In a way It's kind of reassuring that employees found the issue. It shows the testings are not done by totally incompetent people.
The big question is what happened next ?
This is the bit that tweaks me.
I generally stay off these threads because they are typically toxic, depressing, repetitive, and unnaturally fixated with global training standards
But you look at the Boeing commercial product range and they are all almost universally safety benchmarks for their class.
Boeing 777? Benchmark safety
Boeing 787? Benchmark safety
Boeing 737NG? Benchmark safety. I get the trim wheel thing, but the stats don't lie. 10's of millions of flights between fatal accidents.
Boeing clearly know how to operate a product certification process successfully, and it is testament to all those hard working and dedicated Boeing employees that they do so.
And that is the disturbing, and I presume upsetting, thing about the fatal MAX/MCAS saga for those dedicated employees.
The commercial pressure has clearly caused Boeing to behave differently in this case, and turn both a safe product and a safe certification process into unsafe ones.
There is no way that the system that certified the above families of aircraft when properly deployed would have allowed a change to control architecture with a seriously unacceptable failure probability, and an even more seriously unacceptable failure severity impact.
I've worked in such a regulatory environment all my life.
That sort of paradigm shift doesn't happen randomly.Someone, somewhere in Boeing is very seriously culpable here, and for clarity, it isn't the line employees or flight test pilots. It's leadership.
ALL of their other products are so fundamentally safe that the same pilot pool who have been so heavily castigated on here are capable of flying all of them to exemplar levels of safety, despite genuine concerns that training levels are being eroded.
With the MAX, the differentiator is not the pilots - it's the aircraft, and its manufacturer.
And for the poster above who appears to imply that the whole MAX saga is a conspiracy theory cooked up by EASA to stop the MAX flying in Europe I have only one observation.
Emotionally intelligent people, and organisations, once they recognise that something is seriously wrong, will typically bare their chests (or souls) and openly declare their weaknesses and solicit help to overcome them.
The multinational I work for having been implicated in a bribery scandal, bared its chest, and opened its soul to investigators. Its changed our corporate DNA forever.
When Airbus got caught up in the same type of bribery scandal, they too bared their chests.
At least if you are open and transparent, you get to keep at least one hand on the sword as you fall on it.
Boeing leadership have just not exhibited this behaviour.
And whilst the situation remains so opaque, you can bet your ass that the inevitable consequence is that external bodies will turn over the stones that Boeing don't seem to want to turn by themselves.
Trust, once broken, is surpassingly hard to rebuild, and will only be repaired once the appropriate openness, honesty and admission of culpability are displayed.
That's just reality.
I think it's really, really sad for the oh so many people at Boeing doing their best to make this right. My thoughts and best wishes are with you (as they also are with the families of the victims)
posted early on in the saga wondering if the Boeing leadership's "hang on and brazen it out" approach would prove successful in the long term.
Rev, have you had any more thoughts on this?