Revelation wrote:

PW100 wrote:

At some point the cost savings of simplifying the FAL to just the 777X will outweigh a reduced selling price of 777X freighter. But maturity on the production system will be required to reach that point.

I think people are missing the importance of:

Spetsnaz55 wrote:

The plan is actually to use one FAL for both of them. That's why all 777x moves are on AGVs now to allow for maneuvering with the 777 FAL

There eventually will be one FAL.

The AGVs ( automated guided vehicles ) are the same monument-free system being put to use in Airbus A320 FAL #4 in XFW.

The fact that the wings have different shapes doesn't matter at FAL time because the AGVs know exactly where to position the wings relative to the fuselage.

Some info:

The new process will use automated guided vehicles (AGVs) to move the components of FAUB into position, including work stands, fuselages and the robotic arms that will drill and insert fasteners.

And:

Once the 777X enters production, its composite wing will travel through the same main final assembly line as the metal wing now used on the current generation airplanes, thanks largely to the flexibility the new monument-free system affords. Boeing expects to continue building metal wings for the 777 freighter for roughly another 10 years, said Lund, or until the company decides to develop a 777X cargo variant with a composite wing.

So it's all been worked out, the 777x production system is constructed knowing the 77F will be in production for another decade or so.

Boeing has done the sums and has decided building 77F and 77X on the same line makes the most sense going forward for quite a while.

Eventually they presumably will hit a tipping point where customers simply prefer 777X's bigger size, better aero performance and newer engines and are willing to buy enough 777XF to pay for the cost of introducing it, but till that happens, they will keep selling 77F.

Ref: https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news ... transition

Facinating how they are economically adding the variety in production. At one point there will be better economics with one wing (sorry Mitsubishi), but as quoted, years away. I personally think the 778F will be closer to 7 years away, but when predicting so far in the future, unknowns such as taxes and oil prices play an outsize role.

Lightsaber

zeke wrote:

RickNRoll wrote:

QF is to small to have a dedicated plane built for them.

You mean like the 6 744ER pax airframes ?

Or the DC10-15 for AM and MX
Or the A359ULR for SQ



Or the 764ER for.....

777-9 first flight has been delayed until 2020 due to GE9X problems. Worse than any of us thought.

https://twitter.com/jonostrower/status/ ... 96480?s=20

BoeingVista wrote:

777-9 first flight has been delayed until 2020 due to GE9X problems. Worse than any of us thought.

https://twitter.com/jonostrower/status/ ... 96480?s=20

That means new parts.

Didn't they just brag about the engine being the most powerful? What prevents the engine from flying?

ITSTours wrote:

What prevents the engine from flying?

The specifics are up-thread, but the tl;dr is the stator vane actuators on the front-end of the compressor are not as durable as expected so GE is re-engineering them to improve maintenance intervals.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... en-458998/

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... gh-458847/

A not insignificant blow for Boeing at this difficult time. However better to happen now and get it right from the start than later on.

All will be forgotten about this time next year.

Stitch wrote:

ITSTours wrote:

What prevents the engine from flying?

The specifics are up-thread, but the tl;dr is the stator vane actuators on the front-end of the compressor are not as durable as expected so GE is re-engineering them to improve maintenance intervals.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... en-458998/

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... gh-458847/

Thanks for the info, but what I don't get is that if it is durability issue then can't they fly at least once? Or is it not safe to do that?

That was my question. How much was the wear accelerated? Half as long?

ITSTours wrote:

Stitch wrote:

ITSTours wrote:

What prevents the engine from flying?

The specifics are up-thread, but the tl;dr is the stator vane actuators on the front-end of the compressor are not as durable as expected so GE is re-engineering them to improve maintenance intervals.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... en-458998/

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... gh-458847/

Thanks for the info, but what I don't get is that if it is durability issue then can't they fly at least once? Or is it not safe to do that?

Its a serious problem. Though GE are trying not to say so I suspect that the worn stators caused a compressor stall on the test bench and that can kill the engine and cause a flame out, then you are flying on one which is a sub optimal situation. In order to solve this problem at the end of the day GE may have to back off on power / efficiency to get surge margin back,

Stitch wrote:

ITSTours wrote:

What prevents the engine from flying?

The specifics are up-thread, but the tl;dr is the stator vane actuators on the front-end of the compressor are not as durable as expected so GE is re-engineering them to improve maintenance intervals.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... en-458998/

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... gh-458847/

If it was only for durability and not concern they may fail in the very short term - I would have thought they could start flying. This is hurting the 777x. I cannot see it certified and EIS in less than 15 months yet Boeing is still saying EIS in 2020.

There can be no contingency in that plan.

Would ETOPs be effected if there was an engine failure in flight testing?

That would be good reason to wait for perfect engines. Boeing would be better off waiting 6 months and have full ETOPS than have an engine failure and the ETOPs reduced to say 180 minutes.

RJMAZ wrote:

Would ETOPs be effected if there was an engine failure in flight testing?

That would be good reason to wait for perfect engines. Boeing would be better off waiting 6 months and have full ETOPS than have an engine failure and the ETOPs reduced to say 180 minutes.

Plausible but I don't know if that would be the impact.

Stitch wrote:

ITSTours wrote:

What prevents the engine from flying?

The specifics are up-thread, but the tl;dr is the stator vane actuators on the front-end of the compressor are not as durable as expected so GE is re-engineering them to improve maintenance intervals.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... en-458998/

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... gh-458847/

Surely, there must be more to it than just maintenance intervals. Unless you mean with maintenance interval every (couple of) flight|(s).

Maintenance interval issue would not prevent test flying, and even a large portion of certification flying would still be possible. Doing a block change or even Service Bulleting prior to certification and/or EIS would be fairly straight forward; about every major engine program goes through that kind of stuff.

This reads to me that there is a (reliability) problem, where engineers either a) don't really understand the specifics leading up to failure, or b) can't access the suspect area of the part for in-situ detailed inspection monitoring. Meaning the engine would have to be (partially) disassembled (shop work) for inspection regularly. And by that I mean after a handful of flights.

This all reads that there is a (remote?) possibility, that can't be excluded or inspected for, that the component will fail in-flight. And it also means that the risk for test flight is unacceptable. And risk involves either high failure rate, or "hazardous* engine effect" when part fails in-flight, or combination of both. Either way, insufficient engineering data is available to reduce the category from "hazardous" to "major".

* NOTE: I wrote "hazardous" and not "major", as such would still allow for test flights under controlled condition (which a test flight program is).

RJMAZ wrote:

Would ETOPs be effected if there was an engine failure in flight testing?

That would be good reason to wait for perfect engines. Boeing would be better off waiting 6 months and have full ETOPS than have an engine failure and the ETOPs reduced to say 180 minutes.

If the manufacturer can demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt such failure was attributed to a component that has been changed, then there should be no reason for it to affect ETOPS certification. Of course, reliability of the new part(s) also need to be demonstrated. But that should not significantly affect the overall schedule for ETOPS certification.

With regard to first flight in early 2020 and certification by the end of 2020, there are certification tests that don't require flying to accomplish. Examples would be:
Cargo compartment fire suppression
HIRF investigation
Structural vibration frequency investigation
Vmcg (probably doubtful at Paine but possible)

Doing ground testing of this type with the existing engines over the next 5-6 months could shorten the 2020 total certification test flow time.

BoeingVista wrote:

Its a serious problem. Though GE are trying not to say so I suspect that the worn stators caused a compressor stall on the test bench and that can kill the engine and cause a flame out, then you are flying on one which is a sub optimal situation. In order to solve this problem at the end of the day GE may have to back off on power / efficiency to get surge margin back,

I agree. They described the problem as one with durability, but I suspect that was a creative corporate euphemism for "we can't even trust it to last one flight".

Seems to me to be a SNAFU on the scale of the RR coatings problem, if not worse because the RR one at least worked long enough to get through testing, yet on the other hand it's always cheaper to find these things in testing rather than after full scale production has started.

Maybe some day we'll learn what exactly they foobared, but probably not, since it is not in GE's interest for the truth to get out, and there's no mandate to disclose.

OldAeroGuy wrote:

With regard to first flight in early 2020 and certification by the end of 2020, there are certification tests that don't require flying to accomplish. Examples would be:
Cargo compartment fire suppression
HIRF investigation
Structural vibration frequency investigation
Vmcg (probably doubtful at Paine but possible)

Doing ground testing of this type with the existing engines over the next 5-6 months could shorten the 2020 total certification test flow time.

Would these tests not have been done during down time in testing in any case seeing as there are only so many hours you can fly in a day? I remember there was always a few days between flights for the A350 flight testing where I would assume they would check and validate the data (I hope that sounds right ). The problem as always with contracting the flight test schedule is that any issue that will cause a small delay will be felt so much more than the regular schedule.

enzo011 wrote:

OldAeroGuy wrote:

With regard to first flight in early 2020 and certification by the end of 2020, there are certification tests that don't require flying to accomplish. Examples would be:
Cargo compartment fire suppression
HIRF investigation
Structural vibration frequency investigation
Vmcg (probably doubtful at Paine but possible)

Doing ground testing of this type with the existing engines over the next 5-6 months could shorten the 2020 total certification test flow time.

Would these tests not have been done during down time in testing in any case seeing as there are only so many hours you can fly in a day? I remember there was always a few days between flights for the A350 flight testing where I would assume they would check and validate the data (I hope that sounds right ). The problem as always with contracting the flight test schedule is that any issue that will cause a small delay will be felt so much more than the regular schedule.

Bingo. A contingency free zone.

Armodeen wrote:

A not insignificant blow for Boeing at this difficult time. However better to happen now and get it right from the start than later on.

All will be forgotten about this time next year.

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

DocLightning wrote:

Armodeen wrote:

A not insignificant blow for Boeing at this difficult time. However better to happen now and get it right from the start than later on.

All will be forgotten about this time next year.

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

Exactly like that. Ask the travelling public if they remember the 787 EIS problems, and they were much more widely publicised at the time.

PW100 wrote:

Stitch wrote:

ITSTours wrote:

What prevents the engine from flying?

The specifics are up-thread, but the tl;dr is the stator vane actuators on the front-end of the compressor are not as durable as expected so GE is re-engineering them to improve maintenance intervals.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... en-458998/

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... gh-458847/

Surely, there must be more to it than just maintenance intervals. Unless you mean with maintenance interval every (couple of) flight|(s).

Maintenance interval issue would not prevent test flying, and even a large portion of certification flying would still be possible. Doing a block change or even Service Bulleting prior to certification and/or EIS would be fairly straight forward; about every major engine program goes through that kind of stuff.

This reads to me that there is a (reliability) problem, where engineers either a) don't really understand the specifics leading up to failure, or b) can't access the suspect area of the part for in-situ detailed inspection monitoring. Meaning the engine would have to be (partially) disassembled (shop work) for inspection regularly. And by that I mean after a handful of flights.

This all reads that there is a (remote?) possibility, that can't be excluded or inspected for, that the component will fail in-flight. And it also means that the risk for test flight is unacceptable. And risk involves either high failure rate, or "hazardous* engine effect" when part fails in-flight, or combination of both. Either way, insufficient engineering data is available to reduce the category from "hazardous" to "major".

* NOTE: I wrote "hazardous" and not "major", as such would still allow for test flights under controlled condition (which a test flight program is).

This is what I thought but you wrote it much better (with more knowledge). Thanks.

Armodeen wrote:

DocLightning wrote:

Armodeen wrote:

A not insignificant blow for Boeing at this difficult time. However better to happen now and get it right from the start than later on.

All will be forgotten about this time next year.

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

Exactly like that. Ask the travelling public if they remember the 787 EIS problems, and they were much more widely publicised at the time.

To be fair, ask the general public what a 787 is and I'm sure a tiny minority would actually know.

enzo011 wrote:

OldAeroGuy wrote:

With regard to first flight in early 2020 and certification by the end of 2020, there are certification tests that don't require flying to accomplish. Examples would be:
Cargo compartment fire suppression
HIRF investigation
Structural vibration frequency investigation
Vmcg (probably doubtful at Paine but possible)

Doing ground testing of this type with the existing engines over the next 5-6 months could shorten the 2020 total certification test flow time.

Would these tests not have been done during down time in testing in any case seeing as there are only so many hours you can fly in a day? I remember there was always a few days between flights for the A350 flight testing where I would assume they would check and validate the data (I hope that sounds right ). The problem as always with contracting the flight test schedule is that any issue that will cause a small delay will be felt so much more than the regular schedule.

Not necessarily. Maintenance of the airplane and the test equipment needs to be done when the airplane is not flying. Ground testing of the type I've described requires dedicated test environments and conditions. You can't just immediately land the airplane and start the HIRF test or fire suppression test.

In my experience, data validation is a flight test pacing item only if the airplane is not performing as expected and needs to be modified for testing to continue.

The few days between flights on the A350 may have been due to ground tests. If the ground tests have already been done, it may be possible to compress the flight test schedule.

DocLightning wrote:

Armodeen wrote:

A not insignificant blow for Boeing at this difficult time. However better to happen now and get it right from the start than later on.

All will be forgotten about this time next year.

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

Lets throw this out there, could Boeing have screwed up badly enough that some time in late 2020 they are only delivering a single commercial aircraft type?

OldAeroGuy wrote:

enzo011 wrote:

OldAeroGuy wrote:

With regard to first flight in early 2020 and certification by the end of 2020, there are certification tests that don't require flying to accomplish. Examples would be:
Cargo compartment fire suppression
HIRF investigation
Structural vibration frequency investigation
Vmcg (probably doubtful at Paine but possible)

Doing ground testing of this type with the existing engines over the next 5-6 months could shorten the 2020 total certification test flow time.

Would these tests not have been done during down time in testing in any case seeing as there are only so many hours you can fly in a day? I remember there was always a few days between flights for the A350 flight testing where I would assume they would check and validate the data (I hope that sounds right ). The problem as always with contracting the flight test schedule is that any issue that will cause a small delay will be felt so much more than the regular schedule.

Not necessarily. Maintenance of the airplane and the test equipment needs to be done when the airplane is not flying. Ground testing of the type I've described requires dedicated test environments and conditions. You can't just immediately land the airplane and start the HIRF test or fire suppression test.

In my experience, data validation is a flight test pacing item only if the airplane is not performing as expected and needs to be modified for testing to continue.

The few days between flights on the A350 may have been due to ground tests. If the ground tests have already been done, it may be possible to compress the flight test schedule.

I would say it takes a good two days to set up for a test flight. Setting up an "experiment" takes a lot of time especially so if it is an expensive experiment that you do not want to repeat. So you need to test and approve every single stet during installation of the gear and make sure everything works absolutely perfect. Then you go for your flight. Afterwards you need to take the gear out and you clearly do not want to damage it because that stuff is expensive. So you take your time.

So the 2-3 days between the flights seems logical to me.

Still a chance first flight will happen in December... they are working on it

Armodeen wrote:

DocLightning wrote:

Armodeen wrote:

A not insignificant blow for Boeing at this difficult time. However better to happen now and get it right from the start than later on.

All will be forgotten about this time next year.

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

Exactly like that. Ask the travelling public if they remember the 787 EIS problems, and they were much more widely publicised at the time.

Wall Street seems to have forgotten the 787 EIS problems too.
So have the airlines that keep ordering it, much to the dismay of the Boeing haters on this site.

BoeingVista wrote:

DocLightning wrote:

Armodeen wrote:

A not insignificant blow for Boeing at this difficult time. However better to happen now and get it right from the start than later on.

All will be forgotten about this time next year.

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

Lets throw this out there, could Boeing have screwed up badly enough that some time in late 2020 they are only delivering a single commercial aircraft type?

Won't they still be delivering 767's?

cledaybuck wrote:

BoeingVista wrote:

DocLightning wrote:

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

Lets throw this out there, could Boeing have screwed up badly enough that some time in late 2020 they are only delivering a single commercial aircraft type?

Won't they still be delivering 767's?

Sure - just don't bring up the KC-46 is all.

PW100 wrote:

Surely, there must be more to it than just maintenance intervals. Unless you mean with maintenance interval every (couple of) flight|(s).

Well the original fuel injector design on the GE90-70 series was good for about two dozen flights before it needed to be replaced (Saudia was said to be swapping at least one injector out on a frame after every flight).

BoeingVista wrote:

Lets throw this out there, could Boeing have screwed up badly enough that some time in late 2020 they are only delivering a single commercial aircraft type?

Not sure it is fair to blame Boeing for the 777X when it is GE engines that are holding up first-flight. Unless you want to say they screwed up by not choosing the RR RB3025, but that was barely a concept engine so it likely would have had an even later EIS.

9Patch wrote:

Armodeen wrote:

DocLightning wrote:

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

Exactly like that. Ask the travelling public if they remember the 787 EIS problems, and they were much more widely publicised at the time.

Wall Street seems to have forgotten the 787 EIS problems too.
So have the airlines that keep ordering it, much to the dismay of the Boeing haters on this site.

Wall Street and the airlines may assume that Boeing management has learnt from the past, I don’t think EK has a problem when Boeing doesn’t deliver as promised, but Boeing has. Definately a message the Boeing fanbois don’t want to hear...

BoeingVista wrote:

DocLightning wrote:

Armodeen wrote:

A not insignificant blow for Boeing at this difficult time. However better to happen now and get it right from the start than later on.

All will be forgotten about this time next year.

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

Lets throw this out there, could Boeing have screwed up badly enough that some time in late 2020 they are only delivering a single commercial aircraft type?

How did Boeing screw up the 777x when the issue is with an engine from GE?

Armodeen wrote:

DocLightning wrote:

Armodeen wrote:

A not insignificant blow for Boeing at this difficult time. However better to happen now and get it right from the start than later on.

All will be forgotten about this time next year.

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

Exactly like that. Ask the travelling public if they remember the 787 EIS problems, and they were much more widely publicised at the time.

The finance industry and customer senior management are becoming battle hardened to new model issues, and not in a good way.

And increasingly critical of the lack, or downplaying information, while still trying to get customers to go unconditional on early tranches (X engines issues were known in January).

Some posters up thread have been critical of RR. Very early on, RR senior management, with Boeing, visited every customer, explained the issues, promised open communication (good and bad), stated the rectification and compensation plans, and conditions / consequences for confidentiality breaches.

Reminds me of a detailed design flow chart, the author of whom escapes me, with a gap filled by 'then a miracle occurs'. Boeing are in need of a few at the moment.

In comparison, passenger confidence is trivial.

marcelh wrote:

9Patch wrote:

Armodeen wrote:

Exactly like that. Ask the travelling public if they remember the 787 EIS problems, and they were much more widely publicised at the time.

Wall Street seems to have forgotten the 787 EIS problems too.
So have the airlines that keep ordering it, much to the dismay of the Boeing haters on this site.

Wall Street and the airlines may assume that Boeing management has learnt from the past, I don’t think EK has a problem when Boeing doesn’t deliver as promised, but Boeing has. Definately a message the Boeing fanbois don’t want to hear...

I think GE has the problem, but keep telling yourself otherwise if it makes you feel better.

Stitch wrote:

BoeingVista wrote:

Lets throw this out there, could Boeing have screwed up badly enough that some time in late 2020 they are only delivering a single commercial aircraft type?

Not sure it is fair to blame Boeing for the 777X when it is GE engines that are holding up first-flight. Unless you want to say they screwed up by not choosing the RR RB3025, but that was barely a concept engine so it likely would have had an even later EIS.

Boeing does not seem to build realistic contingencies into its programs and seemed to forget the issues related to the original GE90.

But the major Boeing 777X screw up here would be related to ramming through 737 MAX certification which will result in an elongated 777X certification schedule will run on into 2021 this is blowback from their past arrogance. I understand that many on this thread won't be with me on certification delays yet, but I can wait for you guys just like I did on the GE9X delay..

I almost made a remark about Boeing's inability to meet deadlines and timeframes being worse than NASA's, until I realized that the latter's problems are Boeing's fault too...

9Patch wrote:

marcelh wrote:

9Patch wrote:

Wall Street seems to have forgotten the 787 EIS problems too.
So have the airlines that keep ordering it, much to the dismay of the Boeing haters on this site.

Wall Street and the airlines may assume that Boeing management has learnt from the past, I don’t think EK has a problem when Boeing doesn’t deliver as promised, but Boeing has. Definately a message the Boeing fanbois don’t want to hear...

I think GE has the problem, but keep telling yourself otherwise if it makes you feel better.

First reply went wrong, so I try again.
It’s a problem for both GE and Boeing. It’s the GE engine which causes the trouble, but it’s also a problem for Boeing, because of this delay the testing, EIS and deliveries to customers will delay. And honestly, it don’t makes me feel better or worse, because I don’t care. I want to see the plane fly and I want to read if it does (or doesn’t) meet the expectations and discuss those facts. It has nothing to do with “hate” - a word you used - because I’m not a Boeing (or Airbus) “ true believer” who worships B or A.

waly777 wrote:

BoeingVista wrote:

DocLightning wrote:

Just like the completely flawless introduction of the 787 with no delays or groundings?

Lets throw this out there, could Boeing have screwed up badly enough that some time in late 2020 they are only delivering a single commercial aircraft type?

How did Boeing screw up the 777x when the issue is with an engine from GE?

a) Perhaps by squeezing their vendor(s) so hard, sort of forcing them to commit to unrelastic schedule?

b) The 777 motto was: "Working Together". When your vendor (GE) is a risk sharing partner, you're in it together. Shared responisbility.

c) Boeing is selling the plane to customers, including engines (it's not like the customers have any choice). It is Boeing's responsibility towards the customers for timely delivery. The customer doesn't really care if the screw up is caused by Boeing, GE, UTC, Alcoa or Fluke; they expect the contract holder (=Boeing) to manage all of that on their behalve.

9Patch wrote:

marcelh wrote:

9Patch wrote:

Wall Street seems to have forgotten the 787 EIS problems too.
So have the airlines that keep ordering it, much to the dismay of the Boeing haters on this site.

Wall Street and the airlines may assume that Boeing management has learnt from the past, I don’t think EK has a problem when Boeing doesn’t deliver as promised, but Boeing has. Definately a message the Boeing fanbois don’t want to hear...

I think GE has the problem, but keep telling yourself otherwise if it makes you feel better.

That line of thinking is a fairly accurate description of how Boeing dug itself into the hole called 787 EIS (remember Potemkin 787 roll out).

So are they still conducting non-flying testing and certification while awaiting the new / updated engines?

BoeingVista wrote:

Stitch wrote:

BoeingVista wrote:

Lets throw this out there, could Boeing have screwed up badly enough that some time in late 2020 they are only delivering a single commercial aircraft type?

Not sure it is fair to blame Boeing for the 777X when it is GE engines that are holding up first-flight. Unless you want to say they screwed up by not choosing the RR RB3025, but that was barely a concept engine so it likely would have had an even later EIS.

Boeing does not seem to build realistic contingencies into its programs and seemed to forget the issues related to the original GE90.

But the major Boeing 777X screw up here would be related to ramming through 737 MAX certification which will result in an elongated 777X certification schedule will run on into 2021 this is blowback from their past arrogance. I understand that many on this thread won't be with me on certification delays yet, but I can wait for you guys just like I did on the GE9X delay..

I consider that the longer it takes to get 779 in the air the closer in time it will be until the efficient delta between 350 and 77x is so small that 350 with a lighter frame with a very modern wing and a very modern engine equalizes 777x with a more heavy frame, very modern wing and state of the art engine even without talking about a 350neo but with updates of the xwb engines.

I still interested to know and surprised that A.net has not come up with estimates and calculations

Boeing might be even happy about this delay. As the FAA is occupied with the MAX they probably do not have the manpower to certify the 777x anyway but instead of delays due to a prolonged certification which would be 100% Boeings fault they now have someone to blame for the delay and can split the penalties due to late deliveries.

PW100 wrote:

c) Boeing is selling the plane to customers, including engines (it's not like the customers have any choice). It is Boeing's responsibility towards the customers for timely delivery. The customer doesn't really care if the screw up is caused by Boeing, GE, UTC, Alcoa or Fluke; they expect the contract holder (=Boeing) to manage all of that on their behalve.

Considering that engines are now purchased separately from the airframe (even when only one engine model/vendor is offered on said airframe), can an airline really blame Airbus or Boeing for delays in deliveries of their frames when the engines are holding things up?

I would expect the airframe sales contract has provisions in place that indemnify them from delays related to BFE (Buyer Furnished Equipment) like engines, seats and such.

PW100 wrote:

waly777 wrote:

BoeingVista wrote:

Lets throw this out there, could Boeing have screwed up badly enough that some time in late 2020 they are only delivering a single commercial aircraft type?

How did Boeing screw up the 777x when the issue is with an engine from GE?

a) Perhaps by squeezing their vendor(s) so hard, sort of forcing them to commit to unrelastic schedule?

b) The 777 motto was: "Working Together". When your vendor (GE) is a risk sharing partner, you're in it together. Shared responisbility.

c) Boeing is selling the plane to customers, including engines (it's not like the customers have any choice). It is Boeing's responsibility towards the customers for timely delivery. The customer doesn't really care if the screw up is caused by Boeing, GE, UTC, Alcoa or Fluke; they expect the contract holder (=Boeing) to manage all of that on their behalve.

A) speculation on your part

B) they are still separate entities

C) Engines are often bought separately from the aircraft. Boeing is not building the engine, GE is.

In summary GE screwed up and is delaying the 777... not Boeing.

Something is still missing . . an engine can be changed in less than a day . . if it was premature wear, the initial flight test could be done with six engines. One pair flying, one pair being disassembled, one pair being reassembled. The FADEC could be programmed to not permit max thrust. They could be flying - unless they think this kind of failure could blow the engine up.

Even then, a stator vane actuator could be easily beefed up. It's not a rotating part. I know they are weight conscious, with the engine being 20000 lb dry, but to add a hundred pounds or so to keep the actuators from breaking and get on with flight test would seem more reasonable than months and months of delay.

jagraham wrote:

Something is still missing . . an engine can be changed in less than a day . . if it was premature wear, the initial flight test could be done with six engines. One pair flying, one pair being disassembled, one pair being reassembled. The FADEC could be programmed to not permit max thrust. They could be flying - unless they think this kind of failure could blow the engine up.

Even then, a stator vane actuator could be easily beefed up. It's not a rotating part. I know they are weight conscious, with the engine being 20000 lb dry, but to add a hundred pounds or so to keep the actuators from breaking and get on with flight test would seem more reasonable than months and months of delay.

Quick call Boeing and GE. Let them know you know better and more then them.

Spetsnaz55 wrote:

jagraham wrote:

Something is still missing . . an engine can be changed in less than a day . . if it was premature wear, the initial flight test could be done with six engines. One pair flying, one pair being disassembled, one pair being reassembled. The FADEC could be programmed to not permit max thrust. They could be flying - unless they think this kind of failure could blow the engine up.

Even then, a stator vane actuator could be easily beefed up. It's not a rotating part. I know they are weight conscious, with the engine being 20000 lb dry, but to add a hundred pounds or so to keep the actuators from breaking and get on with flight test would seem more reasonable than months and months of delay.

Quick call Boeing and GE. Let them know you know better and more then them.

Not my point. They know all what I said. The fact that they are taking a delay of such magnitude means that there is more involved than they have said.

jagraham wrote:

Something is still missing . . an engine can be changed in less than a day . . if it was premature wear, the initial flight test could be done with six engines. One pair flying, one pair being disassembled, one pair being reassembled. The FADEC could be programmed to not permit max thrust. They could be flying - unless they think this kind of failure could blow the engine up.

Since the issue is in the high-pressure compressor, it may be the case that the part's failure could lead to a flight-safety risk.GE noted that the issue was detected due to higher-than-expected exhaust gas temperatures.

Stitch wrote:

PW100 wrote:

c) Boeing is selling the plane to customers, including engines (it's not like the customers have any choice). It is Boeing's responsibility towards the customers for timely delivery. The customer doesn't really care if the screw up is caused by Boeing, GE, UTC, Alcoa or Fluke; they expect the contract holder (=Boeing) to manage all of that on their behalve.

Considering that engines are now purchased separately from the airframe (even when only one engine model/vendor is offered on said airframe), can an airline really blame Airbus or Boeing for delays in deliveries of their frames when the engines are holding things up?

I would expect the airframe sales contract has provisions in place that indemnify them from delays related to BFE (Buyer Furnished Equipment) like engines, seats and such.

How many X and GE orders have gone unconditional? Of those being built and / or already built, how many customers to-date have arranged finance? Are milestone payments received to-date consistent with usual Boeing and GE practice? Hopefully questions asked at Boeing's upcoming investor meeting in NY, and GE financial update today, might provide insight.