it was yesterday. Back then AF had 2 flights from GIG on most days, AF443 operated by a 744 and AF 447 with the 332. As I was scheduled to fly on AF447 about a month after the accident, I immediately changed my flight to be on the 744 flight instead. I remember telling the agent that I was scared to fly the 332 after all that was being said in the media with the pitot tube being blamed at the time and she answered that I wasn't the only one and that the boeing flight was going out full with a lot of passenger avoiding the 332. They ended up letting me changing my flight at no extra cost.


Same here.
I waited many years before flying an A330 again
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Starfuryt
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 4:50 pm

Hard to believe it's been 10 years, RIP.
 
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LAX772LR
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 10:16 pm

LY777 wrote:
Thibault973 wrote:
I remember it like it was yesterday. Back then AF had 2 flights from GIG on most days, AF443 operated by a 744 and AF 447 with the 332. As I was scheduled to fly on AF447 about a month after the accident, I immediately changed my flight to be on the 744 flight instead. I remember telling the agent that I was scared to fly the 332 after all that was being said in the media with the pitot tube being blamed at the time and she answered that I wasn't the only one and that the boeing flight was going out full with a lot of passenger avoiding the 332. They ended up letting me changing my flight at no extra cost.


Same here.
I waited many years before flying an A330 again

Neither of which being logical, as there was nothing to point towards the crash being specific/endemic to that aircraft model at all... at the time, nor in the aftermath.
I myself, suspect a more prosaic motive... ~Thranduil
 
Thibault973
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 10:28 pm

LAX772LR wrote:
LY777 wrote:
Thibault973 wrote:
I remember it like it was yesterday. Back then AF had 2 flights from GIG on most days, AF443 operated by a 744 and AF 447 with the 332. As I was scheduled to fly on AF447 about a month after the accident, I immediately changed my flight to be on the 744 flight instead. I remember telling the agent that I was scared to fly the 332 after all that was being said in the media with the pitot tube being blamed at the time and she answered that I wasn't the only one and that the boeing flight was going out full with a lot of passenger avoiding the 332. They ended up letting me changing my flight at no extra cost.


Same here.
I waited many years before flying an A330 again

Neither of which being logical, as there was nothing to point towards the crash being specific/endemic to that aircraft model at all... at the time, nor in the aftermath.


1st off there is nothing logical about fear. period.
2nd At the time of the disaster, the media blamed specifically that model of pitot tubes which were apparently being replaced by many airlines because of a defect, including by AF prior to the crash. Don't know where you live but I live in France, and for weeks and weeks it was full blown coverage of the investigation on tv, newspapers, online etc etc with people blaming airbus. It was only once the black box were retrieved that the narrative swiched. So yeah, 20 years old me got scared.
 
yegger
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 02, 2019 10:54 pm

I remember it very well. I had arrived the day before in Paris, and was hearing a lot of chatter about an Air France flight while I was walking around. With my limited French ability, I couldn't fully understand everything I was hearing. I walked by Notre Dame that day and because of the crowds I decided I would go back there in a couple days for a tour. It all made sense once I got back to my hotel and turned on the TV. I will never forget the headline "Paris bound airliner crashes in the Atlantic," without identifying the airline, the type, or the point of departure (what were there, 50-75 flights/night that cross the Atlantic for CDG alone?), and how that headline would have been received at home had this occurred on the day before, when I was flying. I returned to Notre Dame a few days later to go on a tour of the cathedral, but the cathedral, and the square in front of it, were closed off due to a service being held for the passengers and crew of flight 447. :-(
 
glideslope900
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 3:56 am

longhauler wrote:
emiratesdriver wrote:
Simple pitch and power would mean everyone would be alive today.

If you mean ease the nose down gently and leave the power OFF, then you are correct. Otherwise, it is not that simple ... and a delicate balance.

That is what became apparent in the simulator. If you put power up too soon, before the elevators had great effectiveness (they wouldn't at slow speed) then the nose would pitch up, putting you into a deeper stall and more altitude would be lost.

It certainly was an eye opener. In some cases the nose would not come down until thrust was at idle.



Is that how the A330 behaves? In my jet stall recovery is REDUCE PITCH and MAX POWER.

Leaving power at idle just seems odd...was this only for high altitude stalls?
 
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zeke
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 5:14 am

glideslope900 wrote:
Is that how the A330 behaves? In my jet stall recovery is REDUCE PITCH and MAX POWER.

Leaving power at idle just seems odd...was this only for high altitude stalls?


That is not a stall recovery technique, that is a low speed recovery technique for a propeller driven aircraft (your reference to power and not thrust)

Paraphrasing the A330 memory item
Nose down pitch control -apply
Bank -wings level

When out of stall
Thrust - increase smoothly as needed
Speed brake - check retracted
Flight path - recover smoothly

If clean below 20,000 ft
Flap 1 - select

AF 447 however was not “stalled”, they flew the aircraft into a high altitude jet upset, the stall recovery memory item is for the first indication of a stall. It is not designed for a case where the aircraft is flown outside its certified envelope. To recover AF447 they would have had to roll the aircraft, let the nose drop, then do the stall recovery.

What emiratesdriver was suggesting was to maintain the pre loss of airspeed indication pitch attitude and N1 and they would have stayed level, the airspeed recovered about a minute later.
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 7:14 am

Thibault973 wrote:
2nd At the time of the disaster, the media blamed specifically that model of pitot tubes which were apparently being replaced by many airlines because of a defect

Which doesn't refute the point in contention, seeing as the Thales AA pitot tube was not specific to the A330.

It might be a lot to expect even your typical AvGeek to know that off hand, but five seconds of research in the face of hysteria could've easily revealed it, even at that point in time.
I myself, suspect a more prosaic motive... ~Thranduil
 
airbuster
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 7:35 am

As sad and terrible as the accident was I can say that for myself and most pilots it has greatly raised our awareness of airliner automation, high altitude sensitivity, basic pitch/power (thrust) flying and stall recovery. Lessons have been learnt by the community.

I have flown a A332 over the same location as AF447, at night, with thunderstorms around. I remember having some turbulence getting us into a momentary overspeed. I really identified myself with these guys and felt very comfortable knowing that 2.5 degrees pitch and about 93% N1 would keep me out of trouble initially. This awareness is thanks to them, they didn’t have the luxury of this awareness through their training. They were literally in the dark. And things get out of hand fast at FL350.

Merci pour les leçons.

RIP to all and bon voyage,

Airbuster
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spacecadet
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 7:59 am

glideslope900 wrote:
Is that how the A330 behaves? In my jet stall recovery is REDUCE PITCH and MAX POWER.


The reason you don't do that in many under-wing engine airliners is that the increased thrust will tend to push the nose higher, exacerbating the stall. I don't know if it's true for *every* airliner with under-wing mounted engines, but at least the ones I know of do not call for thrust as part of stall recovery. Not until after the stall itself has been recovered and you're returning to normal flight.
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meesh42
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 8:41 am

Whats more upsetting about this incident is that the crew eventually found the problem as to why the plane was going down, but it was too late for them to do anything, the recording is so sad
 
AirwayBill
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 8:54 am

meesh42 wrote:
Whats more upsetting about this incident is that the crew eventually found the problem as to why the plane was going down, but it was too late for them to do anything, the recording is so sad


They never formally identified the stall situation at all, captain might have had an idea when he said "no no, don't pull", but that was as far as it could go, sadly.

I still remember the morning when it became news, my family and I were glued to the radio broadcast hoping for positive news. Very sad day it was.
 
Jomar777
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 9:20 am

LAX772LR wrote:
LY777 wrote:
Thibault973 wrote:
I remember it like it was yesterday. Back then AF had 2 flights from GIG on most days, AF443 operated by a 744 and AF 447 with the 332. As I was scheduled to fly on AF447 about a month after the accident, I immediately changed my flight to be on the 744 flight instead. I remember telling the agent that I was scared to fly the 332 after all that was being said in the media with the pitot tube being blamed at the time and she answered that I wasn't the only one and that the boeing flight was going out full with a lot of passenger avoiding the 332. They ended up letting me changing my flight at no extra cost.


Same here.
I waited many years before flying an A330 again

Neither of which being logical, as there was nothing to point towards the crash being specific/endemic to that aircraft model at all... at the time, nor in the aftermath.


I understand the fear factor but, I would say that, by reading so much into it (ciircumstances of what's happened - speculation at that time since a final reason was not yet known.-, documentaries, news, etc...), I used the information to make a considerable approach.

I live in the UK for 20 years now but am Brazilian by birth and speak French and have a lot of French connections so cold read and see a lot of information on this.

I ended up flying to GRU on an Air France A332 (and back, for that matter) about 5 month's after the accident with my family. Year later, with the start of the preparations and project management to deliver GIG T2 refurbishment and also the branding for the World Cup 2014, I flew on an A332 from GIG to CDG in what was the AF445 (the flight that effectivelly replaced the AF447).

Made me remember but I surpassed my fears.

Valid to clarify here: the pitot issue was well known a problem as much as the effects of flying across the Equator North to South and vice versa. It only meant that you actually had to lfly the aircraft rather that leave it to the gimmicks. So, from the outset, it was known that, although a possible contributing factor, it was not the main one - hard to blame the plane after that.
 
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flyingclrs727
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 11:32 am

747WanSui wrote:
It amazes me how regulators failed to act on aircraft tracking in the aftermath of AF447 - had they done so, they would probably have found MH370’s main wreckage by now.


Or MH-370's disappearance might have been deterred. It appears the captain deliberately intended to ditch the 77E in some of the most remote areas of the Indian ocean in order to prevent anyone from ever finding the wreckage. Better tracking of planes in remote areas would have made it more difficult to make a plane disappear.
 
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enzo011
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 12:23 pm

tu204 wrote:
I believe so. The other crewmember would have seen the fact that the moron in control was pulling back during their 3 minutes in freefall. Listen the the CVR. They have a Eureka moment falling through FL060 where the PF says "I've been pulling the entire time" or something like that and the Capt obviously does a facepalm, but too late.

Something that I like about the MS-21 is that from what I understand, the sidesticks have reverse feedback and show the position that the other pilot is moving it to.



He was not pulling back for 3 minutes. He may have said he was pulling back but looking at the plot points he was not pulling back for 3 minutes. If the PNF was looking at the PF sidestick for the moments he was not pulling back it wouldn't have mattered. In any case I believe pilots are trained to look at the instruments and not what their eyes are telling them so it would have been some miraculous catch from the PNF to catch that the aircraft was flown into a stall by looking away from the instruments he was trained to.

Do you think pilots should be trained to look at the physical movement of yokes/sidesticks and the thrust controllers during an emergency? The main problem, as pointed out already, the aircraft was flown into a high altitude upset by the pilot for some unknown reason. This would have happened with yokes or feedback sidesticks.
 
ubeema
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 1:49 pm

airbuster wrote:
As sad and terrible as the accident was I can say that for myself and most pilots it has greatly raised our awareness of airliner automation, high altitude sensitivity, basic pitch/power (thrust) flying and stall recovery. Lessons have been learnt by the community.

I have flown a A332 over the same location as AF447, at night, with thunderstorms around. I remember having some turbulence getting us into a momentary overspeed. I really identified myself with these guys and felt very comfortable knowing that 2.5 degrees pitch and about 93% N1 would keep me out of trouble initially. This awareness is thanks to them, they didn’t have the luxury of this awareness through their training. They were literally in the dark. And things get out of hand fast at FL350.

Merci pour les leçons.

RIP to all and bon voyage,

Airbuster

Great reminder this tragedy was not in vain. Thank you Sir


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
RickNRoll
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 10:29 pm

tu204 wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
Would that accident have happened with a yoke control? Not that I know it is better or worse, but I think that is a fair question to ask. And, what is the best and safest control system?


I believe so. The other crewmember would have seen the fact that the moron in control was pulling back during their 3 minutes in freefall. Listen the the CVR. They have a Eureka moment falling through FL060 where the PF says "I've been pulling the entire time" or something like that and the Capt obviously does a facepalm, but too late.

Something that I like about the MS-21 is that from what I understand, the sidesticks have reverse feedback and show the position that the other pilot is moving it to.
The captain was only in the cabin at the last moment and knew that the situation was fubar the moment he came in. The PNF wasn't in his seat for some time because he was trying to wake the captain who had not slept properly the night before.
 
wingman
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 03, 2019 11:37 pm

enzo011 wrote:
He was not pulling back for 3 minutes. He may have said he was pulling back but looking at the plot points he was not pulling back for 3 minutes. If the PNF was looking at the PF sidestick for the moments he was not pulling back it wouldn't have mattered. In any case I believe pilots are trained to look at the instruments and not what their eyes are telling them so it would have been some miraculous catch from the PNF to catch that the aircraft was flown into a stall by looking away from the instruments he was trained to.

Do you think pilots should be trained to look at the physical movement of yokes/sidesticks and the thrust controllers during an emergency? The main problem, as pointed out already, the aircraft was flown into a high altitude upset by the pilot for some unknown reason. This would have happened with yokes or feedback sidesticks.


We debated this recently in another thread and there are many industry professionals that believe the present Airbus sidestick set up has this one drawback of inputs being visible or known only to the pilot making them. This doesn't mean that sidesticks are defective or that yokes are a better design. But the latest advents in sidestick functionality all address this issue by making each stick move in tandem with the other. Bonin would've flown any aircraft and with any "wheel" type into coffin's corner. Nevertheless, with a traditional yoke it is very likely Robert would've noticed those early critical nose up inputs, even while staying focused on his instruments, because the yoke would've been in his direct line of sight. Just maybe he would've caught those first inputs by Bonin and taken over the flying himself. As it stands, neither he nor the Captain was ever aware of the nose up inputs until Bonin blurted the fact out. Once again, here is Capt. Sullenberger discussing this exact topic at 1:38, and in explicit detail at 3:30.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kERSSRJant0
 
tu204
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Tue Jun 04, 2019 5:57 am

enzo011 wrote:
tu204 wrote:
I believe so. The other crewmember would have seen the fact that the moron in control was pulling back during their 3 minutes in freefall. Listen the the CVR. They have a Eureka moment falling through FL060 where the PF says "I've been pulling the entire time" or something like that and the Capt obviously does a facepalm, but too late.

Something that I like about the MS-21 is that from what I understand, the sidesticks have reverse feedback and show the position that the other pilot is moving it to.



He was not pulling back for 3 minutes. He may have said he was pulling back but looking at the plot points he was not pulling back for 3 minutes. If the PNF was looking at the PF sidestick for the moments he was not pulling back it wouldn't have mattered. In any case I believe pilots are trained to look at the instruments and not what their eyes are telling them so it would have been some miraculous catch from the PNF to catch that the aircraft was flown into a stall by looking away from the instruments he was trained to.

Do you think pilots should be trained to look at the physical movement of yokes/sidesticks and the thrust controllers during an emergency? The main problem, as pointed out already, the aircraft was flown into a high altitude upset by the pilot for some unknown reason. This would have happened with yokes or feedback sidesticks.


In my personal opinion, yes. It is a good idea to look at the position of the controls during an emergency. There have been countless crashes where someone puts the throttles into a position by mistake and had the other pilot noticed this, the crash could have been avoided.
I do not dream about movie stars, they must dream about me for I am real and they are not. - Alexander Popov
 
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enzo011
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Tue Jun 04, 2019 8:33 am

wingman wrote:
We debated this recently in another thread and there are many industry professionals that believe the present Airbus sidestick set up has this one drawback of inputs being visible or known only to the pilot making them. This doesn't mean that sidesticks are defective or that yokes are a better design. But the latest advents in sidestick functionality all address this issue by making each stick move in tandem with the other. Bonin would've flown any aircraft and with any "wheel" type into coffin's corner. Nevertheless, with a traditional yoke it is very likely Robert would've noticed those early critical nose up inputs, even while staying focused on his instruments, because the yoke would've been in his direct line of sight. Just maybe he would've caught those first inputs by Bonin and taken over the flying himself. As it stands, neither he nor the Captain was ever aware of the nose up inputs until Bonin blurted the fact out. Once again, here is Capt. Sullenberger discussing this exact topic at 1:38, and in explicit detail at 3:30.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kERSSRJant0



You don't know this and is basing this on nothing more than hope. The Asiana accident at SFO had moving throttles with three people in the cockpit and nobody noticed the critical moving part that would have meant the accident didn't happen. This has been said many times before and everytime there is a AF447 thread the same posts pop up about sidesticks and feedback. They were in turbulence and the AP was handling this. When it disengaged they were still in turbulence and experienced a drop in altitude. A move to climb would be normal and I doubt any pilot would have thought it abnormal. They didn't know when their instruments were giving good data and thus didn't trust it when it told them they were too slow.

It is all there in the BAE report. If they thought that feedback sidesticks or a yoke would have made a difference they would have recommended it. Yes it could have been useful to have it, but the other factors that played a role that had nothing to do with the yoke or sidestick means it is a moot point in this accident. It would not have saved this flight with this crew in these conditions and these circumstances.

https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp09 ... 601.en.pdf
 
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enzo011
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Tue Jun 04, 2019 8:41 am

tu204 wrote:
In my personal opinion, yes. It is a good idea to look at the position of the controls during an emergency. There have been countless crashes where someone puts the throttles into a position by mistake and had the other pilot noticed this, the crash could have been avoided.



The PNF was monitoring the altitude and speed, for what they thought it was worth, and he did tell the PF to not climb and to watch his speed. He was aware that they were climbing and didn't need to look away from his instruments in front of him to tell him what is happening. They didn't trust their speeds and when it returned to normal and it was low they didn't believe them. Looking away from the displays to the side will not tell him when the speeds are accurate again. The Stall warning going off for 54 seconds was ignored because they didn't trust their speed indications so looking to the side will not have told him anything as they didn't trust the information given to them.

The Asiana pilots had moving throttles and a third pilot in the cockpit and they missed that they were in idle. Feedback instruments are not a cure and would not have made a difference in this accident.
 
wingman
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Tue Jun 04, 2019 1:19 pm

enzo011 wrote:
Feedback instruments are not a cure and would not have made a difference in this accident.


You have your opinion, just like Sully. And no, the BEA report would never have recommended ripping out a passive sidestick system in Airbus planes for an active system not yet developed or proven. It's simply a point of discussion. You say a yoke would not have made a difference, and yet Bonin's actions are what killed everyone on that plane. Are you 100% positive that Robert would not have seen that yoke moving back at 35,000 feet and instinctually taken over the flying? Some very highly respected industry professionals, including Sully who happens to be a massive fan of the Airbus cockpit design, are not.
 
tu204
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 6:20 am

enzo011 wrote:
tu204 wrote:
In my personal opinion, yes. It is a good idea to look at the position of the controls during an emergency. There have been countless crashes where someone puts the throttles into a position by mistake and had the other pilot noticed this, the crash could have been avoided.



The PNF was monitoring the altitude and speed, for what they thought it was worth, and he did tell the PF to not climb and to watch his speed. He was aware that they were climbing and didn't need to look away from his instruments in front of him to tell him what is happening. They didn't trust their speeds and when it returned to normal and it was low they didn't believe them. Looking away from the displays to the side will not tell him when the speeds are accurate again. The Stall warning going off for 54 seconds was ignored because they didn't trust their speed indications so looking to the side will not have told him anything as they didn't trust the information given to them.

The Asiana pilots had moving throttles and a third pilot in the cockpit and they missed that they were in idle. Feedback instruments are not a cure and would not have made a difference in this accident.


Ok, I do get your point however I personally have had a few "non-usual" situations in my 12 year flying career and I believe that a scan of your surroundings are a good thing to assess the situation.
I do not dream about movie stars, they must dream about me for I am real and they are not. - Alexander Popov
 
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SomebodyInTLS
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 9:14 am

flyingclrs727 wrote:
It appears the captain deliberately intended to ditch the 77E in some of the most remote areas of the Indian ocean in order to prevent anyone from ever finding the wreckage. Better tracking of planes in remote areas would have made it more difficult to make a plane disappear.


Just like AF447 and documentaries stating it was downed by a new type of supercooled ice crystal resulting from 20th century aerosol pollution, that is nothing but an unsubstantiated hypothesis pushed by people convinced there has to be "a reason". Let's just stay rational and leave MH370 unsolved pending actual evidence... (which is statistically far more likely to be mundane mechanical failure mixed with human error).
"As with most things related to aircraft design, it's all about the trade-offs and much more nuanced than A.net likes to make out."
 
Amiga500
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 9:51 am

enzo011 wrote:
Feedback instruments are not a cure and would not have made a difference in this accident.


Feedback sidesticks* are a zero-distraction tacit indicator to both pilots simultaneously of what the primary flight control inputs actually are.

They should be standard on all commercial aircraft.


*unless you have control columns - in which case they should feedback too.
 
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enzo011
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 11:11 am

wingman wrote:
You have your opinion, just like Sully. And no, the BEA report would never have recommended ripping out a passive sidestick system in Airbus planes for an active system not yet developed or proven. It's simply a point of discussion. You say a yoke would not have made a difference, and yet Bonin's actions are what killed everyone on that plane. Are you 100% positive that Robert would not have seen that yoke moving back at 35,000 feet and instinctually taken over the flying? Some very highly respected industry professionals, including Sully who happens to be a massive fan of the Airbus cockpit design, are not.



It is a point of discussion and I think it is a good one. But I cannot accept that feedback sidesticks would have saved this flight. Could it have done? Maybe if they got very lucky that the PNF looked at the sidestick at the right moment and then correctly diagnosed the problem while dealing with the problem of the unreliable airspeed indicators they were dealing with initially.

I am 90% sure that even if he had seen the movements the PF was making with the sidestick that they would still have ended up where they did, because seeing that would not have cleared up their confusion on airspeed and what instruments they could trust during the conditions they were experiencing at that time.
 
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enzo011
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 11:18 am

Amiga500 wrote:
Feedback sidesticks* are a zero-distraction tacit indicator to both pilots simultaneously of what the primary flight control inputs actually are.

They should be standard on all commercial aircraft.


*unless you have control columns - in which case they should feedback too.



Yes, but Zeke has made the point before that what the pilot is doing physically with the controls does not always correspond with the performance of the aircraft. That is why they are taught to trust the information they are given and not what they think they are seeing. The problem obviously is what do you do when you cannot trust the information in front of you, which the pilots believed during this flight.
 
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Polot
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 11:25 am

Feedback sticks probably would not have saved the flight considering the pilots were the ones who put the aircraft into a stall to begin with. I don’t know why we are avoiding talking about that and focusing on just their recovery efforts.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 11:44 am

The problem with the reaction of the pilots to the airplane dropping out of automatic while in turbulence was total and absolute confusion of two pilots. Flying at 35,000 feet at mach 0.8 into turbulence, the auto pilot switched off, the frame went to alternate law and shortly thereafter auto throttle switched off.

Both pilots had enough hours, both total and on the frame, to have learned enough to be able to fly said frame manually. The only instrument that was definitely unreliable was airspeed, due to the frozen pilot tubes. At that moment the frame was not in stall flying level with I assume trust going to idle.

If somebody here could explain how applying toga and going into full climb makes sense in this situation, I would like to hear this explanation. If than somebody could explain how than putting the frame into stall, with all the associated warnings, and still keep the elevator to climb, is being in any way a sensible reaction by a trained pilot, I would like to hear that.

How the second pilot could sit through this maneuvers and not realize what was happening is an absolut mystery. Those two pilots seem to have been absolut clue less what to do with a frame not in automatic. They should have applied 93% thrust and kept the frame level according to the AoA indication. A warning that they were approaching stall should have reminded them to push the stick forward.

And now comes the theory, that having had connected joysticks would have saved the day. In what way would that have saved two pilots that had forgotten everything about flying a frame?
 
airbuster
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 12:16 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
The problem with the reaction of the pilots to the airplane dropping out of automatic while in turbulence was total and absolute confusion of two pilots. Flying at 35,000 feet at mach 0.8 into turbulence, the auto pilot switched off, the frame went to alternate law and shortly thereafter auto throttle switched off.

Both pilots had enough hours, both total and on the frame, to have learned enough to be able to fly said frame manually. The only instrument that was definitely unreliable was airspeed, due to the frozen pilot tubes. At that moment the frame was not in stall flying level with I assume trust going to idle.

If somebody here could explain how applying toga and going into full climb makes sense in this situation, I would like to hear this explanation. If than somebody could explain how than putting the frame into stall, with all the associated warnings, and still keep the elevator to climb, is being in any way a sensible reaction by a trained pilot, I would like to hear that.

How the second pilot could sit through this maneuvers and not realize what was happening is an absolut mystery. Those two pilots seem to have been absolut clue less what to do with a frame not in automatic. They should have applied 93% thrust and kept the frame level according to the AoA indication. A warning that they were approaching stall should have reminded them to push the stick forward.

And now comes the theory, that having had connected joysticks would have saved the day. In what way would that have saved two pilots that had forgotten everything about flying a frame?


Great explanation. I back this 100%. It would surprise people how naturally a non feedback sidestick feels. I as a pilot want a certain outcome/change in flight trajectory, I then take action with my control.....be it feedback or not, digital or conventional. Now when reverting to alt and normal laws things get a little different but the control loop as described above doesn’t change, just your muscle memory.
FLY FOKKER JET LINE!
 
Amiga500
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 3:10 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
And now comes the theory, that having had connected joysticks would have saved the day. In what way would that have saved two pilots that had forgotten everything about flying a frame?


Did the 2nd pilot know that the PIC had pulled back on the stick that much?
 
mjoelnir
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 4:06 pm

Amiga500 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
And now comes the theory, that having had connected joysticks would have saved the day. In what way would that have saved two pilots that had forgotten everything about flying a frame?


Did the 2nd pilot know that the PIC had pulled back on the stick that much?
+

He should have known.

The frame climbed like mad instead of flying straight, with full thrust instead of 93% thrust, how does that bypass a pilot´s brain? Did the second pilot also miss his hearing and feel, stall alarm and stick shaking seems also have bypassed him. Did he never wonder why this thinks were happening? Did he never got the idea to ask the PF what he was doing?

How much obvious information do you need?
 
Amiga500
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Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 4:07 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
How much obvious information do you need?


More than what they got obviously.

Also - your eyes are overloaded with dials and screens going mad, lights blinking all over the place. Your ears are being assaulted by warnings.

If your hand is on the stick and it is feeding back inputs of the PIC, you have a direct input to your brain via completely different mechanism that doesn't require going through multiple levels of diagnosis.

Instead of seeing and looking to find the root cause of:
- airspeed is going mad
- altitude is going mad
- getting stall warnings
- getting speed warnings

WTF is going on...

you immediately feel through the stick
- WTF is this moron doing, nose down.

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