morrisond wrote:rheinwaldner wrote:morrisond wrote:MCAS v 1.0 was not intended to be an Anti-stall - it was due to it's piss poor design that unfortunately it acted like one.
That is why MCAS v2.0 is not required to be one either.
A stick pusher would be an anti-stall system. It was not required for certification.
There is no anti-stall on the NG or MAX. All the systems were there to provide warnings for the pilots.
There is nothing on an 737 NG or MAX to keep the pilot from intentionally putting it into a stall. None of the other systems will prevent a stall. You can pull right through them.
MCAS was required to meet the FAR's for stall characteristics to help the pilot identify they were approaching a stall by not letting the stick force fall below a certain value.
I don't know how more plainly it can be said.
If you were flying the MAX in manual mode and were maintaining a certain angle of attack per the instruments or outside visual reference and MCAS fired once - you would feel the elevator getting a little heavier. You wouldn't let the nose drop by not counteracting that force unless you were being completely inattentive to what the aircraft was supposed to be doing - which is your job as you are flying an airplane in manual mode.
What else do you expect the pilot to be doing if they are trying to fly at way higher than normal AOA's? Going for a coffee or texting on there phone and not paying attention to what the aircraft is doing?
Why are you reversing the truth? Not many sentences in this huge post are correct. The red ones are wrong, the yellow ones are contradicting and the green ones are not relevant to judge whether MCAS is to prevent stalls.
You continue to provide some platitudes as answers but never reach the answer to the final "why is this?"...
E.g. (picking just some of your statements)
- Why is there a certification requirement that demands particular stick forces when approaching a stall? Final answer: to prevent stalls....
- Why are there systems to provide warnings to the pilots? Final answer: to help avoiding stalls.
- Why was the MAX required to meet certain stall characteristics? Final answer: to help avoiding stalls (<- if that is not a no brainer, then maybe questions about ones brain should be asked)
- Why pilots must identify that they are approaching a stall by not letting the stick force fall below a certain value? Final answer: to help avoiding stalls.
It seems like we are arguing about the English language. I'll admit some of what I type is pretty bad sometimes so I apologize if it's ever confusing.
I'll try once more.
The systems on the Max help to give the pilots clues to prevent inadvertently entering a stall - but none of them will actually cause the stall to not happen like a FBW design in Normal Law with all safeties working. They will not "prevent a stall" automatically. They still require the correct action from the pilot. They are helping the pilot to avoid a stall by giving them clues.
A properly functioning Stick Shaker, MCAS, or Audio alarm will not stop a stall from happening.
The probably only automatic thing on a non-FBW aircraft that would prevent(stop) a stall from happening would be a stick pusher that can't be countermanded by the pilot.
The MAX or NG do not have any anti-stall (meaning will automatically stop a stall from happening) systems. They just have systems to help avoid stalls by giving the pilot tactile and Audio clues - MCAS would be included in that category - it gives the pilots clues to help avoid stalls. it won't stop a stall from happening. MCAS gives tactile clues like a stick shaker would.
Ray - help!
Not sure I can help at all. It looks too much like a duck such that JATR did not make a determination. The one thing it isn't, is a pilot warning system.
You will need to accept that the primary concern is not for pilots pulling through into stall, but for stall being accelerated due to a combination of the tendency to nose up on its own or including atmospheric disturbance. Longitudinal stability linearity per se is looking to maintain elevator authority and discourage out of trim in the lead to stall such that recovery is assured. In this case in my view, MCAS only activates between stall warning and actual stall onset, which, if accelerated, could happen before the pilot has had time to feel the stick shaker in hand and it is already pushing the nose down in advance of pilot action. Both of which together, hopefully prevent/protect against/stop/discourage/deter stall occurring.
After all, the intention of stall warnings etc. is to avoid a stall actually occurring if possible.
The stability augmentation label applied by Boeing may be in the same ball park as the New MCAS system being just a minor extension to STS - smoke and mirrors.
NB. NG and MAX have a stall identification/protection/prevention function as part of the A/P also hidden behind the title of A/P STS. If it then relinquishes control to the pilot, I don't know.
Call it what you like, it does what it does and it exists to do it and is not just a nod in the direction of some unimportant regulation.