Scotron12
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 6:19 pm

par13del wrote:
Scotron12 wrote:
Interesting $17B in dividends and $43B in share buy backs in 6yrs...quite a party going on ha? Plus $70M to Mullenberg..how much do other officers get paid?

I guess that is the price to make a safe plane safer...

So the claim here is that those payments to shareholders meant that they did not have sufficient funds to build the MAX?
Do we know how much money was spent on the MAX development?


Estimated at 1 - 1.8Billion....additional 2-3Billion on engine. Some argued at the time that it cost Boeing 2x as much as the 320NEO due to the 737 ground clearance and having to move the engine up and forward of the wing. Boeing of course denied it.
 
mrbots
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 6:20 pm

I guess I've been through different root cause training. From all of the RCA's I've been involved in, which all follows cause mapping, it'd be more like: yes it'll pinpoint MCAS as the main contributing factor but you don't just stop there and move on. You delve into why MCAS is the way it is, into the certification, management, design, etc. You go into the AoA sensor failure as another contributing factor and why it failed. And finally you also go into the pilots' reactions as another, lessor contributing factor then delve into that. Was it poor training, lack of training, sensory overload, incorrect personal choice, etc. To go along with the swiss cheese lining up metaphor, you don't just plug the biggest hole and move on, you plug all of the holes possible.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 6:31 pm

mrbots wrote:
I guess I've been through different root cause training. From all of the RCA's I've been involved in, which all follows cause mapping, it'd be more like: yes it'll pinpoint MCAS as the main contributing factor but you don't just stop there and move on. You delve into why MCAS is the way it is, into the certification, management, design, etc. You go into the AoA sensor failure as another contributing factor and why it failed. And finally you also go into the pilots' reactions as another, lessor contributing factor then delve into that. Was it poor training, lack of training, sensory overload, incorrect personal choice, etc. To go along with the swiss cheese lining up metaphor, you don't just plug the biggest hole and move on, you plug all of the holes possible.

Well, they knew how often the AOA vane would fail. So they knew that would happen x times over the life of the MAX. What is that number? A lot. Then they assumed the pilots would respond near perfect over that number, but in reality the batting average was about .33, not .99999999
That was the critical failed assumption in my estimation. Unless they forgot that AOA vanes fail, which is entirely possible that there is no record of this being considered and numerically analyzed.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 6:40 pm

par13del wrote:
Scotron12 wrote:
Interesting $17B in dividends and $43B in share buy backs in 6yrs...quite a party going on ha? Plus $70M to Mullenberg..how much do other officers get paid?

I guess that is the price to make a safe plane safer...

So the claim here is that those payments to shareholders meant that they did not have sufficient funds to build the MAX?

NYT suggests that Boeing management is pressuring engineers to keep costs low to keep the stock price high, presumably because management bonuses are often stock grants or options.
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SelseyBill
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 8:17 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
.........'Days after the Lion Air crash, the agency invited Boeing executives to the F.A.A.’s Seattle headquarters, according to two people with knowledge of the matter. The officials sat incredulous as Boeing executives explained details about the system that they didn’t know. In the middle of the conversation, an F.A.A. employee, one of the people said, interrupted to ask a question on the minds of several agency engineers: Why hadn’t Boeing updated the safety analysis of a system that had become so dangerous?'


.....that fact alone should be setting alarms going. Is the FAA's HQ really in Seattle? The optics here look so bad for both organisations.......
 
smartplane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 8:21 pm

Revelation wrote:
An engineer who feels he doesn't have as many resources as he feels he needs to get the job done is as common as chips.

I'm sure I could go to my place of employment and survey all the engineers and the same sentiment would be expressed unanimously.

Also engineers feeling a lot of pressure to minimize the scope of work and reduce the cost of goods sold is like sand in the desert.

But you and your fellow engineers, would all rather hope the agency tasked with setting and monitoring safety standards is our ally, not replaced by colleagues dancing to the tune of the same management team, cutting scope and costs.
 
hivue
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 9:10 pm

Revelation wrote:
NYT suggests that Boeing management is pressuring engineers to keep costs low to keep the stock price high, presumably because management bonuses are often stock grants or options.


Management remuneration (not just bonuses) often is heavily influenced by stock price period. If the (major, at any rate) stockholders ain't happy ain't nobody happy. The tyranny of the stockholder has contributed significantly to this mess (and a number of other corporate messes as well).
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
2175301
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 9:14 pm

mrbots wrote:
I guess I've been through different root cause training. From all of the RCA's I've been involved in, which all follows cause mapping, it'd be more like: yes it'll pinpoint MCAS as the main contributing factor but you don't just stop there and move on. You delve into why MCAS is the way it is, into the certification, management, design, etc. You go into the AoA sensor failure as another contributing factor and why it failed. And finally you also go into the pilots' reactions as another, lessor contributing factor then delve into that. Was it poor training, lack of training, sensory overload, incorrect personal choice, etc. To go along with the swiss cheese lining up metaphor, you don't just plug the biggest hole and move on, you plug all of the holes possible.


Thank you for having an insight into the process. What I believe you are missing is that a root cause investigation for a crash asks why did the crash occur. Not just why did the MCAS fail, and how the pilots reaction occured to that failure (although that can lead back to why the crash occurred). There are a lot of interconnected rabbit holes and tunnels....

Here is the outline of my thinking on this - and why I have my conclusions:

1) The MCAS/Flight Computer failure/issues was not the primary reason for the Lion Air crash. Yes that system failure created a problem and exposed a situation that led to the crash. The evidence to support this is that both the flight the day before adequately managed to fly the aircraft while resolving the issue (by turning MCAS off) and the Pilot of the flight that crashed was able to adequately fly the Lion Air aircraft with the problem.

2) While there are many aspects of workload, training, reactions, etc that then go into what the pilots are capable of or did do, and multiple possible factors that contributed to the event in some way (and if I were running the investigation - and I have run multiple many month root cause investigations with teams of people - I would likely have a contributing factor investigation of the confusion over what "continuous" meant in regards to the memory item for trim system cutout).

After thinking through everything that has been released about the Lion Air crash; and all the likely possibilities of the issues not yet released; my conclusion was what caused the Lion Air crash was "lack of key information" of the pilots that day. I actually don't see anything potentially out there that would invalidate that (although it may be stated a different way).

The pilots were faced with a system malfunction. No individual system malfunction should crash an aircraft, and in fact is that the pilots the day before and the pilot of the day did not crash the aircraft while the MCAS malfunction was occurring. The fact that Boeing missed this failure mode in their FMEA, and the FAA missed it as well, and other MCAS factors, is just part of the failure of that system (unfortunately, stuff like this happens - and the 738Max MCAS system is not the first case of it: Fortunately things of this magnitude are rare).

But the pilots of the day were faced with a problem caused by the failure of the system, which significantly increased their workload, etc. They apparently did not connect the response of the aircraft to the runaway trim failure memory item: perhaps because of a different meaning of "continuous" vs what Boeing apparently believed it meant, perhaps for other reasons.

I also do not believe that Boeing knew that this kind of failure event could happen in this way. My analysis also suggest that a similar failure could be caused with an intermittent wiring short (which does happen in other systems from time to time).

Boeing had adequately told the regulators and the Airlines about MCAS (although they had not told them that the amount of change had increased, which I consider fairly minor to the crash sequence). The Indonesia Regulators (as did all regulators except Brazil) agreed with Boeing's recommendation that no specific additional training be provided to the pilots about MCAS (and had the MCAS system been properly designed because the FMEA properly identified the failure mode and significance - with what will be Rev 2 software it's likely that would have been adequate as there are a lot of things pilots are not specifically trained on). The Airlines and Airline Maintenance departments fully knew about MCAS. NOTE: My understanding is that it was not and is not Boeings direct responsibility to notify and train the pilots about MCAS. It is the Regulators and Airlines responsibility (there seems to be a lot of misplaced blame on this point).

The key piece of information that would have prevented the crash, and notified the Airline and Boeing is that this system failed and in this way was from this very same aircraft the day before. The MCAS failed and created a problem that the pilots (with assistance from a 3rd pilot) were able to control while they troubleshot; and implemented their solution of turning off MCAS. Yet, it appears they told no one (and certainly not the pilots of the next flight), and apparently there is no kind of logs withing Lion Air for Pilots to report how their flights went and any issues dealt with (other than specific maintenance items).

It is my belief that had the Pilot retained control of the the aircraft and returned to the airport that there would not have been a crash. He was adequately controlling the situation by constant manual trim up commands. Once on approach and with flap extension the MCAS problem would have gone away. While I have a lot of questions, I have no conclusions as to why the Co-Pilot did not also continue the continuous manual trim ups that the Pilot had been doing (I hope that the CVR transcript will clarify that, when released). But, he didn't - and the trim then went low the aircraft crashed.

Imagine the difference if both the Pilot and Co-Pilot knew before they took off of the previous day's MCAS issue and resolution.

A root cause asks what caused the crash, and what key item or perhaps items would have prevented that specific crash. The MCAS/Flight computer failure was bad (and a clear contributing factor). But did not actually cause the crash, as demonstrated by the pilot adequately flying the aircraft during the failure (and the pilots the day before adequately flying the aircraft during the failure before they turned off MCAS). The lack of knowledge by the Pilots and Co-Pilot about that failure possibility on the day of the flight, and how to recognize and respond to it - in my opinion did cause the crash. The key information that this kind of event (with intermittent automatic trim downs), and its resolution, was held by the pilots of the flight on the day before. Why this information was not passed should (in my opinion) be a focus of the root cause investigation. Based on experience its far more likely to be inadequate Lion Air procedures and culture than other factors. No Crew Member goes to work intending to create a problem or not pass on key information (most people claiming Pilot or Operator Error - are actually citing examples where the Pilots and Operators were set up to fail by bad procedures, training, etc.)

Of course, with any root cause there are likely at least 20 other things that would be investigated as potential causes and a number of them listed as Contributing Factors.

I hope that helps people understand why I conclude that Lion Air hold the key responsibility for this crash, and the MCAS mis-design is just a contributing factor.

Have a great day,
 
Wrotaz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 9:46 pm

2175301 wrote:
1) The MCAS/Flight Computer failure/issues was not the primary reason for the Lion Air crash. Yes that system failure created a problem and exposed a situation that led to the crash.


I’m not an expert, so forgive me a naive question. But isn’t labeling everything on Boeing side as something that created a problem (without judging the actual weight and scale of it) a simplification? Let’s say (exaggerating strongly) that half of the wings fell off during a flight, but a crew managed to land. Can we call the falling wings only a contributing factor of a crash of another crew that failed to save the plane (and them being the main factor). Or thinking about DC-10 that crash landed in Sioux City - if another plane crashed in similar conditions, should we just say that engine failure destroying the flight controls was just a problem and a contributing factor, but not a reason? Only because someone else could handle the situation?
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 10:11 pm

i have no root cause training experience at all

but this all sounds pretty pathetic for me if the initial cause - the building of a plane with at least problematic aerodynamical attitudes, like no one in the last decades did before - completely falls under the table.

if the MAX would be build according to aerodynamical guidelines like every other aircraft in the last 50 years ( exclude the concorde please) you would not need redundant AoA sensors, no heavy used trim wheels, nothing of it

the finally failed attempt to fix that big economic new engins under that low old wings was the initial and main root cause, nothing else ...
 
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enzo011
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Jul 29, 2019 10:15 pm

2175301 wrote:
Have a great day,



I think it would help if you could supply links that shows that regulators knew about the MCAS system before the Lion Air crash and this in turn would then allow you to pass blame to the airline pilots instead of Boeing for the Lion Air crash. You try to say that the pilot on the previous flight should have let the other crews know about the MCAS failure, but if nobody knew about MCAS how were they supposed to let them know?

From my reading, your post wants to blame the airline and the pilots for the crash instead of the MCAS system, Boeing's communication of the new system or the FAA for allowing Boeing to certify their own aircraft because the FAA is underfunded. If you could supply links it would help as a lot of your assumptions that lead to your opinion seems to be false.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 12:05 am

2175301 wrote:
The pilots were faced with a system malfunction

Which was caused by an AOA vane failure. Boeing must know the failure rate of these. How many times over the lifetime of the MAX was an AOA failure / MCAS malfunction going to be? Probably hundreds if not more. And all the crews would turn off electric trim and land ASAP, or was flying to destination without electric trim standard operating procedure? Did Boeing put two and two together, and this was the expectation, hundreds of AOA failure / MCAS malfunction / runaway trim shutoff procedure? Or did they not do the math on how many times it would happen?
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 4:22 am

DenverTed wrote:
2175301 wrote:
The pilots were faced with a system malfunction

Which was caused by an AOA vane failure. Boeing must know the failure rate of these. How many times over the lifetime of the MAX was an AOA failure / MCAS malfunction going to be? Probably hundreds if not more. And all the crews would turn off electric trim and land ASAP, or was flying to destination without electric trim standard operating procedure? Did Boeing put two and two together, and this was the expectation, hundreds of AOA failure / MCAS malfunction / runaway trim shutoff procedure? Or did they not do the math on how many times it would happen?


Based solely on the runaway stabilizer NNC, flying to the destination using manual trim was fine. Doing it with one stick shaker going off the whole time I'm not sure is a great idea.
 
Virtual737
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 5:04 am

2175301 wrote:

1) The MCAS/Flight Computer failure/issues was not the primary reason for the Lion Air crash. Yes that system failure created a problem and exposed a situation that led to the crash. The evidence to support this is that both the flight the day before adequately managed to fly the aircraft while resolving the issue (by turning MCAS off) and the Pilot of the flight that crashed was able to adequately fly the Lion Air aircraft with the problem.



Using this logic, any of the crews that failed to land an A320 on the Hudson without fatalities would be the main cause of those fatalities because Sully managed to do it. There is a reason it was dubbed "Miracle on the Hudson".

2175301 wrote:

After thinking through everything that has been released about the Lion Air crash; and all the likely possibilities of the issues not yet released; my conclusion was what caused the Lion Air crash was "lack of key information" of the pilots that day. I actually don't see anything potentially out there that would invalidate that (although it may be stated a different way).



Haven't there been several simulator sessions that tried to replicate the exact scenario the crew faced (although it is impossible to replicate exactly) which also failed? These simulator crews failed without the additional pressure of actually knowing their lives were on the line.

2175301 wrote:

The pilots were faced with a system malfunction. No individual system malfunction should crash an aircraft.



That no individual system malfunction should cause a crash of an aircraft is a design requirement on the manufacturer. Its not there to lay blame on the crew.

2175301 wrote:

I also do not believe that Boeing knew that this kind of failure event could happen in this way.



Why do you believe this? Boeing designed the whole system and they have been making planes for years. Is it not logical, on the balance of things, to believe they *should* have known about it?

2175301 wrote:

My analysis also suggest that a similar failure could be caused with an intermittent wiring short (which does happen in other systems from time to time).



Which would likely be a design fault or a fault in manufacturing, so we couldn't pin that on the crew either.

2175301 wrote:

Boeing had adequately told the regulators and the Airlines about MCAS (although they had not told them that the amount of change had increased, which I consider fairly minor to the crash sequence).



I'm almost stuck on these comments. Doesn't the part you've put in brackets negate the first sentence? Why would you think that quadrupling the authority of MCAS and not disclosing it would still fall in the "adequately told the regulators and Airlines about MCAS" category? Why would you consider quadrupling the command of MCAS only fairly minor to the crash sequence? There is a HUGE difference between 0.6 degrees nose down and 2.5 degrees.

2175301 wrote:

with what will be Rev 2 software it's likely that would have been adequate as there are a lot of things pilots are not specifically trained on).



Do any of these "lots of things" have significant command over a primary flight surface?

2175301 wrote:

My understanding is that it was not and is not Boeings direct responsibility to notify and train the pilots about MCAS. It is the Regulators and Airlines responsibility (there seems to be a lot of misplaced blame on this point).



...and if the regulators and airlines are not aware of MCAS then whose responsibility does it become? You've already stated that you believe both regulators and airlines were informed, but you've also stated that you do not believe that any of them were informed about the huge increase in the authority of MCAS. Doesn't that single last fact put the burden absolutely with Boeing?

2175301 wrote:

It is my belief that had the Pilot retained control of the the aircraft and returned to the airport that there would not have been a crash.



Yes, if there was no crash then there would not have been a crash. Totally in agreement there ;)

2175301 wrote:

A root cause asks what caused the crash, and what key item or perhaps items would have prevented that specific crash



I'm now getting confused about the difference between root cause and main cause. In United 232, the root cause was a manufacturing defect. The likely main cause, as stated by the NTSB, was human factors around the inspection of components and the detection of issues. The latter was not the root cause as.... it could only happen AFTER the manufacturing defect. Similarly in the MAX crash, any action that happens after the addition of MCAS, where MCAS was a factor in the crash, cannot be the root cause. It might still be the main cause.

2175301 wrote:

The MCAS/Flight computer failure was bad (and a clear contributing factor). But did not actually cause the crash, as demonstrated by the pilot adequately flying the aircraft during the failure (and the pilots the day before adequately flying the aircraft during the failure before they turned off MCAS).



We're kind of back to that Sully argument again. If Sully did it, anyone else not doing it MUST be to blame, right?

2175301 wrote:

I hope that helps people understand why I conclude that Lion Air hold the key responsibility for this crash, and the MCAS mis-design is just a contributing factor.



I have been trying to follow your logic but I'm still failing to see it, unfortunately. Of course, I've not had the training you've had.

2175301 wrote:

Have a great day,



You too.
 
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Francoflier
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 5:45 am

2175301 wrote:
[

I also do not believe that Boeing knew that this kind of failure event could happen in this way. My analysis also suggest that a similar failure could be caused with an intermittent wiring short (which does happen in other systems from time to time).

Boeing had adequately told the regulators and the Airlines about MCAS (although they had not told them that the amount of change had increased, which I consider fairly minor to the crash sequence).


You are bending your own judgement to adapt it to your defensive position. Changing the final MCAS system to such a degree without telling the FAA should be a massive clue that Boeing knew something was wrong with their design and tried to push it through anyway using their political clout and abusing the trust the FAA had put on them.

You are trying to defend Boeing by passing this as an honest mistake when evidences that they were trying to put lipstick on a pig are piling up.

Good luck with that stance.
I'll do my own airline. With Blackjack. And hookers. In fact, forget the airline.
 
Canuck600
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 6:14 am

Do most airlines have a system in place so pilots can report abnormalities that occurred during a flight? Not talking about writing it up as a maintenance issue but something where the chief pilot is informed and info on the occurrence can be distributed to other pilots at the airline?
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 6:56 am

And the flights that did not crash did not encounter the problems at take-off but during cruise. A lot of more room to handle the problem and a stickshaker is much less of a problem then.

But as the flight manual does not even know MCAS at the time of the Lion Air crash and the failure condition does not match the old runaway trim, we are looking at a "could be saved" situation not a "should have been saved" situation.
 
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flyingphil
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 7:33 am

MOL “Boeing needs to get its s**t together”
Ryanair losing patience with the 737MAX fiasco.

https://www.theguardian.com/business/20 ... ary-brexit
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 8:50 am

MSPNWA wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
It might be me, but I'm struggling to see how both of these positions can sit together.A root cause is typically the earliest significant contributing factor. If Boeing owns the blame for releasing the system that put the pilots in the position to have a problem, and that problem ultimately concluded in the accident, how is something else which happened later, the root cause?


If you want to go down that rabbit hole, a strong argument can be made that the root cause was current regulations. Without them, we don't have the higher risk of a new system. .


???
It is accidents like this that define (current) regulations. First thing they tell you at regulations school, is that regulations are written in blood. Scrapping them usually i snot a good idea, unless you want to go back to the safety record of the early sixties. You may want to check out how successful the first couple of years of the 727 was. Hint, MAX record looks very good compared to the 727 introduction.


MSPNWA wrote:
Root cause is unfortunately a poor way to increase safety. It's a great tool though for those that simply want to spread blame around.


Even more ???????
You could not be more wrong. In fact, it is just the other way around; those looking to spread blame are mostly not bothered by root cause, at all; they just cherry pick factors convenient to their agenda.


I must confess that I'm at total loss trying to understand what you were trying to convey in this message. Is it trolling, blind fanboyism, total disconnect from reality?
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
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flyingphil
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 9:34 am

More on the potential rudder cables issue.. worth a read

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/7 ... ified.html
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 9:35 am

2175301 wrote:
mrbots wrote:
I guess I've been through different root cause training. From all of the RCA's I've been involved in, which all follows cause mapping, it'd be more like: yes it'll pinpoint MCAS as the main contributing factor but you don't just stop there and move on. You delve into why MCAS is the way it is, into the certification, management, design, etc. You go into the AoA sensor failure as another contributing factor and why it failed. And finally you also go into the pilots' reactions as another, lessor contributing factor then delve into that. Was it poor training, lack of training, sensory overload, incorrect personal choice, etc. To go along with the swiss cheese lining up metaphor, you don't just plug the biggest hole and move on, you plug all of the holes possible.


Thank you for having an insight into the process. What I believe you are missing is that a root cause investigation for a crash asks why did the crash occur. Not just why did the MCAS fail, and how the pilots reaction occured to that failure (although that can lead back to why the crash occurred). There are a lot of interconnected rabbit holes and tunnels....

Here is the outline of my thinking on this - and why I have my conclusions:

1) The MCAS/Flight Computer failure/issues was not the primary reason for the Lion Air crash. Yes that system failure created a problem and exposed a situation that led to the crash. The evidence to support this is that both the flight the day before adequately managed to fly the aircraft while resolving the issue (by turning MCAS off) and the Pilot of the flight that crashed was able to adequately fly the Lion Air aircraft with the problem.

2) While there are many aspects of workload, training, reactions, etc that then go into what the pilots are capable of or did do, and multiple possible factors that contributed to the event in some way (and if I were running the investigation - and I have run multiple many month root cause investigations with teams of people - I would likely have a contributing factor investigation of the confusion over what "continuous" meant in regards to the memory item for trim system cutout).

After thinking through everything that has been released about the Lion Air crash; and all the likely possibilities of the issues not yet released; my conclusion was what caused the Lion Air crash was "lack of key information" of the pilots that day. I actually don't see anything potentially out there that would invalidate that (although it may be stated a different way).

The pilots were faced with a system malfunction. No individual system malfunction should crash an aircraft, and in fact is that the pilots the day before and the pilot of the day did not crash the aircraft while the MCAS malfunction was occurring. The fact that Boeing missed this failure mode in their FMEA, and the FAA missed it as well, and other MCAS factors, is just part of the failure of that system (unfortunately, stuff like this happens - and the 738Max MCAS system is not the first case of it: Fortunately things of this magnitude are rare).

But the pilots of the day were faced with a problem caused by the failure of the system, which significantly increased their workload, etc. They apparently did not connect the response of the aircraft to the runaway trim failure memory item: perhaps because of a different meaning of "continuous" vs what Boeing apparently believed it meant, perhaps for other reasons.

I also do not believe that Boeing knew that this kind of failure event could happen in this way. My analysis also suggest that a similar failure could be caused with an intermittent wiring short (which does happen in other systems from time to time).

Boeing had adequately told the regulators and the Airlines about MCAS (although they had not told them that the amount of change had increased, which I consider fairly minor to the crash sequence). The Indonesia Regulators (as did all regulators except Brazil) agreed with Boeing's recommendation that no specific additional training be provided to the pilots about MCAS (and had the MCAS system been properly designed because the FMEA properly identified the failure mode and significance - with what will be Rev 2 software it's likely that would have been adequate as there are a lot of things pilots are not specifically trained on). The Airlines and Airline Maintenance departments fully knew about MCAS. NOTE: My understanding is that it was not and is not Boeings direct responsibility to notify and train the pilots about MCAS. It is the Regulators and Airlines responsibility (there seems to be a lot of misplaced blame on this point).

The key piece of information that would have prevented the crash, and notified the Airline and Boeing is that this system failed and in this way was from this very same aircraft the day before. The MCAS failed and created a problem that the pilots (with assistance from a 3rd pilot) were able to control while they troubleshot; and implemented their solution of turning off MCAS. Yet, it appears they told no one (and certainly not the pilots of the next flight), and apparently there is no kind of logs withing Lion Air for Pilots to report how their flights went and any issues dealt with (other than specific maintenance items).

It is my belief that had the Pilot retained control of the the aircraft and returned to the airport that there would not have been a crash. He was adequately controlling the situation by constant manual trim up commands. Once on approach and with flap extension the MCAS problem would have gone away. While I have a lot of questions, I have no conclusions as to why the Co-Pilot did not also continue the continuous manual trim ups that the Pilot had been doing (I hope that the CVR transcript will clarify that, when released). But, he didn't - and the trim then went low the aircraft crashed.

Imagine the difference if both the Pilot and Co-Pilot knew before they took off of the previous day's MCAS issue and resolution.

A root cause asks what caused the crash, and what key item or perhaps items would have prevented that specific crash. The MCAS/Flight computer failure was bad (and a clear contributing factor). But did not actually cause the crash, as demonstrated by the pilot adequately flying the aircraft during the failure (and the pilots the day before adequately flying the aircraft during the failure before they turned off MCAS). The lack of knowledge by the Pilots and Co-Pilot about that failure possibility on the day of the flight, and how to recognize and respond to it - in my opinion did cause the crash. The key information that this kind of event (with intermittent automatic trim downs), and its resolution, was held by the pilots of the flight on the day before. Why this information was not passed should (in my opinion) be a focus of the root cause investigation. Based on experience its far more likely to be inadequate Lion Air procedures and culture than other factors. No Crew Member goes to work intending to create a problem or not pass on key information (most people claiming Pilot or Operator Error - are actually citing examples where the Pilots and Operators were set up to fail by bad procedures, training, etc.)

Of course, with any root cause there are likely at least 20 other things that would be investigated as potential causes and a number of them listed as Contributing Factors.

I hope that helps people understand why I conclude that Lion Air hold the key responsibility for this crash, and the MCAS mis-design is just a contributing factor.

Have a great day,

No. We have three events, one a significant loss of control and two crashes. It is clear the common and primary contributory factor was MCAS V1.0 triggered by AOA failed high. You can apply RCA methods to root out the other contributors - to each event, to MCAS V1.0 and AOA fail high - but you cannot change that , no matter how much you want to.

The RCA factors must be evidenced and validated. You have cited only supposition, largely only those put forward by the 'blame the foreigners' lobby and have ignored equally valid contradictory possibilities and some supposition is incorrect in my opinion. "stuff like this happens" would never appear in the vocabulary of a competent RCA.

I see no evidence of a credible independent RCA exercise in your missives.

Have a gud un yu'sen man

Ray
 
FluidFlow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 9:47 am

flyingphil wrote:
More on the potential rudder cables issue.. worth a read

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/7 ... ified.html


F.A.A. managers conceded that the Max “does not meet” agency guidelines “for protecting flight controls,” according to an agency document. But in another document, they added that they had to consider whether any requested changes would interfere with Boeing’s timeline. The managers wrote that it would be “impractical at this late point in the program,” for the company to resolve the issue. Mr. Duven at the F.A.A. also said the decision was based on the safety record of the plane.


If this turns out true, the FAA will have some explanation to give if they re-certify the aircraft without demanding a change to the rudder issue. How can an agency whose sole goal is to certify aircraft to a standard deviate from said standard to not interrupt the manufacturers timeline?

EDIT: And to what safety record is Mr. Duvan referring? This is a new aircraft model, there is no safety record. For a new aircraft you can demand changes to make a safe plane safer...
I absolutely understand that the NG does not need any change as it is proven safe but the MAX is not so better change it first before there are 5000 of them in the air.
 
RickNRoll
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 11:13 am

Revelation wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
Engineers seem to blame Boeing Management:

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49142761

Now it is not an in-depth piece of journalism but the BBC is in general factually close to the truth.

The title of their Panorama piece on the other side is definitely out of order: Watch BBC Panorama: Boeing's Killer Plane, on 29 July at 8.30pm on BBC One. But you need them clicks you know...

An engineer who feels he doesn't have as many resources as he feels he needs to get the job done is as common as chips.

I'm sure I could go to my place of employment and survey all the engineers and the same sentiment would be expressed unanimously.

Also engineers feeling a lot of pressure to minimize the scope of work and reduce the cost of goods sold is like sand in the desert.

No surprise they had to slap a scandalous title on to this turd ball to try to get people to watch this show.

I think BBC would do better to find that one engineer somewhere that feels he has all the resources he needs to do his job and feels no pressure over cost or scope of work and do a portrait of him/her.

Now that's a show I'd watch!


That's supposed to be why you pay a lot more for a plane than you do for a car. The standard of engineering is supposed to be much higher. Boeing had $10billion it didn't know what to do with. Better resourcing the engineers could be a start.
 
PacificBeach
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 11:43 am

seahawk wrote:
And the flights that did not crash did not encounter the problems at take-off but during cruise. A lot of more room to handle the problem and a stickshaker is much less of a problem then.
But as the flight manual does not even know MCAS at the time of the Lion Air crash and the failure condition does not match the old runaway trim, we are looking at a "could be saved" situation not a "should have been saved" situation.


On the top of that, there is pretty much stupid reasoning which is bundled with attractive acronyms like RCA and then presented ))

The reasoning like the previous flight did not crash so this can not be the fundamental reason is total BS.

Let's say I run a red light at night and cause a big T-bone accident then claim to the police officers I can not be cause of the accident. "Officer, I have just run the previous 9 red lights on the same street and nothing happened. This clearly proves I can not be the culprit!"

But what it proves is that the crappy MCAS design does not have a %100 kill rate. That is about it....
 
Scotron12
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 11:51 am

Boeing's Killer Plane is a fact, is it not?

Quite telling in the programme, Mullenberg kept repeating that there were "many factors" to all accidents and would not deviate from that statement. Not like his prior statement that Boeing owns it, referring to MCAS.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 12:25 pm

PacificBeach wrote:
On the top of that, there is pretty much stupid reasoning which is bundled with attractive acronyms like RCA and then presented ))

The reasoning like the previous flight did not crash so this can not be the fundamental reason is total BS.

Let's say I run a red light at night and cause a big T-bone accident then claim to the police officers I can not be cause of the accident. "Officer, I have just run the previous 9 red lights on the same street and nothing happened. This clearly proves I can not be the culprit!"

But what it proves is that the crappy MCAS design does not have a %100 kill rate. That is about it....

Maybe we can "split the baby" ( ref: Solomon ) and just go with what Boeing admits, that MCAS 1.0 put too much workload on the pilots?

Yes, MCAS 1.0 is an unacceptable design, and the plane is grounded till that is fixed, but from what we know the way Boeing got itself through the decision trees was based on a poor evaluation of what workload MCAS 1.0 would put on pilots versus the workload pilots would be able to handle.

Scotron12 wrote:
Boeing's Killer Plane is a fact, is it not?

Yes, and the idea that we're all going to die is a fact, and the idea that any one of us could die any instant with absolutely no prior notice is a fact, yet civil discourse has evolved to the point where we don't remind each other of those facts very often, right?
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 12:33 pm

Wrotaz wrote:
2175301 wrote:
1) The MCAS/Flight Computer failure/issues was not the primary reason for the Lion Air crash. Yes that system failure created a problem and exposed a situation that led to the crash.


I’m not an expert, so forgive me a naive question. But isn’t labeling everything on Boeing side as something that created a problem (without judging the actual weight and scale of it) a simplification? Let’s say (exaggerating strongly) that half of the wings fell off during a flight, but a crew managed to land. Can we call the falling wings only a contributing factor of a crash of another crew that failed to save the plane (and them being the main factor). Or thinking about DC-10 that crash landed in Sioux City - if another plane crashed in similar conditions, should we just say that engine failure destroying the flight controls was just a problem and a contributing factor, but not a reason? Only because someone else could handle the situation?


Somehow I am not sure if you are geniunely polite about it or this is very dark sarcasm. I like it though. Puts the finger on the sore spot of his argument! :thumbsup:
 
ArgentoSystems
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 12:36 pm

Why there is no updates from Boeing? The last official one is From Jul 17 and it is about 100M. They should be giving weekly updates on the progress. It went largely unnoticed, but the Ryan Air CEO told the Boeing now delaying submission of the fix to FAA till October. Hmm. Why there is no official release from Boeing?

To me the silence is an indicator they are lagging behind. They can't lie and prefer not to tell anything.
 
Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 12:48 pm

They have to wait for whatever the FAA decides. It's beyound their decision.
However I would prefer to get more updates too. What are they working on and what are the suggested solutions? There is more stuff to do than just MCAS 2.0 by now.
 
art
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 12:57 pm

So if Boeing submit everything required in October (and it is proves to be acceptable to FAA) what's the minimum delay before re-certification? 4 weeks? 6 weeks? Longer? Then how long to implement changes on the first stored aircraft and bring it back to airworthiness after storage? 2 weeks? 4 weeks? Longer?

Just trying to get an idea of how soon the first stored airplanes could start returning to service.
 
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kelvin933
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 1:05 pm

art wrote:
So if Boeing submit everything required in October (and it is proves to be acceptable to FAA) what's the minimum delay before re-certification? 4 weeks? 6 weeks? Longer? Then how long to implement changes on the first stored aircraft and bring it back to airworthiness after storage? 2 weeks? 4 weeks? Longer?

Just trying to get an idea of how soon the first stored airplanes could start returning to service.

According to rumors, FAA has stated that they will need 90 days to evaluate and test any fix from Boeing to the outstanding issues on the 737MAX, this is not just about MCAS but other issues that have been discovered after the ET302 crash,
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 1:10 pm

art wrote:
The MAX certification process appears to have been characterised by delegation of a lot of the process to an OEM that did not exercise due diligence yet somehow this breach of trust was not identified or - if identified - not stopped by FAA. To me that invalidates the certification awarded by FAA.

I think the certification of this aircraft should be subject to a 'D check' - the certification should be taken apart, each component of that certification be carefully scrutinised and fixed if fault is found. The process should be done properly and thoroughly this time through FAA doing their job properly.

It's interesting that this idea flies in the face of one aspect of what the latest NYT article raised, which is that the FAA engineers are demoralized because they are being bypassed due to FAA managers favoring delegation and laws passed by a heavily lobbied Congress reducing the scope of their roles, that the FAA can't retain talented engineers, that the FAA often has to rely on junior engineers to serve in roles that they are not experienced enough to fill, and that low FAA pay makes it hard if not impossible for the FAA to hire and keep experienced engineers.

I think you can see the dilemma your idea of a 737 teardown faces: who is going to do this much larger task, presuming it is a given that the FAA engineering cadre is understaffed, behind the curve with regards to experience, and demoralized?

If the NYT reporting is correct, it seems the FAA issue has no easy fix.

It would take many changes in existing laws regarding delegation of responsibility, and a big boost in salaries that would upset the pay scales relative to other federal employees, and a significant amount of time to raise the training level of junior engineers and/or integrate newly hired more senior engineers.

It seems the system has evolved to the point that the only feasible approach is unfortunately delegation, because even if you decide delegation a bad thing you can't change it in the near term. It would need a strong mandate from the executive branch to spend the needed funds (not very likely IMO), a significant amount of backtracking by Congress (again not likely due to the fact that lobbyists/corporations largely pay for Congressional electoral campaigns) and at least 1-2 years for the increased hiring to show any amount of impact.

I wish I could say that a return to the pre-2005 system where delegated engineers reported to FAA managers was restored, but can any of us say this relatively small change is going to happen, despite the clear issues raised by the MAX tragedies?

Basically it would take protests in the street or a storm of early morning tweets to change the direction things are going in, IMO.
Last edited by Revelation on Tue Jul 30, 2019 1:18 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 1:16 pm

ArgentoSystems wrote:
Why there is no updates from Boeing? The last official one is From Jul 17 and it is about 100M. They should be giving weekly updates on the progress. It went largely unnoticed, but the Ryan Air CEO told the Boeing now delaying submission of the fix to FAA till October. Hmm. Why there is no official release from Boeing?

To me the silence is an indicator they are lagging behind. They can't lie and prefer not to tell anything.

So does this fly in the face of the earlier claims that Boeing can spit out an MCAS update in two weeks because they do not care about safety and will use shortcuts?

The MCAS software fix was completed and submitted for testing and certification. The FAA and EASA added additional items, it is somewhat curious that we have not seen much debate about the MCAS fix (other than A.Net) or what the FAA / EASA had to say about it, all we got was the FAA crippling the computers to evoke a specific fault, EASA getting in their 5 items, no additional word about the main culprit MCAS and whether that was fixed to their satisfaction. I don't think that they are in fear of saying that MCAS is now fixed and we are waiting on the additional items to be addressed. I do not see how that would be giving Boeing any positive press, after all, the MAX is still grounded, billions have been allocated to be written off, airlines will be receiving compensation, vendors are being paid while a/c sit undelivered, how much good press can they give?
 
TaromA380
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 1:32 pm

flyingphil wrote:
More on the potential rudder cables issue.. worth a read

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/7 ... ified.html

F.A.A. managers conceded that the Max “does not meet” agency guidelines “for protecting flight controls,” according to an agency document. But in another document, they added that they had to consider whether any requested changes would interfere with Boeing’s timeline. The managers wrote that it would be “impractical at this late point in the program,” for the company to resolve the issue. Mr. Duven at the F.A.A. also said the decision was based on the safety record of the plane.

If this turn out true, does this means that basically the entire MAX program is not in control if its fate anymore ?

Imagine any important national authority taking this seriously and asking for modification before re-certification. It would mean such a delay and resources that the nightmare becomes inferno.

It seems to me that any big national agency can now veto the industrial program if they want to.
 
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PITingres
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 1:45 pm

Wrotaz wrote:
2175301 wrote:
1) The MCAS/Flight Computer failure/issues was not the primary reason for the Lion Air crash. Yes that system failure created a problem and exposed a situation that led to the crash.


I’m not an expert, so forgive me a naive question. But isn’t labeling everything on Boeing side as something that created a problem (without judging the actual weight and scale of it) a simplification? Let’s say (exaggerating strongly) that half of the wings fell off during a flight, but a crew managed to land. Can we call the falling wings only a contributing factor of a crash of another crew that failed to save the plane (and them being the main factor)....


I would say generally yes. If the first crew found a way to land, and then failed to pass that information on to anyone, and the second crew to have half the wings fall off had one pilot managing to fly it but not telling the other pilot how, and the second pilot losing it ... yes, half the wings falling off would be a contributing factor. Obviously a severe one that needs to be fixed, but a contributing factor nonetheless.

And remember, we're only looking at the Lion Air crash here. The conclusion may well be different for Ethiopian.
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seb76
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 1:49 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
flyingphil wrote:
More on the potential rudder cables issue.. worth a read

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/7 ... ified.html


F.A.A. managers conceded that the Max “does not meet” agency guidelines “for protecting flight controls,” according to an agency document. But in another document, they added that they had to consider whether any requested changes would interfere with Boeing’s timeline. The managers wrote that it would be “impractical at this late point in the program,” for the company to resolve the issue. Mr. Duven at the F.A.A. also said the decision was based on the safety record of the plane.


If this turns out true, the FAA will have some explanation to give if they re-certify the aircraft without demanding a change to the rudder issue. How can an agency whose sole goal is to certify aircraft to a standard deviate from said standard to not interrupt the manufacturers timeline?

EDIT: And to what safety record is Mr. Duvan referring? This is a new aircraft model, there is no safety record. For a new aircraft you can demand changes to make a safe plane safer...
I absolutely understand that the NG does not need any change as it is proven safe but the MAX is not so better change it first before there are 5000 of them in the air.


Certifying airliners is so expensive that not a singe eastern company seems capable to enter this market to break this duopoly while russian and chinese manufacturers will probably be kept out by any other possible means (like not recognizing certifications from their certifying autorities, import taxes etc). The last who tried was Canarair and certifying the C series was such an effort that their baby is now an Airbus product (but offered by the canadian tax payers). So if it turns out that although they already own and know this market inside out, which is already a fair advantage on your competition, the two giants (or at least Boeing in this case) are allowed to not play by the same rules as potential entrants, it would be quite disgusting isn't it?
Just to explain my thought, the way multiplayer Sega racing arcade games were designed was always that the cars leading a race would always have little less peak speed than the cars following them because that was creating interesting situations and gave everybody a chance to win. Ultimately, this suspense led more people to spend their money on the game. In commercial aviation, there is zero incentive to attract new challengers.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 1:55 pm

PITingres wrote:
Wrotaz wrote:
2175301 wrote:
1) The MCAS/Flight Computer failure/issues was not the primary reason for the Lion Air crash. Yes that system failure created a problem and exposed a situation that led to the crash.


I’m not an expert, so forgive me a naive question. But isn’t labeling everything on Boeing side as something that created a problem (without judging the actual weight and scale of it) a simplification? Let’s say (exaggerating strongly) that half of the wings fell off during a flight, but a crew managed to land. Can we call the falling wings only a contributing factor of a crash of another crew that failed to save the plane (and them being the main factor)....


I would say generally yes. If the first crew found a way to land, and then failed to pass that information on to anyone, and the second crew to have half the wings fall off had one pilot managing to fly it but not telling the other pilot how, and the second pilot losing it ... yes, half the wings falling off would be a contributing factor. Obviously a severe one that needs to be fixed, but a contributing factor nonetheless.

And remember, we're only looking at the Lion Air crash here. The conclusion may well be different for Ethiopian.

Get real. We have three events, one a significant loss of control and two crashes. It is clear the common and primary contributory factor was MCAS V1.0 triggered by AOA failed high. You can apply RCA methods to root out the other contributors - to each event, to MCAS V1.0 and AOA fail high - but you cannot change that , no matter how much you want to.

Ray
 
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Lilienthal
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:06 pm

Great rundown in today's NYT The Daily podcast:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/podc ... 7-max.html
 
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JetBuddy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:19 pm

I was under the impression there were only two problems facing the MAX. But according to these articles there are now six issues.

In simplified terms:

- MCAS issue (well known)
- Trim wheel issue (too rigid, impossible to move in certain scenarios)
- Lack of training (a few slides on an ipad / no simulator training)
- Flight control computer (the lagging microprocessor)
- Autopilot disengage not working in some emergencies (likely related to the above one)
- Vulnerable rudder cables / if engine disintegration (larger fan blades, different position, vulnerable rudder cables)

Several of these may be related to the others.

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/7 ... ified.html
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/e ... sues-.html
Last edited by JetBuddy on Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:23 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
Jetty
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:21 pm

'Boeing's Killer Planes' by the BBC watchable here: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7eqscu

Unsurprisingly there isn't a single nice word about Boeing included. 'Horrid', 'violent', 'terrifying', 'flawed', 'incomprehensible', 'profit before safety' and 'contrary to everything in aircraft design' do a good job of describing the evil Boeing company though.
 
Interflug74
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:22 pm

2175301 wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
2175301 wrote:

This specific discussion is about the Lion Air Crash - and does not involve the Ethiopian crash. In a post above the previous one under discussion here I state essentially that I have not formed any opinions on the Ethiopian crash.

The preliminary report for the 2018 crash in my opinion validates my point number 1) The pilots of the previous day's flight appropriately handled the situation with the failure of the MCAS/flight control computer system.

I admit that the 2nd point is at best only possibly partially validated by the preliminary report. It does show that for much of the flight once the MCAS system started to automatically trim down, that there were essentially matching manual trip ups to maintain basic flight stability, including pitch trim levels. Then after 22:30:53 in the last about 1.5 minutes hat there were very few (and clearly not matching) manual inputs to offset the automatic trim down commands. Pitch trim went low, altitude was lost with an increas in airspeed (dramatically) and the crash occurred.

Up to in the range of 22:30:53 the pilot flying the aircraft was maintaining essential control, even though they knew they had problems (clearly communicated by the control tower transcripts). After that time they were not.

The preliminary report was issued before the CVR recorders were located. It does not indicate who was at the controls of the aircraft (or at least I did not see that indicated). So, there is no proof one way or another about my belief that there was a switch of the pilot flying during this time (that one adequately controlled the aircraft, and the next one did not).

The Lion Air Crash thread included a lot of information (some factual and very useful, much speculation - of various degrees of plausibility) that was not in the preliminary report, and includes information from after the CVR was located. It will take time to dig through that thread and find why I believe what I currently believe (or identify that my belief was incorrect). That will take some time to do. I will work on it in my free time. If others know if any information in the Lion Air Crash threa, or related thread, about a change of pilots flying the Lion Air flight - and any changes: That would speed things up.

Have a great day,

So apart from repeating the analyses that we been through before, what is the point you wish to make?


Ray


With all due respect Ray. My main point is that there seems to be a large number of people on this forum who largely believe that only Boeing is responsible for the crashes; and dismiss factual data that may indicate otherwise. I personally believe that while Boeing is responsible for a bad MCAS system design (and that the error was at the FMEA stage). They are no where near solely responsible for at least the Lion Air Crash. In my mind Lion Air Management has a lot to explain about their crash concerning at least their procedures and CRM training.

My initial statements that you questioned stand and are now verified. I was not rewriting history - just reporting it. I'm not sure why you or others were so upset. The report you said I should read to verify facts confirmed 3/4 of it (as discussed in the post you replied too).

Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang Post 2978 (on page 60 of that thread) confirms that the Pilot, who had been adequately controlling the aircraft - even with the problem, turned the controls over to the Co-Pilot and referenced a March 20, 2019 New York Times article.

mzlin wrote:
New York Times is reporting that the captain on the accident flight passed control to the FO then looked through the manual. Apparently the memory item of cutting power to the stabilizer did not come to him, even after having to retrim using the electrical switches 20 times. Also strange he apparently didn't instruct the FO to retrim. The FO ended up praying for a miracle. You'd think hearing that the captain might realize the FO wasn't taking effective action to retrim: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/worl ... oeing.html

It is alarming that pilots (mostly outside the US) don't seem to remember the basic parts of an airplane and how they work; they expect airplanes to be like cars where you just need to push buttons and press pedals.


We now know that the pilot was controlling the aircraft at the start of the MCAS event and supplying the relatively constant trip up commands that allowed him to maintain essential control over the aircraft. While I can understand his desire to get involved in troubleshooting - there is no information currently public that I am aware of that would indicate why he transferred control without adequate instructions on the need for constant manual trim up commands to remain in relatively stable flight.

Please see the Loin Air thread for other issues under discussion as possible co-issues to this crash.

My point is in this specific case (Lion Air) that 2 separate pilots adequately dealt with a malfunctioning MCAS and were adequately flying the aircraft. The 3rd did not (and I think the most likely reason is inadequate CRM and possibly training). When asking what is a cause of this crash... those facts point that while Boeing may share some of the blame... they certainly do not own it all (in my humble opinion).

In almost all cases there are multiple factors and shared parties to an event.

My overall point is that I wish people would stop this "Its all - or almost all - Boeing fault; that their management and engineers are not competent (or other words).

Boeing blew the FMEA, the FAA did not catch that. The investigation after identified that and the fix is not just slapping the hands of Boeing and the FAA and telling them to do better (not to mention financial effects); but to implement a completely independent 3rd party review of FMEA's reporting to the FAA - starting with the MCAS fix and moving into the future (my information is that EASA will do the same - as they had the same base vulnerability with Airbus and others self certifying certain things with EASA reviewing it - and the EASA staff, like the FAA, is not robust enough to do it all on their own).

Also, now that I have reviewed the entire Lion Air crash thread: Very early on several forum members were asking about the failure analysis of the MCAS system - well before the FDR was recovered. Others noted that the flight was essentially stable for about 6 minutes (in obvious manual control due to minor elevation changes); and then it went bad. What happened at that point. Again before the FDR was recovered and the traces showed the Auto Trim Down, and Manual Trim Ups, etc. I also think it was Zeke who first said in the Lion Air thread that there are likely dozens of things that could crash an airliner; but, the probabilities were so low.

As for the control cable issue... Which OEMInsider brilliantly explained why it is not likely an issue: its within the accepted failure rate, and I suggest that there is adequate real world uncontained engine failures to validate that less than 5% of them cut a control cable, hydraulic line, or wiring.

I suggest that people on this forum can expect to see many more reports along these lines. My personal guess is that buried within the FMEA's are likely at least 20 and perhaps several times that identified failures that could crash an airliner with loss of all (or most) lives on board. The estimated probabilities for those events are within the accepted limits. But, like the control cable issue - It now seems that the press (and others) joyfully like to point them out. This does not mean that Boeing Management is bad or the engineers incompetent.

Have a great day,

ps: as for the signature: I learned long ago not to sign with my actual name on internet forums (there are a few very old exceptions out there); and I don't like pretending to be someone I'm not. I do want everyone to have a great day - even to those I disagree with. We all work more productive and have more fun that way.


These things happen, when planes, built with known issues in acceptable limits, as you say it, meet pilots, trained good enough for normal operation. Boeing should have known better..
 
ArgentoSystems
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:27 pm

Noshow wrote:
They have to wait for whatever the FAA decides. It's beyound their decision.
However I would prefer to get more updates too. What are they working on and what are the suggested solutions? There is more stuff to do than just MCAS 2.0 by now.

FAA is not deciding anything at the moment. The ball is in BA's hands. They are yet to submit their fix for certification, and I would love to have some first hand info about the progress with the development.
 
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JerseyFlyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:28 pm

My take on the pilot training theme: if a plane is too dangerous to be flown by certain airlines, it is too dangerous to be sold to them
 
B777LRF
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:36 pm

JerseyFlyer wrote:
My take on the pilot training theme: if a plane is too dangerous to be flown by certain airlines, it is too dangerous to be sold to them


Great idea; you've just erased 90% of the Max backlog.
Signature. You just read one.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:43 pm

ArgentoSystems wrote:
Noshow wrote:
They have to wait for whatever the FAA decides. It's beyound their decision.
However I would prefer to get more updates too. What are they working on and what are the suggested solutions? There is more stuff to do than just MCAS 2.0 by now.

FAA is not deciding anything at the moment. The ball is in BA's hands. They are yet to submit their fix for certification, and I would love to have some first hand info about the progress with the development.


i have no clue what is going on
but looked from outside and regarding how boeing is communicating the development of the case ....

... i think they have only a plan A

and plan A is to
- patch MCAS up to 2.0
- rename the bird and burrie the MAX name forever
- ignore the other open cases
and invest a fortune to lobby the potus, the US congress and whom ever to press on the FAA to lift the grounding asap

they really should set up teams for plan B and plan C .....
Last edited by asdf on Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:44 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:44 pm

JetBuddy wrote:
I was under the impression there were only two problems facing the MAX. But according to these articles there are now six issues.

In simplified terms:

- MCAS issue (well known)
- Trim wheel issue (too rigid, impossible to move in certain scenarios)
- Lack of training (a few slides on an ipad / no simulator training)
- Flight control computer (the lagging microprocessor)
- Autopilot disengage not working in some emergencies (likely related to the above one)
- Vulnerable rudder cables / if engine disintegration (larger fan blades, different position, vulnerable rudder cables)

Several of these may be related to the others.

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/7 ... ified.html
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/e ... sues-.html

Been somewhere nice I hope!

You missed the 'AOA reliability' one from the EASA list (don't know what this is really about).

Oh and, the 'Flaps System' problem (no detail but declared catastrophic by FAA).

Oh and, MAX simulator did not simulate MCAS and, whilst on the subject, MAX nor NG simulators did not adequately simulate manual trim wheel loads.

Ray
 
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qf789
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:48 pm

A couple of things regarding the 737MAX from Air Canada's Q2 earning update

Most impacted market due to grounding is Hawaii

https://twitter.com/e_russell/status/11 ... 77186?s=20

Current 737MAX pilots are sitting idle as carrier does not operate 737NG, not hiring new pilots atm

https://twitter.com/e_russell/status/11 ... 51969?s=20

Will take Air Canada up to a year to take delivery of other 737MAX's once recertified as need to hire more pilots before they can take delivery of them

https://twitter.com/e_russell/status/11 ... 01539?s=20
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:48 pm

JetBuddy wrote:
I was under the impression there were only two problems facing the MAX. But according to these articles there are now six issues.

In simplified terms:

- MCAS issue (well known)
- Trim wheel issue (too rigid, impossible to move in certain scenarios)
- Lack of training (a few slides on an ipad / no simulator training)
- Flight control computer (the lagging microprocessor)
- Autopilot disengage not working in some emergencies (likely related to the above one)
- Vulnerable rudder cables / if engine disintegration (larger fan blades, different position, vulnerable rudder cables)

Several of these may be related to the others.

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/7 ... ified.html
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/e ... sues-.html

I'm impressed by that site's close tracking of the events, but the suggested implications always seem to be the worst case scenario.

The original report of the first five issues suggest some of them may be resolved by, for instance, making a convincing argument that iPad training is sufficient rather than needing to have simulator training just because the training issue is on the list.

We don't know if the sixth item was already known to EASA before it made its list.

For all we know, EASA could have decided that the evaluation of risk that Boeing made was proper with respect to the regulations and the concerns of the FAA engineers raised by the NYT were not. Or, of course, the opposite. The issue is we don't know which is true, so we don't know if the issue is now on EASA's list.

And yes, there are other items that some feel are important, but they too weren't on EASA's list.
Last edited by Revelation on Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:51 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 2:50 pm

So how much longer? Two years? Three? If this get's into hardware and it very much looks like we are talking about several years it seems.
 
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PITingres
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Jul 30, 2019 3:18 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
PITingres wrote:
Wrotaz wrote:

I’m not an expert, so forgive me a naive question. But isn’t labeling everything on Boeing side as something that created a problem (without judging the actual weight and scale of it) a simplification? Let’s say (exaggerating strongly) that half of the wings fell off during a flight, but a crew managed to land. Can we call the falling wings only a contributing factor of a crash of another crew that failed to save the plane (and them being the main factor)....


I would say generally yes. If the first crew found a way to land, and then failed to pass that information on to anyone, and the second crew to have half the wings fall off had one pilot managing to fly it but not telling the other pilot how, and the second pilot losing it ... yes, half the wings falling off would be a contributing factor. Obviously a severe one that needs to be fixed, but a contributing factor nonetheless.

And remember, we're only looking at the Lion Air crash here. The conclusion may well be different for Ethiopian.


Get real. We have three events, one a significant loss of control and two crashes. It is clear the common and primary contributory factor was MCAS V1.0 triggered by AOA failed high. You can apply RCA methods to root out the other contributors - to each event, to MCAS V1.0 and AOA fail high - but you cannot change that , no matter how much you want to.

Ray


Clearly you didn't read my last sentence; or if you did, you failed to apply it. In any case, you are correct that as far as a formal declaration of cause, MCAS is a contributing factor. I would be enormously surprised if it were found to be the probable cause, for the reasons already stated - multiple times.

I'm not trying to defend anything, as you seem to imagine I am, and in particular I'm not trying to shift fault away from MCAS 1.0. Findings of probable cause follow a well defined process, and according to my understanding of that process, the Lion Air crash -- given what we know externally -- is likely to be written up just as 2175301 has stated. This does not claim that MCAS 1.0 was free from fault, nor does it somehow blame just the pilots and let everyone off scot-free.

Lots of aircraft accidents whose (formal!) probable cause was found to be between chair and wheel, ended up being ultimately fixed by addressing some other part of the system. Re-read your NTSB AAR's.
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