RickNRoll
Posts: 1783
Joined: Fri Jan 06, 2012 9:30 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 3:24 am

planecane wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:
planecane wrote:

It was a "reasonable" mistake in assumption. I have previously quoted from a 1995 Boeing bulletin regarding freewheeling stabilizers on the 737 classic. It states, "Normal pilot reaction to a runaway stabilizer of opposing the runaway with main electric trim in addition to control column force will initially resolve a runaway."

This is what Boeing engineers thought that the reaction to an MCAS runaway would be. Unfortunately, they didn't seem to have realized the other warnings and symptoms that would occur due to the same AoA sensor failure that caused the MCAS runaway. They also probably didn't bother to find out how well versed pilots are in dealing with runaway stabilizer situations in the current decade since it seems that the causes of runaway stabilizer have been addressed over the years so it doesn't happen very often anymore.
As we could see from the Mentour video, column force was ridiculously heavy. Why a "feedback" that was deliberately made so heavy in a modern passenger plane is bizarre. It harks back to planes of the 1940s, not a plane in the 21st century. It was just one more significant contribution to pilot overload.

I can understand people criticizing the lack of feedback on the Airbus sidestick but can't it be made more civilized and safe these days.


The force had to be the same as it was on the 737-100 to maintain commonality. I can only assume that it was designed that way to make it difficult to enter a stall by needing a lot of force to reach a stall AoA.


That was good back then. Maybe planes should not assume all pilots are WWII or airforce veterans now. On the NG you could disable any automatic trim but keep electrical trim on the control column working.
 
planecane
Posts: 1129
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 3:33 am

RickNRoll wrote:
planecane wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:
As we could see from the Mentour video, column force was ridiculously heavy. Why a "feedback" that was deliberately made so heavy in a modern passenger plane is bizarre. It harks back to planes of the 1940s, not a plane in the 21st century. It was just one more significant contribution to pilot overload.

I can understand people criticizing the lack of feedback on the Airbus sidestick but can't it be made more civilized and safe these days.


The force had to be the same as it was on the 737-100 to maintain commonality. I can only assume that it was designed that way to make it difficult to enter a stall by needing a lot of force to reach a stall AoA.


That was good back then. Maybe planes should not assume all pilots are WWII or airforce veterans now. On the NG you could disable any automatic trim but keep electrical trim on the control column working.

For whatever reason, even though automatic and manual trim had separate switches, the procedure in the NNC was always to cutout both.

I think the only reason there are two switches is that originally there were two different actuators so they were two different circuits.
 
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Francoflier
Posts: 4890
Joined: Wed Oct 31, 2001 12:27 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 4:36 am

planecane wrote:
PStechPaul wrote:
A true stab trim runaway condition would not be affected by manual (electric) trim adjustment.


Says who? If that was the case, why is using it near the beginning of the NNC? The manual electric trim has priority over all other electric trim commands.

With the two switch design on each yoke, it is highly unlikely that a switch issue would be the cause of the runaway.

If what you say is true, the first step in the NNC would be to move the cutout switches to cutout and the second step would be grasp and hold the trim wheel.


For all the years I flew Boeing airplanes (although not the 737), I have never been made to understand a stab runaway event as anything other than exactly that: a stab running away.
Not to mention that in the models I did fly, a runaway event would be signaled by an EICAS warning, prompting the memory item to be carried out ASAP.

You have been trying to push blame on pilots for Months now, all based on the stab runaway NNC. We have 3 spurious MCAS activation events, 2 of them resulting in fatal crashes. You can try to blame the poor training standards and experience levels at the concerned airlines all you want (without knowing much about them, I expect), but a designed failure mode that results in a 67% crash rate when it occurs is a BAD design, and that's without mentioning the fact the the first Lionair crew had an extra pilot just sitting there with the spare brain capacity to help troubleshoot the issue ad hoc.

Then there's the lack of understanding of the failure mode of an unknown or, at best, obscure system by the crew, the multiple conflicting warnings they received, the possible conflicting speed readings in at least one case, stall warnings going on and trim switches that actually responded to pilot inputs (so, not 'running away' then?), all easily leading to massive confusion about what was going on, with very little time to analyse the situation and react to it.

At the end of the day, they had mere seconds to react to a complex failure that you have had month to think about and 'analyse' (with obvious bias).
Sure, there are things that the crew could have done to save the airplane, but they didn't. I'm sure the report will mention this. The problem is that shoulda's and coulda's are not going to bring these people back to life and at the end of the day, the investigation, as it relates to safety, will be looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane from actively trying to fly them into the ground, not, as in many other accidents, why they flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground...

I don't know of any competent pilot who, in their situation, can confidently say that they could have gotten out of it.
So unless your plan is to train every airline pilot to test pilot standard, I really don't see why you try to keep pushing that argument, other than to defend a corporation that, willingly or not, put a bad design in service.

Also, I have probably missed them, but it would at least help your argument if you mentioned your credentials, such as how many hours you have flying the 737, or any other aircraft, or your involvement with aircraft operation or design generally speaking.
I'll do my own airline. With Blackjack. And hookers. In fact, forget the airline.
 
Agrajag
Posts: 81
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 8:23 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 5:13 am

Francoflier wrote:
planecane wrote:
PStechPaul wrote:
A true stab trim runaway condition would not be affected by manual (electric) trim adjustment.


Says who? If that was the case, why is using it near the beginning of the NNC? The manual electric trim has priority over all other electric trim commands.

With the two switch design on each yoke, it is highly unlikely that a switch issue would be the cause of the runaway.

If what you say is true, the first step in the NNC would be to move the cutout switches to cutout and the second step would be grasp and hold the trim wheel.


For all the years I flew Boeing airplanes (although not the 737), I have never been made to understand a stab runaway event as anything other than exactly that: a stab running away.
Not to mention that in the models I did fly, a runaway event would be signaled by an EICAS warning, prompting the memory item to be carried out ASAP.

You have been trying to push blame on pilots for Months now, all based on the stab runaway NNC. We have 3 spurious MCAS activation events, 2 of them resulting in fatal crashes. You can try to blame the poor training standards and experience levels at the concerned airlines all you want (without knowing much about them, I expect), but a designed failure mode that results in a 67% crash rate when it occurs is a BAD design, and that's without mentioning the fact the the first Lionair crew had an extra pilot just sitting there with the spare brain capacity to help troubleshoot the issue ad hoc.

Then there's the lack of understanding of the failure mode of an unknown or, at best, obscure system by the crew, the multiple conflicting warnings they received, the possible conflicting speed readings in at least one case, stall warnings going on and trim switches that actually responded to pilot inputs (so, not 'running away' then?), all easily leading to massive confusion about what was going on, with very little time to analyse the situation and react to it.

At the end of the day, they had mere seconds to react to a complex failure that you have had month to think about and 'analyse' (with obvious bias).
Sure, there are things that the crew could have done to save the airplane, but they didn't. I'm sure the report will mention this. The problem is that shoulda's and coulda's are not going to bring these people back to life and at the end of the day, the investigation, as it relates to safety, will be looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane from actively trying to fly them into the ground, not, as in many other accidents, why they flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground...

I don't know of any competent pilot who, in their situation, can confidently say that they could have gotten out of it.
So unless your plan is to train every airline pilot to test pilot standard, I really don't see why you try to keep pushing that argument, other than to defend a corporation that, willingly or not, put a bad design in service.

Also, I have probably missed them, but it would at least help your argument if you mentioned your credentials, such as how many hours you have flying the 737, or any other aircraft, or your involvement with aircraft operation or design generally speaking.



Bravo. :checkmark:
The plural of anecdote is anecdotes, not data.
Slartibartfast had a point
 
User avatar
aerolimani
Posts: 1184
Joined: Tue Jun 18, 2013 5:46 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 5:15 am

Francoflier wrote:
planecane wrote:
PStechPaul wrote:
A true stab trim runaway condition would not be affected by manual (electric) trim adjustment.


Says who? If that was the case, why is using it near the beginning of the NNC? The manual electric trim has priority over all other electric trim commands.

With the two switch design on each yoke, it is highly unlikely that a switch issue would be the cause of the runaway.

If what you say is true, the first step in the NNC would be to move the cutout switches to cutout and the second step would be grasp and hold the trim wheel.


For all the years I flew Boeing airplanes (although not the 737), I have never been made to understand a stab runaway event as anything other than exactly that: a stab running away.
Not to mention that in the models I did fly, a runaway event would be signaled by an EICAS warning, prompting the memory item to be carried out ASAP.

You have been trying to push blame on pilots for Months now, all based on the stab runaway NNC. We have 3 spurious MCAS activation events, 2 of them resulting in fatal crashes. You can try to blame the poor training standards and experience levels at the concerned airlines all you want (without knowing much about them, I expect), but a designed failure mode that results in a 67% crash rate when it occurs is a BAD design, and that's without mentioning the fact the the first Lionair crew had an extra pilot just sitting there with the spare brain capacity to help troubleshoot the issue ad hoc.

Then there's the lack of understanding of the failure mode of an unknown or, at best, obscure system by the crew, the multiple conflicting warnings they received, the possible conflicting speed readings in at least one case, stall warnings going on and trim switches that actually responded to pilot inputs (so, not 'running away' then?), all easily leading to massive confusion about what was going on, with very little time to analyse the situation and react to it.

At the end of the day, they had mere seconds to react to a complex failure that you have had month to think about and 'analyse' (with obvious bias).
Sure, there are things that the crew could have done to save the airplane, but they didn't. I'm sure the report will mention this. The problem is that shoulda's and coulda's are not going to bring these people back to life and at the end of the day, the investigation, as it relates to safety, will be looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane from actively trying to fly them into the ground, not, as in many other accidents, why they flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground...

I don't know of any competent pilot who, in their situation, can confidently say that they could have gotten out of it.
So unless your plan is to train every airline pilot to test pilot standard, I really don't see why you try to keep pushing that argument, other than to defend a corporation that, willingly or not, put a bad design in service.

Also, I have probably missed them, but it would at least help your argument if you mentioned your credentials, such as how many hours you have flying the 737, or any other aircraft, or your involvement with aircraft operation or design generally speaking.

Thank you for this. I particularly appreciate your statement that I bolded above. It's an important difference which some here seem to ignore.
 
oschkosch
Posts: 287
Joined: Mon Oct 29, 2018 3:41 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 5:37 am

Francoflier wrote:
planecane wrote:
PStechPaul wrote:
A true stab trim runaway condition would not be affected by manual (electric) trim adjustment.


Says who? If that was the case, why is using it near the beginning of the NNC? The manual electric trim has priority over all other electric trim commands.

With the two switch design on each yoke, it is highly unlikely that a switch issue would be the cause of the runaway.

If what you say is true, the first step in the NNC would be to move the cutout switches to cutout and the second step would be grasp and hold the trim wheel.


For all the years I flew Boeing airplanes (although not the 737), I have never been made to understand a stab runaway event as anything other than exactly that: a stab running away.
Not to mention that in the models I did fly, a runaway event would be signaled by an EICAS warning, prompting the memory item to be carried out ASAP.

You have been trying to push blame on pilots for Months now, all based on the stab runaway NNC. We have 3 spurious MCAS activation events, 2 of them resulting in fatal crashes. You can try to blame the poor training standards and experience levels at the concerned airlines all you want (without knowing much about them, I expect), but a designed failure mode that results in a 67% crash rate when it occurs is a BAD design, and that's without mentioning the fact the the first Lionair crew had an extra pilot just sitting there with the spare brain capacity to help troubleshoot the issue ad hoc.

Then there's the lack of understanding of the failure mode of an unknown or, at best, obscure system by the crew, the multiple conflicting warnings they received, the possible conflicting speed readings in at least one case, stall warnings going on and trim switches that actually responded to pilot inputs (so, not 'running away' then?), all easily leading to massive confusion about what was going on, with very little time to analyse the situation and react to it.

At the end of the day, they had mere seconds to react to a complex failure that you have had month to think about and 'analyse' (with obvious bias).
Sure, there are things that the crew could have done to save the airplane, but they didn't. I'm sure the report will mention this. The problem is that shoulda's and coulda's are not going to bring these people back to life and at the end of the day, the investigation, as it relates to safety, will be looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane from actively trying to fly them into the ground, not, as in many other accidents, why they flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground...

I don't know of any competent pilot who, in their situation, can confidently say that they could have gotten out of it.
So unless your plan is to train every airline pilot to test pilot standard, I really don't see why you try to keep pushing that argument, other than to defend a corporation that, willingly or not, put a bad design in service.

Also, I have probably missed them, but it would at least help your argument if you mentioned your credentials, such as how many hours you have flying the 737, or any other aircraft, or your involvement with aircraft operation or design generally speaking.



AMEN! :checkmark: :thumbsup:
 
HugoJunkers
Posts: 14
Joined: Tue Jun 04, 2019 3:23 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 5:43 am

Vladex wrote:
Natflyer wrote:
At what point can airlines just return an unusable jet to Boeing for a full refund? Airplane is unusable through no fault of the customer, but entirely the manufacturers fault. Return, refund and go find something else to fly. May take a while, but there is no end in sight for this bs.


Airlines are guilty of playing A vs B and going for the cheap, quick and easy solutions and discarding any competition in place for collusion. A and B know this so they will cut corners as well and B far more so and they actually sell it as features not faults . 737 MAX with misfiting engine was thus sold as a feature and is a logical end to that duopoly and it's a fault of the airlines that didn't question their buying decisions. In a free market , it would be entirely their fault but it seems like they want to socialize it , as in force everybody else to bear the cost and pain.


We all know at this point that the primary the reason that MCAS was so abysmally implemented was because airlines wanted their pilots to be able to use the same type certificate for the
B737 MAX as the B737-NG and Boeing tried to meet this need. This at once precluded alarms for MCAS faults, gravitated towards no using two alpha vanes and precluded MCAS cut out switches separate from stabiliser run away trim cut out. Do we hold American Airlines vicariously libel for its 2011 order specifying an aircraft in such a way that it was difficult to make safe? (No saying AA did this, just by the way of hypothetical example.)
 
User avatar
aerolimani
Posts: 1184
Joined: Tue Jun 18, 2013 5:46 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 5:48 am

planecane wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
planecane wrote:

My point that you are trying to turn into a contradiction is that AT THE TIME they made the assumption of how pilots would react to an MCAS runaway, it was a reasonable assumption. It turned out to be a flawed assumption because pilots were not able to recognize the runaway stabilizer. I can see how an engineer with intimate knowledge of the procedures in a calm environment would make the assumption. What was needed that they obviously didn't do was to put pilots in an engineering simulator and watch what they did and how they reacted when an AoA sensor failed.

If, AT THE TIME, they could not have foreseen the consequences, then I could perhaps agree with you. However, all anyone had to do was imagine the situation where the pilots don’t respond as expected. There are many, many other scenarios where we don’t 100% rely on pilots. There are warnings, aural and visual, for just about anything a pilot does wrong. We don’t rely exclusively on our pilots’ training. So why would no one ask the “what if” question?

I’m sorry, but for me, that level of ignorance, whether willful or not, is inexcusable. It was
Inexcusable then, and it’s inexcusable now. I expect better.


The assumption was that they would respond as expected. That quote I pulled from the 1995 bulletin referred to the normal reaction to a runaway stabilizer. It seems internally that runaway stabilizer on a 737 was something they felt that every pilot could routinely recognize and respond to quickly.

It seems to have been treated as a routine response like an engine failure where it is assumed the pilot will instinctively and quickly apply the rudder to counteract the asymmetric thrust.

To treat it like an engine failure is so obviously inappropriate. It's apples and oranges. It's understood, despite the manufacturer's best efforts, that engines will occasionally fail. The key words here are best efforts. Had Boeing applied its best effort, we wouldn't have a grounded aircraft, and we wouldn't have 346 people dead. All the changes now being incorporated would have been there from the start. This is software and hardware we're talking about. This NOT new technology. This is not anything even close to pushing the envelope. This was preventable, and relatively easily so.

To me, this assumption "that they would respond as expected," sounds like just another lame excuse. The design was terrible. You've even said so yourself. At best, I can see someone jumping to this assumption as a means to move forward more quickly with the project, and to avoid extra work. If that's the case, and that's what really happened, then the safety culture at Boeing needs a massive overhaul.

It remains to be seen whether this is all the explanation we ever get; this pilot overload talk. I hope that the investigations underway turn up something more, but I have my doubts. If there's any skeletons in the closet still, I have a feeling they've been hauled out, ground into tiny pieces, and dumped in the ocean, along with whatever did the grinding.
 
MSPNWA
Posts: 3413
Joined: Thu Apr 23, 2009 2:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 6:07 am

planecane wrote:
Says who? If that was the case, why is using it near the beginning of the NNC? The manual electric trim has priority over all other electric trim commands.

With the two switch design on each yoke, it is highly unlikely that a switch issue would be the cause of the runaway.

If what you say is true, the first step in the NNC would be to move the cutout switches to cutout and the second step would be grasp and hold the trim wheel.


:checkmark: Precisely.

Francoflier wrote:
For all the years I flew Boeing airplanes (although not the 737), I have never been made to understand a stab runaway event as anything other than exactly that: a stab running away.
Not to mention that in the models I did fly, a runaway event would be signaled by an EICAS warning, prompting the memory item to be carried out ASAP.

You have been trying to push blame on pilots for Months now, all based on the stab runaway NNC. We have 3 spurious MCAS activation events, 2 of them resulting in fatal crashes. You can try to blame the poor training standards and experience levels at the concerned airlines all you want (without knowing much about them, I expect), but a designed failure mode that results in a 67% crash rate when it occurs is a BAD design, and that's without mentioning the fact the the first Lionair crew had an extra pilot just sitting there with the spare brain capacity to help troubleshoot the issue ad hoc.

Then there's the lack of understanding of the failure mode of an unknown or, at best, obscure system by the crew, the multiple conflicting warnings they received, the possible conflicting speed readings in at least one case, stall warnings going on and trim switches that actually responded to pilot inputs (so, not 'running away' then?), all easily leading to massive confusion about what was going on, with very little time to analyse the situation and react to it.

At the end of the day, they had mere seconds to react to a complex failure that you have had month to think about and 'analyse' (with obvious bias).
Sure, there are things that the crew could have done to save the airplane, but they didn't. I'm sure the report will mention this. The problem is that shoulda's and coulda's are not going to bring these people back to life and at the end of the day, the investigation, as it relates to safety, will be looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane from actively trying to fly them into the ground, not, as in many other accidents, why they flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground...

I don't know of any competent pilot who, in their situation, can confidently say that they could have gotten out of it.
So unless your plan is to train every airline pilot to test pilot standard, I really don't see why you try to keep pushing that argument, other than to defend a corporation that, willingly or not, put a bad design in service.

Also, I have probably missed them, but it would at least help your argument if you mentioned your credentials, such as how many hours you have flying the 737, or any other aircraft, or your involvement with aircraft operation or design generally speaking.


You'd have a better argument if you didn't go down the straw man road (no one is saying there wasn't a bad design), state factual errors such as "mere seconds", try to shut down dissenters, and the in end contradict your own argument. Was there a bad design. Yes. Was their bad piloting. Yes. Were there other mistakes. Yes. It's the facts of the case. Saying that people are "pushing blame onto the pilots" is contradicted by "looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane...". You're saying that it's wrong to push blame, but then acknowledge there's potential blame to levy. You can't have it both ways, so what statement are you retracting?

I think you need to know more pilots.
 
sgrow787
Posts: 262
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 6:29 am

HugoJunkers wrote:
Vladex wrote:
Natflyer wrote:
At what point can airlines just return an unusable jet to Boeing for a full refund? Airplane is unusable through no fault of the customer, but entirely the manufacturers fault. Return, refund and go find something else to fly. May take a while, but there is no end in sight for this bs.


Airlines are guilty of playing A vs B and going for the cheap, quick and easy solutions and discarding any competition in place for collusion. A and B know this so they will cut corners as well and B far more so and they actually sell it as features not faults . 737 MAX with misfiting engine was thus sold as a feature and is a logical end to that duopoly and it's a fault of the airlines that didn't question their buying decisions. In a free market , it would be entirely their fault but it seems like they want to socialize it , as in force everybody else to bear the cost and pain.


We all know at this point that the primary the reason that MCAS was so abysmally implemented was because airlines wanted their pilots to be able to use the same type certificate for the
B737 MAX as the B737-NG and Boeing tried to meet this need. This at once precluded alarms for MCAS faults, gravitated towards no using two alpha vanes and precluded MCAS cut out switches separate from stabiliser run away trim cut out. Do we hold American Airlines vicariously libel for its 2011 order specifying an aircraft in such a way that it was difficult to make safe? (No saying AA did this, just by the way of hypothetical example.)


But for some reason they convinced the FAA that the new two-sensor design, with the AOA disagree annunciator and optional AOA indicator, doesn't now need simulator training.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
sgrow787
Posts: 262
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 6:36 am

MSPNWA wrote:
You'd have a better argument if you didn't go down the straw man road (no one is saying there wasn't a bad design), state factual errors such as "mere seconds", try to shut down dissenters, and the in end contradict your own argument.


One of the dissenters posts an average of 10 times a day, for the past week, with a total of 101 posts the last 2 weeks. All pushing the same song, that runaway stab recovery NNC was sufficient to cover the MCAS 1.0 misfires, and how the dead pilots of both crashes failed to follow it. I've been a member for 5 years. I read most of the posts every week, and still I'm only at 150 or so total! WTF?
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
User avatar
aerolimani
Posts: 1184
Joined: Tue Jun 18, 2013 5:46 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 6:49 am

MSPNWA wrote:
planecane wrote:
Says who? If that was the case, why is using it near the beginning of the NNC? The manual electric trim has priority over all other electric trim commands.

With the two switch design on each yoke, it is highly unlikely that a switch issue would be the cause of the runaway.

If what you say is true, the first step in the NNC would be to move the cutout switches to cutout and the second step would be grasp and hold the trim wheel.


:checkmark: Precisely.

Francoflier wrote:
For all the years I flew Boeing airplanes (although not the 737), I have never been made to understand a stab runaway event as anything other than exactly that: a stab running away.
Not to mention that in the models I did fly, a runaway event would be signaled by an EICAS warning, prompting the memory item to be carried out ASAP.

You have been trying to push blame on pilots for Months now, all based on the stab runaway NNC. We have 3 spurious MCAS activation events, 2 of them resulting in fatal crashes. You can try to blame the poor training standards and experience levels at the concerned airlines all you want (without knowing much about them, I expect), but a designed failure mode that results in a 67% crash rate when it occurs is a BAD design, and that's without mentioning the fact the the first Lionair crew had an extra pilot just sitting there with the spare brain capacity to help troubleshoot the issue ad hoc.

Then there's the lack of understanding of the failure mode of an unknown or, at best, obscure system by the crew, the multiple conflicting warnings they received, the possible conflicting speed readings in at least one case, stall warnings going on and trim switches that actually responded to pilot inputs (so, not 'running away' then?), all easily leading to massive confusion about what was going on, with very little time to analyse the situation and react to it.

At the end of the day, they had mere seconds to react to a complex failure that you have had month to think about and 'analyse' (with obvious bias).
Sure, there are things that the crew could have done to save the airplane, but they didn't. I'm sure the report will mention this. The problem is that shoulda's and coulda's are not going to bring these people back to life and at the end of the day, the investigation, as it relates to safety, will be looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane from actively trying to fly them into the ground, not, as in many other accidents, why they flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground...

I don't know of any competent pilot who, in their situation, can confidently say that they could have gotten out of it.
So unless your plan is to train every airline pilot to test pilot standard, I really don't see why you try to keep pushing that argument, other than to defend a corporation that, willingly or not, put a bad design in service.

Also, I have probably missed them, but it would at least help your argument if you mentioned your credentials, such as how many hours you have flying the 737, or any other aircraft, or your involvement with aircraft operation or design generally speaking.


You'd have a better argument if you didn't go down the straw man road (no one is saying there wasn't a bad design), state factual errors such as "mere seconds", try to shut down dissenters, and the in end contradict your own argument.

Perhaps no one is saying there wasn’t a bad design, but there is definitely an attitude that says the bad design is understandable/excusable because the designers were expecting pilots to be the backstop. At least, that seems to now be the push behind the “but the pilots(!)” arguments now.

As to “mere seconds,” that could mean anything. I recall some sim sessions, recreating the Lion Air flight, which determined that from the activation of MCAS, the pilots had about 40 seconds before things get into the unrecoverable range. I’d describe that as mere seconds. When you’re busy just trying to figure out what’s going on, 40 seconds is not a long time. Presumably, and hopefully, even the most unaware pilots will take some actions which extend that 40 second window, but still, that’s tight. I would have no problem framing 40 seconds as being mere seconds.
 
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aerolimani
Posts: 1184
Joined: Tue Jun 18, 2013 5:46 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 7:21 am

MSPNWA wrote:
Francoflier wrote:
For all the years I flew Boeing airplanes (although not the 737), I have never been made to understand a stab runaway event as anything other than exactly that: a stab running away.
Not to mention that in the models I did fly, a runaway event would be signaled by an EICAS warning, prompting the memory item to be carried out ASAP.

You have been trying to push blame on pilots for Months now, all based on the stab runaway NNC. We have 3 spurious MCAS activation events, 2 of them resulting in fatal crashes. You can try to blame the poor training standards and experience levels at the concerned airlines all you want (without knowing much about them, I expect), but a designed failure mode that results in a 67% crash rate when it occurs is a BAD design, and that's without mentioning the fact the the first Lionair crew had an extra pilot just sitting there with the spare brain capacity to help troubleshoot the issue ad hoc.

Then there's the lack of understanding of the failure mode of an unknown or, at best, obscure system by the crew, the multiple conflicting warnings they received, the possible conflicting speed readings in at least one case, stall warnings going on and trim switches that actually responded to pilot inputs (so, not 'running away' then?), all easily leading to massive confusion about what was going on, with very little time to analyse the situation and react to it.

At the end of the day, they had mere seconds to react to a complex failure that you have had month to think about and 'analyse' (with obvious bias).
Sure, there are things that the crew could have done to save the airplane, but they didn't. I'm sure the report will mention this. The problem is that shoulda's and coulda's are not going to bring these people back to life and at the end of the day, the investigation, as it relates to safety, will be looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane from actively trying to fly them into the ground, not, as in many other accidents, why they flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground...

I don't know of any competent pilot who, in their situation, can confidently say that they could have gotten out of it.
So unless your plan is to train every airline pilot to test pilot standard, I really don't see why you try to keep pushing that argument, other than to defend a corporation that, willingly or not, put a bad design in service.

Also, I have probably missed them, but it would at least help your argument if you mentioned your credentials, such as how many hours you have flying the 737, or any other aircraft, or your involvement with aircraft operation or design generally speaking.


You'd have a better argument if you didn't go down the straw man road (no one is saying there wasn't a bad design), state factual errors such as "mere seconds", try to shut down dissenters, and the in end contradict your own argument. Was there a bad design. Yes. Was their bad piloting. Yes. Were there other mistakes. Yes. It's the facts of the case. Saying that people are "pushing blame onto the pilots" is contradicted by "looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane...". You're saying that it's wrong to push blame, but then acknowledge there's potential blame to levy. You can't have it both ways, so what statement are you retracting?

I think you need to know more pilots.

Since you’ve opened the pandora’s box of logical fallacies, I will point out that your ad hominem response to Francoflier manages to completely avoid addressing any of the points presented in Francoflier‘a post. Bravo, sir.
 
PStechPaul
Posts: 16
Joined: Thu Mar 21, 2019 11:29 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 8:00 am

Thank you, Francoflier, for validating my observation that the pilots would likely not have identified the problem as runaway stab, because the yoke trim switches were responsive, and stopped the AND trim caused by MCAS. It could also have been caused by an autopilot malfunction, but AIUI disabling autopilot did not disable MCAS. It seems unfair for MSPNWA to assert that there was "bad piloting". Perhaps "imperfect" would be about as far as I would go to describe their efforts.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1338
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 8:17 am

PStechPaul wrote:
Thank you, Francoflier, for validating my observation that the pilots would likely not have identified the problem as runaway stab, because the yoke trim switches were responsive, and stopped the AND trim caused by MCAS. It could also have been caused by an autopilot malfunction, but AIUI disabling autopilot did not disable MCAS. It seems unfair for MSPNWA to assert that there was "bad piloting". Perhaps "imperfect" would be about as far as I would go to describe their efforts.


These are valid points on Lionair - but don't explain Ethiopian where they should have had full knowledge and understanding of MCAS.
 
uta999
Posts: 738
Joined: Mon Jun 14, 2010 11:10 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 8:25 am

morrisond wrote:
PStechPaul wrote:
Thank you, Francoflier, for validating my observation that the pilots would likely not have identified the problem as runaway stab, because the yoke trim switches were responsive, and stopped the AND trim caused by MCAS. It could also have been caused by an autopilot malfunction, but AIUI disabling autopilot did not disable MCAS. It seems unfair for MSPNWA to assert that there was "bad piloting". Perhaps "imperfect" would be about as far as I would go to describe their efforts.


These are valid points on Lionair - but don't explain Ethiopian where they should have had full knowledge and understanding of MCAS.


If the ET pilots had known about MCAS and its errant code, which meant it would repeatedly (10 x) pitch the nose down in a roller-coaster motion, the MAX would have already been grounded by everyone. The accident would never have happened. Those still screaming it was the pilots fault for not recovering the unrecoverable obviously work for Boeing or their lawyers.
Your computer just got better
 
morrisond
Posts: 1338
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 8:26 am

aerolimani wrote:
MSPNWA wrote:
planecane wrote:
Says who? If that was the case, why is using it near the beginning of the NNC? The manual electric trim has priority over all other electric trim commands.

With the two switch design on each yoke, it is highly unlikely that a switch issue would be the cause of the runaway.

If what you say is true, the first step in the NNC would be to move the cutout switches to cutout and the second step would be grasp and hold the trim wheel.


:checkmark: Precisely.

Francoflier wrote:
For all the years I flew Boeing airplanes (although not the 737), I have never been made to understand a stab runaway event as anything other than exactly that: a stab running away.
Not to mention that in the models I did fly, a runaway event would be signaled by an EICAS warning, prompting the memory item to be carried out ASAP.

You have been trying to push blame on pilots for Months now, all based on the stab runaway NNC. We have 3 spurious MCAS activation events, 2 of them resulting in fatal crashes. You can try to blame the poor training standards and experience levels at the concerned airlines all you want (without knowing much about them, I expect), but a designed failure mode that results in a 67% crash rate when it occurs is a BAD design, and that's without mentioning the fact the the first Lionair crew had an extra pilot just sitting there with the spare brain capacity to help troubleshoot the issue ad hoc.

Then there's the lack of understanding of the failure mode of an unknown or, at best, obscure system by the crew, the multiple conflicting warnings they received, the possible conflicting speed readings in at least one case, stall warnings going on and trim switches that actually responded to pilot inputs (so, not 'running away' then?), all easily leading to massive confusion about what was going on, with very little time to analyse the situation and react to it.

At the end of the day, they had mere seconds to react to a complex failure that you have had month to think about and 'analyse' (with obvious bias).
Sure, there are things that the crew could have done to save the airplane, but they didn't. I'm sure the report will mention this. The problem is that shoulda's and coulda's are not going to bring these people back to life and at the end of the day, the investigation, as it relates to safety, will be looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane from actively trying to fly them into the ground, not, as in many other accidents, why they flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground...

I don't know of any competent pilot who, in their situation, can confidently say that they could have gotten out of it.
So unless your plan is to train every airline pilot to test pilot standard, I really don't see why you try to keep pushing that argument, other than to defend a corporation that, willingly or not, put a bad design in service.

Also, I have probably missed them, but it would at least help your argument if you mentioned your credentials, such as how many hours you have flying the 737, or any other aircraft, or your involvement with aircraft operation or design generally speaking.


You'd have a better argument if you didn't go down the straw man road (no one is saying there wasn't a bad design), state factual errors such as "mere seconds", try to shut down dissenters, and the in end contradict your own argument.

Perhaps no one is saying there wasn’t a bad design, but there is definitely an attitude that says the bad design is understandable/excusable because the designers were expecting pilots to be the backstop. At least, that seems to now be the push behind the “but the pilots(!)” arguments now.

As to “mere seconds,” that could mean anything. I recall some sim sessions, recreating the Lion Air flight, which determined that from the activation of MCAS, the pilots had about 40 seconds before things get into the unrecoverable range. I’d describe that as mere seconds. When you’re busy just trying to figure out what’s going on, 40 seconds is not a long time. Presumably, and hopefully, even the most unaware pilots will take some actions which extend that 40 second window, but still, that’s tight. I would have no problem framing 40 seconds as being mere seconds.


Except it wasn't 40 seconds. The pilot in Command properly counteracted MCAS about 17 times over 9 minutes during which he had control before handing it over to the co-pilot who failed to properly counteract MCAS down. He handed over control to try and find the problem in the manuals - but unfortunately as Boeing didn't disclose it he never would have found it - he just needed to make the intuitive leap to turn off the bad system (malfunctioning electric trim).
 
FluidFlow
Posts: 283
Joined: Wed Apr 10, 2019 6:39 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 9:00 am

morrisond wrote:
(malfunctioning electric trim)


The trim worked perfectly fine and as intended. So did everything except the sensor.

If the bad sensor only would lead to one thing and one thing only, random trim inputs, I bet no crash would have happened. As Boeing already said: To much work load was put on the pilots.

That is also pretty much the reason why the only aircraft landed with a bad sensor was the one with three pilots on board. Back in the days it was normal to have three crew members on board because two had to fly and the third made sure the aircraft was fine.

If you almost get every warning possible at the same time when the AoA sensor fails + stick shaker + random trim inputs (from the view of the crew) it gets really tricky if you need to fly the aircraft (one pilot 100% occupied) and the other trying to figure out which problem so solve and how and probably also helping the first pilot pull at the column as in the 737 this actually is physical work too. With a side stick it is way easier you do not get tired and you even have one hand free.

A normal run away trim only comes with sudden commanded trim and no other "problem".

If you drive your modern car at 120kph with cruise control on and one warning light goes on (water temp high) there is an easy NNC to follow: Break, park, wait. If every light goes on the line assistant rattles your steering wheel, the car beeps like crazy and the parking assistant tries to park your car at 120kph on the side of the road, while the breaking paddle does not react to your input? Good look with that. That would be too much work load on the driver even tho it is solvable if following the right steps. Luckily this does not happen unless the computer in your car malfunctions really bad or is amateurishly designed (like MCAS).
 
Agrajag
Posts: 81
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 8:23 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 9:08 am

Going back and re-reading some of the earlier Max grounding threads is very illuminating. Precise language is repeated over and over by certain posters who are pushing the 'the pilots are to blame, not Boeing' agenda. Im convinced one person has multiple accounts and is attempting to do Boeing a service, either paid or unpaid. If paid, Boeing arent getting value for money.
The plural of anecdote is anecdotes, not data.
Slartibartfast had a point
 
kayik
Posts: 52
Joined: Thu Mar 14, 2019 10:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 9:52 am

MSPNWA wrote:
planecane wrote:
Says who? If that was the case, why is using it near the beginning of the NNC? The manual electric trim has priority over all other electric trim commands.

With the two switch design on each yoke, it is highly unlikely that a switch issue would be the cause of the runaway.

If what you say is true, the first step in the NNC would be to move the cutout switches to cutout and the second step would be grasp and hold the trim wheel.


:checkmark: Precisely.

Francoflier wrote:
For all the years I flew Boeing airplanes (although not the 737), I have never been made to understand a stab runaway event as anything other than exactly that: a stab running away.
Not to mention that in the models I did fly, a runaway event would be signaled by an EICAS warning, prompting the memory item to be carried out ASAP.

You have been trying to push blame on pilots for Months now, all based on the stab runaway NNC. We have 3 spurious MCAS activation events, 2 of them resulting in fatal crashes. You can try to blame the poor training standards and experience levels at the concerned airlines all you want (without knowing much about them, I expect), but a designed failure mode that results in a 67% crash rate when it occurs is a BAD design, and that's without mentioning the fact the the first Lionair crew had an extra pilot just sitting there with the spare brain capacity to help troubleshoot the issue ad hoc.

Then there's the lack of understanding of the failure mode of an unknown or, at best, obscure system by the crew, the multiple conflicting warnings they received, the possible conflicting speed readings in at least one case, stall warnings going on and trim switches that actually responded to pilot inputs (so, not 'running away' then?), all easily leading to massive confusion about what was going on, with very little time to analyse the situation and react to it.

At the end of the day, they had mere seconds to react to a complex failure that you have had month to think about and 'analyse' (with obvious bias).
Sure, there are things that the crew could have done to save the airplane, but they didn't. I'm sure the report will mention this. The problem is that shoulda's and coulda's are not going to bring these people back to life and at the end of the day, the investigation, as it relates to safety, will be looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane from actively trying to fly them into the ground, not, as in many other accidents, why they flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground...

I don't know of any competent pilot who, in their situation, can confidently say that they could have gotten out of it.
So unless your plan is to train every airline pilot to test pilot standard, I really don't see why you try to keep pushing that argument, other than to defend a corporation that, willingly or not, put a bad design in service.

Also, I have probably missed them, but it would at least help your argument if you mentioned your credentials, such as how many hours you have flying the 737, or any other aircraft, or your involvement with aircraft operation or design generally speaking.


You'd have a better argument if you didn't go down the straw man road (no one is saying there wasn't a bad design), state factual errors such as "mere seconds", try to shut down dissenters, and the in end contradict your own argument. Was there a bad design. Yes. Was their bad piloting. Yes. Were there other mistakes. Yes. It's the facts of the case. Saying that people are "pushing blame onto the pilots" is contradicted by "looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane...". You're saying that it's wrong to push blame, but then acknowledge there's potential blame to levy. You can't have it both ways, so what statement are you retracting?

I think you need to know more pilots.


You dont understand what you are reading, do you?
 
bgm
Posts: 2173
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 9:58 am

Agrajag wrote:
Going back and re-reading some of the earlier Max grounding threads is very illuminating. Precise language is repeated over and over by certain posters who are pushing the 'the pilots are to blame, not Boeing' agenda. Im convinced one person has multiple accounts and is attempting to do Boeing a service, either paid or unpaid. If paid, Boeing arent getting value for money.


:checkmark: Completely agree. They clearly have an agenda (either Boeing employee/paid for by Boeing) to alter the narrative to shift blame to the pilots.

Thankfully their attempt to do this is failing rather miserably. They don't seem to be fooling anyone here. Won't stop them prattling on though.
████ ███ █ ███████ ██ █ █████ ██ ████ [redacted]
 
planecane
Posts: 1129
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 10:24 am

Francoflier wrote:
planecane wrote:
PStechPaul wrote:
A true stab trim runaway condition would not be affected by manual (electric) trim adjustment.


Says who? If that was the case, why is using it near the beginning of the NNC? The manual electric trim has priority over all other electric trim commands.

With the two switch design on each yoke, it is highly unlikely that a switch issue would be the cause of the runaway.

If what you say is true, the first step in the NNC would be to move the cutout switches to cutout and the second step would be grasp and hold the trim wheel.


For all the years I flew Boeing airplanes (although not the 737), I have never been made to understand a stab runaway event as anything other than exactly that: a stab running away.
Not to mention that in the models I did fly, a runaway event would be signaled by an EICAS warning, prompting the memory item to be carried out ASAP.

You have been trying to push blame on pilots for Months now, all based on the stab runaway NNC. We have 3 spurious MCAS activation events, 2 of them resulting in fatal crashes. You can try to blame the poor training standards and experience levels at the concerned airlines all you want (without knowing much about them, I expect), but a designed failure mode that results in a 67% crash rate when it occurs is a BAD design, and that's without mentioning the fact the the first Lionair crew had an extra pilot just sitting there with the spare brain capacity to help troubleshoot the issue ad hoc.

Then there's the lack of understanding of the failure mode of an unknown or, at best, obscure system by the crew, the multiple conflicting warnings they received, the possible conflicting speed readings in at least one case, stall warnings going on and trim switches that actually responded to pilot inputs (so, not 'running away' then?), all easily leading to massive confusion about what was going on, with very little time to analyse the situation and react to it.

At the end of the day, they had mere seconds to react to a complex failure that you have had month to think about and 'analyse' (with obvious bias).
Sure, there are things that the crew could have done to save the airplane, but they didn't. I'm sure the report will mention this. The problem is that shoulda's and coulda's are not going to bring these people back to life and at the end of the day, the investigation, as it relates to safety, will be looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane from actively trying to fly them into the ground, not, as in many other accidents, why they flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground...

I don't know of any competent pilot who, in their situation, can confidently say that they could have gotten out of it.
So unless your plan is to train every airline pilot to test pilot standard, I really don't see why you try to keep pushing that argument, other than to defend a corporation that, willingly or not, put a bad design in service.

Also, I have probably missed them, but it would at least help your argument if you mentioned your credentials, such as how many hours you have flying the 737, or any other aircraft, or your involvement with aircraft operation or design generally speaking.


I give up. I have not spent months trying to blame the pilots. I have spent months saying that I could understand how the engineers made the assumptions they did at the time and saying that the pilots could have saved the aircraft. I have repeatedly said that it was a bad design and that Boeing should be (and is being) blamed for creating a frequency of runaway stabilizer that it far beyond what is acceptable. I have stated that I expect pilots to be trained well enough and skilled enough to the point that they are able to save a plane if it is possible to save it and that I hope that every time I board a flight, the pilots have that training and skill.

The fact that you have experience flying newer Boeing aircraft that either sense a runaway stabilizer and provide warnings (757/767) or sense and automatically respond to a runaway stabilizer (747/777/787) isn't relevant to what should be recognized by a 737 pilot as a runaway stabilizer. The 737 does not have a common cockpit or type rating to any Boeing aircraft that came after it.

If you have followed my posts so closely, you would know that I have stated my "credentials." several times. I have stated that I'm not a pilot but that I have had time in a full motion 737-800 simulator and that during that time, it became instinctive almost immediately to trim out control column forces. That experience has led me to question why, when flying straight, it wasn't just instinct to counteract MCAS. It seems like it may have been for the captain of Lion Air 610 but not for the FO that he gave control to.

If the final report on the ET crash determines that the trim motor had enough power to move the stabilizer back into trim, then I will place some percentage of "blame" on the crew. They were given information about MCAS as well as the simultaneous warnings/alarms that could occur and the recovery procedures in the form of the EAD. If performing the runaway stabilizer NNC properly would have saved the aircraft, there is no reason that they shouldn't have been capable of performing the procedure correctly.

Go ahead and attack way based on that last paragraph. Ignore the fact that I qualified it with saying "IF the final report on the ET crash determines..."
 
planecane
Posts: 1129
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 10:35 am

Agrajag wrote:
Going back and re-reading some of the earlier Max grounding threads is very illuminating. Precise language is repeated over and over by certain posters who are pushing the 'the pilots are to blame, not Boeing' agenda. Im convinced one person has multiple accounts and is attempting to do Boeing a service, either paid or unpaid. If paid, Boeing arent getting value for money.


Assuming you are referring to me, I'd like to know what precise language you are talking about.

Regardless, I don't have multiple accounts nor am I attempting to do a service for Boeing. I've also made it very clear on multiple occasions that I do blame Boeing.

My agenda is an expectation that both Boeing should put out designs that meet extremely high safety standards (which, in hindsight MCAS obviously did not) AND that pilots are trained and skilled enough to be the last resort and save aircraft that can be saved regardless of what caused the emergency situation.

My only "defense" of Boeing has been defending the design of MCAS against the charge that it is "criminal" or that it constitutes "murder." I have stated that I can understand why the engineers could have made the assumptions that they did with respect to pilot reactions and that the design was the result of mistaken assumptions, not purposeful disregard for safety in the service of greed. I don't believe that any engineer that isn't psychotic would allow a design that they knew would likely lead to a crash, even if preventing the design got them fired.
 
art
Posts: 2928
Joined: Tue Feb 08, 2005 11:46 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 11:41 am

bob75013 wrote:
snowkarl wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Everyone including Boeing and FAA acknowledge MCAS is a major thing, no one is saying otherwise.

Fixing MCAS doesn't address the fact that we have pilots that ignore stick shakers, put flaps up with stick shaker on, continue to destination with stick shaker on, use full throttle to solve problems that are only made worse with full throttle, etc.

Why is it not "weird flexing" to make up a theoretical unstable aircraft that would never be certified to counter a point about FARs that no one is making then using that made up scenario to try to to disallow consideration of the airmen's behavior?


It's illogical to say we should ignore one set of factors that contribute to one or two accidents that also occur in other scenarios, yet some here seem to feel that discussing those factors here is taboo, probably because of emotional rather than logical thinking.


Sorry but you are a broken record at this point.

The pilots are not the issue. The NG is a very similar plane yet no pilots are getting confused and not realizing the plane is stalling and ignoring the stick shaker on that plane and crashing it into the ground.

This thread is about the MAX grounding - not about pilot training standards. Only one plane has a crash rate this high - the MAX. Why? Poor design. Otherwise other Boeing jets would be having the same issues, but hey, they're not.

But let's keep having this exact same argument for another 100 pages and drown out all bad news you don't like.

Mods are extremely good at deleting posts - yet no mods want to keep this thread on topic? Strange.


We had two Lion MAXs. One crashed. One survivded the same situation that caused the other to crash.

Edit add: What's the difference between the two? Answer: What the fight crew did or did not do.

Wny should that not be part of the discussion?


@snowkart

The Lion Air flight which survived had an extra pilot in the cockpit. It was the pilot not involved with flying the aircraft who saved it. That's the difference between the two. Without him being in the jumpseat there would probably have been two Lion Air MAX crashes in quick succession.

My guess is that Boeing would have blamed the pilots. Very plausible - the only MAX crashes were Lion Air crashes.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1993
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 12:06 pm

planecane wrote:
I give up. I have not spent months trying to blame the pilots. I have spent months saying that I could understand how the engineers made the assumptions they did at the time and saying that the pilots could have saved the aircraft. I have repeatedly said that it was a bad design and that Boeing should be (and is being) blamed for creating a frequency of runaway stabilizer that it far beyond what is acceptable. I have stated that I expect pilots to be trained well enough and skilled enough to the point that they are able to save a plane if it is possible to save it and that I hope that every time I board a flight, the pilots have that training and skill.

Problem is, your explanations escalate the issue from an understandable mistake by Boeing design team - which most of us can accept as a possibility - to some completely new level. Actually, that is why I don't believe in Boeing PR campaign going on - that would mean PR department is even less qualified.
Human performance under serious stress and error levels achievable in those conditions are pretty well known in engineering psychology. Using a human operator as a backstop means accepting 10% failure rate at a most optimistic scenario, at least 20-40% realistically. Achieving better values require periodic drills - like doing go-around and rejected takeoff in a sim bi-annually, or requirement for 3 landings in 90 days.
If MCAS "human backstop"was a mistake - well, I've seen VERY stupid mistakes, shit happens. Even unbelievable shit happens, just ask Murphy (and Ed Murphy was an airspace engineer for USAF, so all those laws have aviation roots). If Boeing engineers ignored that common knowledge and deliberatly made unprofessional assumptions as you say, this is incompetence at best - and it should up to the court of law to qualify it in legal terms.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1338
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 12:13 pm

uta999 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PStechPaul wrote:
Thank you, Francoflier, for validating my observation that the pilots would likely not have identified the problem as runaway stab, because the yoke trim switches were responsive, and stopped the AND trim caused by MCAS. It could also have been caused by an autopilot malfunction, but AIUI disabling autopilot did not disable MCAS. It seems unfair for MSPNWA to assert that there was "bad piloting". Perhaps "imperfect" would be about as far as I would go to describe their efforts.


These are valid points on Lionair - but don't explain Ethiopian where they should have had full knowledge and understanding of MCAS.


If the ET pilots had known about MCAS and its errant code, which meant it would repeatedly (10 x) pitch the nose down in a roller-coaster motion, the MAX would have already been grounded by everyone. The accident would never have happened. Those still screaming it was the pilots fault for not recovering the unrecoverable obviously work for Boeing or their lawyers.


There are some factual errors in your statement. By the time of the ET crash MCAS and how to counter it was fully disclosed to the airlines. Now there are some reports that ET never got that information to there pilots, and based on our understanding of what went on in the cockpit that would explain a lot - but that is another matter - that is a training issue that needs to be addressed, and would help to absolve the pilots.

However any pilot of a particular type should be professional enough by themselves to learn about any issues with the type they are flying and work to learn as much as possible how to counter those issues. That information was easily available within days after the Lionair crash. It should have been top of mind if they ran into the same issue and the response automatic.

That does not absolve Boeing of putting out a piss poor design - it just goes to support the view that other issues need to be addressed as well.

I have heard nothing about changes inside the FAA in terms of there certification process either.
 
User avatar
ssteve
Posts: 1365
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 12:59 pm

art wrote:
The Lion Air flight which survived had an extra pilot in the cockpit. It was the pilot not involved with flying the aircraft who saved it. That's the difference between the two. Without him being in the jumpseat there would probably have been two Lion Air MAX crashes in quick succession.


I'm not sure how they would crash the same plane twice.
 
User avatar
Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 1:12 pm

TObound wrote:
You're right. Clearly the MAX takes more training to fly than the NG. Or maybe the MAX requires three crew to fly, like the aircraft that survived. The FAA can give Boeing options: revoke the common type certification for 737 crew or mandate three crew flight deck.

After all, those unskilled third world pilots aren't crashing NGs at an order of magnitude higher than normal for commercial transport aircraft.

Or, Boeing could fix all the bogus aspects of MCAS, and go beyond via the 'cosmic ray' fix to provide a safety margin never seen to be needed during the NG's lifetime, fix a few other glitches, and we can all move on with life.

It seems people prefer to stay in the 'blame Boeing' -> 'blame the pilots' -> 'blame the regulators' -> 'blame the training' loop ad infinitum.

Yet even the media seems to be running out of click bait articles to write and are resorting to sexing up old info to make their 'impressions'.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
FluidFlow
Posts: 283
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:02 pm

This here should have been known to the ET crew before the fatal flight (Sourcehttps://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/US-2018-23-51):

This AD was prompted by analysis performed by the manufacturer showing that if an erroneously high single angle of attack (AOA) sensor input is received by the flight control system, there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer. We are issuing this AD to address this potential resulting nose-down trim, which could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible impact with terrain.


In the event of an uncommanded horizontal stabilizer trim movement,
combined with any of the following potential effects or indications
resulting from an erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA) input, the flight crew
must comply with the Runaway Stabilizer procedure in the Operating
Procedures chapter of this manual:

1. Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.
2. Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.
3. Increasing nose down control forces.
4. IAS DISAGREE alert.
5. ALT DISAGREE alert.
6. AOA DISAGREE alert (if the option is installed).
7. FEEL DIFF PRESS light
8. Autopilot may disengage.
9. Inability to engage autopilot.


So let us go through this for the event of the ET crash:

At 05:38:44 the left stick shaker activates triggering condition 1 from the above list. No uncommanded trim movements and therefore the captain knows there is a problem but not MCAS. The AD does not mention that MCAS can not be activated in flaps down operation nor in auto pilot flight.

At 05:38:46 Master caution goes off: Master Caution Anti-Ice on CVR. So right now in the heads of the crew is a problem with Ice. For the next 12s they think about this and engage auto pilot at 05:38:58 which triggers an auto pilot warning. This happens again at 05:39:00. So the problem right now is stick shaker, ice and auto pilot. reason for this is (probably) unknown.

Trim on the other hand functions as intended.

At 05:39:22 autopilot was engaged.

At 05:39:55, Autopilot disengaged. That is very interesting, why would the autopilot be disengaged after 33s. Stick shaker was still on but the aircraft seemed to function perfectly.

At 05:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems. Very important: At this point the crew acknowledges that there is a problem. This leads to my assumption that the crew was back on one of the problems mentioned before (auto-pilot, ice, stick shaker)

At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly.

At 05:40:03 Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) “DON’T SINK” alerts occurred. So After one third of the MCAS-cycle a new problem occurs. GPWS warning that leads to the following (MCAS is still active):

The column moved aft and a positive climb was re-established during the automatic AND motion.

At this point the problems are: Stick shaker, ice, auto pilot, GPWS. "Run away trim" is not yet detected or any problem with the trim. Most probably because it actually worked fine all the way up to 9s ago and a lot of other problems are in the flight crews head at this moment.

At 05:40:12, approximately three seconds after AND stabilizer motion ends, electric trim (from pilot activated switches on the yoke) in the Aircraft nose up (ANU) direction is recorded on the DFDR and the stabilizer moved in the ANU direction to 2.4 units. The Aircraft pitch attitude remained about the same as the back pressure on the column increased. The trim does actually still work as intended and the uncommanded trim must have gone undetected due to other problems as listed before and STS active all the time.

23s later, after one more MCAS cycle and some counter trim and importantly three GPWS warnings the trim is detected as a problem:

At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and FirstOfficer confirmed stab trim cut-out

It took 110 seconds to figure out that the trim is the problem at a flight stage. What is the problem here? The trim is deactivated?

The aircraft is massively out of trim at 2.4 units. Out of the following problems that had to be addressed: stick shaker, ice, auto pilot, multiple GPWS warnings and trim, trim was deactivated. It was really hastly deactivated but is this a reason to blame the crew? For some it is but under the stress they are in you try the lucky shot it might solve the problem, because you have 99 problems and trim is now hopefully not one of them anymore.

From now on the crew battles for 35s an aircraft severely out of trim with electric trim not working:


The data indicates that aft force was applied to both columns simultaneously several times throughout the remainder of the recordin, then one more problem shows up:

At 05:41:20, the right overspeed clacker was recorded on CVR. It remained active until the end of the recording That is one more problem in the list (stick shaker, ice, auto pilot, multiple GWPS warnings, being out of trim, having no manual electrical trim, massive control forces needed to keep the aircraft level, speed)

After some 94 seconds of addressing the following problems (stick shaker, being out of trim, having no manual electrical trim, massive control forces needed to keep the aircraft level), the crew finally found the root cause of their situation:


At 05:42:54, both pilots called out “left alpha vane”

The problem was at this point the crash was in my opinion not avoidable anymore because the aircraft was already in a state where too many problems occured at the same time and to just keep the aircraft flying needed attention of both pilots and trouble shooting was not possible anymore. The one attempt actually delivered the final blow:

At 05:43:11, about 32 seconds before the end of the recording, at approximately 13,4002 ft, two momentary manual electric trim inputs are recorded in the ANU direction. The stabilizer moved in the ANU direction from 2.1 units to 2.3 units.

At 05:43:20, approximately five seconds after the last manual electric trim input, an AND automatic trim command occurred and the stabilizer moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5 seconds. The aircraft began pitching nose down. Additional simultaneous aft column force was applied, but the nose down pitch continues, eventually reaching 40° nose down. The stabilizer position varied between 1.1 and 0.8 units for the remainder of the recording.


The followingtwo things that might have actually saved them would have been:

1.
AOA DISAGREE alert (if the option is installed).
Would have been triggered straight away and the first thought going trough the pilots mind would have been AoA disagree and stick shaker = left AoA vane problem. Ice and auto pilot would have never been on their mind as both are a logical consequence of the AoA vane failure as well as stick shaker. At the stage of the MCAS trim only them problems would have been there: AoA disagree, trim and GPWS warning. The stab cut out would have happened way earlier and the crew would have had way more time to adress the flight situation and not at the point were the aircraft was already in a dire state.

2. Mandated sim training on how to react when AoA disagree alert fires due to a failed AoA sensor.

If both would have been implemented after the first crash there would be no grounding and no ET crash. I wonder why Boeing did not think of this quick and simple solution?
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:27 pm

morrisond wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
MSPNWA wrote:

:checkmark: Precisely.



You'd have a better argument if you didn't go down the straw man road (no one is saying there wasn't a bad design), state factual errors such as "mere seconds", try to shut down dissenters, and the in end contradict your own argument.

Perhaps no one is saying there wasn’t a bad design, but there is definitely an attitude that says the bad design is understandable/excusable because the designers were expecting pilots to be the backstop. At least, that seems to now be the push behind the “but the pilots(!)” arguments now.

As to “mere seconds,” that could mean anything. I recall some sim sessions, recreating the Lion Air flight, which determined that from the activation of MCAS, the pilots had about 40 seconds before things get into the unrecoverable range. I’d describe that as mere seconds. When you’re busy just trying to figure out what’s going on, 40 seconds is not a long time. Presumably, and hopefully, even the most unaware pilots will take some actions which extend that 40 second window, but still, that’s tight. I would have no problem framing 40 seconds as being mere seconds.


Except it wasn't 40 seconds. The pilot in Command properly counteracted MCAS about 17 times over 9 minutes during which he had control before handing it over to the co-pilot who failed to properly counteract MCAS down. He handed over control to try and find the problem in the manuals - but unfortunately as Boeing didn't disclose it he never would have found it - he just needed to make the intuitive leap to turn off the bad system (malfunctioning electric trim).

:roll: If you’d read my post properly, you would have noticed that I was referring to sim sessions, and not to the actual events. Those sessions determined that 40 seconds was the window of opportunity in which action had to be taken, before the flight became unrecoverable. I even qualified that statement, saying: “Presumably, and hopefully, even the most unaware pilots will take some actions which extend that 40 second window.”

MSPNWA was trying to discredit Francoflier’s post by suggesting that “mere seconds” was inaccurate phraseology. What I was actually doing was supporting Francoflier’s use of the term “mere seconds” as valid and appropriate phraseology.
 
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Revelation
Posts: 21362
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:28 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
The followingtwo things that might have actually saved them would have been:

1.
AOA DISAGREE alert (if the option is installed).
Would have been triggered straight away and the first thought going trough the pilots mind would have been AoA disagree and stick shaker = left AoA vane problem. Ice and auto pilot would have never been on their mind as both are a logical consequence of the AoA vane failure as well as stick shaker. At the stage of the MCAS trim only them problems would have been there: AoA disagree, trim and GPWS warning. The stab cut out would have happened way earlier and the crew would have had way more time to adress the flight situation and not at the point were the aircraft was already in a dire state.

2. Mandated sim training on how to react when AoA disagree alert fires due to a failed AoA sensor.

If both would have been implemented after the first crash there would be no grounding and no ET crash. I wonder why Boeing did not think of this quick and simple solution?

I can think of a few more.

How about remembering you should not raise the flaps with stick shaker on? That closes holes in the swiss cheese right early, IMO.

Or how about an understanding of the significance of the stick shaker being on one side only? That should clue you in that this is an AoA disagree problem more so than any blinkin' light, IMO.
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:33 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
HugoJunkers wrote:
Vladex wrote:

Airlines are guilty of playing A vs B and going for the cheap, quick and easy solutions and discarding any competition in place for collusion. A and B know this so they will cut corners as well and B far more so and they actually sell it as features not faults . 737 MAX with misfiting engine was thus sold as a feature and is a logical end to that duopoly and it's a fault of the airlines that didn't question their buying decisions. In a free market , it would be entirely their fault but it seems like they want to socialize it , as in force everybody else to bear the cost and pain.


We all know at this point that the primary the reason that MCAS was so abysmally implemented was because airlines wanted their pilots to be able to use the same type certificate for the
B737 MAX as the B737-NG and Boeing tried to meet this need. This at once precluded alarms for MCAS faults, gravitated towards no using two alpha vanes and precluded MCAS cut out switches separate from stabiliser run away trim cut out. Do we hold American Airlines vicariously libel for its 2011 order specifying an aircraft in such a way that it was difficult to make safe? (No saying AA did this, just by the way of hypothetical example.)


But for some reason they convinced the FAA that the new two-sensor design, with the AOA disagree annunciator and optional AOA indicator, doesn't now need simulator training.


Simulator training for what exactly continues to be my question with MCAS 2.0? The AoA disagree already existed and had an NNC (even though nothing is actually directed to be done in the NNC). Now that AoA disagree will disable MCAS, there will be steps to follow in the NNC. Since they will now be flying without MCAS, I'm assuming that the NNC will be doing things to avoid getting anywhere near an approach to stall and landing at the nearest suitable airport. Why would simulator training be needed if my assumption is correct?
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:38 pm

planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
HugoJunkers wrote:

We all know at this point that the primary the reason that MCAS was so abysmally implemented was because airlines wanted their pilots to be able to use the same type certificate for the
B737 MAX as the B737-NG and Boeing tried to meet this need. This at once precluded alarms for MCAS faults, gravitated towards no using two alpha vanes and precluded MCAS cut out switches separate from stabiliser run away trim cut out. Do we hold American Airlines vicariously libel for its 2011 order specifying an aircraft in such a way that it was difficult to make safe? (No saying AA did this, just by the way of hypothetical example.)


But for some reason they convinced the FAA that the new two-sensor design, with the AOA disagree annunciator and optional AOA indicator, doesn't now need simulator training.


Simulator training for what exactly continues to be my question with MCAS 2.0? The AoA disagree already existed and had an NNC (even though nothing is actually directed to be done in the NNC). Now that AoA disagree will disable MCAS, there will be steps to follow in the NNC. Since they will now be flying without MCAS, I'm assuming that the NNC will be doing things to avoid getting anywhere near an approach to stall and landing at the nearest suitable airport. Why would simulator training be needed if my assumption is correct?

You're not alone with the question. I can play devil's advocate and say "practice trim runaway, roller-coaster trim recovery, extra stall recognition practice" - but this is mostly fixing past events, which already occurred - not averting future problems.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:46 pm

kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:

But for some reason they convinced the FAA that the new two-sensor design, with the AOA disagree annunciator and optional AOA indicator, doesn't now need simulator training.


Simulator training for what exactly continues to be my question with MCAS 2.0? The AoA disagree already existed and had an NNC (even though nothing is actually directed to be done in the NNC). Now that AoA disagree will disable MCAS, there will be steps to follow in the NNC. Since they will now be flying without MCAS, I'm assuming that the NNC will be doing things to avoid getting anywhere near an approach to stall and landing at the nearest suitable airport. Why would simulator training be needed if my assumption is correct?

You're not alone with the question. I can play devil's advocate and say "practice trim runaway, roller-coaster trim recovery, extra stall recognition practice" - but this is mostly fixing past events, which already occurred - not averting future problems.


However, those training items should apply to all 737 pilots, not just those who will be flying the MAX.

I know that somebody is going to say they have to have simulator training to learn how to fly with MCAS disabled. Let's say that the probability to have the conditions for MCAS to activate were 1 in 100,000 flights and the AoA disagree happens once every 25,000 flights (a reasonable estimate based on what we know has happened). That means the probability of having an AoA disagree AND entering the conditions for MCAS to activate will be 1 in 2.5 billion or 4x10^-10. That's without the pilots consciously trying to avoid entering the part of the flight envelope that requires MCAS. Considering MCAS activates in an approach to stall, I'd be quite alarmed if 1 in 100,000 flights was approaching a stall.
 
FluidFlow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 2:54 pm

Revelation wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
The followingtwo things that might have actually saved them would have been:

1.
AOA DISAGREE alert (if the option is installed).
Would have been triggered straight away and the first thought going trough the pilots mind would have been AoA disagree and stick shaker = left AoA vane problem. Ice and auto pilot would have never been on their mind as both are a logical consequence of the AoA vane failure as well as stick shaker. At the stage of the MCAS trim only them problems would have been there: AoA disagree, trim and GPWS warning. The stab cut out would have happened way earlier and the crew would have had way more time to adress the flight situation and not at the point were the aircraft was already in a dire state.

2. Mandated sim training on how to react when AoA disagree alert fires due to a failed AoA sensor.

If both would have been implemented after the first crash there would be no grounding and no ET crash. I wonder why Boeing did not think of this quick and simple solution?

I can think of a few more.

How about remembering you should not raise the flaps with stick shaker on? That closes holes in the swiss cheese right early, IMO.

Or how about an understanding of the significance of the stick shaker being on one side only? That should clue you in that this is an AoA disagree problem more so than any blinkin' light, IMO.


I have not found any written procedure that tells pilots to not raise the flaps when a one sided stickshaker is on due to ice ( the information given to the pilots from the aircraft).

And you know as well as i do that one sided stickshaker is not a way to conclude an AoA disagree. There are multiple reasons for one stick shaker activation and AoA disagree is only one of it.
 
TObound
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 3:23 pm

Revelation wrote:
TObound wrote:
You're right. Clearly the MAX takes more training to fly than the NG. Or maybe the MAX requires three crew to fly, like the aircraft that survived. The FAA can give Boeing options: revoke the common type certification for 737 crew or mandate three crew flight deck.

After all, those unskilled third world pilots aren't crashing NGs at an order of magnitude higher than normal for commercial transport aircraft.

Or, Boeing could fix all the bogus aspects of MCAS, and go beyond via the 'cosmic ray' fix to provide a safety margin never seen to be needed during the NG's lifetime, fix a few other glitches, and we can all move on with life.

It seems people prefer to stay in the 'blame Boeing' -> 'blame the pilots' -> 'blame the regulators' -> 'blame the training' loop ad infinitum.

Yet even the media seems to be running out of click bait articles to write and are resorting to sexing up old info to make their 'impressions'.


There's no "people". Just very specific persons who keep pushing the disgusting idea that these unqualified third world pilots are the problem. Yet, these same third world pilots do just fine with other Boeing airplanes. And Boeing has no issues selling them their newest airplanes.

Statistics says there's something wrong with the airplane. If someone wants to argue that it's a man-machine interface problem, than by definition that means this is an airplane problem, since it does not fly like the NG. And this is what I am getting at. The crews are not different. The airports they are flying from are not different. The only change is the airplane. That's your flaw.
 
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Francoflier
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 3:37 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
You'd have a better argument if you didn't go down the straw man road (no one is saying there wasn't a bad design), state factual errors such as "mere seconds", try to shut down dissenters, and the in end contradict your own argument. Was there a bad design. Yes. Was their bad piloting. Yes. Were there other mistakes. Yes. It's the facts of the case. Saying that people are "pushing blame onto the pilots" is contradicted by "looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane...". You're saying that it's wrong to push blame, but then acknowledge there's potential blame to levy. You can't have it both ways, so what statement are you retracting?

I think you need to know more pilots.


I will not retract anything.

The only 'blame' to be levied will be done so in courts of law when plaintiffs will claim that Boeing, by exerting pressure on their project managers and engineers to push the design out in tight budgetary and time constraints, owns (possibly criminal) responsibility in these tragedies. I can't and won't pronounce myself on this.

Regardless of what caused it to be this way, it can be said with no uncertainty that the design was flawed: through a single external sensor failure, it would directly, and to a large extent, act on the most powerful control surface of the airplane to point it downwards, unbeknownst to the crew. This does not pass muster with any aerospace engineer worth his title (leading me to believe that no sane engineer at Boeing would have signed on this without any sort of pressure from above, but again, investigations will determine this, not me). It is, inarguably, a BAD design, and I think we all agree on this.

But then you also decide, with no less certainty, that 'bad piloting' was involved and the problem with that is that it is much less easy to conclude. To say that with any level of certainty, you'd have to prove that these crews performed well below what would have been expected of them and what most of their peers would have achieved. It is easy to blame pilots because hindsight will always provide us with a solution to save the airplane. Except this is a useless metric. You cannot expect pilots to be hyperintelligent superhumans. Pilots are trained to a standard, and their performance can only be evaluated against an average performance. This is not for me, and much less you, to decide on. Only their peers with training experience and intimate knowledge of the failure mode could possibly determine whether an average crew would have performed any better.
Statistically, some would have, some would not. The problem comes with trying to determine what percentage of crews would have saved the day, and then what an acceptable percentage would be for this particular failure, taking into consideration its rate of occurrence.
I'm guessing a few people have a good idea at the moment, and they sure are keeping quiet.

And the problem here is that occurrence rate seemed to be quite high, and relatively high occurrence rate events in aviation should be handled appropriately by 99+% of pilots (engine failure on takeoff, TCAS resolution advisory, low energy recovery, terrain warning, etc.). Something obviously doesn't add up in this case study, and, once again, the complexity of the failure, its direct effect on a primary flight controls, the lack of specific training regarding it, the limited timeframe for identification, evaluation and action would not suggest that an average crew could reliably figure it out (at the time of the events), quite the contrary.

BAD design? Yes.
BAD piloting? You and I cannot tell. All I know is that I wouldn't have wanted to be in that cockpit that day, and I don't know anyone who would.

planecane wrote:
I give up. I have not spent months trying to blame the pilots. I have spent months saying that I could understand how the engineers made the assumptions they did at the time and saying that the pilots could have saved the aircraft. I have repeatedly said that it was a bad design and that Boeing should be (and is being) blamed for creating a frequency of runaway stabilizer that it far beyond what is acceptable. I have stated that I expect pilots to be trained well enough and skilled enough to the point that they are able to save a plane if it is possible to save it and that I hope that every time I board a flight, the pilots have that training and skill.

The fact that you have experience flying newer Boeing aircraft that either sense a runaway stabilizer and provide warnings (757/767) or sense and automatically respond to a runaway stabilizer (747/777/787) isn't relevant to what should be recognized by a 737 pilot as a runaway stabilizer. The 737 does not have a common cockpit or type rating to any Boeing aircraft that came after it.

If you have followed my posts so closely, you would know that I have stated my "credentials." several times. I have stated that I'm not a pilot but that I have had time in a full motion 737-800 simulator and that during that time, it became instinctive almost immediately to trim out control column forces. That experience has led me to question why, when flying straight, it wasn't just instinct to counteract MCAS. It seems like it may have been for the captain of Lion Air 610 but not for the FO that he gave control to.

If the final report on the ET crash determines that the trim motor had enough power to move the stabilizer back into trim, then I will place some percentage of "blame" on the crew. They were given information about MCAS as well as the simultaneous warnings/alarms that could occur and the recovery procedures in the form of the EAD. If performing the runaway stabilizer NNC properly would have saved the aircraft, there is no reason that they shouldn't have been capable of performing the procedure correctly.

Go ahead and attack way based on that last paragraph. Ignore the fact that I qualified it with saying "IF the final report on the ET crash determines..."


Engineers don't work on assumptions, hopes or prayers. No engineer at Boeing would ever produce a design thinking "it should be good enough for the pilots to handle it, or if they did, they would document it at length. If there are any assumptions, they should be regarding the reasonably expected performance of a crew given adequate training (see examples above). These events fell well outside of these parameters. This is why so many accusations are flying at Boeing's face at the moment.

You say that you expect the crew to be capable of saving the aircraft if it is possible to save, meaning that you expect them to be able to handle any failure mode, even one that is unfamiliar, complex, untrained for, time critical and lethal if not handled correctly. That is unfortunately not the case. As I said above, pilots are only human, and the industry, for better or worse, has moved away from requiring extremely competent pilots in cockpits.

As for your stint in a sim trimming a perfectly good airplane, I'm afraid it bears little relevance to what happened. Part of the confusion for the crew came for the fact that they had to repeatedly trim up an airplane that wasn't losing speed, quite the contrary, and which was even giving stall warnings. This was as counter-intuitive for a pilot as it comes, and as far removed from your 'piloting 101' experience in a sim as could be. It might have led to thinking 'stab', but again, it was still responding to commands (so once again not 'running away' which is the very name of the checklist) and, unless they knew exactly what the problem was, they risked losing their only working pitch actuator. Barring any indication of a stab issue, what could have eliminated the possibility of an elevator actuator misbehavior/hardover? Shutting off the stab would, in that case, have doomed them as well. Remember that pilots are used to trimming through short 'blips' of the trim switches, not prolonged actuations to retrim from an agressive pitch down movement of the stab, all the way to full AND stop.Then there's the spurious stall warning, the fact that one pilot was fully absorbed at the control and unable to spare the mental capacity to troubleshoot, the panic of seeing the planet grow larger in your windshield...

As I said above, the performance of the crews on these tragic days can only be compared to what could have reasonably been expected of their peers.
I'm sorry if you want balls-of-steel test pilots at the control of your commercial airliner. The reality is, you get a fresh out of flightschool F/O on the right seat and a captain who might not be that far ahead of him on the seniority list.
The industry and regulators have decided that this was the best way to avoid a pilot shortage and ensure you get a cheap ticket. I deplore it as much as anyone, but the fact is, airplane manufacturers are now the ones we all rely on for reliability and safety. Boeing forgot that and dropped the ball... big time.
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 3:43 pm

Francoflier wrote:
Regardless of what caused it to be this way, it can be said with no uncertainty that the design was flawed: through a single external sensor failure, it would directly, and to a large extent, act on the most powerful control surface of the airplane to point it downwards, unbeknownst to the crew. This does not pass muster with any aerospace engineer worth his title (leading me to believe that no sane engineer at Boeing would have signed on this without any sort of pressure from above, but again, investigations will determine this, not me). It is, inarguably, a BAD design, and I think we all agree on this.

Engineers don't work on assumptions, hopes or prayers. No engineer at Boeing would ever produce a design thinking "it should be good enough for the pilots to handle it, or if they did, they would document it at length. If there are any assumptions, they should be regarding the reasonably expected performance of a crew given adequate training (see examples above). These events fell well outside of these parameters. This is why so many accusations are flying at Boeing's face at the moment.
.

I an hoping the we will still get leaks about those engineers who gave in to political / financial pressure to keep their jobs and sacrificed their integrity as an engineer.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 3:53 pm

Francoflier wrote:
MSPNWA wrote:
You'd have a better argument if you didn't go down the straw man road (no one is saying there wasn't a bad design), state factual errors such as "mere seconds", try to shut down dissenters, and the in end contradict your own argument. Was there a bad design. Yes. Was their bad piloting. Yes. Were there other mistakes. Yes. It's the facts of the case. Saying that people are "pushing blame onto the pilots" is contradicted by "looking into why they failed to prevent an airplane...". You're saying that it's wrong to push blame, but then acknowledge there's potential blame to levy. You can't have it both ways, so what statement are you retracting?

I think you need to know more pilots.


I will not retract anything.

The only 'blame' to be levied will be done so in courts of law when plaintiffs will claim that Boeing, by exerting pressure on their project managers and engineers to push the design out in tight budgetary and time constraints, owns (possibly criminal) responsibility in these tragedies. I can't and won't pronounce myself on this.

Regardless of what caused it to be this way, it can be said with no uncertainty that the design was flawed: through a single external sensor failure, it would directly, and to a large extent, act on the most powerful control surface of the airplane to point it downwards, unbeknownst to the crew. This does not pass muster with any aerospace engineer worth his title (leading me to believe that no sane engineer at Boeing would have signed on this without any sort of pressure from above, but again, investigations will determine this, not me). It is, inarguably, a BAD design, and I think we all agree on this.

But then you also decide, with no less certainty, that 'bad piloting' was involved and the problem with that is that it is much less easy to conclude. To say that with any level of certainty, you'd have to prove that these crews performed well below what would have been expected of them and what most of their peers would have achieved. It is easy to blame pilots because hindsight will always provide us with a solution to save the airplane. Except this is a useless metric. You cannot expect pilots to be hyperintelligent superhumans. Pilots are trained to a standard, and their performance can only be evaluated against an average performance. This is not for me, and much less you, to decide on. Only their peers with training experience and intimate knowledge of the failure mode could possibly determine whether an average crew would have performed any better.
Statistically, some would have, some would not. The problem comes with trying to determine what percentage of crews would have saved the day, and then what an acceptable percentage would be for this particular failure, taking into consideration its rate of occurrence.
I'm guessing a few people have a good idea at the moment, and they sure are keeping quiet.

And the problem here is that occurrence rate seemed to be quite high, and relatively high occurrence rate events in aviation should be handled appropriately by 99+% of pilots (engine failure on takeoff, TCAS resolution advisory, low energy recovery, terrain warning, etc.). Something obviously doesn't add up in this case study, and, once again, the complexity of the failure, its direct effect on a primary flight controls, the lack of specific training regarding it, the limited timeframe for identification, evaluation and action would not suggest that an average crew could reliably figure it out (at the time of the events), quite the contrary.

BAD design? Yes.
BAD piloting? You and I cannot tell. All I know is that I wouldn't have wanted to be in that cockpit that day, and I don't know anyone who would.

planecane wrote:
I give up. I have not spent months trying to blame the pilots. I have spent months saying that I could understand how the engineers made the assumptions they did at the time and saying that the pilots could have saved the aircraft. I have repeatedly said that it was a bad design and that Boeing should be (and is being) blamed for creating a frequency of runaway stabilizer that it far beyond what is acceptable. I have stated that I expect pilots to be trained well enough and skilled enough to the point that they are able to save a plane if it is possible to save it and that I hope that every time I board a flight, the pilots have that training and skill.

The fact that you have experience flying newer Boeing aircraft that either sense a runaway stabilizer and provide warnings (757/767) or sense and automatically respond to a runaway stabilizer (747/777/787) isn't relevant to what should be recognized by a 737 pilot as a runaway stabilizer. The 737 does not have a common cockpit or type rating to any Boeing aircraft that came after it.

If you have followed my posts so closely, you would know that I have stated my "credentials." several times. I have stated that I'm not a pilot but that I have had time in a full motion 737-800 simulator and that during that time, it became instinctive almost immediately to trim out control column forces. That experience has led me to question why, when flying straight, it wasn't just instinct to counteract MCAS. It seems like it may have been for the captain of Lion Air 610 but not for the FO that he gave control to.

If the final report on the ET crash determines that the trim motor had enough power to move the stabilizer back into trim, then I will place some percentage of "blame" on the crew. They were given information about MCAS as well as the simultaneous warnings/alarms that could occur and the recovery procedures in the form of the EAD. If performing the runaway stabilizer NNC properly would have saved the aircraft, there is no reason that they shouldn't have been capable of performing the procedure correctly.

Go ahead and attack way based on that last paragraph. Ignore the fact that I qualified it with saying "IF the final report on the ET crash determines..."


Engineers don't work on assumptions, hopes or prayers. No engineer at Boeing would ever produce a design thinking "it should be good enough for the pilots to handle it, or if they did, they would document it at length. If there are any assumptions, they should be regarding the reasonably expected performance of a crew given adequate training (see examples above). These events fell well outside of these parameters. This is why so many accusations are flying at Boeing's face at the moment.

You say that you expect the crew to be capable of saving the aircraft if it is possible to save, meaning that you expect them to be able to handle any failure mode, even one that is unfamiliar, complex, untrained for, time critical and lethal if not handled correctly. That is unfortunately not the case. As I said above, pilots are only human, and the industry, for better or worse, has moved away from requiring extremely competent pilots in cockpits.

As for your stint in a sim trimming a perfectly good airplane, I'm afraid it bears little relevance to what happened. Part of the confusion for the crew came for the fact that they had to repeatedly trim up an airplane that wasn't losing speed, quite the contrary, and which was even giving stall warnings. This was as counter-intuitive for a pilot as it comes, and as far removed from your 'piloting 101' experience in a sim as could be. It might have led to thinking 'stab', but again, it was still responding to commands (so once again not 'running away' which is the very name of the checklist) and, unless they knew exactly what the problem was, they risked losing their only working pitch actuator. Barring any indication of a stab issue, what could have eliminated the possibility of an elevator actuator misbehavior/hardover? Shutting off the stab would, in that case, have doomed them as well. Remember that pilots are used to trimming through short 'blips' of the trim switches, not prolonged actuations to retrim from an agressive pitch down movement of the stab, all the way to full AND stop.Then there's the spurious stall warning, the fact that one pilot was fully absorbed at the control and unable to spare the mental capacity to troubleshoot, the panic of seeing the planet grow larger in your windshield...

As I said above, the performance of the crews on these tragic days can only be compared to what could have reasonably been expected of their peers.
I'm sorry if you want balls-of-steel test pilots at the control of your commercial airliner. The reality is, you get a fresh out of flightschool F/O on the right seat and a captain who might not be that far ahead of him on the seniority list.
The industry and regulators have decided that this was the best way to avoid a pilot shortage and ensure you get a cheap ticket. I deplore it as much as anyone, but the fact is, airplane manufacturers are now the ones we all rely on for reliability and safety. Boeing forgot that and dropped the ball... big time.


I respect your opinion and your post has definitely been a wakeup call as far as expectations of who is sitting at the controls. I guess I had hoped that at least one of the two pilots would be above average in skill and quick thinking/problem solving ability.

In the context of your description, I can certainly understand what happened on Lion Air 610. As far as ET302, IF the pilots were given the information in the EAD, I would think that, especially given the short time since Lion Air 610, it would bias their troubleshooting towards a runaway stabilizer.

For sure one of the issues with MCAS is that, unlike the 747-787, it would have been impossible for an MCAS induced runaway stabilizer to give a warning. The warnings (and auto-response on the 747, 777 and 787) are based upon uncommanded stabilizer movement. In the case of the MCAS failures, the movement was commanded, just commanded erroneously.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 3:57 pm

par13del wrote:
Francoflier wrote:
Regardless of what caused it to be this way, it can be said with no uncertainty that the design was flawed: through a single external sensor failure, it would directly, and to a large extent, act on the most powerful control surface of the airplane to point it downwards, unbeknownst to the crew. This does not pass muster with any aerospace engineer worth his title (leading me to believe that no sane engineer at Boeing would have signed on this without any sort of pressure from above, but again, investigations will determine this, not me). It is, inarguably, a BAD design, and I think we all agree on this.

Engineers don't work on assumptions, hopes or prayers. No engineer at Boeing would ever produce a design thinking "it should be good enough for the pilots to handle it, or if they did, they would document it at length. If there are any assumptions, they should be regarding the reasonably expected performance of a crew given adequate training (see examples above). These events fell well outside of these parameters. This is why so many accusations are flying at Boeing's face at the moment.
.

I an hoping the we will still get leaks about those engineers who gave in to political / financial pressure to keep their jobs and sacrificed their integrity as an engineer.


I don't think many people would leak that for their own mental wellness. Even if they leaked anonymously, they are still verbalizing or writing that they were essentially responsible for the death of all those people.

Plus, I still don't believe that any Boeing engineers consciously released a design thinking that the likely outcome would be a crash. Some may have allowed themselves to be convinced that there wouldn't be an issue.
 
WIederling
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 4:15 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
I've been a member for 5 years. I read most of the posts every week, and still I'm only at 150 or so total! WTF?

For you it is a hobby.
For others less so.
For some it is a paying job.
Murphy is an optimist
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 4:19 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
Revelation wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
The followingtwo things that might have actually saved them would have been:

1. Would have been triggered straight away and the first thought going trough the pilots mind would have been AoA disagree and stick shaker = left AoA vane problem. Ice and auto pilot would have never been on their mind as both are a logical consequence of the AoA vane failure as well as stick shaker. At the stage of the MCAS trim only them problems would have been there: AoA disagree, trim and GPWS warning. The stab cut out would have happened way earlier and the crew would have had way more time to adress the flight situation and not at the point were the aircraft was already in a dire state.

2. Mandated sim training on how to react when AoA disagree alert fires due to a failed AoA sensor.

If both would have been implemented after the first crash there would be no grounding and no ET crash. I wonder why Boeing did not think of this quick and simple solution?

I can think of a few more.

How about remembering you should not raise the flaps with stick shaker on? That closes holes in the swiss cheese right early, IMO.

Or how about an understanding of the significance of the stick shaker being on one side only? That should clue you in that this is an AoA disagree problem more so than any blinkin' light, IMO.


I have not found any written procedure that tells pilots to not raise the flaps when a one sided stickshaker is on due to ice ( the information given to the pilots from the aircraft).

And you know as well as i do that one sided stickshaker is not a way to conclude an AoA disagree. There are multiple reasons for one stick shaker activation and AoA disagree is only one of it.

Yes. I would just like to add, once established that stick-shaker on one side is erroneous, then raising flaps and maintaining speed and climb to get some altitude would seem entirely appropriate to me and would appear to be what all three crews attempted to do, in my view. You might consider it 'airmanship skills' these crews and supposed not to have had. Since none of the crews had been told that flaps up could initiate the failure mode, they may not have foreseen such an effect. In ET crew case, there was no unexpected nose down trim or 'AOA DISAGREE' warning present that could have tipped them the wink before flaps up command even if they had known.

If 'AOA DISAGREE' had been present, it may have been reasonable for the crew to conclude in all three cases that this was the source of the single side stick-shaker. It was not. The counter thesis is that 'AOA DISAGREE' is not present, then this is not likely to be the cause

Just a note on your original post. Your item 2 sim training post Lion Air - Since there were no (or very few) MAX simulators available to operators, and any that were available were not deigned to simulate MCAS, this would be an effective grounding anyway. That is exactly what they should have done.

Ray
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 4:40 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
So let us go through this for the event of the ET crash:
[cleaver and very detailed description of ET302 cockpit]
:checkmark: :thumbsup:
Superb work, many thanks !

Your description show very well the complexity of the situation. This dramatically contrast with some other theories where the pilots only task it just to flip a switch within 4 seconds...
 
rheinwaldner
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 4:42 pm

morrisond wrote:
Except it wasn't 40 seconds. The pilot in Command properly counteracted MCAS about 17 times over 9 minutes during which he had control before handing it over to the co-pilot who failed to properly counteract MCAS down. He handed over control to try and find the problem in the manuals - but unfortunately as Boeing didn't disclose it he never would have found it - he just needed to make the intuitive leap to turn off the bad system (malfunctioning electric trim).

Except it wasn't 17 times in 9 minutes. What a joke. Getting facts so wrong does not help to substantiate your point.
IMO it is also arrogant to call cutting the trim intuitive. Given the indicated errors and the aircraft behavior, among all the possible failures modes, trim runaway was far down on the list.

planecane wrote:
I give up.

I somehow doubt it. What would you do with the spare time? ;)

The reason, why I say this, because you come across like somebody who entertains a full time job defending Boeing. 5% on topic (="Boeing made a mistake"), 95% off topic (pilots, training, hindsight knowledge).

planecane wrote:
I have not spent months trying to blame the pilots. I have spent months saying that I could understand how the engineers made the assumptions they did at the time and saying that the pilots could have saved the aircraft. I have repeatedly said that it was a bad design and that Boeing should be (and is being) blamed for creating a frequency of runaway stabilizer that it far beyond what is acceptable. I have stated that I expect pilots to be trained well enough and skilled enough to the point that they are able to save a plane if it is possible to save it and that I hope that every time I board a flight, the pilots have that training and skill.

Lets see:
- not spent months trying to blame the pilots: wrong, that topic is in 99% of your posts
- engineers did understandable assumptions: cant be more than in 5% of your posts, also this is wrong, management reportedly overruled concerns of MAX engineers.
- Boeing should be blamed for a bad design: cant be more than in 1% of your posts
- Pilots should be trained well enough: with this I agree. Only, are you aware that the same pilots are flying NGs without causing peaks in the accident statistics? So tell me, what is the issue? The pilots or the MAX? The MAX is the aircraft, that has the worst safety record of any new aircraft since many decades. It is so bad, that every 7th 737 overall would crash, if the whole family would have the accident rate of the MAX (and the crashes would even be for same main reason).
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
Alfons
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 4:46 pm

After a million posts, and a thousand of them still writing that it was the pilots‘ fault/error...

I want to ask them to find one (american if you want) pilot, who would agree to take seat in the cockpit, right after take off when a dozen of lights started to blink. If you found just one pilot honestly agreeing being ready to start in real from this situation at the driver‘s seat, because he or she feels 100% secure to be able to bring back the plane in one piece... then I might start to consider this possibility.

I don‘t think you will find one.


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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 5:00 pm

Revelation wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
The followingtwo things that might have actually saved them would have been:

1.
AOA DISAGREE alert (if the option is installed).
Would have been triggered straight away and the first thought going trough the pilots mind would have been AoA disagree and stick shaker = left AoA vane problem. Ice and auto pilot would have never been on their mind as both are a logical consequence of the AoA vane failure as well as stick shaker. At the stage of the MCAS trim only them problems would have been there: AoA disagree, trim and GPWS warning. The stab cut out would have happened way earlier and the crew would have had way more time to adress the flight situation and not at the point were the aircraft was already in a dire state.

2. Mandated sim training on how to react when AoA disagree alert fires due to a failed AoA sensor.

If both would have been implemented after the first crash there would be no grounding and no ET crash. I wonder why Boeing did not think of this quick and simple solution?

I can think of a few more.

How about remembering you should not raise the flaps with stick shaker on? That closes holes in the swiss cheese right early, IMO.

Or how about an understanding of the significance of the stick shaker being on one side only? That should clue you in that this is an AoA disagree problem more so than any blinkin' light, IMO.


That is wrong. You can raise the flaps if you have positively identified that the stick shaker is caused by wrong airspeed / AoA data. Which is quite easy, if you check your pitch and power. The only error is that they did not fly pitch and power correctly and remained at full thrust right to the end. Something like 80% thrust and a pitch of 2,5-4° would be correct.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 5:07 pm

Alfons wrote:
After a million posts, and a thousand of them still writing that it was the pilots‘ fault/error...

I want to ask them to find one (american if you want) pilot, who would agree to take seat in the cockpit, right after take off when a dozen of lights started to blink. If you found just one pilot honestly agreeing being ready to start in real from this situation at the driver‘s seat, because he or she feels 100% secure to be able to bring back the plane in one piece... then I might start to consider this possibility.

I don‘t think you will find one.


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Why do you want to go there, the first response you are going to get is that in the Lion Air case that a/c would not have been cleared to fly.....so this will only generate more distraction / deflection.
Better to just stick to the facts and go from there.
 
art
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 5:41 pm

ssteve wrote:
art wrote:
The Lion Air flight which survived had an extra pilot in the cockpit. It was the pilot not involved with flying the aircraft who saved it. That's the difference between the two. Without him being in the jumpseat there would probably have been two Lion Air MAX crashes in quick succession.


I'm not sure how they would crash the same plane twice.


Good point! Didn't occur to me!
 
rayfound
Posts: 24
Joined: Tue Mar 12, 2019 5:42 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 6:13 pm

Agrajag wrote:
Going back and re-reading some of the earlier Max grounding threads is very illuminating. Precise language is repeated over and over by certain posters who are pushing the 'the pilots are to blame, not Boeing' agenda. Im convinced one person has multiple accounts and is attempting to do Boeing a service, either paid or unpaid. If paid, Boeing arent getting value for money.


While I don't share the vitriol of many with regards to Boeing's fault/negligence - My personal opinion lands more on "oversight" and "didn't foresee failure modes" than "rushed/forced/negligent".

That said, those who wish to paint this into a pilot failure are walking a really strange line: In all aviation accidents, it is almost ALWAYS a combination of human factors combined with mechanical or technical aspects. In the case of MCAS - technically speaking there WAS a pathway to safety so to speak, but that would require the pilots act perfectly under stress and in-congruent information.

So these people are making the argument that the machine can have failures, but the pilots should be perfect. Not sure I agree. A system should be resilient against failure in as many aspects as possible, and frankly, changing the software/control system of the aircraft is a far easier and more reliable way to accomplish that than leaving failures to the flight crew to diagnose, respond to, and get right inside a few seconds.
 
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par13del
Posts: 9035
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Aug 20, 2019 6:30 pm

rayfound wrote:
In all aviation accidents, it is almost ALWAYS a combination of human factors combined with mechanical or technical aspects.

Millions of people take to the air everyday, they must have faith and confidence in the systems to allow daily operations to continue, not many accidents are traced to mechanical only causes.
The FAA decided to test the bit flip issue, so far we have not seen the details on whether this issue also affects the NG, if it does, and it is an issue that will keep the MAX grounded, what would be the rationale for not also grounding the thousands of NG's flying around?

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