With 103 years of experience in the aviation industry, being arguably the most successful airplane manufacturer in history, lessons in verification, redundancy, testing and logic have long since been learned at Boeing. This epic 737 MAX screw-up did not teach Boeing anything they don't already know.
The engineers at Boeing are not picking up the lesson about redundancy, in the wake of this double tragedy.
The decision was made to make the 737 MAX because management believed it to be the economically and logistically safer option, as well as being the cheaper and faster option, compared to a clean sheet design. Jim McNearney, perhaps the most incompetent CEO Boeing has ever had, was convinced of this. After all he had an MBA degree.
He was wrong. Again.
He cost Boeing billions. Again.
Not to mention huge reputation cost. That's what happened.
Engineering issues, such as engine size, were designed around as much as could be done with the 737 airframe. The peg was almost round, so it was just hammered slightly to fit the round hole. Any issues with this compromise were considered solved and the solutions considered non-critical, both by Boeing and the FAA.
Creating good and safe airframes isn't magic and making the 737 MAX airframe safe, despite it's original engineering compromises, is easily achieved - there's no need to affirm "belief" in that, that's just going to happen. As mentioned, this isn't magic, it's just a question of compromises. There's no need for belief or faith here.
I'm just shocked to read that you think Boeing is learning these lessons now. Boeing engineers did the absolute best they could with the mission they were given, i.e. put these huge engines on a 737 airframe and don't come back until you've done it.
I'm not sure we can go with the idea that institutional knowledge going back to the wooden sea planes built by Bill Boeing 103 years ago is substantial.
Instead I would use the model that one US General said of Vietnam: It wasn't a nine year war, it was nine one year wars.
I don't get the point about the managers abusing the engineers by making them adapt more powerful engines to the airframe.
In the end if this is not feasible it is the engineer's job to push back and say we need to do something else.
Yet it certainly was feasible, we can now see that same airframe with those same engines doing test flights with a properly functioning MCAS.
It was just that the MAX engineers let a seriously flawed design on to the aircraft despite (presumably) having the knowledge to know the ramifications of doing so.
Pushing back at management rather than caving to unrealistic expectations by producing unsafe designs is a big part of an engineer's job.
It's my understanding that the engineers literally sign off on safety documents, the system counts on them to have enough pride of ownership to not allow unsafe designs.
As the old saying goes, if you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen.
As flyingphil's article above says, the US labor market is as tight as it ever has been.
There are plenty of other things for a qualified engineer to do with their career other than taking on excessive amounts of pressure from overly aggressive managers.
In the end it is those engineers who have to try to sleep at night knowing the body count that people here cite over and over again.