airbuster
Posts: 369
Joined: Fri Mar 30, 2007 12:43 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 5:00 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
Amiga500 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
And now comes the theory, that having had connected joysticks would have saved the day. In what way would that have saved two pilots that had forgotten everything about flying a frame?


Did the 2nd pilot know that the PIC had pulled back on the stick that much?
+

He should have known.

The frame climbed like mad instead of flying straight, with full thrust instead of 93% thrust, how does that bypass a pilot´s brain? Did the second pilot also miss his hearing and feel, stall alarm and stick shaking seems also have bypassed him. Did he never wonder why this thinks were happening? Did he never got the idea to ask the PF what he was doing?

How much obvious information do you need?


Without going into details. I’ve been in this business for 13 years now and if anything I learned to never say never. It could have happend to you or me! Do you think a 777 with FBW control would have made a difference? No way.
FLY FOKKER JET LINE!
 
Amiga500
Posts: 2237
Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2015 8:22 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 5:19 pm

Amiga500 wrote:
More than what they got obviously.

Also - your eyes are overloaded with dials and screens going mad, lights blinking all over the place. Your ears are being assaulted by warnings.

If your hand is on the stick and it is feeding back inputs of the PIC, you have a direct input to your brain via completely different mechanism that doesn't require going through multiple levels of diagnosis.

Instead of seeing and looking to find the root cause of:
- airspeed is going mad
- altitude is going mad
- getting stall warnings
- getting speed warnings

WTF is going on...

you immediately feel through the stick
- WTF is this moron doing, nose down.


For the avoidance of doubt, I am not saying the above is what would have happened - I am saying the change would make it a possibility.

I suppose a (somewhat weak) analogy would be when you are racing a car - you don't sense oversteer through your eyes or ears - even though there are signals to that effect - you sense it most tacitly through your hands on the steering wheel

Or when you reach over to lift your pint in a bar - you don't have to be looking at it - despite all distractions, your brain roughly knows where it is and can feel for it then apply appropriate force.
Last edited by Amiga500 on Wed Jun 05, 2019 5:34 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 8651
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 5:19 pm

The bigger issue for me with this incident was the alarms stopping after the stall and or speed got to deep / slow then starting up again when recovery started and the a/c once again got into the threshold for the alarm to start. I can see that adding to the confusion where you think you are recovering then the alarm goes off again, better to reverse what you just did.

10 year on I would have to do searches to see if they changed the limits on those alarms.
 
Amiga500
Posts: 2237
Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2015 8:22 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 5:26 pm

par13del wrote:
The bigger issue for me with this incident was the alarms stopping after the stall and or speed got to deep / slow then starting up again when recovery started and the a/c once again got into the threshold for the alarm to start. I can see that adding to the confusion where you think you are recovering then the alarm goes off again, better to reverse what you just did.


Agreed - very counter-intuitive. An alarm should be easing confusion, not adding to it.
 
Adipocere
Posts: 225
Joined: Sat Jun 27, 2015 9:35 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jun 05, 2019 5:39 pm

Flew on F-GZCP a week earlier. Completely uneventful flight. R.I.P.
 
User avatar
BaconButty
Posts: 797
Joined: Tue Aug 06, 2013 3:42 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Thu Jun 06, 2019 9:20 am

The PNF was aware that the PF was climbing:
2 h 10 min 31 Go back down
2 h 10 min 32 According to that we’re going up
2 h 10 min 33 According to all three you’re going up so go back down
2 h 10 min 35 You’re at…
2 h 10 min 36 Go back down


This is 28 seconds after the incident began with the autopilot disconnect, 16 seconds after they articulated that they lost airspeed and started to react. So it strikes me as pretty clear that linked side-sticks would have likely altered nothing.
Down with that sort of thing!
 
User avatar
BaconButty
Posts: 797
Joined: Tue Aug 06, 2013 3:42 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Thu Jun 06, 2019 11:46 am

Amiga500 wrote:
Agreed - very counter-intuitive. An alarm should be easing confusion, not adding to it.


Extreme AOA values were discarded as unreliable, hence the stall warning didn't sound. IIRC while it sounds like the obvious answer to change that (and not disregard the high AOA values) there were issues with that too, though I don't recall what it was, presumably the potential impact of false stall warnings. In any case - it's notable that the BEA didn't recommend changing that, rather adding an AOA indicator.
Down with that sort of thing!
 
Amiga500
Posts: 2237
Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2015 8:22 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Thu Jun 06, 2019 12:46 pm

BaconButty wrote:
The PNF was aware that the PF was climbing:
2 h 10 min 31 Go back down
2 h 10 min 32 According to that we’re going up
2 h 10 min 33 According to all three you’re going up so go back down
2 h 10 min 35 You’re at…
2 h 10 min 36 Go back down


This is 28 seconds after the incident began with the autopilot disconnect, 16 seconds after they articulated that they lost airspeed and started to react. So it strikes me as pretty clear that linked side-sticks would have likely altered nothing.


If I were PNF and could feel through my hand that PF was still pulling back despite being told to descend, it would have had me turning around and hitting PF a f**king dig along with commentary to the effect of "GO BACK DOWN or I'll put you down!"

Note the two are different. PNF didn't know if PF was trying to nose down or not.
 
Amiga500
Posts: 2237
Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2015 8:22 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Thu Jun 06, 2019 12:58 pm

BaconButty wrote:
Amiga500 wrote:
Agreed - very counter-intuitive. An alarm should be easing confusion, not adding to it.


Extreme AOA values were discarded as unreliable, hence the stall warning didn't sound. IIRC while it sounds like the obvious answer to change that (and not disregard the high AOA values) there were issues with that too, though I don't recall what it was, presumably the potential impact of false stall warnings. In any case - it's notable that the BEA didn't recommend changing that, rather adding an AOA indicator.


Yeah, I'd imagine they were worried about nuisance flags. But I'd have thought that a bit of fault integration and latching could get around that.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 8361
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Thu Jun 06, 2019 1:51 pm

Amiga500 wrote:
BaconButty wrote:
The PNF was aware that the PF was climbing:
2 h 10 min 31 Go back down
2 h 10 min 32 According to that we’re going up
2 h 10 min 33 According to all three you’re going up so go back down
2 h 10 min 35 You’re at…
2 h 10 min 36 Go back down


This is 28 seconds after the incident began with the autopilot disconnect, 16 seconds after they articulated that they lost airspeed and started to react. So it strikes me as pretty clear that linked side-sticks would have likely altered nothing.


If I were PNF and could feel through my hand that PF was still pulling back despite being told to descend, it would have had me turning around and hitting PF a f**king dig along with commentary to the effect of "GO BACK DOWN or I'll put you down!"

Note the two are different. PNF didn't know if PF was trying to nose down or not.


So if the the PNF did know that the airplaine was climbing, he did not need to see the stick or feel the stick. How does an airplane manages to climb? By applying elevator up commands. So to stop climbing you need to stop applying elevator, or give elevator down command. So if the airplaine keeps climbing, somebody is applying elevator up. How big has the stick to be to hit somebody over the head with? All the information the PNF needed was there right before him.

I think the main problem in AF447 was communication.

The PNF did not ask the PF if he was applying nose down command. At the latest when the stall warning sounded the PNF should have reacted and taking over flying, especial as he was the pilot with more experience.
 
Amiga500
Posts: 2237
Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2015 8:22 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Thu Jun 06, 2019 2:09 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
So if the the PNF did know that the airplaine was climbing, he did not need to see the stick or feel the stick. How does an airplane manages to climb? By applying elevator up commands.


Or the PNF could have been under the impression that the flight computer was doing its own thing despite the best efforts of the PF to nose down.

All the information was not there in front of them presented in a clear, concise and unambiguous manner.


[Although I still blame the pilots >95% for the loss]
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 8361
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Thu Jun 06, 2019 2:51 pm

Amiga500 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
So if the the PNF did know that the airplaine was climbing, he did not need to see the stick or feel the stick. How does an airplane manages to climb? By applying elevator up commands.


Or the PNF could have been under the impression that the flight computer was doing its own thing despite the best efforts of the PF to nose down.

All the information was not there in front of them presented in a clear, concise and unambiguous manner.


[Although I still blame the pilots >95% for the loss]


No, because the the flight computer had dropped them out of automatic and into alternate law. auto throttle switched off. So manual flying, manual inputs. There was no ambiguity who flew the airplane.

Once again, how big has the cluestick to be?
 
glideslope900
Posts: 120
Joined: Sun Feb 24, 2019 5:27 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jun 07, 2019 5:34 am

zeke wrote:
glideslope900 wrote:
Is that how the A330 behaves? In my jet stall recovery is REDUCE PITCH and MAX POWER.

Leaving power at idle just seems odd...was this only for high altitude stalls?


That is not a stall recovery technique, that is a low speed recovery technique for a propeller driven aircraft (your reference to power and not thrust)

Paraphrasing the A330 memory item
Nose down pitch control -apply
Bank -wings level

When out of stall
Thrust - increase smoothly as needed
Speed brake - check retracted
Flight path - recover smoothly

If clean below 20,000 ft
Flap 1 - select

AF 447 however was not “stalled”, they flew the aircraft into a high altitude jet upset, the stall recovery memory item is for the first indication of a stall. It is not designed for a case where the aircraft is flown outside its certified envelope. To recover AF447 they would have had to roll the aircraft, let the nose drop, then do the stall recovery.

What emiratesdriver was suggesting was to maintain the pre loss of airspeed indication pitch attitude and N1 and they would have stayed level, the airspeed recovered about a minute later.


Actually, MAX POWER is such a thing in a certain transport category jet.

Also, AF447 was stalled.

Apparently you don’t really know what you are talking about.
 
glideslope900
Posts: 120
Joined: Sun Feb 24, 2019 5:27 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jun 07, 2019 5:36 am

spacecadet wrote:
glideslope900 wrote:
Is that how the A330 behaves? In my jet stall recovery is REDUCE PITCH and MAX POWER.


The reason you don't do that in many under-wing engine airliners is that the increased thrust will tend to push the nose higher, exacerbating the stall. I don't know if it's true for *every* airliner with under-wing mounted engines, but at least the ones I know of do not call for thrust as part of stall recovery. Not until after the stall itself has been recovered and you're returning to normal flight.


Thank you for the clear response. I fly a T-tail so our recovery procedure calls for MAX POWER.
 
User avatar
zeke
Posts: 13787
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jun 07, 2019 8:07 am

glideslope900 wrote:


Actually, MAX POWER is such a thing in a certain transport category jet.



Such as ? please enlighten all of us which jet aircraft produces power and not thrust.
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
airtechy
Posts: 705
Joined: Sun Dec 24, 2006 7:35 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jun 07, 2019 10:07 am

Does the A220 have linked sidesticks? Tracking throttles?
 
Amiga500
Posts: 2237
Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2015 8:22 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jun 07, 2019 10:17 am

mjoelnir wrote:
Once again, how big has the cluestick to be?


Bigger than what they got obviously.

Was the PNF under the impression there was something aside from the PF's inputs causing the aircraft to continue to climb? If you tell the guy beside you to nose down - you assume he is at least trying to do so. You trust the person beside you to be competent at their job and take instruction - or at least immediately feedback if they are not following instruction.

Having your sidestick track with their inputs gives clear and unambiguous message that they are not doing what you asked them and they are the problem, not something hidden within the aircraft.
 
glideslope900
Posts: 120
Joined: Sun Feb 24, 2019 5:27 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jun 07, 2019 11:51 pm

zeke wrote:
glideslope900 wrote:


Actually, MAX POWER is such a thing in a certain transport category jet.



Such as ? please enlighten all of us which jet aircraft produces power and not thrust.


How about the CRJ-700/900? Here is an excerpt from the operating manual:

“[1] Normal takeoff power and maximum power (two engines) is limited to 5 minutes. [2} APR power (one engine) is limited to 10 minutes.”

Also, the CRJ-700/900 has a MAX POWER detent, clearly labeled on the thrust quadrant.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 8361
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 12:24 am

Amiga500 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
Once again, how big has the cluestick to be?


Bigger than what they got obviously.

Was the PNF under the impression there was something aside from the PF's inputs causing the aircraft to continue to climb? If you tell the guy beside you to nose down - you assume he is at least trying to do so. You trust the person beside you to be competent at their job and take instruction - or at least immediately feedback if they are not following instruction.

Having your sidestick track with their inputs gives clear and unambiguous message that they are not doing what you asked them and they are the problem, not something hidden within the aircraft.


are you not now describing a case of bad CRM? As I said missing communication between the pilots.
 
DenverTed
Posts: 242
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 11:12 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 2:22 am

Did Airbus offer the sidestick inidicator guage as standard or an option?
One crash is the freebie. The next crash every unlinked sidestick aircraft gets grounded. That's pretty much how it worked with MCAS.
 
TTailedTiger
Posts: 1241
Joined: Sun Aug 26, 2018 5:19 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 4:06 am

Do you think the passengers knew they were in trouble or was the flat stall undetectable to them?
 
User avatar
zeke
Posts: 13787
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 5:48 am

glideslope900 wrote:

How about the CRJ-700/900?


Cam you show me a document that says how much power a GECF34 turbofan produce ?

This is the engine type certificate that says how much thrust it produces https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/defaul ... 17_0.1.pdf
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
User avatar
zeke
Posts: 13787
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 5:51 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
Do you think the passengers knew they were in trouble or was the flat stall undetectable to them?


I think the initial pitch up as the pilots pulled full after sidestick and TOGA would have resulted in injuries.
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
AirwayBill
Posts: 135
Joined: Fri Mar 29, 2019 8:37 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 7:14 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
Do you think the passengers knew they were in trouble or was the flat stall undetectable to them?


What is mostly felt by the human body during a stall phenomenon is vertical acceleration. The beginning of the stall might have been very noticeable to PAX and crew, because it would quickly go from a weak climb to a 10,000ft/min descent and involve rapidly varying G factor. The 3 last minutes were a calmer, almost steady free fall.

Although there were still pitch changes and aileron roll inputs, there's a bit of a chance the passengers passed away in peace without having too much clue of what was really happening other than strong turbulence. Some people never had that chance (SR111, CI611,...) :shakehead:


According to attorneys quoting BEA reports, there were "no signs of panic nor screams in the cabin when the events occurred", and by interpreting CVR data, the "passengers likely weren't aware of what was happening". "Cabin atmosphere remained similar to the end of recording". Relatives of lost ones were skeptical about that statement. Whether it was made to comfort passenger relatives or the actual observations made by the bureau is all speculation, and thankfully we will never be able to proof check that, since black boxes in France are kept secret and audio content never revealed. Some things better be kept that way. RIP

Articles in French:
https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/justice/crash-du-vol-rio-paris-les-passagers-n-etaient-pas-conscients-de-la-chute-de-l-avion_1621503.html
https://www.europe1.fr/societe/AF-447-la-peur-etait-certainement-la-374298
 
User avatar
zeke
Posts: 13787
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 7:57 am

AirwayBill wrote:
because it would quickly go from a weak climb


I don’t believe this, there are many reports of passenger injuries at altitude in response to TCAS handling. If you are flying at 470 kts true and pull back it involves very high climb rates.
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
RickNRoll
Posts: 1706
Joined: Fri Jan 06, 2012 9:30 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 8:07 am

LAX772LR wrote:
747WanSui wrote:
It amazes me how regulators failed to act on aircraft tracking in the aftermath of AF447 - had they done so, they would probably have found MH370’s main wreckage by now.

So true.... and even today, for that matter. :mad:


IIRC anything and everything that was providing real time data from MH370 was deliberately disabled.
 
AirwayBill
Posts: 135
Joined: Fri Mar 29, 2019 8:37 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 8:12 am

zeke wrote:

I don’t believe this, there are many reports of passenger injuries at altitude in response to TCAS handling. If you are flying at 470 kts true and pull back it involves very high climb rates.


Sorry edited, didn't have the data in front of me and forgot how steep the initial climb coupled with TOGA was (around +4,000fpm)

Whether the passengers knew that anything was seriously amiss beyond a very severe turbulence episode is up to speculation, since the remainder of the stall could have been felt as pretty uneventful compared to the beginning of the events.
 
emiratesdriver
Posts: 263
Joined: Tue Dec 27, 2016 9:04 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 8:40 am

If you mean ease the nose down gently and leave the power OFF, then you are correct. Otherwise, it is not that simple ... and a delicate balance.

That is what became apparent in the simulator. If you put power up too soon, before the elevators had great effectiveness (they wouldn't at slow speed) then the nose would pitch up, putting you into a deeper stall and more altitude would be lost.

It certainly was an eye opener. In some cases the nose would not come down until thrust was at idle.


There is a tad more nuisance to it than that.
When I was taught to fly, one of the first lessons I was taught related to pitch and power, i.e. what pitch and power setting was required to achieve the required level of performance?
Interestingly enough every subsequent aircraft type I’ve flown from that day to this, Including Hawks, Hunters, Tornados, C130s, A320/21/330/380 and 757/767/777 have had included in the AFM an indispensable little chapter covering performance in flight. From those early days till today I committed to memory 5 pitch and power settings that covered pretty much the entire flight envelope to ensure an instrument failure was an inconvenience rather than an emergency.
For me this accident was entirely avoidable and was caused by poor training and an over reliance on automation...the other causal factors of weather and aircraft design merely highlighted the individual skill and competency limitations of the operating pilots.
Pilot static problems have been around since the instruments were introduced and yet modern training programmes don’t in my view place enough emphasis on flightpath protection before fault diagnosis and jumping into a checklist.
This accident should have been an attention getter, but a complete non-event.
Lastly regarding high altitude stall recovery, I completely agree, but the idea is stall avoidance rather than exploring the edge of the envelope and becoming a test pilot for the day..but even so, at high altitudes recover is more about energy management rather than thrust application as a loss of altitude is less of a consideration compared to conventional stalls close to the ground.
 
SurlyBonds
Posts: 331
Joined: Mon Nov 02, 2015 10:24 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 8:53 am

Thibault973 wrote:
I remember it like it was yesterday. Back then AF had 2 flights from GIG on most days, AF443 operated by a 744 and AF 447 with the 332. As I was scheduled to fly on AF447 about a month after the accident, I immediately changed my flight to be on the 744 flight instead. I remember telling the agent that I was scared to fly the 332 after all that was being said in the media with the pitot tube being blamed at the time and she answered that I wasn't the only one and that the boeing flight was going out full with a lot of passenger avoiding the 332. They ended up letting me changing my flight at no extra cost.


Certainly goes against the conventional wisdom that pax don't know what aircraft they're travelling on.
 
User avatar
LAX772LR
Posts: 12298
Joined: Sun Nov 09, 2014 11:06 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 2:30 pm

SurlyBonds wrote:
Certainly goes against the conventional wisdom that pax don't know what aircraft they're travelling on.

How?

A select group of people as recalled by a single person's sphere of acquaintance..... versus the thousands/millions that board that model every day, even within that general area.

Gonna go out on (not much of) a limb, and say that that graph is skewed wayyyyyy to one side.
I myself, suspect a more prosaic motive... ~Thranduil
 
BAeRJ100
Posts: 389
Joined: Sun Nov 20, 2011 9:49 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 2:54 pm

SurlyBonds wrote:
Certainly goes against the conventional wisdom that pax don't know what aircraft they're travelling on.


Remember, there's a tendency for people to evaluate the kind of aircraft they fly on thanks to incidents like this. It's relatively accurate that most people wouldn't know, nor care, if they're on a 737, 777, A330, whatever, but the moment one of them is in the news for any reason those same people become overly cautious.

For example, just recently in Australia there was a TV exposé on QF72, a flight that lost control over Western Australia. I read comments on social media from people who don't know any better, saying they want to avoid flying A330s because of it. This, despite the fact that the incident itself occurred almost 11 years ago, and these same people have probably happily flown aboard A330s since being none the wiser. So, it's entirely within the realm of possibility that "normal" people went out of their way to avoid the AF A330 after flight 447, if only from the aircraft type being ingrained into their mind at the time.
B737/738/739/744ER/752/753/763/77L/77W/788/789
A223/320/321/332/333/346/359/388
MD82/MD88/717/F100/RJ85/RJ100/146-100/200/300
E175/190/CRJ700/900
 
User avatar
fallap
Posts: 976
Joined: Thu Jan 15, 2009 11:36 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 3:01 pm

This won't add to the technical discussion of the tragedy that was AF447, but I remember clearly - ten years ago, working as a paperboy at the age of 18, that early sunny morning delivering newspapers to the local neighbourhood, seeing the front covers displaying pictures of the Air France A330-200 accompanied with various headlines outlining the accident. So unreal.
Ex grease monkey buried head to toe inside an F-16M
Now studying Political Science
 
glideslope900
Posts: 120
Joined: Sun Feb 24, 2019 5:27 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 4:43 pm

zeke wrote:
glideslope900 wrote:

How about the CRJ-700/900?


Cam you show me a document that says how much power a GECF34 turbofan produce ?

This is the engine type certificate that says how much thrust it produces https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/defaul ... 17_0.1.pdf


Lol, nice try but you already made yourself look ignorant. Max power is the term used for auxiliary power reserve (APR) in the CL-65 with CF-348C5 engines.

We were referring to stall recovery procedure, not type certification.
 
User avatar
zeke
Posts: 13787
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jun 08, 2019 6:42 pm

glideslope900 wrote:

Lol, nice try but you already made yourself look ignorant. Max power is the term used for auxiliary power reserve (APR) in the CL-65 with CF-348C5 engines.

We were referring to stall recovery procedure, not type certification.


Not ignorant all all, I asked you to provide what the maximum power figure is for that engine, you deflected not answering the question with a personal attack.

Selecting maximum thrust at minimum speed is not maximum power, it is a long way from it.

Pushing the throttles full forward only gives maximum thrust, to get to maximum power you have to then go down to sea level at Vmo. Then you have maximum power. Maximum power is maximum thrust multiplied by maximum TAS, and that will occur at sea level.
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
triple3driver
Posts: 131
Joined: Tue Mar 12, 2019 1:24 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sun Jun 09, 2019 12:27 am

Flying the A330 near that area, somewhat north, it gets a bit rough, especially during thunderstorms, and I personally feel that it's impossible to really understand what was really going on in that cockpit unless you've experienced that yourself. Such issues happen, and it can be difficult, especially in such adverse conditions, but pitot tubes do malfunction, sensors do go bad, and improvements in training have come a long way in ensuring that another AF447 doesn't happen. Now, when the incident first occurred and also I was training on the A330, I was quite surprised that, unlike the Boeings and Bombardiers that I previously flew, at the lack of feedback from the throttles and sidesticks, but as I flew it more and now have over 1000 hours on it, I find that it really ought to be a non-issue, and I firmly believe that linked sidesticks would not have helped one bit in AF447, and as much as I like to make fun of the A330, it really is a fantastic cockpit with no real design flaws, it is as good or even better than any aircraft that I've flown and it is in fact my favorite aircraft out of all the ones that I've flown, and I'm actually surprised and rather disappointed by Captain Sullenberger's response, I felt that it was fairly one sided and irresponsible to be frank.
If you can walk away from it intact, it was a good landing!
 
Amiga500
Posts: 2237
Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2015 8:22 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Mon Jun 10, 2019 9:09 am

mjoelnir wrote:
are you not now describing a case of bad CRM? As I said missing communication between the pilots.


Does a feedback sidestick not remove any ambiguity or scope for bad CRM with regards primary flight control inputs?
 
MarceloJenisch
Posts: 18
Joined: Tue Jan 01, 2019 12:35 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Wed Jul 03, 2019 6:38 pm

I will open a can of worms here:

How does the idea of the sidestick being a contributing factor to this accident plays out among the aviation community? I'm aware Captain Sully suggested this in an interview. I'm thinking about the subject for some time now. When the PF mentioned he ''had the stick back the whole time'', the captain and the PNF quickly told him to put the nose down. However they were bellow FL100 when this occured, so there was not enough time to recover the aircraft.

Thinking about the sidestick vs yoke scenario, my conclusion is that had the PF simply let the sidestick free after the stall started, and had a consistent nose-down input be necessary in order to recover the aircraft from the stall (which I suppose it was necessary), the plane would continue to fall anyway. Having said that, the question is: had the captain and the PNF noticed the PF was pitching the airplane up, they would have told him do neutralize the controls (which I'm supposing it would also not recover the plane), or they would told him pitch down? And had it been the latter case, why they were not tolding him to do so since the beginning? However by playing the devil's advocate with Sully's argument, I couldn't refute him, because indeed when the PF revelead that the was pulling back on sidestick, the reactions of the other crewmbers were very clear in the sense they told him to pitch down. I just wonder if indeed in case the aircraft had a yoke or active sidestick the other pilots would have clearily noticed what was going on much earlier and would have told the PF to pitch down.
 
Planetalk
Posts: 410
Joined: Thu Aug 27, 2015 5:12 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jul 05, 2019 5:08 pm

MarceloJenisch wrote:
I will open a can of worms here:

How does the idea of the sidestick being a contributing factor to this accident plays out among the aviation community? I'm aware Captain Sully suggested this in an interview. I'm thinking about the subject for some time now. When the PF mentioned he ''had the stick back the whole time'', the captain and the PNF quickly told him to put the nose down. However they were bellow FL100 when this occured, so there was not enough time to recover the aircraft.

Thinking about the sidestick vs yoke scenario, my conclusion is that had the PF simply let the sidestick free after the stall started, and had a consistent nose-down input be necessary in order to recover the aircraft from the stall (which I suppose it was necessary), the plane would continue to fall anyway. Having said that, the question is: had the captain and the PNF noticed the PF was pitching the airplane up, they would have told him do neutralize the controls (which I'm supposing it would also not recover the plane), or they would told him pitch down? And had it been the latter case, why they were not tolding him to do so since the beginning? However by playing the devil's advocate with Sully's argument, I couldn't refute him, because indeed when the PF revelead that the was pulling back on sidestick, the reactions of the other crewmbers were very clear in the sense they told him to pitch down. I just wonder if indeed in case the aircraft had a yoke or active sidestick the other pilots would have clearily noticed what was going on much earlier and would have told the PF to pitch down.


The trouble with the debate on the feedback on the stick issue is that as with everything on the internet, people's opinion depends entirely on which side they're already on.

From my post history it's fairly clear I on the whole prefer Airbus planes. I find them more comfortable, except the 767 which I recently flew on which is also a dream, sadly running down its time. I also have made it clear what I think about Boeing's management and corportae culture with the 737 MAX issue,

However, on the sidestick issue, I cannot fathom why people so desperately want to deny that it is possible additional information would help the pilots in an emergency. People say 'they already f***d up so how would it help?'. as if once they were in the stall we should just give up on them and leave them to die. Which is logical nonsense. Any potential catastrophe may begin with pilots screwing up, and planes are generally designed to help them out of it. In so many other threads pilots talk about how planes should give pilots a much information as possible. Then for some reason, in this particular scenario, they decide additional situational awareness is pointless.

Maybe it wouldn't have changed anything. But maybe it would. The point is we can never know. And it certainly wouldn't have done any further harm. People's desperate determination to protect whatever side they're on, to the point of contradicting their own usual viewpoint, is infuriating, and the harm it is doing goes far further than aircraft forums.

People also say 'but what about that 727 that stalled and crashed and had backdriven yokes'? Again, anyone with knowledge of statistics knows that is a nonsense argument. The point is not the crashes that happened with backdriven yokes, but the crashes that didn't happen that we will never know about, because perhaps they were prevented by that information. As they never happened we will never know if that number is zero or 7 or 20.

I believe the main reason the sidesticks were not linked was for weight saving. I'm sure 99.9999% of the time it doesn't matter. But there are a lot of smart people here being disingenuous when they say they know it wouldn't have helped. They don't know. Even if pilots aren't supposed to look at the controls in normal circumstances, this was not a normal circumstance and anything that helps situational awareness cannot be a bad thing.

I have my suspicions the PNF concluded there was something wrong with the plane, which yes was based on terrible communication. But it's hard to believe that while he was telling the PF to go back down, and took his word for it he would do it, if he could have seen what the guy was actually doing, he wouldn't have taken much more urgent action.

My favourite plane is an A340 by the way which I am very excited to fly in 6 weeks time.
 
Planetalk
Posts: 410
Joined: Thu Aug 27, 2015 5:12 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jul 05, 2019 5:25 pm

BaconButty wrote:
The PNF was aware that the PF was climbing:
2 h 10 min 31 Go back down
2 h 10 min 32 According to that we’re going up
2 h 10 min 33 According to all three you’re going up so go back down
2 h 10 min 35 You’re at…
2 h 10 min 36 Go back down


This is 28 seconds after the incident began with the autopilot disconnect, 16 seconds after they articulated that they lost airspeed and started to react. So it strikes me as pretty clear that linked side-sticks would have likely altered nothing.


And for some reason you've missed out the replies from the PF that he WAS going back down.

2 h 10 min 28,3 Okay, okay okay I’m going back down
2 h 10 min 36,7 It’s going we’re going (back) down

So presumably the PNF believed what the PF was telling him and began to suspect they had a technical issue, not a pilot one. Which would have rather hampered his ability to make the right decisions no?

Would he have just taken the PF at his word if he had a clear sensory input bout what he was doing? We will never know.
 
User avatar
ojjunior
Posts: 807
Joined: Thu Jul 13, 2006 12:31 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jul 05, 2019 5:47 pm

Strolling around Père Lachaise in Paris once (Yes, I like to tour in cemeteries), something caught my attention to the left. A big glass wall in the distance. I approached and found out it was AF447 memorial with names of all who perished.
By the time it was about a year after the accident, subject still strong in our minds, lots of flowers, letters and pics of the deceased still around.
So sad. Ruined my day. Wasn't expecting it.
 
Chemist
Posts: 538
Joined: Tue Oct 20, 2015 4:46 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jul 05, 2019 6:50 pm

Planetalk wrote:
MarceloJenisch wrote:
I will open a can of worms here:

How does the idea of the sidestick being a contributing factor to this accident plays out among the aviation community? I'm aware Captain Sully suggested this in an interview. I'm thinking about the subject for some time now. When the PF mentioned he ''had the stick back the whole time'', the captain and the PNF quickly told him to put the nose down. However they were bellow FL100 when this occured, so there was not enough time to recover the aircraft.

Thinking about the sidestick vs yoke scenario, my conclusion is that had the PF simply let the sidestick free after the stall started, and had a consistent nose-down input be necessary in order to recover the aircraft from the stall (which I suppose it was necessary), the plane would continue to fall anyway. Having said that, the question is: had the captain and the PNF noticed the PF was pitching the airplane up, they would have told him do neutralize the controls (which I'm supposing it would also not recover the plane), or they would told him pitch down? And had it been the latter case, why they were not tolding him to do so since the beginning? However by playing the devil's advocate with Sully's argument, I couldn't refute him, because indeed when the PF revelead that the was pulling back on sidestick, the reactions of the other crewmbers were very clear in the sense they told him to pitch down. I just wonder if indeed in case the aircraft had a yoke or active sidestick the other pilots would have clearily noticed what was going on much earlier and would have told the PF to pitch down.


The trouble with the debate on the feedback on the stick issue is that as with everything on the internet, people's opinion depends entirely on which side they're already on.

From my post history it's fairly clear I on the whole prefer Airbus planes. I find them more comfortable, except the 767 which I recently flew on which is also a dream, sadly running down its time. I also have made it clear what I think about Boeing's management and corportae culture with the 737 MAX issue,

However, on the sidestick issue, I cannot fathom why people so desperately want to deny that it is possible additional information would help the pilots in an emergency. People say 'they already f***d up so how would it help?'. as if once they were in the stall we should just give up on them and leave them to die. Which is logical nonsense. Any potential catastrophe may begin with pilots screwing up, and planes are generally designed to help them out of it. In so many other threads pilots talk about how planes should give pilots a much information as possible. Then for some reason, in this particular scenario, they decide additional situational awareness is pointless.

Maybe it wouldn't have changed anything. But maybe it would. The point is we can never know. And it certainly wouldn't have done any further harm. People's desperate determination to protect whatever side they're on, to the point of contradicting their own usual viewpoint, is infuriating, and the harm it is doing goes far further than aircraft forums.

People also say 'but what about that 727 that stalled and crashed and had backdriven yokes'? Again, anyone with knowledge of statistics knows that is a nonsense argument. The point is not the crashes that happened with backdriven yokes, but the crashes that didn't happen that we will never know about, because perhaps they were prevented by that information. As they never happened we will never know if that number is zero or 7 or 20.

I believe the main reason the sidesticks were not linked was for weight saving. I'm sure 99.9999% of the time it doesn't matter. But there are a lot of smart people here being disingenuous when they say they know it wouldn't have helped. They don't know. Even if pilots aren't supposed to look at the controls in normal circumstances, this was not a normal circumstance and anything that helps situational awareness cannot be a bad thing.

I have my suspicions the PNF concluded there was something wrong with the plane, which yes was based on terrible communication. But it's hard to believe that while he was telling the PF to go back down, and took his word for it he would do it, if he could have seen what the guy was actually doing, he wouldn't have taken much more urgent action.

My favourite plane is an A340 by the way which I am very excited to fly in 6 weeks time.


Very well stated and alignes with my own thoughts on the matter. More information is always better and the unlinked sidesticks remove one path for information.
 
MarceloJenisch
Posts: 18
Joined: Tue Jan 01, 2019 12:35 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jul 05, 2019 8:55 pm

Planetalk wrote:
In so many other threads pilots talk about how planes should give pilots a much information as possible. Then for some reason, in this particular scenario, they decide additional situational awareness is pointless


Yep. I have perceived this. As you can see from my message, I'm trying to explore the other perspective as well. By the way, the Irkut MC-21 is going to use active sidesticks:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqdJZVshgVc&t=95s

Safety backups are at the core of the aviation spirit. In a more extreme example: nobody would deny the importance of a terrain map to avoid CFIT because good crews will always fly at or above the safe altitude. It's pointless. However I'm wonder why Airbus didn't move on with active sidesticks in the A350, or if it would do so in future designs. Perhaps one can think it would be a confession of blame, but I'm unsure if it would be the case. Also, can passive sidesticks present any advantage that may justify Airbus still use them? And yep, you suggested weight saving. Could be any other benefit from their use?
Last edited by MarceloJenisch on Fri Jul 05, 2019 9:07 pm, edited 2 times in total.
 
MarceloJenisch
Posts: 18
Joined: Tue Jan 01, 2019 12:35 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jul 05, 2019 8:59 pm

Planetalk wrote:
BaconButty wrote:
The PNF was aware that the PF was climbing:
2 h 10 min 31 Go back down
2 h 10 min 32 According to that we’re going up
2 h 10 min 33 According to all three you’re going up so go back down
2 h 10 min 35 You’re at…
2 h 10 min 36 Go back down


This is 28 seconds after the incident began with the autopilot disconnect, 16 seconds after they articulated that they lost airspeed and started to react. So it strikes me as pretty clear that linked side-sticks would have likely altered nothing.


And for some reason you've missed out the replies from the PF that he WAS going back down.

2 h 10 min 28,3 Okay, okay okay I’m going back down
2 h 10 min 36,7 It’s going we’re going (back) down

So presumably the PNF believed what the PF was telling him and began to suspect they had a technical issue, not a pilot one. Which would have rather hampered his ability to make the right decisions no?

Would he have just taken the PF at his word if he had a clear sensory input bout what he was doing? We will never know.


Thanks for providing me those informations.
 
User avatar
enzo011
Posts: 1657
Joined: Tue Jun 21, 2011 8:12 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jul 05, 2019 10:41 pm

MarceloJenisch wrote:
I will open a can of worms here:

How does the idea of the sidestick being a contributing factor to this accident plays out among the aviation community? I'm aware Captain Sully suggested this in an interview. I'm thinking about the subject for some time now. When the PF mentioned he ''had the stick back the whole time'', the captain and the PNF quickly told him to put the nose down. However they were bellow FL100 when this occured, so there was not enough time to recover the aircraft.

Thinking about the sidestick vs yoke scenario, my conclusion is that had the PF simply let the sidestick free after the stall started, and had a consistent nose-down input be necessary in order to recover the aircraft from the stall (which I suppose it was necessary), the plane would continue to fall anyway. Having said that, the question is: had the captain and the PNF noticed the PF was pitching the airplane up, they would have told him do neutralize the controls (which I'm supposing it would also not recover the plane), or they would told him pitch down? And had it been the latter case, why they were not tolding him to do so since the beginning? However by playing the devil's advocate with Sully's argument, I couldn't refute him, because indeed when the PF revelead that the was pulling back on sidestick, the reactions of the other crewmbers were very clear in the sense they told him to pitch down. I just wonder if indeed in case the aircraft had a yoke or active sidestick the other pilots would have clearily noticed what was going on much earlier and would have told the PF to pitch down.



You have to be careful on the words you use of the PF. I get the feeling he said he had the stick back the whole time after he had already put the aircraft in trouble. By that time it probably didn't really matter if he had it back or forward, the flight was most likely doomed. He got them in trouble not by pulling back all the time if you look at the plot points that I have seen. Obviously he pulled back to put them in a stall, but it was in no way all the time when the trouble started.

We know in many previous accidents that information overload is a problem for pilots. Adding just another item for them to look at may just make it worse than better, especially if you have to look away from the displays in front of you to see the sidestick and you may miss important information that the aircraft is giving you on performance, not what the other pilot is doing.
 
MarceloJenisch
Posts: 18
Joined: Tue Jan 01, 2019 12:35 pm

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Fri Jul 05, 2019 11:10 pm

enzo011 wrote:
You have to be careful on the words you use of the PF. I get the feeling he said he had the stick back the whole time after he had already put the aircraft in trouble. By that time it probably didn't really matter if he had it back or forward, the flight was most likely doomed. He got them in trouble not by pulling back all the time if you look at the plot points that I have seen. Obviously he pulled back to put them in a stall, but it was in no way all the time when the trouble started.


Certainly not. By the way, according to the BEA transcript, what he said was actually: ''But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while''.

https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyexte ... .en_03.pdf

And yes, they were already bellow FL100 when he said that. I have mentioned this not in the sense he was pulling back all the time, but rather to express that once he revelead to the PNF and the captain he was pitching the aircraft up (despite being already bellow 10,000 ft), they quickly told him to pitch down.

We know in many previous accidents that information overload is a problem for pilots. Adding just another item for them to look at may just make it worse than better, especially if you have to look away from the displays in front of you to see the sidestick and you may miss important information that the aircraft is giving you on performance, not what the other pilot is doing.


Interesting point. There's also the discussion about AoA information being displayed in the cockpit. In the general aviation in the US it appears it is becoming popular to install AoA indicators to provide this information to the pilots. Don't know how things are going in the airline industry all over the world.
 
User avatar
OA940
Posts: 1837
Joined: Fri May 20, 2016 6:18 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jul 06, 2019 12:03 am

I have to say the sidestick didn't play any role in the crash. Pilots pulling the nose up during stalls is nothing new, and counteracting inputs are also common. If the environment is one where the pilots can get confused like that, it doesn't matter wether or not they're on an A330, 777 or anything else.
A350/CSeries = bae
 
User avatar
CALTECH
Posts: 3234
Joined: Thu May 17, 2007 4:21 am

Re: AF447 - 10 Years Later

Sat Jul 06, 2019 12:40 am

tu204 wrote:
In my personal opinion, yes. It is a good idea to look at the position of the controls during an emergency. There have been countless crashes where someone puts the throttles into a position by mistake and had the other pilot noticed this, the crash could have been avoided.


From the BEA report,
"It is worth noting that the inputs applied to a sidestick by one pilot cannot be observed easily by the other one and that the conditions of a night
flight in IMC make it more difficult to monitor aeroplane attitudes (pitch attitude in particular)."

Like you and Capt. Sully point out, having both joysticks coupled together might have helped.
The gun is a precious Symbol of Freedom
Criminals are the deadly cancer on American society
Those who believe otherwise are consumed by an ideology
That is impervious to evidence of tyrants who disarm their citizens

Popular Searches On Airliners.net

Top Photos of Last:   24 Hours  •  48 Hours  •  7 Days  •  30 Days  •  180 Days  •  365 Days  •  All Time

Military Aircraft Every type from fighters to helicopters from air forces around the globe

Classic Airliners Props and jets from the good old days

Flight Decks Views from inside the cockpit

Aircraft Cabins Passenger cabin shots showing seat arrangements as well as cargo aircraft interior

Cargo Aircraft Pictures of great freighter aircraft

Government Aircraft Aircraft flying government officials

Helicopters Our large helicopter section. Both military and civil versions

Blimps / Airships Everything from the Goodyear blimp to the Zeppelin

Night Photos Beautiful shots taken while the sun is below the horizon

Accidents Accident, incident and crash related photos

Air to Air Photos taken by airborne photographers of airborne aircraft

Special Paint Schemes Aircraft painted in beautiful and original liveries

Airport Overviews Airport overviews from the air or ground

Tails and Winglets Tail and Winglet closeups with beautiful airline logos