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zionite
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 12:46 pm

klm617 wrote:
This is so much over kill here. With their problems the Lockheed Electra, Boeing 737-300, Airbus A320, Boeing 767, and The DC-10 were never grounded. Directives were put out and adhered to and all went well. It's of note that when the DC-10 was grounded after the AA 191 crash it wasn't the fault of the plane either. There needs to be proper training done and if the airlines in some countries can't provide adequate training for their novice pilots the they should be required to send their recruits to Boeing and Airbus for proper training. In times of trouble pilots need to rely on their flying skills to get them out of harms way not on the computer system. How many pitot tube accidents have their been where the crew were given erroneous air speed readings and flew their aircraft into the ground and those planes were not grounded.


:lol: Welcome to the 21st century.

So you are comparing 737MAX problems with Lockheed Electra that was introduced about 60 years ago, DC-10 about 50 years ago, 737-300 and 767 about 35 years ago, A320 about 32 years ago.

About same time ago, Bill Gates reportedly said that 640 KB should be enough RAM for everyone. So an accident due to erroneous air speed data from a single pitot tube at that time was still acceptable due to limitations in computational power available. Not any more.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 12:57 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
Will the regulators allow the frame to fly with known defects?

How many groundings have we had for immediate fixes over the life of any existing frames?
History has shown that regulators review the problem with the OEM and most issues are dealt with in time frames, including some items being pushed to production.
Note I did not say there have never been groundings, just in case, A.Net is very particular.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 1:09 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
If the simulator would not model MCAS, what use does this simulator than had for Faulkner?

So is it official that we have discounted Boeing's assertion that the ECAB that he was in was not the final version?
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 1:10 pm

par13del wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
Will the regulators allow the frame to fly with known defects?

How many groundings have we had for immediate fixes over the life of any existing frames?
History has shown that regulators review the problem with the OEM and most issues are dealt with in time frames, including some items being pushed to production.
Note I did not say there have never been groundings, just in case, A.Net is very particular.

SOme minor detail:
-continue using design which proved itself reasonably safe
-start operation of a new design with no operation history
-permit operation of design previously proven unsafe
 
Ertro
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 1:20 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
The simulator wouldn't model MCAS. At least not the one a Boeing (chief) technical pilot would be using 4 months before certification. It would simulate sensor input and then, using the outputs from the FCC that command control surface actuation (that don't exist), simulate a/c flight path and attitude into a 3D model, then generate that 3D representation of the real world onto a screen representing the cockpit window. The production version of the actual a/c FCCs would have been used.


If the simulator would not model MCAS, what use does this simulator than had for Faulkner? His job was to explain to the FAA why Boeing did not want any mentioning of MCAS in the Manuals and pilot training. If Boeing at the same time does not even provide him with the whole truth about MCAS and how it does work, it is a clear sign that Boeing, or certain people and departments at Boeing, had something to hide.


Maybe sgrow787 did not write in clearest possible way so that it is possible to miss what he said.

In my understanding sgrow787 clearly said that the simulator did not simulate MCAS because it was running the real deal MCAS on real deal HW.
The simulator simulated outside environment outside the plane but everything inside cockpit and computers was the real airplane parts that they were building and testing.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 1:20 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
If the simulator would not model MCAS, what use does this simulator than had for Faulkner?


It's use is to test MCAS subsystem (a development version of FCC software - MCAS resides in the FCC - sitting in production FCC hardware or equivalent conformed engineering hardware), in a safe environment where lives aren't at risk, but whose results and representation are very realistic, at least close enough to realistic to then be used in subsequent flight tests on actual a/c. Modeling of FCC hardware might be done at an engineers desk, assuming that engineer is designing FCC software (which is the case in this context). Modeling of MCAS function might be done with Labview or similar software as an early design step, but not in place of simulator testing.
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ArgentoSystems
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 1:21 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
4 months before certification in 2017 the flight simulator was still undergoing qualification? I don't think so. .

Yeah, it is crazy, but that what Boeing does. Look at them now. They are still "fine tuning" the software that they claim will be certified and deployed basically tomorrow.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 1:23 pm

klm617 wrote:
It's of note that when the DC-10 was grounded after the AA 191 crash it wasn't the fault of the plane either.


Well, in fact the design of the plane was a major factor. While the root cause of the chain of events was an improper maintenance procedure for an engine change, major design flaws on the DC-10 itself were major contributing factors, as was a flaw in engine-out training. For the aircraft, the routing of the hydraulics, the lack of a proper lockout mechanism for the leading edge slats due to the cheaper drum-and-cable design (the L10 and 747 used screw jacks), the lack of slat asymmetry warning, were all major factors that made what should have been a recoverable incident (physical loss of an engine), into an unrecoverable situation due to the lack information available to the pilots. A typical block of Swiss cheese where all the holes aligned. The DC10 was and still is, a dog, and its hydraulics were its Achille's heel, as UA232 proved. Apparently it flew nice though.

The big difference with the MAX and the problems of the other types is that in the other cases, it was a learning curve, i.e. unforeseen problems. On the other hand, the MAX debacle is the result of negligence and shortcuts in certification. A proper certification process and a culture of safety would have caught out the MCAS issue long before the first ones were delivered to unsuspecting customers. The sad fact is that with MCAS, only two holes in the Swiss cheese had to align to bring the plane down (faulty AOA sensor, and flawed design).

Beech
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 1:29 pm

par13del wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
If the simulator would not model MCAS, what use does this simulator than had for Faulkner?

So is it official that we have discounted Boeing's assertion that the ECAB that he was in was not the final version?


Forkner was talking with the FAA about the needed pilot training and manuals fro the 737MAX. He was supposed to convince the FAA to keep MCAS completely out of the pilot manuals. So how was anything, including the simulator, usefull for him, that did not show the final version.
Here I am not talking about the simulators that are sold to the customers. I am talking about simulators that are used at Boeing to confirm how different systems work. Tests that you want to fly on simulators.
That simulator was doing things that Forkner did not expect. Forkner did not expect MCAS to go very aggressive active at low speeds. It does not matter if the simulator was wrong. MCAS actually goes active at low speed and very aggressive at that.
So the person, that should explain to the FAA why MCAS should not be in the manuals, has at that time, not many month before EIS, not been informed fully about MCAS, when it goes active and what it does. The failure mode, we see at the two accidents, was either never tested, or some department at Boeing kept really quite about it.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 1:35 pm

Ertro wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
The simulator wouldn't model MCAS. At least not the one a Boeing (chief) technical pilot would be using 4 months before certification. It would simulate sensor input and then, using the outputs from the FCC that command control surface actuation (that don't exist), simulate a/c flight path and attitude into a 3D model, then generate that 3D representation of the real world onto a screen representing the cockpit window. The production version of the actual a/c FCCs would have been used.


If the simulator would not model MCAS, what use does this simulator than had for Faulkner? His job was to explain to the FAA why Boeing did not want any mentioning of MCAS in the Manuals and pilot training. If Boeing at the same time does not even provide him with the whole truth about MCAS and how it does work, it is a clear sign that Boeing, or certain people and departments at Boeing, had something to hide.


Maybe sgrow787 did not write in clearest possible way so that it is possible to miss what he said.

In my understanding sgrow787 clearly said that the simulator did not simulate MCAS because it was running the real deal MCAS on real deal HW.
The simulator simulated outside environment outside the plane but everything inside cockpit and computers was the real airplane parts that they were building and testing.


:checkmark:
That's about it, although I reserved myself from mentioning the other aircraft systems, since I have not seen a full Boeing simulator before. I'm just going by what I've seen in my work with cockpit display development and test. That said, I would expect the full array of real 737 Max hardware in the kind of simulator that Mr. Forkner (not Faulkner) would have used.
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sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 1:51 pm

beechnut wrote:
The sad fact is that with MCAS, only two holes in the Swiss cheese had to align to bring the plane down (faulty AOA sensor, and flawed design).

Beech


I would add to that and say, when a manufacturer hides a new subsystem from the safety regulator and from the end user, because the new system is "rarely used" and "too much information" for the end user, then it's equivalent to removing the block of Swiss cheese altogether, leaving nothing but clean air between product and failure.
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XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 2:20 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Ertro wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:

If the simulator would not model MCAS, what use does this simulator than had for Faulkner? His job was to explain to the FAA why Boeing did not want any mentioning of MCAS in the Manuals and pilot training. If Boeing at the same time does not even provide him with the whole truth about MCAS and how it does work, it is a clear sign that Boeing, or certain people and departments at Boeing, had something to hide.


Maybe sgrow787 did not write in clearest possible way so that it is possible to miss what he said.

In my understanding sgrow787 clearly said that the simulator did not simulate MCAS because it was running the real deal MCAS on real deal HW.
The simulator simulated outside environment outside the plane but everything inside cockpit and computers was the real airplane parts that they were building and testing.


:checkmark:
That's about it, although I reserved myself from mentioning the other aircraft systems, since I have not seen a full Boeing simulator before. I'm just going by what I've seen in my work with cockpit display development and test. That said, I would expect the full array of real 737 Max hardware in the kind of simulator that Mr. Forkner (not Faulkner) would have used.

I would have expected this would be the most likely configuration. However, it seems to be contradicted by the Boeing press release. Are they being economical with the truth?
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130533

'......his comments reflected a reaction to a simulator program that was not functioning properly, and that was still undergoing testing.....'

'.....The simulator software used during the Nov. 15 session was still undergoing testing and qualification and had not been finalized, but it, too, provided for MCAS operation at low speed. Separately, a low-speed version of MCAS was installed on the airplanes used for training-related flight testing that the FAA administered in August 2016...….'


Ray
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 2:24 pm

par13del wrote:
So is it official that we have discounted Boeing's assertion that the ECAB that he was in was not the final version?

It's not relevant, IMO.

Whatever version he was using caused him to say he (inadvertently) lied to FAA, so to him it was a realistic representation of the product's behavior.

Boeing's response only said it wasn't the final version, but that does not exclude it having a realistic implementation of MCAS behavior in it.

Given we knew how MCAS did end up behaving, Forkner surely would/should have been alerted to retest it on the "final" version of ECAB.

Not doing so knowing the potential for "egregious" behavior and "rampant" trimming would be negligent.

Then, later on at the time of the JT crash, the publicly available FR24 flight profile would have had to have been a Revelation to him.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 2:32 pm

SteelChair wrote:
My rough guess is that, all in, this mistake will cost Boeing $50 billion. They should terminate the Max program right now, scrap all the Max airplanes, and spool up the NG program to buy 4 years of time to develop the NSA. And bring back Alan Mullally to run it all.

:checkmark: :checkmark:

AAPramugari14 wrote:
That was about the dumbest thing I've heard all day. All Boeing needs to do is fix the problem(s) (in the correct manner) and revise training.

:talktothehand:

SteelChair wrote:
Well your personal insult aside, no, they don't just need to fix the problem and revise the training.

They've had problem after problem after problem. And then they've lied and attempted to cover them up. Remember, because of the KC-46 fiasco (people went to jail), they now have a corporate history of lying and cover ups. Their leadership is corrupt to the core and their products are dangerous. Those are the facts.

:checkmark: :checkmark:

Thank you, SteelChair. We need more people like you and less like AAPramugari14.

Boeing should indeed terminate the Max, switch back to the NG and concentrate on a real new design for the 737 successor.

After many years of dreaming I finally visited the Boeing factor in Everett in 2017. One of the aviation highlights of my life. Great to see what all the workers accomplish there. I wore the cap I bought at the Boeing shop with pride. Not anymore unfortunately. This whole Max saga did a lot of damage to Boeing. It’s time for a fresh start. Too bad about the sunk cost, but time to move on. Safety first and stockholder value last, please.
 
beechnut
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 2:49 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
beechnut wrote:
The sad fact is that with MCAS, only two holes in the Swiss cheese had to align to bring the plane down (faulty AOA sensor, and flawed design).

Beech


I would add to that and say, when a manufacturer hides a new subsystem from the safety regulator and from the end user, because the new system is "rarely used" and "too much information" for the end user, then it's equivalent to removing the block of Swiss cheese altogether, leaving nothing but clean air between product and failure.


Absolutely. I've flown spam cans a good part of my life and rarely have I been reluctant to fly in a well-maintained and properly-certified aircraft. But even if the MAX regains its certification, I will go out of my way to avoid flying on one. I just can't trust that there's no other rotten cheese hidden in there somewhere by the flawed certification process and the prevailing culture that existed during the design and construction of the MAX. I'm not sure that kind of thing can be "certified out"of the design. And I'm hearing the same sort of thing from airline pilots as well, on competing forums and from the handful I know.

Beech
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 2:58 pm

klm617 wrote:
This is so much over kill here. With their problems the Lockheed Electra, Boeing 737-300, Airbus A320, Boeing 767, and The DC-10 were never grounded. Directives were put out and adhered to and all went well. It's of note that when the DC-10 was grounded after the AA 191 crash it wasn't the fault of the plane either. There needs to be proper training done and if the airlines in some countries can't provide adequate training for their novice pilots the they should be required to send their recruits to Boeing and Airbus for proper training. In times of trouble pilots need to rely on their flying skills to get them out of harms way not on the computer system. How many pitot tube accidents have their been where the crew were given erroneous air speed readings and flew their aircraft into the ground and those planes were not grounded.


Those "novice" pilots had no chance to learn properly because Boeing themselves excluded any mention of MCAS from training and didn't include it in simulators. The most extensive "training" they provided was a short video. The plane was uncontrollably nose diving and the pilots did their best to save it, but with no knowledge of what was even causing the failure and no ability to overpower the system without disabling MCAS (which, once again, they had never been trained to do) their only real chance was the dumb luck of realizing it's some supposedly ancillary system and disabling it within the extremely short time they had, while battling a vertical dive and probably disoriented.

I honestly can't believe people are still blaming it on the pilots. Maybe if there was a third crash we could say they should have known, as it's big news by now, but I don't think we could reasonably expect these pilots to realize how major the MCAS issue was. Especially the Lion flight which had no warning whatsoever.

And comparing safety standards of today to those of 30-50 years ago isn't really sound logic. There's a reason the US saw 5+ fatal accidents a year back then and now hasn't had a major one since 2009. Grounding the MAX was the right decision. Sure it might hurt Boeing but boo hoo for them, maybe they should have properly implemented their systems and not indirectly killed hundreds of people.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 3:04 pm

Do not be overly dramatic. The MAX problem is nothing that can not be fixed, albeit at a cost.

In a best case the scenario it needs the new software, a working AoA disagree warning, a revised checklist and and an extra page in ipad training.

I worst case scenario it will need some strakes on the cowlings to disrupt the airflow at higher AoA, possibly with some cost in fuel burn.

This is not a huge technical problem to solve. The big problem at Boeing is that they tried to fix it with as little cost as possible and it seems like they are still trying.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 3:13 pm

seahawk wrote:
Do not be overly dramatic. The MAX problem is nothing that can not be fixed, albeit at a cost.


This is not a huge technical problem to solve. The big problem at Boeing is that they tried to fix it with as little cost as possible and it seems like they are still trying.


So if this is all so easy peasy, why is it not solved already?

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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 3:27 pm

seahawk wrote:
Do not be overly dramatic. The MAX problem is nothing that can not be fixed, albeit at a cost.

In a best case the scenario it needs the new software, a working AoA disagree warning, a revised checklist and and an extra page in ipad training.

I worst case scenario it will need some strakes on the cowlings to disrupt the airflow at higher AoA, possibly with some cost in fuel burn.

This is not a huge technical problem to solve. The big problem at Boeing is that they tried to fix it with as little cost as possible and it seems like they are still trying.



As an aerospace signatory, can I suggest that I would be very very reluctant to sign off anything on the MAX.

It’s easy for you to type those words on a forum.

Can I suggest that when you know your signature puts people life’s in your hands, you think very hard about what your signing.

Can I ask how you would feel if you signed off the MAX now and six months later another crash happens and it’s pointed at you that you didn’t do due diligence.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 3:30 pm

oschkosch wrote:
seahawk wrote:
Do not be overly dramatic. The MAX problem is nothing that can not be fixed, albeit at a cost.


This is not a huge technical problem to solve. The big problem at Boeing is that they tried to fix it with as little cost as possible and it seems like they are still trying.


So if this is all so easy peasy, why is it not solved already?

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The real problem for Boeing is one more screw up and it sinks the whole product line and possibly more. They need to make sure that nothing related to the aircraft will cause a crash in the next 10 years.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 3:43 pm

seahawk wrote:
Do not be overly dramatic. The MAX problem is nothing that can not be fixed, albeit at a cost.

In a best case the scenario it needs the new software, a working AoA disagree warning, a revised checklist and and an extra page in ipad training.

I worst case scenario it will need some strakes on the cowlings to disrupt the airflow at higher AoA, possibly with some cost in fuel burn.

This is not a huge technical problem to solve. The big problem at Boeing is that they tried to fix it with as little cost as possible and it seems like they are still trying.


After the two accidents it became obviously apparent that Boeing had made some terrible mistakes, and had poorly communicated data to the FAA, EASA, airlines, and their pilots. Add a little poor maintenance in some countries, poor training and information, maybe some pilot issues and two catastrophic accidents and loss of life.

Boeing had somewhat communicated relevant data to the FAA and airlines, even the badly performing MCAS. and pilots messaging was in the hands of FBI and someone else months ago. "Somewhat" is not good enough, but it was and is enough that FAA should have been asking questions two years ago. But managers seem not to have passed information down the chain to appropriate aviation engineers and pilots.

It is not so much who know what and when did they know it, but how clearly was information shared and how comprehensively was information shared.
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lowbank
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:08 pm

The survey data in this article suggests that it’s more a couple of people who are concerned about getting on the MAX.

https://news.yahoo.com/boeing-wants-fly ... Xs7gFKRbla
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mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:08 pm

seahawk wrote:
Do not be overly dramatic. The MAX problem is nothing that can not be fixed, albeit at a cost.

In a best case the scenario it needs the new software, a working AoA disagree warning, a revised checklist and and an extra page in ipad training.

I worst case scenario it will need some strakes on the cowlings to disrupt the airflow at higher AoA, possibly with some cost in fuel burn.

This is not a huge technical problem to solve. The big problem at Boeing is that they tried to fix it with as little cost as possible and it seems like they are still trying.


It needs a new manual trim wheel that is working and it should be moved to EICAS, so it would not need exceptions to FAR, as the current interface in the cockpit does.

I agree that there are not huge technical problems to solve. Especially as EICAS has been integrated on the P-8. And nobody can tell me, that Boeing is not able to design a trim wheel that does not need a Gorilla to turn.

And I agree with you, that the main problem is Boeing continuing to try to cut corners.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:27 pm

MartijnNL wrote:
SteelChair wrote:
My rough guess is that, all in, this mistake will cost Boeing $50 billion. They should terminate the Max program right now, scrap all the Max airplanes, and spool up the NG program to buy 4 years of time to develop the NSA. And bring back Alan Mullally to run it all.

AAPramugari14 wrote:
That was about the dumbest thing I've heard all day. All Boeing needs to do is fix the problem(s) (in the correct manner) and revise training.

Boeing should indeed terminate the Max, switch back to the NG and concentrate on a real new design for the 737 successor.

Terminating the MAX is about the only course of action guaranteed to lose more money than fixing the MAX.

https://www.reuters.com/article/boeing- ... SL3N2762OT suggests the losses are now $5.6 billion with another $3.2 billion to come.

So you are off by at least a factor of four in terms of cost.

Killing the MAX will cause even more lawsuits due to breaking contracts with customers and suppliers, with guilt 100% certain.

Then the idea that the customers will trust the same organization that just stiffed them and solidified the incompetence narrative to produce an all-new replacement in record time is laughable.

The only way forward is to fix the MAX and deal with the fallout.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:29 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
If the simulator would not model MCAS, what use does this simulator than had for Faulkner?

Believe it or not the sim was used to test/develop other aspects of MAX operation besides MCAS. He wasn't hired to try out MCAS only.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:35 pm

oschkosch wrote:
seahawk wrote:
Do not be overly dramatic. The MAX problem is nothing that can not be fixed, albeit at a cost.


This is not a huge technical problem to solve. The big problem at Boeing is that they tried to fix it with as little cost as possible and it seems like they are still trying.


So if this is all so easy peasy, why is it not solved already?

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Because they still try to do it with as little change compared to the NG and with as little effort and cost as possible.

lowbank wrote:
As an aerospace signatory, can I suggest that I would be very very reluctant to sign off anything on the MAX.

It’s easy for you to type those words on a forum.

Can I suggest that when you know your signature puts people life’s in your hands, you think very hard about what your signing.

Can I ask how you would feel if you signed off the MAX now and six months later another crash happens and it’s pointed at you that you didn’t do due diligence.


As a the FAA or EASA I would be very sceptical about anything Boeing comes up with, but they do not have to fix the MAX, Boeing does. And I have no doubt that the engineers there could fix the problem to the fullest satisfaction of the regulation authorities, but maybe not to the satisfaction of their own bean counters.

mjoelnir wrote:
seahawk wrote:
Do not be overly dramatic. The MAX problem is nothing that can not be fixed, albeit at a cost.

In a best case the scenario it needs the new software, a working AoA disagree warning, a revised checklist and and an extra page in ipad training.

I worst case scenario it will need some strakes on the cowlings to disrupt the airflow at higher AoA, possibly with some cost in fuel burn.

This is not a huge technical problem to solve. The big problem at Boeing is that they tried to fix it with as little cost as possible and it seems like they are still trying.


It needs a new manual trim wheel that is working and it should be moved to EICAS, so it would not need exceptions to FAR, as the current interface in the cockpit does.

I agree that there are not huge technical problems to solve. Especially as EICAS has been integrated on the P-8. And nobody can tell me, that Boeing is not able to design a trim wheel that does not need a Gorilla to turn.

And I agree with you, that the main problem is Boeing continuing to try to cut corners.


I think if you change the switches for the trim controls, so that one disables all automatic trim systemw and the second disables electric manual trim, the problem would be minimized. If you then add the roller coaster manoeuvrer back into the conversion training and add it to the flight manuals, this could be just fine. We know from the experience of the NG that a runaway trim is rare and seldom a problem.
 
hivue
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:49 pm

Revelation wrote:
par13del wrote:
So is it official that we have discounted Boeing's assertion that the ECAB that he was in was not the final version?

It's not relevant, IMO.

Whatever version he was using caused him to say he (inadvertently) lied to FAA, so to him it was a realistic representation of the product's behavior.

Boeing's response only said it wasn't the final version, but that does not exclude it having a realistic implementation of MCAS behavior in it.

Given we knew how MCAS did end up behaving, Forkner surely would/should have been alerted to retest it on the "final" version of ECAB.

Not doing so knowing the potential for "egregious" behavior and "rampant" trimming would be negligent.

Then, later on at the time of the JT crash, the publicly available FR24 flight profile would have had to have been a Revelation to him.


:checkmark: The question is what was it about the sim session(s) he was complaining about that caused him to say he had inadvertently misrepresented something to regulators in the past? It's not likely the regulators would be interested in whether the sim was fully tweaked.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
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EA CO AS
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:51 pm

CLESpotter95 wrote:
Those "novice" pilots had no chance to learn properly because Boeing themselves excluded any mention of MCAS from training and didn't include it in simulators. The most extensive "training" they provided was a short video. The plane was uncontrollably nose diving and the pilots did their best to save it, but with no knowledge of what was even causing the failure and no ability to overpower the system without disabling MCAS (which, once again, they had never been trained to do) their only real chance was the dumb luck of realizing it's some supposedly ancillary system and disabling it within the extremely short time they had, while battling a vertical dive and probably disoriented.

I honestly can't believe people are still blaming it on the pilots.


My workgroup had the opportunity to have a presentation on the MAX by three B737 fleet captains, and they did a very deep dive into the FDR data for both the JT and ET accidents. They reviewed MCAS in detail with us, and what role it played. While they acknowledged that Boeing should have explained MCAS more clearly than was originally done, and made it clear they were EXTREMELY uncomfortable with laying any blame at the feet of their fellow aviators, they also had no qualms in pointing out that any B737 type-rated pilot shouldn't have lost either airplane, as both accidents presented as a runaway stabilizer, and the standard checklist for the B737 would have involved engaging the trim cutout switches.

In one accident, the cutouts were never touched. In the other, they were engaged, but then immediately turned back on, allowing the runaway to continue.

Boeing's decision to have two AOA vanes instead of one, alternating use from left to right between flights, was definitely a contributing factor, but again, these 737 pilots were clear about the MAX being safe and ready to fly, and this was an airmanship problem more than anything else.
"In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem - government IS the problem." - Ronald Reagan

Comments made here are my own and are not intended to represent the official position of Alaska Air Group
 
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flyingclrs727
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:55 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
seahawk wrote:
I think ipad training is enough for this. The changes to the switches are imho unavoidable, as there needs to be an option to turn automatic trim systems off and still keep manual electric trim. (otherwise the whole trim wheel problems will come to bite)


After the whole sh*tshow mostly created by Boeing and now the whole pointing at the FAA it would not surprise me when Sim-training will be mandated anyway but if there is a new switch function connected with a new memory item then they will mandate that for sure.

Boeing pointing the finger at the agency they rely on to bring their cash cow back up in the air is the worst you can do.


Perhaps in the future, the FAA rules will require simulator training for all new major variants of airliners before flying.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:55 pm

hivue wrote:
Revelation wrote:
par13del wrote:
So is it official that we have discounted Boeing's assertion that the ECAB that he was in was not the final version?

It's not relevant, IMO.

Whatever version he was using caused him to say he (inadvertently) lied to FAA, so to him it was a realistic representation of the product's behavior.

Boeing's response only said it wasn't the final version, but that does not exclude it having a realistic implementation of MCAS behavior in it.

Given we knew how MCAS did end up behaving, Forkner surely would/should have been alerted to retest it on the "final" version of ECAB.

Not doing so knowing the potential for "egregious" behavior and "rampant" trimming would be negligent.

Then, later on at the time of the JT crash, the publicly available FR24 flight profile would have had to have been a Revelation to him.


:checkmark: The question is what was it about the sim session(s) he was complaining about that caused him to say he had inadvertently misrepresented something to regulators in the past? It's not likely the regulators would be interested in whether the sim was fully tweaked.

I thought that the gist of that exchange was that the regulators knew of high speed MCAS. Forkner just got back from the simulator and found out from the simulator, not the design team, at the 11th hour, that there was now low speed MCAS. His previous assurances to the FAA were now invalid in light of that new information.
Last edited by DenverTed on Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:59 pm, edited 2 times in total.
 
kayik
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:56 pm

From Reuters link posted by Revelation:

The company on Sunday expressed regret over the messages, and said it was still investigating what they meant.


They were sitting on that script for months now. Still investigating what they meant?
 
lowbank
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 5:27 pm

seahawk wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
seahawk wrote:
Do not be overly dramatic. The MAX problem is nothing that can not be fixed, albeit at a cost.


This is not a huge technical problem to solve. The big problem at Boeing is that they tried to fix it with as little cost as possible and it seems like they are still trying.


So if this is all so easy peasy, why is it not solved already?

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk


Because they still try to do it with as little change compared to the NG and with as little effort and cost as possible.

lowbank wrote:
As an aerospace signatory, can I suggest that I would be very very reluctant to sign off anything on the MAX.

It’s easy for you to type those words on a forum.

Can I suggest that when you know your signature puts people life’s in your hands, you think very hard about what your signing.

Can I ask how you would feel if you signed off the MAX now and six months later another crash happens and it’s pointed at you that you didn’t do due diligence.


As a the FAA or EASA I would be very sceptical about anything Boeing comes up with, but they do not have to fix the MAX, Boeing does. And I have no doubt that the engineers there could fix the problem to the fullest satisfaction of the regulation authorities, but maybe not to the satisfaction of their own bean counters.

mjoelnir wrote:
seahawk wrote:
Do not be overly dramatic. The MAX problem is nothing that can not be fixed, albeit at a cost.

In a best case the scenario it needs the new software, a working AoA disagree warning, a revised checklist and and an extra page in ipad training.

I worst case scenario it will need some strakes on the cowlings to disrupt the airflow at higher AoA, possibly with some cost in fuel burn.

This is not a huge technical problem to solve. The big problem at Boeing is that they tried to fix it with as little cost as possible and it seems like they are still trying.


It needs a new manual trim wheel that is working and it should be moved to EICAS, so it would not need exceptions to FAR, as the current interface in the cockpit does.

I agree that there are not huge technical problems to solve. Especially as EICAS has been integrated on the P-8. And nobody can tell me, that Boeing is not able to design a trim wheel that does not need a Gorilla to turn.

And I agree with you, that the main problem is Boeing continuing to try to cut corners.


I think if you change the switches for the trim controls, so that one disables all automatic trim systemw and the second disables electric manual trim, the problem would be minimized. If you then add the roller coaster manoeuvrer back into the conversion training and add it to the flight manuals, this could be just fine. We know from the experience of the NG that a runaway trim is rare and seldom a problem.



I notice you didn’t actually answer my question.

Working in the industry as I do, things are always harder than those outside of it think.

MCAS was developed for reason, that reason still exists.

Trying to back away from what you have declared is needed is a hard argument to have. Boeing are in a massive hole, that’s why they have been grounded for so long and from what I am seeing they have not put away the shovels yet and are digging themselves deeper.

Trying to shift the blame on the regulators smacks of desperation and if it was me being attacked would be even less likely to sign off the MAX.
Every days a school day.
 
lowbank
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 5:33 pm

EA CO AS wrote:
CLESpotter95 wrote:
Those "novice" pilots had no chance to learn properly because Boeing themselves excluded any mention of MCAS from training and didn't include it in simulators. The most extensive "training" they provided was a short video. The plane was uncontrollably nose diving and the pilots did their best to save it, but with no knowledge of what was even causing the failure and no ability to overpower the system without disabling MCAS (which, once again, they had never been trained to do) their only real chance was the dumb luck of realizing it's some supposedly ancillary system and disabling it within the extremely short time they had, while battling a vertical dive and probably disoriented.

I honestly can't believe people are still blaming it on the pilots.


My workgroup had the opportunity to have a presentation on the MAX by three B737 fleet captains, and they did a very deep dive into the FDR data for both the JT and ET accidents. They reviewed MCAS in detail with us, and what role it played. While they acknowledged that Boeing should have explained MCAS more clearly than was originally done, and made it clear they were EXTREMELY uncomfortable with laying any blame at the feet of their fellow aviators, they also had no qualms in pointing out that any B737 type-rated pilot shouldn't have lost either airplane, as both accidents presented as a runaway stabilizer, and the standard checklist for the B737 would have involved engaging the trim cutout switches.

In one accident, the cutouts were never touched. In the other, they were engaged, but then immediately turned back on, allowing the runaway to continue.

Boeing's decision to have two AOA vanes instead of one, alternating use from left to right between flights, was definitely a contributing factor, but again, these 737 pilots were clear about the MAX being safe and ready to fly, and this was an airmanship problem more than anything else.




As I have said.

That’s the real problem with the industry I love, that’s changed in the last few years.

In light of what we know as fact. I am not sure an future Boeing aircraft will be safe to fly on if this is their position still.
Every days a school day.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 5:37 pm

EA CO AS wrote:
CLESpotter95 wrote:
Those "novice" pilots had no chance to learn properly because Boeing themselves excluded any mention of MCAS from training and didn't include it in simulators. The most extensive "training" they provided was a short video. The plane was uncontrollably nose diving and the pilots did their best to save it, but with no knowledge of what was even causing the failure and no ability to overpower the system without disabling MCAS (which, once again, they had never been trained to do) their only real chance was the dumb luck of realizing it's some supposedly ancillary system and disabling it within the extremely short time they had, while battling a vertical dive and probably disoriented.

I honestly can't believe people are still blaming it on the pilots.


My workgroup had the opportunity to have a presentation on the MAX by three B737 fleet captains, and they did a very deep dive into the FDR data for both the JT and ET accidents. They reviewed MCAS in detail with us, and what role it played. While they acknowledged that Boeing should have explained MCAS more clearly than was originally done, and made it clear they were EXTREMELY uncomfortable with laying any blame at the feet of their fellow aviators, they also had no qualms in pointing out that any B737 type-rated pilot shouldn't have lost either airplane, as both accidents presented as a runaway stabilizer, and the standard checklist for the B737 would have involved engaging the trim cutout switches.

In one accident, the cutouts were never touched. In the other, they were engaged, but then immediately turned back on, allowing the runaway to continue.

Boeing's decision to have two AOA vanes instead of one, alternating use from left to right between flights, was definitely a contributing factor, but again, these 737 pilots were clear about the MAX being safe and ready to fly, and this was an airmanship problem more than anything else.


It is always interesting how things are translated.

Cleaning MAX out of the pilot manuals and presenting no information even about it's existence, translates to: acknowledging that Boeing should have explained MCAS more clearly than was originally done.
 
MSPNWA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 5:40 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
It needs a new manual trim wheel that is working and it should be moved to EICAS, so it would not need exceptions to FAR, as the current interface in the cockpit does.

I agree that there are not huge technical problems to solve. Especially as EICAS has been integrated on the P-8. And nobody can tell me, that Boeing is not able to design a trim wheel that does not need a Gorilla to turn.

And I agree with you, that the main problem is Boeing continuing to try to cut corners.


Clearly it doesn't need a new trim wheel. The EASA is even saying so with their actions (the lack thereof). If the MAX needs a new trim wheel, the NG does too. The NG clearly doesn't yet need work on the wheels according to regulators, and so the MAX doesn't need it either to them. Logically the MAX cannot remain grounded because of the trim wheels.

It also doesn't need EICAS. Exceptions are perfectly acceptable when proper, and the current system is not being implicated as a significant contributing factor with the accidents. If that is actually an issue, there's a whole host of airplanes that need to be grounded for less-than-perfect warning systems (I'm looking at you, A330).

Really, the actions of some make it seem they really just want to keep the MAX on the ground, safe or not. Nothing to do with actual safety. Nothing to do with cutting corners. Time for the MAX to fly again. Boeing plugged their hole. It's time for the world to swallow their pride and plug theirs.

mjoelnir wrote:
It is always interesting how things are translated.

Cleaning MAX out of the pilot manuals and presenting no information even about it's existence, translates to: acknowledging that Boeing should have explained MCAS more clearly than was originally done.


It's the proper position. Yes, in hindsight something should have been in the manual, but it's dubious that it would have changed anything considering ET302 should have had full knowledge of MCAS (as much or more information AND being highlighted by a previous event) and still mishandled it badly. The manual talk is more of a red herring than anything.
 
hivue
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:02 pm

DenverTed wrote:
hivue wrote:
Revelation wrote:
It's not relevant, IMO.

Whatever version he was using caused him to say he (inadvertently) lied to FAA, so to him it was a realistic representation of the product's behavior.

Boeing's response only said it wasn't the final version, but that does not exclude it having a realistic implementation of MCAS behavior in it.

Given we knew how MCAS did end up behaving, Forkner surely would/should have been alerted to retest it on the "final" version of ECAB.

Not doing so knowing the potential for "egregious" behavior and "rampant" trimming would be negligent.

Then, later on at the time of the JT crash, the publicly available FR24 flight profile would have had to have been a Revelation to him.


:checkmark: The question is what was it about the sim session(s) he was complaining about that caused him to say he had inadvertently misrepresented something to regulators in the past? It's not likely the regulators would be interested in whether the sim was fully tweaked.

I thought that the gist of that exchange was that the regulators knew of high speed MCAS. Forkner just got back from the simulator and found out from the simulator, not the design team, at the 11th hour, that there was now low speed MCAS. His previous assurances to the FAA were now invalid in light of that new information.


I tend to agree with this. The next question is did his concerns get passed on up the chain of command?
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Nils75cz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:08 pm

klm617 wrote:
This is so much over kill here. With their problems the Lockheed Electra, Boeing 737-300, Airbus A320, Boeing 767, and The DC-10 were never grounded. Directives were put out and adhered to and all went well. It's of note that when the DC-10 was grounded after the AA 191 crash it wasn't the fault of the plane either. There needs to be proper training done and if the airlines in some countries can't provide adequate training for their novice pilots the they should be required to send their recruits to Boeing and Airbus for proper training. In times of trouble pilots need to rely on their flying skills to get them out of harms way not on the computer system. How many pitot tube accidents have their been where the crew were given erroneous air speed readings and flew their aircraft into the ground and those planes were not grounded.


Please remember that the plane got grounded, not pilots nor airlines. There is a reason for that. I would also like to draw your attention to the fact, that one of the big selling points of the 737 MAX is that there is no mentionable extra education to speak of to be able to fly this aircraft.
 
lowbank
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:15 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
PW100 wrote:
I'm at total trying to understand loss why anyone would want to label that as immediately, apart from demonstrating that one has a rather specific agenda. And has no understanding at all that turning them back on was litterally the crew's last resort. They fully knew that if that did not work, they would be dead immediately, to borrow your own word. The crew was looking death directly in the eyes.


You know what's funny (or not, actually). I knew somebody would immediately come and pick apart that one word, and use it to try to discredit the entire message.

Here's the test. Remove the word. Does it change the message? No, the point is just as clear. So we know it's wrong to try to discredit the message based on one subjective, immaterial adverb.

It sounds like an interesting presentation, and it deserves a fair look, not a smear.


Tell you what, just the MAX back in the air.

Boeing would go the way of the Comet and the UK aviation industry on the next accident of the MAX.

Seriously I want the MAX back in the air and cured of its MCAS issue.

Will it crash again, yes but as long as it’s not due to MCAS, it will continue to fly.
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:17 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
Clearly it doesn't need a new trim wheel. The EASA is even saying so with their actions (the lack thereof). If the MAX needs a new trim wheel, the NG does too. The NG clearly doesn't yet need work on the wheels according to regulators, and so the MAX doesn't need it either to them. Logically the MAX cannot remain grounded because of the trim wheels.

I wouldn't go that far, but I would agree that the trim wheel itself as a stand-alone issue is not reason for immediate grounding of the NG. Hundreds of millions of flight hours have demonstrated that (which, btw, is really what grand fathering is all about). But at this point in time, I'm not putting any money down that a (some) regulator(s) would want to see improvements and assign a time line to such.
Remember many serious AD's also come with a certain accomplishment time frame (which can be days, months and even years (fuel tank safety for instance).


MSPNWA wrote:
It's the proper position. Yes, in hindsight something should have been in the manual, but it's dubious that it would have changed anything considering ET302 should have had full knowledge of MCAS (as much or more information AND being highlighted by a previous event) and still mishandled it badly. The manual talk is more of a red herring than anything.

I wouldn't say they mishandled it badly. In fact, the FDR chart points the other way: they did hit the cut-out switches, and MCAS did not even complete two cycles.
Especially with the still on-going discussions and FAA/EASA/etc analysis on how prudent the normally expected crew reaction time fits in with the available time to hit the cut outs.

I don’t understand why the AD did not mention the Boeing Bulletin on MCAS, which provided much more and better info.
Further, an action that is so vitally important, with such high risk of occurring (much higher than in-flight shut-down, which gets practiced every sim session), which such bad consequences if not handled in a very timely fashion (much worse than virtually any engine failure), that should have been trained thoroughly. That should have been drilled. In stead, Boeing told the world that the MAX was just like an NG, no worries on the differences. If you can fly an NG, the MAX is also a piece of cake.
I don’t think you can just waive that off as a red herring, referring to some Bulletin not even mentioned in the AD.
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mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:26 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
It needs a new manual trim wheel that is working and it should be moved to EICAS, so it would not need exceptions to FAR, as the current interface in the cockpit does.

I agree that there are not huge technical problems to solve. Especially as EICAS has been integrated on the P-8. And nobody can tell me, that Boeing is not able to design a trim wheel that does not need a Gorilla to turn.

And I agree with you, that the main problem is Boeing continuing to try to cut corners.


Clearly it doesn't need a new trim wheel. The EASA is even saying so with their actions (the lack thereof). If the MAX needs a new trim wheel, the NG does too. The NG clearly doesn't yet need work on the wheels according to regulators, and so the MAX doesn't need it either to them. Logically the MAX cannot remain grounded because of the trim wheels.

It also doesn't need EICAS. Exceptions are perfectly acceptable when proper, and the current system is not being implicated as a significant contributing factor with the accidents. If that is actually an issue, there's a whole host of airplanes that need to be grounded for less-than-perfect warning systems (I'm looking at you, A330).

Really, the actions of some make it seem they really just want to keep the MAX on the ground, safe or not. Nothing to do with actual safety. Nothing to do with cutting corners. Time for the MAX to fly again. Boeing plugged their hole. It's time for the world to swallow their pride and plug theirs.

mjoelnir wrote:
It is always interesting how things are translated.

Cleaning MAX out of the pilot manuals and presenting no information even about it's existence, translates to: acknowledging that Boeing should have explained MCAS more clearly than was originally done.


It's the proper position. Yes, in hindsight something should have been in the manual, but it's dubious that it would have changed anything considering ET302 should have had full knowledge of MCAS (as much or more information AND being highlighted by a previous event) and still mishandled it badly. The manual talk is more of a red herring than anything.


Your defense of the trim wheel, because it is on the NG, is an absolute red herring. Because a safety feature was hardly ever needed, it is OK that that safety feature is not working and therefore you keep this not working safety feature in the next frame. About the worst safety argument you could present.

The trim wheel is on the list from EASA. As EASA has not yet retracted the grounding of the 737MAX, what inaction exactly does prove that EASA will accept the MAX with the now installed manual trim system?

If inclusion of MCAS in the manual would have not been any help to the pilots and you are so sure about that, is it than not better to through this seemingly useless manual completely away, to not to confuse pilots?
 
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JetBuddy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:26 pm

lowbank wrote:
The survey data in this article suggests that it’s more a couple of people who are concerned about getting on the MAX.

https://news.yahoo.com/boeing-wants-fly ... Xs7gFKRbla


From the article:

"Just 19 percent of business travelers and 14 percent of leisure travelers would willingly take the 737 MAX within six months of returning to the sky, according to an Atmosphere survey.

Nearly half of the 2,000 respondents said they would pay more to avoid the MAX."


Wow, if this is correct, Boeing is in real trouble. There are quite a few voices in this thread mocking people saying the public will avoid the MAX. Hopefully they'll start taking this more seriously.
Last edited by JetBuddy on Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:30 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:28 pm

hivue wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
I thought that the gist of that exchange was that the regulators knew of high speed MCAS. Forkner just got back from the simulator and found out from the simulator, not the design team, at the 11th hour, that there was now low speed MCAS. His previous assurances to the FAA were now invalid in light of that new information.

I tend to agree with this. The next question is did his concerns get passed on up the chain of command?

This is, in essence, the "Watergate Question (TM)".

Note again how Boeing's weekend communication focused on the sim's maturity status as opposed to the fact that it led Forkner to conclude he had inadvertently lied to FAA.

Focusing on the known immature but not really relevant status of the sim seems to be one form of being "economical with the truth".
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lowbank
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:32 pm

JetBuddy wrote:
lowbank wrote:
The survey data in this article suggests that it’s more a couple of people who are concerned about getting on the MAX.

https://news.yahoo.com/boeing-wants-fly ... Xs7gFKRbla


From the article:

"Just 19 percent of business travelers and 14 percent of leisure travelers would willingly take the 737 MAX within six months of returning to the sky, according to an Atmosphere survey.

Nearly half of the 2,000 respondents said they would pay more to avoid the MAX."


Wow, if this is correct, Boeing is in real trouble. There are quite a few voices in this thread mocking people saying the public will avoid the MAX. Hopefully they'll start taking this more seriously.



Do not underestimate the fear of flying in the general public.
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:32 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
PW100 wrote:
I'm at total trying to understand loss why anyone would want to label that as immediately, apart from demonstrating that one has a rather specific agenda. And has no understanding at all that turning them back on was litterally the crew's last resort. They fully knew that if that did not work, they would be dead immediately, to borrow your own word. The crew was looking death directly in the eyes.


You know what's funny (or not, actually). I knew somebody would immediately come and pick apart that one word, and use it to try to discredit the entire message.
Here's the test. Remove the word. Does it change the message? No, the point is just as clear. So we know it's wrong to try to discredit the message based on one subjective, immaterial adverb.
It sounds like an interesting presentation, and it deserves a fair look, not a smear.


Removing the word doesn't change the spirit of the message. Just as that my point of view is not that the pilots couldn't have done a better job.

But I think we had already had two threads totalling over 100pages whether the MCAS run-away is *was not/should have been/insert any word you want* easily recognizable as run-away trim. With deep focus on words as "continuously", "uncommanded", “run-away” etc.

If you read the JATR report, you will find that it goes pretty deeply into the trim run-away, and the associated assumptions to handle it in a pre-determined time frame. I feel we should wait for further clarification from the final reports, and regulators view on their own certification standards in this respect before throwing a dead crew under the bus.

Nevertheless, the opinions has been noted and will be part of the above described actions.
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oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:33 pm

Here's an extremely interesting article. Boeing is in a difficult position to put it mildly.


https://seekingalpha.com/article/429733 ... d-damocles


Boeing received tens of billions of dollars in cash payments for 737 MAX jets yet to be delivered.

Boeing ended the quarter with $9.2B in cash and cash equivalents. What I often hear is that the continued production of the MAX provides the company with aircraft to be rolled out to customers once the MAX is cleared for service allowing the final delivery payment to take place. That’s certainly true, but what also holds is that even if Boeing would want to halt production, Boeing would face the $33.4B sword of Damocles hanging above its head. If the company doesn’t produce, not only does the jet maker miss out on cash - it also means that billions of cash should be handed back and those are billions Boeing doesn’t have.

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk
:stirthepot: :airplane: "This airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys" :airplane: :stirthepot:
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 870
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:41 pm

FAA cert flight currently slated for ~early November.
EASA cert flight test currently slated ~mid December.
EASA cert stated January earliest.

EASA do not expect more that 4 to 6 weeks between FAA and EASA cert, so suggests FAA cert by ~year end is expected.

But-
'Ky said the next few weeks would be "critical" as regulators turn their attention to "human factors" - or assessing whether crew can cope with a high workload from future sensor failures.'

So could still all go pear shaped. However, it suggests the major problems are pretty much wrapped up (unless there is another one!).
https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-eu-reg ... 04390.html

Ray
 
Kikko19
Posts: 681
Joined: Sat Apr 22, 2017 4:45 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:51 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
FAA cert flight currently slated for ~early November.
EASA cert flight test currently slated ~mid December.
EASA cert stated January earliest.

EASA do not expect more that 4 to 6 weeks between FAA and EASA cert, so suggests FAA cert by ~year end is expected.

But-
'Ky said the next few weeks would be "critical" as regulators turn their attention to "human factors" - or assessing whether crew can cope with a high workload from future sensor failures.'

So could still all go pear shaped. However, it suggests the major problems are pretty much wrapped up (unless there is another one!).
https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-eu-reg ... 04390.html

Ray
Reuters confirms earlier in January
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethi ... X021S?il=0
 
ACATROYAL
Posts: 67
Joined: Mon Aug 20, 2007 11:25 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:55 pm

The one thought that keeps running through my mind regarding this MAX issue and other projects like the 777X or the F-35 etc. is why after all these years we keep screwing up in aviation? The aviation landscape is littered with new projects that are way over budget, way behind schedule and released with multiple issues that an airline or military power has to correct after delivery. You would think that after all these years we would know how to do things right, afterall the aviation community employees some of the highest educated minds Ph.D.'s. Masters Degree etc but we still end up screwing royally! It's like we never learn from our past mistakes. You would think that in this day and age of supercomputers, complex imaging software that it would be child's play to get a plane from conception to reality in no time flat and with no issues but it just seems to be getting worse!

I don't know about you but I'm really worried about the state of the aviation community...we need really leaders to guide it right now and I'm sorry to say I just don't see any, Boeing especially needs help Big Time... sad times indeed...
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 10397
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:59 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
par13del wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
If the simulator would not model MCAS, what use does this simulator than had for Faulkner?

So is it official that we have discounted Boeing's assertion that the ECAB that he was in was not the final version?


Forkner was talking with the FAA about the needed pilot training and manuals fro the 737MAX. He was supposed to convince the FAA to keep MCAS completely out of the pilot manuals. So how was anything, including the simulator, usefull for him, that did not show the final version.
Here I am not talking about the simulators that are sold to the customers. I am talking about simulators that are used at Boeing to confirm how different systems work. Tests that you want to fly on simulators.
That simulator was doing things that Forkner did not expect. Forkner did not expect MCAS to go very aggressive active at low speeds. It does not matter if the simulator was wrong. MCAS actually goes active at low speed and very aggressive at that.
So the person, that should explain to the FAA why MCAS should not be in the manuals, has at that time, not many month before EIS, not been informed fully about MCAS, when it goes active and what it does. The failure mode, we see at the two accidents, was either never tested, or some department at Boeing kept really quite about it.

Well we know for a fact that the MCAS version he was using when he made those text never made it into production, if it had, we would have heard much more about MCAS before the two fatal crashes, pilots may not have know what it was but the reports of excessive runaway trim on the MAX would have been reported by operators, and when the first crash occurred, those reports would have been leaked all over the media.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 1026
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 7:08 pm

EA CO AS wrote:
CLESpotter95 wrote:
Those "novice" pilots had no chance to learn properly because Boeing themselves excluded any mention of MCAS from training and didn't include it in simulators. The most extensive "training" they provided was a short video. The plane was uncontrollably nose diving and the pilots did their best to save it, but with no knowledge of what was even causing the failure and no ability to overpower the system without disabling MCAS (which, once again, they had never been trained to do) their only real chance was the dumb luck of realizing it's some supposedly ancillary system and disabling it within the extremely short time they had, while battling a vertical dive and probably disoriented.

I honestly can't believe people are still blaming it on the pilots.


My workgroup had the opportunity to have a presentation on the MAX by three B737 fleet captains, and they did a very deep dive into the FDR data for both the JT and ET accidents. They reviewed MCAS in detail with us, and what role it played. While they acknowledged that Boeing should have explained MCAS more clearly than was originally done, and made it clear they were EXTREMELY uncomfortable with laying any blame at the feet of their fellow aviators, they also had no qualms in pointing out that any B737 type-rated pilot shouldn't have lost either airplane, as both accidents presented as a runaway stabilizer, and the standard checklist for the B737 would have involved engaging the trim cutout switches.

In one accident, the cutouts were never touched. In the other, they were engaged, but then immediately turned back on, allowing the runaway to continue.

Boeing's decision to have two AOA vanes instead of one, alternating use from left to right between flights, was definitely a contributing factor, but again, these 737 pilots were clear about the MAX being safe and ready to fly, and this was an airmanship problem more than anything else.

This forum experience reset as often as the MCAS v1...
But given the massive number of established facts actually available that point to the management, design, and certification issues, his require a reset massive enough to disconnect from the real life to still pretend that "the MAX being safe and ready to fly, and this was an airmanship problem more than anything else."
Last edited by PixelFlight on Mon Oct 21, 2019 7:22 pm, edited 1 time in total.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:

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