9w748capt wrote:

seahawk wrote:

planecane wrote:

I don't think 10 seconds of continuous trim input is really a "short burst." It is a myth that MCAS runaway and "normal" runaway are so different that a pilot would not be able to recognize MCAS runaway as a runaway stabilizer. I would be willing to bet that when the final reports come out that there is no discussion where the pilots discuss the possibility of runaway stabilizer and determine it isn't one because of the slightly different behavior. My opinion is that lack of focus of training for runaway stabilizer for decades due to the exceedingly rare rate of occurrence is the reason that it wasn't recognized.

Also, a "normal" runaway stabilizer does not necessarily mean that electric trim won't work. In fact, the runaway stabilizer NNC directs the pilots to use the electric trim among the first steps.

You are right. I did overlook this. Clear cut case of crew incompetence indeed.

Right - because Boeing had been so forthcoming and transparent with max pilots about mcas, which would have helped them diagnose the problem in the first place. What a joke!

Some of you are truly unbelievable. First, Seahawk I never said anything about crew incompetence. And 748capt I hope your user name isn't your occupation. Neither crew needed to diagnose the problem. They needed to recognize the symptoms and determine what NNC to perform. It doesn't matter to the crew if the runaway is caused by MCAS or a flying unicorn living in the trim motor.

For all the nitpicking about what a "real" runaway stabilizer is vs an MCAS runaway, I am willing to bet money that neither final report contains a conversation amongst the crew where they bring up the possibility of runaway stabilizer but determine that it isn't because of MCAS behavior.

I don't blame the crews, I blame inadequate training on runaway stabilizer. Boeing shares that blame because they introduced a new cause for runaway stabilizer but didn't alert the customer airlines. This disclosure may have led to it being more of a focus in differences training.

brindabella wrote:

Not to mention the (predictably) volcanic reaction from POTUS when informed that the FAA had cleared 2.0 internally - but the FAA`was afraid to declare their decision without support from other regulatory agencies (read EU)..
cheers

Which POTUS are we talking about, the one who countermanded the FAA and grounded the MAX or some other one?

TTailedTiger wrote:

Andy33 wrote:

TTailedTiger wrote:

Those agencies would be very foolish to withhold certification if Boeing fixes all issues. The FAA could turn around and do the same thing. Maybe the FAA would decide they need to go over the A320neo again since they missed things on the 73M. What you are suggesting is a dangerous game.

Bullying EASA is likely to prove counter-productive, and of course bullying China, or India, or Australia etc would have no effect since nobody is asking the FAA to allow planes built in these countries into US airspace.

The scope of the FAA is limited to the criteria they have set for the 73M. If Boeing satisfies them then the FAA will have no legal authority to keep it grounded. "But the other countries are still pouting" won't be a valid reason. An injunction or executive order would hit the FAA so fast it would make their heads spin. And if the agencies of other countries keep it grounded after Boeing has made all required fixes then you can bet those airlines will take them to court.

The 'fix' as you put it is much more than engineering, programming and retraining. Part of this process for non-USA authorities is asking the question, can we trust Boeing and the FAA as a partnership? If the FAA are seen to be flagging the MAX through, or forcing the issue at all, other authorities will not be so quick to clear MAX. Other authorities will want tp know the FAA are doing their job thoroughly......

I know that doesn't suit your narrative, but it is a vital part of rebuilding trust worldwide.

planecane wrote:

9w748capt wrote:

seahawk wrote:

You are right. I did overlook this. Clear cut case of crew incompetence indeed.

Right - because Boeing had been so forthcoming and transparent with max pilots about mcas, which would have helped them diagnose the problem in the first place. What a joke!

I don't blame the crews, I blame inadequate training on runaway stabilizer. Boeing shares that blame because they introduced a new cause for runaway stabilizer but didn't alert the customer airlines. This disclosure may have led to it being more of a focus in differences training.

Just a username, definitely not my occupation.

And your approach is reasonable IMO. What I got tired of was the right wing crowd here immediately blaming the foreign crews, with little regard for any other factors. Given the overall tone on this forum these days, I'm not sure why I was so surprised. It's the new norm.

planecane wrote:

9w748capt wrote:

seahawk wrote:

You are right. I did overlook this. Clear cut case of crew incompetence indeed.

Right - because Boeing had been so forthcoming and transparent with max pilots about mcas, which would have helped them diagnose the problem in the first place. What a joke!

Some of you are truly unbelievable. First, Seahawk I never said anything about crew incompetence. And 748capt I hope your user name isn't your occupation. Neither crew needed to diagnose the problem. They needed to recognize the symptoms and determine what NNC to perform. It doesn't matter to the crew if the runaway is caused by MCAS or a flying unicorn living in the trim motor.

For all the nitpicking about what a "real" runaway stabilizer is vs an MCAS runaway, I am willing to bet money that neither final report contains a conversation amongst the crew where they bring up the possibility of runaway stabilizer but determine that it isn't because of MCAS behavior.

I don't blame the crews, I blame inadequate training on runaway stabilizer. Boeing shares that blame because they introduced a new cause for runaway stabilizer but didn't alert the customer airlines. This disclosure may have led to it being more of a focus in differences training.

But we know a pilot who knew about both accidents, had all the information on MCAS, and knew exactly what to expect, still lost the plane in the simulator during the FAA trials. Which would suggest the problem was always more than training on runaway stabiliser, MCAS was fundamentally dangerous.

SelseyBill wrote:

The 'fix' as you put it is much more than engineering, programming and retraining. Part of this process for non-USA authorities is asking the question, can we trust Boeing and the FAA as a partnership? If the FAA are seen to be flagging the MAX through, or forcing the issue at all, other authorities will not be so quick to clear MAX. Other authorities will want tp know the FAA are doing their job thoroughly......

I know that doesn't suit your narrative, but it is a vital part of rebuilding trust worldwide.

Well, if they have to watch US carriers fly the MAX for months before they have enough faith in the FAA to approve the a/c for flight in their regions, so be it, there really is nothing that Boeing or the FAA can about that, trust is earned not bought.
The harsh reality is that the the FAA is tasked with the oversight of the aviation industry in the USA, no where else, their expertise can be requested, but at the end of the day, their mission is the USA. So if they put Boeing through their ropes and the a/c passes and meets all their criteria, they can say now go see what the rest of the world wants and we will wait, however, if they do such one would expect back lash across the political spectrum as well as within the nation.
If that is their intent, I expect they would leave their testing for last to ensure no whistle blower leaks that they already approved MCAS 2.0 and their other requirements but are waiting for the clearance of "foreign requirements".
Interesting thing is that other than when initially announced, we have not revisited the EASA requirements in detail to see whether some or any of them can be deferred to the production line versus prior to return to flight. Example, how do they make the trim wheel larger or easier to use without a cockpit redesign, after all, it got smaller because more space was needed.

TTailedTiger wrote:

Why would I trust the EASA when they didn't ground the ATR after the American Eagle crash and its aileron reversal issue was discovered? Aerospatiale even refused to fix the problem and the US had to ban them from operating in cold weather here. So you can get off your high horse. The EASA only cares when it's a product of another country apparently.

Good lord.

• The pan-European EASA wasn't founded until 8 years after this accident! This was the french DGAC.
• The bilaterals that exist now didn't then.- the FAA were free to certify independently, and were indeed slated (along with DGAC) for their airworthiness work
• The FAA were, as now, at perfect liberty to ground the aircraft independently
• The design features that likely caused the crash were far from unique to the ATR - per the FAA no less than 27 part 23 and part 25 aircraft models were affected. I can't find a list (it includes the SAAB 340) but it would be a shock if the US wasn't represented in there.
• Operating restrictions were enforced, and changes were made (the de-icing boot extended further down the chord)

Both those facts make me suspect the 777X certification is going to take a lot longer than Boeing wants as well.[/quote]

They will certainly generate more scrutiny fom non-US regulators than Boeing may have anticipated

planecane wrote:

9w748capt wrote:

seahawk wrote:

You are right. I did overlook this. Clear cut case of crew incompetence indeed.

Right - because Boeing had been so forthcoming and transparent with max pilots about mcas, which would have helped them diagnose the problem in the first place. What a joke!

Some of you are truly unbelievable. First, Seahawk I never said anything about crew incompetence. And 748capt I hope your user name isn't your occupation. Neither crew needed to diagnose the problem. They needed to recognize the symptoms and determine what NNC to perform. It doesn't matter to the crew if the runaway is caused by MCAS or a flying unicorn living in the trim motor.

For all the nitpicking about what a "real" runaway stabilizer is vs an MCAS runaway, I am willing to bet money that neither final report contains a conversation amongst the crew where they bring up the possibility of runaway stabilizer but determine that it isn't because of MCAS behavior.

I don't blame the crews, I blame inadequate training on runaway stabilizer. Boeing shares that blame because they introduced a new cause for runaway stabilizer but didn't alert the customer airlines. This disclosure may have led to it being more of a focus in differences training.

Always betting this or guaranteeing that, you'll have to give very long odds for me take the latest bet since LionAir crew did not know MCAS existed and ET crew recognised it and hit the cut-out, so I think you are likely correct for once.

If Boeing had disclosed MCAS V1.0 to anyone such that the SSA was updated, FAA reviewed it, it was in the FCOM, training was considered, then it would not have made it through certification.

The big question is what are Boeing to do about those pesky nesting unicorns?

Ray

JerseyFlyer wrote:

Both those facts make me suspect the 777X certification is going to take a lot longer than Boeing wants as well.

They will certainly generate more scrutiny fom non-US regulators than Boeing may have anticipated[/quote]
Since the FAA does not have the staff, it will be Boeing staffers doing all the heavy lifting, so the more resources Boeing throws at the FAA issues the faster the certification can be accomplished. The FAA may well want to do more scrutiny but they have to live within the bubble they created.

Most all of the MAX discussion is about flaws and fixes for the MCAS and flight control systems. But what about the possibility of Boeing having to declare bankruptcy? The 737 is their cash flow cow. But now that has dried up with deliveries on hold. And this could last well into 2020. And how much time, effort and manpower will be required to update all of the undelivered MAX A/C, so they can be delivered? And how much pilot training/ retraining will be needed before they can fly again? How much will the FAA and other regulators fine Boeing? Likely to be in the billions, not millions. Lastly, there is the loss of orders and cancellations which will mean reduced upfront cash payments. So Boeing is in a somewhat precarious position right now, and the effect on its cash flow may be worse than is apparent.

traindoc wrote:

Most all of the MAX discussion is about flaws and fixes for the MCAS and flight control systems. But what about the possibility of Boeing having to declare bankruptcy? The 737 is their cash flow cow. But now that has dried up with deliveries on hold. And this could last well into 2020. And how much time, effort and manpower will be required to update all of the undelivered MAX A/C, so they can be delivered? And how much pilot training/ retraining will be needed before they can fly again? How much will the FAA and other regulators fine Boeing? Likely to be in the billions, not millions. Lastly, there is the loss of orders and cancellations which will mean reduced upfront cash payments. So Boeing is in a somewhat precarious position right now, and the effect on its cash flow may be worse than is apparent.

Lol, Boeing is not going to go bankrupt.

ikolkyo wrote:

Lol, Boeing is not going to go bankrupt.

The CEO's are usually saying that while the clerks are filing the papers.
How about this thought, we have a resident Program Accounting Expert who shows the dire situation Boeing is in with the deferred cost of the 787 program, add in the 5 billion already written off, the billions sitting in undelivered inventory with stage payments, the penalties to be paid to carriers and vendors, compensation to families, etc etc. he can probably show that Boeing has high negative equity and is technically bankrupt.

Another “benefit” of bankruptcy is that Boeing becomes the victim and no longer the villain. I like Boeing, and did the Everrett factory tour (again) last September. But, I think that they have really stepped deep into the doodoo this time, and recovery is a long way off.

par13del wrote:

ikolkyo wrote:

Lol, Boeing is not going to go bankrupt.

The CEO's are usually saying that while the clerks are filing the papers.
How about this thought, we have a resident Program Accounting Expert who shows the dire situation Boeing is in with the deferred cost of the 787 program, add in the 5 billion already written off, the billions sitting in undelivered inventory with stage payments, the penalties to be paid to carriers and vendors, compensation to families, etc etc. he can probably show that Boeing has high negative equity and is technically bankrupt.

Not that bad currently. However, as this thing is going on and on, the bill is getting bigger. Boeing holds 54billion of its own shares. If this goes deep in 2020, chapter 11 is there, then watch the share prices.. Shares are good when they still have value.

Total bill is $8.3b, from ET crash to 30 June. 2.3b/month. this keeps building up. At the year end auditors would like to see provisions for any future compensations and possible legal disputes. If they raise a "going concern" issue (probably they will but hide it in wording) then SHTF.

Seems unlikely that Boeing will go bust, the recent leaks are a bit more optimistic
But the billions the 737MAX fiasco is going to cost must be eating up the profits for the 737 program.
If it is not returned to flight pretty soon they must eventually run out of funds or be vulnerable to take overs, mergers, buyouts, shareholders revolts.. the next few weeks will be critical.

They are issuing Bonds to fund the joint venture with Embraer
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ur-460003/

PW100 wrote:

SQ32 wrote:

In reality, everything can be done, it depends on capabilities of the engineering team.

747 went from drawing board to the sky in 1968, a time span just 3 years. Today, with all these software modelling tools, super fast PCs, the Boeing engineers come back and say nothing can be fixed.

Incomparable.

For starters, safety was much much worsen then. If you think that the MAX introduction is bad with two fatal accidents, you might want to look at the 727 introduction. Hint, MAX safety record actually looks very good then compared to the 727.

All that extra enigneering requires time, money and valuable resources. If you would go back to the sixties safety level, MAX would already have been flying within weeks (if grounded at all).

But we are not in the sixties.

And passengers, airlines, financiers and insurers won't tolerate sixties levels of safety.

The MAX seems to be equivalent to a car OEM releasing a new model in 2019, with a one start crash safety rating, when the model it replaced was a four or five.

Ugh. Read one page of replies and was quickly reminded why I have stayed out of this thread recently.

Boeing is not in financial trouble. They will be just fine. As are all the suppliers.

Max deliveries by my estimate will begin in early q4. Year end financials will be fine.

kayik wrote:

... as this thing is going on and on, the bill is getting bigger. Boeing holds 54billion of its own shares. If this goes deep in 2020, chapter 11 is there, then watch the share prices.. Shares are good when they still have value.

Total bill is $8.3b, from ET crash to 30 June. 2.3b/month. this keeps building up. At the year end auditors would like to see provisions for any future compensations and possible legal disputes. If they raise a "going concern" issue (probably they will but hide it in wording) then SHTF.

Going concern query? If Boeing lost $25-50 billion on MAX but it was allowed to fly again I I don't see how that would stop the company being a going concern. Boeing have $50 billion+ of Boeing stock in the kitty according to the poster. They should be starting to turn that stock into cash. Yes, stock price may drop a lot so I feel terribly sorry for management who may not make as much as usual from artificially inflating the stock price.

So we believe that they have changed the Chpt.11 laws so much that a company must be bankrupt to take advantage of the Chpt.11 provisions?

trpmb6 wrote:

Ugh. Read one page of replies and was quickly reminded why I have stayed out of this thread recently.

Boeing is not in financial trouble. They will be just fine. As are all the suppliers.

Max deliveries by my estimate will begin in early q4. Year end financials will be fine.

Why have some airlines cancelled flights with the MAX through Jan 2020 then?

SelseyBill wrote:

TTailedTiger wrote:

Andy33 wrote:

Bullying EASA is likely to prove counter-productive, and of course bullying China, or India, or Australia etc would have no effect since nobody is asking the FAA to allow planes built in these countries into US airspace.

The scope of the FAA is limited to the criteria they have set for the 73M. If Boeing satisfies them then the FAA will have no legal authority to keep it grounded. "But the other countries are still pouting" won't be a valid reason. An injunction or executive order would hit the FAA so fast it would make their heads spin. And if the agencies of other countries keep it grounded after Boeing has made all required fixes then you can bet those airlines will take them to court.

The 'fix' as you put it is much more than engineering, programming and retraining. Part of this process for non-USA authorities is asking the question, can we trust Boeing and the FAA as a partnership? If the FAA are seen to be flagging the MAX through, or forcing the issue at all, other authorities will not be so quick to clear MAX. Other authorities will want tp know the FAA are doing their job thoroughly......

I know that doesn't suit your narrative, but it is a vital part of rebuilding trust worldwide.

The agencies of other nations can ground the 73M for as long as they want. But their keeping it grounded will not be a valid reason for the FAA to keep it grounded if Boeing satisfies all of the FAA's requirements. You apparently have zero understanding of legal precedence. If they tried to pull such a stunt it would be a race to see who intervenes first, the courts or the president.

DenverTed wrote:

The bit flip disable wasn't a random test that went wherever it went. Somebody specifically chose that it would or could disable the MCAS cutout switches and decided on that test case. How many switches are there on an airplane? This seems like choosing a desired result over the scientific method, logic, or probablility. But it is what it is. Maybe they shouldn't have grandfathered the single source computer onto the MAX, and now they are using MCAS as an excuse to fix that oversight. Whatever it takes. But what's next, the MAX needs overwing slides? Is MCAS carte blanche to fix everything they should have not grandfathered in back in 2011?

Strangely enough, for a test of worse case, you choose the worst cases to test. Think of it as a stress test.

Ray

SEU wrote:

trpmb6 wrote:

Ugh. Read one page of replies and was quickly reminded why I have stayed out of this thread recently.

Boeing is not in financial trouble. They will be just fine. As are all the suppliers.

Max deliveries by my estimate will begin in early q4. Year end financials will be fine.

Why have some airlines cancelled flights with the MAX through Jan 2020 then?

Deliveries.

And those airlines (WN specifically) are just making smart business decisions.

Planetalk wrote:

planecane wrote:

9w748capt wrote:

Right - because Boeing had been so forthcoming and transparent with max pilots about mcas, which would have helped them diagnose the problem in the first place. What a joke!

Some of you are truly unbelievable. First, Seahawk I never said anything about crew incompetence. And 748capt I hope your user name isn't your occupation. Neither crew needed to diagnose the problem. They needed to recognize the symptoms and determine what NNC to perform. It doesn't matter to the crew if the runaway is caused by MCAS or a flying unicorn living in the trim motor.

For all the nitpicking about what a "real" runaway stabilizer is vs an MCAS runaway, I am willing to bet money that neither final report contains a conversation amongst the crew where they bring up the possibility of runaway stabilizer but determine that it isn't because of MCAS behavior.

I don't blame the crews, I blame inadequate training on runaway stabilizer. Boeing shares that blame because they introduced a new cause for runaway stabilizer but didn't alert the customer airlines. This disclosure may have led to it being more of a focus in differences training.

But we know a pilot who knew about both accidents, had all the information on MCAS, and knew exactly what to expect, still lost the plane in the simulator during the FAA trials. Which would suggest the problem was always more than training on runaway stabiliser, MCAS was fundamentally dangerous.

Please link to this story because I haven't seen any report of this happening. The only similar simulator session I know of was done with the aircraft already severely out of trim and the electric trim cut off.

DenverTed wrote:

The bit flip disable wasn't a random test that went wherever it went. Somebody specifically chose that it would or could disable the MCAS cutout switches and decided on that test case. How many switches are there on an airplane? This seems like choosing a desired result over the scientific method, logic, or probablility. But it is what it is. Maybe they shouldn't have grandfathered the single source computer onto the MAX, and now they are using MCAS as an excuse to fix that oversight. Whatever it takes. But what's next, the MAX needs overwing slides? Is MCAS carte blanche to fix everything they should have not grandfathered in back in 2011?

The problem is, I doubt the authorities believe anything Boeing tells them anymore. So inevitably they will want to double check everything. Even on this forum it was advocated recently that Boeing's best strategy is to keep quiet about any other gremlins they know about, so as to get it back into service as soon as possible. I find it quite astonishing anyone would think Boeing should carry on exactly as it behaved before all this and keep quiet about any 'issues' with the plane. And if I was a regulator, that's more or less the impression I'd be getting from how Boeing management have behaved since the crashes, which would make me extra suspicious. At some point you have to stop digging.

This is why Boeing has created a massive hole for itself with the 777X, because the regulators will not take its word for granted. Trust is a very very hard thing to get back once you lose it, which applies to the FAA as well, since now foreign regulators are taking a far closer look than they normally would at the process. Previously in recent years the FAA and EASA generally accepted each others work. Not now it seems.

I am sure Boeing will survive, but if you are a stockholder, are you happy with a company who's last three programs are the 787, 747-8 and 737 MAX? I suppose the 787 may turn some kind of overall profit one day. People focus on the share price holding steady, but imagine how much higher the share price would be if Boeing had launched a plane since the 77W that turned a profit. A CEOs job is to maximise profit, not hold share prices steady despite repeatedly stuffing up. Though all those buybacks help of course.

trpmb6 wrote:

Ugh. Read one page of replies and was quickly reminded why I have stayed out of this thread recently.

Boeing is not in financial trouble. They will be just fine. As are all the suppliers.

Max deliveries by my estimate will begin in early q4. Year end financials will be fine.

Yeah I’m sure Boeing and it’s suppliers sleep well every night over the Max. It’s no big deal. It’s only money.

My apologies if this has been discussed before but I haven't seen anything about this issue reported on this site.

It appears that another issue has been found (discovered) with the 737 MAX. It appears that the MAX does not conform to FAA guidelines for protecting flight controls. According to the website (link below):

"The pilots in the 737 MAX use foot pedals to control the hydraulics that move the plane's rudder. Steel cables run from the foot pedals to the hydraulic control valves in the back of the plane. If debris from an uncontained engine failure cuts one of these cables the plane will become uncontrollable. It is quite obvious why the FAA engineers saw this as a problem. But solving it would have cost time and money. Boeing rejected to fix the issue and the FAA management took Boeing's side:

F.A.A. managers conceded that the Max “does not meet” agency guidelines “for protecting flight controls,” according to an agency document. But in another document, they added that they had to consider whether any requested changes would interfere with Boeing’s timeline. The managers wrote that it would be “impractical at this late point in the program,” for the company to resolve the issue. Mr. Duven at the F.A.A. also said the decision was based on the safety record of the plane."

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/07/7 ... ified.html

Does anyone have anymore information on this? Is this a non-issue? Or something more serious?

horizon360 wrote:

My apologies if this has been discussed before but I haven't seen anything about this issue reported on this site.

It appears that another issue has been found (discovered) with the 737 MAX. It appears that the MAX does not conform to FAA guidelines for protecting flight controls. According to the website (link below):
...

This has been brought up and discussed at length already upthread.

Apology accepted, this thread is getting quite massive... and we're still a way from Q4.

planecane wrote:

9w748capt wrote:

seahawk wrote:

You are right. I did overlook this. Clear cut case of crew incompetence indeed.

Right - because Boeing had been so forthcoming and transparent with max pilots about mcas, which would have helped them diagnose the problem in the first place. What a joke!

Some of you are truly unbelievable. First, Seahawk I never said anything about crew incompetence. And 748capt I hope your user name isn't your occupation. Neither crew needed to diagnose the problem. They needed to recognize the symptoms and determine what NNC to perform. It doesn't matter to the crew if the runaway is caused by MCAS or a flying unicorn living in the trim motor.

For all the nitpicking about what a "real" runaway stabilizer is vs an MCAS runaway, I am willing to bet money that neither final report contains a conversation amongst the crew where they bring up the possibility of runaway stabilizer but determine that it isn't because of MCAS behavior.

I don't blame the crews, I blame inadequate training on runaway stabilizer. Boeing shares that blame because they introduced a new cause for runaway stabilizer but didn't alert the customer airlines. This disclosure may have led to it being more of a focus in differences training.

Well, it depends on what you expect from a crew. Should they only b able to read a checklist or should they notice problems on their own. In that case we have clear and obvious uncommanded trim inputs and the correct response is to hit the cut out switch. What system causes this does not matter.

JerseyFlyer wrote:

They will certainly generate more scrutiny fom non-US regulators than Boeing may have anticipated

Wouldn't the FAA also claw back some regulatory dominance from Boeing ? Even if it is just for looks?

One issue I see: FAA is tasked with certification/safety _but also_ with furthering the US aerospace industry.
This is a competing set of tasks I'd see as problematic. An arrangement not found elsewhere.

Just to add to the fun..

https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2019/0 ... g-is-broke

Will re-visit when the Q1 2020 thread starts

Well many are saying:

"it will be back in October"
"ohh ungrounding will be in Q4"

yet nobody knows or states which year lol!

SQ32 wrote:

In reality, everything can be done, it depends on capabilities of the engineering team.

747 went from drawing board to the sky in 1968, a time span just 3 years. Today, with all these software modelling tools, super fast PCs, the Boeing engineers come back and say nothing can be fixed.

It is one thing when one is doing a clean sheet design. It is another when trying to retrofit something into a pre-existing design with a lot of inherited limitations and constraints.

We're taught to retrofit anything, the average cost increases by a factor of forty times versus if it was designed that way inherently.

seahawk wrote:

Well, it depends on what you expect from a crew. Should they only b able to read a checklist or should they notice problems on their own. In that case we have clear and obvious uncommanded trim inputs and the correct response is to hit the cut out switch. What system causes this does not matter.

Wrong, wrong and wrong again.

1: Boeing worked on the assumption pilots would be able to react within a 3 second window, a feat not even manageable in subsequent simulations where the pilots were fully briefed on what was supposed to happen.
2: The trim wheel on the 737NG and Max is running almost continually, due to STS. Thus a constantly moving wheel would not, even under quiet and normal circumstances, be viewed as anything but normal
3: The crew had numerous audio and tactile warning going off; stick shaker, overspeed, stall - you name it. They were close to the ground and rapidly losing control of the aircraft. Yet, even in that situation you expect them to diagnose a moving trim wheel as anything but ops normal, when said wheel was moving due to a system they either didn't know exist or only had the most rudimentary understanding of (ref. the AD)
4: Even if you run the NNC, by the time you reach item 4 (cut-out switches) you haven't even reached the part about 'anticipate trim conditions'.

If you'd bothered to acquaint yourself with the inner workings of the 737NG and Max, you'd have known about the STS system and how, in that respect, it most certainly matters very much what system causes the trim to move. When you've flown the 737 for a few months, or even years, you won't even notice the trim wheel moving, as it'll quickly become part of the normal going ons. But, sure, with klaxons going off and a yoke dancing around in your hands, sure you'd have diagnosed something with is normally a completely standard part of the picture as a non-normal event.

flyingphil wrote:

Just to add to the fun..

https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2019/0 ... g-is-broke

Will re-visit when the Q1 2020 thread starts

From the link:

So far, FAA has received four calls from Boeing employee whistleblowers. This is what we know about. Those planes did not just fall out of the sky. They crashed because they were designed badly. And if they were designed badly, it looks like it's because execs wanted them to make cash fast, and the cash was badly needed to justify buybacks, a practice that transfers the spoils of production to those who had little or nothing to do with it.

That is what I guess happened - simply management greed.

... if I'm right, the cash for the buybacks in the second half of the decade was mostly borrowed

Hope he or she is wrong.

flyingphil wrote:

Just to add to the fun..

https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2019/0 ... g-is-broke

Will re-visit when the Q1 2020 thread starts

So the Boeing mountains of cash are a mirage according to this article. I will wait to see if the story has any legs.

seahawk wrote:

planecane wrote:

Some of you are truly unbelievable. First, Seahawk I never said anything about crew incompetence. And 748capt I hope your user name isn't your occupation. Neither crew needed to diagnose the problem. They needed to recognize the symptoms and determine what NNC to perform. It doesn't matter to the crew if the runaway is caused by MCAS or a flying unicorn living in the trim motor.

For all the nitpicking about what a "real" runaway stabilizer is vs an MCAS runaway, I am willing to bet money that neither final report contains a conversation amongst the crew where they bring up the possibility of runaway stabilizer but determine that it isn't because of MCAS behavior.

I don't blame the crews, I blame inadequate training on runaway stabilizer. Boeing shares that blame because they introduced a new cause for runaway stabilizer but didn't alert the customer airlines. This disclosure may have led to it being more of a focus in differences training.

Well, it depends on what you expect from a crew. Should they only b able to read a checklist or should they notice problems on their own. In that case we have clear and obvious uncommanded trim inputs and the correct response is to hit the cut out switch. What system causes this does not matter.

This has nothing to do with the ability to read a check list.

Some argued that the time available is too short to pick up a checklist and go through it step by step. Therefore this should be a memory item (drill). Unfortunately, this drill was/is never trained in simulator sessions, and not required by Boeing ion the conversion course to MAX.

With Pilots, Autopilot, STS, MCAS, each having different functionality and authority to send commands to the stabilizer trim motor, it becomes rather hard to quickly recognize and determine what is uncommanded.

When the elevator is reacting to thump switch trim input from PF (Pilot Flying), then that does not seem to reflect traditional Trim Runaway Characteristics.

What you are describing really is that Pilot 1 (PF) and Pilot 2 (PM) are the second and third sensor for a single-sensor system. In any case, FAA has made it very clear that such is unacceptable for flight critical system.

WIederling wrote:

Wouldn't the FAA also claw back some regulatory dominance from Boeing ? Even if it is just for looks?

One issue I see: FAA is tasked with certification/safety _but also_ with furthering the US aerospace industry.
This is a competing set of tasks I'd see as problematic. An arrangement not found elsewhere.

Well they also have NASA but some have roped them in as a Boeing WTO subsidy, so............

As for clawing back for looks, would that be safe if one of those "looks" items becomes critical?
In my opinion, simple thing would be new hires placed at the various OEM's to work with and learn, in a year or two they would be able to "wean" some functions.
They can also hire Boeing staff members only issue there is you get baggage, they either love or hate Boeing.
Outsourcing did not start overnight and it will not be solved overnight, inspection departments need to have technical knowledge and experience so a mix of junior and senior staff.

Only 4 calls from whistle blowers? Seems low

smokeybandit wrote:

Only 4 calls from whistle blowers? Seems low

Its been the same argument for months now ...........

WIederling wrote:

Wouldn't the FAA also claw back some regulatory dominance from Boeing ? Even if it is just for looks?

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethi ... SKCN1UP2BB says:

Since the crashes, federal prosecutors, the Transportation Department’s inspector general, Congress and several blue-ribbon panels have been investigating how the FAA certifies new aircraft and its longstanding practice of delegating certification tasks to airplane manufacturers.

(Acting FAA Administrator) Elwell noted in his letter that on March 5 he created a new Aviation Safety Organization office on delegating authority. That office is in the process of selecting staff and is developing procedures “to conduct this important mission. No substantive changes to the existing (delegation) program have been made as a result of standing up this office.”

Seems the right steps are being taken.

Planetalk wrote:

This is why Boeing has created a massive hole for itself with the 777X, because the regulators will not take its word for granted. Trust is a very very hard thing to get back once you lose it, which applies to the FAA as well, since now foreign regulators are taking a far closer look than they normally would at the process. Previously in recent years the FAA and EASA generally accepted each others work. Not now it seems.

You might want to visit our 777x production thread and notice that a nicely painted 777x is sitting on the ramp and others are following. BoeingGuy and others have told us that the certification basis for 777x was agreed between FAA and Boeing years ago. This resulted in a few changes to regulations to cover things like the folding wingtips. FAA may want to amend some things and do more scrutiny, but the "massive hole" you speak of seems to be nothing but hyperbole. We're not talking about dealing with 60s vintage systems and 70s vintage computers. 777x did a large systems upgrade taking many elements from 787 all being tested against current regs. The situation is quite different than 737.

PW100 wrote:

seahawk wrote:

planecane wrote:

Some of you are truly unbelievable. First, Seahawk I never said anything about crew incompetence. And 748capt I hope your user name isn't your occupation. Neither crew needed to diagnose the problem. They needed to recognize the symptoms and determine what NNC to perform. It doesn't matter to the crew if the runaway is caused by MCAS or a flying unicorn living in the trim motor.

For all the nitpicking about what a "real" runaway stabilizer is vs an MCAS runaway, I am willing to bet money that neither final report contains a conversation amongst the crew where they bring up the possibility of runaway stabilizer but determine that it isn't because of MCAS behavior.

I don't blame the crews, I blame inadequate training on runaway stabilizer. Boeing shares that blame because they introduced a new cause for runaway stabilizer but didn't alert the customer airlines. This disclosure may have led to it being more of a focus in differences training.

Well, it depends on what you expect from a crew. Should they only b able to read a checklist or should they notice problems on their own. In that case we have clear and obvious uncommanded trim inputs and the correct response is to hit the cut out switch. What system causes this does not matter.

This has nothing to do with the ability to read a check list.

Some argued that the time available is too short to pick up a checklist and go through it step by step. Therefore this should be a memory item (drill). Unfortunately, this drill was/is never trained in simulator sessions, and not required by Boeing ion the conversion course to MAX.

With Pilots, Autopilot, STS, MCAS, each having different functionality and authority to send commands to the stabilizer trim motor, it becomes rather hard to quickly recognize and determine what is uncommanded.

When the elevator is reacting to thump switch trim input from PF (Pilot Flying), then that does not seem to reflect traditional Trim Runaway Characteristics.

What you are describing really is that Pilot 1 (PF) and Pilot 2 (PM) are the second and third sensor for a single-sensor system. In any case, FAA has made it very clear that such is unacceptable for flight critical system.

Except if you are in manual flight the only trim input they would have expected would have been from STS. As far as I know, STS doesn't typically move the trim continuously for several seconds. STS also only operates at low speed. Therefore, not knowing about MCAS should have helped the Lion Air crew recognize a runaway stabilizer. As far as they knew, no system operating properly could move the trim like that.

RickNRoll wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

Just to add to the fun..

https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2019/0 ... g-is-broke

Will re-visit when the Q1 2020 thread starts

So the Boeing mountains of cash are a mirage according to this article. I will wait to see if the story has any legs.

You don't have to wait, Boeing reports quarterly. They borrowed 11.7b in the first half to repay debts due, buy own shares and distribute dividends. Currently they are issuing bonds for another 5.5b to finance Embraer JV for 4b, the rest for daily use.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... nt-venture

9w748capt wrote:

planecane wrote:

9w748capt wrote:

Right - because Boeing had been so forthcoming and transparent with max pilots about mcas, which would have helped them diagnose the problem in the first place. What a joke!

I don't blame the crews, I blame inadequate training on runaway stabilizer. Boeing shares that blame because they introduced a new cause for runaway stabilizer but didn't alert the customer airlines. This disclosure may have led to it being more of a focus in differences training.

Just a username, definitely not my occupation.

And your approach is reasonable IMO. What I got tired of was the right wing crowd here immediately blaming the foreign crews, with little regard for any other factors. Given the overall tone on this forum these days, I'm not sure why I was so surprised. It's the new norm.

I remain curious how you know those critical of the pilots actions or in actions are "right wing"? I have heard comments from all over the political spectrum. Plenty of blame to go around on this accident so lets wait for the final official report before we sling any more mud around.

Perhaps in the future, new aircraft certification should be moved from the FAA to a new department at the NTSB. They are far more independent (from Boeing) and into safety than the FAA.

ikolkyo wrote:

traindoc wrote:

Most all of the MAX discussion is about flaws and fixes for the MCAS and flight control systems. But what about the possibility of Boeing having to declare bankruptcy? The 737 is their cash flow cow. But now that has dried up with deliveries on hold. And this could last well into 2020. And how much time, effort and manpower will be required to update all of the undelivered MAX A/C, so they can be delivered? And how much pilot training/ retraining will be needed before they can fly again? How much will the FAA and other regulators fine Boeing? Likely to be in the billions, not millions. Lastly, there is the loss of orders and cancellations which will mean reduced upfront cash payments. So Boeing is in a somewhat precarious position right now, and the effect on its cash flow may be worse than is apparent.

Lol, Boeing is not going to go bankrupt.

Yes whether it be though defense contracts, bail out, or whatever else they may try the government Republican or Democrat would have to ensure Boeing doesn’t go bankrupt otherwise they’d be in trouble... so you’re right

In the old days some would joke that Boeing stock seesawed between $30 and $60. Loyal Seattle-ites would support Boeing when the price went down to 30, home team needed help, but go ahead and sell when it was 60.

and per one inflation calculator:

The dollar experienced an average inflation rate of 4.06% per year during this period, meaning the real value of a dollar decreased. In other words, $60 in 1965 is equivalent in purchasing power to about $457.16 in 2016, a difference of $397.16 over 51 years

BravoOne wrote:

I remain curious how you know those critical of the pilots actions or in actions are "right wing"? I have heard comments from all over the political spectrum. Plenty of blame to go around on this accident so lets wait for the final official report before we sling any more mud around.

Personally, I think the time to be critical about the pilots is definitely over.

Boeing admitted the aircraft they designed and manufactured put too much workload on the pilots.

FAA admitted the aircraft they certified put too much workload on the pilots.

Case closed, no?

MCAS is being addressed with tremendous amounts of scrutiny from FAA, EASA, etc.

The one-in-ten-trillion odds flight computer issue is being addressed with tremendous amounts of scrutiny from FAA, EASA, etc.

Time to move on, no?