Andy33 wrote:

The thing to consider is that around 80% of both the built but undelivered planes and the outstanding order book, are for airlines based outside the USA. Until regulators around the world are convinced that the MAX has been made safe to fly in their airspace and for airlines registered in their countries, Boeing is still in desperate trouble even if the FAA gives a green light to the MAX.
None of the non-US regulators have the health of the US aviation industry as part of their remit, some indeed see the FAA's dual role as part of the problem.

The FAA may want the rest of the world involved, they have involved the rest of the world, but just as when there are tragic accidents around the world where the FAA is involved, the rest of the world regulators ultimately make their own decisions.
If the FAA reinstates the MAX in the USA and other regulators say no, it is up to Boeing to invest the time and the money to get them on board. As you state, the bulk of the orders are not for USA base carriers, but if USA carriers can take delivery, it will provide a cash flow to mitigate the financial strain, especially if they can take early delivery.
Even if the regulators decline to allow the MAX into their air space by foreign carriers, for the next couple years or so, the American carriers will have enough capacity to deploy the MAX on domestic routes only while Boeing works with those regulators to get the MAX fit for operation, even if that means physical changes.
The size of the USA domestic market in such a scenario would be beneficial, especially if WN has the largest order of the USA carriers, they are primarily domestic.

GE released the 2Q19 results on the 31st. https://www.ge.com/investor-relations/events-reports

Aircraft engine orders by value for the quarter down 10%. MAX engines still being sold and paid in full? Inventory increasing, so perhaps not. GECAS has a financial interest in nearly 200 MAX (in service, built but undelivered, being built, unconditional orders - full payment or milestone payments made). No lessee is deemed non-performing in respect to MAX. Does that mean GECAS has adjusted lease payments to zero / nominal amount to avoid technical default? Quarterly MAX cost USD400m, which seems low (USD2m per aircraft plus engine manufacture exposure). SAFRAN exposure included?

par13del wrote:

Suck it up how, the USA is a liability country, any admissions as in "suck it up" will have a bevy of lawyers looking for compensation for mental stress and aggravation.

That should be the "silver lining", no?

No one can find a way to change laws written by Congress or change FAA's love of delegation, but a pack of lawyers with a class action lawsuit really could really drive Boeing to show clear improvements in its procedures.

As the old saying goes, grab them by the ****s and their hearts and minds will follow!

Boeing wanted to self regulate, they better hope they didn't self insure.

art wrote:

I am in the UK. Symbiotic business relationships don't exist your side of the pond? You know, I gain from dealing with you and you gain from dealing with me and if I as a supplier encounter problems likely to lead to late delivery, I give you my best estimate of when I will deliver, being aware that you are making plans based on when I say I will deliver.

I think that if customers can trust you they will be more likely to want to deal with you again.

I think that the only bigger oxymoron than "business ethics" is "compassionate capitalism".

Sorry if I'm coming across as snarky, but in reality I am jaded.

I do appreciate your posts, art, they are well written and remind me of the days before I was jaded.

smithbs wrote:

And then for those who think the entire 737 program should be scrapped at this point, I'm amazed at the drama and extremist position. Just because a couple issues need to be worked out in the design doesn't mean the whole product needs to be put down.

Yes, the whole product needs to be put down. The Max must go. Boeing has taken the development of the 737 one step too far. From the -100 all the way to the -900 was an amazing journey. But now it's time for a new design. Boeing should really focus on that.

MartijnNL wrote:

smithbs wrote:

And then for those who think the entire 737 program should be scrapped at this point, I'm amazed at the drama and extremist position. Just because a couple issues need to be worked out in the design doesn't mean the whole product needs to be put down.

Yes, the whole product needs to be put down. The Max must go. Boeing has taken the development of the 737 one step too far. From the -100 all the way to the -900 was an amazing journey. But now it's time for a new design. Boeing should really focus on that.

Thank you for your opinion - everyone has one. However with 5000 orders on the books, that ain't happening.

In https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethi ... SKCN1UQ24J we read the Senate seems to be using the NYT report from this weekend to have a go at the FAA officials.

Here's how the FAA officials explain themselves:

Acting Deputy FAA Administrator Carl Burleson told the panel that while the longstanding practice of delegating authority is not perfect there were no significant issues. “The fundamental process of how we went about certifying the MAX was sound,” Burleson said.

Ali Bahrami, the FAA’s associate administrator for aviation safety, told the panel its primary concern was safety and not any Boeing timetable.

Seems Sen. Collins was non-plussed by this:

After the hearing Collins said she was “surprised” FAA officials disputed concerns on delegating aircraft certification considering documents the committee has reviewed. “They did not seem to think that there were problems at the agency,” she told Reuters.

Seems Sen. Collins has a NYT subscription.

Is the following scenario at all plausible:

- The FAA mandates the Max to be recertified as a new model, with a full new type rating.
- Boeing reponds with launching the NSA and at the same time offering all airlines with a Max on order to keep it (knowing that extra pilot training would be necessary), to convert it (for a discount) to an NG or (for a premium) to convert it to an NSA.

Shouldn’t this please all parties?

14ccKemiskt wrote:

Is the following scenario at all plausible:

- The FAA mandates the Max to be recertified as a new model, with a full new type rating.

As above, FAA officials just finished telling the Senate Appropriations Committee “The fundamental process of how we went about certifying the MAX was sound".

Clearly FAA doesn't feel the Max needs to be recertified.

par13del wrote:

Even if the regulators decline to allow the MAX into their air space by foreign carriers, for the next couple years or so, the American carriers will have enough capacity to deploy the MAX on domestic routes only while Boeing works with those regulators to get the MAX fit for operation

And do you honestly believe the US travelling public will accept flying on an aircraft that's grounded in the rest of the world?

In a world of globally accessible instant news, alternative news and opinions, I just don't see that happening; the social shit storm which this would be absolutely certain to cause, would be of such proportions no airline would touch the thing with a bargepole.

So rather than being an option for Boeing to maintain reduced production (to the extent that's even possible when you've temporarily removed 80% of the backlog), it might rather become the victim of public, media and - sure as there's smoke from a fire - political pressure to such an extent, it could spell it's complete demise.

Didn't see this article posted here so this is from The Wall Street Journal.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators ... 1564565521

"An internal risk analysis after the first of two Boeing 737 MAX airliner crashes showed the likelihood was high of a similar cockpit emergency within months, according to a Federal Aviation Administration official familiar with the details and others briefed on the matter.

The regulator’s analysis, not previously reported, showed that it “didn’t take that much” for a malfunction like the one confronted by the pilots of the Lion Air flight that crashed into the Java Sea last year to occur"

I get that they didn't want to ground the Max after the first crash and warned pilots of the problem. But when the second crash happened and they refused to ground the Max after this article. They already knew about the issues with the MCAS and knew there was a HIGH probability of a second crash. The best course was to lead the World in grounding the plane and putting safety first. The fact that they were the last to do so puts a very poor light on the FAA and how it wasn't a leader for the World in these tragedies.

B777LRF wrote:

And do you honestly believe the US travelling public will accept flying on an aircraft that's grounded in the rest of the world?

Many will, and those that won't accept it won't know what plane they are flying.

Forgedias wrote:

Didn't see this article posted here so this is from The Wall Street Journal.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators ... 1564565521

"An internal risk analysis after the first of two Boeing 737 MAX airliner crashes showed the likelihood was high of a similar cockpit emergency within months, according to a Federal Aviation Administration official familiar with the details and others briefed on the matter.

The regulator’s analysis, not previously reported, showed that it “didn’t take that much” for a malfunction like the one confronted by the pilots of the Lion Air flight that crashed into the Java Sea last year to occur"

I get that they didn't want to ground the Max after the first crash and warned pilots of the problem. But when the second crash happened and they refused to ground the Max after this article. They already knew about the issues with the MCAS and knew there was a HIGH probability of a second crash. The best course was to lead the World in grounding the plane and putting safety first. The fact that they were the last to do so puts a very poor light on the FAA and how it wasn't a leader for the World in these tragedies.

What mystifies me is why, left to their own devices, FAA did not ground the type immediately after the second crash. The MAX had just done what they thought was highly likely - it had crashed again. Inexplicable to me. Unless FAA were not left to their own devices.

Revelation wrote:

14ccKemiskt wrote:

Is the following scenario at all plausible:

- The FAA mandates the Max to be recertified as a new model, with a full new type rating.

As above, FAA officials just finished telling the Senate Appropriations Committee “The fundamental process of how we went about certifying the MAX was sound".

Clearly FAA doesn't feel the Max needs to be recertified.

FAA officials says everything was sound with certification.

Boeing officials says ... the same.

=> there is no problem with the Max. The self-assessments race being completed once more, the Max can fly again starting tomorrow.

Oh wait.

TaromA380 wrote:

Revelation wrote:

14ccKemiskt wrote:

Is the following scenario at all plausible:

- The FAA mandates the Max to be recertified as a new model, with a full new type rating.

As above, FAA officials just finished telling the Senate Appropriations Committee “The fundamental process of how we went about certifying the MAX was sound".

Clearly FAA doesn't feel the Max needs to be recertified.

FAA officials says everything was sound with certification.

Boeing officials says ... the same.

=> there is no problem with the Max. The self-assessments race being completed once more, the Max will fly again starting tomorrow.

Oh wait.

The operation was a success, but the patient died.

hOMSaR wrote:

The operation was a success, but the patient died.

If we're going by what the FAA officials are saying to the Senate, one of the surgeries was a failure but the patient will live.

B777LRF wrote:

And do you honestly believe the US travelling public will accept flying on an aircraft that's grounded in the rest of the world?

In a world of globally accessible instant news, alternative news and opinions, I just don't see that happening; the social shit storm which this would be absolutely certain to cause, would be of such proportions no airline would touch the thing with a bargepole.

So rather than being an option for Boeing to maintain reduced production (to the extent that's even possible when you've temporarily removed 80% of the backlog), it might rather become the victim of public, media and - sure as there's smoke from a fire - political pressure to such an extent, it could spell it's complete demise.

The world has seen the Americans rally around the flag, so yes, I see them travelling on the a/c. I would love to see the airline who has the brass to say that their foreign made a/c is safe and see the backlash they receive.
Since the last gulf wars and even under the current POTUS the world has been anti-USA so....

As for the reduced production, the majority of Boeing's commercial production is geared around the 737, presently established at 52 per month due to grow to 60, they reduced to 40 and say it may go lower, I suspect they went lower to minimize finding more parking space, even going lower does not solve the problem of no deliveries. If the FAA some how is persuaded to kill the MAX they will be the chief figurehead in front of congress pushing for launch aid, tax free loans or whatever Federal financing they can come up with to keep Boeing out of chpt.11.

From Boeing financials page 53-54
https://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/do ... 9-10-Q.pdf

In the preparation of our financial statements, we have made assumptions regarding outcomes of accident investigations, timing and conditions of
return to service, timing of future 737 production rate increases, supplier readiness to support production rate changes, timing and sequence of
future customer deliveries as well as outcomes of negotiations with customers impacted by the grounding. These assumptions are highly uncertain
and significantly affect the estimates inherent in our financial statements.

The 737 MAX grounding also affects projected revenues and costs associated with the 737 program accounting quantity. As a result of the
grounding, we have reduced the 737 production rate from 52 per month to 42 per month and continue to evaluate further reductions in production
rate, including a temporary shutdown in 737 production. Prior to the grounding, we had planned to increase the production rate to 57 per month in
2019. The FAA and other civil aviation authorities will determine the timing and conditions of the 737 MAX’s return to service. At June 30, 2019, we
have assumed that regulatory approval of 737 MAX return to service in the U.S. and other jurisdictions begins early in the fourth quarter of 2019. We
have further assumed a gradual increase in the production rate from 42 per month to 57 per month in 2020, and that deliveries of 737 MAX airplanes
in inventory will occur over several quarters following return to service. The resulting impacts increased estimated costs to produce aircraft included
in the current accounting quantity by $1,016 million and $1,748 million in the first and second quarters of 2019 and reduced 737 program and overall
BCA segment operating margins. If the timing and conditions surrounding a return to service differ from our assumptions, it could have a material
effect on our financial statements.

We recorded an earnings charge of $5,610 million, net of estimated insurance recoveries of $500 million, in the second quarter in connection with an
estimate of potential concessions and other considerations to customers for disruptions related to the 737 MAX grounding and associated delivery
delays. This charge represents our current best estimate of future concessions and other considerations we expect to provide to customers. This
estimate relies on the exercise of judgment by management and is significantly impacted by the assumptions described above, as well as the status
of negotiations with our customers. Any delays in return to service, further disruptions to our production system, supplier claims or assertions, or
changes to estimated concessions and other considerations we expect to provide to customers could have a material adverse effect on our financial
position, results of operations, and/or cash flows...

...The 737 MAX fleet is currently grounded, and we are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties related to the timing and conditions
surrounding the aircraft’s return to service, including potential future reductions to the production rate and/or additional delivery delays,
as well as risks associated with assumptions and estimates made in our financial statements regarding the 737 program.
On March 13, 2019, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an order to suspend operations of all 737 MAX aircraft in the U.S. and by U.S.
aircraft operators following two fatal 737 MAX accidents. Non-U.S. civil aviation authorities have issued directives to the same effect. We are working
closely with the relevant government authorities to support both accident investigations and are fully cooperating with other U.S. government
investigations related to the accidents. Multiple legal actions have also been filed against us as a result of the accidents. While production continues
on the 737 MAX, deliveries have been suspended until clearance is granted by the appropriate regulatory authorities. The grounding has reduced
revenues, operating margins, and cash flows, and will continue to do so until deliveries resume and production rates increase. In connection with the
effort to restore the 737 MAX to service, we have been developing a software update to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or
MCAS, on the 737 MAX, together with an associated pilot training and supplementary education program. Further, on June 26, 2019, the FAA
directed us to address a specific condition of flight, unrelated to MCAS, that the planned software update did not previously address. We agreed with
the FAA's decision, and are currently working on the software to address this requirement, and we will not offer the 737 MAX for certification until we
have satisfied all requirements for certification and the safe return of the 737 MAX to service. Any unanticipated delays in certification and/or return
to service or other liabilities associated with the accidents or grounding could have a material adverse effect on our financial position, results of
operations, and/or cash flows.

On April 5, 2019, we announced plans to reduce the 737 production rate from 52 aircraft per month to 42 per month effective April 15, 2019. In
addition to being unable to deliver completed aircraft until the required certifications are obtained, impacts related to the reduced production rate
have increased costs to produce aircraft included in the current accounting quantity and reduced 737 program and overall BCA segment operating
margins. If we are unable to return the 737 MAX aircraft to service in one or more jurisdictions or begin deliveries to customers in a timely manner,
we would incur additional costs and/or further reduce the 737 production rate. In addition, unanticipated delays in certification and/or return to
service of the 737 MAX in one or more jurisdictions could result in significant additional disruption to the 737 production system, including further
reductions in the production rate and/or a temporary shutdown in 737 production, delaying efforts to restore and/or implement previously planned
increases in the 737 production rate. Cash flows could also be negatively impacted through a combination of delayed payments from customers and
higher costs and inventory levels. In addition, we have experienced claims and assertions from customers in connection with the grounding, and we
recorded an earnings charge of $5,610, net of estimated insurance recoveries of $500, in the second quarter in connection with an estimate of
potential concessions and other considerations to customers for disruptions related to the grounding and associated delivery delays. Any such
delays in return to service, further disruptions to our production system, supplier claims or assertions, or changes to estimated concessions or other
considerations we expect to provide to customers could have a material adverse effect on our financial position, results of operations, and/or cash
flows. The FAA and other civil aviation authorities will determine the timing and conditions of return to service. However, for purposes of our second
quarter financial results, we have assumed that regulatory approval of 737 MAX

FAA officials just finished telling the Senate Appropriations Committee “The fundamental process of how we went about certifying the MAX was sound".

One must be really obtuse to claim their process was sound in light of the doubly catastrophic result. I mean, really, really stupid. "The process was sound" means nothing needs to be changed in the process. How can this idiot be allowed to stay in charge? If they can't even recognize deficiency of their work.

ArgentoSystems wrote:

One must be really obtuse to claim their process was sound in light of the doubly catastrophic result. I mean, really, really stupid. "The process was sound" means nothing needs to be changed in the process. How can this idiot be allowed to stay in charge? If they can't even recognize deficiency of their work.

Well, he is talking to his bosses, and with all the whistle blowers around, I am sure that they will not have to look too far to find evidence to the contrary, if they do not, they may decide to go through his claim with a fine tooth comb making sure they understand exactly what he meant.
I do not expect them to look too hard once they finish their PR show, after all, they ultimately approved and provided the funding or lack thereof to implement the delegation of certification authority to the OEM, I say OEM because this was not just directed at Boeing, it was an industry decision.

MSPNWA wrote:

B777LRF wrote:

And do you honestly believe the US travelling public will accept flying on an aircraft that's grounded in the rest of the world?

Many will, and those that won't accept it won't know what plane they are flying.

Prior to flight, I've known the hull number of every aircraft I, or my family, has flown for the last 10 years. Flightradar24 is pretty cheap in the long run.

kdeg00 wrote:

MSPNWA wrote:

B777LRF wrote:

And do you honestly believe the US travelling public will accept flying on an aircraft that's grounded in the rest of the world?

Many will, and those that won't accept it won't know what plane they are flying.

Prior to flight, I've known the hull number of every aircraft I, or my family, has flown for the last 10 years. Flightradar24 is pretty cheap in the long run.

People who care about such things as serial numbers are likely less than 1% of the flying population. Don’t extrapolate your own level of interest...

14ccKemiskt wrote:

Is the following scenario at all plausible:

- The FAA mandates the Max to be recertified as a new model, with a full new type rating.
- Boeing reponds with launching the NSA and at the same time offering all airlines with a Max on order to keep it (knowing that extra pilot training would be necessary), to convert it (for a discount) to an NG or (for a premium) to convert it to an NSA.

Shouldn’t this please all parties?

No, it isn't.

2175301 wrote:

Here is the outline of my thinking on this - and why I have my conclusions:

1) The MCAS/Flight Computer failure/issues was not the primary reason for the Lion Air crash.

Sorry, but nothing you write after this statement has any credibility.

MSPNWA wrote:

B777LRF wrote:

And do you honestly believe the US travelling public will accept flying on an aircraft that's grounded in the rest of the world?

Many will, and those that won't accept it won't know what plane they are flying.

Yes, many will. But that doesn't mean that it will be viable for US domestic airlines to operate the MAX in that situation.

Large companies with travelling employees do not want to discuss airline type with employees. Even if only one percent of their employees would bother. They will make contracts with airlines to guarantee that their employees fly on non-MAX planes only. Saves a lot of time compared to having one percent of the employees needing special treatment and/or ticket change.

After boarding a pax load, then one or two pax may discover that they are on a MAX, and insist to be deboarded. Bag must be found and removed from the belly. Time is running while bag is found. MAX planes will almost always be late, if not for something else, then for late arriving plane. Even some "MAX-lovers" will try to avoid booking on a MAX simply to avoid those delays.

That leaves the MAX, if certified by FAA only, to be used viably by only cheapish US domestic holiday package tour makers. And even them will be at a slight disadvantage compared to non-MAX operation.

But of course the MAX will be certified around the world. It is the interest of everybody. Take EASA for instance, they are under enormous pressure by European present day and future MAX operators to cooperate the best they can, and as fast as they can, with the FAA and Boeing to get the MAX in the air again ASAP. And I can't imagine that the situation should be different for Asian and South American regulators.

For natural reasons non-US regulators will take a closer look this time and not just rubberstamp FAA documents. But that doesn't mean that they are less interested than FAA in getting the MAX in the air again ASAP.

prebennorholm wrote:

MSPNWA wrote:

B777LRF wrote:

And do you honestly believe the US travelling public will accept flying on an aircraft that's grounded in the rest of the world?

Many will, and those that won't accept it won't know what plane they are flying.

Yes, many will. But that doesn't mean that it will be viable for US domestic airlines to operate the MAX in that situation.

Large companies with travelling employees do not want to discuss airline type with employees. Even if only one percent of their employees would bother. They will make contracts with airlines to guarantee that their employees fly on non-MAX planes only. Saves a lot of time compared to having one percent of the employees needing special treatment and/or ticket change.

After boarding a pax load, then one or two pax may discover that they are on a MAX, and insist to be deboarded. Bag must be found and removed from the belly. Time is running while bag is found. MAX planes will almost always be late, if not for something else, then for late arriving plane. Even some "MAX-lovers" will try to avoid booking on a MAX simply to avoid those delays.

That leaves the MAX, if certified by FAA only, to be used viably by only cheapish US domestic holiday package tour makers. And even them will be at a slight disadvantage compared to non-MAX operation.

But of course the MAX will be certified around the world. It is the interest of everybody. Take EASA for instance, they are under enormous pressure by European present day and future MAX operators to cooperate the best they can, and as fast as they can, with the FAA and Boeing to get the MAX in the air again ASAP. And I can't imagine that the situation should be different for Asian and South American regulators.

For natural reasons non-US regulators will take a closer look this time and not just rubberstamp FAA documents. But that doesn't mean that they are less interested than FAA in getting the MAX in the air again ASAP.

Bags only have to travel with the passenger on international flights. There is no searching for bags for a domestic flight.

par13del wrote:

seahawk wrote:

I agree with you, except for one point. The third point is suicide imho. If they do not come clean now, one more problem that has been hidden (again) would destroy the MAX and probably Boeing. It is suck it up time and that is the only way forward imho.
Boeing should be proactive and convince people that this was a one time misstep and not company policy. Something like "not only do we fix everything the regulators want, we will also add feature XYZ to further improve the safety of our planes"

By one time misstep you would be referring to the MAX, 787, KC tanker or Boeing in general?
Suck it up how, the USA is a liability country, any admissions as in "suck it up" will have a bevy of lawyers looking for compensation for mental stress and aggravation.
Every day someone somewhere is coming up with additional things, some previously known and accepted, some known but only accepted by some and not all, now as a result of the tragedies, everyone is now empowered to throw more irons into the fire.

All Boeing can do is pretty much what they are doing, unless they elect to go chpt.11. The MCAS fix was completed and submitted, we got no word on whether it was accepted or not, what we did get is a list of 5 or 6 more items from the FAA and EASA along with a specific test which crippled the computer to see how it performed.
Where Boeing is not being given credit is that in spite of the financial cost, they have not attempted to rush the fix out to the FAA to get the a/c back in the air, based on the tone in these threads, one could be shocked that Boeing did not release the fix the day after the a/c was grounded in the USA, do we give them credit for now trying to do due diligence and make sure the fixes are done properly on their side before independent testing?

It is just another risk analysis. Keep hiding things until caught or come clean now, as the shit already hit the fan. Long term I think coming clear is better, but in today´s management culture they will probably opt for the other solution.

This talk of just the FAA certifying the MAX whilst the rest of the world turns their nose up at it. As mentioned not only are passengers going to be asking question, some airlines will be skeptical, what about insurance companies? It's one thing to fly whilst waiting for (say chinese) certification, but to fly it when they have refused certification, sure the insurance companies will love that.
Investors?! Probably happy, their main concern is this drop in revenue from lost routes!

Sent from my SM-T800 using Tapatalk

The Boeing 737MAX has had accidents with 346 dead.

The same number of people died in the infamous DC-10 crash near Paris, after which it was uncovered that the FAA had a "gentleman's agreement" with Douglas. It allowed unmodified DC-10s to fly, even when the defective door latch design was known.

Bahrami, who maintained the FAA was required under an agreement with the National Transportation Safety Board to keep certain information confidential while receiving real-time safety data from accident investigators, assured the committee the FAA’s actions were “normal practice” during an accident probe.

“We do not disclose information or any indication what may have gone wrong in that particular case, and that is a very delicate balance for us to play,” Bahrami said. “So, we wanted to basically resolve the issue without having to disclose information that investigators did not want us to disclose. And from the safety perspective, we felt strongly that what we did was adequate.”

The Seattle Times 7/31

This was the response to why no detailed information on MCAS was relayed to pilots after the Lion Air crash.

I do not think their actions have been anywhere near "adequate". I would prefer the words absolutely disgraceful!!

Facts:

• MCAS is dead end evolutionary aviation technology.
• Boeing is investing heaps of resource dollars to fix the MAX.
• MAX 7.5 is a bit inefficient compared to newer aircraft designs
• MAX software & engineering issues are delaying the NSA / 797.
• 346 people are still dead
• Airlines need airplanes, Boeing isn’t the only manufacturer.
• The Boeing MAX short cut is costing Boeing enormous amounts.
• Recertification is going to be multi-faceted and not quick.
• It is legitimate to think there will be some management shifts and retirements at Boeing.
• There will have to be a fair amount of belt tightening to get the MAX program back to profitability.

Will Boeing NIX the MAX 10 in favor of the NSA and 797? It kind of makes sense to.

kdeg00 wrote:

Prior to flight, I've known the hull number of every aircraft I, or my family, has flown for the last 10 years. Flightradar24 is pretty cheap in the long run.

You are part of a very tiny minority. I'm a part of it as well. The vast majority are not like us. I'm reminded often how even people that work in the industry don't know much about the airplanes being flown. In general, most of consumers don't care. Those that do care, don't know. I think already the MAX thing is off the radar. I bet that if it returned today without media coverage, the ignorance would be blissful.

Revelation wrote:

14ccKemiskt wrote:

Is the following scenario at all plausible:

- The FAA mandates the Max to be recertified as a new model, with a full new type rating.

As above, FAA officials just finished telling the Senate Appropriations Committee “The fundamental process of how we went about certifying the MAX was sound".

Clearly FAA doesn't feel the Max needs to be recertified.

So certification process was sound, but they certified a plane with multiple and fatal flaws... hmmmm... They still call that sound????
Sounds like FAA still trying to save their own asses.

The greater irony and hypocrisy here has to be a government which, for decades now, has cut budgets and entertained lobbyists who demand less regulations, only to turn on the very administration it crippled when the sh*t inevitably hit the fan.

flyingturtle wrote:

The Boeing 737MAX has had accidents with 346 dead.

The same number of people died in the infamous DC-10 crash near Paris, after which it was uncovered that the FAA had a "gentleman's agreement" with Douglas. It allowed unmodified DC-10s to fly, even when the defective door latch design was known.

There was similar comment about developing country pilot skills at the time. At least until the cause was made public.

Just a couple of observations:

1 People fail to realize the entire Max fleet did not have MCAS, it was only the MAX 8 and it was problematic in a very limited portion of the flight envelope. Had Boeing placed restrictions on aft CG, this forum probably wouldn't exist.

2 MCAS or no MCAS the runaway stabilizer trim checklist should have covered the situation. Switching off both red guarded switches and LEAVING THEM OFF, would have rendered the MCAS inop. Someone pointed out flying with stick shaker going off might not be a good idea, I agree but that wasn't the case.

3 I have never flown the 737, but have plenty of time in the 727, which had a very similar trim system. The typical sim scenario was a directed speed increase and then runaway trim. You got to see it at least every six months. Trimming with the stab trim stuck at high speed is a two man job. But it is doable.

4 Airbus is also having similar issues with the 320NEO, 321NEO and the 350. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... en-460046/ However, Airbus got out in front of the issue and has issued CG restrictions or "loading guidance" to ensure their liability is reduced while the situation is on going.

This is just my opinion. Having been an instructor on most Boeing and the 320 aircraft, I am not convinced experience or lack of was not a big issue in both events. I know in the Lion Air crash, the autothrottles were left engaged and did just what they were commanded to do. So, there seems to be an issue of training in that case.

Amiga500 wrote:

An investment should be just that, an investment, not a case of buy at 9am and sell at 11am the same day.

Real "Investment" is limited to the first buyer of a share.

All the other "followup" "investors" ( should be turned into a beep word ) don't invest. they trade ( between share owners.)

The call back to the emitter is limited to share value effecting the company value and thus dept margins.

mmo wrote:

Just a couple of observations:

1 People fail to realize the entire Max fleet did not have MCAS, it was only the MAX 8 and it was problematic in a very limited portion of the flight envelope. Had Boeing placed restrictions on aft CG, this forum probably wouldn't exist.
.

That will be news to operators of MAX 9s, whose delivered and undelivered planes have also been grounded by the regulators in each country. Maybe you meant the MAX10 which is said not to need MCAS, but the MAX10 has yet to be certified though there has been some test flying. As for the MAX7 (or 7.5) I'm not certain, but since none of these have been delivered it is academic.

China Southern suspends Boeing 737 Max order

China Southern Airlines has suspended its order for as many as 64 Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft.

https://www.ttgmedia.com/news/news/chin ... rder-18876

mmo wrote:

Just a couple of observations:

1 People fail to realize the entire Max fleet did not have MCAS, it was only the MAX 8 and it was problematic in a very limited portion of the flight envelope. Had Boeing placed restrictions on aft CG, this forum probably wouldn't exist.

And, right there, your arguments fell completely to the floor. MCAS is integral to all Max versions and any restrictions placed on CG would have sod all effect, as an AoA vane malfunctioning high would activate MCAS at full steam, forcing the nose down regardless of where the CG was. You see the problem wasn't not so much MCAS working as intended, in a limited portion of the flight envelope. It was the inherent risk of it malfunctioning due to several issues, not least relying on a single sensor, that's the issue.

Your additional points are equally flawed.

PS
I too flew the 727, and the 757 for the matter, none of which has any bearing what so ever on the MCAS system on the Max or, indeed, the overlying STS system it's working through.

MSPNWA wrote:

kdeg00 wrote:

Prior to flight, I've known the hull number of every aircraft I, or my family, has flown for the last 10 years. Flightradar24 is pretty cheap in the long run.

You are part of a very tiny minority. I'm a part of it as well. The vast majority are not like us. I'm reminded often how even people that work in the industry don't know much about the airplanes being flown. In general, most of consumers don't care. Those that do care, don't know. I think already the MAX thing is off the radar. I bet that if it returned today without media coverage, the ignorance would be blissful.

You are right.... untill an even minor accident will happen to the newest generation of 737 (formerly known as MAX). Then the spotlights are on and the (social) media will come with the stories... it’s not if this happens, but when.

jetmatt777 wrote:

Bags only have to travel with the passenger on international flights. There is no searching for bags for a domestic flight.

That sounds strange. Why would the 'risks' be non existent on U.S. domestic flights?

mmo wrote:

Just a couple of observations:

1 People fail to realize the entire Max fleet did not have MCAS, it was only the MAX 8 and it was problematic in a very limited portion of the flight envelope. Had Boeing placed restrictions on aft CG, this forum probably wouldn't exist.

2 MCAS or no MCAS the runaway stabilizer trim checklist should have covered the situation. Switching off both red guarded switches and LEAVING THEM OFF, would have rendered the MCAS inop. Someone pointed out flying with stick shaker going off might not be a good idea, I agree but that wasn't the case.

3 I have never flown the 737, but have plenty of time in the 727, which had a very similar trim system. The typical sim scenario was a directed speed increase and then runaway trim. You got to see it at least every six months. Trimming with the stab trim stuck at high speed is a two man job. But it is doable.

4 Airbus is also having similar issues with the 320NEO, 321NEO and the 350. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... en-460046/ However, Airbus got out in front of the issue and has issued CG restrictions or "loading guidance" to ensure their liability is reduced while the situation is on going.

This is just my opinion. Having been an instructor on most Boeing and the 320 aircraft, I am not convinced experience or lack of was not a big issue in both events. I know in the Lion Air crash, the autothrottles were left engaged and did just what they were commanded to do. So, there seems to be an issue of training in that case.

'Facts' are incorrect. Only Max 8 and a few Max 9 were flying - all with MCAS. The problem is related to the tendency for the engine nacelles to give lift and 'lighten' the yoke when in climb - not specifically CG. MCAS V1.0 was intended to act at any point in manual flight with AOA trip exceeded, in AOA fault condition it operates in all manual flight conditions. Pilots nor much anyone else were aware MCAS existed let alone the measures needed to protect themselves. None of the Boeing NNCs applicable recommended RTB for single side stick shaker funnily enough, it was only the flight that continued with single side stick shaker (and did not attempt a high speed banked turn back) that did not crash. Manual trim was patently not doable in the ET case. In relation to throttle, I think you are trying to refer to ET not LionAir and it is not clear if autothrottle was engaged.

Surprised that an instructor would go out of his way to spread miss-information.

Ray

Arguing on this is drifting off topic and I'm talking with my EASA background, FAA may be different. so I'll won't fo further after this post.

smartplane wrote:

Grandfathering isn't as black and white, which you elude to in your comment '... if rudder control doesn't change MUCH..' (my bold).

I simplified a bit but in AESA world it is as black and white.
When I say doesn't change MUCH, it is to illustrate without being specific the difference between an MINOR MOD (certified by OEM only thanks to its DOA privilege) and a MAJOR MOD (needs the authority validation for certification).

smartplane wrote:

Firstly, many grandfathering decisions - yes, can grandfather, no can't, are now made by the OEM not FAA, and even where not, Boeing employees with FAA badges, make recommendations which carry enormous weight, due to FAA resources and de-skilling.

True it's the OEM which classify what is minor or major (with scrutiny of another, independant, branch of the Design Organisation), but that's also part of its DOA privilege not because of authority being un-skilled or under-staffed.

smartplane wrote:

Secondly, the 'change much' grandfathering philosophy goes way back to the -100 and -200, through all subsequent iterations, when in reality if you start with the first models, and leap to the MAX, the changes are massive. For example engine thrust, aircraft length and payload.

The grandfathering is within a Type Certificate, no mater if it comes from the original design from the 60' or from a more recent update, if the system if certified within the TC and doesn't suffer a MAJOR MOD it can be reused as is. A MAJOR MOD kills the grandfathering because needs to be certified against current regulation, whereas a grandfathered design remain certified against its original regulation.

smartplane wrote:

Thirdly, where materials and structures are concerned, via scaling rules (a fancy way of saying yet more grandfathering), we are grandfathering between aircraft families, for example the 787 to 777X.

From one TC to another one, it's definitively not grandfathering.

smartplane wrote:

Fourth, every new grandfathering decision creates yet a new 'base' precedent.

Aircraft OEM's trying to launch completely new aircraft families believe grandfathering gives established OEM's insurmountable cost advantages, and creates unfair and illegal barriers to entry. How much innovation would have been brought to market by now, if Boeing had had to clean sheet the NG?

Of course it's an advantage, you don't have to certify a system and can just rely on all the flight hours and cycle it accumulated over time even if not in line with current regulation.
After all it may makes sense to rely on a proven stuff and put more check efforts to certify a brand new fancy system, no ?

Maybe in the case of the 737 we are reaching the limits of this way of certifying, maybe when introducing a new variant in the TC we should introduce a time limit grandfathering, let's say impossible to grandfather a system certified against a more than xx years old regulation.

MartijnNL wrote:

jetmatt777 wrote:

Bags only have to travel with the passenger on international flights. There is no searching for bags for a domestic flight.

That sounds strange. Why would the 'risks' be non existent on U.S. domestic flights?

Because no terrorist related event has ever started on a US domestic flight.... wait a minute.....

ARKAMAX used to be a fictitious CD drive known to Demi Moore and Michael Douglas. It's now the aircraft recently known as MAX.

TTailedTiger wrote:

The problem appears to be the FAA. Not Boeing.

Really? I'd say both organisations have been proven to be 'asleep at the wheel', and both driven predominantly by stocks over safety. The FAA have been far too 'close' to Boeing, maybe even negligent in carrying out their own responsibilities. To imply that the current situation is down to the regulator rather than the errant manufacturer is irresponsible in itself IMO.

TTailedTiger wrote:

As far as I have seen Boeing has been compliant and done everything in their power to to get the Max back in the air.

Boeing are not in control of this process any longer, nor should they be. 346 dead people should tell you why. Boeing may well have sound engineering fixes to the ever-lengthening list of MAX problems, but it will be the regulators and the court of public opinion that will decide when MAX flies again irrespective of what you might think.

TTailedTiger wrote:

The FAA is dragging their feet and now they are going back on systems they already approved?

The FAA is; (belatedly); doing their job. They have to appear to be at arms length to Boeing to re-build their own lost reputation as the worlds premier aviation regulator, and they need to know that the MAX is going to be 100% safe. Thats going to be difficult in a world outside the USA, where people across the aviation sector and an informed worldwide public, that do not seem ready to accept Boeings' word any longer.

TTailedTiger wrote:

It sounds like the president needs to cut a few people at the FAA down to size.

.......Trump may be many things, but he aint dumb. Hell stay well clear of this mess, and leave it to ex-Delta guy Dickson to sort out. I don't know what kind of relationship Dickson at DL had with Boeing, but I expect he already knows its vital that the FAA is seen as being distant from them.

TTailedTiger wrote:

Bring in some real professionals who can make sure the plane is safe and get it back on the air in a timely manner.

You mean, like the same 'professionals' that heralded this mess in the first place? MAX should not be introduced IMO in a 'timely manner', but in a 'thorough manner'..........

TTailedTiger wrote:

They are not really concerned with safety. Just posturing.

Take a look in the mirror sometime. Given some of your posts over the last few months, I would say that you should be the last contributor anyone should listen to for safety advice.......

smithbs wrote:

sillystrings wrote:

smithbs wrote:

For the VW scandal, the fix was also easy - software and/or parts, depending on the model. The buy-backs were optional for owners - owners could either have the fix made or have their car bought back by VW.

False. The only car that was fixable was the Passat. I know, I had to sell back my Jetta for which there was no fix, my son still has his Passat. I would have gladly held on to the car had they been able to fix it.

I'm not entirely clear on the terms of the VW fiasco. From the consumer reports and Car-and-Driver articles I read, it appeared that mandatory buy-back did not occur. Maybe some were "highly encouraged?"

https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/car ... ns-recall-
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a1533 ... s-scandal/

XRAYretired wrote:

Except. You have reduced the deaths of 346 people to 'a couple of issues that need to worked out'. I'm sure that was not your intent.

It was, actually. 346 people died due to a few issues that need to be worked out. Welcome to safety-critical engineering performed by humans. The same number of people died at once due to "an issue that needed to be worked out" with some cargo door locking actuators (TK 981), which to me is an even more stupid reason for 346 people to die than the chain of events that needed to crash two separate MAX's. It was just some stupid clasps and rods on the DC-10. So yes, little issues have big effects, and all the more ironic because often the fix for a little issue is not a big deal to accomplish. I'm certain Boeing wishes it could go back in a time machine and do the simple little things that would have prevented this disaster...but nobody gets that luxury.

XRAYretired wrote:

Secondly, from reports we can concluded Boeing introduced a major change in design and minimised it such that it did not receive second party review, let alone a third party. They did not update the SSA, as they should have, which would have required FAA review so it didn't get reviewed by FAA. The FAA were not adequately appraised of how the 'new' system worked. References to the system were physically removed from at least one manual. The system, or even reference to modification of STS, were not included in the FSB. All chances of the problem being caught by 2nd or 3rd parties were removed. I.e. Boeing did not live up their side of the bargain. This a lot more significant than 'something slipped through'.

I agree that both sides did not live up to their side of the bargain. Boeing let slip a dangerous scenario and FAA didn't pay enough attention. Now the consequences get to be experienced. I expect to see the FAA riding their backs for a long time to come.

Please accept my apologies for giving the benefit of the doubt.

Flight test problem potentially preventing certification is a biggie. Implementing a major change in the system design to fix it is a biggie. Dismissing either as little things to be worked out, either during or after the fact, is unacceptable and dangerous. Welcome to the consequences of lack of integrity in safety critical system design.

Ray

flyingphil wrote:

China Southern suspends Boeing 737 Max order

China Southern Airlines has suspended its order for as many as 64 Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft.

https://www.ttgmedia.com/news/news/chin ... rder-18876

Now retracting the story .. saying he was ‘mis-quoted’

https://paxex.aero/2019/07/china-southe ... er-cancel/

SelseyBill wrote:

TTailedTiger wrote:

The problem appears to be the FAA. Not Boeing.

Really? I'd say both organisations have been proven to be 'asleep at the wheel', and both driven predominantly by stocks over safety. The FAA have been far too 'close' to Boeing, maybe even negligent in carrying out their own responsibilities. To imply that the current situation is down to the regulator rather than the errant manufacturer is irresponsible in itself IMO.

TTailedTiger wrote:

As far as I have seen Boeing has been compliant and done everything in their power to to get the Max back in the air.

Boeing are not in control of this process any longer, nor should they be. 346 dead people should tell you why. Boeing may well have sound engineering fixes to the ever-lengthening list of MAX problems, but it will be the regulators and the court of public opinion that will decide when MAX flies again irrespective of what you might think.

TTailedTiger wrote:

The FAA is dragging their feet and now they are going back on systems they already approved?

The FAA is; (belatedly); doing their job. They have to appear to be at arms length to Boeing to re-build their own lost reputation as the worlds premier aviation regulator, and they need to know that the MAX is going to be 100% safe. Thats going to be difficult in a world outside the USA, where people across the aviation sector and an informed worldwide public, that do not seem ready to accept Boeings' word any longer.

TTailedTiger wrote:

It sounds like the president needs to cut a few people at the FAA down to size.

.......Trump may be many things, but he aint dumb. Hell stay well clear of this mess, and leave it to ex-Delta guy Dickson to sort out. I don't know what kind of relationship Dickson at DL had with Boeing, but I expect he already knows its vital that the FAA is seen as being distant from them.

TTailedTiger wrote:

Bring in some real professionals who can make sure the plane is safe and get it back on the air in a timely manner.

You mean, like the same 'professionals' that heralded this mess in the first place? MAX should not be introduced IMO in a 'timely manner', but in a 'thorough manner'..........

TTailedTiger wrote:

They are not really concerned with safety. Just posturing.

Take a look in the mirror sometime. Given some of your posts over the last few months, I would say that you should be the last contributor anyone should listen to for safety advice.......

The court of public opinion will have no bearing on whether the 73M returns to service. Just as they have no voice on any other civil or criminal proceeding. I don't know how you do things in your country but in the US do not allow kangaroo courts or mob rule. If Boeing is able to satisfy all established FAA requirements then the FAA will have no choice but to put it back on the air. What you or anyone else thinks is immaterial.

mmo wrote:

2 MCAS or no MCAS the runaway stabilizer trim checklist should have covered the situation. Switching off both red guarded switches and LEAVING THEM OFF, would have rendered the MCAS inop. Someone pointed out flying with stick shaker going off might not be a good idea, I agree but that wasn't the case. .

The problem is that a normal runaway trim creates a constant trim input and manual electric trim would have no effect.

With the MCAS it makes short but strong trim inputs separated by longer time intervals of no input at all, manual electric trim works.

Now at least the LION air crew did not even know that MCAS existed nor how it worked.

mmo wrote:

Just a couple of observations:
1 ....
2 ....
3 ....
4 ....

It would be really great if someone made the effort to summarize the facts from the existing MAX groundig threads

then it would be less likely that participants would make theories based on assumptions that are long since disproven and make assumptions that are not substantiated by the existing facts