OK - so then the new standard is that if an Engineer or an Organization makes a mistake they are going to Jail?
If it really turns out that the 737 MAX (without augmentation) can not fly safely within the permissible operating values due to the engines mounted too far forward, and the redundancy and deployment logic of the augmentation system can not be solved properly then additional to the few hundreds of death bodies and thousands of desperate relatives $.$$$.$$$.$$$.$$$,- are in play and at some point the question will arise who knew something and who could have done something when.
The change of Boeing's technical chief pilot to a lower position with a Boeing customer at an interesting point of the timeline is quite ..... interesting ..... here.
It seems - if the assumptions are correct - to give a lot of people affected here and a lot of Errors, too.
ERROR 1:Missed Opportunity
. Boeing management has overlooked the fact that by installing the large new fuel-efficient engines, the busses could suddenly gain a significant market advantage. That was already recognizable years before, only nobody recognized it. This mistake was made by the Management. When it happened (A320NEO), they were desperately looking for a way to build similar big new engines for the 737NG. But due to the much lower ground clearance of the 737 compared to the airbuses, this was not possible.
ERROR 2:Underestimated Problem
. Under the pressure of the market to be able to offer a competitive product, boeing has decided to mount the engines far in front of the wings, because this way they could be attached to the 737. The technicians have certainly calculated the aerodynamics beforehand and already they must have seen that this will lead to aerodynamic problems. Management underestimated this problem, probably under pressure from stockholders and the sales department.
ERROR 3:Decision not taken
. Although they did not know exactly how to solve this problem, they started to market the product. The marketing was very successful, the product was developed. Boeing already had many thousands of pre-orders when it turned out that the aerodynamic issues are serious and it is doubtful if they are solvable. Instead of closing the MAX project and developing the NSA with high pressure, the problem was kept secret and technical solutions were sought to disguise it in front of customers and the regulatory authority. At this point in time, a large number of employes within boeing were clear about the scope of the problem.
ERROR 4:Wrong assumption
. In a completely FBW-controlled aircraft type, aerodynamic problems can be well compensated by the electronic flight control. It then only depends on the redundancy of the components and sensors. In contrast, in a fundamentally mechanically controlled aircraft such as the 737, additional electronic control of flight control surfaces is much more difficult to realize. It takes a variety of sensors and actuators to always respond to different flight situations. Such an extension, if properly conceived, is not much easier to build than a complete FBW concept. Many at the manufacturer boeing must have realized that not a common solution was created here but it was trying to mask a defect.
ERROR 5:Wrong assumption
. Apparently it was believed that with sufficient coverage of measures, use of unsuspicious terms and implementation of PR measures can not only obscure the aerodynamic deficiency, but also refrain from pilot training and thus can make additional profit on sales. That did not work in the long run due to the two disasters.
ERROR 6:Fundamental problem not recognized. Consequences are not considered
. It was not taken into account from the very beginning that a manually controlled aircraft such as the 737, if it shows a problematic flight behavior, is inevitably much more insecure in operation than an aircraft engineered for aerodynamic optimum. Until now, everyones focus is always on the most safe and reliable electronic augmentation of misconduct (MCAS). But this does not change the fact that a plane with aerodynamical flaws is much less secure in any kind of exceptional situations (operation at the limit of permissible values, overload, weather, evasive action, below average pilot skills, mechanical or electrical component faults, maintenance faults, etc.). Even the best augmentation system can not change that fact. You can only compensate aerodynamical flaws with a complete FBW system.
They should have realized sooner that their market position was endangered, then the NSA plane would already be in production today and nobody cares about a MAX.
If boeing have detected it too late then boeing would have to analyze the problem with the aerodnamic in detail in time, then boeing would have stopped development on time.
But of course it is hard to cancel a product for which you have thousands of orders.
There is no Plan B for the 737 MAX.