Asiaflyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 11:53 am

I am amazed how all of a sudden EASA has become scapegoat by some people here. How can EASA be blamed by doing their job as an authority? As travellers we should be greatful for any authority that keeps the flag high to protect us from what just happened between FAA and Boeing.

It is FAA who has screwed up in big scale by letting them be mislead and manipulated by Boeing. And Boeing screwed up even more by pushing the "Crashliner" through a flawed certification process.

Some month ago it sounded better as Boeing talked about putting safety first but now it all seems like a race to get the 737MAX up in the air a.s.a.p. again.
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RossW
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 12:05 pm

keesje wrote:
Aesma wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
I actually see China and CAAC as the real "king makers" in the room. Their current silence is maybe just the calm before the storm?


China has zero credibility on these matters.


China has not seen a single hull loss since 2012. In a crowded, fast growing market.

https://www.mro-network.com/airlines/ch ... amatically

We should be able to give cridit where credit's due.

Perceptions & reality seem to quickly drift apart these days.


I'm guessing that doesnt include Taiwan
 
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keesje
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 12:28 pm

planecane wrote:
uta999 wrote:
keesje wrote:

China has not seen a single hull loss since 2012. In a crowded, fast growing market.

https://www.mro-network.com/airlines/ch ... amatically

We should be able to give cridit where credit's due.

Perceptions & reality seem to quickly drift apart these days.


Wasn't China one of the first to ground the MAX as well?


Yes. Due to the ongoing trade dispute with the US, we can't be sure it was purely due to safety concerns. If the FAA approves the MAX in October, I'd bet the October trade talks have a lot to do with how quicky China follows.


Nope. Let's no twist an uncomfortable truth.

CAAC asked Boeing for additional info after the Lionair crash but were largely ignored. After the Ethiopian crash, CAAC saw the data, took note of similairities and uncertainties and took the (correct) grounding decision for Chinese passenegers / airspace based on that.

Boeing and the FAA failed to notice, review, conclude and take appropiate actions and are now under investigation.
"Never mistake motion for action." Ernest Hemingway
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 1:28 pm

keesje wrote:
planecane wrote:
uta999 wrote:

Wasn't China one of the first to ground the MAX as well?


Yes. Due to the ongoing trade dispute with the US, we can't be sure it was purely due to safety concerns. If the FAA approves the MAX in October, I'd bet the October trade talks have a lot to do with how quicky China follows.


Nope. Let's no twist an uncomfortable truth.

CAAC asked Boeing for additional info after the Lionair crash but were largely ignored. After the Ethiopian crash, CAAC saw the data, took note of similairities and uncertainties and took the (correct) grounding decision for Chinese passenegers / airspace based on that.

Boeing and the FAA failed to notice, review, conclude and take appropiate actions and are now under investigation.


Let's not be naive. China's speed in acting showed there were other considerations at play. Just because they made the correct decision doesn't mean it wasn't motivated by reasons other than safety.
 
uta999
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 1:48 pm

China's speed in acting on the MAX proved to be the right call. There is no other way to view this. The FAA made the wrong call in so many ways.
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kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 1:50 pm

Asiaflyer wrote:
Some month ago it sounded better as Boeing talked about putting safety first but now it all seems like a race to get the 737MAX up in the air a.s.a.p. again.

if you think about all the costs, another crash is probably a cheaper option compared to continued grounding. Yes, lives are priceless ($5M/person is a typical estimate for engineering purposes), and unlike crash costs which are shared by many parties, grounding bill goes mostly to Boeing. So yes, return to flight at any cost - including a cost of another crash.
 
ikramerica
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 1:56 pm

uta999 wrote:
China's speed in acting on the MAX proved to be the right call. There is no other way to view this. The FAA made the wrong call in so many ways.

Did it? Training could still overcome this issue in the short term, along with more stringent procedures for sensor repairs.
Of all the things to worry about... the Wookie has no pants.
 
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Aesma
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 2:06 pm

oschkosch wrote:
Aesma wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
I actually see China and CAAC as the real "king makers" in the room. Their current silence is maybe just the calm before the storm?


China has zero credibility on these matters.


Remind us all how many orders Chinese airlines / companies hold for the max? More than 25% of max in service were Chinese prior to grounding...

Chinese airlines operated 97 of the 371 737 MAX jets in service before the grounding, the most of any country, according to Flightglobal data.


So since China owns tons of 737Max, their certification competency is credible ?

When did a Chinese made aircraft, supervised by the CAAC, get FAA or EASA certified ?
New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
 
Ertro
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 2:22 pm

Aesma wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
Aesma wrote:
China has zero credibility on these matters.

Remind us all how many orders Chinese airlines / companies hold for the max? More than 25% of max in service were Chinese prior to grounding...
Chinese airlines operated 97 of the 371 737 MAX jets in service before the grounding, the most of any country, according to Flightglobal data.

So since China owns tons of 737Max, their certification competency is credible?When did a Chinese made aircraft, supervised by the CAAC, get FAA or EASA certified ?


You are looking at this a completely wrong way. The point is that in the eyes of Chinese nationality customers, which there are many and for huge number of frames, they think much more highly about CAAC and the decisions of CAAC than you. Your opinion about CAAC competence is completely irrelevant as well as mine is also.

If CAAC grounds the plane nobody is going to come ask your or mine opinion either. The situation just happens to be that huge number of frames are grounded and somebody start treating the information requests coming from CAAC pretty seriously to get the grounding ending sooner rather than later. Belittling or mocking CAAC does not help even at this moment when thinking about possible future.
 
StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 2:29 pm

planecane wrote:
keesje wrote:
planecane wrote:

Yes. Due to the ongoing trade dispute with the US, we can't be sure it was purely due to safety concerns. If the FAA approves the MAX in October, I'd bet the October trade talks have a lot to do with how quicky China follows.


Nope. Let's no twist an uncomfortable truth.

CAAC asked Boeing for additional info after the Lionair crash but were largely ignored. After the Ethiopian crash, CAAC saw the data, took note of similairities and uncertainties and took the (correct) grounding decision for Chinese passenegers / airspace based on that.

Boeing and the FAA failed to notice, review, conclude and take appropiate actions and are now under investigation.


Let's not be naive. China's speed in acting showed there were other considerations at play. Just because they made the correct decision doesn't mean it wasn't motivated by reasons other than safety.


I think to throw mud that it was a political grounding is incredibly short sighted.
 
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JetBuddy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 3:08 pm

I don't know if this has been posted before, but here's the link to the publically available PDF document (it's been made public on the European Parliament web pages on September 3rd 2019) from EASA that requires the following on page 16:

Next major milestones:

- Safety assessment of the new design changes proposed by Boeing, including
operational procedures

- Human factor evaluation and functional tests of the new software

- Flight tests on a modified B737 max [one full week - at Boeing Flight Test Center]

- MCAS operations (nominal behavior)

- Flight without MCAS (including high speed turns and stall)

- Scenario of stabiliser runaway (uncommanded MCAS activation, manual trim wheel forces)

- Approach to stall with autopilot engaged

- Crew Training requirements, in particular using Computer Based Training or Simulator

- Coordination with EASA Member States on Return to Service actions

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/1 ... iginal.pdf

I know it's not new information, but I think people would like to read the PDF for themselves. Pages 14 and 15 are also very interesting.
 
gregpodpl
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 3:21 pm

kalvado wrote:
Asiaflyer wrote:
Some month ago it sounded better as Boeing talked about putting safety first but now it all seems like a race to get the 737MAX up in the air a.s.a.p. again.

if you think about all the costs, another crash is probably a cheaper option compared to continued grounding. Yes, lives are priceless ($5M/person is a typical estimate for engineering purposes), and unlike crash costs which are shared by many parties, grounding bill goes mostly to Boeing. So yes, return to flight at any cost - including a cost of another crash.

I don't agree. Another MAX crash with fatalities, within a year or so of ungrounding, where even 1% of blame is on the plane, could kill MAX permanently. And that would really hurt Boeing.
 
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AirlineCritic
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 3:40 pm

A bit of tribe thinking in this thread. And painting things and actions in unnecessarily bad light. When in reality things are probably moving along over the course of a normal process. I don't mean to say that the aircraft will be released tomorrow, but I'm 100% certain it will at some point, perhaps later this year, perhaps next year. But in the end it will be good, and the issues have been addressed.

It is usually good advice to avoid believing in conspiracies and malice. I believe also so in this case. Building commercial aircraft at volume and to the spec of the incredible level of safety that we've reached in aviation is ... hard. Unfortunately, at times there may be accidents (of design or otherwise). Even more unfortunately, some people may lose their lives due to these accidents.

I don't see any evidence of intentional bad design by Boeing. Too optimistic, design errors? Sure. And I don't see a glaring malpractice by pilots either. Finding the right action few hundred feet above ground when the cockpit warning lights turn into a Christmas tree is ... also hard. But by the same token, I really don't see a big issue in any of the regulator sides either. Should FAA initially have paid more attention? Of course. I think they are trying to make up for it. Or EASA, why are people raising an issue against them? They are doing exactly what a regulator should be doing. Perform a safety analysis to protect the citizens of their region. From what I can see, they've asked very reasonable questions, Boeing works with them, and again, eventually the problem will be solved.

By the way, I don't see any reason for this king maker discussion either. In general, any safety-controlled or regulated product in this world gets to be processed and approved -- somehow -- by one or several regulators for different countries. Typically several, for most products. Do the regulators always get it right? For sure not. But _someone_ has to take on the task and do a reasonable analysis, then call it approved when it satisfies the requirements.
 
airnorth
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 4:02 pm

AirlineCritic wrote:
A bit of tribe thinking in this thread. And painting things and actions in unnecessarily bad light. When in reality things are probably moving along over the course of a normal process. I don't mean to say that the aircraft will be released tomorrow, but I'm 100% certain it will at some point, perhaps later this year, perhaps next year. But in the end it will be good, and the issues have been addressed.

It is usually good advice to avoid believing in conspiracies and malice. I believe also so in this case. Building commercial aircraft at volume and to the spec of the incredible level of safety that we've reached in aviation is ... hard. Unfortunately, at times there may be accidents (of design or otherwise). Even more unfortunately, some people may lose their lives due to these accidents.

I don't see any evidence of intentional bad design by Boeing. Too optimistic, design errors? Sure. And I don't see a glaring malpractice by pilots either. Finding the right action few hundred feet above ground when the cockpit warning lights turn into a Christmas tree is ... also hard. But by the same token, I really don't see a big issue in any of the regulator sides either. Should FAA initially have paid more attention? Of course. I think they are trying to make up for it. Or EASA, why are people raising an issue against them? They are doing exactly what a regulator should be doing. Perform a safety analysis to protect the citizens of their region. From what I can see, they've asked very reasonable questions, Boeing works with them, and again, eventually the problem will be solved.

By the way, I don't see any reason for this king maker discussion either. In general, any safety-controlled or regulated product in this world gets to be processed and approved -- somehow -- by one or several regulators for different countries. Typically several, for most products. Do the regulators always get it right? For sure not. But _someone_ has to take on the task and do a reasonable analysis, then call it approved when it satisfies the requirements.


I'm not sure there is room in this thread for an objective point of view.
Just kidding, thanks for the even keeled post!
 
Virtual737
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 4:10 pm

JetBuddy wrote:
I don't know if this has been posted before, but here's the link to the publically available PDF document (it's been made public on the European Parliament web pages on September 3rd 2019) from EASA that requires the following on page 16:

Next major milestones:

- Safety assessment of the new design changes proposed by Boeing, including
operational procedures

- Human factor evaluation and functional tests of the new software

- Flight tests on a modified B737 max [one full week - at Boeing Flight Test Center]

- MCAS operations (nominal behavior)

- Flight without MCAS (including high speed turns and stall)

- Scenario of stabiliser runaway (uncommanded MCAS activation, manual trim wheel forces)

- Approach to stall with autopilot engaged

- Crew Training requirements, in particular using Computer Based Training or Simulator

- Coordination with EASA Member States on Return to Service actions

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/1 ... iginal.pdf

I know it's not new information, but I think people would like to read the PDF for themselves. Pages 14 and 15 are also very interesting.


Thanks for the info. Is any of this unreasonable and/or have Boeing or the FAA deemed any of it so?
 
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Aesma
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 4:22 pm

Ertro wrote:
Aesma wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
Remind us all how many orders Chinese airlines / companies hold for the max? More than 25% of max in service were Chinese prior to grounding...

So since China owns tons of 737Max, their certification competency is credible?When did a Chinese made aircraft, supervised by the CAAC, get FAA or EASA certified ?


You are looking at this a completely wrong way. The point is that in the eyes of Chinese nationality customers, which there are many and for huge number of frames, they think much more highly about CAAC and the decisions of CAAC than you. Your opinion about CAAC competence is completely irrelevant as well as mine is also.

If CAAC grounds the plane nobody is going to come ask your or mine opinion either. The situation just happens to be that huge number of frames are grounded and somebody start treating the information requests coming from CAAC pretty seriously to get the grounding ending sooner rather than later. Belittling or mocking CAAC does not help even at this moment when thinking about possible future.


Maybe I misunderstood what you meant. Of course Chinese airlines will do what the CAAC says. And Boeing should be licking the CAAC's butt.

However, the FAA and EASA won't probably be listening too much to what the CAAC has to say to take their decision.
New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 5:43 pm

Aesma wrote:
Ertro wrote:
Aesma wrote:
So since China owns tons of 737Max, their certification competency is credible?When did a Chinese made aircraft, supervised by the CAAC, get FAA or EASA certified ?


You are looking at this a completely wrong way. The point is that in the eyes of Chinese nationality customers, which there are many and for huge number of frames, they think much more highly about CAAC and the decisions of CAAC than you. Your opinion about CAAC competence is completely irrelevant as well as mine is also.

If CAAC grounds the plane nobody is going to come ask your or mine opinion either. The situation just happens to be that huge number of frames are grounded and somebody start treating the information requests coming from CAAC pretty seriously to get the grounding ending sooner rather than later. Belittling or mocking CAAC does not help even at this moment when thinking about possible future.


Maybe I misunderstood what you meant. Of course Chinese airlines will do what the CAAC says. And Boeing should be licking the CAAC's butt.

However, the FAA and EASA won't probably be listening too much to what the CAAC has to say to take their decision.

Which is very sad. Because if CAAC discovers a problem other guys overlooked, they better be heard.
Actually, this is exactly what happened with MAX by now: EASA and Brazilian regulator were unhappy with approach FAA took with respect to MCAS.... And look where it brought FAA, MAX and Boeing.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 6:10 pm

Virtual737 wrote:
JetBuddy wrote:
I don't know if this has been posted before, but here's the link to the publically available PDF document (it's been made public on the European Parliament web pages on September 3rd 2019) from EASA that requires the following on page 16:

Next major milestones:

- Safety assessment of the new design changes proposed by Boeing, including
operational procedures

- Human factor evaluation and functional tests of the new software

- Flight tests on a modified B737 max [one full week - at Boeing Flight Test Center]

- MCAS operations (nominal behavior)

- Flight without MCAS (including high speed turns and stall)




- Scenario of stabiliser runaway (uncommanded MCAS activation, manual trim wheel forces)

- Approach to stall with autopilot engaged

- Crew Training requirements, in particular using Computer Based Training or Simulator

- Coordination with EASA Member States on Return to Service actions

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/1 ... iginal.pdf

I know it's not new information, but I think people would like to read the PDF for themselves. Pages 14 and 15 are also very interesting.


Thanks for the info. Is any of this unreasonable and/or have Boeing or the FAA deemed any of it so?


I don't think anybody has deemed it unreasonable. I would question if, under an MCAS 2.0 runaway scenario, the manual trim wheel forces matter. If MCAS 2.0 fails as designed, the worst case movement of the stabilizer will still allow control via the elevator. I guess the biggest concern I would have is the case where MCAS fails at low speed but the pilots cut off electric trim before getting back in trim. Then, if they go to a higher speed, they could end up in a situation where they no longer have authority with the elevator.

To be completely honest (and this is based upon my background as an electrical engineer with a focus on failure analysis and redesign), Boeing should have redesigned the cutout switch circuit to allow the manual electric trim to stay powered while cutting off automatic electric trim. It's not like they are short on time given how long the grounding has lasted. Then, the NNC could allow re-enabling of the manual electric trim for use as long as the runaway doesn't continue.
 
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Erebus
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 6:14 pm

kalvado wrote:
Which is very sad. Because if CAAC discovers a problem other guys overlooked, they better be heard.


If they do find an issue overlooked by the others, it would most definitely be welcome.

But I do wonder if CAAC can really be as stringent in applying safety standards as the other authorities. What will become of China's own manufacturer? Case in point, the ARJ21 is approved to fly within China, but has not been able to secure approval from the FAA or EASA.
 
Virtual737
Posts: 608
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 6:16 pm

planecane wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
JetBuddy wrote:
I don't know if this has been posted before, but here's the link to the publically available PDF document (it's been made public on the European Parliament web pages on September 3rd 2019) from EASA that requires the following on page 16:

Next major milestones:

- Safety assessment of the new design changes proposed by Boeing, including
operational procedures

- Human factor evaluation and functional tests of the new software

- Flight tests on a modified B737 max [one full week - at Boeing Flight Test Center]

- MCAS operations (nominal behavior)

- Flight without MCAS (including high speed turns and stall)




- Scenario of stabiliser runaway (uncommanded MCAS activation, manual trim wheel forces)

- Approach to stall with autopilot engaged

- Crew Training requirements, in particular using Computer Based Training or Simulator

- Coordination with EASA Member States on Return to Service actions

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/1 ... iginal.pdf

I know it's not new information, but I think people would like to read the PDF for themselves. Pages 14 and 15 are also very interesting.


Thanks for the info. Is any of this unreasonable and/or have Boeing or the FAA deemed any of it so?


I don't think anybody has deemed it unreasonable. I would question if, under an MCAS 2.0 runaway scenario, the manual trim wheel forces matter. If MCAS 2.0 fails as designed, the worst case movement of the stabilizer will still allow control via the elevator. I guess the biggest concern I would have is the case where MCAS fails at low speed but the pilots cut off electric trim before getting back in trim. Then, if they go to a higher speed, they could end up in a situation where they no longer have authority with the elevator.

To be completely honest (and this is based upon my background as an electrical engineer with a focus on failure analysis and redesign), Boeing should have redesigned the cutout switch circuit to allow the manual electric trim to stay powered while cutting off automatic electric trim. It's not like they are short on time given how long the grounding has lasted. Then, the NNC could allow re-enabling of the manual electric trim for use as long as the runaway doesn't continue.


Thank you. Actually I've wondered for a long time why that wasn't the design in the first place (manual electric trim can still work). The electric trim requires 2 switches to close the circuit anyway which eliminates the risk of a single switch failing closed to operate the trim uncommanded.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1893
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 6:33 pm

Erebus wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Which is very sad. Because if CAAC discovers a problem other guys overlooked, they better be heard.


If they do find an issue overlooked by the others, it would most definitely be welcome.

But I do wonder if CAAC can really be as stringent in applying safety standards as the other authorities. What will become of China's own manufacturer? Case in point, the ARJ21 is approved to fly within China, but has not been able to secure approval from the FAA or EASA.

Well, one may ask - how much politics is behind ARJ situation?
And FAA clearly demonstrated that they cannot really be as stringent in applying safety standards as the other authorities. Which is the root cause of this 100 page thread.
 
2175301
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 7:21 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
2175301 wrote:
4.1.2: At the request of either Authority, the Authority for the SoD will assist in determining what action is considered necessary for the continued operational safety of the product or article. The Authority for the SoR retains sole authority for decisions on final actions to be taken for products or articles under their jurisdiction. The FAA and EASA will strive to resolve differences.

On April 1 EASA then sends a letter to the FAA stating:

4 conditions:
1.Design changes proposed by Boeing are EASA approved (no delegation to FAA)
2.Additional and broader independent design review has been satisfactorily completed by EASA
3.Accidents of JT610 and ET302 are deemed sufficiently understood
4.B737 MAX flight crews have been adequately trained

I see no real evidence that the various procedures defined within for issues within the Technical Implementation Procedures for issues other than the other nations identified in Section 1.9.4 are involved.

By my reading and understanding Conditions 1 and 2 appear to clearly violate of the Technical Implementation Procedures and is way beyond Section 1.13.70 verification procedures (does anyone not think that the FAA is going to be triple cautious on ensuring that things are done right - and EASA (Brazil and Canada have the same rights) have the right to be in direct involvement in the verification process. The FAA represents the SoD, and is granted sole authority to decide the final actions taken.

Condition 3 seems to be ambiguous on if its adequately covered by the Technical Implementation Procedures, and Item 4 is clearly within the purview of EASA for operations by EASA operators.

Now reports early on in the process (months ago) indicated that the FAA was including input on process improvements for the review of the Boeing corrections to the MCAS issue; which is what the Technical Implementation Procedures set up to happen.

So, yes; it appears to me that EASA seems to be at least publicly setting themselves up as saying they don't trust the FAA and will no longer consider their certifications as actually valid; a violation of Section 1.3.1, which is the purpose of the Bilateral; is not going to honor Section IV in regards to continued airworthiness (the direct grounding issue) for the clearly stated responsibilities and rights of the FAA; and setting themselves up as Kingmaker - my rules, not the Bilateral rules for continued airworthiness and verification rights for a case like this.

If they actually act that way and implement their actions and approvals that way; then I think the Bilateral with the EU may die. Certainly, the EU cannot complain if the FAA then insist on things not in it for any further reviews of modifications or new aircraft from EU countries; or even suspending all approvals for EU aircraft without full US licensing review. I wonder what Brazil and Canada are thinking about how valid their bilateral actually is with the EU.

Can you show me any sections where the EASA has the right to alter the terms of the Technical Implementation Process on their own? They may of course withdraw with a 60 day notice.

Have a great day,


1) The FAA failed on the 737-8/9 MAX, certainly breaking the spirit of the agreement, if not some of the Technical Implementation Procedures items.
2) EASA did communicate to not have enough information about JT610 and ET302, possibly because of a breaking of the "continuous communication and mutual confidence" (1.3.1).
3) My understanding of 4.1.2 SoR is that EASA have the right to issue the 4 conditions that there require for the aircraft operating in EU.



I was to busy to respond to this yesterday:

Wording and Intent matter... and the issue is much larger than just the FAA EASA Bilateral as I suspect anyone who negotiates and implements international and agreements with the EU is watching this.

First: Can you tell me exactly how the FAA broke the spirit of the Bilateral Agreement, and cite the Technical Implementation Procedure items they have violated; which could not be fixed by the normal resolution process defined in the Technical Implementation Procedure:

I'll concede up front that Boeing mis-designed the MCAS. A key part of that error was an inadequate FMEA analysis and document. The FMEA document is one of the key documents that FAA reviews that says something is safe per the regulation standards of safety.

The FAA did not catch the error in the FMEA Document.

That is functionally what happened here. Everything else functionally flows from that (no need to train for a minor "augmentation" system only rarely expected to ever activate with no significant failure modes or consequences).

I am unsure if EASA would have caught it either having been personally involved in at least several FMEA reviews; which are not an easy task and require a lot of very specific knowledge about a system and failure modes (an awful lot of events have occurred over the decades by previously unknown failure modes or sequences - and the FMEA forms keep getting longer as those kinds of failure modes are added to them).

It is the magnitude of the resulting error made in the MCAS FMEA that is significant; but, I cannot believe anyone intentionally made that error or that the reviewers intentionally did not think through what they knew about the system and how it could fail, its seriousness, and the probability. But, make the error they did (and I am sure some of them were literally sick to their stomach when they realized how bad they goofed - I know I have been so on far less serious errors I have made in my life).

Somewhat recently, after Lion Air 610 and ET 302 Airbus and the EASA announced that a review of one of their Aircraft flight envelope performance found a problem with how the aircraft would respond in a corner of the flight envelope normally never entered (but possible to enter); and that an appropriate software update was being developed. Fortunately, this had not actually caused any major flight problems or a crash. I personally suspect that Airbus went looking for this kind of issue as a result of the Boeing mistakes on the 737max MCAS (one of the ways that significant events improve the industry); and posted that thought in the thread about this finding at that time (I don't have time to dig up the reference to that thread or the industry announcement- but anyone who has been following this forum for months will know of the tread and issue).

So this kind of error is not unique to Boeing or the FAA. The significance of the error appears at this stage (without the crash reports being issued) to be likely larger than any similar error in the last several decades. But, the type of error is not.

So why does making this error - in and of itself - imply a loss of confidence? The FAA held off grounding until they had evidence that the 2nd crash had at least the appearance of a similar issue between the crashes (the position of the jackscrew). I think that is reasonable. If the ET 302 crash was for other unrelated issues... grounding would likely have not been appropriate.

The FAA is legally bound by other international treaties and conventions not to share any knowledge they have of the Lion Air 610 and ET 302 crash. EASA cannot use that lack of sharing as a reason. EASA can approach the investigation boards directly for access if they have a legitimate reason. However, my personally having lead root cause investigations within the USA was that other plants had to show me that they really needed the information "now" for their safety - and we provided relevant information directly to the other affected plants as soon as we knew something that affected current operating safety (we didn't sit on critical information). I could easily see the Lion Air or ET Investigating board chairperson asking the EASA why they needed the information at this time; and after seeing the Bilateral concluding that only the FAA needed the information as they were the relevant party with the authority to make the decision on what fixes needed to be done.

The Technical Implementation Procedures have within them a defined process for either party to identify to the other party apparent shortcomings in their processes, and a way to resolve those shortcomings.

Key is the concept of auditing, advising, providing suggestions, etc; and not stating independent requirements that subvert the obligations and rights granted in the Bilateral.

As an example: My view is that Section 4.1.2 is that EASA has the right to suggest those 4 conditions to the SoD (The FAA); but not the right to independently demand condition 1 or 2 in addition to the FAA approval as part of their acceptance for Return To Service.

I also do not see how EASA can claim other rights in this Bilateral for these requirements. EASA is allowed to add independent requirements for areas that the USA Laws and FAA regulations do not appropriately cover to EU standards (vice-versa). However, given that the flight computer and MCAS was not independently reviewed with independent conditions on inital certification. It appears that the USA Laws and FAA regulations in this area are considered equivalent, and per the Bilateral the FAA's certification (and rectification) is to be honored.

EASA (Brazil and Canada) have the right to be directly involved and witnesses in the FAA directed Testing and other Verification of the fixes under 1.13.70.

Key point the languge matters:

EASA could say something to the effect we have suggested to the FAA testing for X,Y,Z which they have agreed to (and I have not heard the FAA refusing any reasonable actions in this case - in fact inviting and adopting suggestions); and we will be directly witnessing such testing to verify its adequacy. We, along with Brazil and Canada are reviewing the FAA approval process and making suggestions, etc. We will independently review and decide on training requirements for the EU airlines (which is a right they have).

That would say: We are working within the agreement to resolve this issue and ensure the aircraft is safe

Saying that we will require independent testing and set our own standards is not in compliance with the agreement - and I foresee will be very costly long term to EASA and the EU across many fronts.

I can assure you; that anyone who negotiates and implements international agreements have downloaded and read the Bilaterial - and is watching what is being said and done.

"So this is what the EU does if there is a problem... not follow and support the agreement; I guess we better ensure our next agreement has.... (and it will be more costly to the EU)."

As much as many of you may agree with what the EASA is doing. The way they are doing it - appears to not in compliance with the Bilateral - and those appearances count in far more places than the USA.

Have a great day,
 
MartijnNL
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 7:56 pm

bob75013 wrote:
Boeing owes you nothing. Boeing owes a-net nothing. Boeing is (probably) talking with great detail with regulators and airlines - probably accompanied by NDAs.

Boeing owes the flying public, the media and the world credible information. The company screwed up big time with the Max. They could better start building the 797 and forget about the Max. I will stay away from the type when it goes back into service.

What are NDA’s?
 
cledaybuck
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 8:05 pm

uta999 wrote:
China's speed in acting on the MAX proved to be the right call. There is no other way to view this. The FAA made the wrong call in so many ways.

So did EASA make the wrong call by not grounding the plane until 2 days after China did?
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bob75013
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 8:21 pm

MartijnNL wrote:
bob75013 wrote:
Boeing owes you nothing. Boeing owes a-net nothing. Boeing is (probably) talking with great detail with regulators and airlines - probably accompanied by NDAs.

Boeing owes the flying public, the media and the world credible information. The company screwed up big time with the Max. They could better start building the 797 and forget about the Max. I will stay away from the type when it goes back into service.

What are NDA’s?



NDA=non disclosure agreement.

Boeing will, I'm sure, provide all the credible information that the world would want -- after the grounding is lifted.

Until then it's providing credible information to the governmental agencies and airlines that need it - and using NDAs to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of incomplete iinformation before it is ready to be released to the public.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 9:04 pm

According to Flight Global:

The EASA executive director spoke to the European Transport and Tourism Committee. Patrick Key confirmed that EASA would make its own judgement on whether the Max is ready to fly again, and that it is still awaiting satisfactory answers about safety-critical parts not limited to the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS).

further:

Although progress has been made since EASA raised those concerns with Boeing and the FAA in July, "there are aspects on which we're happy with the solutions which are proposed by Boeing, others on which we need to discuss more, and others on which there is still a lot of work that needs to be performed", Ky explains in Brussels.

and

EASA's review extends far beyond MCAS, also touching on concerns related to pilot procedures, crew workload, display and alerting systems, and the ability of pilots to use manual aircraft trim during extreme manoeuvres.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 9:09 pm

cledaybuck wrote:
uta999 wrote:
China's speed in acting on the MAX proved to be the right call. There is no other way to view this. The FAA made the wrong call in so many ways.

So did EASA make the wrong call by not grounding the plane until 2 days after China did?


Still waiting politely for the FAA to "see the light"
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 9:44 pm

planecane wrote:
keesje wrote:
planecane wrote:
Yes. Due to the ongoing trade dispute with the US, we can't be sure it was purely due to safety concerns. If the FAA approves the MAX in October, I'd bet the October trade talks have a lot to do with how quicky China follows.
Nope. Let's no twist an uncomfortable truth.
CAAC asked Boeing for additional info after the Lionair crash but were largely ignored. After the Ethiopian crash, CAAC saw the data, took note of similairities and uncertainties and took the (correct) grounding decision for Chinese passenegers / airspace based on that.
Boeing and the FAA failed to notice, review, conclude and take appropiate actions and are now under investigation.

Let's not be naive. China's speed in acting showed there were other considerations at play. Just because they made the correct decision doesn't mean it wasn't motivated by reasons other than safety.


They could have grounded right after the Lion AIr crash. Why would they wait for another crash if their grounding was mainly politically motivated?
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 9:47 pm

ikramerica wrote:
uta999 wrote:
China's speed in acting on the MAX proved to be the right call. There is no other way to view this. The FAA made the wrong call in so many ways.

Did it? Training could still overcome this issue in the short term, along with more stringent procedures for sensor repairs.

Boeing and FAA did not consider extra training required, even after the first accident; just a simple re-hash of existing procedures which did not quite cover it.

More stringent procedures for sensor repairs would have done diddly squat to the ET accident.
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sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 9:50 pm

AirlineCritic wrote:
A bit of tribe thinking in this thread. And painting things and actions in unnecessarily bad light. When in reality things are probably moving along over the course of a normal process. I don't mean to say that the aircraft will be released tomorrow, but I'm 100% certain it will at some point, perhaps later this year, perhaps next year. But in the end it will be good, and the issues have been addressed.

It is usually good advice to avoid believing in conspiracies and malice. I believe also so in this case. Building commercial aircraft at volume and to the spec of the incredible level of safety that we've reached in aviation is ... hard. Unfortunately, at times there may be accidents (of design or otherwise). Even more unfortunately, some people may lose their lives due to these accidents.

I don't see any evidence of intentional bad design by Boeing. Too optimistic, design errors? Sure. And I don't see a glaring malpractice by pilots either. Finding the right action few hundred feet above ground when the cockpit warning lights turn into a Christmas tree is ... also hard. But by the same token, I really don't see a big issue in any of the regulator sides either. Should FAA initially have paid more attention? Of course. I think they are trying to make up for it. Or EASA, why are people raising an issue against them? They are doing exactly what a regulator should be doing. Perform a safety analysis to protect the citizens of their region. From what I can see, they've asked very reasonable questions, Boeing works with them, and again, eventually the problem will be solved.

By the way, I don't see any reason for this king maker discussion either. In general, any safety-controlled or regulated product in this world gets to be processed and approved -- somehow -- by one or several regulators for different countries. Typically several, for most products. Do the regulators always get it right? For sure not. But _someone_ has to take on the task and do a reasonable analysis, then call it approved when it satisfies the requirements.

Probably not going as normal as we would like:

Airlines say lack of trust by EASA of FAA ( deservedly or not deservedly) is going to cause issues

https://finance.yahoo.com/amphtml/news/ ... 27746.html

This is the first signs of how the EASA is being pressured by the Airlines to just go along.
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Just one sensor,
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Oo-oo-ooh.
 
MBSDALHOU
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 9:57 pm

JetBuddy wrote:
I don't know if this has been posted before, but here's the link to the publically available PDF document (it's been made public on the European Parliament web pages on September 3rd 2019) from EASA that requires the following on page 16:

Next major milestones:

- Safety assessment of the new design changes proposed by Boeing, including
operational procedures

- Human factor evaluation and functional tests of the new software

- Flight tests on a modified B737 max [one full week - at Boeing Flight Test Center]

- MCAS operations (nominal behavior)

- Flight without MCAS (including high speed turns and stall)

- Scenario of stabiliser runaway (uncommanded MCAS activation, manual trim wheel forces)

- Approach to stall with autopilot engaged

- Crew Training requirements, in particular using Computer Based Training or Simulator

- Coordination with EASA Member States on Return to Service actions

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/1 ... iginal.pdf

I know it's not new information, but I think people would like to read the PDF for themselves. Pages 14 and 15 are also very interesting.


Thank you for this!! I was trying to search for it but I didn’t get very far.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 10:00 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Probably not going as normal as we would like:

Airlines say lack of trust by EASA of FAA ( deservedly or not deservedly) is going to cause issues

https://finance.yahoo.com/amphtml/news/ ... 27746.html

This is the first signs of how the EASA is being pressured by the Airlines to just go along.

Linked article says:

An FAA spokesperson said it welcomes scrutiny from safety experts and looks forward to the findings. But for its part, FAA officials have pointed out in the past that EASA delegates to a greater degree than the U.S. does.

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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 10:20 pm

2175301 wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
2175301 wrote:
4.1.2: At the request of either Authority, the Authority for the SoD will assist in determining what action is considered necessary for the continued operational safety of the product or article. The Authority for the SoR retains sole authority for decisions on final actions to be taken for products or articles under their jurisdiction. The FAA and EASA will strive to resolve differences.

On April 1 EASA then sends a letter to the FAA stating:

4 conditions:
1.Design changes proposed by Boeing are EASA approved (no delegation to FAA)
2.Additional and broader independent design review has been satisfactorily completed by EASA
3.Accidents of JT610 and ET302 are deemed sufficiently understood
4.B737 MAX flight crews have been adequately trained

I see no real evidence that the various procedures defined within for issues within the Technical Implementation Procedures for issues other than the other nations identified in Section 1.9.4 are involved.

By my reading and understanding Conditions 1 and 2 appear to clearly violate of the Technical Implementation Procedures and is way beyond Section 1.13.70 verification procedures (does anyone not think that the FAA is going to be triple cautious on ensuring that things are done right - and EASA (Brazil and Canada have the same rights) have the right to be in direct involvement in the verification process. The FAA represents the SoD, and is granted sole authority to decide the final actions taken.

Condition 3 seems to be ambiguous on if its adequately covered by the Technical Implementation Procedures, and Item 4 is clearly within the purview of EASA for operations by EASA operators.

Now reports early on in the process (months ago) indicated that the FAA was including input on process improvements for the review of the Boeing corrections to the MCAS issue; which is what the Technical Implementation Procedures set up to happen.

So, yes; it appears to me that EASA seems to be at least publicly setting themselves up as saying they don't trust the FAA and will no longer consider their certifications as actually valid; a violation of Section 1.3.1, which is the purpose of the Bilateral; is not going to honor Section IV in regards to continued airworthiness (the direct grounding issue) for the clearly stated responsibilities and rights of the FAA; and setting themselves up as Kingmaker - my rules, not the Bilateral rules for continued airworthiness and verification rights for a case like this.

If they actually act that way and implement their actions and approvals that way; then I think the Bilateral with the EU may die. Certainly, the EU cannot complain if the FAA then insist on things not in it for any further reviews of modifications or new aircraft from EU countries; or even suspending all approvals for EU aircraft without full US licensing review. I wonder what Brazil and Canada are thinking about how valid their bilateral actually is with the EU.

Can you show me any sections where the EASA has the right to alter the terms of the Technical Implementation Process on their own? They may of course withdraw with a 60 day notice.

Have a great day,


1) The FAA failed on the 737-8/9 MAX, certainly breaking the spirit of the agreement, if not some of the Technical Implementation Procedures items.
2) EASA did communicate to not have enough information about JT610 and ET302, possibly because of a breaking of the "continuous communication and mutual confidence" (1.3.1).
3) My understanding of 4.1.2 SoR is that EASA have the right to issue the 4 conditions that there require for the aircraft operating in EU.



I was to busy to respond to this yesterday:

Wording and Intent matter... and the issue is much larger than just the FAA EASA Bilateral as I suspect anyone who negotiates and implements international and agreements with the EU is watching this.

First: Can you tell me exactly how the FAA broke the spirit of the Bilateral Agreement, and cite the Technical Implementation Procedure items they have violated; which could not be fixed by the normal resolution process defined in the Technical Implementation Procedure:

I'll concede up front that Boeing mis-designed the MCAS. A key part of that error was an inadequate FMEA analysis and document. The FMEA document is one of the key documents that FAA reviews that says something is safe per the regulation standards of safety.

The FAA did not catch the error in the FMEA Document.

That is functionally what happened here. Everything else functionally flows from that (no need to train for a minor "augmentation" system only rarely expected to ever activate with no significant failure modes or consequences).

I am unsure if EASA would have caught it either having been personally involved in at least several FMEA reviews; which are not an easy task and require a lot of very specific knowledge about a system and failure modes (an awful lot of events have occurred over the decades by previously unknown failure modes or sequences - and the FMEA forms keep getting longer as those kinds of failure modes are added to them).

It is the magnitude of the resulting error made in the MCAS FMEA that is significant; but, I cannot believe anyone intentionally made that error or that the reviewers intentionally did not think through what they knew about the system and how it could fail, its seriousness, and the probability. But, make the error they did (and I am sure some of them were literally sick to their stomach when they realized how bad they goofed - I know I have been so on far less serious errors I have made in my life).

Somewhat recently, after Lion Air 610 and ET 302 Airbus and the EASA announced that a review of one of their Aircraft flight envelope performance found a problem with how the aircraft would respond in a corner of the flight envelope normally never entered (but possible to enter); and that an appropriate software update was being developed. Fortunately, this had not actually caused any major flight problems or a crash. I personally suspect that Airbus went looking for this kind of issue as a result of the Boeing mistakes on the 737max MCAS (one of the ways that significant events improve the industry); and posted that thought in the thread about this finding at that time (I don't have time to dig up the reference to that thread or the industry announcement- but anyone who has been following this forum for months will know of the tread and issue).

So this kind of error is not unique to Boeing or the FAA. The significance of the error appears at this stage (without the crash reports being issued) to be likely larger than any similar error in the last several decades. But, the type of error is not.

So why does making this error - in and of itself - imply a loss of confidence? The FAA held off grounding until they had evidence that the 2nd crash had at least the appearance of a similar issue between the crashes (the position of the jackscrew). I think that is reasonable. If the ET 302 crash was for other unrelated issues... grounding would likely have not been appropriate.

The FAA is legally bound by other international treaties and conventions not to share any knowledge they have of the Lion Air 610 and ET 302 crash. EASA cannot use that lack of sharing as a reason. EASA can approach the investigation boards directly for access if they have a legitimate reason. However, my personally having lead root cause investigations within the USA was that other plants had to show me that they really needed the information "now" for their safety - and we provided relevant information directly to the other affected plants as soon as we knew something that affected current operating safety (we didn't sit on critical information). I could easily see the Lion Air or ET Investigating board chairperson asking the EASA why they needed the information at this time; and after seeing the Bilateral concluding that only the FAA needed the information as they were the relevant party with the authority to make the decision on what fixes needed to be done.

The Technical Implementation Procedures have within them a defined process for either party to identify to the other party apparent shortcomings in their processes, and a way to resolve those shortcomings.

Key is the concept of auditing, advising, providing suggestions, etc; and not stating independent requirements that subvert the obligations and rights granted in the Bilateral.

As an example: My view is that Section 4.1.2 is that EASA has the right to suggest those 4 conditions to the SoD (The FAA); but not the right to independently demand condition 1 or 2 in addition to the FAA approval as part of their acceptance for Return To Service.

I also do not see how EASA can claim other rights in this Bilateral for these requirements. EASA is allowed to add independent requirements for areas that the USA Laws and FAA regulations do not appropriately cover to EU standards (vice-versa). However, given that the flight computer and MCAS was not independently reviewed with independent conditions on inital certification. It appears that the USA Laws and FAA regulations in this area are considered equivalent, and per the Bilateral the FAA's certification (and rectification) is to be honored.

EASA (Brazil and Canada) have the right to be directly involved and witnesses in the FAA directed Testing and other Verification of the fixes under 1.13.70.

Key point the languge matters:

EASA could say something to the effect we have suggested to the FAA testing for X,Y,Z which they have agreed to (and I have not heard the FAA refusing any reasonable actions in this case - in fact inviting and adopting suggestions); and we will be directly witnessing such testing to verify its adequacy. We, along with Brazil and Canada are reviewing the FAA approval process and making suggestions, etc. We will independently review and decide on training requirements for the EU airlines (which is a right they have).

That would say: We are working within the agreement to resolve this issue and ensure the aircraft is safe

Saying that we will require independent testing and set our own standards is not in compliance with the agreement - and I foresee will be very costly long term to EASA and the EU across many fronts.

I can assure you; that anyone who negotiates and implements international agreements have downloaded and read the Bilaterial - and is watching what is being said and done.

"So this is what the EU does if there is a problem... not follow and support the agreement; I guess we better ensure our next agreement has.... (and it will be more costly to the EU)."

As much as many of you may agree with what the EASA is doing. The way they are doing it - appears to not in compliance with the Bilateral - and those appearances count in far more places than the USA.

Have a great day,

Many thanks for your long explanation of your perception of the situation. I don't think that my own perception of the situation will change.

In my own perception the notion of error is not so important and I don't think that the analysis of the FAA failure end only at a missing FMEA. If it was so simple, the FAA would have not so much trouble fixing it, and the EASA would not have to do as much work as there are doing now. Something more fishy has happened to explain the unusual current situation. I find rational that the work the EASA is currently doing is the work that the FAA was unable to present, for whatever reasons. The worst speculation idea is that something inside the FAA prevented them to present the safety work. The mutual agreement is clearly based on the principle of "continuous communication", if it was the case, the FAA would have been in the position to present the work that that the EASA is looking for.

Similarly, if the EASA is not satisfied about the communication of safety subjects related to the JT620 and ET302, there is certainly because of a good reason. I suspect that the sections 4.1.2, 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 play a key role here. There are clearly aware of the bilateral agreement since there explicitly wrote that there actions are in compliance with the agreement. There probably double checked that with competent peoples in that matter. Again the question for me is more why the FAA was unable to provides the responses to the EASA, that debating the EASA reaction to the FAA failure. Even the FAA did not even complain about the EASA action to date.

We certainly didn't agree on the section 4.1.2 interpretation. The agreement is relatively strict about the certification subject, but I found it far more permissive about the airworthiness. Note also the whole chapter 8.1 "Technical Assistance Between Authorities" that seem the describes exactly what the EASE is actually providing to the FAA. Finally this agreement is modified almost every last years, this is only possible if the FAA and the EASA work closely together.

My conclusion is still that the situation look actually more like the EASA is helping the FAA. From the reported meeting incident there both walked out of the room, together. I can speculate that the FAA need both to go out of an unsafe relation with Boeing and to share the big task of reviewing the 737-8/9 MAX design. We can't exclude that Boeing is playing some pressure on the FAA to not reopen everything. In that case the EASA conditions is a comfortable and radical way to stop Boeing game.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 10:36 pm

Revelation wrote:
Linked article says:

An FAA spokesperson said it welcomes scrutiny from safety experts and looks forward to the findings. But for its part, FAA officials have pointed out in the past that EASA delegates to a greater degree than the U.S. does.

Incoming volley received, returned in kind?


It also says...

Recently, sharp rhetoric from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) suggests the relationship between it and the FAA has frayed


While the title of the article covertly implies the 737 Max recert review:

Airlines worry FAA trust issues will further delay the new Boeing 777X
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
kevin5345179
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 11:28 pm

asdf wrote:
no idea what they could have found now


maybe "only" a IF-THEN situation?

IF you dont provide us the MCAS-free test flight to check for the flight behavior of the MAX without augmentation systems
THEN we need to believe that there is a serious problem with the airflow and we need to calculate that whole MAX aerodynamics by our technical teams and make wind tunnel test with patterns and all that stuff

or

IF you dont provide us a chart of the manual rotational force needed to trim that wheel on all situations (speed, AoA, turns, acend/decent) inside and 10% outside of the flight envelope
THEN we need to believe that there is a serious problem with the trim-wheel force and we need to calculate that whole trim wheel forces by our technical teams and make wind tunnel test with patterns and all that stuff

and this need months

but even that is pretty far-fetched, isnt it ...


according to earlier report from WSJ, even FAA found new software issue

“In recent weeks, Boeing and the FAA identified another potential flight-control computer risk requiring additional software changes and testing, according to two of the government and pilot officials.”

https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-delays ... k2IUVo9leV
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 09, 2019 11:32 pm

If Airbus or any other manufacturer was looked at this intently, I'd bet they'd find similar quirks
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 12:11 am

smokeybandit wrote:
If Airbus or any other manufacturer was looked at this intently, I'd bet they'd find similar quirks

If you can only bet, this prove to be without any rational argument. Technically it's entirely possible that the actual scale of the problem is limited to the 737-8/9 MAX only. His unusually old architecture could be a god explanation why.
 
sphealey
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 12:31 am

PixelFlight wrote:
smokeybandit wrote:
If Airbus or any other manufacturer was looked at this intently, I'd bet they'd find similar quirks

If you can only bet, this prove to be without any rational argument. Technically it's entirely possible that the actual scale of the problem is limited to the 737-8/9 MAX only. His unusually old architecture could be a god explanation why.
While in no way suggesting this should be a "but he does it too" response, Airbus is currently working on two problems with the 320neo: (1) strength of pitch response to throttle (2) inability to use full center-of-gravity range in certain configurations. The first of those was reported publicly if quietly about 3 months after the details of the similar MAX issues started leaking out; the second just popped up in Aviation Leak last week; it had apparently been a concern for over a year. Presumably neither is considered serious enough to warrant immediate action, but then again the pitot heat problem wasn't considered that serious either. If any modern complex system, no matter how carefully designed and tested, is subject to long deep scrutiny after the fact by parties with investigative if not hostile intent problems with the design, some serious, will be found - that's a fact of nature.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 12:45 am

sphealey wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
smokeybandit wrote:
If Airbus or any other manufacturer was looked at this intently, I'd bet they'd find similar quirks

If you can only bet, this prove to be without any rational argument. Technically it's entirely possible that the actual scale of the problem is limited to the 737-8/9 MAX only. His unusually old architecture could be a god explanation why.
While in no way suggesting this should be a "but he does it too" response, Airbus is currently working on two problems with the 320neo: (1) strength of pitch response to throttle (2) inability to use full center-of-gravity range in certain configurations. The first of those was reported publicly if quietly about 3 months after the details of the similar MAX issues started leaking out; the second just popped up in Aviation Leak last week; it had apparently been a concern for over a year. Presumably neither is considered serious enough to warrant immediate action, but then again the pitot heat problem wasn't considered that serious either. If any modern complex system, no matter how carefully designed and tested, is subject to long deep scrutiny after the fact by parties with investigative if not hostile intent problems with the design, some serious, will be found - that's a fact of nature.


That's interesting. I'm thankful we have good oversight authorities like EASA looking at these issues. I think the grandfathering rules have been stretched too far.

Too much regulation stifles innovation. But just the right amount can incentivize innovation also. And we do need more innovation and modern solutions in aviation - instead of rehashing the same designs over and over.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 1:25 am

sphealey wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
smokeybandit wrote:
If Airbus or any other manufacturer was looked at this intently, I'd bet they'd find similar quirks

If you can only bet, this prove to be without any rational argument. Technically it's entirely possible that the actual scale of the problem is limited to the 737-8/9 MAX only. His unusually old architecture could be a god explanation why.
While in no way suggesting this should be a "but he does it too" response, Airbus is currently working on two problems with the 320neo: (1) strength of pitch response to throttle (2) inability to use full center-of-gravity range in certain configurations. The first of those was reported publicly if quietly about 3 months after the details of the similar MAX issues started leaking out; the second just popped up in Aviation Leak last week; it had apparently been a concern for over a year. Presumably neither is considered serious enough to warrant immediate action, but then again the pitot heat problem wasn't considered that serious either. If any modern complex system, no matter how carefully designed and tested, is subject to long deep scrutiny after the fact by parties with investigative if not hostile intent problems with the design, some serious, will be found - that's a fact of nature.

My understanding of "flight-control computer risk" is that the computer itself can fail in a way to expose too high risk. Not certain that the A320neo issue fit in that category, look more as high level algorithm to be improved.

Issues are not created by the discovery of others issues. In one design there is a limited amount of issues. The fact that we initially not know the amount of issue didn't increase the amount of issues. Fact of nature ...
 
2175301
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 4:49 am

JetBuddy wrote:
sphealey wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
If you can only bet, this prove to be without any rational argument. Technically it's entirely possible that the actual scale of the problem is limited to the 737-8/9 MAX only. His unusually old architecture could be a god explanation why.
While in no way suggesting this should be a "but he does it too" response, Airbus is currently working on two problems with the 320neo: (1) strength of pitch response to throttle (2) inability to use full center-of-gravity range in certain configurations. The first of those was reported publicly if quietly about 3 months after the details of the similar MAX issues started leaking out; the second just popped up in Aviation Leak last week; it had apparently been a concern for over a year. Presumably neither is considered serious enough to warrant immediate action, but then again the pitot heat problem wasn't considered that serious either. If any modern complex system, no matter how carefully designed and tested, is subject to long deep scrutiny after the fact by parties with investigative if not hostile intent problems with the design, some serious, will be found - that's a fact of nature.


That's interesting. I'm thankful we have good oversight authorities like EASA looking at these issues. I think the grandfathering rules have been stretched too far.

Too much regulation stifles innovation. But just the right amount can incentivize innovation also. And we do need more innovation and modern solutions in aviation - instead of rehashing the same designs over and over.


It's an interesting delemna. Grandfathering has clear advantages too. Well historically proven systems and structures are used again... even if they would not qualify under the newer processes.

A key question is what makes something actually work reliably and work long term. How do you define all the characteristics. The old definitions and expectations are different than the new ones - and they do not overlap in characteristics. The result is that you tend to find certain kinds of issues with older grandfathered systems and structures; and a completely different type of issues with the newer systems and structures under the newer rules. Not necessarily a reduction in the numbers of issues (once you eliminated the most frequent failures from the older systems - often done decades ago).

In some cases the newer systems are clearly superior because they actually eliminated a common failure mode of the older systems. In other cases the jury is still out on that (modern digital computer circuits to replace a older analog circuits have not by themselves proven to be more reliable or problem free - even if you actually get the modern digital device to actually adequately mimic the older analog device - which has proven to be a major headache most of the times; and functionally impossible at times). Also, there are always flaws if you look close enough. How significant are those flaws?... that's hard to say.

In other cases the newer generation doesn't know of what used to be commonly known on how to solve certain problems. They reinvent from scratch - which is full of lots of error potential.

A more significant problem that I have personally seen several times is that a person trained to the modern systems and standards mentally freezes when faced with an older and grandfathered design and certification standards. They often initially can't even comprehend how it is possibly allowed to operate, much less adjust their thinking to how it was designed to be able to start asking rational questions that might identify real problems with the design.

This may actually be part of the reason behind the FMEA review errors of the original MCAS system. It might also be part of the reason that the EASA is so worried about the 737 now... they may no longer have enough people who understand the concepts that went into designing the old systems to be able to see what's OK and what might have an issue (I admit this is speculation on my part).

I'm not sure that we have pushed grandfathering too far especially when using something that has worked so well for so long. But, we may need to train a certain segment of engineers in older technology so that they understand it. It's costly to design from clean sheet - and you then have a whole new set of issues that will crop up. Old tech works very well for some things (I'll admit to perhaps being a bit biased on that... I'm totally astonished at how often I'm expected to now replace appliances and devices).

Have a great day,
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:45 am

2175301 wrote:
The FAA did not catch the error in the FMEA Document.


A Seattle Times story cited a Boeing engineer who stated that the FAA did not require the details of the FMEA, only the summary results.

"You turn in your answer," he said. "You don't have to document all your work."


https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-ne ... afeguards/
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
B777LRF
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 8:12 am

More on the EASA reservations

From Flight Global: https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ge-460726/

Fair use excerpt:

CRITICAL SYSTEMS

Regarding the second condition – EASA's "own, independent review" into the 737 Max – "what we were saying was, okay, in the 737 Max there were obviously some things which were not working on safety-critical systems".

Ky states that its decision to investigate systems beyond the MCAS was prompted by the question: "What proves to us that there are not other areas where there would not be disfunctioning [sic] systems as well?"

He explains that the Max systems EASA has focused on comprise "displays, alerting systems, autopilot and air data systems".

EASA decided to recertify those "safety-critical" parts, Ky states.

It therefore communicated "70 test points" on 22 May, covering normal and abnormal operating conditions, and simulator evaluations were completed in June and July.

"On our findings, we found significant technical issues [with the 737 Max]," Ky says. "Basically, we identified critical items that absolutely need to be corrected before the aircraft can be considered for return to service."

The significant technical issues found by EASA included: "A lack of exhaustive monitoring of the system failures, resulting in stabiliser runaway; too high forces needed to move the manual trim wheel in case of a stabiliser runaway; too late disconnection of autopilot near stall speed (in specific conditions); and too high crew workload and risk of crew confusion in some failure cases."

Questions about manual trim have been prominent, with some pilots reporting that manually trimming the Max can be nearly impossible in some high-speed conditions due to excessive force against the horizontal stabiliser.

EASA's findings were communicated to Boeing and the FAA in July. "On this basis, Boeing did some work," Ky explains.

Of the solutions proposed by Boeing, EASA notes good progress on changes to the flight control computer architecture; some progress on the simplification of crew procedures and associated training; and "no appropriate response to angle-of-attack integrity issues".

"There is still a lot of work to be done," Ky asserts.

EASA will "continue to work with Boeing and assess fully what they are proposing", he states. "We will perform flight tests when all of those activities have been successfully finished, and from those flights tests, we will be able to define crew training requirements."

Ky did not give an indication of the likely timescales involved, only reiterating that EASA's four conditions for the Max's return were still to be met.


-----------------------------------------

Forget about Q4 for RTS anywhere else than, maybe, in the continental US. In fact, forget all about RTS anywhere outside the US until such time Boeing has swallowed its pride and starts working in earnest addressing the points raised by EASA. You may bet your last Dollar, no regulator outside the US will accept the Max until such time these issues have been resolved. And since that's where around 90% of their backlog for the model lives, one would suggest that is the only prudent course of action.

------------------------------------------

From the same article, on JATR:

At the same time, several of those agencies are part of the FAA's Joint Authorities Technical Review panel, which is yet publish its recommendations on the Max.

The panel "expects to submit its observations, findings and recommendations in the coming weeks", the FAA said in a statement on 30 August. Its recommendations could affect both the future of how the FAA conducts safety certification and could influence how soon regulators from other nations return the aircraft to service.

The FAA's certification of the Max does not require the panel to first finish its review.

But as Ky states: "It is very likely that international authorities will want a second opinion, or a further opinion [once the FAA clears the Max]. It was not like this a year ago."


-----------------------------------------

This tells us two important things:

1: The FAA are still living in a bubble.
2: The Max will not be certified outside the US until the JATR have submitted their recommendations, making the entire effort of estimating a RTS date futile.
Signature. You just read one.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 561
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 9:22 am

Thanks for the details :-)
B777LRF wrote:
More on the EASA reservations
Ky states that its decision to investigate systems beyond the MCAS was prompted by the question: "What proves to us that there are not other areas where there would not be disfunctioning [sic] systems as well?"

This is yet another indication that the FAA failed to provides the requested documentation to properly respond that that legitimate critical question.

B777LRF wrote:
From the same article, on JATR:
The panel "expects to submit its observations, findings and recommendations in the coming weeks", the FAA said in a statement on 30 August. Its recommendations could affect both the future of how the FAA conducts safety certification and could influence how soon regulators from other nations return the aircraft to service.

This is yet another indication that something is not working properly inside the FAA.

Now I wonder why the FAA have to wait the EASA and JATR moves to start changing internally, as it was reported that the FAA finds itself in a 'very difficult' situation. What forces inside the FAA prevent them to do what the EASA do ?
 
Alfons
Posts: 259
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 9:27 am

PixelFlight wrote:
What forces inside the FAA prevent them to do what the EASA do ?


Boeing.

Sorry for the very short answer, was just thinking loud.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 10:23 am

Don't discount that part of the EASA statements could be posturing. With the exception of MCAS (and the related stick force gradient) and accidentally leaving the AoA disagree alert out, all of the other issues on the MAX also exist on the NG.

It is perfectly fine for the EASA to require tests with MCAS disabled since that is what will happen on an AoA disagree. It is also perfectly fine for them to require demonstration of the MAX being safe upon the worst case MCAS 2.0 runaway, including ability to manually trim in that scenario. However, if they go beyond that, then they will have to justify why they aren't grounding the NG fleet as well for issues that exist on both.

I strongly suspect that the EASA will approve the MAX as long as MCAS 2.0 runaway is recoverable, with MCAS disabled, stick force gradient issues are confined to rarely entered parts of the flight envelope, and stall recovery is not an issue.
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 560
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 11:19 am

planecane wrote:
Don't discount that part of the EASA statements could be posturing. With the exception of MCAS (and the related stick force gradient) and accidentally leaving the AoA disagree alert out, all of the other issues on the MAX also exist on the NG.

It is perfectly fine for the EASA to require tests with MCAS disabled since that is what will happen on an AoA disagree. It is also perfectly fine for them to require demonstration of the MAX being safe upon the worst case MCAS 2.0 runaway, including ability to manually trim in that scenario. However, if they go beyond that, then they will have to justify why they aren't grounding the NG fleet as well for issues that exist on both.

I strongly suspect that the EASA will approve the MAX as long as MCAS 2.0 runaway is recoverable, with MCAS disabled, stick force gradient issues are confined to rarely entered parts of the flight envelope, and stall recovery is not an issue.

EASA have been entire clear, concise and transparent. You might as well have just re-copied the flight test programme, as organised, that you appear to entirely happy with anyway. I agree, that providing the stated items are cleared down then supporting the FAA certification will not be a problem.

However, EASA have completed a review of the flight control systems etc. above and beyond MCAS precisely to assure no other such miss-steps have occurred. Should they identify any issues that are also applicable to NG, then it will be for Boeing (and FAA) to justify no action or an acceptable action to address them. EASA do not need to justify anything.

Ray
 
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ExperimentalFTE
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 11:32 am

Situation between FAA and EASA and OTHER Certification authorities is very complicated now. Undeniable fact is that before both crashes different cert authorities were questioning certification of the MCAS and that even official statements of concern have been issued to FAA.....and were blown away via bilateral agreements channels...

So issue now when it came out public and after two crashes has completely different gravity....

Again general public doesn't have full story on the background of this saga so shooting conclusions from the hip based on what you've read somewhere in the news or on the forum is pointless...

Cheers
 
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lightsaber
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 12:16 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
planecane wrote:
Don't discount that part of the EASA statements could be posturing. With the exception of MCAS (and the related stick force gradient) and accidentally leaving the AoA disagree alert out, all of the other issues on the MAX also exist on the NG.

It is perfectly fine for the EASA to require tests with MCAS disabled since that is what will happen on an AoA disagree. It is also perfectly fine for them to require demonstration of the MAX being safe upon the worst case MCAS 2.0 runaway, including ability to manually trim in that scenario. However, if they go beyond that, then they will have to justify why they aren't grounding the NG fleet as well for issues that exist on both.

I strongly suspect that the EASA will approve the MAX as long as MCAS 2.0 runaway is recoverable, with MCAS disabled, stick force gradient issues are confined to rarely entered parts of the flight envelope, and stall recovery is not an issue.

EASA have been entire clear, concise and transparent. You might as well have just re-copied the flight test programme, as organised, that you appear to entirely happy with anyway. I agree, that providing the stated items are cleared down then supporting the FAA certification will not be a problem.

However, EASA have completed a review of the flight control systems etc. above and beyond MCAS precisely to assure no other such miss-steps have occurred. Should they identify any issues that are also applicable to NG, then it will be for Boeing (and FAA) to justify no action or an acceptable action to address them. EASA do not need to justify anything.

Ray

Regulators need to be careful. The NG has proven safe. If this appears political or economic driven, the FAA/EASA agreement losses force. Yes, I realize this goes both ways. I also realize allowing one slip requires a deep dive. But one way of verifying safety is proving similar to an already flying safe system. The 737NG has certainly proven beyond requirements to be safe.

Pretty soon there will be massive job losses. Every $3 million of lost salaries (after consideration of unemployment insurance) is generally going to result in a death. (E.g., a friend at work was stupid and earned a DUI, automatic grounds for termination at my work. His 20 year younger wife has major health problems, so to keep her with enough funds and a few years of bridge health insurance, he committed suicide last weekend before being officially fired, scheduled for last Monday). So ironically, if the MAX isn't ungrounded fairly, we could see more secondary deaths than we saw in the two crashes. There is a reason governments set the value of a life at a dollar (or Euro value). There are several branches of economics that study this:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_life

As much as we consider ourselves and our loved ones priceless, there must be a balance. For example, coal is horrible environmentally which kills people, but without the electricity from coal more people would die.

For aviation, that is expressed as an overall acceptable risk. EASA may find issues, but if their probability is so low that few, if any, crashes would ever occur, then unenforceable. Last I looked, 1*10^-6 crashes per hour, but ETOPs is operated under stricter rules.

Aviation is already the safest way to travel. If the MAX grounding were lifted unmodified, my greatest risk flying it would still be crossing the street from the LAX parking lot to the terminal. My second greatest risk would be the sum of the car rides to and from the airport. My 3rd greatest risk would be the car emissions at the airport. I believe my 4th risk would likely be the fast food meal I am likely to eat.

As tragic as the accidents are, in the 1980s this would have been noise and unnoticed. I am happy aviation safety has improved enough that the MAX is an issue. I want the system to meet proper redundancy requirements. My employer would never send an aircraft out the door with such a single point failure. Note:. Our aircraft have many well understood single point failures, e. g., single pilot ops, single engine, single landing gear lever, and any one window breaking being a bad day. But never FBW and pitot tubes require 5-way redundancy and FBW computers require two independent systems physically separated until they get to that single generator, but has dual battery backup and a rat.

Lightsaber
IM messages to mods on warnings and bans will be ignored and nasty ones will result in a ban.
 
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ExperimentalFTE
Posts: 40
Joined: Sun Mar 10, 2019 7:59 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 12:36 pm

lightsaber wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
planecane wrote:
Don't discount that part of the EASA statements could be posturing. With the exception of MCAS (and the related stick force gradient) and accidentally leaving the AoA disagree alert out, all of the other issues on the MAX also exist on the NG.

It is perfectly fine for the EASA to require tests with MCAS disabled since that is what will happen on an AoA disagree. It is also perfectly fine for them to require demonstration of the MAX being safe upon the worst case MCAS 2.0 runaway, including ability to manually trim in that scenario. However, if they go beyond that, then they will have to justify why they aren't grounding the NG fleet as well for issues that exist on both.

I strongly suspect that the EASA will approve the MAX as long as MCAS 2.0 runaway is recoverable, with MCAS disabled, stick force gradient issues are confined to rarely entered parts of the flight envelope, and stall recovery is not an issue.

EASA have been entire clear, concise and transparent. You might as well have just re-copied the flight test programme, as organised, that you appear to entirely happy with anyway. I agree, that providing the stated items are cleared down then supporting the FAA certification will not be a problem.

However, EASA have completed a review of the flight control systems etc. above and beyond MCAS precisely to assure no other such miss-steps have occurred. Should they identify any issues that are also applicable to NG, then it will be for Boeing (and FAA) to justify no action or an acceptable action to address them. EASA do not need to justify anything.

Ray

Regulators need to be careful. The NG has proven safe. If this appears political or economic driven, the FAA/EASA agreement losses force. Yes, I realize this goes both ways. I also realize allowing one slip requires a deep dive. But one way of verifying safety is proving similar to an already flying safe system. The 737NG has certainly proven beyond requirements to be safe.

Pretty soon there will be massive job losses. Every $3 million of lost salaries (after consideration of unemployment insurance) is generally going to result in a death. (E.g., a friend at work was stupid and earned a DUI, automatic grounds for termination at my work. His 20 year younger wife has major health problems, so to keep her with enough funds and a few years of bridge health insurance, he committed suicide last weekend before being officially fired, scheduled for last Monday). So ironically, if the MAX isn't ungrounded fairly, we could see more secondary deaths than we saw in the two crashes. There is a reason governments set the value of a life at a dollar (or Euro value). There are several branches of economics that study this:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_life

As much as we consider ourselves and our loved ones priceless, there must be a balance. For example, coal is horrible environmentally which kills people, but without the electricity from coal more people would die.

For aviation, that is expressed as an overall acceptable risk. EASA may find issues, but if their probability is so low that few, if any, crashes would ever occur, then unenforceable. Last I looked, 1*10^-6 crashes per hour, but ETOPs is operated under stricter rules.

Aviation is already the safest way to travel. If the MAX grounding were lifted unmodified, my greatest risk flying it would still be crossing the street from the LAX parking lot to the terminal. My second greatest risk would be the sum of the car rides to and from the airport. My 3rd greatest risk would be the car emissions at the airport. I believe my 4th risk would likely be the fast food meal I am likely to eat.

As tragic as the accidents are, in the 1980s this would have been noise and unnoticed. I am happy aviation safety has improved enough that the MAX is an issue. I want the system to meet proper redundancy requirements. My employer would never send an aircraft out the door with such a single point failure. Note:. Our aircraft have many well understood single point failures, e. g., single pilot ops, single engine, single landing gear lever, and any one window breaking being a bad day. But never FBW and pitot tubes require 5-way redundancy and FBW computers require two independent systems physically separated until they get to that single generator, but has dual battery backup and a rat.

Lightsaber


Hi Saber,

Not really sure where you are going with this.

It is one thing to request based on novel design or engineering solution issue paper from FAA and after analysis obtain relieve from that cert requirements with ELOS (equivalent level of safety),

But it is completely other issue to request that rules dont apply to some product because you are citing track record of previous platform. Lets not confuse those two. This case would ultimately result in unfavorable competition between products as stricter rules apply to some....read performance penalty at the end of the day.....very unfair!

On the other hand if you are advocating that we should lower failure rate probability for flight controls and FBW, I am all up for that panel discussion but lets set a point in time and say from this point all new products can do this...it would be very unfair to do this for a patch and quick fix of platform that takes its certification basis rules back to 1961.....

I"ve seen many ludicrous requests from various OEMs to cert authorities.....one should compile a book....I even saw a response from one OEM to finding from authority where instead addressing finding they badmouthed other OEM and their already certified airplane as official response which is just below shameful for serious engineering....

I totally get your point on value of life, but hardly applicable in aircraft certification...

Cheers

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