But not on technical level. What is happening now has to happen the way it does and it is good that they are taking a close look at the processes, but on technical level this problem is easy to handle, maybe not easy given the current hardware on the 737MAX, but that is solely Boeing´s problem and if true it down to their decision making and not some technical hurdle.
There is no separation there. Once you decide how to handle things implementation might be easy (which is a universal statement, btw), but getting to that stage is hard. These are not two levels though. Why do you think Boeing could not come up with a fix for MCAS in almost half a year between Lion and ET? Nobody was looking at them. They could make the fix, deploy it, and the MAX would still be happily flying. Nobody would give them hard time for the other problem they are dealing with atm.
One guy here claiming to be from BA said they started to work on the fix immediately after Lion. And I believe him. And yet they failed to produce the fix before ET. Why? My guess - they simply could not come up with a workable logic that was not breaking something else. So maybe it is not so easy.
Afraid not in my view. The fix MCAS V2.0 is relatively simple. (it would have been cheap and easy to implement this design from the point MCAS was found required for slow speed stall approach as well as high speed).
The initial Boeing statement is pretty clear as well (remember the safe/safer one!):
'On Mar 12th 2019 Boeing issued following release with respect to MCAS, Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian flight 302:
For the past several months and in the aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already safe aircraft even safer. This includes updates to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law, pilot displays, operation manuals and crew training. The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority.
The FAA says it anticipates mandating this software enhancement with an Airworthiness Directive (AD) no later than April. We have worked with the FAA in development of this software enhancement.'
At this point, the target would have appeared to be end March for certification and at least some flight testing would have already been completed. Shortly thereafter, a problem was found with Flaps System and the first delay pushing the target to the April/May timeframe occurred. Draft FSB for MCAS V2.0 cert. was issued 17th April. Development and certification (including flight testing) of safety critical flight control software mod in 3 or 4 months is quick.
What it does indicate is that Boeing/FAA were in full possession of the facts i.e. MCAS was fundamentally flawed and hazardous almost immediately following the Lion Air event.