These articles could have been written by stitching together a lot of the posts in this thread (and its predecessors).
Regardless, they should at least get the facts correct. The first article blames Muilenburg for oversight of the MAX development when he wasn't on the commercial side until he became CEO (with responsibility for the whole company), which was less than a year before the first flight and many years past when the decisions were made that led to the necessity of MCAS.
The second article says that aerodynamics caused by the engine placement causes the "potential for the plane to stall during a climb" which is incorrect. That statement insinuates that there could be stalls during routine operations. The truth is that there is the potential for it to be easier to enter a stall during certain, very rare extreme maneuvers at the edge of the certified flight envelope.
Had Boeing just put the MCAS software in for the certification flights and then removed it before the model entered service, it is very likely that issue caused by the engine size and placement would have never led to a stall. The WSJ (I think) report detailed that the "old school" test pilot that wasn't happy that software would be used to solve the issue indicated that he was OK with MCAS because he felt that the situations where it would activate were so rare that it might never activate in service.
I have no view on when Muilenburg should go . However, I would make the following points for balance:
Muilenburg was the incumbent when MCAS V1.0 was designed, the SSA was not updated and when MCAS was not disclosed. Muilenburg was the incumbent when the dangerous nature of the system was exposed by the first crash and the A/C was not grounded. Muilenburg was the incumbent when the A/C was not grounded immediately following the second crash. Muilenburg is the incumbent and it is the incumbent that carries the can. It is quite likely that Muilenburg will go, with the usual golden handshake, when MAX is back flying and the new man can come in with a clean slate, and not because his hands are clean.
On your second paragraph, its just splitting hairs and don't forget, with AOA failed high, MCAS is active in any manual, flaps up regime.
On the final paragraph you are suggesting illegally removing functionality instead of just being incompetent. The 'old school' test pilot reported comment was in relation to the satisfactorily implemented MCAS version 0.0. At least one test pilot appeared to be horrified by V1.0 implementation.