mjoelnir wrote:

morrisond wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

You even confess that you are not an expert, and what you write at that time did not explain that an excessive speed prevented the manual trim wheels to function as expected by the established procedure. My guess is that you mentioned the speed at that time only because there was an overspeed alert, and that you try, as you demonstrate since many months, to blame the pilots are every occasions with every possible arguments. You made a good guess, but without understanding why.

Now you have to understand that 'you making a good guess without understanding why' is really not an argument, nor to blame the pilots, nor to improve flight safety. There is a hug difference between "it was possible to save that flight" and "all future flights that will face that situation will remain safe". That difference include in particular the risk assessment and it's now very clear that many correctives actions was recently implemented at that level to reach the safety certification level that the 737-8/9 MAX should have from day one of commercial operation.

Sorry - talking about Manual trim possibly not being effective came three minutes later that day after writing that post. See post 4072 in viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1417519&p=21250347#p21250347

"The flight was okay after turning it off for several minutes - but it appears as though they flicked the switch again and turned it on (Electric Trim) which the Boeing bulletin says specifically not to do.

They probably turned on the electric system again as they couldn't trim the plane correctly as they were travelling too fast."

Sorry for the three minute delay that day to clarify what I wrote.

That manual trim is not effective, has been talked about hundreds of times in this threads. There must have been an effort to not to read about it, if one followed this threads.
Again a Boeing information problem. The part about difficult manual trim, accompanied by description of the roller coaster mode, seems to have departed the manuals with the NG, when at that time Boeing made using the trim wheel still more difficult by reducing its size.

Oh brother. No it's not effective at really high speed. It works perfectly fine at normal flight speeds otherwise how did the Previous Lionair flight make it?

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

You even confess that you are not an expert, and what you write at that time did not explain that an excessive speed prevented the manual trim wheels to function as expected by the established procedure. My guess is that you mentioned the speed at that time only because there was an overspeed alert, and that you try, as you demonstrate since many months, to blame the pilots are every occasions with every possible arguments. You made a good guess, but without understanding why.

Now you have to understand that 'you making a good guess without understanding why' is really not an argument, nor to blame the pilots, nor to improve flight safety. There is a hug difference between "it was possible to save that flight" and "all future flights that will face that situation will remain safe". That difference include in particular the risk assessment and it's now very clear that many correctives actions was recently implemented at that level to reach the safety certification level that the 737-8/9 MAX should have from day one of commercial operation.

Sorry - talking about Manual trim possibly not being effective came three minutes later that day after writing that post. See post 4072 in viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1417519&p=21250347#p21250347

"The flight was okay after turning it off for several minutes - but it appears as though they flicked the switch again and turned it on (Electric Trim) which the Boeing bulletin says specifically not to do.

They probably turned on the electric system again as they couldn't trim the plane correctly as they were travelling too fast."

Sorry for the three minute delay that day to clarify what I wrote.

What I wrote is:

Remember that it take days after the second crash before some experts did raise the possibility that the speed did play a major role in the crashes. This understanding was not available to the ET302 pilots.

Your post is only after the ET302 preliminary report that was published the 04 April 2019 not after the ET302 crash the 10 March 2019. You are just more than one full month too late to save the plane !!!

How would I know that speed was a factor in the crash before the fatal flight even took place? Experts were guessing after the crash - there was no certainty until we all saw the FDR traces when the pre-liminary report was released.

How does that excuse the ET302 from not knowing that excessive speed could make the controls ineffective? That is covered in basic flight training.

It's been over 10 years since I did my PPL and if I can remember that within seconds of reading a report I would hope Pilots actually flying airplanes on an daily basis can remember that nugget of information.

par13del wrote:

zkojq wrote:

Sooner787 wrote:

There's an excellent article on the Aviation Week website ( need to register to access--free ) detailing
Southwest and AA's RTS plans for their Max's. Southwest will focus first on their 40 new build but
undelivered Max's. Once those are on property, Southwest's attention will turn to the 34 they have in
storage in VCV.

One would have thought that they'd do the opposite to preserve CAPEX.

CAPEX is involved in new frames being delivered also, I think the issue is which one they can get into service faster.

Yes but much more CAPEX required to make the final pre-delivery payment that the relatively small outlay to remove an aircraft from storage (assuming only a software update).

Revelation wrote:

This staggering sum included not only the direct cost to Boeing of redesigning the airplane systems but also the expense of additional pilot training that new systems would require — costs that would have been borne by Boeing’s airline customers and would have made the MAX a much less attractive airplane to buy.

[/quote]

But I thought that more training was good?

glideslope wrote:

Disconnecting your AT is always a good starting point in a recovery.

Indeed but if you're above Vne the A/T will have retarded the throttles long ago.

Revelation wrote:

I don't think there is much overlap between MCAS and EICAS.

MCAS is a function of FCC (flight control computer) whereas EICAS ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engine-in ... ing_system ) is more of a FMS (flight management system) function.

Yet there aren't many details of these black boxes in the public arena.

EICAS certainly could be used to announce the AoA Disagree quite clearly and presumably guide pilots through an electronic checklist, but would not do anything to fix the dreadful MCAS 1.0 FCC implementation.

Of course a wholesale redo of the 737 cockpit and sensors would do wonders but that's not been on the cards, because then you really do move away from the N days differences training.

I interpreted the Seattle Times article as saying the MCAS developed for the 767 Tanker would not work in the 737 MAX, and that one of the reasons was that the 767 Tankers had a more modern (80s) system architecture including EICAS. That's why the 737 MAX MCAS was so botched and different. But it's probably more about the underlying design differences.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ew-alerts/

When an A330 pilot only needs differences training to get an A350 type rating, I would imagine a 737NG pilot going to 737 MAX with EICAS and updated cockpit would only require the same?

morrisond wrote:

zeke wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Nice to see someone pointing out the root cause of the crashes - substandard pilots that flew a perfectly fine airplane into the ground because they failed to identify a simple fault and failed to work through a very simple memory item.

Their point is not very valid. ET has a very good training system, their pilot and corporate standards are very high. Higher than many western airlines. That crew tried everything, and when the memory procedure did not work as they did not have enough strength to move the controls, they tried to think out of the box and turned the electric motors back on for assistance.

That aircraft was in an undesirable state because of a problem that the airframe caused. That is very different to AF447 where if the pilots had done nothing everything would have been ok. It was the pilots that flew the aircraft into an upset.

So did ET by not disengaging Autothrottle and leaving it at TOGA.

Where does the TOGA claim come from? I did not read that in the prelim report.

The prelim report states 94% N1 basically throughout the flight, but it did not state how that was achieved. I suspect that normal take-off would start with pressing toga switch? But if autothrotlle was active throughout the six minutes, wouldn't we expect some modulation in the N1 during some point in time, given the changing airpseed, temperature and pressure altitude?
And why would N1 not be closer to 100%? Does 94% N1 represent maximum available N1 for the actual pressure altitide an OAT?

zkojq wrote:

Indeed but if you're above Vne the A/T will have retarded the throttles long ago.

Not in a 737NG or MAX, IF you are in a LVL CHG climb.

From the ET302 preliminary report:

At 05:39:42, Level Change mode was engaged. The selected altitude was 32000 ft. Shortly after the mode change, the selected airspeed was set to 238 kt.

In LVL CHG, the auto throttles are in a thrust limit mode. The FMA thrust indication will be "N1", and the throttles will maintain the FMC computed climb thrust. They WILL NOT retard if you push the nose over and exceed VMO/MMO, the FD will command a pitch up when you approach VMO, but the crew (or autopilot, if engaged) would have to follow that command, and manually retard the throttles, if necessary. Otherwise, the auto throttles will happily continue doing what you told them to do, that's maintain climb N1.

morrisond wrote:

How would I know that speed was a factor in the crash before the fatal flight even took place? Experts were guessing after the crash - there was no certainty until we all saw the FDR traces when the pre-liminary report was released.

How does that excuse the ET302 from not knowing that excessive speed could make the controls ineffective? That is covered in basic flight training.

It's been over 10 years since I did my PPL and if I can remember that within seconds of reading a report I would hope Pilots actually flying airplanes on an daily basis can remember that nugget of information.

The speed of ET302 was known already the same day of the crash from the ADS-B data. The next day some site like FR24 provided full graph of the ET302 speed : https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/flightradar24-data-regarding-the-crash-of-ethiopian-airlines-flight-302/

The small Vmo overspeed didn't make the control surfaces ineffective. The speed make the manual trim wheels too hard to use, and this was unknown to the ET302 pilots.

PW100 wrote:

Where does the TOGA claim come from? I did not read that in the prelim report.

The prelim report states 94% N1 basically throughout the flight, but it did not state how that was achieved. I suspect that normal take-off would start with pressing toga switch? But if autothrotlle was active throughout the six minutes, wouldn't we expect some modulation in the N1 during some point in time, given the changing airpseed, temperature and pressure altitude?
And why would N1 not be closer to 100%? Does 94% N1 represent maximum available N1 for the actual pressure altitide an OAT?

You will push the TOGA buttons at the start of every takeoff, but that doesn't mean the engines will be producing maximum thrust. On the MAX there are three possible thrust ratings used for takeoff, and those can be further derated with temperature. So depending on the rating used, the derate, and ambient conditions, thrust will often be less than 100%.

morrisond wrote:

. . .
So you don't expect Pilot's to know that operating over Vmo is bad and should be avoided at all costs?

Why do you believe that the crew did not understand the importance of Vmo?


The FDR graph in the premlim report shows that Vmo was reached only when they were already in very deep shit, long *after* MCAS became alive.

It is quite likely that the crew became overwhelmed with alerts/warnings (Stick Shaker, Anti-Ice, Auto-Pilot warning, GPWS Don't Sink, Overspeed), didn’t understand what the airplane was doing and couldn't find their way out. Reaching Vmo was only one part of a complex problem and at most was a strong indication that the crew could wasn’t able to handle the complex situation/workload presented to them. I don’t see that as evidence that “the crew did not understand the importance of Vmo”, and I'm at loss trying to understand how one would arrive at such conlcusion.

Focussing on just one item (speed) and then claiming the crew did not understand Vmo is bad, is a rather skewed presentation.
Without MCAS-run-away and associated plethora of symptoms, Vmo would likely never have been reached.

AABusDrvr wrote:

PW100 wrote:

Where does the TOGA claim come from? I did not read that in the prelim report.

The prelim report states 94% N1 basically throughout the flight, but it did not state how that was achieved. I suspect that normal take-off would start with pressing toga switch? But if autothrotlle was active throughout the six minutes, wouldn't we expect some modulation in the N1 during some point in time, given the changing airpseed, temperature and pressure altitude?
And why would N1 not be closer to 100%? Does 94% N1 represent maximum available N1 for the actual pressure altitide an OAT?

You will push the TOGA buttons at the start of every takeoff, but that doesn't mean the engines will be producing maximum thrust. On the MAX there are three possible thrust ratings used for takeoff, and those can be further derated with temperature. So depending on the rating used, the derate, and ambient conditions, thrust will often be less than 100%.

But why would N1 stay at 94% if autothrottle is engaged? Wouldn't some level of modulation be expected from autothrottle?

PW100 wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

PW100 wrote:

Where does the TOGA claim come from? I did not read that in the prelim report.

The prelim report states 94% N1 basically throughout the flight, but it did not state how that was achieved. I suspect that normal take-off would start with pressing toga switch? But if autothrotlle was active throughout the six minutes, wouldn't we expect some modulation in the N1 during some point in time, given the changing airpseed, temperature and pressure altitude?
And why would N1 not be closer to 100%? Does 94% N1 represent maximum available N1 for the actual pressure altitide an OAT?

You will push the TOGA buttons at the start of every takeoff, but that doesn't mean the engines will be producing maximum thrust. On the MAX there are three possible thrust ratings used for takeoff, and those can be further derated with temperature. So depending on the rating used, the derate, and ambient conditions, thrust will often be less than 100%.

But why would N1 stay at 94% if autothrottle is engaged? Wouldn't some level of modulation be expected from autothrottle?

Not if the Autopilot isn't engaged and hence why the MCAS checklist tells you to disengage AT as MCAS can't act if AP is engaged.

morrisond wrote:

Speed was set to 238 knots in the climb to 32,000' - which if you look at the traces is = to TOGA(Full Thrust) - when AP disengaged Full thrust kept going.

I am not an expert by far - but I think I was able to point out within a few minutes of the ET302 pre-lim being published that they were going too fast.

My quote from about 30 minutes after the preliminary report was issued (or when I posted the link on these forums).

"My take on reading the accident report is that the flight was saveable until they turned the Electric Trim back on which reactivated MCAS which due to the high speed they were travelling at they were not able to recover from as the airspeed was excessive.

On Page 33 of the Accident report the Boeing Nov 6, 2018 Flight bulletin clearly says to not reengage the Electric Trim system for the remainder of the flight."

I'm sorry but if a Pilot doesn't understand that going above Vmo is a really bad thing they shouldn't be a pilot. It's almost as bad as not having enough speed/thrust.

If the thrust levers were somehow at Zero when the event started would that be Boeing's fault for not telling them to ensure that you have sufficient thrust to maintain desired speed/altitude?

I'm sorry, but this statement really is ridiculous and frankly offensive. You are actually implying these pilots didn't understand going above Mmo is a bad thing. That is drivel and that's why your posts are being called out. You are making statements about the pilot performance as if they are facts, when they are just your opinion. The authorities have not yet offered their interpretation for the pilots actions and reasons for them doing what they did, and you come here making statements they shouldn't have been pilots, based on them not meeting a criterion you have made up. You seem to think you know more about flying these planes than the pilots did. I guarantee you don't. The self praise in your post for reading a report does you no favours either, given the number of factually incorrect statements you've made throughout this thread

Your last sentence you then again attempt to move blame to the pilots away from Boeing by arguing from absurdity. Why are you unable to accept the conclusions of the worlds aviation authorities that this plane should not have been flying, and that it was not within certification limits for responses required by pilots in certain kinds of emergencies? You already stated falsely a couple of days ago that the pilots didn't meet existing standards for handling this type of emergency which is completely false. There are no standards for this type of emergency. Please stop it. Who on earth do you think you are fooling? I really really hope you have nothing to do with Boeing, if you do it is shameful that anyone connected to them continues this kind of disinformation campaign, smearing dead pilots in the process.

If you were making objective statements about what the pilots might have done differently, with the caveat there may be reasons they did what they did and that they were placed in a completely untested position, your remarks might be taken more seriously. But repeatedly suggesting the pilots were not competent, or that their training was lacking, without a single statement to that effect having bee made by the authorities, is contemptible. The plane is grounded. Zero recommendations have been made to the airline or pilots. Those are the facts, poor old Boeing are not the victims of a couple of cowboy pilots, however much you try to paint it that way. How stupid do you think people are?

Sorry for the tone but this really angers me.

Revelation wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Thus you show the fallacy of your 260x statistic: it compares the unfixed MAX to planes that had problems that got fixed and flew for decades.

In statistics you can compare things like they are.

This confirms you do not understand how statistics work.

You can compare statistics from dissimilar populations all you want, but you can't reach any valid conclusions by doing so.

This type of comparison is garbage in, garbage out.

Yes, indeed.
But the point of course is that what went into his comparison was not garbage at all. While the input may not have been 100% perfect, it was certainly good enough to reach subject conclusion.

So, with the grounding stretching further into the future with no end in sight Ryanair are looking elsewhere to top up their fleet.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airl ... SKBN1WJ1JH

"Leading European low-cost operator Ryanair (RYA.I), which has been hit hard by the MAX grounding, is seeking to take over Airbus (AIR.PA) A320-family aircraft previously leased by Thomas Cook and deploy them at its Austrian carrier Lauda."
"Opportunities crop up out of things like the failure of Thomas Cook," Ryanair group CEO Michael O'Leary said at a Reuters Newsmaker event in London on Tuesday."

"We're talking to a number of the leasing companies about taking some of those Airbus aircraft and putting them into Lauda next summer," he said.

I wonder how much longer airlines can continue to wait for the 737MAX.. and if and when it enters service will the public want to fly on it.

Boeing have got themselves into this with no Plan B. The 737 replacement is probably a decade away.. not to mention the 757/767 replacement.

flyingphil wrote:

"Leading European low-cost operator Ryanair (RYA.I), which has been hit hard by the MAX grounding, is seeking to take over Airbus (AIR.PA) A320-family aircraft previously leased by Thomas Cook and deploy them at its Austrian carrier Lauda."

And thus FR goes one step closer from being an exclusive Boeing customer to being a carrier which has also Airbus in its fleet. Excellent move imho.

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

Erebus wrote:

Funny, you had to bring up the VW scandal. Nobody died as a result of an emissions cheating device but the US courts still took it upon themselves to dish out a $2.8 billion fine and criminally charge their (ex) CEO.

What kind of criminal consequences do you think Boeing will face for a scandal involving serious safety regulatory lapses and 346 dead? With the amount of power and influence Boeing has, I'd say it will walk away with none - "change my mind".

US Courts really had no choice but act after a researcher showed the VW Diesel polluted like crazy in real world environments and the California version of EPA found the defeat device along with the paperwork signed by a VW executive saying no such cheat device existed.

Boeing so far has been able to maintain a plausible deniability defense when it comes to criminal liability. All the recent info about 737 not meeting current FAA standards is covered by exemptions FAA granted to Boeing. We have yet to find a "smoking gun" where MCAS is shown to be something other than simple human error. We have lots of evidence that Boeing management pushed engineering to deliver on the quickest budget and shortest schedule, but that's not criminal.

IMO if there is a bombshell to be found, it will come from the FBI/DoJ probe. Allegedly hundreds of professional investigators are involved, and they have subpoena power, and many people in the various media reports say they have testified to the grand jury.

Planetalk wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Speed was set to 238 knots in the climb to 32,000' - which if you look at the traces is = to TOGA(Full Thrust) - when AP disengaged Full thrust kept going.

I am not an expert by far - but I think I was able to point out within a few minutes of the ET302 pre-lim being published that they were going too fast.

My quote from about 30 minutes after the preliminary report was issued (or when I posted the link on these forums).

"My take on reading the accident report is that the flight was saveable until they turned the Electric Trim back on which reactivated MCAS which due to the high speed they were travelling at they were not able to recover from as the airspeed was excessive.

On Page 33 of the Accident report the Boeing Nov 6, 2018 Flight bulletin clearly says to not reengage the Electric Trim system for the remainder of the flight."

I'm sorry but if a Pilot doesn't understand that going above Vmo is a really bad thing they shouldn't be a pilot. It's almost as bad as not having enough speed/thrust.

If the thrust levers were somehow at Zero when the event started would that be Boeing's fault for not telling them to ensure that you have sufficient thrust to maintain desired speed/altitude?

I'm sorry, but this statement really is ridiculous and frankly offensive. You are actually implying these pilots didn't understand going above Mmo is a bad thing. That is drivel and that's why your posts are being called out. You are making statements about the pilot performance as if they are facts, when they are just your opinion. The authorities have not yet offered their interpretation for the pilots actions and reasons for them doing what they did, and you come here making statements they shouldn't have been pilots, based on them not meeting a criterion you have made up. You seem to think you know more about flying these planes than the pilots did. I guarantee you don't. The self praise in your post for reading a report does you no favours either, given the number of factually incorrect statements you've made throughout this thread

Your last sentence you then again attempt to move blame to the pilots away from Boeing by arguing from absurdity. Why are you unable to accept the conclusions of the worlds aviation authorities that this plane should not have been flying, and that it was not within certification limits for responses required by pilots in certain kinds of emergencies? You already stated falsely a couple of days ago that the pilots didn't meet existing standards for handling this type of emergency which is completely false. There are no standards for this type of emergency. Please stop it. Who on earth do you think you are fooling? I really really hope you have nothing to do with Boeing, if you do it is shameful that anyone connected to them continues this kind of disinformation campaign, smearing dead pilots in the process.

If you were making objective statements about what the pilots might have done differently, with the caveat there may be reasons they did what they did and that they were placed in a completely untested position, your remarks might be taken more seriously. But repeatedly suggesting the pilots were not competent, or that their training was lacking, without a single statement to that effect having bee made by the authorities, is contemptible. The plane is grounded. Zero recommendations have been made to the airline or pilots. Those are the facts, poor old Boeing are not the victims of a couple of cowboy pilots, however much you try to paint it that way. How stupid do you think people are?

Sorry for the tone but this really angers me.

No Pixeltalk was implying that because Boeing didn't specify it in the AD the Pilot's had no responsibility to know it was a bad thing to be above Vmo and the controls could be ineffective. I was being sarcastic.

Which MCAS checklist btw?

Revelation wrote:

We have yet to find a "smoking gun" where MCAS is shown to be something other than simple human error.

Just for better understanding, the fact that Boeing hid Mcas from the airlines initially is not a smoking gun which will lead to liability on Boeing's side of things?

Revelation wrote:

Erebus wrote:

Funny, you had to bring up the VW scandal. Nobody died as a result of an emissions cheating device but the US courts still took it upon themselves to dish out a $2.8 billion fine and criminally charge their (ex) CEO.

What kind of criminal consequences do you think Boeing will face for a scandal involving serious safety regulatory lapses and 346 dead? With the amount of power and influence Boeing has, I'd say it will walk away with none - "change my mind".

US Courts really had no choice but act after a researcher showed the VW Diesel polluted like crazy in real world environments and the California version of EPA found the defeat device along with the paperwork signed by a VW executive saying no such cheat device existed.

Boeing so far has been able to maintain a plausible deniability defense when it comes to criminal liability. All the recent info about 737 not meeting current FAA standards is covered by exemptions FAA granted to Boeing. We have yet to find a "smoking gun" where MCAS is shown to be something other than simple human error. We have lots of evidence that Boeing management pushed engineering to deliver on the quickest budget and shortest schedule, but that's not criminal.

IMO if there is a bombshell to be found, it will come from the FBI/DoJ probe. Allegedly hundreds of professional investigators are involved, and they have subpoena power, and many people in the various media reports say they have testified to the grand jury.

The granting of the exemptions to Boeing by the FAA could be or become the smoking gun. The FBI/DoJ probe is surly to look at the comfortable relationship between Boeing and the FAA.

oschkosch wrote:

Revelation wrote:

We have yet to find a "smoking gun" where MCAS is shown to be something other than simple human error.

Just for better understanding, the fact that Boeing hid Mcas from the airlines initially is not a smoking gun which will lead to liability on Boeing's side of things?

Boeing did not hide MCAS from any National Regulator or from any Airline. The Airline was provided all relevant information; and MCAS is clearly and I understand fully described in the Maintenance manuals.

Boeing did recommend that the Pilots did not need any specific training and that it did not need to be in standard manuals for the Pilots. Both FAA and EASA, and most other world regulators - and airlines went along with that. I understand that Brazil did not and required specific pilot training on MCAS for all pilots of Brazilian Airlines using the 737Max, and that at least one airline in North America decided that they needed to provide specific MCAS training (the reference to that is in either the Lion Air or Ethiopian Crash thread).

There are many sub-sytems on an aircraft that the pilots are not specifically trained on, nor described in standard pilot manuals. No one would have questioned this omission or blamed Boeing (or anyone else) Had MCAS V1.0 been designed correctly and not malfunctioned the way it did.

In the end, the Airline is actually legally responsible for the training provided. They have to do as a minimum what the National Regulator decides. They can do more. Manufacturers make training recommendations to the National Regulators, who may adopt or change as they see appropriate.

So yes, there is no legal liability on Boeing for "hiding" information - because they did not hide it.

Have a great day,

Revelation wrote:

aerolimani wrote:

Training recommendations, as regards the actions of the specific accident crews, will be made separately from the ungrounding, Will follow the reports, and therefore do not belong in this thread.

Overall world pilot training standards is yet again another topic, and is not part this thread.

Review of pilot training material is squarely part of the 737 ungrounding endgame described by Boeing's CEO:

The final steps to lifting the ban are clearly defined, and timing will be determined by the FAA, Muilenburg said. Once a final version of the flight control computer update is ready, Boeing will invite airline pilots to test-fly it in the company’s engineering simulators known as e-cabs. A separate team of pilots will review the company’s updated training material. After that FAA pilots will test the changes in a Boeing 737 Max bristling with sensors and other flight-testing equipment.

Ref: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... ax-crashes

This training material has to be created with regards to "the actions of the specific accident crews" and needs to be understood by pilots trained to "world pilot training standards" lest MCAS 2.0 have an unknown flaw.

The essence of your post is correct of course, pilot actions and training requirements are definitely part of the ungrounding actions, and are certainly under the microscope in both accident investigations.


The problem is that there are three different types of training (with each having their own specifics requirements) being discussed at the same time:
a) Basic pilot training (i.e. worldwide pilot standards);
b) Type training (i.e. 737 MAX specific);
c) Conversion training (i.e NG --> MAX, or the infamous 90 minutes iPad thingy).

The frustration of many is that a) is being misused all over the place, including the discussion you quoted from member aerolimani, originating from member StTim . . .

morrisond wrote:

Planetalk wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Speed was set to 238 knots in the climb to 32,000' - which if you look at the traces is = to TOGA(Full Thrust) - when AP disengaged Full thrust kept going.

I am not an expert by far - but I think I was able to point out within a few minutes of the ET302 pre-lim being published that they were going too fast.

My quote from about 30 minutes after the preliminary report was issued (or when I posted the link on these forums).

"My take on reading the accident report is that the flight was saveable until they turned the Electric Trim back on which reactivated MCAS which due to the high speed they were travelling at they were not able to recover from as the airspeed was excessive.

On Page 33 of the Accident report the Boeing Nov 6, 2018 Flight bulletin clearly says to not reengage the Electric Trim system for the remainder of the flight."

I'm sorry but if a Pilot doesn't understand that going above Vmo is a really bad thing they shouldn't be a pilot. It's almost as bad as not having enough speed/thrust.

If the thrust levers were somehow at Zero when the event started would that be Boeing's fault for not telling them to ensure that you have sufficient thrust to maintain desired speed/altitude?

I'm sorry, but this statement really is ridiculous and frankly offensive. You are actually implying these pilots didn't understand going above Mmo is a bad thing. That is drivel and that's why your posts are being called out. You are making statements about the pilot performance as if they are facts, when they are just your opinion. The authorities have not yet offered their interpretation for the pilots actions and reasons for them doing what they did, and you come here making statements they shouldn't have been pilots, based on them not meeting a criterion you have made up. You seem to think you know more about flying these planes than the pilots did. I guarantee you don't. The self praise in your post for reading a report does you no favours either, given the number of factually incorrect statements you've made throughout this thread

Your last sentence you then again attempt to move blame to the pilots away from Boeing by arguing from absurdity. Why are you unable to accept the conclusions of the worlds aviation authorities that this plane should not have been flying, and that it was not within certification limits for responses required by pilots in certain kinds of emergencies? You already stated falsely a couple of days ago that the pilots didn't meet existing standards for handling this type of emergency which is completely false. There are no standards for this type of emergency. Please stop it. Who on earth do you think you are fooling? I really really hope you have nothing to do with Boeing, if you do it is shameful that anyone connected to them continues this kind of disinformation campaign, smearing dead pilots in the process.

If you were making objective statements about what the pilots might have done differently, with the caveat there may be reasons they did what they did and that they were placed in a completely untested position, your remarks might be taken more seriously. But repeatedly suggesting the pilots were not competent, or that their training was lacking, without a single statement to that effect having bee made by the authorities, is contemptible. The plane is grounded. Zero recommendations have been made to the airline or pilots. Those are the facts, poor old Boeing are not the victims of a couple of cowboy pilots, however much you try to paint it that way. How stupid do you think people are?

Sorry for the tone but this really angers me.

No Pixeltalk was implying that because Boeing didn't specify it in the AD the Pilot's had no responsibility to know it was a bad thing to be above Vmo and the controls could be ineffective. I was being sarcastic.

Vmo is a SAFETY MARGIN and ET302 only reached it within the last minute of the flight BECAUSE of the MCAS nose down command. The ET302 pilots tried to correct the trim far before the Vmo and the associated overspeed alert. In fact the CVR and FDR clearly indicate that there was working on this since the very first MCAS nose down command when there speed was below 250 kt, very far from the 340 kt Vmo.

Vmo is a SAFETY MARGIN derived from the design speed that is much higher. The trim wheels should have worked even with a small Vmo overspeed.

Finally, I suspect that the trim wheels are gradually becoming hard to use far before Vmo. Maybe the major effect is the mis-trim itself as it was analysed early: https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and-range.html

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Planetalk wrote:

I'm sorry, but this statement really is ridiculous and frankly offensive. You are actually implying these pilots didn't understand going above Mmo is a bad thing. That is drivel and that's why your posts are being called out. You are making statements about the pilot performance as if they are facts, when they are just your opinion. The authorities have not yet offered their interpretation for the pilots actions and reasons for them doing what they did, and you come here making statements they shouldn't have been pilots, based on them not meeting a criterion you have made up. You seem to think you know more about flying these planes than the pilots did. I guarantee you don't. The self praise in your post for reading a report does you no favours either, given the number of factually incorrect statements you've made throughout this thread

Your last sentence you then again attempt to move blame to the pilots away from Boeing by arguing from absurdity. Why are you unable to accept the conclusions of the worlds aviation authorities that this plane should not have been flying, and that it was not within certification limits for responses required by pilots in certain kinds of emergencies? You already stated falsely a couple of days ago that the pilots didn't meet existing standards for handling this type of emergency which is completely false. There are no standards for this type of emergency. Please stop it. Who on earth do you think you are fooling? I really really hope you have nothing to do with Boeing, if you do it is shameful that anyone connected to them continues this kind of disinformation campaign, smearing dead pilots in the process.

If you were making objective statements about what the pilots might have done differently, with the caveat there may be reasons they did what they did and that they were placed in a completely untested position, your remarks might be taken more seriously. But repeatedly suggesting the pilots were not competent, or that their training was lacking, without a single statement to that effect having bee made by the authorities, is contemptible. The plane is grounded. Zero recommendations have been made to the airline or pilots. Those are the facts, poor old Boeing are not the victims of a couple of cowboy pilots, however much you try to paint it that way. How stupid do you think people are?

Sorry for the tone but this really angers me.

No Pixeltalk was implying that because Boeing didn't specify it in the AD the Pilot's had no responsibility to know it was a bad thing to be above Vmo and the controls could be ineffective. I was being sarcastic.

Vmo is a SAFETY MARGIN and ET302 only reached it within the last minute of the flight BECAUSE of the MCAS nose down command. The ET302 pilots tried to correct the trim far before the Vmo and the associated overspeed alert. In fact the CVR and FDR clearly indicate that there was working on this since the very first MCAS nose down command when there speed was below 250 kt, very far from the 340 kt Vmo.

Vmo is a SAFETY MARGIN derived from the design speed that is much higher. The trim wheels should have worked even with a small Vmo overspeed.

Finally, I suspect that the trim wheels are gradually becoming hard to use far before Vmo. Maybe the major effect is the mis-trim itself as it was analysed early: https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and-range.html

Yes, it is pretty clear, after all the analysis that has been done, that with significant out of trim and yoke pull back, the trim wheel becomes increasingly difficult to operate and 'roller-coaster' is the only effective recourse. Airspeed just exacerbates the situation.

I recommend ignoring these piecemeal and nit-picking singular parameter distractions consistently put forward creating roundabout argument and counter argument. The crews were likely overwhelmed as is now being recognised by NTSB and previously confirmed by Boeing CEO and credible commentators.

Ray

XRAYretired wrote:

The crews were likely overwhelmed as is now being recognised by NTSB and previously confirmed by Boeing CEO and credible commentators.
Ray

Good to see the Boeing CEO included as being credible, that bodes well for the difficult times ahead when the reports are released and the MAX gets closer to RTS.

PixelFlight wrote:

Vmo is a SAFETY MARGIN and ET302 only reached it within the last minute of the flight BECAUSE of the MCAS nose down command. The ET302 pilots tried to correct the trim far before the Vmo and the associated overspeed alert. In fact the CVR and FDR clearly indicate that there was working on this since the very first MCAS nose down command when there speed was below 250 kt, very far from the 340 kt Vmo.

Vmo is a SAFETY MARGIN derived from the design speed that is much higher. The trim wheels should have worked even with a small Vmo overspeed.

Finally, I suspect that the trim wheels are gradually becoming hard to use far before Vmo. Maybe the major effect is the mis-trim itself as it was analysed early: https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and-range.html

Your statements don't align with the FDR facts.

ET302 was at or above Vmo for about two minutes prior to the plunge, for about 2 and a half minutes total. It was near Vmo for another 45 seconds or so prior to the overspeed clacker sounding. They were already very near Vmo during the final electric trim movement prior to the cutout of the electric trim. They didn't exceed Vmo and stay there until after MCAS was done acting up.

All controls are much less effective when nearing and exceeding Vmo. That has been a basic fact of flying since it began. The safety margin isn't like "you can do anything you want yet--barrel rolls, loops, etc.". The margin is more like "the wings won't fall off, but you had better get your speed under control". They lost control of their speed, and it severely hindered their ability to save the plane.

PW100 wrote:

( edited to remove content: see above for details )

The problem is that there are three different types of training (with each having their own specifics requirements) being discussed at the same time:
a) Basic pilot training (i.e. worldwide pilot standards);
b) Type training (i.e. 737 MAX specific);
c) Conversion training (i.e NG --> MAX, or the infamous 90 minutes iPad thingy).

The frustration of many is that a) is being misused all over the place, including the discussion you quoted from member aerolimani, originating from member StTim . . .

Thank you PW100. I believe this is an important clarification.

As an outsider looking in - and as one Root Cause trained and who routinely reads and studies (and does case studies) on aircraft crashes...

My opinion is that there is an overall incomplete and at least partially ineffective Basic pilot training. For example: Flying a Cessna in circles, lines, and squares for 1500 hours does not I believe teach you enough basic skills. Also, having an aircraft being flown by a computer while you sit there and watch does not build or maintain key basic skills either.

I believe this is what Airbus and other organizations are saying when they say more Training is needed.

I see no overall evidence that Type Training not sufficient.

There are questions on Conversion Training. Most often it appears to have been done adequately. However, there are cases where it is at least questionable (such as your referenced 90 minute MCAS ipad course).

Have a great day,

MSPNWA wrote:

Your statements don't align with the FDR facts.

ET302 was at or above Vmo for about two minutes prior to the plunge, for about 2 and a half minutes total. It was near Vmo for another 45 seconds or so prior to the overspeed clacker sounding. They were already very near Vmo during the final electric trim movement prior to the cutout of the electric trim. They didn't exceed Vmo and stay there until after MCAS was done acting up.

All controls are much less effective when nearing and exceeding Vmo. That has been a basic fact of flying since it began. The safety margin isn't like "you can do anything you want yet--barrel rolls, loops, etc.". The margin is more like "the wings won't fall off, but you had better get your speed under control". They lost control of their speed, and it severely hindered their ability to save the plane.

From the ET302 Prelimiary Report FACTUAL INFORMATION:

"From 05:40:42 to 05:43:11 (about two and a half minutes), the stabilizer position gradually moved
in the AND direction from 2.3 units to 2.1 units. During this time, aft force was applied to the
control columns which remained aft of neutral position. The left indicated airspeed increased from
approximately 305 kt to approximately 340 kt (VMO). The right indicated airspeed was
approximately 20-25 kt higher than the left."

"At 05:43:11, about 32 seconds before the end of the recording, at approximately 13,400 2 ft, two
momentary manual electric trim inputs are recorded in the ANU direction. The stabilizer moved in
the ANU direction from 2.1 units to 2.3 units."

To me 32 seconds before the end of the recording is within the last minute of the flight.

AA is ferrying two to TUL and will be moving the rest soon.

“ Of American Airlines’ entire 737 MAX fleet, they now have 16 aircraft undergoing checks in Tulsa, and eight more are being prepared to fly north from New Mexico.”

https://simpleflying.com/american-airli ... -oklahoma/

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Planetalk wrote:

I'm sorry, but this statement really is ridiculous and frankly offensive. You are actually implying these pilots didn't understand going above Mmo is a bad thing. That is drivel and that's why your posts are being called out. You are making statements about the pilot performance as if they are facts, when they are just your opinion. The authorities have not yet offered their interpretation for the pilots actions and reasons for them doing what they did, and you come here making statements they shouldn't have been pilots, based on them not meeting a criterion you have made up. You seem to think you know more about flying these planes than the pilots did. I guarantee you don't. The self praise in your post for reading a report does you no favours either, given the number of factually incorrect statements you've made throughout this thread

Your last sentence you then again attempt to move blame to the pilots away from Boeing by arguing from absurdity. Why are you unable to accept the conclusions of the worlds aviation authorities that this plane should not have been flying, and that it was not within certification limits for responses required by pilots in certain kinds of emergencies? You already stated falsely a couple of days ago that the pilots didn't meet existing standards for handling this type of emergency which is completely false. There are no standards for this type of emergency. Please stop it. Who on earth do you think you are fooling? I really really hope you have nothing to do with Boeing, if you do it is shameful that anyone connected to them continues this kind of disinformation campaign, smearing dead pilots in the process.

If you were making objective statements about what the pilots might have done differently, with the caveat there may be reasons they did what they did and that they were placed in a completely untested position, your remarks might be taken more seriously. But repeatedly suggesting the pilots were not competent, or that their training was lacking, without a single statement to that effect having bee made by the authorities, is contemptible. The plane is grounded. Zero recommendations have been made to the airline or pilots. Those are the facts, poor old Boeing are not the victims of a couple of cowboy pilots, however much you try to paint it that way. How stupid do you think people are?

Sorry for the tone but this really angers me.

No Pixeltalk was implying that because Boeing didn't specify it in the AD the Pilot's had no responsibility to know it was a bad thing to be above Vmo and the controls could be ineffective. I was being sarcastic.

Vmo is a SAFETY MARGIN and ET302 only reached it within the last minute of the flight BECAUSE of the MCAS nose down command. The ET302 pilots tried to correct the trim far before the Vmo and the associated overspeed alert. In fact the CVR and FDR clearly indicate that there was working on this since the very first MCAS nose down command when there speed was below 250 kt, very far from the 340 kt Vmo.

Vmo is a SAFETY MARGIN derived from the design speed that is much higher. The trim wheels should have worked even with a small Vmo overspeed.

Finally, I suspect that the trim wheels are gradually becoming hard to use far before Vmo. Maybe the major effect is the mis-trim itself as it was analysed early: https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and-range.html

I don't know what traces you are reading but they were at Vmo well before 1 minute to go and over it before this was recorded in the cockpit before they may have even tried the manual trim wheels(which is still debatable).

"At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied
that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At
05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.

https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... ET-AVJ.pdf

Look at the traces on Page 26 - not the discussion.

Out of respect to Ray - I'll stop responding to this line of the discussion now.

oschkosch wrote:

Just for better understanding, the fact that Boeing hid Mcas from the airlines initially is not a smoking gun which will lead to liability on Boeing's side of things?

Boeing's justification goes along the lines of telling the pilots about MCAS would have been adding needless detail for them to consider since Boeing felt any problem it would present would appear just like a runaway stab trim problem. In essence Boeing is saying they made a technical judgement that the pilots would not need to know about MCAS. At best that creates an issue for civil liability (they did something that turned out to be wrong) vs criminal liability (they knowingly did something wrong and lied about it which is what VW did).

Revelation wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

Just for better understanding, the fact that Boeing hid Mcas from the airlines initially is not a smoking gun which will lead to liability on Boeing's side of things?

Boeing's justification goes along the lines of telling the pilots about MCAS would have been adding needless detail for them to consider since Boeing felt any problem it would present would appear just like a runaway stab trim problem. In essence Boeing is saying they made a technical judgement that the pilots would not need to know about MCAS. At best that creates an issue for civil liability (they did something that turned out to be wrong) vs criminal liability (they knowingly did something wrong and lied about it which is what VW did).

The 737 POH is already over 1,300 pages long.http://www.737ng.co.uk/737NG%20POH.pdf

We still do not have a clarification and agreement as two when the two planes exceeded safe speed limits at low elevations.

morrisond wrote:

No Pixeltalk was implying that because Boeing didn't specify it in the AD the Pilot's had no responsibility to know it was a bad thing to be above Vmo and the controls could be ineffective. I was being sarcastic.

The controls (as in manual/electric trimming) were already ineffective before Vmo, as has been demonstrated by various you tubers.

You continue to beat a dead horse . . .

PW100 wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

PW100 wrote:

Where does the TOGA claim come from? I did not read that in the prelim report.

The prelim report states 94% N1 basically throughout the flight, but it did not state how that was achieved. I suspect that normal take-oftarget won't changef would start with pressing toga switch? But if autothrotlle was active throughout the six minutes, wouldn't we expect some modulation in the N1 during some point in time, given the changing airpseed, temperature and pressure altitude?
And why would N1 not be closer to 100%? Does 94% N1 represent maximum available N1 for the actual pressure altitide an OAT?

You will push the TOGA buttons at the start of every takeoff, but that doesn't mean the engines will be producing maximum thrust. On the MAX there are three possible thrust ratings used for takeoff, and those can be further derated with temperature. So depending on the rating used, the derate, and ambient conditions, thrust will often be less than 100%.

But why would N1 stay at 94% if autothrottle is engaged? Wouldn't some level of modulation be expected from autothrottle?

Once they selected LVL CHG, with an altitude higher than the current altitude selected in the MCP, the throttles will hold the computed climb thrust, apparently that was around 94%. Often times, when performing a derated takeoff, the takeoff thrust setting will be lower, or about the same as the climb thrust setting. As long as the altitude doesn't change much, the thrust target wont change much, and the throttles wont move.

Revelation wrote:

Boeing's justification goes along the lines of telling the pilots about MCAS would have been adding needless detail for them to consider since Boeing felt any problem it would present would appear just like a runaway stab trim problem. In essence Boeing is saying they made a technical judgement that the pilots would not need to know about MCAS. At best that creates an issue for civil liability (they did something that turned out to be wrong) vs criminal liability (they knowingly did something wrong and lied about it which is what VW did).

Agreed VW was slam dunk. We shall see what FBI/DoJ come up with in Boeing/FAA probes. Burden of proof is still on Boeing because investigators will be looking for substantial evidence showing the basis of their “technical judgement”, including what type of testing were run against that assumption.

2175301 wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

Revelation wrote:

We have yet to find a "smoking gun" where MCAS is shown to be something other than simple human error.

Just for better understanding, the fact that Boeing hid Mcas from the airlines initially is not a smoking gun which will lead to liability on Boeing's side of things?

Boeing did not hide MCAS from any National Regulator or from any Airline. The Airline was provided all relevant information; and MCAS is clearly and I understand fully described in the Maintenance manuals.

Boeing did recommend that the Pilots did not need any specific training and that it did not need to be in standard manuals for the Pilots. Both FAA and EASA, and most other world regulators - and airlines went along with that. I understand that Brazil did not and required specific pilot training on MCAS for all pilots of Brazilian Airlines using the 737Max, and that at least one airline in North America decided that they needed to provide specific MCAS training (the reference to that is in either the Lion Air or Ethiopian Crash thread).

There are many sub-sytems on an aircraft that the pilots are not specifically trained on, nor described in standard pilot manuals. No one would have questioned this omission or blamed Boeing (or anyone else) Had MCAS V1.0 been designed correctly and not malfunctioned the way it did.

In the end, the Airline is actually legally responsible for the training provided. They have to do as a minimum what the National Regulator decides. They can do more. Manufacturers make training recommendations to the National Regulators, who may adopt or change as they see appropriate.

So yes, there is no legal liability on Boeing for "hiding" information - because they did not hide it.

Have a great day,

Not quite correct, I believe. The only evidence we have relating to manuals is firstly - visibility of the description of MCAS in an MX training manual. This describes V0.0 (i.e. limited to wind up turn, high vertical speed, high AOA). it is pretty clear this is what was in the maintenance manual as well. It is also pretty clear that few knew of the changes to V1.0 at all. It is likely that any knowledge of MCAS by airlines and regulators was also limited to V0.0. Secondly, we know that a description of MCAS was in the FCOM and removed. This was also V0.0 and removed on the basis that training was not required because it was limited to the rare wind up turn situation. The person responsible for this achievement and persuasion of FAA to remove it from the FCOM was also, reportedly, unaware of V1.0. Even so, at least Brazilian authority thought it necessary to require some mention in training.

It is my understanding that no description of MCAS at V1.0 was in any manuals until after Lion Air event (surprise, surprise?).

So , it may actually be possible to prove, beyond doubt, that V1.0 functionality was not disclosed (call it hidden). It remains to be seen if it can also be shown that this was intentional, negligent or just plain incompetent.

Note. Being even tried to avoid publishing MCAS V1.0 functional description in the aftermath of the Lion Air event, until persuaded otherwise by their customers.

Ray

oschkosch wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

"Leading European low-cost operator Ryanair (RYA.I), which has been hit hard by the MAX grounding, is seeking to take over Airbus (AIR.PA) A320-family aircraft previously leased by Thomas Cook and deploy them at its Austrian carrier Lauda."

And thus FR goes one step closer from being an exclusive Boeing customer to being a carrier which has also Airbus in its fleet. Excellent move imho.

Laudamotion (the full FR subsidiary) already has around 21 A320s, thus a few more will not make a difference. Thus FR isn't more exclusive Boeing as it is with these A320s.

PW100 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

No Pixeltalk was implying that because Boeing didn't specify it in the AD the Pilot's had no responsibility to know it was a bad thing to be above Vmo and the controls could be ineffective. I was being sarcastic.

The controls (as in manual/electric trimming) were already ineffective before Vmo, as has been demonstrated by various you tubers.

You continue to beat a dead horse . . .

Please link to a video that shows that manual ELECTRIC trim was ineffective before Vmo. There is information that limits were placed on the manual electric trim on the max (although I haven't seen details of the conditions and limits). However, unless a YouTuber has access to a MAX simulator, I don't know how this can be demonstrated.

morrisond wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

No Pixeltalk was implying that because Boeing didn't specify it in the AD the Pilot's had no responsibility to know it was a bad thing to be above Vmo and the controls could be ineffective. I was being sarcastic.

Vmo is a SAFETY MARGIN and ET302 only reached it within the last minute of the flight BECAUSE of the MCAS nose down command. The ET302 pilots tried to correct the trim far before the Vmo and the associated overspeed alert. In fact the CVR and FDR clearly indicate that there was working on this since the very first MCAS nose down command when there speed was below 250 kt, very far from the 340 kt Vmo.

Vmo is a SAFETY MARGIN derived from the design speed that is much higher. The trim wheels should have worked even with a small Vmo overspeed.

Finally, I suspect that the trim wheels are gradually becoming hard to use far before Vmo. Maybe the major effect is the mis-trim itself as it was analysed early: https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and-range.html

I don't know what traces you are reading but they were at Vmo well before 1 minute to go and over it before this was recorded in the cockpit before they may have even tried the manual trim wheels(which is still debatable).

"At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied
that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At
05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.

https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... ET-AVJ.pdf

Look at the traces on Page 26 - not the discussion.

Out of respect to Ray - I'll stop responding to this line of the discussion now.

I read the factual information of the ET302 preliminary report. See my post #278 above.
Even at Vmo an aircraft must be fully functional, including the manual trim wheel, because this is a safety margin speed from the design speed. This was not the case for the 737-8/9 MAX trim wheels

Erebus wrote:

Waterbomber2 wrote:

This is taking the proportions of a scandal, akin to VW's dieselgate.

If I were Muellenberg, I would order to stop producing MAXes and start producing B738NG's again. The B738NG may not be as competitive but at least it is a well proven design and many airlines will accept to switch back to it at the right price.

Funny, you had to bring up the VW scandal. Nobody died as a result of an emissions cheating device but the US courts still took it upon themselves to dish out a $2.8 billion fine and criminally charge their (ex) CEO.

What kind of criminal consequences do you think Boeing will face for a scandal involving serious safety regulatory lapses and 346 dead? With the amount of power and influence Boeing has, I'd say it will walk away with none - "change my mind".

Agree completely. This is the kind of punitive judgment that is required in this case imho...and I’m not holding my breath for it either.

ubeema wrote:

We shall see what FBI/DoJ come up with in Boeing/FAA probes. Burden of proof is still on Boeing

"FBI/DoJ" implies a criminal activity investigation. In criminal cases the burden of proof always lies with the prosecution.

kalvado wrote:

Revelation wrote:

JetBuddy wrote:

This is one of the important elements of this story.

If EICAS was already developed for the P-8 (737-800) - although not FAA certified - it means implementing the original MCAS from the 767 tankers would likely have been much easier and straight forward. The $10 billion figure sounds incredibly high, even when training is included. The R&D was basically done already.

EICAS equipped 737 MAX would likely require differences training only. A 3 day course with half a day in the simulator.

Part of the $10 billion cost would have to be swallowed by the customer. I wonder if part of the cost is a calculation of how many sales would be lost due to customers choosing another type.

Another aspect of this is that Boeing could have modernized the entire flight deck further if implementing EICAS. All the grandfathered weird quirks and details in the overhead panel would no longer be necessary. The manual trim wheels might not have been necessary either.

But Boeing chose to cut corners to save costs. Southwest would likely have bought the plane regardless. American Airlines, maybe not.

I don't think there is much overlap between MCAS and EICAS.

MCAS is a function of FCC (flight control computer) whereas EICAS ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engine-in ... ing_system ) is more of a FMS (flight management system) function.

Yet there aren't many details of these black boxes in the public arena.

EICAS certainly could be used to announce the AoA Disagree quite clearly and presumably guide pilots through an electronic checklist, but would not do anything to fix the dreadful MCAS 1.0 FCC implementation.

Of course a wholesale redo of the 737 cockpit and sensors would do wonders but that's not been on the cards, because then you really do move away from the N days differences training.

A concise "AoA failure" message instead of a large flock of warnings (NOT including "AoA failure"!) could do wonders with situation awareness.
And I can see Boeing coerced into cockpit upgrade, regardless of training requirements or costs.

You’re thinking like maintenance, not like a pilot. The pilot needs to know what information being presented to him cannot be trusted. It does not matter why, or what the underlying cause is. In your scenario, you’d get an AoA sensor failure light and then have to remember every single system that AoA feeds, and know not to use that specific information.

JetBuddy wrote:

If EICAS was already developed for the P-8 (737-800) - although not FAA certified - it means implementing the original MCAS from the 767 tankers would likely have been much easier and straight forward. The $10 billion figure sounds incredibly high, even when training is included. The R&D was basically done already.

Can someone post a photo of a AOA disagree light on 737 NG cockpit? Was it standalone hardware, or was it from the FCC? Was the AOA retrofit for Southwest post Lion Air a standalone or from FCC (assuming the retrofit happened prior to the grounding, and not after, in which case no one would be able to confirm).

I'm asking because the evidence so far is pointing to dual AOA redundancy within the FCC is looking difficult to impossible, both because of the certification events pre-crashes, and the length of time they are taking to get a redundancy solution submitted. In fact, I'm thinking the AOA indicator option explanation was just cover to buy Boeing more time (they knew about the issue in 2017, could have notified Southwest and sold them the indicator option to get their AOA disagree light working, but they chose not to tell anyone).

I've looked on youtube at 737 NG cockpit videos and don't see anything.

EDIT: No, we don't know that AOA+AOA on 737 Max was doable. No, the 767 had better hardware, so the R&D does not transfer to the Max.

PixelFlight wrote:

From the ET302 Prelimiary Report FACTUAL INFORMATION:

I don't even know what you're talking out now. If you have a problem believing my previous post, I recommend looking at the FDR traces first-hand, not second-hand. The timeline is clear, and my post took the information directly from them.

https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/05/bjorn ... -analysis/

morrisond wrote:

PW100 wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

You will push the TOGA buttons at the start of every takeoff, but that doesn't mean the engines will be producing maximum thrust. On the MAX there are three possible thrust ratings used for takeoff, and those can be further derated with temperature. So depending on the rating used, the derate, and ambient conditions, thrust will often be less than 100%.

But why would N1 stay at 94% if autothrottle is engaged? Wouldn't some level of modulation be expected from autothrottle?

Not if the Autopilot isn't engaged and hence why the MCAS checklist tells you to disengage AT as MCAS can't act if AP is engaged.

OK. Thanks, got it.

The 737 A/T apparenlty works in close coopereation with AP. It appears actually to be against Boeing recommendations to use A/T in isolation without autopilot, as that could create pitch coupling (pitch/speed instability):
http://www.flaps2approach.com/journal/2014/9/2/b737-autothrottle-at-normal-and-non-normal-operations.html

PW100 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

PW100 wrote:

But why would N1 stay at 94% if autothrottle is engaged? Wouldn't some level of modulation be expected from autothrottle?

Not if the Autopilot isn't engaged and hence why the MCAS checklist tells you to disengage AT as MCAS can't act if AP is engaged.

OK. Thanks, got it.

The 737 A/T apparenlty works in close coopereation with AP. It appears actually to be against Boeing recommendations to use A/T in isolation without autopilot, as that could create pitch coupling (pitch/speed instability):
http://www.flaps2approach.com/journal/2014/9/2/b737-autothrottle-at-normal-and-non-normal-operations.html

That's a good article. It explains a lot and probably explains a lot of the landing incidents with 737's if Autothrottle is used in gusty conditions.

planecane wrote:

PW100 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

No Pixeltalk was implying that because Boeing didn't specify it in the AD the Pilot's had no responsibility to know it was a bad thing to be above Vmo and the controls could be ineffective. I was being sarcastic.

The controls (as in manual/electric trimming) were already ineffective before Vmo, as has been demonstrated by various you tubers.

You continue to beat a dead horse . . .

Please link to a video that shows that manual ELECTRIC trim was ineffective before Vmo. There is information that limits were placed on the manual electric trim on the max (although I haven't seen details of the conditions and limits). However, unless a YouTuber has access to a MAX simulator, I don't know how this can be demonstrated.

Yes, you are correct. The video was limited to the manual trim wheel, and did not concern electric trimming.

However various sources claim that to be the case for electric trimming as well. But I have no "proof" of that.

But as I have argued for a long time, it appears that ET crew were for some reason unable to perform electric trimming beyond 2.3 units. We do not know why that is. It may be this same aerodynamic loading at untrimmed condition, it may be something else in the control logic. But really, it doesn't really matters to my point: Vmo did not cause the issues and the inability to return to trimmed condition; Vmo was just another result of the deep shit the ET crew found themselves in due to the plethora of alerts/warnings and MCAS AND action. Up to the point of first MCAS activation, the crew performance in terms of speed management does not seem very poor to me.