XRAYretired
Posts: 632
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 1:08 pm

morrisond wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:
Piling up the strawmen there. The pilots thought they had the necessary knowledge to cope and tried to act appropriately. C. If it had been scale. Other pilots in a sim with MCAS modelling noted it was harder to deal with than expected. But this has all been said many times before so I don't know why you keep bringing it up.

"Some time in a simulator that had MCAS behaviour modelled accurately would have probably been useful"
The simulator training is a requirement that Boeing have the responsibility to set to comply with the aircraft safety regulation regarding a safety critical control surface.


So I take it you are a No to my question "So are you and Pixelflight basically saying you don't believe the ET Pilot's needed to take any action to understand EAD that was issued in regards to the Lionair crash?"

It's all Boeing's fault the pilot's didn't know and fully understand the EAD? No personal responsibility for ET or the Pilot's?

You really need to cut this ridiculous line. It has only been you, you alone, in this series of silly posts that is suggesting the pilots did not understand the EAD and suggesting that is what others must believe when they have just stated fact, for the most part. There is no evidence for you assertion in the first place.

Grow up.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1398
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 1:33 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
"Some time in a simulator that had MCAS behaviour modelled accurately would have probably been useful"
The simulator training is a requirement that Boeing have the responsibility to set to comply with the aircraft safety regulation regarding a safety critical control surface.


So I take it you are a No to my question "So are you and Pixelflight basically saying you don't believe the ET Pilot's needed to take any action to understand EAD that was issued in regards to the Lionair crash?"

It's all Boeing's fault the pilot's didn't know and fully understand the EAD? No personal responsibility for ET or the Pilot's?

You really need to cut this ridiculous line. It has only been you, you alone, in this series of silly posts that is suggesting the pilots did not understand the EAD and suggesting that is what others must believe when they have just stated fact, for the most part. There is no evidence for you assertion in the first place.

Grow up.


Ray - you are missing the point - Kalvado and PixelFlight were insisting that the Pilots and Airlines had no obligation to understand the EAD other than putting it in the manual therefore you can't fault the Pilots for errors in the air.

That is ridiculous.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1398
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 1:37 pm

kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
"Some time in a simulator that had MCAS behaviour modelled accurately would have probably been useful"
The simulator training is a requirement that Boeing have the responsibility to set to comply with the aircraft safety regulation regarding a safety critical control surface.


So I take it you are a No to my question "So are you and Pixelflight basically saying you don't believe the ET Pilot's needed to take any action to understand EAD that was issued in regards to the Lionair crash?"

It's all Boeing's fault the pilot's didn't know and fully understand the EAD? No personal responsibility for ET or the Pilot's?

ET pilots understood EAD to the extent it could be expected: treat MCAS as runaway, flip trim switch. Fine print convoluted wording in memory item? well...
. Lets see. Do you have a credit card? (I assume you do). It is your responsibility to read and understand the cardholder agreement. Lets check if you did that.
What are the fees and APR on cash advance taken in ATM of a foreign branch of your bank?


Somebodies lives (including my own) are are not dependent on my understanding the fine print on a credit card statement. That is a ridiculous analogy.
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 632
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 1:48 pm

morrisond wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
morrisond wrote:

So I take it you are a No to my question "So are you and Pixelflight basically saying you don't believe the ET Pilot's needed to take any action to understand EAD that was issued in regards to the Lionair crash?"

It's all Boeing's fault the pilot's didn't know and fully understand the EAD? No personal responsibility for ET or the Pilot's?

You really need to cut this ridiculous line. It has only been you, you alone, in this series of silly posts that is suggesting the pilots did not understand the EAD and suggesting that is what others must believe when they have just stated fact, for the most part. There is no evidence for you assertion in the first place.

Grow up.


Ray - you are missing the point - Kalvado and PixelFlight were insisting that the Pilots and Airlines had no obligation to understand the EAD other than putting it in the manual therefore you can't fault the Pilots for errors in the air.

That is ridiculous.

No they did not. You put that in to the conversation.

Ray
 
kalvado
Posts: 2022
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 1:57 pm

morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:

So I take it you are a No to my question "So are you and Pixelflight basically saying you don't believe the ET Pilot's needed to take any action to understand EAD that was issued in regards to the Lionair crash?"

It's all Boeing's fault the pilot's didn't know and fully understand the EAD? No personal responsibility for ET or the Pilot's?

ET pilots understood EAD to the extent it could be expected: treat MCAS as runaway, flip trim switch. Fine print convoluted wording in memory item? well...
. Lets see. Do you have a credit card? (I assume you do). It is your responsibility to read and understand the cardholder agreement. Lets check if you did that.
What are the fees and APR on cash advance taken in ATM of a foreign branch of your bank?


Somebodies lives (including my own) are are not dependent on my understanding the fine print on a credit card statement. That is a ridiculous analogy.

For someone who is not directly in charge of other's lives this is as close analogy as it can be. You see, education and training are what's left after most things you learn are forgotten. It is up to the educator to ensure that take-home message covers important issues. For most of us, message that cash advance APR is high is sufficient. Putting details in fine print, like Boeing did, is the best way to ensure those details will not be remembered few months later...
Toobad boeings engineers did remember too little from their college days...
 
morrisond
Posts: 1398
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 2:16 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
morrisond wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
You really need to cut this ridiculous line. It has only been you, you alone, in this series of silly posts that is suggesting the pilots did not understand the EAD and suggesting that is what others must believe when they have just stated fact, for the most part. There is no evidence for you assertion in the first place.

Grow up.


Ray - you are missing the point - Kalvado and PixelFlight were insisting that the Pilots and Airlines had no obligation to understand the EAD other than putting it in the manual therefore you can't fault the Pilots for errors in the air.

That is ridiculous.

No they did not. You put that in to the conversation.

Ray


You have to read back further.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1398
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 2:21 pm

kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:
ET pilots understood EAD to the extent it could be expected: treat MCAS as runaway, flip trim switch. Fine print convoluted wording in memory item? well...
. Lets see. Do you have a credit card? (I assume you do). It is your responsibility to read and understand the cardholder agreement. Lets check if you did that.
What are the fees and APR on cash advance taken in ATM of a foreign branch of your bank?


Somebodies lives (including my own) are are not dependent on my understanding the fine print on a credit card statement. That is a ridiculous analogy.

For someone who is not directly in charge of other's lives this is as close analogy as it can be. You see, education and training are what's left after most things you learn are forgotten. It is up to the educator to ensure that take-home message covers important issues. For most of us, message that cash advance APR is high is sufficient. Putting details in fine print, like Boeing did, is the best way to ensure those details will not be remembered few months later...
Toobad boeings engineers did remember too little from their college days...


Ok - then that is why certain things are drilled in Aviation - if the Automation starts doing crazy things - turn it all off (Electric Trim, Auto Pilot, Auto Throttle) and Hand Fly until you can figure things out. Get control of the airplane (attitude, speed, Altitude and Heading) and then figure out what to after you have control.

BTW - there was no fine print on the EAD/FCOM - it was right in the body of the document.
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 21434
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 2:21 pm

kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:
ET pilots understood EAD to the extent it could be expected: treat MCAS as runaway, flip trim switch. Fine print convoluted wording in memory item? well...
. Lets see. Do you have a credit card? (I assume you do). It is your responsibility to read and understand the cardholder agreement. Lets check if you did that.
What are the fees and APR on cash advance taken in ATM of a foreign branch of your bank?

Somebodies lives (including my own) are are not dependent on my understanding the fine print on a credit card statement. That is a ridiculous analogy.

For someone who is not directly in charge of other's lives this is as close analogy as it can be. You see, education and training are what's left after most things you learn are forgotten. It is up to the educator to ensure that take-home message covers important issues. For most of us, message that cash advance APR is high is sufficient. Putting details in fine print, like Boeing did, is the best way to ensure those details will not be remembered few months later...
Too bad boeings engineers did remember too little from their college days...

You aren't being paid to remember your credit card's APR. You aren't brought to a simulator to show you remember your APR before you can start your career, or every six months thereafter, or every time you change assignments, with a failure to do so potentially ending your career, thus giving you plenty of incentive to refresh your memory.

Allegedly some places follow different practices, where knowing memory items might not be as important:

In Jakarta, a graybeard captain, speaking to me on the condition of anonymity, described the attitude of the new owners toward their pilots. He said: “The pilots passed the check ride! They can fly the airplanes!” Also, in some owners’ view, the semiannual simulator training is wasteful because the simulators are costly to run and maintain, and while the pilots are playing around in them (while collecting their pay), they are not out producing revenue. Normally two pilots train in a simulator at a time, with an instructor seated behind them — so, three in the box. I was told that in Indonesian simulators, there are sometimes seven in there: two pilots flying, one instructing and four others standing up and logging the time.

Ref: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/maga ... ashes.html
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
Checklist787
Posts: 215
Joined: Sat Jun 01, 2019 2:37 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 2:25 pm

asdf wrote:
Checklist787 wrote:
Ugly51 wrote:
Boeing told no one about MCAS. They are ultimately responsible for both aviation disasters. This is a long way from over for Boeing.
The 737 Max, 777X, KC-46??? These problems need to be resolved or Boeings credibility is gone.


Any development of a new aircraft must have its time, 8 years on average. Nothing to do with credibility.

When the A320 crashed in Absheim in 1988 there was NO Twitter, FB, YouTube and INTERNET to express [its sarcasm.] :roll:


nothing to do with FB and twitter
a accident during an airshow is seriouse as any other and has to be investigated properly

but the MAX is a complete other animal
boeing knew that problem and hided it


Boeing might not have trusted pilots crashed and they had the right it was beyond comprehension as it then arose the microchip problem revealed last June by the FAA with a binary calculation that made vicious the recovery of driver control on MCAS. I remind you that in simulation the FAA pilots managed to regain control.

The irony is that this problem exists on the 737NG but not dangerous.
It was a design flaw that became even more vicious when designing the 737MAX when MCAS was integrated. On the other hand, when Airbus had accused the pilots who crashed in Absheim, the circumstances and the economic situation meant that at the time there was no Twitter, no FB, no YT and no internet.

That's what I try to explain!

So public opinion could not express itself contrary to the case of the 737MAX. IMHOI think that Boeing "does not necessarily deserve" this situation.

In any case, all who enjoy this situation must say that neither the industry nor the passengers nor the airlines are winners.

I hope this crisis will end soon ...

If I do not know something else it does not matter to me, I wanted to say what I think.

Thanks
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 651
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 3:47 pm

WIederling wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
The simulator training is a requirement that Boeing have the responsibility to set to comply with the aircraft safety regulation regarding a safety critical control surface.


When was the first simulator instance available that correctly modeled MCAS behavior ( inclusive of presenting correctly faults in its data path) ? who got it?

IMU ET had a "MAX" simulator freshly available that did not offer full compatibility to the MAX.
They could even have chained their crews down in the simulator. it would have made no difference.

Right, and this was Boeing decision to not make 737-8/9 MAX simulator required, as there goal was MAX = NG. ET did all right in this regards, in particular ET was one of the first airline to get a 737-8/9 MAX simulator. ET can't have responsibilities about the fact that the 737-8/9 MAX simulator was not correctly simulating the MCAS. Again this was a Boeing failure.
Last edited by PixelFlight on Sun Sep 22, 2019 4:07 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 651
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 3:55 pm

morrisond wrote:
So are you and Pixelflight basically saying you don't believe the ET Pilot's needed to take any action to understand EAD that was issued in regards to the Lionair crash?

ET302 pilots have perfectly understand the EAD as there implemented it correctly. There only take less than 10 seconds more delay that the unrealistic expected 3 seconds. What the EAD didn't tell them is that the manual trim wheels was unusable at there speed. The EAD was not clear enough about the that point to avoid to drives them in a unrecoverable fatal situation. This was proved later by simulation.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 651
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 4:03 pm

morrisond wrote:
]
It's all Boeing's fault the pilot's didn't know and fully understand the EAD? No personal responsibility for ET or the Pilot's?

Since you stall at the same level, I have to respond the same: ET302 pilots did understand the EAD as there correctly implemented it.
 
User avatar
OA412
Moderator
Posts: 4678
Joined: Thu Dec 28, 2000 6:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 5:06 pm

Please keep this thread on topic and stop rehashing the same old arguments.
Hughes Airwest - Top Banana In The West
 
sgrow787
Posts: 266
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 6:00 pm

Well it didn't take long for EASA's Patrick Ky to capitulate to the pressure..

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... x-s-future
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 9057
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 6:08 pm

Define "almost the same time", next week / day, a month or two?
I suspect this is just a trial balloon to see the response to the statement, if a lot of negativity, almost the same time will be 2020 as was previously mentioned probably end first quarter, if less negativity mid to late December when most are out for the holidays so 2020 anyway.

Bigger issue is we still need the details, we already have the new FAA head pilot talking about simulator time, still no details but it is what it is, 8 days to go for the fix submission deadline.
 
LJ
Posts: 4855
Joined: Wed Nov 17, 1999 8:28 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 6:12 pm

par13del wrote:
Define "almost the same time", next week / day, a month or two?


According to the article "a few days".
 
MrBretz
Posts: 396
Joined: Tue Jun 14, 2016 9:13 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 6:27 pm

Do you think the Q4 thread starting in just over a week will be as lively as the other threads? My opinion is that Boeing, the airliners' maintenance, and the pilots taken together will share the blame. How that is split up is anyone's guess and you can argue about it forever if you have nothing better to do.

I am more interested in when the MAX will return to the air. But that's just my focus.
 
User avatar
enzo011
Posts: 1688
Joined: Tue Jun 21, 2011 8:12 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 6:31 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Well it didn't take long for EASA's Patrick Ky to capitulate to the pressure..

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... x-s-future



If you have been following the Brexit debacle the past 3 years this type of statement would be very familiar. It is intended not to upset the boat but at the same time confirm that there are still issues to work through. He doesn't say they will follow the FAA, but they hope to be working together to ensure that there is very little time difference as they are aware that they have a working relationship with the FAA and unless it is impossible to avoid, rather not upset people before it is needed.

“We are in permanent contact with the FAA in order to remain coordinated and to be able to aim for a near simultaneous return to flight of the aircraft in Europe and the United States,” Ky told Air and Cosmos International.

“We have different administrative processes, and this could generate a few days’ difference in the end,” he said. “A return to service under the same conditions and at the same time is an objective, not an obligation.”


So a return to service under the same conditions is a objective, and what happens if they cannot achieve it? How long will it take Boeing to clear the hurdles from EASA to have the aircraft back in the air.
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 632
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 6:38 pm

A pragmatic review of the NYT magazine article.
https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/explos ... Ye6ZG5Fw2w

'Ultimately, the author’s attitude about airmanship and the pilot’s role in safety is sadly outmoded. The view of the pilot as the hero, the one who stands as the last line of defense against disaster is the stuff of John Wayne movies. The truth, which Langewiesche admits, is that a very small percentage of pilots who think they would be up to the task when faced with a difficult challenge in a flight simulator actually succeed at the task.
The dream of every pilot being a hero, like Tammie Jo Shults or Sully Sullenberger, is wishful thinking. Even worse, it gives rise to accepting inadequate aviation infrastructure, systems and training.
As poorly as the pilots of Lion Air 610 performed, they had the deck stacked against them, and if studying accidents shows us anything, it is that when things start going south in a complicated cockpit, even good pilots can have a very bad day. We need to expend our energy on keeping those bad days from happening instead of hoping in vain to have a pair of heroes in every cockpit. '

Ray
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 21434
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 6:56 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Well it didn't take long for EASA's Patrick Ky to capitulate to the pressure..

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... x-s-future

Although I wouldn't call what the article reports as "capitulation", some of us have been saying a black vs white "foot on the neck" approach seemed a bit much for quite a while now.

It should make Team A a bit happy that Dickson at least referred to "humility" in his remarks, no?

That seems to be what a lot of posters on this thread are clamoring the most for.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 21434
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 7:06 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
A pragmatic review of the NYT magazine article.
https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/explos ... Ye6ZG5Fw2w

'Ultimately, the author’s attitude about airmanship and the pilot’s role in safety is sadly outmoded. The view of the pilot as the hero, the one who stands as the last line of defense against disaster is the stuff of John Wayne movies. The truth, which Langewiesche admits, is that a very small percentage of pilots who think they would be up to the task when faced with a difficult challenge in a flight simulator actually succeed at the task.
The dream of every pilot being a hero, like Tammie Jo Shults or Sully Sullenberger, is wishful thinking. Even worse, it gives rise to accepting inadequate aviation infrastructure, systems and training.
As poorly as the pilots of Lion Air 610 performed, they had the deck stacked against them, and if studying accidents shows us anything, it is that when things start going south in a complicated cockpit, even good pilots can have a very bad day. We need to expend our energy on keeping those bad days from happening instead of hoping in vain to have a pair of heroes in every cockpit. '

I guess we all get to have opinions on what the right expecations are.

The P&P article suggests Langeweische is expecting heros in the cockpit, yet if you read what he wrote, he's just asking for basic airmanship.

For balance, here's the conclusion of Langeweische's article from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/maga ... ashes.html :

What we had in the two downed airplanes was a textbook failure of airmanship. In broad daylight, these pilots couldn’t decipher a variant of a simple runaway trim, and they ended up flying too fast at low altitude, neglecting to throttle back and leading their passengers over an aerodynamic edge into oblivion. They were the deciding factor here — not the MCAS, not the Max. Furthermore, it is certain that thousands of similar crews are at work around the world, enduring as rote pilots and apparently safe, but only so long as conditions are routine. Airbus has gone further than Boeing in acknowledging this reality with its robotic designs, though thereby, unintentionally, steepening the very decline it has tried to address. Boeing is aware of the decline, but until now — even after these two accidents — it has been reluctant to break with its traditional pilot-centric views. That needs to change, and someday it probably will; in the end Boeing will have no choice but to swallow its pride and follow the Airbus lead.

In some way, the opinions are more similar than they are different, in that they both are saying that Boeing needs to expect less from pilots going forward.

In some now deleted posts, we had a Boeing employee suggesting they and FAA have reached the same conclusion.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 9057
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 7:58 pm

So is the mindset that the Boeing fly by wire on the 787 / 777 is not adequate?
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 21434
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 8:06 pm

par13del wrote:
So is the mindset that the Boeing fly by wire on the 787 / 777 is not adequate?

If you're reacting to Langeweische's article, I would say Boeing fly by wire on the 787 / 777 is not being discussed.

BTW the NYT link itself works now.

I suspect they blocked non subscribers for the first three or so days.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 632
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 8:35 pm

Revelation wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
Well it didn't take long for EASA's Patrick Ky to capitulate to the pressure..

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... x-s-future

Although I wouldn't call what the article reports as "capitulation", some of us have been saying a black vs white "foot on the neck" approach seemed a bit much for quite a while now.

It should make Team A a bit happy that Dickson at least referred to "humility" in his remarks, no?

That seems to be what a lot of posters on this thread are clamoring the most for.

Perhaps evidence of a professional and collaborative approach from FAA and EASA to restore trust in the system (and return MAX to the air - safely).

Might upset some folks who desire only conflict.

Ray
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 651
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 9:00 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
Revelation wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
Well it didn't take long for EASA's Patrick Ky to capitulate to the pressure..

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... x-s-future

Although I wouldn't call what the article reports as "capitulation", some of us have been saying a black vs white "foot on the neck" approach seemed a bit much for quite a while now.

It should make Team A a bit happy that Dickson at least referred to "humility" in his remarks, no?

That seems to be what a lot of posters on this thread are clamoring the most for.

Perhaps evidence of a professional and collaborative approach from FAA and EASA to restore trust in the system (and return MAX to the air - safely).

Might upset some folks who desire only conflict.

Ray
:checkmark:
Certainly true.

EASA have always stated that there decisions regarding the 737-8/9 MAX are in compliance with the bilateral agreements. This bilateral agreements contains several articles on how to process to resolve disagreement. I think this is exactly what happened.
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 9057
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 9:09 pm

Revelation wrote:
par13del wrote:
So is the mindset that the Boeing fly by wire on the 787 / 777 is not adequate?

If you're reacting to Langeweische's article, I would say Boeing fly by wire on the 787 / 777 is not being discussed.

BTW the NYT link itself works now.

I suspect they blocked non subscribers for the first three or so days.

When the article first came out I posted that the MAX is the last commercial pax a/c with little to no FBW, so going forward Boeing will not be designing another.
So when he says "bite the bullet" I could have assumed he meant the 737, but as it relates to Boeing pilot centric, their FBW is still more pilot centric than Airbus, at least that's my take from all the professional who weighed in on the A330 and 777 crashes.
My question then and now would be if the FAA as a part of ungrounding the MAX says no more variations of the 737 unless it is a clean sheet.
 
User avatar
lightsaber
Moderator
Posts: 18146
Joined: Wed Jan 19, 2005 10:55 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 9:22 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Although I wouldn't call what the article reports as "capitulation", some of us have been saying a black vs white "foot on the neck" approach seemed a bit much for quite a while now.

It should make Team A a bit happy that Dickson at least referred to "humility" in his remarks, no?

That seems to be what a lot of posters on this thread are clamoring the most for.

Perhaps evidence of a professional and collaborative approach from FAA and EASA to restore trust in the system (and return MAX to the air - safely).

Might upset some folks who desire only conflict.

Ray
:checkmark:
Certainly true.

EASA have always stated that there decisions regarding the 737-8/9 MAX are in compliance with the bilateral agreements. This bilateral agreements contains several articles on how to process to resolve disagreement. I think this is exactly what happened.

My opinion is EASA has been professional. The FAA received a black eye, but was central to making aviation so safe.

There was a big lessons learned on FBW certification with these incidents. All future aircraft will receive more scrutiny.

Lightsaber
IM messages to mods on warnings and bans will be ignored and nasty ones will result in a ban.
 
WPIAeroGuy
Posts: 312
Joined: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 10:56 pm

I haven't posted in this thread in a while, but I've been following along. I've been meaning to post this for a while, hopefully it brings a slightly different perspective to the existing ideas.

1. In a hypothetical situation, let's say a Part 23 airplane has an engine failure at Vr that results in a crash. As we all know, this is a situation that every pilot should be able to handle. If we find out the engine failed because it was assembled with popsicle sticks and Elmer's glue, it still doesn't absolve the pilots. As far as I'm aware, you don't get to pass a botched checkride because the simulated failure was due to "negligent design" versus "an acceptable cause of failure."

2. The argument that the pilots didn't recognize the MCAS activation as runaway trim in my opinion, is ridiculous. First, it happened while the pilots were hand flying. They would have immediately felt the increased backpressure in the yoke and heard and/or saw the manual trim wheels moving. Second, they knew to correct by applying ANU electric trim. Unless they thought the 737 had an infinite amount of trim, they should have realized they were countering whatever automatic trim was being applied.

2a. While everyone is looking at this crash with 20/20 hindsight, imagine your an engineer at Boeing circa 2012. I feel like no one actually understands how hard it would be to not only predict this failure mode, but convince superiors it was dangerous enough to warrant a redesign. Let's pretend you're pretty much clairvoyant, and you predict the EXACT failure mode that happened in the LionAir crash. So you have to convince your superiors that MCAS is inadequate because two pilots each with several thousand hours would not recognize 6 minutes of repeated AND trim being applied as a runaway (or at a minimum, an issue with the electric trim system). If you went to the test pilots for an opinion, do you think they would tell you 1. "That's definitely not a runaway, because there's only one way trim can runaway" or 2. "It's some sort of runaway or issue with electric trim, I'd disable it and trim manually". Having been in this situation many times, I can easily see it being #2. So you determine that is a reasonable solution because you know all pilots are trained for a runaway, and it hasn't been an issue in 40 years of 737 flying.

3. I think the inital media storylines have played a major role in people's perception of the crash. If MCAS had been a paragraph on the iPad training then the whole "hidden system" storyline would have gone away, yet we likely wouldn't have seen any different outcome. Heck, not only did the ET pilots know about MCAS, they knew about its worst failure mode. However, I can completely understand why it wasn't included. It was treated as if the jackscrew motor was made by a different manufacturer who used a new type of insulation. The pilots don't need to know that the new vendor uses a cheaper insulation that is more likely to cause a short. They need to recognize the electric trim is not behaving as it should and disable it.

3a. In the meantime, especially in the ET case, the pilots have to fly the airplane. I don't' know how many of you follow FlightChops on YouTube, but he just did his BFR and his instructor brought up some excellent points regarding dealing with stressful situation and emergencies. As a demo, the instructor intentionally got the controller riled up, and then made Steve (the pilot) perform some menial tasks before he could respond to a frequency handoff. The point was to learn how to fight the urge to respond to distractions instead of flying the airplane. In the ET crash, they did not fall back to pitch and power settings when they should have. The excuses keep coming up that there were too many lights and alarms, etc. Well, that's the whole damn point of pitch and power. It's how to keep the airplane safe until you can figure out what's going on.

4. There's a huge difference between blame and responsibility. Boeing is responsible for a significant portion of the crash. However, I don't think I can blame them (i.e. assign them fault for negligence) because there was no way to predict that the MCAS activation would not be recognized as a trim runaway. Now, there might be an issue that trim runaways are in fact more dangerous than we though, however that opens the aperture up a lot and could apply to any aircraft with automatic trim. At the same time, I don't blame the pilots. I've certainly made some dumb mistakes in my flying history, and fortunately I haven't bent any metal. But I can see how easily it can happen. In this case, the mistakes cost them their lives. However, for example. if we started seeing accidents after to emergency descents due to rapid depressurization, then I think its equally as valid to question why the pilots couldn't handle these "routine" scenarios as it is to question the need to engineer a more robust fuselage.

I know I'm not bringing any new facts to light, but hopefully just looking at them from an existing perspective.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
SEU
Posts: 182
Joined: Wed Mar 13, 2019 7:21 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 11:24 pm

Its Q4 now - should be open a new thread?
 
kalvado
Posts: 2022
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Sun Sep 22, 2019 11:25 pm

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
I haven't posted in this thread in a while, but I've been following along. I've been meaning to post this for a while, hopefully it brings a slightly different perspective to the existing ideas.

1. In a hypothetical situation, let's say a Part 23 airplane has an engine failure at Vr that results in a crash. As we all know, this is a situation that every pilot should be able to handle. If we find out the engine failed because it was assembled with popsicle sticks and Elmer's glue, it still doesn't absolve the pilots. As far as I'm aware, you don't get to pass a botched checkride because the simulated failure was due to "negligent design" versus "an acceptable cause of failure."

2. The argument that the pilots didn't recognize the MCAS activation as runaway trim in my opinion, is ridiculous. First, it happened while the pilots were hand flying. They would have immediately felt the increased backpressure in the yoke and heard and/or saw the manual trim wheels moving. Second, they knew to correct by applying ANU electric trim. Unless they thought the 737 had an infinite amount of trim, they should have realized they were countering whatever automatic trim was being applied.

2a. While everyone is looking at this crash with 20/20 hindsight, imagine your an engineer at Boeing circa 2012. I feel like no one actually understands how hard it would be to not only predict this failure mode, but convince superiors it was dangerous enough to warrant a redesign. Let's pretend you're pretty much clairvoyant, and you predict the EXACT failure mode that happened in the LionAir crash. So you have to convince your superiors that MCAS is inadequate because two pilots each with several thousand hours would not recognize 6 minutes of repeated AND trim being applied as a runaway (or at a minimum, an issue with the electric trim system). If you went to the test pilots for an opinion, do you think they would tell you 1. "That's definitely not a runaway, because there's only one way trim can runaway" or 2. "It's some sort of runaway or issue with electric trim, I'd disable it and trim manually". Having been in this situation many times, I can easily see it being #2. So you determine that is a reasonable solution because you know all pilots are trained for a runaway, and it hasn't been an issue in 40 years of 737 flying.

3. I think the inital media storylines have played a major role in people's perception of the crash. If MCAS had been a paragraph on the iPad training then the whole "hidden system" storyline would have gone away, yet we likely wouldn't have seen any different outcome. Heck, not only did the ET pilots know about MCAS, they knew about its worst failure mode. However, I can completely understand why it wasn't included. It was treated as if the jackscrew motor was made by a different manufacturer who used a new type of insulation. The pilots don't need to know that the new vendor uses a cheaper insulation that is more likely to cause a short. They need to recognize the electric trim is not behaving as it should and disable it.

3a. In the meantime, especially in the ET case, the pilots have to fly the airplane. I don't' know how many of you follow FlightChops on YouTube, but he just did his BFR and his instructor brought up some excellent points regarding dealing with stressful situation and emergencies. As a demo, the instructor intentionally got the controller riled up, and then made Steve (the pilot) perform some menial tasks before he could respond to a frequency handoff. The point was to learn how to fight the urge to respond to distractions instead of flying the airplane. In the ET crash, they did not fall back to pitch and power settings when they should have. The excuses keep coming up that there were too many lights and alarms, etc. Well, that's the whole damn point of pitch and power. It's how to keep the airplane safe until you can figure out what's going on.

4. There's a huge difference between blame and responsibility. Boeing is responsible for a significant portion of the crash. However, I don't think I can blame them (i.e. assign them fault for negligence) because there was no way to predict that the MCAS activation would not be recognized as a trim runaway. Now, there might be an issue that trim runaways are in fact more dangerous than we though, however that opens the aperture up a lot and could apply to any aircraft with automatic trim. At the same time, I don't blame the pilots. I've certainly made some dumb mistakes in my flying history, and fortunately I haven't bent any metal. But I can see how easily it can happen. In this case, the mistakes cost them their lives. However, for example. if we started seeing accidents after to emergency descents due to rapid depressurization, then I think its equally as valid to question why the pilots couldn't handle these "routine" scenarios as it is to question the need to engineer a more robust fuselage.

I know I'm not bringing any new facts to light, but hopefully just looking at them from an existing perspective.

1. I guess the concept of multiple simultaneous failures didn't penetrate into your consciousness yet. This is a concept which
Unfortunately, some (many) of us will experience a similar situation at the older age, where multiple health problems are building on top of each other. Proper diagnostics of a most important problem can be a serious issue. Hopefully, it will not be after autopsy when the truth comes out. This is the key issue in any pilot-related discussion: triple, if not quadruple airplane failure with root cause indicator just forgotten. See (3) below
2a. Possible defense for Lion crash. But I essentially predicted ET scenario in Lion discussion. Boing engineers could - and should - have done the same while putting together EAD.
3. If,.. If... But If only Boeing did a better job, then yes, they wouldn't be where they are today. Maybe MAX would still be flying..
4. Yes. Boeing may offload some responsibility through courts, but they are forever to be blamed for MCAS fiasco.
 
dangle
Posts: 18
Joined: Sat Dec 03, 2016 8:45 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 12:14 am

Per WSJ, Indonesia's first government report nearing completion, likely to be released in early November:

Indonesian investigators have determined that design and oversight lapses played a central role in the fatal crash of a Boeing 737 MAX jet in October, according to people familiar with the matter, in what is expected to be the first formal government finding of fault.

The draft conclusions, these people said, also identify a string of pilot errors and maintenance mistakes as causal factors in the fatal plunge of the Boeing Co. plane into the Java Sea, echoing a preliminary report from Indonesia last year.


The latest version of Indonesia’s accident report has been shared with the FAA and NTSB for comment. U.S. officials are expected to visit Indonesia around the end of this month to finalize the document. People familiar with the process said NTSB experts don’t appear to have major disagreements with the draft. Boeing and the FAA, on the other hand, are concerned the final report will unduly emphasize design and FAA certification missteps, some of these people said.

Unlike NTSB reports that identify the primary cause of accidents and then list contributing issues determined to be less significant, Indonesia is following a convention used by many foreign regulators of listing causal factors without ranking them. Instead, the report is expected to list more than 100 elements of the crash chronology, according to a person briefed on the details. Many of those points are likely to refer to missteps by pilots and mechanics initially revealed last year in Indonesia’s preliminary report.


https://www.wsj.com/articles/indonesia- ... _lead_pos2
 
WPIAeroGuy
Posts: 312
Joined: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 12:29 am

kalvado wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
I haven't posted in this thread in a while, but I've been following along. I've been meaning to post this for a while, hopefully it brings a slightly different perspective to the existing ideas.

1. In a hypothetical situation, let's say a Part 23 airplane has an engine failure at Vr that results in a crash. As we all know, this is a situation that every pilot should be able to handle. If we find out the engine failed because it was assembled with popsicle sticks and Elmer's glue, it still doesn't absolve the pilots. As far as I'm aware, you don't get to pass a botched checkride because the simulated failure was due to "negligent design" versus "an acceptable cause of failure."

2. The argument that the pilots didn't recognize the MCAS activation as runaway trim in my opinion, is ridiculous. First, it happened while the pilots were hand flying. They would have immediately felt the increased backpressure in the yoke and heard and/or saw the manual trim wheels moving. Second, they knew to correct by applying ANU electric trim. Unless they thought the 737 had an infinite amount of trim, they should have realized they were countering whatever automatic trim was being applied.

2a. While everyone is looking at this crash with 20/20 hindsight, imagine your an engineer at Boeing circa 2012. I feel like no one actually understands how hard it would be to not only predict this failure mode, but convince superiors it was dangerous enough to warrant a redesign. Let's pretend you're pretty much clairvoyant, and you predict the EXACT failure mode that happened in the LionAir crash. So you have to convince your superiors that MCAS is inadequate because two pilots each with several thousand hours would not recognize 6 minutes of repeated AND trim being applied as a runaway (or at a minimum, an issue with the electric trim system). If you went to the test pilots for an opinion, do you think they would tell you 1. "That's definitely not a runaway, because there's only one way trim can runaway" or 2. "It's some sort of runaway or issue with electric trim, I'd disable it and trim manually". Having been in this situation many times, I can easily see it being #2. So you determine that is a reasonable solution because you know all pilots are trained for a runaway, and it hasn't been an issue in 40 years of 737 flying.

3. I think the inital media storylines have played a major role in people's perception of the crash. If MCAS had been a paragraph on the iPad training then the whole "hidden system" storyline would have gone away, yet we likely wouldn't have seen any different outcome. Heck, not only did the ET pilots know about MCAS, they knew about its worst failure mode. However, I can completely understand why it wasn't included. It was treated as if the jackscrew motor was made by a different manufacturer who used a new type of insulation. The pilots don't need to know that the new vendor uses a cheaper insulation that is more likely to cause a short. They need to recognize the electric trim is not behaving as it should and disable it.

3a. In the meantime, especially in the ET case, the pilots have to fly the airplane. I don't' know how many of you follow FlightChops on YouTube, but he just did his BFR and his instructor brought up some excellent points regarding dealing with stressful situation and emergencies. As a demo, the instructor intentionally got the controller riled up, and then made Steve (the pilot) perform some menial tasks before he could respond to a frequency handoff. The point was to learn how to fight the urge to respond to distractions instead of flying the airplane. In the ET crash, they did not fall back to pitch and power settings when they should have. The excuses keep coming up that there were too many lights and alarms, etc. Well, that's the whole damn point of pitch and power. It's how to keep the airplane safe until you can figure out what's going on.

4. There's a huge difference between blame and responsibility. Boeing is responsible for a significant portion of the crash. However, I don't think I can blame them (i.e. assign them fault for negligence) because there was no way to predict that the MCAS activation would not be recognized as a trim runaway. Now, there might be an issue that trim runaways are in fact more dangerous than we though, however that opens the aperture up a lot and could apply to any aircraft with automatic trim. At the same time, I don't blame the pilots. I've certainly made some dumb mistakes in my flying history, and fortunately I haven't bent any metal. But I can see how easily it can happen. In this case, the mistakes cost them their lives. However, for example. if we started seeing accidents after to emergency descents due to rapid depressurization, then I think its equally as valid to question why the pilots couldn't handle these "routine" scenarios as it is to question the need to engineer a more robust fuselage.

I know I'm not bringing any new facts to light, but hopefully just looking at them from an existing perspective.

1. I guess the concept of multiple simultaneous failures didn't penetrate into your consciousness yet. This is a concept which
Unfortunately, some (many) of us will experience a similar situation at the older age, where multiple health problems are building on top of each other. Proper diagnostics of a most important problem can be a serious issue. Hopefully, it will not be after autopsy when the truth comes out. This is the key issue in any pilot-related discussion: triple, if not quadruple airplane failure with root cause indicator just forgotten. See (3) below


They didn't have multiple simultaneous failures. They had multiple simultaneous alarms. Only the AoA vane was actually bad. And that's the crux of the issue. Nothing on the airplane that makes it fly was broken. They had all the tools to keep the airplane flying while they figured out what was going on. That's the whole point that Langewiesche's article is getting at. Both crews were so concerned with the root cause of the problem that they stopped flying the airplane.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
kalvado
Posts: 2022
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 12:55 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
kalvado wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
I haven't posted in this thread in a while, but I've been following along. I've been meaning to post this for a while, hopefully it brings a slightly different perspective to the existing ideas.

1. In a hypothetical situation, let's say a Part 23 airplane has an engine failure at Vr that results in a crash. As we all know, this is a situation that every pilot should be able to handle. If we find out the engine failed because it was assembled with popsicle sticks and Elmer's glue, it still doesn't absolve the pilots. As far as I'm aware, you don't get to pass a botched checkride because the simulated failure was due to "negligent design" versus "an acceptable cause of failure."

2. The argument that the pilots didn't recognize the MCAS activation as runaway trim in my opinion, is ridiculous. First, it happened while the pilots were hand flying. They would have immediately felt the increased backpressure in the yoke and heard and/or saw the manual trim wheels moving. Second, they knew to correct by applying ANU electric trim. Unless they thought the 737 had an infinite amount of trim, they should have realized they were countering whatever automatic trim was being applied.

2a. While everyone is looking at this crash with 20/20 hindsight, imagine your an engineer at Boeing circa 2012. I feel like no one actually understands how hard it would be to not only predict this failure mode, but convince superiors it was dangerous enough to warrant a redesign. Let's pretend you're pretty much clairvoyant, and you predict the EXACT failure mode that happened in the LionAir crash. So you have to convince your superiors that MCAS is inadequate because two pilots each with several thousand hours would not recognize 6 minutes of repeated AND trim being applied as a runaway (or at a minimum, an issue with the electric trim system). If you went to the test pilots for an opinion, do you think they would tell you 1. "That's definitely not a runaway, because there's only one way trim can runaway" or 2. "It's some sort of runaway or issue with electric trim, I'd disable it and trim manually". Having been in this situation many times, I can easily see it being #2. So you determine that is a reasonable solution because you know all pilots are trained for a runaway, and it hasn't been an issue in 40 years of 737 flying.

3. I think the inital media storylines have played a major role in people's perception of the crash. If MCAS had been a paragraph on the iPad training then the whole "hidden system" storyline would have gone away, yet we likely wouldn't have seen any different outcome. Heck, not only did the ET pilots know about MCAS, they knew about its worst failure mode. However, I can completely understand why it wasn't included. It was treated as if the jackscrew motor was made by a different manufacturer who used a new type of insulation. The pilots don't need to know that the new vendor uses a cheaper insulation that is more likely to cause a short. They need to recognize the electric trim is not behaving as it should and disable it.

3a. In the meantime, especially in the ET case, the pilots have to fly the airplane. I don't' know how many of you follow FlightChops on YouTube, but he just did his BFR and his instructor brought up some excellent points regarding dealing with stressful situation and emergencies. As a demo, the instructor intentionally got the controller riled up, and then made Steve (the pilot) perform some menial tasks before he could respond to a frequency handoff. The point was to learn how to fight the urge to respond to distractions instead of flying the airplane. In the ET crash, they did not fall back to pitch and power settings when they should have. The excuses keep coming up that there were too many lights and alarms, etc. Well, that's the whole damn point of pitch and power. It's how to keep the airplane safe until you can figure out what's going on.

4. There's a huge difference between blame and responsibility. Boeing is responsible for a significant portion of the crash. However, I don't think I can blame them (i.e. assign them fault for negligence) because there was no way to predict that the MCAS activation would not be recognized as a trim runaway. Now, there might be an issue that trim runaways are in fact more dangerous than we though, however that opens the aperture up a lot and could apply to any aircraft with automatic trim. At the same time, I don't blame the pilots. I've certainly made some dumb mistakes in my flying history, and fortunately I haven't bent any metal. But I can see how easily it can happen. In this case, the mistakes cost them their lives. However, for example. if we started seeing accidents after to emergency descents due to rapid depressurization, then I think its equally as valid to question why the pilots couldn't handle these "routine" scenarios as it is to question the need to engineer a more robust fuselage.

I know I'm not bringing any new facts to light, but hopefully just looking at them from an existing perspective.

1. I guess the concept of multiple simultaneous failures didn't penetrate into your consciousness yet. This is a concept which
Unfortunately, some (many) of us will experience a similar situation at the older age, where multiple health problems are building on top of each other. Proper diagnostics of a most important problem can be a serious issue. Hopefully, it will not be after autopsy when the truth comes out. This is the key issue in any pilot-related discussion: triple, if not quadruple airplane failure with root cause indicator just forgotten. See (3) below


They didn't have multiple simultaneous failures. They had multiple simultaneous alarms. Only the AoA vane was actually bad. And that's the crux of the issue. Nothing on the airplane that makes it fly was broken. They had all the tools to keep the airplane flying while they figured out what was going on. That's the whole point that Langewiesche's article is getting at. Both crews were so concerned with the root cause of the problem that they stopped flying the airplane.


They had what presented itself as multiple failures - without a clear way to trace things to the single root or time to stop, think and handle things one by one. A sole hint which could help was conveniently forgotten by Boeing.
Failure to realize after the Lion crash that a single failure presents itself as multipioint issue and act immediately is what makes Boeing look as a gang of amateurs - and makes me suspect that it is not just an appearance, but the essence.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1398
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 2:21 am

kalvado wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
kalvado wrote:
1. I guess the concept of multiple simultaneous failures didn't penetrate into your consciousness yet. This is a concept which
Unfortunately, some (many) of us will experience a similar situation at the older age, where multiple health problems are building on top of each other. Proper diagnostics of a most important problem can be a serious issue. Hopefully, it will not be after autopsy when the truth comes out. This is the key issue in any pilot-related discussion: triple, if not quadruple airplane failure with root cause indicator just forgotten. See (3) below


They didn't have multiple simultaneous failures. They had multiple simultaneous alarms. Only the AoA vane was actually bad. And that's the crux of the issue. Nothing on the airplane that makes it fly was broken. They had all the tools to keep the airplane flying while they figured out what was going on. That's the whole point that Langewiesche's article is getting at. Both crews were so concerned with the root cause of the problem that they stopped flying the airplane.


They had what presented itself as multiple failures - without a clear way to trace things to the single root or time to stop, think and handle things one by one. A sole hint which could help was conveniently forgotten by Boeing.
Failure to realize after the Lion crash that a single failure presents itself as multipioint issue and act immediately is what makes Boeing look as a gang of amateurs - and makes me suspect that it is not just an appearance, but the essence.


The ET crew faced just what the EAD said they would almost to the letter.
 
AABusDrvr
Posts: 83
Joined: Sat Dec 03, 2016 6:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 2:32 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
kalvado wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
I haven't posted in this thread in a while, but I've been following along. I've been meaning to post this for a while, hopefully it brings a slightly different perspective to the existing ideas.

1. In a hypothetical situation, let's say a Part 23 airplane has an engine failure at Vr that results in a crash. As we all know, this is a situation that every pilot should be able to handle. If we find out the engine failed because it was assembled with popsicle sticks and Elmer's glue, it still doesn't absolve the pilots. As far as I'm aware, you don't get to pass a botched checkride because the simulated failure was due to "negligent design" versus "an acceptable cause of failure."

2. The argument that the pilots didn't recognize the MCAS activation as runaway trim in my opinion, is ridiculous. First, it happened while the pilots were hand flying. They would have immediately felt the increased backpressure in the yoke and heard and/or saw the manual trim wheels moving. Second, they knew to correct by applying ANU electric trim. Unless they thought the 737 had an infinite amount of trim, they should have realized they were countering whatever automatic trim was being applied.

2a. While everyone is looking at this crash with 20/20 hindsight, imagine your an engineer at Boeing circa 2012. I feel like no one actually understands how hard it would be to not only predict this failure mode, but convince superiors it was dangerous enough to warrant a redesign. Let's pretend you're pretty much clairvoyant, and you predict the EXACT failure mode that happened in the LionAir crash. So you have to convince your superiors that MCAS is inadequate because two pilots each with several thousand hours would not recognize 6 minutes of repeated AND trim being applied as a runaway (or at a minimum, an issue with the electric trim system). If you went to the test pilots for an opinion, do you think they would tell you 1. "That's definitely not a runaway, because there's only one way trim can runaway" or 2. "It's some sort of runaway or issue with electric trim, I'd disable it and trim manually". Having been in this situation many times, I can easily see it being #2. So you determine that is a reasonable solution because you know all pilots are trained for a runaway, and it hasn't been an issue in 40 years of 737 flying.

3. I think the inital media storylines have played a major role in people's perception of the crash. If MCAS had been a paragraph on the iPad training then the whole "hidden system" storyline would have gone away, yet we likely wouldn't have seen any different outcome. Heck, not only did the ET pilots know about MCAS, they knew about its worst failure mode. However, I can completely understand why it wasn't included. It was treated as if the jackscrew motor was made by a different manufacturer who used a new type of insulation. The pilots don't need to know that the new vendor uses a cheaper insulation that is more likely to cause a short. They need to recognize the electric trim is not behaving as it should and disable it.

3a. In the meantime, especially in the ET case, the pilots have to fly the airplane. I don't' know how many of you follow FlightChops on YouTube, but he just did his BFR and his instructor brought up some excellent points regarding dealing with stressful situation and emergencies. As a demo, the instructor intentionally got the controller riled up, and then made Steve (the pilot) perform some menial tasks before he could respond to a frequency handoff. The point was to learn how to fight the urge to respond to distractions instead of flying the airplane. In the ET crash, they did not fall back to pitch and power settings when they should have. The excuses keep coming up that there were too many lights and alarms, etc. Well, that's the whole damn point of pitch and power. It's how to keep the airplane safe until you can figure out what's going on.

4. There's a huge difference between blame and responsibility. Boeing is responsible for a significant portion of the crash. However, I don't think I can blame them (i.e. assign them fault for negligence) because there was no way to predict that the MCAS activation would not be recognized as a trim runaway. Now, there might be an issue that trim runaways are in fact more dangerous than we though, however that opens the aperture up a lot and could apply to any aircraft with automatic trim. At the same time, I don't blame the pilots. I've certainly made some dumb mistakes in my flying history, and fortunately I haven't bent any metal. But I can see how easily it can happen. In this case, the mistakes cost them their lives. However, for example. if we started seeing accidents after to emergency descents due to rapid depressurization, then I think its equally as valid to question why the pilots couldn't handle these "routine" scenarios as it is to question the need to engineer a more robust fuselage.

I know I'm not bringing any new facts to light, but hopefully just looking at them from an existing perspective.

1. I guess the concept of multiple simultaneous failures didn't penetrate into your consciousness yet. This is a concept which
Unfortunately, some (many) of us will experience a similar situation at the older age, where multiple health problems are building on top of each other. Proper diagnostics of a most important problem can be a serious issue. Hopefully, it will not be after autopsy when the truth comes out. This is the key issue in any pilot-related discussion: triple, if not quadruple airplane failure with root cause indicator just forgotten. See (3) below


They didn't have multiple simultaneous failures. They had multiple simultaneous alarms. Only the AoA vane was actually bad. And that's the crux of the issue. Nothing on the airplane that makes it fly was broken. They had all the tools to keep the airplane flying while they figured out what was going on. That's the whole point that Langewiesche's article is getting at. Both crews were so concerned with the root cause of the problem that they stopped flying the airplane.



Pretty much spot on.

A blocked or frozen pitot tube can cause a stick shaker/overspeed warning at the same time, we have all trained for that. The alarms are annoying as hell, but you fly the airplane, diagnose the problem and deal with it. The 737 has three independent airspeed indicators and altimeters, a quick cross check will tell you which one is wrong in short order.

I still eagerly await the answer for why the captain of Lion 610 was able to keep the airplane under control for 9 minutes, and 22 MCAS activation cycles, yet the first officer lost control within two minutes after the captain gave him the airplane.

You can argue amongst yourselves about the wording of the Runaway Stabilizer QRH, but if the stabilizer trim does something you don't want it to do, and keeps doing it, that's the first checklist every 737 pilot I know, myself included would start with. Why they couldn't figure that out is also a mystery to me. Again, perhaps if we ever have the full, unredacted transcripts of both accident CVR's we will have answers to these questions.
 
User avatar
WildcatYXU
Posts: 3102
Joined: Sat May 06, 2006 2:05 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 3:17 am

AABusDrvr wrote:

I still eagerly await the answer for why the captain of Lion 610 was able to keep the airplane under control for 9 minutes, and 22 MCAS activation cycles, yet the first officer lost control within two minutes after the captain gave him the airplane.



That's actually the stupid question I wanted to ask. Wasn't MCAS supposed to stop "mcasing" when the controls were switched to the working AOA vane's side?
310, 319, 320, 321, 321N, 332, 333, 343, 345, 346, 732, 735, 73G, 738, 744, 752, 762, 763, 77L, 77W, 788, AT4, AT7, BEH, CR2, CRA, CR9, DH1, DH3, DH4, E45, E75, E90, E95, F28, F50, F100, MD82, Saab 340, YAK40
 
AABusDrvr
Posts: 83
Joined: Sat Dec 03, 2016 6:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 3:25 am

WildcatYXU wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:

I still eagerly await the answer for why the captain of Lion 610 was able to keep the airplane under control for 9 minutes, and 22 MCAS activation cycles, yet the first officer lost control within two minutes after the captain gave him the airplane.



That's actually the stupid question I wanted to ask. Wasn't MCAS supposed to stop "mcasing" when the controls were switched to the working AOA vane's side?


The way I understand it, the MCAS gets its data from the “master” FCC. That’s usually the flying pilots side. Whichever flight director switch is turned on first, that side becomes the master FCC.

At my airline, at least, we do this during the preflight setup, and wouldn’t normally switch them around if we changed the PF in flight .
 
IADFCO
Posts: 131
Joined: Sun May 22, 2016 4:20 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 4:19 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:

[...]
2a. While everyone is looking at this crash with 20/20 hindsight, imagine your an engineer at Boeing circa 2012. I feel like no one actually understands how hard it would be to not only predict this failure mode, but convince superiors it was dangerous enough to warrant a redesign. Let's pretend you're pretty much clairvoyant, and you predict the EXACT failure mode that happened in the LionAir crash.
[...]



I don't think it would be so hard to figure out what would happen if your sensor fails high or fails low. I'm sure you have your Simulink model (or whatever Boeing uses) with at least a linearized model of the aircraft. Put a do/for loop over all the sensors, for each consider fail high/fail low, integrate the equations of motion for a bunch of flight conditions and step inputs with a paper pilot model. Flag all the results that break linearity for a further look by a human analyst. We run sims with 100 states and the equivalent of thousands of panels in real time on a high-end desktop with a good GPU with no particular attention to computational efficiency, and even so we could run hundreds if not thousands of simulations a day on a $2K desktop.

I don't know about design practices in commercial aviation because I don't work in that area, but I find very hard to believe that Boeing could not figure out what would happen with a failed vane, and in fact IIRC none of the whistleblowers have claimed that.
 
justloveplanes
Posts: 1005
Joined: Thu Jul 08, 2004 5:38 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 4:33 am

https://newrepublic.com/article/154944/ ... ket-newtab

Sobering read. I can't disagree with the description of MCAS.
 
RickNRoll
Posts: 1792
Joined: Fri Jan 06, 2012 9:30 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 5:47 am

justloveplanes wrote:
https://newrepublic.com/article/154944/boeing-737-max-investigation-indonesia-lion-air-ethiopian-airlines-managerial-revolution?utm_source=pocket-newtab

Sobering read. I can't disagree with the description of MCAS.


Yes. There are many people out there voicing their dissatisfaction with the culture that Boeing developed. Many of them left. Safety was deliberately compromised to boost profits.
 
rheinwaldner
Posts: 1756
Joined: Wed Jan 02, 2008 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 6:06 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
They didn't have multiple simultaneous failures. They had multiple simultaneous alarms.

The perception counts. Multiple simultaneous alarms are perceived as multiple failures. So you are totally wrong.

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
Only the AoA vane was actually bad. And that's the crux of the issue.

That shows how bad the MAX was designed. Such a small issue triggering multiple simultaneous alarms, which overwhelmed the best US pilots in simulator.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
sgrow787
Posts: 266
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 6:41 am

XRAYretired wrote:
A pragmatic review of the NYT magazine article.
https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/explos ... Ye6ZG5Fw2w


And this part puts things into perspective:

Still, the author suggests that were he in a position of authority to do so, he would return the airliner to service as it's currently configured.


So pilot blame is more about saying there's nothing wrong with the plane, and therefore the certification, than pilot training. Which is exactly what Boeing PR would want to be putting out at this point in the game.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
WIederling
Posts: 8888
Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 6:45 am

Revelation wrote:
Although I wouldn't call what the article reports as "capitulation", some of us have been saying a black vs white "foot on the neck" approach seemed a bit much for quite a while now.


Issue is that any kind of critique however reasonable it is
is handled as if "foot on the neck" is imminent and
handled accordingly with unmoderated push back.

This is a cultural ( and rather problematic) issue. No potential for learning.
It is win or lose and disallows any synergetic outcome.
Murphy is an optimist
 
User avatar
scbriml
Posts: 17485
Joined: Wed Jul 02, 2003 10:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 6:56 am

SEU wrote:
Its Q4 now - should be open a new thread?


Your calendar need fixing. ;)
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
sgrow787
Posts: 266
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 7:00 am

justloveplanes wrote:
https://newrepublic.com/article/154944/boeing-737-max-investigation-indonesia-lion-air-ethiopian-airlines-managerial-revolution?utm_source=pocket-newtab

Sobering read. I can't disagree with the description of MCAS.


This story was posted already upthread a few days ago. That said, one of the takeaways I came away with was, the idea that Boeing is too big to fail, particularly with the last sentence:

He [Paul Njoroge, who lost his family in the ET crash] would never buy it himself, of course, but even now it would be hard to justify leaving it out of a client’s portfolio
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
AABusDrvr
Posts: 83
Joined: Sat Dec 03, 2016 6:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 9:27 am

rheinwaldner wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
They didn't have multiple simultaneous failures. They had multiple simultaneous alarms.

The perception counts. Multiple simultaneous alarms are perceived as multiple failures. So you are totally wrong.

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
Only the AoA vane was actually bad. And that's the crux of the issue.

That shows how bad the MAX was designed. Such a small issue triggering multiple simultaneous alarms, which overwhelmed the best US pilots in simulator.


They are not alarms, that indicate system failures. They are aural warnings, designed to alert the crew to unsafe conditions (takeoff configuration warning, stall warning, overspeed warning etc) or bring things to your attention (autopilot disconnect warning).
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 651
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 9:33 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
2. The argument that the pilots didn't recognize the MCAS activation as runaway trim in my opinion, is ridiculous. First, it happened while the pilots were hand flying. They would have immediately felt the increased backpressure in the yoke and heard and/or saw the manual trim wheels moving. Second, they knew to correct by applying ANU electric trim. Unless they thought the 737 had an infinite amount of trim, they should have realized they were countering whatever automatic trim was being applied.

ET302 was in autopilot, not manual flight, when in addition to several disagree messages, none of them pointing to the real cause, the autopilot suddenly and unexpectedly disconnected and thus allowed the MCAS to immediately and aggressively trim the horizontal stabilized to pitch the nose down. The pilots take 12 seconds, instead of the unrealistic 3 seconds expected, to correctly react with a manual electric stab trim nose up. Please refer to the published preliminary report before speculating about a situation that did not correspond to the facts already established. The additional 9 seconds delay have to take in account the fact that the pilots already have a higher than normal workload at this time, was in autopilot flight, and that no training was ever done for a such situation. Nothing to blame the pilots here.

For the rest of your post, you have to understand that aircraft safety certification is normally a very formal process that is far away from the speculation you expose. The fact that this process was not done correctly is the main reason why the 737-8/9 MAX have to redo that safety certification process. Nothing to blame the pilots here.
 
User avatar
scbriml
Posts: 17485
Joined: Wed Jul 02, 2003 10:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 9:47 am

AABusDrvr wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
They didn't have multiple simultaneous failures. They had multiple simultaneous alarms.

The perception counts. Multiple simultaneous alarms are perceived as multiple failures. So you are totally wrong.

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
Only the AoA vane was actually bad. And that's the crux of the issue.

That shows how bad the MAX was designed. Such a small issue triggering multiple simultaneous alarms, which overwhelmed the best US pilots in simulator.


They are not alarms, that indicate system failures. They are aural warnings, designed to alert the crew to unsafe conditions (takeoff configuration warning, stall warning, overspeed warning etc) or bring things to your attention (autopilot disconnect warning).


Do you have an aural warning clock to help you get up for work in the morning?
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
AABusDrvr
Posts: 83
Joined: Sat Dec 03, 2016 6:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 10:33 am

scbriml wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
The perception counts. Multiple simultaneous alarms are perceived as multiple failures. So you are totally wrong.


That shows how bad the MAX was designed. Such a small issue triggering multiple simultaneous alarms, which overwhelmed the best US pilots in simulator.


They are not alarms, that indicate system failures. They are aural warnings, designed to alert the crew to unsafe conditions (takeoff configuration warning, stall warning, overspeed warning etc) or bring things to your attention (autopilot disconnect warning).


Do you have an aural warning clock to help you get up for work in the morning?


A quick search of my 737 manuals on my ipad comes up with the word alarm only three times. There is the fire alarm bell, the lavatory fire alarm, and a reference about causing alarm in the cabin. So neither of these crews had multiple alarms going off in the flight deck. In fact, until they exceeded VMO, they probably only had one aural warning going off, the stick shaker on the captains side.
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 632
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q3 2019

Mon Sep 23, 2019 10:48 am

AABusDrvr wrote:
scbriml wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:

They are not alarms, that indicate system failures. They are aural warnings, designed to alert the crew to unsafe conditions (takeoff configuration warning, stall warning, overspeed warning etc) or bring things to your attention (autopilot disconnect warning).


Do you have an aural warning clock to help you get up for work in the morning?


A quick search of my 737 manuals on my ipad comes up with the word alarm only three times. There is the fire alarm bell, the lavatory fire alarm, and a reference about causing alarm in the cabin. So neither of these crews had multiple alarms going off in the flight deck. In fact, until they exceeded VMO, they probably only had one aural warning going off, the stick shaker on the captains side.

Would have thought 'DONT SINK' can be counted?

Ray

Popular Searches On Airliners.net

Top Photos of Last:   24 Hours  •  48 Hours  •  7 Days  •  30 Days  •  180 Days  •  365 Days  •  All Time

Military Aircraft Every type from fighters to helicopters from air forces around the globe

Classic Airliners Props and jets from the good old days

Flight Decks Views from inside the cockpit

Aircraft Cabins Passenger cabin shots showing seat arrangements as well as cargo aircraft interior

Cargo Aircraft Pictures of great freighter aircraft

Government Aircraft Aircraft flying government officials

Helicopters Our large helicopter section. Both military and civil versions

Blimps / Airships Everything from the Goodyear blimp to the Zeppelin

Night Photos Beautiful shots taken while the sun is below the horizon

Accidents Accident, incident and crash related photos

Air to Air Photos taken by airborne photographers of airborne aircraft

Special Paint Schemes Aircraft painted in beautiful and original liveries

Airport Overviews Airport overviews from the air or ground

Tails and Winglets Tail and Winglet closeups with beautiful airline logos