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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 11:22 am

PW100 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
I'm sorry, but IMO you are using reduction to absurdity and strawman arguments by using the specter of an unstable aircraft that you yourself say doesn't exist to avoid addressing a point about the competence of an airman that would ignore stick shakers and aural warnings, then suggesting that acting on the warnings you do get (which go beyond stick shaker and aural warnings) implies favoring the idea of getting rid of FARs related to aircraft stability.

I'm sorry, I've totally lost you there.
...
You guys are going through a lot of word flexing trying to convince yourself that MCAS is a minor thing, and that if we had competent pilots, it would not be needed. I'm not buying that, and neither do the FAA and EASA (rightfully).

Everyone including Boeing and FAA acknowledge MCAS is a major thing, no one is saying otherwise.

Fixing MCAS doesn't address the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.

Why is it not "weird flexing" to make up a theoretical unstable aircraft that would never be certified to counter a point about FARs that no one is making then using that made up scenario to try to to disallow consideration of the airmen's behavior?

PixelFlight wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Fixing MCAS doesn't fix the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.

Is that specific to the 737-8/9 MAX ? No.
[logic vs emotion]

It's illogical to say we should ignore one set of factors that contribute to one or two accidents that also occur in other scenarios, yet some here seem to feel that discussing those factors here is taboo, probably because of emotional rather than logical thinking.
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 11:47 am

 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 12:29 pm

seahawk wrote:

The report says the stick shaker activated for three seconds at 1:25 and stopped, flaps up ordered at 2:00 with stick shaker off.

This is not the same thing, but thanks for the interesting report.

Seems the "cosmic ray" fix would have eliminated a lot of workload in this case since the FCCs were generating different outputs.

Seems the crew did fly pitch and power, got the aircraft to a workable altitude and figured out which side had the bad airspeed indication.
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snowkarl
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 1:07 pm

Revelation wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
I'm sorry, but IMO you are using reduction to absurdity and strawman arguments by using the specter of an unstable aircraft that you yourself say doesn't exist to avoid addressing a point about the competence of an airman that would ignore stick shakers and aural warnings, then suggesting that acting on the warnings you do get (which go beyond stick shaker and aural warnings) implies favoring the idea of getting rid of FARs related to aircraft stability.

I'm sorry, I've totally lost you there.
...
You guys are going through a lot of word flexing trying to convince yourself that MCAS is a minor thing, and that if we had competent pilots, it would not be needed. I'm not buying that, and neither do the FAA and EASA (rightfully).

Everyone including Boeing and FAA acknowledge MCAS is a major thing, no one is saying otherwise.

Fixing MCAS doesn't address the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.

Why is it not "weird flexing" to make up a theoretical unstable aircraft that would never be certified to counter a point about FARs that no one is making then using that made up scenario to try to to disallow consideration of the airmen's behavior?

PixelFlight wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Fixing MCAS doesn't fix the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.

Is that specific to the 737-8/9 MAX ? No.
[logic vs emotion]

It's illogical to say we should ignore one set of factors that contribute to one or two accidents that also occur in other scenarios, yet some here seem to feel that discussing those factors here is taboo, probably because of emotional rather than logical thinking.


Sorry but you are a broken record at this point.

The pilots are not the issue. The NG is a very similar plane yet no pilots are getting confused and not realizing the plane is stalling and ignoring the stick shaker on that plane and crashing it into the ground.

This thread is about the MAX grounding - not about pilot training standards. Only one plane has a crash rate this high - the MAX. Why? Poor design. Otherwise other Boeing jets would be having the same issues, but hey, they're not.

But let's keep having this exact same argument for another 100 pages and drown out all bad news you don't like.

Mods are extremely good at deleting posts - yet no mods want to keep this thread on topic? Strange.
 
bob75013
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 1:17 pm

snowkarl wrote:
Revelation wrote:
PW100 wrote:

I'm sorry, I've totally lost you there.
...
You guys are going through a lot of word flexing trying to convince yourself that MCAS is a minor thing, and that if we had competent pilots, it would not be needed. I'm not buying that, and neither do the FAA and EASA (rightfully).

Everyone including Boeing and FAA acknowledge MCAS is a major thing, no one is saying otherwise.

Fixing MCAS doesn't address the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.

Why is it not "weird flexing" to make up a theoretical unstable aircraft that would never be certified to counter a point about FARs that no one is making then using that made up scenario to try to to disallow consideration of the airmen's behavior?

PixelFlight wrote:
Is that specific to the 737-8/9 MAX ? No.
[logic vs emotion]

It's illogical to say we should ignore one set of factors that contribute to one or two accidents that also occur in other scenarios, yet some here seem to feel that discussing those factors here is taboo, probably because of emotional rather than logical thinking.


Sorry but you are a broken record at this point.

The pilots are not the issue. The NG is a very similar plane yet no pilots are getting confused and not realizing the plane is stalling and ignoring the stick shaker on that plane and crashing it into the ground.

This thread is about the MAX grounding - not about pilot training standards. Only one plane has a crash rate this high - the MAX. Why? Poor design. Otherwise other Boeing jets would be having the same issues, but hey, they're not.

But let's keep having this exact same argument for another 100 pages and drown out all bad news you don't like.

Mods are extremely good at deleting posts - yet no mods want to keep this thread on topic? Strange.


We had two Lion MAXs. One crashed. One survivded the same situation that caused the other to crash.

Edit add: What's the difference between the two? Answer: What the fight crew did or did not do.

Wny should that not be part of the discussion?
Last edited by bob75013 on Mon Aug 19, 2019 1:25 pm, edited 2 times in total.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 1:19 pm

snowkarl wrote:
This thread is about the MAX grounding - not about pilot training standards. Only one plane has a crash rate this high - the MAX. Why? Poor design. Otherwise other Boeing jets would be having the same issues, but hey, they're not.

But let's keep having this exact same argument for another 100 pages and drown out all bad news you don't like.

Mods are extremely good at deleting posts - yet no mods want to keep this thread on topic? Strange.

If we had the rule that all we would talk about is the progress to ungrounding then all talk of what led to the grounding would be off topic, so we could not discuss things like last week's WSJ article, and we'd get even more complaints about drowning out all bad news some people don't like.

If we do say this thread is about all aspects of the grounding including events leading to the grounding, then IMO we can/should talk about what Boeing expected of pilots during the initial MCAS design, and how they fell short of that expectation.

Several posters here equate any discussion of pilot behavior as a total shift of blame to the pilots, which IMO is absurd, and accepting a ban on discussing this is IMO the kind of censorship you claim you reject.
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 2:01 pm

Revelation wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Fixing MCAS doesn't fix the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.

Is that specific to the 737-8/9 MAX ? No.
[logic vs emotion]

It's illogical to say we should ignore one set of factors that contribute to one or two accidents that also occur in other scenarios, yet some here seem to feel that discussing those factors here is taboo, probably because of emotional rather than logical thinking.

Please consider opening a specific thread for that factors that also occur in other scenarios.
After so many loops around the pilots training debate in this threads series, I think this could be worth trying.
The subject Is no taboo at all, but there is actually not so much new related information to debate on that subject. I understand that a newcomer will innocently restart the loop, but you are a venerable contributor since a long time. :airplane:

The main contributing factor to the 737-8/9 MAX accident and grounding was identified by multiple responsible parties as within the 733-8/9 MAX itself and a lot of work is actually ongoing to fix that. This is so very public and official. The others factors certainly exists, but there are actually just that: others factors, not the main factor. When the Emmental cheese holes was aligned on the 737-8/9 MAX accidents, each holes was from a different cause, have a different probability to occur, and have different tool to mitigate his existence. Some of those holes produced a higher complexity for the pilot to understand quickly enough the machine failure and to act appropriately. Should the pilots be trained for more complex scenarios exposed by the machine ? Should the machine be designed to reduce his complexity for the pilot ? Ideally both, but in practice the 737-8/9 MAX was found with a certification process that started itself a debate on it own, so the current priority is to fix the 737-8/9 MAX. Will this be enough ? I don't know, but the observation is that others aircraft seem to be more tolerant to human pilots and his limitations as currently trained worldwide.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 2:10 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Revelation wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Is that specific to the 737-8/9 MAX ? No.
[logic vs emotion]

It's illogical to say we should ignore one set of factors that contribute to one or two accidents that also occur in other scenarios, yet some here seem to feel that discussing those factors here is taboo, probably because of emotional rather than logical thinking.

Please consider opening a specific thread for that factors that also occur in other scenarios.
After so many loops around the pilots training debate in this threads series, I think this could be worth trying.
The subject Is no taboo at all, but there is actually not so much new related information to debate on that subject. I understand that a newcomer will innocently restart the loop, but you are a venerable contributor since a long time. :airplane:

Counter point: The WSJ article from last week got a lot of play in this thread last week, and there was no complaints about going over old ground, but that's exactly what it did.

The only part that could have said to be different was the way the article's authors worked the four seconds of terror angle, but that too was covered in various ways in this thread via our discussions of FAA terminology such as catastrophic vs severe, etc.
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sillystrings
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 2:15 pm

bob75013 wrote:

Edit add: What's the difference between the two? Answer: What the fight crew did or did not do.

Wny should that not be part of the discussion?


Incorrect. The plane that made it had a third crew member in the cokpit that had no workload.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 2:23 pm

bob75013 wrote:
We had two Lion MAXs. One crashed. One survivded the same situation that caused the other to crash.

Edit add: What's the difference between the two? Answer: What the fight crew did or did not do.

Wny should that not be part of the discussion?

How can you say it should not be part of the discussion when this was so much debated here already ?

Fact is that flight safety is simply not based on a 50% survival statistic for a set of 2 flights. Flight safety goal is to have a very remote probability of fatal accident, and this was proved to be the right thing to do. The flight safety of the 737-8/9 MAX have an obvious and dramatic problem. How to improve the situation ? Take a moment to think about it: what action will be the most effective to improve flight safety ? Make your own list and put your numbers. You are free to disagree, but the fact is that a lot of responsible parties, including Boeing, have found that fixing the 737 MAX will be the most effective action to improve flight safety. That don't mean that the others actions will be without effect at all on flight safety, but there are currently not at the highest priority.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 2:45 pm

Revelation wrote:
Counter point: The WSJ article from last week got a lot of play in this thread last week, and there was no complaints about going over old ground, but that's exactly what it did.

The only part that could have said to be different was the way the article's authors worked the four seconds of terror angle, but that too was covered in various ways in this thread via our discussions of FAA terminology such as catastrophic vs severe, etc.

The article author is free to write what he want and of course this article will be debated here regarding for potential new information. I thing that most here agree that it bring little if no new information compared to what was already discussed in this forum. I don't think it have the potential to change the pilot training debate.

I don't want to avoid someone to write something, but a better structure could help everyone to understand each other different points of view and decrease the probability to repetitively wrote the same thing over and over again. There are different points of view, this is perfectly normal and respectable in a such complex drama. New information will certainly help to reduce the differences, but not to the point that everyone will agree someday to a single fully common story.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 2:55 pm

sillystrings wrote:
bob75013 wrote:

Edit add: What's the difference between the two? Answer: What the fight crew did or did not do.

Wny should that not be part of the discussion?


Incorrect. The plane that made it had a third crew member in the cokpit that had no workload.

So by default are you now saying that there was something to Boeing's point about overloading pilots?
I thought that Boeing statement was poorly regarded when they admitted fault on the work load issue.
 
Vladex
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 3:43 pm

Natflyer wrote:
At what point can airlines just return an unusable jet to Boeing for a full refund? Airplane is unusable through no fault of the customer, but entirely the manufacturers fault. Return, refund and go find something else to fly. May take a while, but there is no end in sight for this bs.


Airlines are guilty of playing A vs B and going for the cheap, quick and easy solutions and discarding any competition in place for collusion. A and B know this so they will cut corners as well and B far more so and they actually sell it as features not faults . 737 MAX with misfiting engine was thus sold as a feature and is a logical end to that duopoly and it's a fault of the airlines that didn't question their buying decisions. In a free market , it would be entirely their fault but it seems like they want to socialize it , as in force everybody else to bear the cost and pain.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 4:12 pm

Vladex wrote:
Airlines are guilty of playing A vs B and going for the cheap, quick and easy solutions and discarding any competition in place for collusion. A and B know this so they will cut corners as well and B far more so and they actually sell it as features not faults . 737 MAX with misfiting engine was thus sold as a feature and is a logical end to that duopoly and it's a fault of the airlines that didn't question their buying decisions. In a free market , it would be entirely their fault but it seems like they want to socialize it , as in force everybody else to bear the cost and pain.

Airlines do not define the required safety certification. Governmental agencies do that precisely to avoid that cost reduction decrease safety. This has worked well the last couple of decades, until the 737-8/9 MAX. So it' normal that the safety certification is debated again, especially the delegation.

The totally free market is not know to be the right tool to protect peoples against a business that can potentially kill them. There is a reason why so much governments have created regulation, and was common that those regulation was created after peoples where horrified by some dramatic accidents.
 
bob75013
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 7:02 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
bob75013 wrote:
We had two Lion MAXs. One crashed. One survivded the same situation that caused the other to crash.

Edit add: What's the difference between the two? Answer: What the fight crew did or did not do.

Wny should that not be part of the discussion?

How can you say it should not be part of the discussion when this was so much debated here already ?

Fact is that flight safety is simply not based on a 50% survival statistic for a set of 2 flights. Flight safety goal is to have a very remote probability of fatal accident, and this was proved to be the right thing to do. The flight safety of the 737-8/9 MAX have an obvious and dramatic problem. How to improve the situation ? Take a moment to think about it: what action will be the most effective to improve flight safety ? Make your own list and put your numbers. You are free to disagree, but the fact is that a lot of responsible parties, including Boeing, have found that fixing the 737 MAX will be the most effective action to improve flight safety. That don't mean that the others actions will be without effect at all on flight safety, but there are currently not at the highest priority.



Read my comment again. I was reponding to a person who said "lets stop blaming the flight crews"

My comment was "why should that (flight crew peformance) not be part of the dicscussion?" (two crews, two identical situations, two different outcomes. There is something to learn there dontcha think?

Capiche?
 
2175301
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 7:32 pm

My apologies to all who have commented on my post several weeks ago. I had a modest health issue and have not been on the forum for several weeks (and some other internet forums either). I am not fully recovered and only have limited time. But, will start to review things. It is unlikely I will respond to all comments at this time, given the time passage.

Otherwise, I trust everyone else is well.

Have a great day,
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 7:37 pm

bob75013 wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
bob75013 wrote:
We had two Lion MAXs. One crashed. One survivded the same situation that caused the other to crash.

Edit add: What's the difference between the two? Answer: What the fight crew did or did not do.

Wny should that not be part of the discussion?

How can you say it should not be part of the discussion when this was so much debated here already ?

Fact is that flight safety is simply not based on a 50% survival statistic for a set of 2 flights. Flight safety goal is to have a very remote probability of fatal accident, and this was proved to be the right thing to do. The flight safety of the 737-8/9 MAX have an obvious and dramatic problem. How to improve the situation ? Take a moment to think about it: what action will be the most effective to improve flight safety ? Make your own list and put your numbers. You are free to disagree, but the fact is that a lot of responsible parties, including Boeing, have found that fixing the 737 MAX will be the most effective action to improve flight safety. That don't mean that the others actions will be without effect at all on flight safety, but there are currently not at the highest priority.



Read my comment again. I was reponding to a person who said "lets stop blaming the flight crews"

My comment was "why should that (flight crew peformance) not be part of the dicscussion?" (two crews, two identical situations, two different outcomes. There is something to learn there dontcha think?

Capiche?


I agree. I don't know why we can't accept that these crashes exposed a terrible design by Boeing but also showed some kind of issue with pilot training, at least with respect to a runaway stabilizer. Every time it is mentioned or suggested that the crew could have done something different, the post is attacked as blaming the crew and absolving Boeing of blame.

Just as Boeing is going to be drastically improving the safety of the 737MAX as a result of the crashes, why can't we also use lessons learned to improve training for the pilots that fly the 737? That way, if there is ever a case of a runaway stabilizer (not caused by MCAS) on a 737 concurrent with other warnings and symptoms, the crew will be able to get the issue under control and land safely. Even if that only happens once in the entire service life of the MAX. Let the victim's loss of life be used to save every possible life going forward.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 7:42 pm

2175301 wrote:
My apologies to all who have commented on my post several weeks ago. I had a modest health issue and have not been on the forum for several weeks (and some other internet forums either). I am not fully recovered and only have limited time. But, will start to review things. It is unlikely I will respond to all comments at this time, given the time passage.

Otherwise, I trust everyone else is well.

Have a great day,


I wish you a speedy and complete recovery. And now, back to topic.
"When I find out I was wrong, I change my mind. What do you do?" -attributed to John Maynard Keynes
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 7:46 pm

planecane wrote:
bob75013 wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
How can you say it should not be part of the discussion when this was so much debated here already ?

Fact is that flight safety is simply not based on a 50% survival statistic for a set of 2 flights. Flight safety goal is to have a very remote probability of fatal accident, and this was proved to be the right thing to do. The flight safety of the 737-8/9 MAX have an obvious and dramatic problem. How to improve the situation ? Take a moment to think about it: what action will be the most effective to improve flight safety ? Make your own list and put your numbers. You are free to disagree, but the fact is that a lot of responsible parties, including Boeing, have found that fixing the 737 MAX will be the most effective action to improve flight safety. That don't mean that the others actions will be without effect at all on flight safety, but there are currently not at the highest priority.



Read my comment again. I was reponding to a person who said "lets stop blaming the flight crews"

My comment was "why should that (flight crew peformance) not be part of the dicscussion?" (two crews, two identical situations, two different outcomes. There is something to learn there dontcha think?

Capiche?


I agree. I don't know why we can't accept that these crashes exposed a terrible design by Boeing but also showed some kind of issue with pilot training, at least with respect to a runaway stabilizer. Every time it is mentioned or suggested that the crew could have done something different, the post is attacked as blaming the crew and absolving Boeing of blame.

Just as Boeing is going to be drastically improving the safety of the 737MAX as a result of the crashes, why can't we also use lessons learned to improve training for the pilots that fly the 737? That way, if there is ever a case of a runaway stabilizer (not caused by MCAS) on a 737 concurrent with other warnings and symptoms, the crew will be able to get the issue under control and land safely. Even if that only happens once in the entire service life of the MAX. Let the victim's loss of life be used to save every possible life going forward.


Amen.
 
oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 8:36 pm

morrisond wrote:
planecane wrote:
bob75013 wrote:


Read my comment again. I was reponding to a person who said "lets stop blaming the flight crews"

My comment was "why should that (flight crew peformance) not be part of the dicscussion?" (two crews, two identical situations, two different outcomes. There is something to learn there dontcha think?

Capiche?


I agree. I don't know why we can't accept that these crashes exposed a terrible design by Boeing but also showed some kind of issue with pilot training, at least with respect to a runaway stabilizer. Every time it is mentioned or suggested that the crew could have done something different, the post is attacked as blaming the crew and absolving Boeing of blame.

Just as Boeing is going to be drastically improving the safety of the 737MAX as a result of the crashes, why can't we also use lessons learned to improve training for the pilots that fly the 737? That way, if there is ever a case of a runaway stabilizer (not caused by MCAS) on a 737 concurrent with other warnings and symptoms, the crew will be able to get the issue under control and land safely. Even if that only happens once in the entire service life of the MAX. Let the victim's loss of life be used to save every possible life going forward.


Amen.
I think it is important that we all agree on the fact that
a) it was Boeing that hid Mcas
b) it was Boeing that said the max only required a quick iPad session of training

It is the combination of a) and b) plus the faulty design of Mcas which caused the crashes. Pilots couldn't be properly trained because Boeing "convinced" the world and FAA etc. that the Max is like the NG. Pilots couldn't be properly trained on an iPad while important information about the mere existence of Mcas was hidden to them.

It's similar to a relationship. You start a relationship based on lies/untruthful things, it will all come crashing down on you. That is what happened with the Max.

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PStechPaul
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 8:52 pm

Just a few quick questions/comments:

1. I have seen reference to a Boeing 738? Is that actually a 737-8?

2. For redundancy, would it be better (and easier/cheaper) to have a pilot-commanded switch-over from primary system to alternate system, to see if that corrected what seem to be erroneous readings and warnings?

3. Perhaps the situations of the three flights that had MCAS issues were NOT identical. I think there may have been a mechanical (or electrical/software) problem in the third flight that prevented any adjustment of trim beyond the 2.3 degrees where adjustment seemed to stop twice. There were likely other differences, such as the third (deadhead) pilot in the first flight, as well as their greater altitude that gave them more time and perhaps less force on controls.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 9:01 pm

planecane wrote:
Just as Boeing is going to be drastically improving the safety of the 737MAX as a result of the crashes, why can't we also use lessons learned to improve training for the pilots that fly the 737? That way, if there is ever a case of a runaway stabilizer (not caused by MCAS) on a 737 concurrent with other warnings and symptoms, the crew will be able to get the issue under control and land safely. Even if that only happens once in the entire service life of the MAX. Let the victim's loss of life be used to save every possible life going forward.

Certainly the way to do: improving every aspects that can have a positive effect on flight safety.
Probably that the training of a more complex runaway stabilizer situation is the next priority within the agencies (FAA/EASA/...).
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 9:03 pm

Revelation wrote:
PW100 wrote:
. . .

Why is it not "weird flexing" to make up a theoretical unstable aircraft that would never be certified to counter a point about FARs that no one is making then using that made up scenario to try to to disallow consideration of the airmen's behavior?

Simple. Because I have never claimed it is a [theoretical] unstable aircraft. It seems a lot of weird word flexing is going on to put those words in my mouth.
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 9:12 pm

PStechPaul wrote:
Just a few quick questions/comments:

1. I have seen reference to a Boeing 738? Is that actually a 737-8?

738 = 737-800 , a 737 NG.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_type_designators
https://www.icao.int/publications/DOC8643/Pages/Search.aspx
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 9:16 pm

morrisond wrote:
planecane wrote:
bob75013 wrote:


Read my comment again. I was reponding to a person who said "lets stop blaming the flight crews"

My comment was "why should that (flight crew peformance) not be part of the dicscussion?" (two crews, two identical situations, two different outcomes. There is something to learn there dontcha think?

Capiche?


I agree. I don't know why we can't accept that these crashes exposed a terrible design by Boeing but also showed some kind of issue with pilot training, at least with respect to a runaway stabilizer. Every time it is mentioned or suggested that the crew could have done something different, the post is attacked as blaming the crew and absolving Boeing of blame.

Just as Boeing is going to be drastically improving the safety of the 737MAX as a result of the crashes, why can't we also use lessons learned to improve training for the pilots that fly the 737? That way, if there is ever a case of a runaway stabilizer (not caused by MCAS) on a 737 concurrent with other warnings and symptoms, the crew will be able to get the issue under control and land safely. Even if that only happens once in the entire service life of the MAX. Let the victim's loss of life be used to save every possible life going forward.


Amen.

The issue is, that that the poor pilot standards group, tend to push the training issue to general pilot skills, when it is overwhelmingly concentrated to MAX specific training. When this argument is being brought forward, the post is attacked as well.

If we take out the MAX accidents, pilot standards seem to be coping quite well. Of course one can always find issues, but the overall statistics speak for themselves

To add to that, some feel it is being (mis-)used to take attention away from where it (mainly) belongs.
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RickNRoll
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 9:34 pm

bob75013 wrote:
snowkarl wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Everyone including Boeing and FAA acknowledge MCAS is a major thing, no one is saying otherwise.

Fixing MCAS doesn't address the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.

Why is it not "weird flexing" to make up a theoretical unstable aircraft that would never be certified to counter a point about FARs that no one is making then using that made up scenario to try to to disallow consideration of the airmen's behavior?


It's illogical to say we should ignore one set of factors that contribute to one or two accidents that also occur in other scenarios, yet some here seem to feel that discussing those factors here is taboo, probably because of emotional rather than logical thinking.


Sorry but you are a broken record at this point.

The pilots are not the issue. The NG is a very similar plane yet no pilots are getting confused and not realizing the plane is stalling and ignoring the stick shaker on that plane and crashing it into the ground.

This thread is about the MAX grounding - not about pilot training standards. Only one plane has a crash rate this high - the MAX. Why? Poor design. Otherwise other Boeing jets would be having the same issues, but hey, they're not.

But let's keep having this exact same argument for another 100 pages and drown out all bad news you don't like.

Mods are extremely good at deleting posts - yet no mods want to keep this thread on topic? Strange.


We had two Lion MAXs. One crashed. One survivded the same situation that caused the other to crash.

Edit add: What's the difference between the two? Answer: What the fight crew did or did not do.

Wny should that not be part of the discussion?
The one that survived had an observer in the jump seat. Without him they may have crashed as well. As he was not actively trying to save the plane and experiencing pilot overload, he was able air back and work or the problem. The active pilots didn't have that luxury.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 9:41 pm

Okay… about pilot training, here’s my question to all poster here. Was it reasonable for Boeing to design MCAS v1 as it did, with the justification that the pilots should know how to save the plane? Unless someone wants to reopen the debate on whether the grounding itself is justified, I don’t see how any other pilot related question is relevant.

As to anything else pilot training related, There’s been no new information for a very long time, so why does it keep coming up again and again?

This thread is still, IMO, the best place on the internet to learn more about the grounding. That said, there’s still a lot of white noise to sift through. I wish the discussion could stay more focused.

*edited to correct accidental spanish autocorrect
 
kayik
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 10:07 pm

Imagine for a moment that both Lion Air and ET flights were saved by the pilots trained to maximum standards and landed safely after a roller coaster flight. Would that make MAX airworthy?
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 10:15 pm

PW100 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
PW100 wrote:
. . .

Why is it not "weird flexing" to make up a theoretical unstable aircraft that would never be certified to counter a point about FARs that no one is making then using that made up scenario to try to to disallow consideration of the airmen's behavior?

Simple. Because I have never claimed it is a [theoretical] unstable aircraft. It seems a lot of weird word flexing is going on to put those words in my mouth.

Here's the post with the hypothetical airplane you created, then went on to suggest people were suggesting that FARs get tossed out the window when they were not, all this to avoid discussing pilot behavior that we know was incorrect. Pretty "weird flexing", IMO.

PW100 wrote:
To put it a bit more extreme, what help would stick shakers and aural warnings provide if the aircraft is (very) unstable in pitch? None. They would be too little too late (and again, for the record, I am not claiming that the Max is unstable in pitch).

Are you suggesting that as long as an aircraft has stick shakers and aural warnings, stick force gradient FARs can be tossed out the window? Have you suggested that to FAA and EASA?

Ref: viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1426007&start=2250#p21593953
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 10:16 pm

aerolimani wrote:
Okay… about pilot training, here’s my question to all poster here. Was it reasonable for Boeing to design MCAS v1 as it did, with the justification that the pilots should know how to save the plane?


"Well, it seemed like a good idea at the time." anon.

Yes, it was reasonable. The problem is, a lot of reasonable, rational ideas are seen to have actually been really stupid when viewed with the benefit of hindsight.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 10:20 pm

Has there been any update from Boeing in the past month at all?

Seems radio silence for the moment.
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 10:46 pm

hivue wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
Okay… about pilot training, here’s my question to all poster here. Was it reasonable for Boeing to design MCAS v1 as it did, with the justification that the pilots should know how to save the plane?


"Well, it seemed like a good idea at the time." anon.

Yes, it was reasonable. The problem is, a lot of reasonable, rational ideas are seen to have actually been really stupid when viewed with the benefit of hindsight.


It was a "reasonable" mistake in assumption. I have previously quoted from a 1995 Boeing bulletin regarding freewheeling stabilizers on the 737 classic. It states, "Normal pilot reaction to a runaway stabilizer of opposing the runaway with main electric trim in addition to control column force will initially resolve a runaway."

This is what Boeing engineers thought that the reaction to an MCAS runaway would be. Unfortunately, they didn't seem to have realized the other warnings and symptoms that would occur due to the same AoA sensor failure that caused the MCAS runaway. They also probably didn't bother to find out how well versed pilots are in dealing with runaway stabilizer situations in the current decade since it seems that the causes of runaway stabilizer have been addressed over the years so it doesn't happen very often anymore.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 11:40 pm

oschkosch wrote:
morrisond wrote:
planecane wrote:

I agree. I don't know why we can't accept that these crashes exposed a terrible design by Boeing but also showed some kind of issue with pilot training, at least with respect to a runaway stabilizer. Every time it is mentioned or suggested that the crew could have done something different, the post is attacked as blaming the crew and absolving Boeing of blame.

Just as Boeing is going to be drastically improving the safety of the 737MAX as a result of the crashes, why can't we also use lessons learned to improve training for the pilots that fly the 737? That way, if there is ever a case of a runaway stabilizer (not caused by MCAS) on a 737 concurrent with other warnings and symptoms, the crew will be able to get the issue under control and land safely. Even if that only happens once in the entire service life of the MAX. Let the victim's loss of life be used to save every possible life going forward.


Amen.
I think it is important that we all agree on the fact that
a) it was Boeing that hid Mcas
b) it was Boeing that said the max only required a quick iPad session of training

It is the combination of a) and b) plus the faulty design of Mcas which caused the crashes. Pilots couldn't be properly trained because Boeing "convinced" the world and FAA etc. that the Max is like the NG. Pilots couldn't be properly trained on an iPad while important information about the mere existence of Mcas was hidden to them.

It's similar to a relationship. You start a relationship based on lies/untruthful things, it will all come crashing down on you. That is what happened with the Max.

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The pilots could have been properly trained because the way to recover from MCAS was the exact same as the way to recover from any other runaway stabilizer. The cause of the runaway stabilizer does not matter. Since it has been published that the expected reaction time to a runaway stabilizer is 4 seconds, it did not matter that MCAS was intermittent. MCAS activated for ten seconds which is six seconds longer than the expected recognition of a runaway stabilizer.

I agree that the reason the two planes crashed was because the design of MCAS used very flawed assumptions which led to a terrible design. However, it also pointed out that there are many crews that would not respond properly to a runaway stabilizer caused by something else, especially if there were other simultaneous warnings/symptoms.

ALL 737 pilots (not just MAX pilots) should be trained to recognize and deal with a runaway stabilizer under similar circumstances.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Aug 19, 2019 11:53 pm

planecane wrote:
Since it has been published that the expected reaction time to a runaway stabilizer is 4 seconds, it did not matter that MCAS was intermittent. MCAS activated for ten seconds which is six seconds longer than the expected recognition of a runaway stabilizer.

Any MCAS action longer than 4 second is then a runaway stabilizer. I highly doubt that a published procedure for the pilots allow to conclude that.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 12:21 am

PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
Since it has been published that the expected reaction time to a runaway stabilizer is 4 seconds, it did not matter that MCAS was intermittent. MCAS activated for ten seconds which is six seconds longer than the expected recognition of a runaway stabilizer.

Any MCAS action longer than 4 second is then a runaway stabilizer. I highly doubt that a published procedure for the pilots allow to conclude that.


That's a good point. If the pilots were paying attention to the trim wheel, the low speed activation of MCAS would be seen as a runaway stabilizer. The pilot flying wouldn't think anything was wrong because the stick force wouldn't increase in his perception. However, the pilot monitoring might see it as a problem and alert the pilot flying.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 12:32 am

planecane wrote:
hivue wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
Okay… about pilot training, here’s my question to all poster here. Was it reasonable for Boeing to design MCAS v1 as it did, with the justification that the pilots should know how to save the plane?


"Well, it seemed like a good idea at the time." anon.

Yes, it was reasonable. The problem is, a lot of reasonable, rational ideas are seen to have actually been really stupid when viewed with the benefit of hindsight.


It was a "reasonable" mistake in assumption. I have previously quoted from a 1995 Boeing bulletin regarding freewheeling stabilizers on the 737 classic. It states, "Normal pilot reaction to a runaway stabilizer of opposing the runaway with main electric trim in addition to control column force will initially resolve a runaway."

This is what Boeing engineers thought that the reaction to an MCAS runaway would be. Unfortunately, they didn't seem to have realized the other warnings and symptoms that would occur due to the same AoA sensor failure that caused the MCAS runaway. They also probably didn't bother to find out how well versed pilots are in dealing with runaway stabilizer situations in the current decade since it seems that the causes of runaway stabilizer have been addressed over the years so it doesn't happen very often anymore.
As we could see from the Mentour video, column force was ridiculously heavy. Why a "feedback" that was deliberately made so heavy in a modern passenger plane is bizarre. It harks back to planes of the 1940s, not a plane in the 21st century. It was just one more significant contribution to pilot overload.

I can understand people criticizing the lack of feedback on the Airbus sidestick but can't it be made more civilized and safe these days.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 12:35 am

RickNRoll wrote:
planecane wrote:
hivue wrote:

"Well, it seemed like a good idea at the time." anon.

Yes, it was reasonable. The problem is, a lot of reasonable, rational ideas are seen to have actually been really stupid when viewed with the benefit of hindsight.


It was a "reasonable" mistake in assumption. I have previously quoted from a 1995 Boeing bulletin regarding freewheeling stabilizers on the 737 classic. It states, "Normal pilot reaction to a runaway stabilizer of opposing the runaway with main electric trim in addition to control column force will initially resolve a runaway."

This is what Boeing engineers thought that the reaction to an MCAS runaway would be. Unfortunately, they didn't seem to have realized the other warnings and symptoms that would occur due to the same AoA sensor failure that caused the MCAS runaway. They also probably didn't bother to find out how well versed pilots are in dealing with runaway stabilizer situations in the current decade since it seems that the causes of runaway stabilizer have been addressed over the years so it doesn't happen very often anymore.
As we could see from the Mentour video, column force was ridiculously heavy. Why a "feedback" that was deliberately made so heavy in a modern passenger plane is bizarre. It harks back to planes of the 1940s, not a plane in the 21st century. It was just one more significant contribution to pilot overload.

I can understand people criticizing the lack of feedback on the Airbus sidestick but can't it be made more civilized and safe these days.


The force had to be the same as it was on the 737-100 to maintain commonality. I can only assume that it was designed that way to make it difficult to enter a stall by needing a lot of force to reach a stall AoA.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 12:35 am

planecane wrote:
hivue wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
Okay… about pilot training, here’s my question to all poster here. Was it reasonable for Boeing to design MCAS v1 as it did, with the justification that the pilots should know how to save the plane?


"Well, it seemed like a good idea at the time." anon.

Yes, it was reasonable. The problem is, a lot of reasonable, rational ideas are seen to have actually been really stupid when viewed with the benefit of hindsight.


It was a "reasonable" mistake in assumption.

planecane wrote:
I agree that the reason the two planes crashed was because the design of MCAS used very flawed assumptions which led to a terrible design.

Flawed assumption or "reasonable" assumption? I can't resist pointing out your inconsistency here.

I am well familiar with the concept of 20/20 hindsight. What makes the assumption not reasonable, IMO, is that designers of planes should innately understand that foresight is what is necessary, and an overabundance to boot. Even just within aviation, we have many examples of tiny mistakes leading to disastrous consequences. It is shocking to me, the apparent absence of forethought due diligence.

I can forgive people their mistakes, but forgiveness does not require excusing the mistakes. To me, describing the apparent assumptions around MCAS v1 as reasonable, is to excuse the mistake. Yes, the pilots made mistakes, but they were in the highest pressure situation imaginable, and the time restrictions were severe. Boeing had all the all the time they wanted, and they were not staring death in the face. What is Boeing's excuse?
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 12:54 am

oschkosch wrote:
morrisond wrote:
planecane wrote:

I agree. I don't know why we can't accept that these crashes exposed a terrible design by Boeing but also showed some kind of issue with pilot training, at least with respect to a runaway stabilizer. Every time it is mentioned or suggested that the crew could have done something different, the post is attacked as blaming the crew and absolving Boeing of blame.

Just as Boeing is going to be drastically improving the safety of the 737MAX as a result of the crashes, why can't we also use lessons learned to improve training for the pilots that fly the 737? That way, if there is ever a case of a runaway stabilizer (not caused by MCAS) on a 737 concurrent with other warnings and symptoms, the crew will be able to get the issue under control and land safely. Even if that only happens once in the entire service life of the MAX. Let the victim's loss of life be used to save every possible life going forward.


Amen.
I think it is important that we all agree on the fact that
a) it was Boeing that hid Mcas
b) it was Boeing that said the max only required a quick iPad session of training

It is the combination of a) and b) plus the faulty design of Mcas which caused the crashes. Pilots couldn't be properly trained because Boeing "convinced" the world and FAA etc. that the Max is like the NG. Pilots couldn't be properly trained on an iPad while important information about the mere existence of Mcas was hidden to them.

It's similar to a relationship. You start a relationship based on lies/untruthful things, it will all come crashing down on you. That is what happened with the Max.

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Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 1:04 am

aerolimani wrote:
planecane wrote:
hivue wrote:

"Well, it seemed like a good idea at the time." anon.

Yes, it was reasonable. The problem is, a lot of reasonable, rational ideas are seen to have actually been really stupid when viewed with the benefit of hindsight.


It was a "reasonable" mistake in assumption.

planecane wrote:
I agree that the reason the two planes crashed was because the design of MCAS used very flawed assumptions which led to a terrible design.

Flawed assumption or "reasonable" assumption? I can't resist pointing out your inconsistency here.

I am well familiar with the concept of 20/20 hindsight. What makes the assumption not reasonable, IMO, is that designers of planes should innately understand that foresight is what is necessary, and an overabundance to boot. Even just within aviation, we have many examples of tiny mistakes leading to disastrous consequences. It is shocking to me, the apparent absence of forethought due diligence.

I can forgive people their mistakes, but forgiveness does not require excusing the mistakes. To me, describing the apparent assumptions around MCAS v1 as reasonable, is to excuse the mistake. Yes, the pilots made mistakes, but they were in the highest pressure situation imaginable, and the time restrictions were severe. Boeing had all the all the time they wanted, and they were not staring death in the face. What is Boeing's excuse?


My point that you are trying to turn into a contradiction is that AT THE TIME they made the assumption of how pilots would react to an MCAS runaway, it was a reasonable assumption. It turned out to be a flawed assumption because pilots were not able to recognize the runaway stabilizer. I can see how an engineer with intimate knowledge of the procedures in a calm environment would make the assumption. What was needed that they obviously didn't do was to put pilots in an engineering simulator and watch what they did and how they reacted when an AoA sensor failed.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 1:11 am

planecane wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
Since it has been published that the expected reaction time to a runaway stabilizer is 4 seconds, it did not matter that MCAS was intermittent. MCAS activated for ten seconds which is six seconds longer than the expected recognition of a runaway stabilizer.

Any MCAS action longer than 4 second is then a runaway stabilizer. I highly doubt that a published procedure for the pilots allow to conclude that.


That's a good point. If the pilots were paying attention to the trim wheel, the low speed activation of MCAS would be seen as a runaway stabilizer. The pilot flying wouldn't think anything was wrong because the stick force wouldn't increase in his perception. However, the pilot monitoring might see it as a problem and alert the pilot flying.

Again, can you find a published procedure to the pilots that conclude to that ?
The 4 second is alleged to be a Boeing value used for a design decision. I want to see a prof that this value have been properly communicate to the pilots.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 1:26 am

bob75013 wrote:
snowkarl wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Everyone including Boeing and FAA acknowledge MCAS is a major thing, no one is saying otherwise.

Fixing MCAS doesn't address the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.

Why is it not "weird flexing" to make up a theoretical unstable aircraft that would never be certified to counter a point about FARs that no one is making then using that made up scenario to try to to disallow consideration of the airmen's behavior?


It's illogical to say we should ignore one set of factors that contribute to one or two accidents that also occur in other scenarios, yet some here seem to feel that discussing those factors here is taboo, probably because of emotional rather than logical thinking.


Sorry but you are a broken record at this point.

The pilots are not the issue. The NG is a very similar plane yet no pilots are getting confused and not realizing the plane is stalling and ignoring the stick shaker on that plane and crashing it into the ground.

This thread is about the MAX grounding - not about pilot training standards. Only one plane has a crash rate this high - the MAX. Why? Poor design. Otherwise other Boeing jets would be having the same issues, but hey, they're not.

But let's keep having this exact same argument for another 100 pages and drown out all bad news you don't like.

Mods are extremely good at deleting posts - yet no mods want to keep this thread on topic? Strange.


We had two Lion MAXs. One crashed. One survivded the same situation that caused the other to crash.

Edit add: What's the difference between the two? Answer: What the fight crew did or did not do.

Wny should that not be part of the discussion?


You're right. Clearly the MAX takes more training to fly than the NG. Or maybe the MAX requires three crew to fly, like the aircraft that survived. The FAA can give Boeing options: revoke the common type certification for 737 crew or mandate three crew flight deck.

After all, those unskilled third world pilots aren't crashing NGs at an order of magnitude higher than normal for commercial transport aircraft.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 1:54 am

bob75013 wrote:
We had two Lion MAXs. One crashed. One survivded the same situation that caused the other to crash.

Edit add: What's the difference between the two? Answer: What the flight crew did or did not do.

Wny should that not be part of the discussion?

The difference between the two is in fact very, very small. One crashed and one almost crashed.

We can discuss the flight crew performances all we want with the limitations of what little we know. Until we get the final report with CVR data it is all guesswork what was pilot skill / lack of pilot skill and what was luck / lack of luck.

That said, it is slightly off topic. This thread is about grounding of the MAX. It is grounded due to a design fault, not due to crew training issues. A single point and rather trivial failure has the consequence in best case to provide a very uncomfortable ride for the pax, and in worst case catastrophe - depending on fast and correct flight crew reaction, or not. Both are totally unacceptable. The MAX simply doesn't fulfil current certification criteria, and it was a fault that it got certified.

Conclusions about training issues before we know a lot more are premature.
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:03 am

PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Any MCAS action longer than 4 second is then a runaway stabilizer. I highly doubt that a published procedure for the pilots allow to conclude that.


That's a good point. If the pilots were paying attention to the trim wheel, the low speed activation of MCAS would be seen as a runaway stabilizer. The pilot flying wouldn't think anything was wrong because the stick force wouldn't increase in his perception. However, the pilot monitoring might see it as a problem and alert the pilot flying.

Again, can you find a published procedure to the pilots that conclude to that ?
The 4 second is alleged to be a Boeing value used for a design decision. I want to see a prof that this value have been properly communicate to the pilots.

I was under the impression from the reports that it was an FAA requirement.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:04 am

planecane wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
planecane wrote:

It was a "reasonable" mistake in assumption.

planecane wrote:
I agree that the reason the two planes crashed was because the design of MCAS used very flawed assumptions which led to a terrible design.

Flawed assumption or "reasonable" assumption? I can't resist pointing out your inconsistency here.

I am well familiar with the concept of 20/20 hindsight. What makes the assumption not reasonable, IMO, is that designers of planes should innately understand that foresight is what is necessary, and an overabundance to boot. Even just within aviation, we have many examples of tiny mistakes leading to disastrous consequences. It is shocking to me, the apparent absence of forethought due diligence.

I can forgive people their mistakes, but forgiveness does not require excusing the mistakes. To me, describing the apparent assumptions around MCAS v1 as reasonable, is to excuse the mistake. Yes, the pilots made mistakes, but they were in the highest pressure situation imaginable, and the time restrictions were severe. Boeing had all the all the time they wanted, and they were not staring death in the face. What is Boeing's excuse?


My point that you are trying to turn into a contradiction is that AT THE TIME they made the assumption of how pilots would react to an MCAS runaway, it was a reasonable assumption. It turned out to be a flawed assumption because pilots were not able to recognize the runaway stabilizer. I can see how an engineer with intimate knowledge of the procedures in a calm environment would make the assumption. What was needed that they obviously didn't do was to put pilots in an engineering simulator and watch what they did and how they reacted when an AoA sensor failed.

If, AT THE TIME, they could not have foreseen the consequences, then I could perhaps agree with you. However, all anyone had to do was imagine the situation where the pilots don’t respond as expected. There are many, many other scenarios where we don’t 100% rely on pilots. There are warnings, aural and visual, for just about anything a pilot does wrong. We don’t rely exclusively on our pilots’ training. So why would no one ask the “what if” question?

I’m sorry, but for me, that level of ignorance, whether willful or not, is inexcusable. It was
Inexcusable then, and it’s inexcusable now. I expect better.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:17 am

PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Any MCAS action longer than 4 second is then a runaway stabilizer. I highly doubt that a published procedure for the pilots allow to conclude that.


That's a good point. If the pilots were paying attention to the trim wheel, the low speed activation of MCAS would be seen as a runaway stabilizer. The pilot flying wouldn't think anything was wrong because the stick force wouldn't increase in his perception. However, the pilot monitoring might see it as a problem and alert the pilot flying.

Again, can you find a published procedure to the pilots that conclude to that ?
The 4 second is alleged to be a Boeing value used for a design decision. I want to see a prof that this value have been properly communicate to the pilots.


A loud air horn to alarm the pilots of a runaway stabilizer if the trim wheel rotates constantly more than 4 seconds?
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:39 am

aerolimani wrote:
planecane wrote:
aerolimani wrote:

Flawed assumption or "reasonable" assumption? I can't resist pointing out your inconsistency here.

I am well familiar with the concept of 20/20 hindsight. What makes the assumption not reasonable, IMO, is that designers of planes should innately understand that foresight is what is necessary, and an overabundance to boot. Even just within aviation, we have many examples of tiny mistakes leading to disastrous consequences. It is shocking to me, the apparent absence of forethought due diligence.

I can forgive people their mistakes, but forgiveness does not require excusing the mistakes. To me, describing the apparent assumptions around MCAS v1 as reasonable, is to excuse the mistake. Yes, the pilots made mistakes, but they were in the highest pressure situation imaginable, and the time restrictions were severe. Boeing had all the all the time they wanted, and they were not staring death in the face. What is Boeing's excuse?


My point that you are trying to turn into a contradiction is that AT THE TIME they made the assumption of how pilots would react to an MCAS runaway, it was a reasonable assumption. It turned out to be a flawed assumption because pilots were not able to recognize the runaway stabilizer. I can see how an engineer with intimate knowledge of the procedures in a calm environment would make the assumption. What was needed that they obviously didn't do was to put pilots in an engineering simulator and watch what they did and how they reacted when an AoA sensor failed.

If, AT THE TIME, they could not have foreseen the consequences, then I could perhaps agree with you. However, all anyone had to do was imagine the situation where the pilots don’t respond as expected. There are many, many other scenarios where we don’t 100% rely on pilots. There are warnings, aural and visual, for just about anything a pilot does wrong. We don’t rely exclusively on our pilots’ training. So why would no one ask the “what if” question?

I’m sorry, but for me, that level of ignorance, whether willful or not, is inexcusable. It was
Inexcusable then, and it’s inexcusable now. I expect better.


The assumption was that they would respond as expected. That quote I pulled from the 1995 bulletin referred to the normal reaction to a runaway stabilizer. It seems internally that runaway stabilizer on a 737 was something they felt that every pilot could routinely recognize and respond to quickly.

It seems to have been treated as a routine response like an engine failure where it is assumed the pilot will instinctively and quickly apply the rudder to counteract the asymmetric thrust.
 
PStechPaul
Posts: 16
Joined: Thu Mar 21, 2019 11:29 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:42 am

A true stab trim runaway condition would not be affected by manual (electric) trim adjustment.
 
ArgentoSystems
Posts: 313
Joined: Sun Mar 24, 2019 12:05 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:44 am

Spiderguy252 wrote:
Has there been any update from Boeing in the past month at all?

Seems radio silence for the moment.

Zero updates since end of June. Not even some kind of rumor or leaked info. I don't count repeat promise to finish fixes in Sep as an update. I don't know, I see it as sign that things are not looking good. If there is problem and they know how to fix it, why not share that? Like they did with MCAS. They've been fairly detailed in the description of algorithmic changes that they are making. With the June's problem no info whatsoever. I guess the problem is so bad they don't want to reveal it until they have a solution. And they still don't.
 
planecane
Posts: 1148
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:51 am

PStechPaul wrote:
A true stab trim runaway condition would not be affected by manual (electric) trim adjustment.


Says who? If that was the case, why is using it near the beginning of the NNC? The manual electric trim has priority over all other electric trim commands.

With the two switch design on each yoke, it is highly unlikely that a switch issue would be the cause of the runaway.

If what you say is true, the first step in the NNC would be to move the cutout switches to cutout and the second step would be grasp and hold the trim wheel.

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