Can we all just agree to not call it a death trap and also agree that it is not safe in the modern air travel world and move on.
I agree on both counts.
Revelation, you are a good value to a.net and I always like to read your posts. But you know that you are playing a little bit small head now, no? As those planes are flying now under a very special context, we can suppose that they are readied, pre-checked for any AOA sensor anomalies, and much else additionally pre-controlled under special scrutinity, and obviously the company pilots flying the airplane having any seconds of the flight the specific symptoms in mind which can be related to the known MAX issues, and maybe even dry-trained the main-d‘oeuvre a hundred times before the flight, if it happens again. Or do you really think those pilots step-in into the airplane like any other John Smith pilot doing his yearly duties flying A to B like a thousand times before?
Thanks for the kind words.
I think any John Smith pilot knows what the challenging aspects of flying their plane are and does the mental / dry training loops often enough to feel confident that they can handle those challenging aspects. I would think especially after the JT tragedy that all MAX pilots would have heard about the AD and had spent some time doing such mental / dry training to make sure those procedures were top of mind.
I also think Boeing expects the same to have happened. Google up the Mike Sinnett leaked tapes and you find him saying that the airplane and pilot together are qualified as a system (or something similar). There are things the system needs the pilots to be able to do on Boeing and on every other aircraft. One of Boeing's few admissions is that they put too much workload on those pilots in the case of MCAS and is going to fix that. In the mean time, given how much press this situation has gotten, by this point in time I can't imagine there is a 737 pilot who hasn't seriously reviewed the AD and the trim system and the things they need to do should it malfunction, even if it malfunctions as badly as MCAS 1.0 did, along with the things they need to do to avoid the parts of the flight envelope where MCAS does kick in.
So, in short I'm sure these aren't normal flights, I'm sure a lot of systems checks happen before hand especially with regard to the AOA sensors, but I don't think the pilots are super human and I think at this point in time pretty much every 737 pilot would have spent time understanding what MCAS 1.0 did and how they would deal with a malfunction on a similar scale to the degree where they feel they could handle a MCAS 1.0 scale event.
Is there any way that Dennis Muilenburg survives this ordeal at this point? With each passing moment the situation at Boeing only continues to worsen. If nothing else I'm assuming shareholders will force him out of at least one if not two of his titles as Chair, Prez, and CEO.
The way I see things playing out is that he stays at the helm to weather the rest of the grounding, then is either ousted or resigns upon EIS Round Two. The last thing on Boeing's plate right now would be to have to look for a new leader amidst its struggles with the grounding, Military, NMA, and 777X... Thoughts?
My thoughts already written here is if the grounding goes in to next year he is in deep trouble.
It's interesting how he is now doubling down by saying he expects the plane to be back in service in October.
I think DM has enough evidence to convince himself that early October is not just plausible but also likely, and if there is a miss it's not because the fixes weren't ready, it's because the regulators are taking a long time to scrutinize the reports.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... n-software
I'm confused. Is this a reference to the processor overload problem which came to light during testing or is this something else that needs to be fixed?
You are correct in that the article is very confusing and seems to be saying no hardware changes are needed but seems to be saying this in the context of MCAS.
I guess I'd go with what DM himself says:
“We are confident that is a software update, not a hardware update,” Boeing Chief Executive Officer Dennis Muilenburg said during an earnings call on Wednesday. “It’s an understood update and we’re in the middle of working our way through that.”
And since he knows about the response time issue, we have to presume DM and Boeing feels the response time issue can be handled by a software change that will be ready in time for a October RTS.
Unfortunately the report is too garbled to conclude much, but at least it provided the DM quote.
I wrote here after the EASA identified the five things Boeing needed to address that the good news for Boeing was that at least now the problem set was bounded and it would only be a matter of time before acceptable responses could be found.
It seems DM is saying that they know how they are going to respond to all the issues, and none of them need hardware changes, and all they need now is the time to work through the items.