Thus you show the fallacy of your 260x statistic: it compares the unfixed MAX to planes that had problems that got fixed and flew for decades.
In statistics you can compare things like they are. And having a crash causing failure rate, which is 260 times worse than normal, is where the MAX currently stands.
And what kind of weird mentality would cry foul because we compare the unfixed MAX with fixed aircraft? No other modern aircraft was ever "unfixed" on the level how the MAX was.
Your words show that even you don't believe the implication of the 260x result, because you say MAX will converge to the norm once the fix is applied.
I absolutely stand behind my calculation. Its devastating for the MAX and shows at the same time, that the same crew proficiency, that was good enough to have excellent safety in aviation overall, played no role in the grounding.
Also in mathetmatics you don't "believe" in things. With my calculation I made a claim, which could be challenged, but so far nobody tried. Even those of my assumptions, which could be some percent off were not challenged. Anyway I consider it close to impossible to challenge the magnitude of this "260 times worse" factor. Therefore the implication stands. The MAX has a horrible safety record, has a crash causing failure rate 260 times higher than normal.
And finally, for the MAX to converge to the norm, you need to apply tricks by avoiding the first two years after EIS from the observation time span.
I am not disputing that the MCAS isn't flawed it is - however what the crashes have shown is that training is lacking as well.
Under the existing standards Pilots were assumed to be able to handle an emergency of this type. Obviously they were not.
The assumption was wrong, not the pilots. The pilots were as good as any NG pilot is. But with NGs, the same pilot proficiency does not result in the horrible safety record, that the MAX got.
Also the existing standards are not at fault (-> see aviation safety sans MAX).
If you are really accurate, you have to say, that the existing standards and the pilots are not the problem. The problem was, that the nature of this emergency and how it was presenting itself was not at all understood by Boeing when they built MCAS V1. Lack of proficiency in Boeings design halls would be the correct verdict.
You're hung up on statistics in order to implement improvements. Stats don't tell us why there was a crash. From available information, we know the factors that caused the crashes and hence grounding. Correcting only one area of failure isn't acceptable in my view, and I hope it's not in yours.
The stats help me to understand the following:
If the MAX would not have been as broken as it was, crews with average proficiency would have brought it down once every 4.7 million flights. Like crews with average proficiency do with all other modern aircraft types. But, as the MAX was flawed, it came down once every 0.25 million flights. One crash every 4.7 million flights to be expected by the given crew proficiency vs. one crash every 0.25 million flights by the MAX defects. Where do you see the most leverage?
Can't you see, that once the MAX will be fixed, it will be in line with the other aircraft again? Safety will be as good again as it was before the MAX. Arguably you can try to tackle the "One crash every 4.7 million flights by crew failure" but it will have nothing to do with the MAX then.
The MAX was broken, has devastating safety stats, is therefore grounded, requires a fix and will after the fix be fine again.