Agrajag
Posts: 69
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 4:48 am

jollo wrote:
morrisond wrote:
You would have to show intent to prove criminal negligence.


Agrajag wrote:
Actually, 'intent' is the one thing you would not have to show.


I am not a lawyer, but I think Agrajag has a point: IIRC "criminal negligence" is a lesser degree of culpability than "criminal intent". So - if I'm not mistaken - by definition if you show intent, you have proven it's not negligence (with recklessness and gross negligence somewhere in between).

However the concept is "failure to foresee and to avoid the manifestation of a danger", and if you think it cannot be a crime if it's not willful, think again.



Exactly so.
The plural of anecdote is anecdotes, not data.
Slartibartfast had a point
 
RickNRoll
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 6:21 am

hivue wrote:
WIederling wrote:
morrisond wrote:

That document also calls MCAS an Anti-Stall system.

It's like EASA developed it's list by reading things that were misreported by the media.


EASA is not entangled in the Boeing reality distortion field.
They see a nudy and talk about it.:-)


If sovereign aviation certificating authorities are now also getting confused about the actual technical issues involved then this whole thing could get way uglier than it already is.
Perhaps it was an anti stall system all along. Boeing just couldn't call it one. We still don't know for sure why MCAS was changed to cater for low speed events as well as the initial high speed ones.
 
WIederling
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 6:41 am

RickNRoll wrote:
hivue wrote:
WIederling wrote:

EASA is not entangled in the Boeing reality distortion field.
They see a nudy and talk about it.:-)


If sovereign aviation certificating authorities are now also getting confused about the actual technical issues involved then this whole thing could get way uglier than it already is.
Perhaps it was an anti stall system all along. Boeing just couldn't call it one. We still don't know for sure why MCAS was changed to cater for low speed events as well as the initial high speed ones.

I'd be surprised if a professional unit like EASA gets technically "confused".

Lower speed -> lower lift at same AoA. higher lift demand ( via "Maneuvering" ) requires higher AoA.
I don't think MCAS was ever really targeting the higher speed (relative to what) domain
but more like the "minimum speeds no flaps" range.
Murphy is an optimist
 
RickNRoll
Posts: 1752
Joined: Fri Jan 06, 2012 9:30 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 7:00 am

lightsaber wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
planecane wrote:
Don't discount that part of the EASA statements could be posturing. With the exception of MCAS (and the related stick force gradient) and accidentally leaving the AoA disagree alert out, all of the other issues on the MAX also exist on the NG.

It is perfectly fine for the EASA to require tests with MCAS disabled since that is what will happen on an AoA disagree. It is also perfectly fine for them to require demonstration of the MAX being safe upon the worst case MCAS 2.0 runaway, including ability to manually trim in that scenario. However, if they go beyond that, then they will have to justify why they aren't grounding the NG fleet as well for issues that exist on both.

I strongly suspect that the EASA will approve the MAX as long as MCAS 2.0 runaway is recoverable, with MCAS disabled, stick force gradient issues are confined to rarely entered parts of the flight envelope, and stall recovery is not an issue.

EASA have been entire clear, concise and transparent. You might as well have just re-copied the flight test programme, as organised, that you appear to entirely happy with anyway. I agree, that providing the stated items are cleared down then supporting the FAA certification will not be a problem.

However, EASA have completed a review of the flight control systems etc. above and beyond MCAS precisely to assure no other such miss-steps have occurred. Should they identify any issues that are also applicable to NG, then it will be for Boeing (and FAA) to justify no action or an acceptable action to address them. EASA do not need to justify anything.

Ray

Regulators need to be careful. The NG has proven safe. If this appears political or economic driven, the FAA/EASA agreement losses force. Yes, I realize this goes both ways. I also realize allowing one slip requires a deep dive. But one way of verifying safety is proving similar to an already flying safe system. The 737NG has certainly proven beyond requirements to be safe.

Pretty soon there will be massive job losses. Every $3 million of lost salaries (after consideration of unemployment insurance) is generally going to result in a death. (E.g., a friend at work was stupid and earned a DUI, automatic grounds for termination at my work. His 20 year younger wife has major health problems, so to keep her with enough funds and a few years of bridge health insurance, he committed suicide last weekend before being officially fired, scheduled for last Monday). So ironically, if the MAX isn't ungrounded fairly, we could see more secondary deaths than we saw in the two crashes. There is a reason governments set the value of a life at a dollar (or Euro value). There are several branches of economics that study this:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_life

As much as we consider ourselves and our loved ones priceless, there must be a balance. For example, coal is horrible environmentally which kills people, but without the electricity from coal more people would die.

For aviation, that is expressed as an overall acceptable risk. EASA may find issues, but if their probability is so low that few, if any, crashes would ever occur, then unenforceable. Last I looked, 1*10^-6 crashes per hour, but ETOPs is operated under stricter rules.

Aviation is already the safest way to travel. If the MAX grounding were lifted unmodified, my greatest risk flying it would still be crossing the street from the LAX parking lot to the terminal. My second greatest risk would be the sum of the car rides to and from the airport. My 3rd greatest risk would be the car emissions at the airport. I believe my 4th risk would likely be the fast food meal I am likely to eat.

As tragic as the accidents are, in the 1980s this would have been noise and unnoticed. I am happy aviation safety has improved enough that the MAX is an issue. I want the system to meet proper redundancy requirements. My employer would never send an aircraft out the door with such a single point failure. Note:. Our aircraft have many well understood single point failures, e. g., single pilot ops, single engine, single landing gear lever, and any one window breaking being a bad day. But never FBW and pitot tubes require 5-way redundancy and FBW computers require two independent systems physically separated until they get to that single generator, but has dual battery backup and a rat.

Lightsaber

I feel sorry for the rank and file Boeing employee. They don't deserve this as the policy from the top is what has created the current situation. More than once I have read of past Boeing employees saying they are glad they no longer work there. This isn't something new, it has been building up for years. Even the back when the NG was introduced and the trim wheel had to be made smaller to cope with the larger displays, people were already thinking that there was something wrong. The smaller trim wheel also had to have dampers added to it to stop backlash. There was already a problem waiting for the holes to line up to create a disaster.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 9:57 am

WIederling wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:
hivue wrote:

If sovereign aviation certificating authorities are now also getting confused about the actual technical issues involved then this whole thing could get way uglier than it already is.
Perhaps it was an anti stall system all along. Boeing just couldn't call it one. We still don't know for sure why MCAS was changed to cater for low speed events as well as the initial high speed ones.


Lower speed -> lower lift at same AoA. higher lift demand ( via "Maneuvering" ) requires higher AoA.
I don't think MCAS was ever really targeting the higher speed (relative to what) domain
but more like the "minimum speeds no flaps" range.


The original, pre flight test, version of MCAS was designed for high speed, high g force maneuvers. That's why a g force sensor was originally read as part of the activation criteria. It wasn't until observations from flight testing that they expanded it into low speed situations which necessitated removal of the g force sensor (which would have prevented the runaway events even though it wasn't truly a redundant design) from the equation.
 
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keesje
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 10:00 am

RickNRoll wrote:
lightsaber wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:



(E.g., a friend at work was stupid and earned a DUI, automatic grounds for termination at my work. His 20 year younger wife has major health problems, so to keep her with enough funds and a few years of bridge health insurance, he committed suicide last weekend before being officially fired, scheduled for last Monday


That deeply sucks. Tragic. Condolences.

- Introduce reasonable healthcare fall back for everybody, wether they deserve it or not. But don't name it Obamacare, people learned to hate that...
- We should be carefull not to accept short cuts on safety. I think the certification requirements of the MAX were grandfathered to much.
"Never mistake motion for action." Ernest Hemingway
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 560
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 10:02 am

WIederling wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:
hivue wrote:

If sovereign aviation certificating authorities are now also getting confused about the actual technical issues involved then this whole thing could get way uglier than it already is.
Perhaps it was an anti stall system all along. Boeing just couldn't call it one. We still don't know for sure why MCAS was changed to cater for low speed events as well as the initial high speed ones.

I'd be surprised if a professional unit like EASA gets technically "confused".

Lower speed -> lower lift at same AoA. higher lift demand ( via "Maneuvering" ) requires higher AoA.
I don't think MCAS was ever really targeting the higher speed (relative to what) domain
but more like the "minimum speeds no flaps" range.

At the risk of being provocative, I'll have ago at clearing up the EASA point.

The EASA presentation includes a diagrammatic representation of the action of MCAS. This diagram includes 'anti stall system' in its title. They have used a diagram credited to 'The Air Current'. EASA have not called MCAS an anti stall system directly, although, the use of the diagram may be a more subtle indication of their view, it may also be just a handy diagram and they are not so sensitive to the use of the words as some on this thread.

On the MCAS front, again with trepidation. It seems the high speed element stated for V1.0 is expressed in the use of g-sensor as a trigger i.e. high (vertical) speed - climb, not airspeed per se, airspeed is accounted for in the algorithm to set the AOA trigger value. It follows that the use of low speed stated for V2.0 is low (vertical) speed (level flight or maybe even negative g) and hence the g sensor can not be used and was removed. Airspeed (indicated or computed?) is still used to calculate the AOA trigger value.

Hence we end up with an MCAS that will activate with A/C in any attitude (there may be roll restriction) or flight stage if flaps up and A/P off (and I would assume a minimum altitude restriction), if the calculated AOA trigger point is exceeded.

I think whether or not you call it anti stall is moot (and may well be debated in court).

Ray
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 560
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 10:35 am

XRAYretired wrote:
WIederling wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:
Perhaps it was an anti stall system all along. Boeing just couldn't call it one. We still don't know for sure why MCAS was changed to cater for low speed events as well as the initial high speed ones.

I'd be surprised if a professional unit like EASA gets technically "confused".

Lower speed -> lower lift at same AoA. higher lift demand ( via "Maneuvering" ) requires higher AoA.
I don't think MCAS was ever really targeting the higher speed (relative to what) domain
but more like the "minimum speeds no flaps" range.

At the risk of being provocative, I'll have ago at clearing up the EASA point.

The EASA presentation includes a diagrammatic representation of the action of MCAS. This diagram includes 'anti stall system' in its title. They have used a diagram credited to 'The Air Current'. EASA have not called MCAS an anti stall system directly, although, the use of the diagram may be a more subtle indication of their view, it may also be just a handy diagram and they are not so sensitive to the use of the words as some on this thread.

On the MCAS front, again with trepidation. It seems the high speed element stated for V0.0 is expressed in the use of g-sensor as a trigger i.e. high (vertical) speed - climb, not airspeed per se, airspeed is accounted for in the algorithm to set the AOA trigger value. It follows that the use of low speed stated for V1.0 is low (vertical) speed (level flight or maybe even negative g) and hence the g sensor can not be used and was removed. Airspeed (indicated or computed?) is still used to calculate the AOA trigger value.

Hence we end up with an MCAS that will activate with A/C in any attitude (there may be roll restriction) or flight stage if flaps up and A/P off (and I would assume a minimum altitude restriction), if the calculated AOA trigger point is exceeded.

I think whether or not you call it anti stall is moot (and may well be debated in court).

Ray

Apologies, missed my edit slot. Corrected as above in bold
 
morrisond
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Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 10:36 am

XRAYretired wrote:
WIederling wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:
Perhaps it was an anti stall system all along. Boeing just couldn't call it one. We still don't know for sure why MCAS was changed to cater for low speed events as well as the initial high speed ones.

I'd be surprised if a professional unit like EASA gets technically "confused".

Lower speed -> lower lift at same AoA. higher lift demand ( via "Maneuvering" ) requires higher AoA.
I don't think MCAS was ever really targeting the higher speed (relative to what) domain
but more like the "minimum speeds no flaps" range.

At the risk of being provocative, I'll have ago at clearing up the EASA point.

The EASA presentation includes a diagrammatic representation of the action of MCAS. This diagram includes 'anti stall system' in its title. They have used a diagram credited to 'The Air Current'. EASA have not called MCAS an anti stall system directly, although, the use of the diagram may be a more subtle indication of their view, it may also be just a handy diagram and they are not so sensitive to the use of the words as some on this thread.

On the MCAS front, again with trepidation. It seems the high speed element stated for V1.0 is expressed in the use of g-sensor as a trigger i.e. high (vertical) speed - climb, not airspeed per se, airspeed is accounted for in the algorithm to set the AOA trigger value. It follows that the use of low speed stated for V2.0 is low (vertical) speed (level flight or maybe even negative g) and hence the g sensor can not be used and was removed. Airspeed (indicated or computed?) is still used to calculate the AOA trigger value.

Hence we end up with an MCAS that will activate with A/C in any attitude (there may be roll restriction) or flight stage if flaps up and A/P off (and I would assume a minimum altitude restriction), if the calculated AOA trigger point is exceeded.

I think whether or not you call it anti stall is moot (and may well be debated in court).

Ray


That is entirely plausible but on the other hand EASA could be in the same state(or near to the same state) as the FAA and they basically just Googled "Problems with the MAX" and that is how they generated their own list without doing the work themselves.

As they relied on the FAA to do the original MAX certification their tribal knowledge of the design could be relatively low and this is all just political posturing to make it look like they are doing something.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 10:42 am

Agrajag wrote:
jollo wrote:
morrisond wrote:
You would have to show intent to prove criminal negligence.


Agrajag wrote:
Actually, 'intent' is the one thing you would not have to show.


I am not a lawyer, but I think Agrajag has a point: IIRC "criminal negligence" is a lesser degree of culpability than "criminal intent". So - if I'm not mistaken - by definition if you show intent, you have proven it's not negligence (with recklessness and gross negligence somewhere in between).

However the concept is "failure to foresee and to avoid the manifestation of a danger", and if you think it cannot be a crime if it's not willful, think again.



Exactly so.


OK - so then the new standard is that if an Engineer or an Organization makes a mistake they are going to Jail?

Does that apply to FAA employees as well for lack of oversight or Airplane mechanics neglecting to replace a component that results in a crash or for pilots that fail to follow a published procedure?

Good luck on getting Good/Smart people into the industry if that is the standard people on here are believing that the Aviation industry should be held too.
 
WIederling
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 10:44 am

XRAYretired wrote:
I think whether or not you call it anti stall is moot (and may well be debated in court).


A rose by any other name :-)

I do balk at the high speed thingy.
This backstory appears to be more of a detraction than anything else.

Higher speeds provide more lift from the same AoA.
The region most susceptible to being over "AoAd" is just after you
have retracted flaps into clean config. i.e. lowish speed in the clean config domain.
Murphy is an optimist
 
planecane
Posts: 1085
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 10:44 am

keesje wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:
lightsaber wrote:


(E.g., a friend at work was stupid and earned a DUI, automatic grounds for termination at my work. His 20 year younger wife has major health problems, so to keep her with enough funds and a few years of bridge health insurance, he committed suicide last weekend before being officially fired, scheduled for last Monday


That deeply sucks. Tragic. Condolences.

- Introduce reasonable healthcare fall back for everybody, wether they deserve it or not. But don't name it Obamacare, people learned to hate that...
- We should be carefull not to accept short cuts on safety. I think the certification requirements of the MAX were grandfathered to much.


There already is. It is called Medicaid. Also, the aforementioned Obamacare (which is actually named the affordable care act) provides subsidies for premiums based on income. No reason to commit suicide to ensure health care for a spouse. Very sad that the guy in the story did that.
 
planecane
Posts: 1085
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 11:00 am

WIederling wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
I think whether or not you call it anti stall is moot (and may well be debated in court).


A rose by any other name :-)

I do balk at the high speed thingy.
This backstory appears to be more of a detraction than anything else.

Higher speeds provide more lift from the same AoA.
The region most susceptible to being over "AoAd" is just after you
have retracted flaps into clean config. i.e. lowish speed in the clean config domain.

The backstory is a fact as reported by the wall Street journal in an extensive investigative report. If they knew (as you apparently do) that MCAS would be needed at low speed, why would they include the g force sensor in the design? It is pretty clear that they had unexpected flight test results at low speed and decided that expanding the envelope of MCAS was the solution.

The fact that Boeing had stated multiple times that it activates in rarely entered parts of the flight envelope contradicts your assertion that the most susceptible region is just after flaps retraction. This would be a very frequently entered part of the envelope. Pretty much 100%.
 
astuteman
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 11:11 am

morrisond wrote:
Agrajag wrote:
jollo wrote:



I am not a lawyer, but I think Agrajag has a point: IIRC "criminal negligence" is a lesser degree of culpability than "criminal intent". So - if I'm not mistaken - by definition if you show intent, you have proven it's not negligence (with recklessness and gross negligence somewhere in between).

However the concept is "failure to foresee and to avoid the manifestation of a danger", and if you think it cannot be a crime if it's not willful, think again.



Exactly so.


OK - so then the new standard is that if an Engineer or an Organization makes a mistake they are going to Jail?

Does that apply to FAA employees as well for lack of oversight or Airplane mechanics neglecting to replace a component that results in a crash or for pilots that fail to follow a published procedure?

Good luck on getting Good/Smart people into the industry if that is the standard people on here are believing that the Aviation industry should be held too.


Firstly, it's not a new standard - it has been around a very long time.
Secondly, it is not "an Engineer" that becomes liable for criminal negligence.
It will be the Design "authority" or their delegate.

Any regulatory body, whether it be in aerospace, or nuclear, or construction, or whatever, will require you to demonstrate "a safe system" in order for you to be certified.
That system will have to demonstrate how "Authority" is delegated down through the organisation from the CEO to (in this case) the Exec VP for Engineering, and so on downward, through persons that can be demonstrated to have the depth and breadth of Engineering knowledge and experience to exercise that Authority..

That safe system will of necessity demand an oversight from an authorised body which approves (authorises) anything that an engineer does that affects product safety. It is not possible to gain accreditation by leaving "Authority" vested in a line engineer.
Thus a line Engineer will not be liable for criminal negligence.

But those in the authorisation process absolutely can be liable, if they demonstrably failed to exert the authority vested in them through the licence conditions mandated by the regulator in an appropriate manner.

If this had been the UK, I would have expected that by now either a Senior Product Assurance VP, or the Chief Engineer on the 737, or the Chief Engineer for commercial aircraft, or any combination thereof would have been suspended immediately, and now be the subject of an investigation.

But no proof of intent is required to convict for criminal negligence.
All that is needed is proof that the authorisation process was either compromised, or flawed in the first place (the latter of which will bring the Regulator into question as well - as seems to have happened with the MAX).

But the liability lies with the Delegated Design Authority. Period.
And always has.

Rgds
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 560
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 11:15 am

WIederling wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
I think whether or not you call it anti stall is moot (and may well be debated in court).


A rose by any other name :-)

I do balk at the high speed thingy.
This backstory appears to be more of a detraction than anything else.

Higher speeds provide more lift from the same AoA.
The region most susceptible to being over "AoAd" is just after you
have retracted flaps into clean config. i.e. lowish speed in the clean config domain.

Assume you mean airspeed, then the calculated AOA trigger value will no doubt be lower at lower airspeeds.

Ray
 
kalvado
Posts: 1893
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 11:16 am

planecane wrote:
WIederling wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
I think whether or not you call it anti stall is moot (and may well be debated in court).


A rose by any other name :-)

I do balk at the high speed thingy.
This backstory appears to be more of a detraction than anything else.

Higher speeds provide more lift from the same AoA.
The region most susceptible to being over "AoAd" is just after you
have retracted flaps into clean config. i.e. lowish speed in the clean config domain.

The backstory is a fact as reported by the wall Street journal in an extensive investigative report. If they knew (as you apparently do) that MCAS would be needed at low speed, why would they include the g force sensor in the design? It is pretty clear that they had unexpected flight test results at low speed and decided that expanding the envelope of MCAS was the solution.

The fact that Boeing had stated multiple times that it activates in rarely entered parts of the flight envelope contradicts your assertion that the most susceptible region is just after flaps retraction. This would be a very frequently entered part of the envelope. Pretty much 100%.

And all we can do is to keep over-interpreting Boeing's vague statements.
Lowest speed at flaps up - that should higher AoA - is indeed after takeoff; how close plane comes to MCAS activation is a big unknown. If "stick shaker activates well before MCAS" is to be believed, then no, not too close. Besides, denser air may mean AoA at initial climb is not that high as it is up at cruise.
There is a speculation above that airspeed is a part of MCAS input; again that was never directly said, and may not be the case - or most likely not the case.

Overall, looks like this information is not available outside Boeing - as MCAS certification was in-house to begin with; so EASA attempt to squeeze and verify some data is perfectly reasonable.
 
WIederling
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Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 11:20 am

planecane wrote:
The fact that Boeing had stated multiple times that it activates in rarely entered parts of the flight envelope contradicts your assertion that the most susceptible region is just after flaps retraction. This would be a very frequently entered part of the envelope. Pretty much 100%.

but not coupled with high g demand as in "maneuvering", right?

( and I give a s*t about "what Boeing stated" without very careful semantic analysis of what unmentioned/able facts could be hidden behind the statement.)
Murphy is an optimist
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 560
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 11:30 am

planecane wrote:
WIederling wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
I think whether or not you call it anti stall is moot (and may well be debated in court).


A rose by any other name :-)

I do balk at the high speed thingy.
This backstory appears to be more of a detraction than anything else.

Higher speeds provide more lift from the same AoA.
The region most susceptible to being over "AoAd" is just after you
have retracted flaps into clean config. i.e. lowish speed in the clean config domain.

The backstory is a fact as reported by the wall Street journal in an extensive investigative report. If they knew (as you apparently do) that MCAS would be needed at low speed, why would they include the g force sensor in the design? It is pretty clear that they had unexpected flight test results at low speed and decided that expanding the envelope of MCAS was the solution.

The fact that Boeing had stated multiple times that it activates in rarely entered parts of the flight envelope contradicts your assertion that the most susceptible region is just after flaps retraction. This would be a very frequently entered part of the envelope. Pretty much 100%.

Rather disingenuous. It is clear his reference is to exceeding the calculated AOA trigger value i.e. exactly the part of the envelope designed for or in high AOA value fault condition. e.g. our two incidents.

Ray
 
RickNRoll
Posts: 1752
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 11:34 am

morrisond wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
WIederling wrote:
I'd be surprised if a professional unit like EASA gets technically "confused".

Lower speed -> lower lift at same AoA. higher lift demand ( via "Maneuvering" ) requires higher AoA.
I don't think MCAS was ever really targeting the higher speed (relative to what) domain
but more like the "minimum speeds no flaps" range.

At the risk of being provocative, I'll have ago at clearing up the EASA point.

The EASA presentation includes a diagrammatic representation of the action of MCAS. This diagram includes 'anti stall system' in its title. They have used a diagram credited to 'The Air Current'. EASA have not called MCAS an anti stall system directly, although, the use of the diagram may be a more subtle indication of their view, it may also be just a handy diagram and they are not so sensitive to the use of the words as some on this thread.

On the MCAS front, again with trepidation. It seems the high speed element stated for V1.0 is expressed in the use of g-sensor as a trigger i.e. high (vertical) speed - climb, not airspeed per se, airspeed is accounted for in the algorithm to set the AOA trigger value. It follows that the use of low speed stated for V2.0 is low (vertical) speed (level flight or maybe even negative g) and hence the g sensor can not be used and was removed. Airspeed (indicated or computed?) is still used to calculate the AOA trigger value.

Hence we end up with an MCAS that will activate with A/C in any attitude (there may be roll restriction) or flight stage if flaps up and A/P off (and I would assume a minimum altitude restriction), if the calculated AOA trigger point is exceeded.

I think whether or not you call it anti stall is moot (and may well be debated in court).

Ray


That is entirely plausible but on the other hand EASA could be in the same state(or near to the same state) as the FAA and they basically just Googled "Problems with the MAX" and that is how they generated their own list without doing the work themselves.

As they relied on the FAA to do the original MAX certification their tribal knowledge of the design could be relatively low and this is all just political posturing to make it look like they are doing something.


That is some A grade supposing there.
 
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SomebodyInTLS
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 11:46 am

RickNRoll wrote:
hivue wrote:
WIederling wrote:

EASA is not entangled in the Boeing reality distortion field.
They see a nudy and talk about it.:-)


If sovereign aviation certificating authorities are now also getting confused about the actual technical issues involved then this whole thing could get way uglier than it already is.

Perhaps it was an anti stall system all along. Boeing just couldn't call it one.


Gee... dja think? ;)
"As with most things related to aircraft design, it's all about the trade-offs and much more nuanced than A.net likes to make out."
 
jollo
Posts: 363
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 11:59 am

morrisond wrote:
OK - so then the new standard is that if an Engineer or an Organization makes a mistake they are going to Jail?


He/she might not go to jail, but for sure they risk having their licenses and professional qualifications revoked (where I live and work, engineers are licensed officials). It may be an individual or an organization, but the Design Authority is still fully liable. And that's not a new standard: it's very much the current standard, thankfully.

However, I'm getting tired of following your attempts to deflect the discussion by chasing single words. A quick recap:
  • someone implied - in a sarcastic post, so maybe that was hyperbole, however unwarranted since we're talking about 300+ dead people - that MAX design issues leading to 2 MCAS-related crashes in 6 months (plus the current 6-months-and-counting grounding) are in any way comparable to A340 design issues possibly implicated in AF447: they are not, by any stretch of imagination.
  • you and other posters claimed MCAS can easily be disabled by pilots: it cannot. You can say that AND inputs issued by MCAS can be - temporarily - "inhibited" by pilots, "counteracted" by pilots, that pilots can apply workarounds to - temporarily - "stop MCAS affecting the plane", that pilots can cutout the electric trim actuators thus making MCAS inputs ineffective, but MCAS 1.0 cannot be selectively disabled by the flight crew. You can continue to use imprecise terminology, but it's not helping the quality of the discussion.
  • you have objected to my use of the term "criminal negligence" applied to Boeing's appalling design blunders: since the definition is "failure to foresee and to prevent the realization of a risk", that this is - in my opinion - exactly what happened at Boeing (and FAA), and that intentionality/premeditation has nothing to do with it, I stand by my wording. You are free to disagree.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 12:33 pm

kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:
WIederling wrote:

A rose by any other name :-)

I do balk at the high speed thingy.
This backstory appears to be more of a detraction than anything else.

Higher speeds provide more lift from the same AoA.
The region most susceptible to being over "AoAd" is just after you
have retracted flaps into clean config. i.e. lowish speed in the clean config domain.

The backstory is a fact as reported by the wall Street journal in an extensive investigative report. If they knew (as you apparently do) that MCAS would be needed at low speed, why would they include the g force sensor in the design? It is pretty clear that they had unexpected flight test results at low speed and decided that expanding the envelope of MCAS was the solution.

The fact that Boeing had stated multiple times that it activates in rarely entered parts of the flight envelope contradicts your assertion that the most susceptible region is just after flaps retraction. This would be a very frequently entered part of the envelope. Pretty much 100%.

And all we can do is to keep over-interpreting Boeing's vague statements.
Lowest speed at flaps up - that should higher AoA - is indeed after takeoff; how close plane comes to MCAS activation is a big unknown. If "stick shaker activates well before MCAS" is to be believed, then no, not too close. Besides, denser air may mean AoA at initial climb is not that high as it is up at cruise.
There is a speculation above that airspeed is a part of MCAS input; again that was never directly said, and may not be the case - or most likely not the case.

Overall, looks like this information is not available outside Boeing - as MCAS certification was in-house to begin with; so EASA attempt to squeeze and verify some data is perfectly reasonable.

FYI on airspeed. I think this is not quite so vague as a lot of the Boeing stuff.

'...............The function is commanded by the Flight Control Computer (FCC) using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.
The MCAS function becomes active when the AoA exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. .................

Ray
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 12:45 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
FYI on airspeed. I think this is not quite so vague as a lot of the Boeing stuff.

'...............The function is commanded by the Flight Control Computer (FCC) using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.
The MCAS function becomes active when the AoA exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. .................

Ray

Well, a grain of common sense still exists. How big of a grain? Would be a tricky question, as AoA is used in airspeed calculations - sure, since Pitots are not movable - an airspeed would be way off on both crashed flights. And airspeed unreliable flag is just ignored?
 
SRT75
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 12:51 pm

airnorth wrote:
Some more AC MAX movements, not really sure what's up. I'm sure they need a special permit to ferry or perform test flights. The last time C-GEHL was active a few days back it flew a few segments one day before heading back to YUL, now I see that it has been ferried to MZJ, Pinal Airport, storage perhaps?

C-GEJL is currently in the air, flying YYC-YUL as AC2358.
https://www.flightradar24.com/ACA2358/220c8f57

edited to add the FR24 link.


Sorry if this has been covered (hard to keep up with 3000+ posts), but will Boeing fly each frame at least once after it is upgraded and before it is delivered/re-delivered to the customer? That's a LOT of test flights!
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 12:55 pm

jollo wrote:
morrisond wrote:
OK - so then the new standard is that if an Engineer or an Organization makes a mistake they are going to Jail?


He/she might not go to jail, but for sure they risk having their licenses and professional qualifications revoked (where I live and work, engineers are licensed officials). It may be an individual or an organization, but the Design Authority is still fully liable. And that's not a new standard: it's very much the current standard, thankfully.

However, I'm getting tired of following your attempts to deflect the discussion by chasing single words. A quick recap:
  • someone implied - in a sarcastic post, so maybe that was hyperbole, however unwarranted since we're talking about 300+ dead people - that MAX design issues leading to 2 MCAS-related crashes in 6 months (plus the current 6-months-and-counting grounding) are in any way comparable to A340 design issues possibly implicated in AF447: they are not, by any stretch of imagination.
  • you and other posters claimed MCAS can easily be disabled by pilots: it cannot. You can say that AND inputs issued by MCAS can be - temporarily - "inhibited" by pilots, "counteracted" by pilots, that pilots can apply workarounds to - temporarily - "stop MCAS affecting the plane", that pilots can cutout the electric trim actuators thus making MCAS inputs ineffective, but MCAS 1.0 cannot be selectively disabled by the flight crew. You can continue to use imprecise terminology, but it's not helping the quality of the discussion.
  • you have objected to my use of the term "criminal negligence" applied to Boeing's appalling design blunders: since the definition is "failure to foresee and to prevent the realization of a risk", that this is - in my opinion - exactly what happened at Boeing (and FAA), and that intentionality/premeditation has nothing to do with it, I stand by my wording. You are free to disagree.


AF447 was an A330.

You need to be more precise - in your original post you were implying that there was nothing the crews could do to counteract MCAS. In your own words "Let's not forget that MCAS 1.0 is (or was) an automation system with unlimited authority, vulnerable to single sensor failure, with no input sanitation and no way for human operators to disable it:"

That statement is wrong and implies that whatever the crews did that once MCAS became active they were going to have to ride it to the ground no matter what they did. Casual readers of this thread would easily come to that conclusion based on what you wrote.

I'll stand by my original statement - Hitting the Trim cutoff switches (just like Boeing told Airlines to do after Lionair) or dropping the flaps would have disabled it. Technically you have a point on the trim Cut-off switches as MCAS would still be trying to affect the plane - however with no result - but you keep avoiding the drop the flaps work around.

I was objecting to the Criminal Negligence comment more from a Hyperbole standpoint. I will be amazed if anyone from Boeing or the FAA sees the inside of a Jail cell or faces actual criminal charges.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 12:56 pm

SRT75 wrote:
airnorth wrote:
Some more AC MAX movements, not really sure what's up. I'm sure they need a special permit to ferry or perform test flights. The last time C-GEHL was active a few days back it flew a few segments one day before heading back to YUL, now I see that it has been ferried to MZJ, Pinal Airport, storage perhaps?

C-GEJL is currently in the air, flying YYC-YUL as AC2358.
https://www.flightradar24.com/ACA2358/220c8f57

edited to add the FR24 link.


Sorry if this has been covered (hard to keep up with 3000+ posts), but will Boeing fly each frame at least once after it is upgraded and before it is delivered/re-delivered to the customer? That's a LOT of test flights!

Plenty of planes are flown away from Boeing to storage locations to make more room. Return flight may be the test flight for those
 
Ugly51
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 1:06 pm

[quote="freakyrat"]From This mornings Dallas Morning News.
Southwest is optimistic.

https://www.dallasnews.com/business/loc ... nksgiving/[/quote

I read an article a few days ago. It stated that an Ex-Boeing company pilot had taken the 5th amendment concerning producing legal documentation to the US government.
He is working for Southwest. This definitely does not bode well for Boeing. I think the net is slowly closing now]
 
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Polot
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 1:14 pm

SRT75 wrote:
airnorth wrote:
Some more AC MAX movements, not really sure what's up. I'm sure they need a special permit to ferry or perform test flights. The last time C-GEHL was active a few days back it flew a few segments one day before heading back to YUL, now I see that it has been ferried to MZJ, Pinal Airport, storage perhaps?

C-GEJL is currently in the air, flying YYC-YUL as AC2358.
https://www.flightradar24.com/ACA2358/220c8f57

edited to add the FR24 link.


Sorry if this has been covered (hard to keep up with 3000+ posts), but will Boeing fly each frame at least once after it is upgraded and before it is delivered/re-delivered to the customer? That's a LOT of test flights!

They are going to be doing all the usual pre delivery test flying (both the standard Boeing ones and the customer test flights) with them anyways. That’s one reason why it will take a bit to clear through the backlog.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 1:21 pm

morrisond wrote:
You need to be more precise - in your original post you were implying that there was nothing the crews could do to counteract MCAS. In your own words "Let's not forget that MCAS 1.0 is (or was) an automation system with unlimited authority, vulnerable to single sensor failure, with no input sanitation and no way for human operators to disable it:"

That statement is wrong and implies that whatever the crews did that once MCAS became active they were going to have to ride it to the ground no matter what they did. Casual readers of this thread would easily come to that conclusion based on what you wrote.

I'll stand by my original statement - Hitting the Trim cutoff switches (just like Boeing told Airlines to do after Lionair) or dropping the flaps would have disabled it. Technically you have a point on the trim Cut-off switches as MCAS would still be trying to affect the plane - however with no result - but you keep avoiding the drop the flaps work around.

I was objecting to the Criminal Negligence comment more from a Hyperbole standpoint. I will be amazed if anyone from Boeing or the FAA sees the inside of a Jail cell or faces actual criminal charges.

The disagreement is probably because there is two aspects of the problem in case of a erratic high AoA:

1) From the MCAS point of view: it can be disabled by an action on the trim switches, setting flaps not up, or by the cutoff switches. Only the cutoff switch procedure was documented after JT610 in case of erratic high AoA.

2) From the safety point of view: Using the only documented procedure, the cutoff switches, will not only disable the MCAS but also disable the electric trim, so that only the "too hard to use" trim wheels remains. This is just exchanging a critical problem for an other critical problem. Add that the MCAS have already put the stabilizer in a extreme position and you can see why disabling the MCAS that way will not improve safety. The final problem is that no training was done for the pilot to recognize quickly enough a erratic high AoA fault, to use the electric trim to stop and neutralize MCAS before using the cutoff switches, nor to set the flaps not up to selectively disable MCAS.

Commercial flight safety should not look like an escape game where there is little change to success without any error.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 1:25 pm

morrisond wrote:
OK - so then the new standard is that if an Engineer or an Organization makes a mistake they are going to Jail?


If it really turns out that the 737 MAX (without augmentation) can not fly safely within the permissible operating values ​​due to the engines mounted too far forward, and the redundancy and deployment logic of the augmentation system can not be solved properly then additional to the few hundreds of death bodies and thousands of desperate relatives $.$$$.$$$.$$$.$$$,- are in play and at some point the question will arise who knew something and who could have done something when.

The change of Boeing's technical chief pilot to a lower position with a Boeing customer at an interesting point of the timeline is quite ..... interesting ..... here.

It seems - if the assumptions are correct - to give a lot of people affected here and a lot of Errors, too.

ERROR 1:
Missed Opportunity. Boeing management has overlooked the fact that by installing the large new fuel-efficient engines, the busses could suddenly gain a significant market advantage. That was already recognizable years before, only nobody recognized it. This mistake was made by the Management. When it happened (A320NEO), they were desperately looking for a way to build similar big new engines for the 737NG. But due to the much lower ground clearance of the 737 compared to the airbuses, this was not possible.

ERROR 2:
Underestimated Problem. Under the pressure of the market to be able to offer a competitive product, boeing has decided to mount the engines far in front of the wings, because this way they could be attached to the 737. The technicians have certainly calculated the aerodynamics beforehand and already they must have seen that this will lead to aerodynamic problems. Management underestimated this problem, probably under pressure from stockholders and the sales department.

ERROR 3:
Decision not taken. Although they did not know exactly how to solve this problem, they started to market the product. The marketing was very successful, the product was developed. Boeing already had many thousands of pre-orders when it turned out that the aerodynamic issues are serious and it is doubtful if they are solvable. Instead of closing the MAX project and developing the NSA with high pressure, the problem was kept secret and technical solutions were sought to disguise it in front of customers and the regulatory authority. At this point in time, a large number of employes within boeing were clear about the scope of the problem.

ERROR 4:
Wrong assumption. In a completely FBW-controlled aircraft type, aerodynamic problems can be well compensated by the electronic flight control. It then only depends on the redundancy of the components and sensors. In contrast, in a fundamentally mechanically controlled aircraft such as the 737, additional electronic control of flight control surfaces is much more difficult to realize. It takes a variety of sensors and actuators to always respond to different flight situations. Such an extension, if properly conceived, is not much easier to build than a complete FBW concept. Many at the manufacturer boeing must have realized that not a common solution was created here but it was trying to mask a defect.

ERROR 5:
Wrong assumption. Apparently it was believed that with sufficient coverage of measures, use of unsuspicious terms and implementation of PR measures can not only obscure the aerodynamic deficiency, but also refrain from pilot training and thus can make additional profit on sales. That did not work in the long run due to the two disasters.

ERROR 6:
Fundamental problem not recognized. Consequences are not considered. It was not taken into account from the very beginning that a manually controlled aircraft such as the 737, if it shows a problematic flight behavior, is inevitably much more insecure in operation than an aircraft engineered for aerodynamic optimum. Until now, everyones focus is always on the most safe and reliable electronic augmentation of misconduct (MCAS). But this does not change the fact that a plane with aerodynamical flaws is much less secure in any kind of exceptional situations (operation at the limit of permissible values, overload, weather, evasive action, below average pilot skills, mechanical or electrical component faults, maintenance faults, etc.). Even the best augmentation system can not change that fact. You can only compensate aerodynamical flaws with a complete FBW system.


They should have realized sooner that their market position was endangered, then the NSA plane would already be in production today and nobody cares about a MAX.
If boeing have detected it too late then boeing would have to analyze the problem with the aerodnamic in detail in time, then boeing would have stopped development on time.
But of course it is hard to cancel a product for which you have thousands of orders.

There is no Plan B for the 737 MAX.
Last edited by asdf on Wed Sep 11, 2019 1:44 pm, edited 7 times in total.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 1:31 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Commercial flight safety should not look like an escape game where there is little change to success without any error.

Where we are heading is much more simple, when you consider that all these decision trees and escape games will still be required but done by the computer, the graphic of the dog in the cockpit become less funny and more real. One does not need to know physics to operate a computer.
Will leave my thoughts at that before being accused of trying to blame pilots, absolve Boeing, etc etc etc.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 1:57 pm

par13del wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Commercial flight safety should not look like an escape game where there is little change to success without any error.

Where we are heading is much more simple, when you consider that all these decision trees and escape games will still be required but done by the computer, the graphic of the dog in the cockpit become less funny and more real. One does not need to know physics to operate a computer.
Will leave my thoughts at that before being accused of trying to blame pilots, absolve Boeing, etc etc etc.


That reminds me of the Movie "Lost in Space" when the "Pilot" of the spaceship Matt LeBlanc is frustrated at the amount of automation and is given the instruction to take off and simply presses one button says "And the Monkey Presses the Button"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nkru1_beXpA
 
jollo
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 2:09 pm

morrisond wrote:
AF447 was an A330. You need to be more precise


Yes, well: when I am not precise, I thank for the correction and move on. Of course, AF447 was an A330, thanks for the correction. Not that it makes one bit of difference for the argument.

morrisond wrote:
In your original post you were implying that there was nothing the crews could do to counteract MCAS. [...]
That statement [...] implies that whatever the crews did that once MCAS became active they were going to have to ride it to the ground no matter what they did. Casual readers of this thread would easily come to that conclusion based on what you wrote.


I never wrote anything of the sort and it takes a very partisan outlook to see this implied meaning in my posts. I said that MCAS (an automation controller) cannot be (selectively) disabled by the flight crew, and then clarified my meaning exhaustively.

If we started making up implied meanings, one could say that your insistence that "it's easy for the pilots to disable MCAS" could be meant to make casual readers think "Oh, it was so easy! Why didn't the pilots simply switch the damn thing off?". So let's not go down that alley, pretty please?

morrisond wrote:
II'll stand by my original statement - Hitting the Trim cutoff switches (just like Boeing told Airlines to do after Lionair) or dropping the flaps would have disabled it. Technically you have a point on the trim Cut-off switches as MCAS would still be trying to affect the plane - however with no result - but you keep avoiding the drop the flaps work around.


I'm not avoiding anything: as I already explained more that once, FLAPS UP is just one of several activation conditions in MCAS control logic. With sufficient knowledge of the control logic (and time to think it out), you could in principle inhibit MCAS control inputs by negating any of the necessary conditions, not only by dropping flaps: you could just as well switch the A/P on, or you could stick your hand out of the cockpit window and force the active AOA vane to a position under the activation threshold for the current altitude and speed. Any of those actions would - temporarily - stop MCAS from issuing control inputs, but none can be defined as "disabling MCAS". If you do not get - or do not want to get - the difference in concept between "active" and "enabled", then I cannot help you further.

(as already noted, the only way to effectively "disable MCAS" would be to cut off power to the FCC - with even more critical side-effects than cutting off the electric trim actuator, so that's not really advisable).

morrisond wrote:
I was objecting to the Criminal Negligence comment more from a Hyperbole standpoint. I will be amazed if anyone from Boeing or the FAA sees the inside of a Jail cell or faces actual criminal charges.


AFAIK the FBI is investigating possible charges: they will surely take your view that they are wasting taxpayer's money in careful consideration.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 2:31 pm

asdf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
OK - so then the new standard is that if an Engineer or an Organization makes a mistake they are going to Jail?


If it really turns out that the 737 MAX (without augmentation) can not fly safely within the permissible operating values ​​due to the engines mounted too far forward, and the redundancy and deployment logic of the augmentation system can not be solved properly then additional to the few hundreds of death bodies and thousands of desperate relatives $.$$$.$$$.$$$.$$$,- are in play and at some point the question will arise who knew something and who could have done something when.

The change of Boeing's technical chief pilot to a lower position with a Boeing customer at an interesting point of the timeline is quite ..... interesting ..... here.

It seems - if the assumptions are correct - to give a lot of people affected here and a lot of Errors, too.

ERROR 1:
Missed Opportunity. Boeing management has overlooked the fact that by installing the large new fuel-efficient engines, the busses could suddenly gain a significant market advantage. That was already recognizable years before, only nobody recognized it. This mistake was made by the Management. When it happened (A320NEO), they were desperately looking for a way to build similar big new engines for the 737NG. But due to the much lower ground clearance of the 737 compared to the airbuses, this was not possible.

ERROR 2:
Underestimated Problem. Under the pressure of the market to be able to offer a competitive product, boeing has decided to mount the engines far in front of the wings, because this way they could be attached to the 737. The technicians have certainly calculated the aerodynamics beforehand and already they must have seen that this will lead to aerodynamic problems. Management underestimated this problem, probably under pressure from stockholders and the sales department.

ERROR 3:
Decision not taken. Although they did not know exactly how to solve this problem, they started to market the product. The marketing was very successful, the product was developed. Boeing already had many thousands of pre-orders when it turned out that the aerodynamic issues are serious and it is doubtful if they are solvable. Instead of closing the MAX project and developing the NSA with high pressure, the problem was kept secret and technical solutions were sought to disguise it in front of customers and the regulatory authority. At this point in time, a large number of employes within boeing were clear about the scope of the problem.

ERROR 4:
Wrong assumption. In a completely FBW-controlled aircraft type, aerodynamic problems can be well compensated by the electronic flight control. It then only depends on the redundancy of the components and sensors. In contrast, in a fundamentally mechanically controlled aircraft such as the 737, additional electronic control of flight control surfaces is much more difficult to realize. It takes a variety of sensors and actuators to always respond to different flight situations. Such an extension, if properly conceived, is not much easier to build than a complete FBW concept. Many at the manufacturer boeing must have realized that not a common solution was created here but it was trying to mask a defect.

ERROR 5:
Wrong assumption. Apparently it was believed that with sufficient coverage of measures, use of unsuspicious terms and implementation of PR measures can not only obscure the aerodynamic deficiency, but also refrain from pilot training and thus can make additional profit on sales. That did not work in the long run due to the two disasters.

ERROR 6:
Fundamental problem not recognized. Consequences are not considered. It was not taken into account from the very beginning that a manually controlled aircraft such as the 737, if it shows a problematic flight behavior, is inevitably much more insecure in operation than an aircraft engineered for aerodynamic optimum. Until now, everyones focus is always on the most safe and reliable electronic augmentation of misconduct (MCAS). But this does not change the fact that a plane with aerodynamical flaws is much less secure in any kind of exceptional situations (operation at the limit of permissible values, overload, weather, evasive action, below average pilot skills, mechanical or electrical component faults, maintenance faults, etc.). Even the best augmentation system can not change that fact. You can only compensate aerodynamical flaws with a complete FBW system.


They should have realized sooner that their market position was endangered, then the NSA plane would already be in production today and nobody cares about a MAX.
If boeing have detected it too late then boeing would have to analyze the problem with the aerodnamic in detail in time, then boeing would have stopped development on time.
But of course it is hard to cancel a product for which you have thousands of orders.

There is no Plan B for the 737 MAX.

Re: "Although they did not know exactly how to solve this problem, they started to market the product" -- that describes every product I've worked on for three plus decades as an engineer! The thing I'm working on now for two years still has big problems that my team does not know how to solve, and yet the product is in the marketplace already. Well, we always have field trials to try to sort it out. Engineers are inventive. We have a few approaches to solving the problem, but are not sure which one will be best.

Strange, you are suggesting the right answer was to go forward with NSA which had even more unsolved problems than did MAX, both in terms of engineering and marketing.

The answer to that is the one you already gave, the customers preferred a timely and affordable performance boost to MAX rather than the cost and delay that an all new aircraft comes with.

The fact that the MCAS design was totally botched does not undo the market verdict that the MAX was the preferred product.
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The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 2:48 pm

Revelation wrote:

The fact that the MCAS design was totally botched does not undo the market verdict that the MAX was the preferred product.


I normally enjoy your posts, but that just sounds like a bad excuse.

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 2:57 pm

oschkosch wrote:
Revelation wrote:

The fact that the MCAS design was totally botched does not undo the market verdict that the MAX was the preferred product.


I normally enjoy your posts, but that just sounds like a bad excuse.

The reality was that the customers were not willing to wait the amount of time it was going to take to do a NSA nor were they willing to pay what it would cost to produce it, nor sacrifice compatibility with all the 737 training and spares they had already purchased for what was probably not a significant gain in fuel burn relative to the competitor.

The reality was that Boeing did not understand how to build CFRP narrow bodies at the rate and cost needed to satisfy the market back in 2011.

The reality is that Boeing needs an effort similar to NMA to prove out the techniques needed for building CRFP airplanes at the required rate and cost needed to satisfy the NSA market, and even that is taking till 2025 or so to achieve.

The reality is the CFRP narrow body is not going to provide much performance gain over the MAX, and in some missions may actually be less efficient, depending on what missions they target the NSA for.

The reality is that NSA was not a viable product back when they made the MAX launch decision in 2011.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
Agrajag
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:03 pm

morrisond wrote:
Agrajag wrote:
jollo wrote:



I am not a lawyer, but I think Agrajag has a point: IIRC "criminal negligence" is a lesser degree of culpability than "criminal intent". So - if I'm not mistaken - by definition if you show intent, you have proven it's not negligence (with recklessness and gross negligence somewhere in between).

However the concept is "failure to foresee and to avoid the manifestation of a danger", and if you think it cannot be a crime if it's not willful, think again.



Exactly so.


OK - so then the new standard is that if an Engineer or an Organization makes a mistake they are going to Jail?

Does that apply to FAA employees as well for lack of oversight or Airplane mechanics neglecting to replace a component that results in a crash or for pilots that fail to follow a published procedure?

Good luck on getting Good/Smart people into the industry if that is the standard people on here are believing that the Aviation industry should be held too.



Morrisond, i have been following your comments on here since the beginning of these Max threads. Well worth a glance back to March and April for anyone interested. At least being wrong all the time is a form of consistency. Well done.

I appreciate that you are not a lawyer but im sure you can use google. A clear explanation of Criminal Negligence can be found there.
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frmrCapCadet
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:06 pm

Off topic, but Medicaid is not available in all states. By design of the ACA it was suppose to be available. But States could greatly restrict it and most Red States did.
Buffet: the airline business...has eaten up capital...like..no other (business)
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:06 pm

Revelation wrote:
Re: "Although they did not know exactly how to solve this problem, they started to market the product" -- that describes every product I've worked on for three plus decades as an engineer! The thing I'm working on now for two years still has big problems that my team does not know how to solve, and yet the product is in the marketplace already. Well, we always have field trials to try to sort it out. Engineers are inventive. We have a few approaches to solving the problem, but are not sure which one will be best.

I don't know if the "big" problems you are talking about are safety critical problems. The precise objective of safety analysis, assessment, and testing is to avoid that this kind of problems are still present when operating a safety critical product. Commercial aircraft are safety< certified to ensure that all the safety analysis, assessment, and testing was done according to the safety regulation. Systematic implementation of that safety regulation have proved to lower the fatalities in the last few decades. Now there is a case where there is strong indications that the safety regulation was not properly implemented and consequently caused more fatalities.
 
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ExperimentalFTE
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:09 pm

Revelation wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
Revelation wrote:

The fact that the MCAS design was totally botched does not undo the market verdict that the MAX was the preferred product.


I normally enjoy your posts, but that just sounds like a bad excuse.

The reality was that the customers were not willing to wait the amount of time it was going to take to do a NSA nor were they willing to pay what it would cost to produce it, nor sacrifice compatibility with all the 737 training and spares they had already purchased for what was probably not a significant gain in fuel burn relative to the competitor.

The reality was that Boeing did not understand how to build CFRP narrow bodies at the rate and cost needed to satisfy the market back in 2011.

The reality is that Boeing needs an effort similar to NMA to prove out the techniques needed for building CRFP airplanes at the required rate and cost needed to satisfy the NSA market, and even that is taking till 2025 or so to achieve.

The reality is the CFRP narrow body is not going to provide much performance gain over the MAX, and in some missions may actually be less efficient, depending on what missions they target the NSA for.

The reality is that NSA was not a viable product back when they made the MAX launch decision in 2011.


Very nice summary! However it dies appear that you are advocating that market and customers belong to Boeing and you use that to justify idiotic program and business decisions of the modern school of management! Hey, they F-ED up big time that is bottom line.....just as they screwed others in the market when they went to -300series on 737 and later -700 in a same way market screwed them up now and they reacted wrongly to that on numerous accounts....

Karma can be real bitch sometimes...
 
jollo
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:15 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
morrisond wrote:
You need to be more precise - in your original post you were implying that there was nothing the crews could do to counteract MCAS. In your own words "Let's not forget that MCAS 1.0 is (or was) an automation system with unlimited authority, vulnerable to single sensor failure, with no input sanitation and no way for human operators to disable it:"

That statement is wrong and implies that whatever the crews did that once MCAS became active they were going to have to ride it to the ground no matter what they did. Casual readers of this thread would easily come to that conclusion based on what you wrote.

I'll stand by my original statement - Hitting the Trim cutoff switches (just like Boeing told Airlines to do after Lionair) or dropping the flaps would have disabled it. Technically you have a point on the trim Cut-off switches as MCAS would still be trying to affect the plane - however with no result - but you keep avoiding the drop the flaps work around.

I was objecting to the Criminal Negligence comment more from a Hyperbole standpoint. I will be amazed if anyone from Boeing or the FAA sees the inside of a Jail cell or faces actual criminal charges.

The disagreement is probably because there is two aspects of the problem in case of a erratic high AoA:

1) From the MCAS point of view: it can be disabled by an action on the trim switches, setting flaps not up, or by the cutoff switches. Only the cutoff switch procedure was documented after JT610 in case of erratic high AoA.

2) From the safety point of view: Using the only documented procedure, the cutoff switches, will not only disable the MCAS but also disable the electric trim, so that only the "too hard to use" trim wheels remains. This is just exchanging a critical problem for an other critical problem. Add that the MCAS have already put the stabilizer in a extreme position and you can see why disabling the MCAS that way will not improve safety. The final problem is that no training was done for the pilot to recognize quickly enough a erratic high AoA fault, to use the electric trim to stop and neutralize MCAS before using the cutoff switches, nor to set the flaps not up to selectively disable MCAS.

Commercial flight safety should not look like an escape game where there is little change to success without any error.


My only issue is one of terminology: as already discussed at length in other posts, I disagreee with the notion that MCAS can be easily disabled by pilots. It can be inhibited by dropping flaps, or its actuator - the electric trim motor - can be cut out (therefore making MCAS control inputs go “unheeded”), but neither action disables the MCAS controller - it’s always on. Mind you, both actions can be effective workarounds to deal with a runaway MCAS: they just don’t disable it.

Otherwise, agree 100% with your post.
Last edited by jollo on Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:21 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:21 pm

ExperimentalFTE wrote:
Revelation wrote:
oschkosch wrote:

I normally enjoy your posts, but that just sounds like a bad excuse.

The reality was that the customers were not willing to wait the amount of time it was going to take to do a NSA nor were they willing to pay what it would cost to produce it, nor sacrifice compatibility with all the 737 training and spares they had already purchased for what was probably not a significant gain in fuel burn relative to the competitor.

The reality was that Boeing did not understand how to build CFRP narrow bodies at the rate and cost needed to satisfy the market back in 2011.

The reality is that Boeing needs an effort similar to NMA to prove out the techniques needed for building CRFP airplanes at the required rate and cost needed to satisfy the NSA market, and even that is taking till 2025 or so to achieve.

The reality is the CFRP narrow body is not going to provide much performance gain over the MAX, and in some missions may actually be less efficient, depending on what missions they target the NSA for.

The reality is that NSA was not a viable product back when they made the MAX launch decision in 2011.


Very nice summary! However it dies appear that you are advocating that market and customers belong to Boeing and you use that to justify idiotic program and business decisions of the modern school of management! Hey, they F-ED up big time that is bottom line.....just as they screwed others in the market when they went to -300series on 737 and later -700 in a same way market screwed them up now and they reacted wrongly to that on numerous accounts....

Karma can be real bitch sometimes...

Honestly speaking, this is 20/20 hindsight. I am still not sure if clean sheet narrowbody really makes sense - even if launched today and not in 2011.
Boeing was choosing between two less than ideal options: clean sheet, new technology - hence high cost for low-cost market; or pushing platform to the limit (which they ALMOST did OK, I would say)
It was one of those situations without a clear winning strategy.
 
ArgentoSystems
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:28 pm

I'm listening to the Muilenburg at Laguna conference. As I suspected they are still not done with their fix of the second problem. I quote, "this is the work that we wrapping up now." Still no specifics of that the problem was.

Surprisingly he still blabbers about RTS early Q4. Unbelievable.
 
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ExperimentalFTE
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:28 pm

kalvado wrote:
ExperimentalFTE wrote:
Revelation wrote:
The reality was that the customers were not willing to wait the amount of time it was going to take to do a NSA nor were they willing to pay what it would cost to produce it, nor sacrifice compatibility with all the 737 training and spares they had already purchased for what was probably not a significant gain in fuel burn relative to the competitor.

The reality was that Boeing did not understand how to build CFRP narrow bodies at the rate and cost needed to satisfy the market back in 2011.

The reality is that Boeing needs an effort similar to NMA to prove out the techniques needed for building CRFP airplanes at the required rate and cost needed to satisfy the NSA market, and even that is taking till 2025 or so to achieve.

The reality is the CFRP narrow body is not going to provide much performance gain over the MAX, and in some missions may actually be less efficient, depending on what missions they target the NSA for.

The reality is that NSA was not a viable product back when they made the MAX launch decision in 2011.


Very nice summary! However it dies appear that you are advocating that market and customers belong to Boeing and you use that to justify idiotic program and business decisions of the modern school of management! Hey, they F-ED up big time that is bottom line.....just as they screwed others in the market when they went to -300series on 737 and later -700 in a same way market screwed them up now and they reacted wrongly to that on numerous accounts....

Karma can be real bitch sometimes...

Honestly speaking, this is 20/20 hindsight. I am still not sure if clean sheet narrowbody really makes sense - even if launched today and not in 2011.
Boeing was choosing between two less than ideal options: clean sheet, new technology - hence high cost for low-cost market; or pushing platform to the limit (which they ALMOST did OK, I would say)
It was one of those situations without a clear winning strategy.


I would say it was Time as number 1 and Money as number 2, nothing else..... redesigning CWB and MLG was option.....far away from clean sheet...

But it seemed easier to try and twist and bend rules and misrepresent stuff even when people expressed valid concerns....

You reap what you sow...
 
oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:29 pm

ArgentoSystems wrote:
I'm listening to the Muilenburg at Laguna conference. As I suspected they are still not done with their fix of the second problem. I quote, "this is the work that we wrapping up now." Still no specifics of that the problem was.

Surprisingly he still blabbers about RTS early Q4. Unbelievable.
well, did he say which year? ;-)

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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:35 pm

ExperimentalFTE wrote:
Very nice summary! However it dies appear that you are advocating that market and customers belong to Boeing and you use that to justify idiotic program and business decisions of the modern school of management! Hey, they F-ED up big time that is bottom line.....just as they screwed others in the market when they went to -300series on 737 and later -700 in a same way market screwed them up now and they reacted wrongly to that on numerous accounts....

The marketing has been correct for MAX. Boeing was selling MAXes faster than they could make them and hitting financial targets while doing so. The screw up was many poor decisions by engineers with regard to MCAS. We read that these happened largely because of management pressure, but when push comes to shove it is a part of an engineer's job to resist management pressure and produce safe designs and implementations to the best of one's abilities. Some of the things we've seen, such as accepting a single AoA input without sanitizing the data, multiple/endless MCAS activation, etc do not pass muster even if under large amounts of management pressure.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
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ExperimentalFTE
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:49 pm

Revelation wrote:
ExperimentalFTE wrote:
Very nice summary! However it dies appear that you are advocating that market and customers belong to Boeing and you use that to justify idiotic program and business decisions of the modern school of management! Hey, they F-ED up big time that is bottom line.....just as they screwed others in the market when they went to -300series on 737 and later -700 in a same way market screwed them up now and they reacted wrongly to that on numerous accounts....

The marketing has been correct for MAX. Boeing was selling MAXes faster than they could make them and hitting financial targets while doing so. The screw up was many poor decisions by engineers with regard to MCAS. We read that these happened largely because of management pressure, but when push comes to shove it is a part of an engineer's job to resist management pressure and not compromise on safety.


Marketing was correct for airplane which they didn't have, marketing was set way before they even knew about issues they are dealing with and that is another set of problems with modern management.

I highly disagree regarding engineering decisions! Not true! These were management decisions....and when management doesn't like what engineering has to say they retrieve and make their own decision.....unfortunately that is state of industry and parasites around industry we are dealing with...

And when shit hits the fan....well those very manager will blame those very engineers..

It doesn't get more Dilbert than this...
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 3:58 pm

ArgentoSystems wrote:
I'm listening to the Muilenburg at Laguna conference. As I suspected they are still not done with their fix of the second problem. I quote, "this is the work that we wrapping up now." Still no specifics of that the problem was.

Surprisingly he still blabbers about RTS early Q4. Unbelievable.

Yet ST's recent report about EASA doing its own test flights says FAA is largely ready to accept the fixes so IMO Q4 is still believable, even if it will be RTS of a small number of frames in the US only.

ExperimentalFTE wrote:
Marketing was correct for airplane which they didn't have, marketing was set way before they even knew about issues they are dealing with and that is another set of problems with modern management.

I highly disagree regarding engineering decisions! Not true! These were management decisions....and when management doesn't like what engineering has to say they retrieve and make their own decision.....unfortunately that is state of industry and parasites around industry we are dealing with...

And when shit hits the fan....well those very manager will blame those very engineers..

It doesn't get more Dilbert than this...

Hyperbole.

Marketing is not as ignorant of engineering issues as you suggest. They would have largely known the challenges of doing a clean sheet NSA in 2011. They may not have known issues related to MAX and nacelle lift but they would have known there were going to be engine integration issues and that engineering might need time and resources to resolve them.

The system counts on engineers (especially delegated representatives!) to not sign off on unsafe designs even with heavy management pressure to do so.

To me this is where the FBI/DoJ probe needs to be centered: who signed off, and why, are there any smoking guns?
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
DenverTed
Posts: 247
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 4:15 pm

Six months after the grounding and 20 years after the NG has been flying with two AOA sensors, EASA decides they need three? Maybe they can make a case for a slow retrofit, but this does not seem like a legitimate reason to delay the return to service.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Wed Sep 11, 2019 4:19 pm

DenverTed wrote:
Six months after the grounding and 20 years after the NG has been flying with two AOA sensors, EASA decides they need three? Maybe they can make a case for a slow retrofit, but this does not seem like a legitimate reason to delay the return to service.

In case you missed it, two planes crashed because of AoA failures...

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