PW100 wrote:Revelation wrote:I'm sorry, but IMO you are using reduction to absurdity and strawman arguments by using the specter of an unstable aircraft that you yourself say doesn't exist to avoid addressing a point about the competence of an airman that would ignore stick shakers and aural warnings, then suggesting that acting on the warnings you do get (which go beyond stick shaker and aural warnings) implies favoring the idea of getting rid of FARs related to aircraft stability.
I'm sorry, I've totally lost you there.
You guys are going through a lot of word flexing trying to convince yourself that MCAS is a minor thing, and that if we had competent pilots, it would not be needed. I'm not buying that, and neither do the FAA and EASA (rightfully).
Everyone including Boeing and FAA acknowledge MCAS is a major thing, no one is saying otherwise.
Fixing MCAS doesn't address the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.
Why is it not "weird flexing" to make up a theoretical unstable aircraft that would never be certified to counter a point about FARs that no one is making then using that made up scenario to try to to disallow consideration of the airmen's behavior?
PixelFlight wrote:Revelation wrote:Fixing MCAS doesn't fix the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.
Is that specific to the 737-8/9 MAX ? No.
[logic vs emotion]
It's illogical to say we should ignore one set of factors that contribute to one or two accidents that also occur in other scenarios, yet some here seem to feel that discussing those factors here is taboo, probably because of emotional rather than logical thinking.