Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

planecane · Fri Jul 26, 2019 5:59 pm

Theseus wrote:
timh4000 wrote:
Just some perspective.

The max had been flying for over a year without incident. By the time it was grounded there were nearly 400 taking to the skies. After the grounding, pilots didnt start coming out of the woodwork stating what a horrible plane it was to fly.

I think the number that you cite shows how bad the safety record of the 737 MAX is at this point.

A quick look at wiki says that A320 and 737NG have respectively 0.26 and 0.27 hull loss per million take offs. And even fewer fatal ones. On the page of the A320, it says 0.12. Not sure about the 737NG, but probably similar.

With "400 samples flying for over a year", we can say each of them did fly for much less at the time of the grounding (deliveries were increasing with a transition from NG to MAX). Not sure how many take-offs that means, but probably not more than a million. Let us say 4000 cycles per year (high number, more than 10 per day), average in service time about half a year. Then I get less than a million cycles (0.8 million flights), and 2 fatal hull losses. For sure we would need a larger base to have a robust statistics, but trend looks 20 times worse than comparable, previous generation airplanes (as said before, not enough data for robust rate).

Which does not mean that it will not do better after the current issues are properly addressed and fixed and it flies again...

There weren't anywhere near 0.8 million flights at the time of the grounding. WN had 41,000 and that was the most and I think they had the largest fleet (almost 10% of deliveries). There probably weren't much more than 200k flights of the MAX.

marcelh · Fri Jul 26, 2019 6:12 pm

Revelation wrote:
marcelh wrote:
It was statistically a death trap after the second crash and NOT a safe plane. IIRC, it was just as safe as a NG with a crash rate of one per week.
Also funny that you were willing to fly with the MAX “only with a major airline”. So, you are primarilary blaming the pilots and/or airlines of the crashed planes and much less Boeing. Those “non major airlines” don’t crash and kill the passengers with the NG in the same rate as the MAX, so something isn’t right with the MAX.

Funny, you would think it would not be possible to survive a trip in a "death trap" yet we know those MAX aircraft parked in Everett and Moses Lake and San Antonio weren't moved by flatbed truck or An225. Maybe FlightAware is posting fake flight paths too? Or maybe the "death trap" tag is absurd hyperbole?

Or you are just splitting hairs and taking it too literally. You can do better than that.

zckls04 · Fri Jul 26, 2019 7:05 pm

marcelh wrote:
Or you are just splitting hairs and taking it too literally. You can do better than that.

Indeed. If you're a Boeing cheerleader, it's probably not a good sign when you're quibbling over the definition of the term "death trap"!

Agrajag · Fri Jul 26, 2019 7:27 pm

zckls04 wrote:
marcelh wrote:
Or you are just splitting hairs and taking it too literally. You can do better than that.

Indeed. If you're a Boeing cheerleader, it's probably not a good sign when you're quibbling over the definition of the term "death trap"!

We have a winner for today!

snowkarl · Fri Jul 26, 2019 8:32 pm

timh4000 wrote:
Just some perspective.

The max had been flying for over a year without incident. By the time it was grounded there were nearly 400 taking to the skies. After the grounding, pilots didnt start coming out of the woodwork stating what a horrible plane it was to fly.

I'm not saying the grounding is the wrong action to take. While so many have come out acting as if the max is a flying death trap, it's not. Yes, mistakes were made and there's blame to be pointed in every direction. Even if somehow I could go back in time, the day after the 2nd crash, I would not hesitate to get on one, with only the condition it was with a major airline. By sheer numbers, it was at the time of the grounding a safe plane. Obviously not as safe as it should have been. But still safe overall.

1 year without a fatal crash is not a good record.

Your assertion that it's 'not a death trap' because 400 planes were flying and not crashing is really not accurate, because the MAX, compared with ANY other modern aircraft, has a much much higher rate of failure.

Saying it was safe overall is completely false and not even Boeing says this so I'm not sure why you're saying this - unless you've either got some new, previously undisclosed information or something?

By sheer numbers it's far, FAR from a safe plane.

Revelation · Fri Jul 26, 2019 8:32 pm

marcelh wrote:
Revelation wrote:
marcelh wrote:
It was statistically a death trap after the second crash and NOT a safe plane. IIRC, it was just as safe as a NG with a crash rate of one per week.
Also funny that you were willing to fly with the MAX “only with a major airline”. So, you are primarilary blaming the pilots and/or airlines of the crashed planes and much less Boeing. Those “non major airlines” don’t crash and kill the passengers with the NG in the same rate as the MAX, so something isn’t right with the MAX.

Funny, you would think it would not be possible to survive a trip in a "death trap" yet we know those MAX aircraft parked in Everett and Moses Lake and San Antonio weren't moved by flatbed truck or An225. Maybe FlightAware is posting fake flight paths too? Or maybe the "death trap" tag is absurd hyperbole?

Or you are just splitting hairs and taking it too literally. You can do better than that.

You are the one tossing around the morbid term "death trap" casually, and it's on me to do better?

zckls04 wrote:
Indeed. If you're a Boeing cheerleader, it's probably not a good sign when you're quibbling over the definition of the term "death trap"!

Indeed. If you're a Boeing hater, you'll take any chance you can get to toss around such morbid language.

smartplane · Fri Jul 26, 2019 8:56 pm

Revelation wrote:
Noshow wrote:
Don't they ferry them with special pilots only and flaps out to prevent MCAS from activating?

Company pilots: yes.
Flaps out: There are plenty of flight tracks showing ferry flights at max altitude and speed, I posted one earlier to this thread.
So, not a "death trap".

After an initial grace period, the rest of the World has banned ferry / positioning / storage flights.

FAA has done Boeing a favour by approving one way positioning / storage flights, with FAA-approved, insurance (not Boeing's experimental / test cover), presumably with weather, altitude, destination and shortest route conditions.

7BOEING7 · Fri Jul 26, 2019 9:28 pm

smartplane wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Noshow wrote:
Don't they ferry them with special pilots only and flaps out to prevent MCAS from activating?

Company pilots: yes.
Flaps out: There are plenty of flight tracks showing ferry flights at max altitude and speed, I posted one earlier to this thread.
So, not a "death trap".

After an initial grace period, the rest of the World has banned ferry / positioning / storage flights.

FAA has done Boeing a favour by approving one way positioning / storage flights, with FAA-approved, insurance (not Boeing's experimental / test cover), presumably with weather, altitude, destination and shortest route conditions.

The airplane was grounded for commercial operations. The FAA allows Boeing to fly them under their production ticket, so they are completing B-1 flights and all the associated maneuvers. If the production ticket includes operations over most of the western US, they can also complete any outstanding checks on the way to San Antonio for storage. If not a ferry permit will be issued, probably with few if any restrictions except minimum crew.

IIRC the Europeans allowed a ferry flight recently, well after any "grace period", so they appear to be open to reason.

cledaybuck · Fri Jul 26, 2019 11:41 pm

Can we all just agree to not call it a death trap and also agree that it is not safe in the modern air travel world and move on.

StarAC17 · Fri Jul 26, 2019 11:50 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
max999 wrote:
Boeing's veiled threats are directed to Trump and to the members of Congress who have oversight over the FAA

If the grounding stretches into next year, I think Boeing will use strategic threats of job reductions to induce Trump to send angry tweets to the FAA and EASA.

All this only helps if all the problems will be solved. Boeing wont survive another MAX crash due to a half baked and rushed 2nd EIS.

Go ahead, then you can fly the Max domestically only as Trump isn't going to push the EASA or other governing bodies to return the max to the skies through the threat of Twitter. Also as said it takes away all credibility from the FAA if that were to happen.

flyingphil · Sat Jul 27, 2019 12:05 am

https://theaircurrent.com/scoops/octobe ... ellations/

“When the clock strikes midnight on October 1, 2019, a host of new problems land on Boeing’s doorstep.

On that date, key contractual provisions, including the right to cancel a delayed airplane delivery, come into effect for some customers. This will further cloud the commercial dynamics around the 737 Max and the large base of customers, and particularly lessors, who have been buffeted by the jet’s grounding..”

So... no pressure then

pasen · Sat Jul 27, 2019 1:12 am

planecane wrote:
There weren't anywhere near 0.8 million flights at the time of the grounding. WN had 41,000 and that was the most and I think they had the largest fleet (almost 10% of deliveries). There probably weren't much more than 200k flights of the MAX.

Here are some other estimates about the crash rate of the MAX:
- http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/rate_mod.htm
- https://www.fliegerfaust.com/air-travel ... 60011.html

Considering how the term "death trap" is commonly used in everyday language, it seems quite appropriate to me for a plane with an estimated fatal crash rate of 1:300,000.

marcelh · Sat Jul 27, 2019 5:33 am

cledaybuck wrote:
Can we all just agree to not call it a death trap and also agree that it is not safe in the modern air travel world and move on.

“Not safe” is an understatement, while “death trap” may have been an exaggeration. But splittng hairs is only allowed by some posters here.... :white:

Andy33 · Sat Jul 27, 2019 5:38 am

7BOEING7 wrote:
IIRC the Europeans allowed a ferry flight recently, well after any "grace period", so they appear to be open to reason.

,

They did. That's where the flaps out comment comes from, this was one of the conditions of the flight being allowed. The logic presumably was that if MCAS 1.0 cannot operate with flaps out, there can be no danger from MCAS on a ferry flight under those conditions.
Do bear in mind that disastrous as the Lionair and Ethiopian crashes are, nobody at ground level was hit by the impacts, things could have been even worse than they actually were. With European population density the risk of some settlement being taken out by a crashing plane is higher.

Whiteguy · Sat Jul 27, 2019 5:45 am

smartplane wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Noshow wrote:
Don't they ferry them with special pilots only and flaps out to prevent MCAS from activating?

Company pilots: yes.
Flaps out: There are plenty of flight tracks showing ferry flights at max altitude and speed, I posted one earlier to this thread.
So, not a "death trap".

After an initial grace period, the rest of the World has banned ferry / positioning / storage flights.

FAA has done Boeing a favour by approving one way positioning / storage flights, with FAA-approved, insurance (not Boeing's experimental / test cover), presumably with weather, altitude, destination and shortest route conditions.

Ferry flights for MTC checks or storage are still happening once in a while, they have not been banned...

BigPlaneGuy13 · Sat Jul 27, 2019 5:51 am

Is there any way that Dennis Muilenburg survives this ordeal at this point? With each passing moment the situation at Boeing only continues to worsen. If nothing else I'm assuming shareholders will force him out of at least one if not two of his titles as Chair, Prez, and CEO.

The way I see things playing out is that he stays at the helm to weather the rest of the grounding, then is either ousted or resigns upon EIS Round Two. The last thing on Boeing's plate right now would be to have to look for a new leader amidst its struggles with the grounding, Military, NMA, and 777X... Thoughts?

dampfnudel · Sat Jul 27, 2019 5:57 am

flyingphil wrote:
https://theaircurrent.com/scoops/october-brings-prospect-of-737-max-cancellations/

“When the clock strikes midnight on October 1, 2019, a host of new problems land on Boeing’s doorstep.

On that date, key contractual provisions, including the right to cancel a delayed airplane delivery, come into effect for some customers. This will further cloud the commercial dynamics around the 737 Max and the large base of customers, and particularly lessors, who have been buffeted by the jet’s grounding..”

So... no pressure then

That will be an interesting day and possibly not in a good way for Boeing. I wonder which airlines will decide to press the cancel button.

marcelh · Sat Jul 27, 2019 6:23 am

dampfnudel wrote:
flyingphil wrote:
https://theaircurrent.com/scoops/october-brings-prospect-of-737-max-cancellations/

“When the clock strikes midnight on October 1, 2019, a host of new problems land on Boeing’s doorstep.

On that date, key contractual provisions, including the right to cancel a delayed airplane delivery, come into effect for some customers. This will further cloud the commercial dynamics around the 737 Max and the large base of customers, and particularly lessors, who have been buffeted by the jet’s grounding..”

So... no pressure then

That will be an interesting day and possibly not in a good way for Boeing. I wonder which airlines will decide to press the cancel button.

I don’t think a lot of them will press the cancelation button. They will use it to negotiate more favorable prices and/or compensation. Cancelling means that you have to go to Airbus for some NEO’s, but early slots - when available - aren’t a bargain.

Francoflier · Sat Jul 27, 2019 6:23 am

dampfnudel wrote:
That will be an interesting day and possibly not in a good way for Boeing. I wonder which airlines will decide to press the cancel button.

These airlines or lessors whose business outlook has changed for the worse in the last couple of years might use this as a providential way out of a burdensome deal... Don't know who that might be though.

We're unlikely to see anybody defect for Airbus however, as delivery slots would be even further down the path and the price would certainly not be the same.

Alfons · Sat Jul 27, 2019 6:31 am

Revelation, you are a good value to a.net and I always like to read your posts. But you know that you are playing a little bit small head now, no? As those planes are flying now under a very special context, we can suppose that they are readied, pre-checked for any AOA sensor anomalies, and much else additionally pre-controlled under special scrutinity, and obviously the company pilots flying the airplane having any seconds of the flight the specific symptoms in mind which can be related to the known MAX issues, and maybe even dry-trained the main-d‘oeuvre a hundred times before the flight, if it happens again. Or do you really think those pilots step-in into the airplane like any other John Smith pilot doing his yearly duties flying A to B like a thousand times before?

I suppose Boeing can‘t afford itself today a ferry flight crash. They will do everything possible on earth now, that it can‘t happen.

Alfons

Gesendet von iPhone mit Tapatalk

timh4000 · Sat Jul 27, 2019 6:50 am

To make a point contrary to mine, you guys conveniently leave out the parts where I say grounding was the right thing to do. And that I feel blame goes in all directions. So I'm not excusing Boeing either. I'm not a particular Boeing fan over airbus. I'm especially not a fan of the 737. But, when I get on one I'm not all depressed about it. Same goes for the A320. Taken several rides on them. Not particularly fond of doing a JFK-LAX. Shorter flights to Florida honestly I'd choose the A320 over any version of a 737.

bennett123 · Sat Jul 27, 2019 7:05 am

Is one man being Chairman, President and CEO at the same time a good idea anyway.

Seems to concentrate too much power in the hands of that man.

Particularly for a firm this size.

marcelh · Sat Jul 27, 2019 7:10 am

timh4000 wrote:
To make a point contrary to mine, you guys conveniently leave out the parts where I say grounding was the right thing to do. And that I feel blame goes in all directions. So I'm not excusing Boeing either. I'm not a particular Boeing fan over airbus. I'm especially not a fan of the 737. But, when I get on one I'm not all depressed about it. Same goes for the A320. Taken several rides on them. Not particularly fond of doing a JFK-LAX. Shorter flights to Florida honestly I'd choose the A320 over any version of a 737.

OK, I’ll bite :mrgreen:

I didn’t leave out anything of your post, I just reacted to those parts I of which I have a (slightly) different opinion. We don’t have to agree, I’m fine with agree to disagree.

flyingphil · Sat Jul 27, 2019 7:38 am

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... n-software

Just possible that a bit of good news has leaked out from two 'sources'. Maybe they can get it ungrounded without any hardware changes? If I was a lessor my finger would be near the cancel button, but then what do you do? Go to the back of the Airbus queue?

Noshow · Sat Jul 27, 2019 7:53 am

Buy MRO shares as many NGs will need big overhauls for ongoing long duty?

B777LRF · Sat Jul 27, 2019 8:14 am

par13del wrote:
B777LRF wrote:
Should Boeing attempt to raise the TBTF flag, and get Trump onboard for a spot of Twitter tirade aimed at the FAA, the result might be a quicker ungrounding of the US flagged fleet. But that would be a pyrrhic victory, as whatever creditability the FAA has in the international arena would quickly evaporate

So you are countering previous posters and the trend of thought that the FAA had already lost its moral authority and credibility by being the last one to ground the MAX?

Not quite sure how you reached that conclusion. My take is that the FAA is a deeply politicised entity, one that has been made to bend to the will of industry by the politicians who set the rules. This happened long before the Max debacle, and has been evident to anyone who've had dealings with both the FAA and other regulators, who operate far more independently.

My position is that the FAA is still as liable to political pressure as it ever was, and that a determined US President may relatively easy force his will - as Trump did when he, and not the FAA, announced the grounding of the Max in US airspace. That action alone tells you all you need to know.

The problem for the FAA is that it's lack of independence, and it's politically forced modus operandi of signing ever larger responsibility over to the manufacturers, has become evident to a far larger number of people.

So I'm far from countering the assertion the FAA lost it's moral authority a long time ago, and am actually arguing they may yet dig themselves into an even bigger political hold, courtesy of undue political pressure.

art · Sat Jul 27, 2019 8:16 am

As U.S. government test pilots ran through dozens of flight scenarios on the Boeing Co. 737 Max in recent weeks, a potential failure got their attention.

The plane’s flight computer tried to push the aircraft’s nose down repeatedly during a simulator run, prompted by a stream of erroneous flight data.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... n-software

I'm confused. Is this a reference to the processor overload problem which came to light during testing or is this something else that needs to be fixed?

B777LRF · Sat Jul 27, 2019 8:23 am

par13del wrote:
Throughout this thread and previous ones it is stated over and over that Boeing is in this problem with the MAX and the 737 because they have done everything at the behest of WN, old cockpit, lack of additional training for NG to MAX, etc etc etc.
WN alone nor the combined USA carriers do not make up the bulk of 737 deliveries or a/c in operation.

Yes and no. WN, having ordered more than 1000 737s throughout it's history, is undeniably the most important customer for Boeing with the 737 line, and probably the single most important customer to BCA throughout it's entire product portfolio - perhaps only challenged by EK due to their massive orders for the most lucrative of their products.

WN also has a set of clear priorities, the main one of which is to keep costs as low as possible. It's no secret in this industry that the kludge which is the 737 overhead panel, still looks like it did in 1968 because WN wanted commonality when they went from Classic to NG to Max. So whilst WN may only hold 5% of all Max orders, it is still the single largest customer, a consistent launch customer and therefore one which has both ears of Boeing. It's also no secret that certain functions new to the NG FMC and A/P vs the Classic was not used by WN, for the simple reasons of maintaining a common pilot pool. WN are conservative, powerfuel and cost conscious bunch, which have had the unfortunate effect of keeping the 737 more jurassic than it needed to be.

I am, however, quite confident WN would have had no objection to additional training requirements for the Max, provided Boeing had been willing to pick up the tab, and provided they could still rotate pilots between NG and Max. Hence the clause in the contract I suppose.

astuteman · Sat Jul 27, 2019 9:59 am

flyingphil wrote:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-27/latest-737-max-fault-that-alarmed-test-pilots-rooted-in-software

Just possible that a bit of good news has leaked out from two 'sources'. Maybe they can get it ungrounded without any hardware changes? If I was a lessor my finger would be near the cancel button, but then what do you do? Go to the back of the Airbus queue?

I think there are a couple of things potentially at play here.

The first one is whether the glut of narrowbody orders that some people say exists is real or not.
If there is some overheating of the orderbook, then this might be an opportunity for one or two customers to trim their orders.

I think that until the point where customers have the right to cancel without penalty, the MAX orders remain as assets to Boeing that can be used to offset deals for other Boeing models in competiton with Airbus. We have seen before where airlines want to get out of orders, and the OEM offers them alternative products in lieu of penalties.

Going beyond the point where cancellation penalties apply definitely removes one of Boeing's strongest cards.

In reality, even if the October deadline passes, I think we'll see few, but some, cancellations, some conversions, but most orders staying in place.
As an afterthought, I wonder how many conversions would be prompted by the formal launch of the 797 ...

Rgds

DartHerald · Sat Jul 27, 2019 11:47 am

In addition to whatever unused production slots Airbus may have, isn't it also likely that lessors with big order books may have some as yet unallocated deliveries available in the short to medium term?

par13del · Sat Jul 27, 2019 11:47 am

B777LRF wrote:
I am, however, quite confident WN would have had no objection to additional training requirements for the Max, provided Boeing had been willing to pick up the tab, and provided they could still rotate pilots between NG and Max. Hence the clause in the contract I suppose.

Which in my opinion is the whole point. WN cost for pilot training on 5% of a deployed fleet is much less than the profits to be gained improving the design.
Is WN an important customer, yes, does WN make or break the 737, no, so if Boeing decides to penalize all customers for 5% then they should not be shocked if they can only maintain market share with no choice clients. Volume on your product is always more important than the largest use client, largest use client only becomes more important when they are the former, who then can control all upgrades and ongoing revisions.
The auto dealers previously had this down pat with examples like Lincoln Mercury etc. minor modifications of the base to satisfy the clients who refuse to buy Ford. On a/c I guess the major concern would be how much differences the authorities allow before certification requirements change.

factsonly · Sat Jul 27, 2019 11:52 am

A B737MAX is flying today!

Today Saturday 27 July, TUI Netherlands is ferrying a stranded B737MAX from Sofia back to base in Amsterdam.
This aircraft has been parked in Sofia, Bulgaria ever since the European grounding of the B737MAX.
Several attempts to ferry the aircraft back to AMS base have been unsuccessful, because of overflight permissions not being granted, particularly by Germany.

Apparently Germany maintains that no B737MAX is permitted to overfly the country, as today's empty ferry flight is heading over Poland towards Denmark, to turn back to the Netherlands.

https://www.flightradar24.com/TFL064F/217466c7

Revelation · Sat Jul 27, 2019 11:53 am

cledaybuck wrote:
Can we all just agree to not call it a death trap and also agree that it is not safe in the modern air travel world and move on.

I agree on both counts.

Alfons wrote:
Revelation, you are a good value to a.net and I always like to read your posts. But you know that you are playing a little bit small head now, no? As those planes are flying now under a very special context, we can suppose that they are readied, pre-checked for any AOA sensor anomalies, and much else additionally pre-controlled under special scrutinity, and obviously the company pilots flying the airplane having any seconds of the flight the specific symptoms in mind which can be related to the known MAX issues, and maybe even dry-trained the main-d‘oeuvre a hundred times before the flight, if it happens again. Or do you really think those pilots step-in into the airplane like any other John Smith pilot doing his yearly duties flying A to B like a thousand times before?

Thanks for the kind words.

I think any John Smith pilot knows what the challenging aspects of flying their plane are and does the mental / dry training loops often enough to feel confident that they can handle those challenging aspects. I would think especially after the JT tragedy that all MAX pilots would have heard about the AD and had spent some time doing such mental / dry training to make sure those procedures were top of mind.

I also think Boeing expects the same to have happened. Google up the Mike Sinnett leaked tapes and you find him saying that the airplane and pilot together are qualified as a system (or something similar). There are things the system needs the pilots to be able to do on Boeing and on every other aircraft. One of Boeing's few admissions is that they put too much workload on those pilots in the case of MCAS and is going to fix that. In the mean time, given how much press this situation has gotten, by this point in time I can't imagine there is a 737 pilot who hasn't seriously reviewed the AD and the trim system and the things they need to do should it malfunction, even if it malfunctions as badly as MCAS 1.0 did, along with the things they need to do to avoid the parts of the flight envelope where MCAS does kick in.

So, in short I'm sure these aren't normal flights, I'm sure a lot of systems checks happen before hand especially with regard to the AOA sensors, but I don't think the pilots are super human and I think at this point in time pretty much every 737 pilot would have spent time understanding what MCAS 1.0 did and how they would deal with a malfunction on a similar scale to the degree where they feel they could handle a MCAS 1.0 scale event.

BigPlaneGuy13 wrote:
Is there any way that Dennis Muilenburg survives this ordeal at this point? With each passing moment the situation at Boeing only continues to worsen. If nothing else I'm assuming shareholders will force him out of at least one if not two of his titles as Chair, Prez, and CEO.

The way I see things playing out is that he stays at the helm to weather the rest of the grounding, then is either ousted or resigns upon EIS Round Two. The last thing on Boeing's plate right now would be to have to look for a new leader amidst its struggles with the grounding, Military, NMA, and 777X... Thoughts?

My thoughts already written here is if the grounding goes in to next year he is in deep trouble.

It's interesting how he is now doubling down by saying he expects the plane to be back in service in October.

I think DM has enough evidence to convince himself that early October is not just plausible but also likely, and if there is a miss it's not because the fixes weren't ready, it's because the regulators are taking a long time to scrutinize the reports.

art wrote:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... n-software

I'm confused. Is this a reference to the processor overload problem which came to light during testing or is this something else that needs to be fixed?

You are correct in that the article is very confusing and seems to be saying no hardware changes are needed but seems to be saying this in the context of MCAS.

I guess I'd go with what DM himself says:

“We are confident that is a software update, not a hardware update,” Boeing Chief Executive Officer Dennis Muilenburg said during an earnings call on Wednesday. “It’s an understood update and we’re in the middle of working our way through that.”

And since he knows about the response time issue, we have to presume DM and Boeing feels the response time issue can be handled by a software change that will be ready in time for a October RTS.

Unfortunately the report is too garbled to conclude much, but at least it provided the DM quote.

I wrote here after the EASA identified the five things Boeing needed to address that the good news for Boeing was that at least now the problem set was bounded and it would only be a matter of time before acceptable responses could be found.

It seems DM is saying that they know how they are going to respond to all the issues, and none of them need hardware changes, and all they need now is the time to work through the items.

par13del · Sat Jul 27, 2019 12:04 pm

astuteman wrote:
As an afterthought, I wonder how many conversions would be prompted by the formal launch of the 797 ...

Rgds

My opinion, looking a gift horse in the mouth.
Boeing has been trying to close the business case, if I assume that the no new tech is firm but new / simplified production, then having the vendors on board may already be done. Engine OEM's have already shown their wares, so would 5.6 billion have closed the business case, probably, if it was just sitting there doing nothing, a tragedy forced it and now they have very good numbers on how much each additional month of delay will cost.
Large carriers who assign assets based on routes won't drop 737's for the 797, but smaller carriers would as they "abuse" frames as they can only afford a one size fits all.
So I agree, if they launch the 797 now they will have conversions possibly enough to hit their launch number, in addition, as the a/c is years out, they can spread their compensation payments further into the future, reduce pressure on the monthly build number, so ease some of the burden.
An interesting possibility.

smartplane · Sat Jul 27, 2019 12:24 pm

7BOEING7 wrote:
smartplane wrote:
After an initial grace period, the rest of the World has banned ferry / positioning / storage flights.

FAA has done Boeing a favour by approving one way positioning / storage flights, with FAA-approved, insurance (not Boeing's experimental / test cover), presumably with weather, altitude, destination and shortest route conditions.

The airplane was grounded for commercial operations. The FAA allows Boeing to fly them under their production ticket, so they are completing B-1 flights and all the associated maneuvers. If the production ticket includes operations over most of the western US, they can also complete any outstanding checks on the way to San Antonio for storage. If not a ferry permit will be issued, probably with few if any restrictions except minimum crew.

IIRC the Europeans allowed a ferry flight recently, well after any "grace period", so they appear to be open to reason.

EASA revised their AD to clarify non-commercial ferry flights about a fortnight after the first grounding, on a case by case basis. EASA have to approve each flight, imposing conditional factors, like weather, altitude, destination, shortest route, and no over-flying large population areas. The airline must demonstrate it has approved insurance, and confirm approval of each country to be over flown is held before the flight starts.

In contrast, it seems the FAA has taken a somewhat softer approach.

seahawk · Sat Jul 27, 2019 1:17 pm

par13del wrote:
astuteman wrote:
As an afterthought, I wonder how many conversions would be prompted by the formal launch of the 797 ...

Rgds

My opinion, looking a gift horse in the mouth.
Boeing has been trying to close the business case, if I assume that the no new tech is firm but new / simplified production, then having the vendors on board may already be done. Engine OEM's have already shown their wares, so would 5.6 billion have closed the business case, probably, if it was just sitting there doing nothing, a tragedy forced it and now they have very good numbers on how much each additional month of delay will cost.
Large carriers who assign assets based on routes won't drop 737's for the 797, but smaller carriers would as they "abuse" frames as they can only afford a one size fits all.
So I agree, if they launch the 797 now they will have conversions possibly enough to hit their launch number, in addition, as the a/c is years out, they can spread their compensation payments further into the future, reduce pressure on the monthly build number, so ease some of the burden.
An interesting possibility.

The question is, do those smaller carrier need something with 797 capabilities or something with 737 capabilities. I would think the later.

planecane · Sat Jul 27, 2019 4:12 pm

art wrote:
As U.S. government test pilots ran through dozens of flight scenarios on the Boeing Co. 737 Max in recent weeks, a potential failure got their attention.

The plane’s flight computer tried to push the aircraft’s nose down repeatedly during a simulator run, prompted by a stream of erroneous flight data.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... n-software

I'm confused. Is this a reference to the processor overload problem which came to light during testing or is this something else that needs to be fixed?

It is a reference to what was originally reported as a processor overload problem but seems to have actually been something slightly different. Keep in mind, all reports (including this one) are based on anonymous sources so there has not been official word on exactly what the FAA found. All we know officially is they found something and Boeing stated it was a software issue that can be/is being fixed with a software change.

MrBretz · Sat Jul 27, 2019 4:29 pm

Yes, I agree. They are discussing the previously reported problem. We will never know what it really means. I think based on my experience eons ago in programming a flight computer, that a program that was scheduled to run, say 32/sec, to extrapolate things didn’t get done in the interval. The simulated plane may have been in an unusual position and just too many computations may have been going on. And the computations didn’t complete gracefully. The solution might be simple or complex. It is up for grabs.

IADFCO · Sat Jul 27, 2019 4:57 pm

I have several colleagues at Boeing, including simulation and flight controls, none of them (like me) having anything to do with commercial airliners. All of them top notch technically, incredibly ethical engineers, by the way. I have been very reluctant to ask them for information about the MAX issue, because I assume that Boeing legal must be watching everybody like hawks, and I don't want anybody to get into trouble.

Still, I have built this very personal impression that the MAX is not an "all hands on deck" situation within the company. I'm sure that within "bigger" Boeing, e.g., space, military, helicopters, there is plenty of engineering talent that could be helpful, and may not be tapped as well as it could. Again, this is a personal impression, and I'm curious to know if it's shared by others here.

MrBretz · Sat Jul 27, 2019 5:36 pm

IADFCO, I am sure the pressure is on and the groups with expertise are totally committed. The problems with outsiders is bringing them up to speed. If your acquaintances had relevant experience that would help, I bet they would be there.

XRAYretired · Sat Jul 27, 2019 6:39 pm

Latest NYT report. Last two paragraphs tell the story.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/busi ... x-faa.html

'Days after the Lion Air crash, the agency invited Boeing executives to the F.A.A.’s Seattle headquarters, according to two people with knowledge of the matter. The officials sat incredulous as Boeing executives explained details about the system that they didn’t know.
In the middle of the conversation, an F.A.A. employee, one of the people said, interrupted to ask a question on the minds of several agency engineers: Why hadn’t Boeing updated the safety analysis of a system that had become so dangerous?'

Ray

DenverTed · Sat Jul 27, 2019 7:26 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
Latest NYT report. Last two paragraphs tell the story.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/busi ... x-faa.html

'Days after the Lion Air crash, the agency invited Boeing executives to the F.A.A.’s Seattle headquarters, according to two people with knowledge of the matter. The officials sat incredulous as Boeing executives explained details about the system that they didn’t know.
In the middle of the conversation, an F.A.A. employee, one of the people said, interrupted to ask a question on the minds of several agency engineers: Why hadn’t Boeing updated the safety analysis of a system that had become so dangerous?'

Ray

Perhaps Boeing culture of 'the smartest guys in the room'? Seems like the FAA was seen as a required bureaucratic check off rather than a respected ally in the safety and design process.

Revelation · Sat Jul 27, 2019 7:30 pm

MrBretz wrote:
IADFCO, I am sure the pressure is on and the groups with expertise are totally committed. The problems with outsiders is bringing them up to speed. If your acquaintances had relevant experience that would help, I bet they would be there.

The CEO spoke on the quarterly results call about daily meetings tracking all aspects of the 737 situation. It should be a real pressure cooker for everyone involved. Careers are made or broken in such situations. We already saw that the head of the 737 program chose to retire. It would not surprise me if the CEO attends such meetings himself or gets a daily briefing based on the meeting. Certainly the new head of the 737 program does attend.

ACATROYAL · Sat Jul 27, 2019 7:42 pm

You are right. Boeing is in a make or break moment currently, what they need is a man like Clarence Leonard "Kelly" Johnson to lead them out of this mess (777X, MAX, KC-46). Real leadership is needed to solve this horrible and sad situation Boeing is in...

TW870 · Sat Jul 27, 2019 8:27 pm

DenverTed wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
Latest NYT report. Last two paragraphs tell the story.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/busi ... x-faa.html

'Days after the Lion Air crash, the agency invited Boeing executives to the F.A.A.’s Seattle headquarters, according to two people with knowledge of the matter. The officials sat incredulous as Boeing executives explained details about the system that they didn’t know.
In the middle of the conversation, an F.A.A. employee, one of the people said, interrupted to ask a question on the minds of several agency engineers: Why hadn’t Boeing updated the safety analysis of a system that had become so dangerous?'

Ray

Perhaps Boeing culture of 'the smartest guys in the room'? Seems like the FAA was seen as a required bureaucratic check off rather than a respected ally in the safety and design process.

I think the most damaging piece for Boeing in the article is the reference to how they overrode FAA engineers' worry about uncontained engine failures cutting the rudder cable lines. According to the article, Boeing didn't want to make a change to the rudder control system for fear of adding cost and reducing commonality. But given the newer, larger engines with larger fans and in a new position, the FAA engineers worried about damage to the rudder cables in the event of an uncontained failure. Boeing self-regulated and left the cables untouched. This reminded me that an uncontained engine failure cut the hydraulic lines on the DC-10 in the UA232 case in 1989, and that McDonnell Douglas had to redesign that system in the wake of the accident. I guess now we just hope there aren't any uncontained failures on takeoff - or that the airplane flies well at low speed and low altitude with asymmetrical thrust and no rudder control.

XRAYretired · Sat Jul 27, 2019 8:38 pm

TW870 wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
Latest NYT report. Last two paragraphs tell the story.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/busi ... x-faa.html

'Days after the Lion Air crash, the agency invited Boeing executives to the F.A.A.’s Seattle headquarters, according to two people with knowledge of the matter. The officials sat incredulous as Boeing executives explained details about the system that they didn’t know.
In the middle of the conversation, an F.A.A. employee, one of the people said, interrupted to ask a question on the minds of several agency engineers: Why hadn’t Boeing updated the safety analysis of a system that had become so dangerous?'

Ray

Perhaps Boeing culture of 'the smartest guys in the room'? Seems like the FAA was seen as a required bureaucratic check off rather than a respected ally in the safety and design process.

I think the most damaging piece for Boeing in the article is the reference to how they overrode FAA engineers' worry about uncontained engine failures cutting the rudder cable lines. According to the article, Boeing didn't want to make a change to the rudder control system for fear of adding cost and reducing commonality. But given the newer, larger engines with larger fans and in a new position, the FAA engineers worried about damage to the rudder cables in the event of an uncontained failure. Boeing self-regulated and left the cables untouched. This reminded me that an uncontained engine failure cut the hydraulic lines on the DC-10 in the UA232 case in 1989, and that McDonnell Douglas had to redesign that system in the wake of the accident. I guess now we just hope there aren't any uncontained failures on takeoff - or that the airplane flies well at low speed and low altitude with asymmetrical thrust and no rudder control.

I would expect if you're still on the ground, its only the rudder that would keep you on the runway. But we are talking extremely remote probabilities here.

Ray

ArgentoSystems · Sat Jul 27, 2019 8:59 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
Latest NYT report. Last two paragraphs tell the story.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/busi ... x-faa.html

'Days after the Lion Air crash, the agency invited Boeing executives to the F.A.A.’s Seattle headquarters, according to two people with knowledge of the matter. The officials sat incredulous as Boeing executives explained details about the system that they didn’t know.
In the middle of the conversation, an F.A.A. employee, one of the people said, interrupted to ask a question on the minds of several agency engineers: Why hadn’t Boeing updated the safety analysis of a system that had become so dangerous?'

Ray

Ouch. That stinks. Could've just avoid the certification altogether.

MartijnNL · Sat Jul 27, 2019 9:21 pm

snowkarl wrote:
It cannot be cancelled.

Of course it can be cancelled. Just do it. And start building something else.

snowkar wrote:
Not only is there no replacement within at least 5 years (A and B backlogs for same efficiency or similar planes) but Boeing would lose an incredibly large part of the market as well as all brand trust and probably disappear fairly quickly.

Boeing would actually regain trust by ditching this failed aircraft type. Even without a replacement in the next five years the world will continue to revolve just fine. Less aircraft in the sky doesn't equal more problems.

snowkar wrote:
They really have no choice but to fix it, whatever it takes, because they bet it literally everything on this makeshift product.

They should concentrate on something else, the 797 maybe. Or on the development of a higher landing gear that removes the need for the engine to be placed where it is now.

snowkar wrote:
Because they stopped investing in future products, research and development, they are now playing constant catch up to Airbus, which has led to this current issue. It will take them decades to get back to where they used to, and should be at.

If NASA can put men on the Moon in eight years, why should it take decades for Boeing to get back to where they used to be?

I like to fly on the 737, 747, 757, 767 and 777. I stay away from the 787 (because of the crew override option on the dimmable windows) and the 737 Max, also after it will be deemed safe to travel on.

I feel sad that this all happened. Visiting the Boeing factory in Everett in 2017 was one of the greatest moments of my life.

frmrCapCadet · Sat Jul 27, 2019 9:22 pm

This NYT's article (also posted in the Seattle Times) adds fuel to my observation that Boeing is mostly interested in making money for stockholders (and very senior executives), not in making safe planes. I still would not be surprised to see Boeing required to sell off its commercial division. Not only has it proved incapable of selling safe 737s, it can't sell or make 767s or 777s in a timely fashion. This is not the Boeing I and others grew up watching and admiring.

MartijnNL · Sat Jul 27, 2019 9:34 pm

factsonly wrote:
A B737MAX is flying today!

Today Saturday 27 July, TUI Netherlands is ferrying a stranded B737MAX from Sofia back to base in Amsterdam.

Thank you for the heads up. I saw it gliding through the sky this afternoon. Apparently the entire flight was done at 20,000 feet and 300 knots.

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