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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 12:40 pm

Alfons wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
What forces inside the FAA prevent them to do what the EASA do ?


Boeing.

Sorry for the very short answer, was just thinking loud.

Based on what we know so far, is it reasonable to say that Boeing does not know that the majority of 737-MAX sales are outside of the USA?
 
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fran4065
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 1:33 pm

planecane wrote:
Don't discount that part of the EASA statements could be posturing. With the exception of MCAS (and the related stick force gradient) and accidentally leaving the AoA disagree alert out, all of the other issues on the MAX also exist on the NG.

It is perfectly fine for the EASA to require tests with MCAS disabled since that is what will happen on an AoA disagree. It is also perfectly fine for them to require demonstration of the MAX being safe upon the worst case MCAS 2.0 runaway, including ability to manually trim in that scenario. However, if they go beyond that, then they will have to justify why they aren't grounding the NG fleet as well for issues that exist on both.

I strongly suspect that the EASA will approve the MAX as long as MCAS 2.0 runaway is recoverable, with MCAS disabled, stick force gradient issues are confined to rarely entered parts of the flight envelope, and stall recovery is not an issue.


Let's go back to the beginning: 737 Max has a tendency for this pitch up in take-off phase, mostly because of the lift of the big nacelle of these new big engines positioned in front of the wings.
This tendency to pitch up can too easily cause the 737 Max to stall.
This is structural.
The MCAS must avoid the stall, but even if it is made perfectly reliable, it will never remove structural defects.
The questions to be answered by the FAA, EASA, all regulators ... are:
1) Does the 737MAX meet the flight criteria if the MCAS does not work, either due to AoA failures or because it is switched off? the answer is probably no ... we will see what says the test claimed by EASA.
2) Is the 737MAX able to climb correctly in the event of a critical but probable situation? especially when taking off on airports with an obstacle in the axe of the runway?
without MCAS will stall be evitable? and with MCAS will the aircraft climb enough?
Which regulator, apart from the FAA seems it, will take the risk of a third crash accepting a weakness of this aircraft to satisfy economic or political motivations?
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 1:41 pm

fran4065 wrote:

Let's go back to the beginning: 737 Max has a tendency for this pitch up in take-off phase, mostly because of the lift of the big nacelle of these new big engines positioned in front of the wings.
This tendency to pitch up can too easily cause the 737 Max to stall.
This is structural.

Nope.
1. This is not structural. Aerodynamics, yes. The structural problem means just that- the structure is not handling the load.
2. Takeoff engine lift is not an issue. Engine lift shows up as a problem when flaps are up, and center of lift moves forward compared to takeoff configuration - in fact, MCAS is active only with flaps up...
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 1:46 pm

fran4065 wrote:
planecane wrote:
Don't discount that part of the EASA statements could be posturing. With the exception of MCAS (and the related stick force gradient) and accidentally leaving the AoA disagree alert out, all of the other issues on the MAX also exist on the NG.

It is perfectly fine for the EASA to require tests with MCAS disabled since that is what will happen on an AoA disagree. It is also perfectly fine for them to require demonstration of the MAX being safe upon the worst case MCAS 2.0 runaway, including ability to manually trim in that scenario. However, if they go beyond that, then they will have to justify why they aren't grounding the NG fleet as well for issues that exist on both.

I strongly suspect that the EASA will approve the MAX as long as MCAS 2.0 runaway is recoverable, with MCAS disabled, stick force gradient issues are confined to rarely entered parts of the flight envelope, and stall recovery is not an issue.


Let's go back to the beginning: 737 Max has a tendency for this pitch up in take-off phase, mostly because of the lift of the big nacelle of these new big engines positioned in front of the wings.
This tendency to pitch up can too easily cause the 737 Max to stall.
This is structural.
The MCAS must avoid the stall, but even if it is made perfectly reliable, it will never remove structural defects.
The questions to be answered by the FAA, EASA, all regulators ... are:
1) Does the 737MAX meet the flight criteria if the MCAS does not work, either due to AoA failures or because it is switched off? the answer is probably no ... we will see what says the test claimed by EASA.
2) Is the 737MAX able to climb correctly in the event of a critical but probable situation? especially when taking off on airports with an obstacle in the axe of the runway?
without MCAS will stall be evitable? and with MCAS will the aircraft climb enough?
Which regulator, apart from the FAA seems it, will take the risk of a third crash accepting a weakness of this aircraft to satisfy economic or political motivations?


You are wrong on the 737 has a tendency to pitch up. The controls just get lighter than allowed by regulation - that is a big difference.

As has been discussed many times you would have to almost completely incompetent to stall an MAX with all the warnings that would be going off even without MCAS.
 
wingman
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 2:13 pm

Alfons wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
What forces inside the FAA prevent them to do what the EASA do ?


Boeing.

Sorry for the very short answer, was just thinking loud.


I agree. And somewhat magically, EASA have agreed with Airbus that 100% of all deaths on Airbus aircraft are the result of incompetent pilots. I think once EASA has forced this necessary cultural change on the FAA, it would be wise for the FAA to reopen Airbus cases like AF337 and tear that cockpit apart to see how it is that every single accident and every single death on Airbus aircraft is due to monumentally stupid pilots with the skill levels of three year olds. Is it really just them, could it be the training requirements approved by EASA (impossible!), could it be something in the Airbus design philosophy that turns pilots into so much Jell-O when their passengers need them most? Ky says he's going to look at every single system on the MAX before letting that plane return to service because of 300 deaths. The next time that happens on an Airbus we'll all breathe a sigh of relief that agencies like the FAA and CAAC don't simply rubber stamp another foregone conclusion that another cockpit vegetable drove another obviously perfect machine into the water. All of these agencies need to take EASA's lead and do the right thing from now on.
 
jollo
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 2:14 pm

planecane wrote:
To be completely honest (and this is based upon my background as an electrical engineer with a focus on failure analysis and redesign), Boeing should have redesigned the cutout switch circuit to allow the manual electric trim to stay powered while cutting off automatic electric trim. It's not like they are short on time given how long the grounding has lasted. Then, the NNC could allow re-enabling of the manual electric trim for use as long as the runaway doesn't continue.


Virtual737 wrote:
Actually I've wondered for a long time why that wasn't the design in the first place (manual electric trim can still work). The electric trim requires 2 switches to close the circuit anyway which eliminates the risk of a single switch failing closed to operate the trim uncommanded.


IMO this point is quite relevant because Boeing could just have left the original NG's stab trim cutout switches design unmodified to achieve this result (i.e. allow pilots to cut off FCC trim commands while retaining manual electric trim control).

A recap on this issue for clarification:

NG has two distinct STAB TRIM CUT OUT switches: one, labelled AUTO PILOT, allows pilots to cut out FCC inputs (including A/P and STS) while still retaining manual control over the electric stab trim, while the other, labelled MAIN ELECT, completely cuts off the stab trim actuator and therefore also disables the manual electric trim switch commands. No SOP ever calls to operate the cutout switches separately (the “Runaway Stabilizer” NNC is the only one involving cutout switches, and only instructs pilots to set both switches at once to CUT OUT), but the possibility to operate manual electric trim without interference from the FCC is there.

MAX still has two STAB TRIM CUT OUT switches, but their function was modified so that both switches disable the actuator; therefore setting either switch to CUT OUT disables both FCC and manual trim switch commands, leaving only the manual trim wheel for horizontal stab control. Furthermore, certification documentation submitted to FAA only describes a labeling change of the switches to PRI and B/U (conceivably meant as “PRImary” and “Back/Up”); the (in)famous iPad 1-hour training also only mentions the change as relabeling; the FCOM doesn’t mention the change at all ( the “Runaway Stabilizer” NNC still directs pilots to move both switches together).

Now my question, which I have already asked a couple of thousand posts ago (sorry for beating a dead horse, but no answer was ever proposed) is: why did Boeing feel the need to change the design of the stab trim cutout switches (and then downplayed it as a mere "relabeling"), when, arguably, it would have been easier and better to leave NG's design unchanged, both to aid "grandfathering" and to give pilots more control (supposedly Boeing's distinctive design philosophy)?
Last edited by jollo on Tue Sep 10, 2019 2:19 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 2:25 pm

B777LRF wrote:
Forget about Q4 for RTS anywhere else than, maybe, in the continental US. In fact, forget all about RTS anywhere outside the US until such time Boeing has swallowed its pride and starts working in earnest addressing the points raised by EASA.

I think the requirement is to pass the regulator's reviews and tests, not to swallow pride.

Your own report says these issues were raised in June and some points have been at least partially addressed, so the work has begun in earnest.

B777LRF wrote:
You may bet your last Dollar, no regulator outside the US will accept the Max until such time these issues have been resolved. And since that's where around 90% of their backlog for the model lives, one would suggest that is the only prudent course of action.

Like it or not, FAA is the lead agency for airplanes manufactured in the US.

Boeing will work to get FAA's approval first and foremost.

B777LRF wrote:
This tells us two important things:

1: The FAA are still living in a bubble.
2: The Max will not be certified outside the US until the JATR have submitted their recommendations, making the entire effort of estimating a RTS date futile.

A US-first RTS has a lot of value for US operators and Boeing.

I think it's pretty obvious that we are heading for a US-first RTS.

FAA has already said JATR is independent of ungrounding.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 2:38 pm

"What proves to us that there are not other areas where there would not be disfunctioning [sic] systems as well


I don't know how that reads in whatever language it was written, but this English sentence clearly asks for a negative to be proved. I think that probability but not proof is what should have been said.

from rational wiki
The argument from ignorance (or argumentum ad ignorantiam and negative proof) is a logical fallacy that claims the truth of a premise is based on the fact that it has not (yet) been proven false, or that a premise is false because it has not (yet) been proven true. This is often phrased as "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence".

If the only evidence for something's existence is a lack of evidence for it not existing, then the default position is one of mild skepticism and not credulity. This type of negative proof is common in proofs of God's existence or in pseudosciences where it is used as an attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the skeptic rather than the proponent of the idea. The burden of proof is on the individual proposing existence, not the one questioning existence.
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jollo
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 2:42 pm

wingman wrote:
Alfons wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
What forces inside the FAA prevent them to do what the EASA do ?


Boeing.

Sorry for the very short answer, was just thinking loud.


I agree. And somewhat magically, EASA have agreed with Airbus that 100% of all deaths on Airbus aircraft are the result of incompetent pilots. I think once EASA has forced this necessary cultural change on the FAA, it would be wise for the FAA to reopen Airbus cases like AF337 and tear that cockpit apart to see how it is that every single accident and every single death on Airbus aircraft is due to monumentally stupid pilots with the skill levels of three year olds. Is it really just them, could it be the training requirements approved by EASA (impossible!), could it be something in the Airbus design philosophy that turns pilots into so much Jell-O when their passengers need them most? Ky says he's going to look at every single system on the MAX before letting that plane return to service because of 300 deaths. The next time that happens on an Airbus we'll all breathe a sigh of relief that agencies like the FAA and CAAC don't simply rubber stamp another foregone conclusion that another cockpit vegetable drove another obviously perfect machine into the water. All of these agencies need to take EASA's lead and do the right thing from now on.


I get the sarcasm, but in all fairness I think the role of aircraft design as a contributing factor to AF447 cannot even remotely be compared to the MAX predicament.

Let's not forget that MCAS 1.0 is (or was) an automation system with unlimited authority, vulnerable to single sensor failure, with no input sanitation and no way for human operators to disable it: pushing a design like that into production is nothing less than criminal negligence in my book (as an automation professional), even if it wasn't meant to be installed in a flying machine.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 3:03 pm

jollo wrote:
wingman wrote:
Alfons wrote:

Boeing.

Sorry for the very short answer, was just thinking loud.


I agree. And somewhat magically, EASA have agreed with Airbus that 100% of all deaths on Airbus aircraft are the result of incompetent pilots. I think once EASA has forced this necessary cultural change on the FAA, it would be wise for the FAA to reopen Airbus cases like AF337 and tear that cockpit apart to see how it is that every single accident and every single death on Airbus aircraft is due to monumentally stupid pilots with the skill levels of three year olds. Is it really just them, could it be the training requirements approved by EASA (impossible!), could it be something in the Airbus design philosophy that turns pilots into so much Jell-O when their passengers need them most? Ky says he's going to look at every single system on the MAX before letting that plane return to service because of 300 deaths. The next time that happens on an Airbus we'll all breathe a sigh of relief that agencies like the FAA and CAAC don't simply rubber stamp another foregone conclusion that another cockpit vegetable drove another obviously perfect machine into the water. All of these agencies need to take EASA's lead and do the right thing from now on.


I get the sarcasm, but in all fairness I think the role of aircraft design as a contributing factor to AF447 cannot even remotely be compared to the MAX predicament.

Let's not forget that MCAS 1.0 is (or was) an automation system with unlimited authority, vulnerable to single sensor failure, with no input sanitation and no way for human operators to disable it: pushing a design like that into production is nothing less than criminal negligence in my book (as an automation professional), even if it wasn't meant to be installed in a flying machine.


It was easy to disable MCAS 1.0 - just hit the trim cut-off switches or drop to the flaps to the first notch.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 3:12 pm

morrisond wrote:
jollo wrote:
wingman wrote:

I agree. And somewhat magically, EASA have agreed with Airbus that 100% of all deaths on Airbus aircraft are the result of incompetent pilots. I think once EASA has forced this necessary cultural change on the FAA, it would be wise for the FAA to reopen Airbus cases like AF337 and tear that cockpit apart to see how it is that every single accident and every single death on Airbus aircraft is due to monumentally stupid pilots with the skill levels of three year olds. Is it really just them, could it be the training requirements approved by EASA (impossible!), could it be something in the Airbus design philosophy that turns pilots into so much Jell-O when their passengers need them most? Ky says he's going to look at every single system on the MAX before letting that plane return to service because of 300 deaths. The next time that happens on an Airbus we'll all breathe a sigh of relief that agencies like the FAA and CAAC don't simply rubber stamp another foregone conclusion that another cockpit vegetable drove another obviously perfect machine into the water. All of these agencies need to take EASA's lead and do the right thing from now on.


I get the sarcasm, but in all fairness I think the role of aircraft design as a contributing factor to AF447 cannot even remotely be compared to the MAX predicament.

Let's not forget that MCAS 1.0 is (or was) an automation system with unlimited authority, vulnerable to single sensor failure, with no input sanitation and no way for human operators to disable it: pushing a design like that into production is nothing less than criminal negligence in my book (as an automation professional), even if it wasn't meant to be installed in a flying machine.


It was easy to disable MCAS 1.0 - just hit the trim cut-off switches or drop to the flaps to the first notch.

Some people think that the guillotine is the ultimate headache medication.
 
jollo
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 3:39 pm

morrisond wrote:
jollo wrote:
wingman wrote:

I agree. And somewhat magically, EASA have agreed with Airbus that 100% of all deaths on Airbus aircraft are the result of incompetent pilots. I think once EASA has forced this necessary cultural change on the FAA, it would be wise for the FAA to reopen Airbus cases like AF337 and tear that cockpit apart to see how it is that every single accident and every single death on Airbus aircraft is due to monumentally stupid pilots with the skill levels of three year olds. Is it really just them, could it be the training requirements approved by EASA (impossible!), could it be something in the Airbus design philosophy that turns pilots into so much Jell-O when their passengers need them most? Ky says he's going to look at every single system on the MAX before letting that plane return to service because of 300 deaths. The next time that happens on an Airbus we'll all breathe a sigh of relief that agencies like the FAA and CAAC don't simply rubber stamp another foregone conclusion that another cockpit vegetable drove another obviously perfect machine into the water. All of these agencies need to take EASA's lead and do the right thing from now on.


I get the sarcasm, but in all fairness I think the role of aircraft design as a contributing factor to AF447 cannot even remotely be compared to the MAX predicament.

Let's not forget that MCAS 1.0 is (or was) an automation system with unlimited authority, vulnerable to single sensor failure, with no input sanitation and no way for human operators to disable it: pushing a design like that into production is nothing less than criminal negligence in my book (as an automation professional), even if it wasn't meant to be installed in a flying machine.


It was easy to disable MCAS 1.0 - just hit the trim cut-off switches or drop to the flaps to the first notch.


Both your statements are incorrect:
  • STAB TRIM CUT OUT switches disable the actuator (the stab trim motor), not the controller - pilots also loose manual electric trim
  • FLAPS UP is a condition in MCAS 1.0 control logic: dropping flaps does not disable the controller

Furthermore, workarounds do not justify in any way allowing a criminally negligent design in public service.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 3:47 pm

jollo wrote:
morrisond wrote:
jollo wrote:

I get the sarcasm, but in all fairness I think the role of aircraft design as a contributing factor to AF447 cannot even remotely be compared to the MAX predicament.

Let's not forget that MCAS 1.0 is (or was) an automation system with unlimited authority, vulnerable to single sensor failure, with no input sanitation and no way for human operators to disable it: pushing a design like that into production is nothing less than criminal negligence in my book (as an automation professional), even if it wasn't meant to be installed in a flying machine.


It was easy to disable MCAS 1.0 - just hit the trim cut-off switches or drop to the flaps to the first notch.


Both your statements are incorrect:
  • STAB TRIM CUT OUT switches disable the actuator (the stab trim motor), not the controller - pilots also loose manual electric trim
  • FLAPS UP is a condition in MCAS 1.0 control logic: dropping flaps does not disable the controller

Furthermore, workarounds do not justify in any way allowing a criminally negligent design in public service.


But will MCAS continue to act if the Stab Trim Cut out switches are used?

Dropping flaps will cause MCAS to stop affecting the plane as well - we you see it on the traces of both ET and Lionair when they are used ( Stab Trim Cut -off switches) as the pitch does not change.

Therefore you are incorrect - there were two easy ways to turn off the effects of MCAS. Who cares if the controller is sending signals that the plane is not using to effect the flight path?

I think you would be surprised how many workarounds exist on all Commercial aircraft built by all makers.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 3:49 pm

morrisond wrote:
It was easy to disable MCAS 1.0 - just hit the trim cut-off switches or drop to the flaps to the first notch.


just WOW

after thousands of thousands of postings in this thread there is really one user left who has not understand how to counteract MCAS ...

the ET crew did exactly that
and they crashed
because no more electric trim
and no way to rotate that manual trim wheel
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 3:58 pm

asdf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
It was easy to disable MCAS 1.0 - just hit the trim cut-off switches or drop to the flaps to the first notch.


just WOW

after thousands of thousands of postings in this thread there is really one user left who has not understand how to counteract MCAS ...

the ET crew did exactly that
and they crashed
because no more electric trim
and no way to rotate that manual trim wheel


No need to rehash the whole sequence again but you are ignoring the other actions the ET failed to do which would have made the Manual Trim usable (mainly pulling the thrust back from TOGA) by getting under Vmo.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 4:03 pm

morrisond wrote:
The previous poster just posted that you couldn't disable MCAS - he was wrong - yes you can. Actions could have been taken that would have saved the plane(s).

However it would have helped that there was more training on those actions - especially on Lionair.

Disabling a system by disabling a significant portion of control functionality is... Well, guillotine for headache.
There is a control problem, and in most cases, you want to preserve as much functionality as possible by disabling as few things as needed to achieve the goal.
This is why saying "MCAS cannot be disabled" is perfectly correct - it can be disabled only as part of a much bigger chunk of systems, including STS and electric trim via thumbswitch, hence limiting controllability. Which pretty much cost lives to ET302.
Coming back, shutting off actuator for MCAS disabling is the same as removing head for headache - slightly more drastic, but not by that much.
 
B777LRF
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 4:17 pm

Revelation wrote:

I think the requirement is to pass the regulator's reviews and tests, not to swallow pride.

Your own report says these issues were raised in June and some points have been at least partially addressed, so the work has begun in earnest.


Yes, and the report also says one of those 4 major points was not well received by the US contingent, and that EASA is still waiting on work to be done on that. Which, in other words, means that the FAA/Boeing has stuck their noses at one of EASA's requirements, which does point towards needing to take a humble pill and get on with it. If you read the entire article, it's quite clear EASA are not getting the level of cooperation from the FAA that they need in order to re-certify the aircraft, the reason seemingly being the usual level of arrogance we associate the FAA with.

Revelation wrote:
Like it or not, FAA is the lead agency for airplanes manufactured in the US.

Boeing will work to get FAA's approval first and foremost.


And they will do so at their own peril, jeopardising 90% of their backlog to save the 10%. And I'm absolutely fine with the FAA being the lead agency, in fact I couldn't care less. What I do care about is safety, and if the FAA is not willing to subject Boeing to the requirements which will satisfy that, then their lead will bring bring them absolutely no further than the US market. At which point the 737 program is dead.

Revelation wrote:
I think it's pretty obvious that we are heading for a US-first RTS.

FAA has already said JATR is independent of ungrounding.


I think you're right, but I also think you are underestimating how far it might take between FAA and RoW RTS or, indeed, the potential (however remote) risk that RoW will nix the aircraft entirely, should Boeing adopt a position of 'the FAA are happy with it, so should you be, and we're not going to make any further changes'.

As for what the FAA said about the JATR, all of the above applies: They live in a bubble and whether they like or not, the findings of the JATR panel will have an impact on 737 Max RTS.

It would be a brave CEO indeed who, upon receiving notice the FAA has cleared the aircraft but the rest of the world are baulking, said 'sod 'em, let's fly!'. It would be an even braver public who'd climb aboard such an aircraft, having had their social media and news spilling over with those very facts.
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MSPNWA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 4:34 pm

asdf wrote:
just WOW

after thousands of thousands of postings in this thread there is really one user left who has not understand how to counteract MCAS ...

the ET crew did exactly that
and they crashed
because no more electric trim
and no way to rotate that manual trim wheel


Yeah wow, here we go again. We should not need to go over this again, but untruths need to be corrected. We do not know if the ET crew properly used the trim wheels, and the available evidence strongly points to the negative. We also know other mistakes were made that could have made it difficult to move the wheels.

Stating MCAS cannot be disabled is simply wrong, and it needed to be corrected.


B777LRF wrote:
Yes, and the report also says one of those 4 major points was not well received by the US contingent, and that EASA is still waiting on work to be done on that. Which, in other words, means that the FAA/Boeing has stuck their noses at one of EASA's requirements, which does point towards needing to take a humble pill and get on with it. If you read the entire article, it's quite clear EASA are not getting the level of cooperation from the FAA that they need in order to re-certify the aircraft, the reason seemingly being the usual level of arrogance we associate the FAA with.

One can switch the words "FAA" and "EASA" and potentially be just as right.

An opinion that creates a saint out of one party and a villain out of another without congruent reasons for those feelings isn't a sound one.
 
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keesje
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 4:41 pm

Revelation wrote:
Like it or not, FAA is the lead agency for airplanes manufactured in the US.

Boeing will work to get FAA's approval first and foremost.
..
A US-first RTS has a lot of value for US operators and Boeing.

I think it's pretty obvious that we are heading for a US-first RTS.

FAA has already said JATR is independent of ungrounding.


Yes that is very well possible.FAA and Boeing approve the MAX for RTS while results of the various investigations on Boeing, the FAA come in.

CAA, CAAC, EASA proceed their own 737MAX certification process. Meanwhile Southwest, American and United will hire communication experts to confuse and convince passengers and insurance companies.

Sounds good, What could possibly happen?

EASA communicates it's own detailed, independent results & Reuters picks it up in seconds. An instant credibility melt-down and accompaning stock value implosion, likely government intervention.. Maybe think twice..
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jollo
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:07 pm

morrisond wrote:
Yes - it was a monstrous fuck up by Boeing.


That was my point: it's not comparable (not even remotely) to the design issues that could *possibly* be considered as contributing factors to AF447, as the poster I was replying to seemed to imply.

morrisond wrote:
They did not intentionally produce a design that killed people.


I never said that it was intentional. It's still a "criminally negligent" (or monstrous, in your words) design blunder.

morrisond wrote:
The previous poster just posted that you couldn't disable MCAS - he was wrong - yes you can. Actions could have been taken that would have saved the plane(s).


I never claimed the accident flights could not be saved. However, "disabling a controller" has a specific meaning in automation: MCAS 1.0 is a controller, and it cannot be disabled by pilots. Pilots can disable the actuator, or negate some of the activation conditions in the control logic (if they know about them), but neither will disable MCAS.

MSPNWA wrote:
[Stating MCAS cannot be disabled is simply wrong, and it needed to be corrected.


You - and other posters - can keep on using imprecise terminology if you insist, but it's not helping the discussion much IMO.

(some could argue that switching off the whole computer system the controller is running on - e.g. pulling the FCC breaker - could be construed as "disabling the controller", but that would really amount to guillotine as a cure to headache)
Last edited by jollo on Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:22 pm, edited 3 times in total.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:08 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
asdf wrote:
just WOW

after thousands of thousands of postings in this thread there is really one user left who has not understand how to counteract MCAS ...

the ET crew did exactly that
and they crashed
because no more electric trim
and no way to rotate that manual trim wheel


Yeah wow, here we go again. We should not need to go over this again, but untruths need to be corrected. We do not know if the ET crew properly used the trim wheels, and the available evidence strongly points to the negative. We also know other mistakes were made that could have made it difficult to move the wheels.

Stating MCAS cannot be disabled is simply wrong, and it needed to be corrected.


B777LRF wrote:
Yes, and the report also says one of those 4 major points was not well received by the US contingent, and that EASA is still waiting on work to be done on that. Which, in other words, means that the FAA/Boeing has stuck their noses at one of EASA's requirements, which does point towards needing to take a humble pill and get on with it. If you read the entire article, it's quite clear EASA are not getting the level of cooperation from the FAA that they need in order to re-certify the aircraft, the reason seemingly being the usual level of arrogance we associate the FAA with.

One can switch the words "FAA" and "EASA" and potentially be just as right.

An opinion that creates a saint out of one party and a villain out of another without congruent reasons for those feelings isn't a sound one.

Your trim point is strongly in the positive I believe.

There are only two options available: MANUAL electric TRIM and MANUAL TRIM wheel.

'the Captain asked the First-Officer if the TRIM is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the TRIM was not working and asked if he could try it MANUALly. The Captain told him to try the First-Officer replied that it is not working.'

I think it is unlikely that the F/O would use two different terms for the same function in the same sentence and would not be asking the Capt. to confirm trying the same function is checked for a second time using two terms. But two terms are used. The only satisfactory conclusion is that the F/O is referring to both functions. The question is which term refers to which function.

My suggestion is that, remembering that it was FO that offered STAB TRIM CUT-OUT ~1 min. before hand and the Capt. seemed unsure in his response, that the Capt. was asking for confirmation that manual electric TRIM was not available, that the FO confirmed not working, because it was in cut-out, and then suggested to try MANUAL trim wheel -also not working.

On your last point. No, you cant switch the words, its Boeing/FAA that have messed up not EASA.

Ray
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:17 pm

jollo wrote:
I never claimed the accident flights could not be saved. However, "disabling a controller" has a specific meaning in automation: MCAS 1.0 is a controller, and it cannot be disabled by pilots. Pilots can disable the actuator, or negate some of the activation conditions in the control logic (if they know about them), but neither will disable MCAS. You - and other posters - can keep on using misleading terminology if you insist, but it's not helping the discussion much.

(some could argue that switching off the whole computer system the controller is running on - e.g. pulling the FCC breaker - could be construed as "disabling the controller", but that would really amount to guillotine as a cure to headache)

So maybe for the laymen on the thread it would have been helpful for the technical folks like you to explain the differences of disabling a controller versus dropping the flaps and preventing MCAS functions, see I just added some additional words to try to get my point across.

The average person hears / heard that MCAS version 1.0 only activates in manual mode in clean flight and that autopilot and flaps would disable.
When the words actuator comes along with activation conditions I think you loose some who are not as technical, any by technical I do not only mean about the mechanics but also the technicality of the words themselves.

This thread has been ongoing for months, I don't think anything critical will happen that a few sentences cannot be used to get the rest of the folks in understanding a point being discussed, not argued.
Just a thought
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:19 pm

jollo wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Yes - it was a monstrous fuck up by Boeing.


That was my point: it's not comparable (not even remotely) with design issues that could *possibly* be considered as contributing factors to AF447, as the poster I was replying to seemed to imply.

morrisond wrote:
They did not intentionally produce a design that killed people.


I never said that it was intentional. It's still a "criminally negligent" (or monstrous, in your words) fuck-up.

morrisond wrote:
The previous poster just posted that you couldn't disable MCAS - he was wrong - yes you can. Actions could have been taken that would have saved the plane(s).


I never claimed the accident flights could not be saved. However, "disabling a controller" has a specific meaning in automation: MCAS 1.0 is a controller, and it cannot be disabled by pilots. Pilots can disable the actuator, or negate some of the activation conditions in the control logic (if they know about them), but neither will disable MCAS. You - and other posters - can keep on using misleading terminology if you insist, but it's not helping the discussion much.

(some could argue that switching off the whole computer system the controller is running on - e.g. pulling the FCC breaker - could be construed as "disabling the controller", but that would really amount to guillotine as a cure to headache)


You would have to show intent to prove criminal negligence. Incompetence is probably a better word. People/systems and organizations can make mistakes.

Then drop the flaps one notch - MCAS is not active at all then. That would mean the computer is not sending signals to the controller at all. MCAS disabled.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:21 pm

keesje wrote:
Yes that is very well possible.FAA and Boeing approve the MAX for RTS while results of the various investigations on Boeing, the FAA come in.

CAA, CAAC, EASA proceed their own 737MAX certification process. Meanwhile Southwest, American and United will hire communication experts to confuse and convince passengers and insurance companies.

Sounds good, What could possibly happen?

Weeks if not months of demonstrating safe and efficient flight, defusing the "death trap" hysteria.

keesje wrote:
EASA communicates it's own detailed, independent results & Reuters picks it up in seconds. An instant credibility melt-down and accompaning stock value implosion, likely government intervention.. Maybe think twice..

EASA has already signaled its findings and its intent to go its own way, it's been on all the media channels, and we've had no melt downs or stock value implosions.

Thanks for the high octane hyperbole, though, it was amusing.

Customers will see the EASA report, then look at the ungrounded US planes flying safely, and go 'meh'.
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B777LRF
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:26 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
Stating MCAS cannot be disabled is simply wrong, and it needed to be corrected.


Right, since that's the case kindly point us towards the switch which disables MCAS, and MCAS only, if you please. Don't bother, we all know there's no such switch.

What you can do is de-power the horisontal stabiliser completely, taking it with it the ability to trim electrically, STS and, indeed, MCAS. The potential outcome of such action has been laid before us, making it clear as day such action may have drastic consequences.

So it's plain obvious you cannot disable MCAS without also killing a few other functions. It's a bit like claiming it's possible to turn the electronic injection on your car off. Well, you can, but only if you shut the entire engine off completely, taking with the power steering and brake amplifier, leaving you up shyte creek sans paddle, careening towards an accident with no steering and brakes. Come to think of it that's rather apt comparison, and one which goes a long way to demonstrate the nonsense you're attempting to peddle.
Signature. You just read one.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:46 pm

morrisond wrote:
You are wrong on the 737 has a tendency to pitch up. The controls just get lighter than allowed by regulation - that is a big difference.


no

read the EASA documents
are already postet here in that thread

its written word by word
"... has a tendency to pitch up..."
and
"... has a tendency to stall at about 16% (or 16 degree) AoA ..."
 
ZKCIF
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:51 pm

Mr./Ms. Revelation,
please note that months of safe operation within the USA do not provide sufficient statistical background.
Prior to grounding, we had 2 disasters coming from roughly 400,000 flights (I believe my numbers are right).
Now, if FAA only gives green light, we have only 5 airlines operating.
when including frames in the final assembly (source https://737-max.blogspot.com/2017/12/ma ... rline.html)
we get
Alaska 2 aircraft (currently 0 delivered)
American 33 aircraft (currently 24 delivered)
Southwest 52 aircraft (currently 34 delivered)
United 30 aircraft (currently 14 delivered)
and possibly COPA 10 aircraft (currently 6 delivered) if they can manage operate from PTY to the USA

we get 117 aircraft for airlines from USA for which we give 5 flights a day and COPA would have to fly long segments thus we give 3 segments a day.
We get 615 flights/day
For half a year, we get only 111,930 flights. That is VERY VERY little.

Successful operation cannot be proven yet due to insufficient sample.
Respectfully,
ZKCIF
Last edited by ZKCIF on Tue Sep 10, 2019 6:02 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:54 pm

So maybe Boeing just needs to take the bull by the horns and announce the cancellation of the MAX and launch the NSA for EIS 7 years from now and be done with it.
Layoff thousands to trim payroll - recall that by volume, most workers are working on MAX at 40+ frames per month versus 14 for the next highest -, use shareholder wealth to pay off suppliers who demand payment, ensure they do not work on the NSA, cease share buy back as a social point, transfer some MAX workers to the tanker to ensure all tools are properly accounted for, place some assets with the trainer program, write a few percentage points off their value to satisfy those who require their pound of flesh, and advise that when the crash reports are made public they will review then finalize victim payments based on existing contract law.
What could go wrong with this plan.....much better than every day reading some other reporter saying delay, no RTS, delay, etc etc etc.
In the meantime, it is still September and Boeing's self imposed deadline to get the fixes to the FAA is 20 days away.
Last edited by par13del on Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:56 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
Spetsnaz55
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 5:58 pm

par13del wrote:
So maybe Boeing just needs to take the bull by the horns and announce the cancellation of the MAX and launch the NSA for EIS 7 years from now and be done with it.
Layoff thousands to trim payroll - recall that by volume, most workers are working on MAX at 40+ frames per month versus 14 for the next highest -, use shareholder wealth to pay off suppliers who demand payment, ensure they do not work on the NSA, cease share buy back as a social point, transfer some MAX workers to the tanker to ensure all tools are properly accounted for, place some assets with the trainer program, write a few percentage points off their value to satisfy those who require their pound of flesh, and advise that when the crash reports are made public they will review then finalize victim payments based on existing contract law.
What could go wrong with this plan.....much better than every day reading some other reporter saying delay, no RTS, delay, etc etc etc.
In the meantime, it is still September and Boeing's self imposed deadline to get the fixes to the FAA is 20 days away.



No matter how bad you want the max program to stop and shut down, that will not happen. You obviously don't want this plane maker to succeed.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 6:00 pm

par13del wrote:
So maybe Boeing just needs to take the bull by the horns and announce the cancellation of the MAX and launch the NSA for EIS 7 years from now and be done with it.
....


It would be very strange if the Boeing CEO had not formed a very large working group at the latest after the LionAir Crash in order to massively advance NSA development. At latest at this point it showed up that the aerodynamical flaws can not be held under cover.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 6:18 pm

asdf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
You are wrong on the 737 has a tendency to pitch up. The controls just get lighter than allowed by regulation - that is a big difference.


no

read the EASA documents
are already postet here in that thread

its written word by word
"... has a tendency to pitch up..."
and
"... has a tendency to stall at about 16% (or 16 degree) AoA ..."

Can you please point me to the '16 degrees' reference, I've not seen.

Ray
 
jollo
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 6:20 pm

par13del wrote:
jollo wrote:
I never claimed the accident flights could not be saved. However, "disabling a controller" has a specific meaning in automation: MCAS 1.0 is a controller, and it cannot be disabled by pilots. Pilots can disable the actuator, or negate some of the activation conditions in the control logic (if they know about them), but neither will disable MCAS. You - and other posters - can keep on using misleading terminology if you insist, but it's not helping the discussion much.

(some could argue that switching off the whole computer system the controller is running on - e.g. pulling the FCC breaker - could be construed as "disabling the controller", but that would really amount to guillotine as a cure to headache)

So maybe for the laymen on the thread it would have been helpful for the technical folks like you to explain the differences of disabling a controller versus dropping the flaps and preventing MCAS functions, see I just added some additional words to try to get my point across.

The average person hears / heard that MCAS version 1.0 only activates in manual mode in clean flight and that autopilot and flaps would disable.
When the words actuator comes along with activation conditions I think you loose some who are not as technical, any by technical I do not only mean about the mechanics but also the technicality of the words themselves.

This thread has been ongoing for months, I don't think anything critical will happen that a few sentences cannot be used to get the rest of the folks in understanding a point being discussed, not argued.
Just a thought

I apologize for using over-technical wording. However - and maybe it's my professional background coloring my view - I don't think it's so hard to distinguish between having the possibility (i.e. the control) to disable a specific malfunctioning system (as in "A/P is acting up"-->"disarm A/P") and enacting some work-around so the malfunctioning system will stop trying to kill you. Ok, the end result is (hopefully) the same, and NNCs are often based on (effective) workarounds, but we were discussing design issues: workarounds do not acquit a bad (appallingly bad) design.

I'll give it a try with an fictional everyday analogy (even if analogies are often misleading, so beware): let's say the ABS (Anti-Blocking System) controller in your car slams the brakes while you're driving on the highway, causing an accident. Diagnosis shows the problem was a single faulty wheel sensor. Someone says: "hey, but the controller's logic activates only above 100 km/h: it was easy to avoid the accident, just drive slower". Someone else says: "hey, but you could have switched off the ignition, thus turning off power braking - the actuator - and then you could have gently come to a stop using your emergency parking brake". None of these observations would make you say "you're right, disabling ABS would have been easy, stupid me for not doing it": you would rightfully sue the car maker for all its worth. ABS in your car - the controller - cannot be disabled by the driver: that's why car components makers invest vast amounts of resources in designing (and testing paranoically) input sanitation systems that ensure that your ABS disables itself as soon as a sensor failure is detected (and a light comes on on your dashboard to warn you have lost anti-skid protection).

Of course no real ABS activates only above a certain speed threshold: it's only for the sake of the argument. However, if it did - and it was a feature undocumented by the owner's manual - it would do you no good, and just driving under the threshold speed would not "disable" the controller: it's would still there ready to kill you in a single sensor failure scenario.
 
Agrajag
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 6:23 pm

You would have to show intent to prove criminal negligence.

Actually, 'intent' is the one thing you would not have to show.
The plural of anecdote is anecdotes, not data.
Slartibartfast had a point
 
bgm
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 6:26 pm

The 737 MAX now has the dubious honor of being grounded for 6 months now, with no concrete end in sight.

Quite the milestone.
████ ███ █ ███████ ██ █ █████ ██ ████ [redacted]
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 6:56 pm

Spetsnaz55 wrote:
No matter how bad you want the max program to stop and shut down, that will not happen. You obviously don't want this plane maker to succeed.

Re-read the post, I am tired of every day reports from reporters finding new ways to re-post the same information over and over again to make the same point over and over again as if the number of times something is said makes it right.
At least over the last few weeks we have seen a decline in the lawn dart, blood on hands, Boeing PR trolls, etc etc which essentially made visits to this thread painful.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:07 pm

Sounds like the EASA problem with AOA Vane System integrity is not directly related to MCAS specifically but generally the multiple simultaneous effects of AOA vane failures.

'The European regulator’s concerns include the ability of pilots to handle an angle-of-attack failure during takeoff or other critical phases of flight. In the two 737 Max crashes, the erroneous data from failed angle-of-attack sensors prompted multiple cockpit alarms, including a false stall warning and altitude and airspeed gauges that didn’t agree with each other.
“We are not being prescriptive in the way these concerns should be addressed,” Northcote said.'
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... s-k0e0frs7

Ray
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:15 pm

asdf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
You are wrong on the 737 has a tendency to pitch up. The controls just get lighter than allowed by regulation - that is a big difference.


no

read the EASA documents
are already postet here in that thread

its written word by word
"... has a tendency to pitch up..."
and
"... has a tendency to stall at about 16% (or 16 degree) AoA ..."


That document also calls MCAS an Anti-Stall system.

It's like EASA developed it's list by reading things that were misreported by the media.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:26 pm

"Clearly, Boeing's credibility has been severely damaged. They continually tried to minimize the extent of the problem and advertise the fix was a minor software fix," Goelz said. "This has also severely undercut the FAA's leadership in air safety worldwide."

It seems redundant to go on about the damage to Boeing and FAA's reputation, that genie is out of the bottle.

Overall, the article is a rehash of the last few days news (Ky's statement, IATA displeasure, etc) but seems to be reinforcing the idea that we are going to see a US-first ungrounding.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
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MSPNWA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:27 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
Your trim point is strongly in the positive I believe.

There are only two options available: MANUAL electric TRIM and MANUAL TRIM wheel.

'the Captain asked the First-Officer if the TRIM is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the TRIM was not working and asked if he could try it MANUALly. The Captain told him to try the First-Officer replied that it is not working.'

I think it is unlikely that the F/O would use two different terms for the same function in the same sentence and would not be asking the Capt. to confirm trying the same function is checked for a second time using two terms. But two terms are used. The only satisfactory conclusion is that the F/O is referring to both functions. The question is which term refers to which function.

My suggestion is that, remembering that it was FO that offered STAB TRIM CUT-OUT ~1 min. before hand and the Capt. seemed unsure in his response, that the Capt. was asking for confirmation that manual electric TRIM was not available, that the FO confirmed not working, because it was in cut-out, and then suggested to try MANUAL trim wheel -also not working.


You're failing to account for the qualifier "properly". Just 8 seconds of back and forth dialogue with no language suggesting an attempt for proper operation (or language talking about helping if there's a problem) means that it's virtually impossible that they were properly operating the trim wheels. We can argue that they tried the trim the wheels - the evidence shows that could be either way - but one cannot make a good argument that they properly operated them. Considering they already made a major mistake to get into a point where either electric or manual trim operation was questionable, to now trust that somehow the crew knew the proper manual trim procedure and attempted to execute it in the manner of a couple seconds is at best a huge stretch. Stating it as fact is completely irresponsible. You're free to believe whatever though.
 
WIederling
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:30 pm

morrisond wrote:
asdf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
You are wrong on the 737 has a tendency to pitch up. The controls just get lighter than allowed by regulation - that is a big difference.


no

read the EASA documents
are already postet here in that thread

its written word by word
"... has a tendency to pitch up..."
and
"... has a tendency to stall at about 16% (or 16 degree) AoA ..."


That document also calls MCAS an Anti-Stall system.

It's like EASA developed it's list by reading things that were misreported by the media.


EASA is not entangled in the Boeing reality distortion field.
They see a nudy and talk about it.:-)
Murphy is an optimist
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:37 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
Your trim point is strongly in the positive I believe.

There are only two options available: MANUAL electric TRIM and MANUAL TRIM wheel.

'the Captain asked the First-Officer if the TRIM is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the TRIM was not working and asked if he could try it MANUALly. The Captain told him to try the First-Officer replied that it is not working.'

I think it is unlikely that the F/O would use two different terms for the same function in the same sentence and would not be asking the Capt. to confirm trying the same function is checked for a second time using two terms. But two terms are used. The only satisfactory conclusion is that the F/O is referring to both functions. The question is which term refers to which function.

My suggestion is that, remembering that it was FO that offered STAB TRIM CUT-OUT ~1 min. before hand and the Capt. seemed unsure in his response, that the Capt. was asking for confirmation that manual electric TRIM was not available, that the FO confirmed not working, because it was in cut-out, and then suggested to try MANUAL trim wheel -also not working.


You're failing to account for the qualifier "properly". Just 8 seconds of back and forth dialogue with no language suggesting an attempt for proper operation (or language talking about helping if there's a problem) means that it's virtually impossible that they were properly operating the trim wheels. We can argue that they tried the trim the wheels - the evidence shows that could be either way - but one cannot make a good argument that they properly operated them. Considering they already made a major mistake to get into a point where either electric or manual trim operation was questionable, to now trust that somehow the crew knew the proper manual trim procedure and attempted to execute it in the manner of a couple seconds is at best a huge stretch. Stating it as fact is completely irresponsible. You're free to believe whatever though.

I said nothing about a 'fact' what I have given you is what was reported in the preliminary and an assessment of it.

Just because the FO isn't recorded as saying I tried and tried and tried your honour doesn't mean he didn't absence of evidence etc. etc.

Of course if it doesn't fit your agenda, frankly my dear...………

Ray
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:38 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
Sounds like the EASA problem with AOA Vane System integrity is not directly related to MCAS specifically but generally the multiple simultaneous effects of AOA vane failures.

'The European regulator’s concerns include the ability of pilots to handle an angle-of-attack failure during takeoff or other critical phases of flight. In the two 737 Max crashes, the erroneous data from failed angle-of-attack sensors prompted multiple cockpit alarms, including a false stall warning and altitude and airspeed gauges that didn’t agree with each other.
“We are not being prescriptive in the way these concerns should be addressed,” Northcote said.'
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... s-k0e0frs7

Ray

Interesting reporting, first that all Boeing a/c use 2 sensors, second that 2 sensors is the bare minimum required (relevant how since no one is proposing going to 1), then stating that the regulations can be met with 2, software and crew training to enhance safety, but 3 sensors are more easily compliant.

"The crashes -- one off the coast of Indonesia in October and a second in Ethiopia in March -- were triggered by a malfunctioning sensor known as an angle-of-attack vane that measured whether the plane’s nose was pointed up or down relative to the oncoming air. Boeing has two such sensors on all its aircraft, while other manufacturers, including the Blagnac, France-based Airbus SE, have used three or more to ensure more redundancy."

"EASA is also examining whether Boeing’s use of two vanes is sufficient, Northcote said. The regulations don’t necessarily require an additional one must be added. Safety could be addressed “through improvement of the flight crew procedures and training, or through design enhancements, or a combination of the two,” EASA said.

EASA said two vanes are considered “the bare minimum requirement to meet the safety objectives,” and in the agency’s experience “an architecture with three vanes can more easily be found compliant with the regulation.”"
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:46 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
asdf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
You are wrong on the 737 has a tendency to pitch up. The controls just get lighter than allowed by regulation - that is a big difference.


no

read the EASA documents
are already postet here in that thread

its written word by word
"... has a tendency to pitch up..."
and
"... has a tendency to stall at about 16% (or 16 degree) AoA ..."

Can you please point me to the '16 degrees' reference, I've not seen.

Ray


I have searched it now but unfortunately not found. It is - as far as I remember - a document on one side of an EU organization. IT was posted about 3 to 5 days ago. It is NOT the well known power point presentation but a pdf. I was quite surprised to find AoA values ​​there. It was 13 or 16 degrees or percent.

During my search, I have - regardless of - found a BBC article. In the graph, the danger of stall is noted from 10%.
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49591363

But that was not the document I was looking for.

I will look again for it in the evening
 
MSPNWA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:52 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
I said nothing about a 'fact' what I have given you is what was reported in the preliminary and an assessment of it.

Just because the FO isn't recorded as saying I tried and tried and tried your honour doesn't mean he didn't absence of evidence etc. etc.

You responded to my response of a post that stated it as fact. It was a general statement not directed at you personally. Sorry, I should have been clear on that. I'd prefer the same respect back.

I will continue building my opinion on the lack of evidence to the contrary, not building my opinion based on required evidence that doesn't exist.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:54 pm

asdf wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
asdf wrote:

no

read the EASA documents
are already postet here in that thread

its written word by word
"... has a tendency to pitch up..."
and
"... has a tendency to stall at about 16% (or 16 degree) AoA ..."

Can you please point me to the '16 degrees' reference, I've not seen.

Ray


I have searched it now but unfortunately not found. It is - as far as I remember - a document on one side of an EU organization. IT was posted about 3 to 5 days ago. It is NOT the well known power point presentation but a pdf. I was quite surprised to find AoA values ​​there. It was 13 or 16 degrees or percent.

During my search, I have - regardless of - found a BBC article. In the graph, the danger of stall is noted from 10%.
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49591363

But that was not the document I was looking for.

I will look again for it in the evening

OK. Thanks

Ray
 
User avatar
InsideMan
Posts: 334
Joined: Thu Aug 04, 2011 9:49 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 7:56 pm

wingman wrote:
Alfons wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
What forces inside the FAA prevent them to do what the EASA do ?


Boeing.

Sorry for the very short answer, was just thinking loud.


I agree. And somewhat magically, EASA have agreed with Airbus that 100% of all deaths on Airbus aircraft are the result of incompetent pilots. I think once EASA has forced this necessary cultural change on the FAA, it would be wise for the FAA to reopen Airbus cases like AF337 and tear that cockpit apart to see how it is that every single accident and every single death on Airbus aircraft is due to monumentally stupid pilots with the skill levels of three year olds. Is it really just them, could it be the training requirements approved by EASA (impossible!), could it be something in the Airbus design philosophy that turns pilots into so much Jell-O when their passengers need them most? Ky says he's going to look at every single system on the MAX before letting that plane return to service because of 300 deaths. The next time that happens on an Airbus we'll all breathe a sigh of relief that agencies like the FAA and CAAC don't simply rubber stamp another foregone conclusion that another cockpit vegetable drove another obviously perfect machine into the water. All of these agencies need to take EASA's lead and do the right thing from now on.


a) sarcasm is not exactly appropriate imo
b) the EASA is NOT Airbus friend
c) sadly a lot of pilots are subpar performers either due to bad training, bad habits, arrogance, complacency whatever
d) in order to have something happen as you describe said Airbus aircraft would have to be grounded in the first place and that is highly unlikely based on ONE event.
 
hivue
Posts: 1917
Joined: Tue Feb 26, 2013 2:26 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 8:19 pm

WIederling wrote:
morrisond wrote:
asdf wrote:

no

read the EASA documents
are already postet here in that thread

its written word by word
"... has a tendency to pitch up..."
and
"... has a tendency to stall at about 16% (or 16 degree) AoA ..."


That document also calls MCAS an Anti-Stall system.

It's like EASA developed it's list by reading things that were misreported by the media.


EASA is not entangled in the Boeing reality distortion field.
They see a nudy and talk about it.:-)


If sovereign aviation certificating authorities are now also getting confused about the actual technical issues involved then this whole thing could get way uglier than it already is.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1893
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 9:13 pm

hivue wrote:
WIederling wrote:
morrisond wrote:

That document also calls MCAS an Anti-Stall system.

It's like EASA developed it's list by reading things that were misreported by the media.


EASA is not entangled in the Boeing reality distortion field.
They see a nudy and talk about it.:-)


If sovereign aviation certificating authorities are now also getting confused about the actual technical issues involved then this whole thing could get way uglier than it already is.

More like calling things what they are, not using euphemisms.
 
jollo
Posts: 363
Joined: Mon Aug 08, 2011 7:24 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 9:25 pm

morrisond wrote:
You would have to show intent to prove criminal negligence.


Agrajag wrote:
Actually, 'intent' is the one thing you would not have to show.


I am not a lawyer, but I think Agrajag has a point: IIRC "criminal negligence" is a lesser degree of culpability than "criminal intent". So - if I'm not mistaken - by definition if you show intent, you have proven it's not negligence (with recklessness and gross negligence somewhere in between).

However the concept is "failure to foresee and to avoid the manifestation of a danger", and if you think it cannot be a crime if it's not willful, think again.
 
airnorth
Posts: 369
Joined: Thu Jun 09, 2011 7:30 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Tue Sep 10, 2019 10:29 pm

Some more AC MAX movements, not really sure what's up. I'm sure they need a special permit to ferry or perform test flights. The last time C-GEHL was active a few days back it flew a few segments one day before heading back to YUL, now I see that it has been ferried to MZJ, Pinal Airport, storage perhaps?

C-GEJL is currently in the air, flying YYC-YUL as AC2358.
https://www.flightradar24.com/ACA2358/220c8f57

edited to add the FR24 link.

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