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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Thu Oct 24, 2019 6:40 pm

morrisond wrote:
Boeing built it that way as they screwed up big time and it I don't believe it was the intent to have it fire multiple times. They would not be able to get MCAS V2 past the regulators if they required it to fire more than once.
Again an another false claim.
Boeing description of the MCAS v2 fix: https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/737-max-software-updates.page
If MCAS is activated in non-normal conditions, it will only provide one input for each elevated AOA event. There are no known or envisioned failure conditions where MCAS will provide multiple inputs.

The limitation of one input for each elevated AOA event is only if activated in non-normal condition.
So in normal condition, even MCAS v2 can still generate multiple inputs for each elevated AOA event.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 12:39 am

rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
I don't disagree - the Root cause of MAX grounding is MCAS crappy design - and it should be grounded as the assumed state of Pilot Proficiency does not exist to handle an emergency like MCAS.

Thats correct. Coming to that conclusion earlier would have safed you the effort to write hundreds of posts...

I think you give morrisond too much credit here. He/she still neglects to mention that it was Boeing’s grossly negligent hazard misclassification which led to their (colossally terrible) design relying on pilots to be the backstop, and instead offloads blame onto “Pilot Proficiency.”

Baby steps though, I suppose.
 
WPIAeroGuy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 2:20 am

Mjoelnir, you said:

MCAS at slow speeds moves the stabilizer to point the nose down.


It moves the stabilizer in the AND direction. Would you say speed trim points the nose down as the aircraft accelerates? You're using inflammatory language to create an emotional response rather than a logical one.

Next, you started on the right track but then contradicted yourself:

That is what happens if you move the stabilizer in that direction. In reaction the pilot has to pull on the elevator to keep the nose up. Nothing about just adjusting the feel, nothing about holding steady with a heavier load, the pilot has to move the elevator to compensate.


You're actually agreeing with me here. You're exactly right. You must apply additional control force (pull back harder) to achieve the same pitch.

You seem to declare that it is enough to hold the elevator just still against an increased force to keep the nose from going down and that is just definitely wrong. Sit down with a piece of paper and pencil and draw it up and think about what you are talking about.


No, that is not what I said. What I said was "If you’re holding the yoke because you’re flying manually you’ll feel a linear increase in stick force as you pull back without affecting pitch." To maintain a pitch attitude, if the stab trims AND the pilot must pull the yoke back further, which will ALSO result in an increased stick force.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 2:23 am

So is the stall test in level flight? So when MCAS activates that one time, the pilot will have to pull back on the elevator (with increasingly more force) for that 9 seconds to keep the aircraft in level flight. Then what happens? The elevator is pulled back with ever increasing force for the final few degrees of AOA before stall? I guess it would be interesting to see a force, time, pitch, righting moment plot of what exactly is happening here.
 
WPIAeroGuy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 2:34 am

aerolimani wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
I don't disagree - the Root cause of MAX grounding is MCAS crappy design - and it should be grounded as the assumed state of Pilot Proficiency does not exist to handle an emergency like MCAS.

Thats correct. Coming to that conclusion earlier would have safed you the effort to write hundreds of posts...

I think you give morrisond too much credit here. He/she still neglects to mention that it was Boeing’s grossly negligent hazard misclassification which led to their (colossally terrible) design relying on pilots to be the backstop, and instead offloads blame onto “Pilot Proficiency.”

Baby steps though, I suppose.


Maybe if there was a little less hyperbole about how sh*tty the design was, and instead an effort to understand how such a design came to be, people wouldn't feel the need to defend the engineering. I hate to break it to you, but decisions like MCAS happen ALL THE TIME. The only reason we don't hear about more disasters is because luck - the holes in the swiss cheese don't align. And this applies to more than just airplanes. And if you think pilots shouldn't be the backstop, then I'd wait about 50 years before getting on an airplane because we're no where's near that point yet.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 2:41 am

DenverTed wrote:
So is the stall test in level flight? So when MCAS activates that one time, the pilot will have to pull back on the elevator (with increasingly more force) for that 9 seconds to keep the aircraft in level flight. Then what happens? The elevator is pulled back with ever increasing force for the final few degrees of AOA before stall? I guess it would be interesting to see a force, time, pitch, righting moment plot of what exactly is happening here.

Unless I'm misunderstanding you, why would a pilot want to maintain level flight while in a stall? They would want to pitch down to recover from the stall.
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 5:12 am

aerolimani wrote:
hivue wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
How do you feel about the JATR’s alternate suggestion that it could be called a stall identification system?


I feel confused. Boeing implemented MCAS to operate in total secrecy so there is no possibility it could have identified an impending stall to a flight crew. But I take your meaning. If MCAS 1.0 were set up to alert the crew when it activated as anticipated with no failures in the airplane then that could be considered a form of impending stall identification. But the crew could still go ahead and stall the airplane.

Have you read the reg which MCAS was designed to help the plane meet? Unless I am mistaken, the reg is written (and enforced, even for Boeing and the MAX) to ensure that pressure on the yoke/stick never decreases as you approach stall, because a lessening of pressure could encourage a pilot to pull back further, thinking that they must not be approaching a stall because the pressure has eased. A system, regardless of by what means, which keeps this pressure consistent, must therefore be there to discourage stalling. Now, how about a system which supposedly creates that pressure, but also coincidentally produces an aerodynamic result of encouraging the noise to point back down again?

My caveat here is that I am merely an interested party, with no formal education in the business of aircraft design and operation. So… if anybody else has a more complete or more correct understanding of the intention behind 14 CFR 25.203 - Stall characteristics, I would really welcome it. To date, I can’t recall anyone here tackling this question.

Downloads available here: https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CFR ... -sec25-203


The MCAS is there merely to maintain the required trimmed speed stability until the stall break. It is NOT there to identify or prevent the stall. If you disagree, present your engineering test pilot credentials, please.
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 5:17 am

planecane wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
So is the stall test in level flight? So when MCAS activates that one time, the pilot will have to pull back on the elevator (with increasingly more force) for that 9 seconds to keep the aircraft in level flight. Then what happens? The elevator is pulled back with ever increasing force for the final few degrees of AOA before stall? I guess it would be interesting to see a force, time, pitch, righting moment plot of what exactly is happening here.

Unless I'm misunderstanding you, why would a pilot want to maintain level flight while in a stall? They would want to pitch down to recover from the stall.


Performance planning is based on the reference stall which is defined at 1G flight ie level flight when the stall break occurs. That’s during the envelope test section to define the plane’s envelope. In service, you’re correct during an inadvertent stall.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 5:23 am

morrisond wrote:
In the realm of bad things that can happen in the air the malfunction of the MCAS system should not have been a death sentence. This was a defeatable system that could have been worked around if the pilots had the properly trained skills to deal with situations they were not familiar with.
:bored: Same loop restart again...

This is most probably how Boeing did initially consider the MCAS from a safety point of view. You know the result. All what happen since is precisely to change that. So no need to constantly remind here how the initial state was. Safety agencies wants to see a entirely different consideration of the MCAS safety. This process will be done, even if you continue so hard to repeat here that it "could have been worked around". You are not in position to change anything in that process done by a lot of competent peoples, all very aware of the scale of the crisis and certainly not willing to risk any more safety issue with that system.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 6:12 am

Can we just discuss the topic without rehashing the same things. On top of this we are not going to restrict posters to posting once a day, that is not just going to happen so please just try and discuss the topic and keep any personal comments out of the discussion. Please all just think about the following, do not put the moderators in a position where we have to lock the thread as that will be a detriment to the whole site. If you can not discuss things in a civil manner maybe you should remove yourself from the discussion for a couple of days, calm down before returning to posting
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 6:13 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:

Thats correct. Coming to that conclusion earlier would have safed you the effort to write hundreds of posts...

I think you give morrisond too much credit here. He/she still neglects to mention that it was Boeing’s grossly negligent hazard misclassification which led to their (colossally terrible) design relying on pilots to be the backstop, and instead offloads blame onto “Pilot Proficiency.”

Baby steps though, I suppose.


Maybe if there was a little less hyperbole about how sh*tty the design was, and instead an effort to understand how such a design came to be, people wouldn't feel the need to defend the engineering. I hate to break it to you, but decisions like MCAS happen ALL THE TIME. The only reason we don't hear about more disasters is because luck - the holes in the swiss cheese don't align. And this applies to more than just airplanes. And if you think pilots shouldn't be the backstop, then I'd wait about 50 years before getting on an airplane because we're no where's near that point yet.

I’m sorry (not really), but I do believe the design was absolutely terrible, and that incorrectly classifying MCAS‘s hazard level was grossly negligent. Also, “sh**ty” is your word, not mine. Not to mention, two posts after yours, we have morissond saying MCAS was a “colossal screw up.” :bigthumbsup:

Next point: I’m sure there’s more than a few people who would take exception to your rather dismissive comments about the competency of the aero engineering community. Luck. LUCK???!! Are you kidding? If getting quality engineering is just luck, then what the heck are companies paying all these expensive engineers for?

And, you’re taking a very selective re my pilot backstop stance. I’m referring to Boeing’s classification of MCAS as merely hazardous, which apparently gave Boeing engineering permission to be lazy about the design (and subsequent testing/certification, it would seem), using the excuse that the pilots are there to fix any problems the system might cause. This, was instead of classifying MCAS as hazardous, and subsequently (much more likely) designing it properly.

I understand perfectly well that things can (and will) go wrong, and we need the best pilots, reasonably expectable, to hopefully solve the problems and save the plane. But, that’s no excuse for designing something as poorly as MCAS.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 6:40 am

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
hivue wrote:

I feel confused. Boeing implemented MCAS to operate in total secrecy so there is no possibility it could have identified an impending stall to a flight crew. But I take your meaning. If MCAS 1.0 were set up to alert the crew when it activated as anticipated with no failures in the airplane then that could be considered a form of impending stall identification. But the crew could still go ahead and stall the airplane.

Have you read the reg which MCAS was designed to help the plane meet? Unless I am mistaken, the reg is written (and enforced, even for Boeing and the MAX) to ensure that pressure on the yoke/stick never decreases as you approach stall, because a lessening of pressure could encourage a pilot to pull back further, thinking that they must not be approaching a stall because the pressure has eased. A system, regardless of by what means, which keeps this pressure consistent, must therefore be there to discourage stalling. Now, how about a system which supposedly creates that pressure, but also coincidentally produces an aerodynamic result of encouraging the noise to point back down again?

My caveat here is that I am merely an interested party, with no formal education in the business of aircraft design and operation. So… if anybody else has a more complete or more correct understanding of the intention behind 14 CFR 25.203 - Stall characteristics, I would really welcome it. To date, I can’t recall anyone here tackling this question.

Downloads available here: https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CFR ... -sec25-203


The MCAS is there merely to maintain the required trimmed speed stability until the stall break. It is NOT there to identify or prevent the stall. If you disagree, present your engineering test pilot credentials, please.

If you have the credentials, then perhaps you might explain for us the intent behind the creation and enforcement of regulation 14 CFR 25.203 - Stall characteristics.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 6:52 am

PixelFlight wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Boeing built it that way as they screwed up big time and it I don't believe it was the intent to have it fire multiple times. They would not be able to get MCAS V2 past the regulators if they required it to fire more than once.
Again an another false claim.
Boeing description of the MCAS v2 fix: https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/737-max-software-updates.page
If MCAS is activated in non-normal conditions, it will only provide one input for each elevated AOA event. There are no known or envisioned failure conditions where MCAS will provide multiple inputs.

The limitation of one input for each elevated AOA event is only if activated in non-normal condition.
So in normal condition, even MCAS v2 can still generate multiple inputs for each elevated AOA event.


Yes, that can be understood that way, and we should still be open to the idea that it might mean something different. We know that MCAs 1.0 would also have triggered multiple times even in normal conditions, if the AoA is not reduced, but imho this was never intended. Or if it was, then MCAS would be much closer to a stall protection, than what Boeing is telling us.

But in the end regulators will be asking the same questions and the system will be fixed when the MAX flies again.
 
rheinwaldner
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 7:20 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
I hate to break it to you, but decisions like MCAS happen ALL THE TIME.

That is simply not correct looking at the outcome. The impact of MCAS on the safety record of the MAX is devastating and unprecedented. No other jet passenger aircraft except the very first one was ever plagued by such a badly and fatally flawed system. No design flaw in any other Boeing or Airbus aircraft resulted in a comparing outcome.

So decisions like MCAS do absolutely not happen all the time. The crash statistics would quickly reveal them. Never before happened it and hopefully never again does it happen.

Just to give you some ballpark figures:
the decision to build MCASv1 resulted in an aircraft, that contributed to crashes 260 times more than usual by technical failures. If indeed every aircraft would be plagued by issues that brought down 2 in about 250k flights, there would be more than a hundred hull losses every year, which is about 10% of the number of aircraft, which is produced in one year.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
rheinwaldner
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 8:09 am

morrisond wrote:
If people wouldn't keep coming on here and insisting that the pilot's actions were not a contributing factor at all and the state of training is absolutely fine worldwide - then I (and others) wouldn't have to keep bringing it up.

Average global crash rate before the MAX was 1 in 4.16 million flights. As pilot errors far outweigh system failures this can be directly considered as the safety level reached by global aviation training standards. Are you saying, this is not fine? You can compare it with other transportation means and find out it is phenomenal.

The MAX on the other had a technical flaw, which caused it to crash in 1 of 0.125 million flights, which is 37 times more frequent than an average proficient crews would have crashed it if it would have been flawless.

That gap can never be closed by "more training". Training simply has not the leverage to fix fatally flawed aircraft designs.

Pilot training exists to erase pilot flaws. It does not exist to erase the impact of bad aircraft designs and reconcile flawed aircraft like the MCASv1 equipped MAX with normal safety standards.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 8:43 am

rheinwaldner wrote:
Pilot training exists to erase pilot flaws. It does not exist to erase the impact of bad aircraft designs and reconcile flawed aircraft like the MCASv1 equipped MAX with normal safety standards.


This x 1000.

Pilots should not be required to compensate for poor aircraft design. It really is as simple as that.

The 737NG has been flown safely for decades. The MAX has had 2 fatal crashes in less than 2 years of service.
Hires only the best people... lol
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 8:58 am

rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
If people wouldn't keep coming on here and insisting that the pilot's actions were not a contributing factor at all and the state of training is absolutely fine worldwide - then I (and others) wouldn't have to keep bringing it up.

Average global crash rate before the MAX was 1 in 4.16 million flights. As pilot errors far outweigh system failures this can be directly considered as the safety level reached by global aviation training standards. Are you saying, this is not fine? You can compare it with other transportation means and find out it is phenomenal.

The MAX on the other had a technical flaw, which caused it to crash in 1 of 0.125 million flights, which is 37 times more frequent than an average proficient crews would have crashed it if it would have been flawless.

That gap can never be closed by "more training". Training simply has not the leverage to fix fatally flawed aircraft designs.

Pilot training exists to erase pilot flaws. It does not exist to erase the impact of bad aircraft designs and reconcile flawed aircraft like the MCASv1 equipped MAX with normal safety standards.


You could acutally train for MCAS1.0, but that would require the system to be simulated in the simulators, mentioned in the manuals, having checklists redone to include MCAS failure and an working AoA disagree warning would be nice too.
 
olle
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 9:41 am

seahawk wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
If people wouldn't keep coming on here and insisting that the pilot's actions were not a contributing factor at all and the state of training is absolutely fine worldwide - then I (and others) wouldn't have to keep bringing it up.

Average global crash rate before the MAX was 1 in 4.16 million flights. As pilot errors far outweigh system failures this can be directly considered as the safety level reached by global aviation training standards. Are you saying, this is not fine? You can compare it with other transportation means and find out it is phenomenal.

The MAX on the other had a technical flaw, which caused it to crash in 1 of 0.125 million flights, which is 37 times more frequent than an average proficient crews would have crashed it if it would have been flawless.

That gap can never be closed by "more training". Training simply has not the leverage to fix fatally flawed aircraft designs.

Pilot training exists to erase pilot flaws. It does not exist to erase the impact of bad aircraft designs and reconcile flawed aircraft like the MCASv1 equipped MAX with normal safety standards.


You could acutally train for MCAS1.0, but that would require the system to be simulated in the simulators, mentioned in the manuals, having checklists redone to include MCAS failure and an working AoA disagree warning would be nice too.



But what a company would be able to sell tickets to general public based on the text above?

The 737NG would even be better choice not mentioning A220 or A320. If the airliner succed to sell tickets to 737max then they need to pay extra cost for training to switch 737ng to 737max. 32ceo to 320neo will not.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 9:48 am

olle wrote:
seahawk wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
Average global crash rate before the MAX was 1 in 4.16 million flights. As pilot errors far outweigh system failures this can be directly considered as the safety level reached by global aviation training standards. Are you saying, this is not fine? You can compare it with other transportation means and find out it is phenomenal.

The MAX on the other had a technical flaw, which caused it to crash in 1 of 0.125 million flights, which is 37 times more frequent than an average proficient crews would have crashed it if it would have been flawless.

That gap can never be closed by "more training". Training simply has not the leverage to fix fatally flawed aircraft designs.

Pilot training exists to erase pilot flaws. It does not exist to erase the impact of bad aircraft designs and reconcile flawed aircraft like the MCASv1 equipped MAX with normal safety standards.


You could acutally train for MCAS1.0, but that would require the system to be simulated in the simulators, mentioned in the manuals, having checklists redone to include MCAS failure and an working AoA disagree warning would be nice too.



But what a company would be able to sell tickets to general public based on the text above?

The 737NG would even be better choice not mentioning A220 or A320. If the airliner succed to sell tickets to 737max then they need to pay extra cost for training to switch 737ng to 737max. 32ceo to 320neo will not.


I was just pointing out that Boeing failed to provide the basis for pilot training when we look at the MCAS. So unless you want to train all pilots to test pilot standard, it is the duty of the OEM to design failsafe systems and provide sufficient and reliable training information.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 9:48 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
Mjoelnir, you said:

MCAS at slow speeds moves the stabilizer to point the nose down.


It moves the stabilizer in the AND direction. Would you say speed trim points the nose down as the aircraft accelerates? You're using inflammatory language to create an emotional response rather than a logical one..

Let's look at it from the other angle. As plane accelerates, airfoil would generate more lift if AoA would remain constant. That would induce undesired climb. It is fairly logical to add a system which would reduce AoA with speed to arrest that undesired climb by applying nose down force to reduce pitch.
Looking at things closer, there may be a few more details like change of stabilizer lift with airspeed affecting pitch.
But overall it is totally ok to say that control system points nose up or down to cancel out undesired changes in order to maintain level flight at zero pilot input.
You problem is you are looking at things very narrowly, confusing short term goal - reducing control force - with broader consideration of multiple factors affecting flight parameters, and balancing out those. Level flight at zero stick input is one possible goal of such balance, but not the only possible one.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 10:51 am

kalvado wrote:
Level flight at zero stick input is one possible goal of such balance, but not the only possible one.


Level flight at zero stick input in usual terms is called "a stabile flight attidude"
a transport category aircraft with a need to electronically augment a non-linear (or even negativ) stick load can be called a aircraft with an unstable flight attidude.

the foundingfathers of aircraft certification and regulations wanted only stable and safe aircrafts certifiable
as we all want, wont we?

those days they thought it would be sufficient to make a rule that .....stick needs to be neutral within the whole flight enevelope ...... and thought that would make shure that there is not a construction in the future with is pitching itself up unexpectly for the cockpit crew

they didnt had any idea of electronic possibilities half a century later

if they would had an idea that it would be possible to build a potential unstable aircraft and augment the stickload to meet regulations they would have inserted the word "unaugmented" in that regulations ...

because you can augment the stick load
but the aircraft is still a unstable aircraft if you need to fly it manual by hand
we didnt build such aircrafts till Charles Lindberghs time ...

its kinda pioneer achievment what boeing is doing here with the 737MAX
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 11:05 am

seahawk wrote:
olle wrote:
seahawk wrote:

You could acutally train for MCAS1.0, but that would require the system to be simulated in the simulators, mentioned in the manuals, having checklists redone to include MCAS failure and an working AoA disagree warning would be nice too.



But what a company would be able to sell tickets to general public based on the text above?

The 737NG would even be better choice not mentioning A220 or A320. If the airliner succed to sell tickets to 737max then they need to pay extra cost for training to switch 737ng to 737max. 32ceo to 320neo will not.


I was just pointing out that Boeing failed to provide the basis for pilot training when we look at the MCAS. So unless you want to train all pilots to test pilot standard, it is the duty of the OEM to design failsafe systems and provide sufficient and reliable training information.


You are all missing the point on the Pilots. They do not need to be test pilots. They just need to be competent enough to pass a simple licensing flight test - the one they supposedly passed to become a pilot.

Nuggets from the final report are starting to come out.

"The final report said the first officer onboard was unfamiliar with procedures and had shown issues handling the aircraft during training."

I'm not excusing Boeing they are the root cause. However the crashes have exposed some other cracks in the system that need to be dealt with as well.

Do you think someone like that should be placed in a position where their actions could result in the deaths of hundred's of people? The basic and recurrent training that airlines are supposedly providing for their pilots and making sure they are competent enough to pass for even the worst pilot should have been able to handle a malfunction such as MCAS or that Pilot should never have been given the green light to fly. Even if they had no clue what MCAS was. Would you put yourself or your loved ones on a flight with a Pilot like that?

We are not seeing it in the crash statistics as aircraft are becoming so reliable that the times Pilots are actually forced to take manual control and do that Pilot thing are fortunately/unfortunately it turns out so few and far between they no longer have the basic skills they need and are required to have as part of their licensing.

Or the one on Lion Air Maintenance from ABC:

"The summary presented Friday identified various missteps prior to the crash. The aircraft, only in use for two months, began having problems on Oct. 26. A new angle of attack sensor was installed the day before the crash on the Indonesian resort island of Bali, but it was mis-calibrated, resulting in it being 21 degrees out of alignment. The problem was not detected when it was installed."

Enough said for now - hopefully we will see the full report soon.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 11:13 am

asdf wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Level flight at zero stick input is one possible goal of such balance, but not the only possible one.


Level flight at zero stick input in usual terms is called "a stabile flight attidude"
a transport category aircraft with a need to electronically augment a non-linear (or even negativ) stick load can be called a aircraft with an unstable flight attidude.

the foundingfathers of aircraft certification and regulations wanted only stable and safe aircrafts certifiable
as we all want, wont we?

those days they thought it would be sufficient to make a rule that .....stick needs to be neutral within the whole flight enevelope ...... and thought that would make shure that there is not a construction in the future with is pitching itself up unexpectly for the cockpit crew

they didnt had any idea of electronic possibilities half a century later

if they would had an idea that it would be possible to build a potential unstable aircraft and augment the stickload to meet regulations they would have inserted the word "unaugmented" in that regulations ...

because you can augment the stick load
but the aircraft is still a unstable aircraft if you need to fly it manual by hand
we didnt build such aircrafts till Charles Lindberghs time ...

its kinda pioneer achievment what boeing is doing here with the 737MAX

Now remember that MCAS operates only at high AoA, away from level flight.... And ask yourself if you're actually following up on discussion or just venting
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 11:14 am

asdf wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Level flight at zero stick input is one possible goal of such balance, but not the only possible one.


Level flight at zero stick input in usual terms is called "a stabile flight attidude"
a transport category aircraft with a need to electronically augment a non-linear (or even negativ) stick load can be called a aircraft with an unstable flight attidude.

the foundingfathers of aircraft certification and regulations wanted only stable and safe aircrafts certifiable
as we all want, wont we?

those days they thought it would be sufficient to make a rule that .....stick needs to be neutral within the whole flight enevelope ...... and thought that would make shure that there is not a construction in the future with is pitching itself up unexpectly for the cockpit crew

they didnt had any idea of electronic possibilities half a century later

if they would had an idea that it would be possible to build a potential unstable aircraft and augment the stickload to meet regulations they would have inserted the word "unaugmented" in that regulations ...

because you can augment the stick load
but the aircraft is still a unstable aircraft if you need to fly it manual by hand
we didnt build such aircrafts till Charles Lindberghs time ...

its kinda pioneer achievment what boeing is doing here with the 737MAX


Stop with this nonsense - as far as anyone knows the MAX is not unstable, the stick force does not go negative and it does not pitch up unexpectedly.

If totally linear stick force is your criteria for an aircraft being airworthy then you better ground every aircraft certified before 1995/1996 when the regulation came into place.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 11:30 am

rheinwaldner wrote:
planecane wrote:
I still don't understand how a larger stabilizer would have helped with this issue.

Because destabilizing surfaces in front of CG can be compensated with larger surfaces behind the CG.


But how would it help maintain a constant stick force gradient when the destabilization is non-linear with increasing AoA? I guess you could make the stabilizer large enough that the induced lift becomes negligible. However, if the size needed to be increased too much then the added weight and drag could make it very inefficient.

I would think that PROPERLY DESIGNED and implemented software would be preferable to losing a significant amount of the efficiency benefit of the new engines.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 12:08 pm

morrisond wrote:
asdf wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Level flight at zero stick input is one possible goal of such balance, but not the only possible one.


Level flight at zero stick input in usual terms is called "a stabile flight attidude"
a transport category aircraft with a need to electronically augment a non-linear (or even negativ) stick load can be called a aircraft with an unstable flight attidude.

the foundingfathers of aircraft certification and regulations wanted only stable and safe aircrafts certifiable
as we all want, wont we?

those days they thought it would be sufficient to make a rule that .....stick needs to be neutral within the whole flight enevelope ...... and thought that would make shure that there is not a construction in the future with is pitching itself up unexpectly for the cockpit crew

they didnt had any idea of electronic possibilities half a century later

if they would had an idea that it would be possible to build a potential unstable aircraft and augment the stickload to meet regulations they would have inserted the word "unaugmented" in that regulations ...

because you can augment the stick load
but the aircraft is still a unstable aircraft if you need to fly it manual by hand
we didnt build such aircrafts till Charles Lindberghs time ...

its kinda pioneer achievment what boeing is doing here with the 737MAX


Stop with this nonsense - as far as anyone knows the MAX is not unstable, the stick force does not go negative and it does not pitch up unexpectedly.

If totally linear stick force is your criteria for an aircraft being airworthy then you better ground every aircraft certified before 1995/1996 when the regulation came into place.


all circumstantials point to a unstabe flight behaviour of the 737MAX
go read the JATR report

they pointed it out more than once
but they didnt get a flight test to proof

EASA same thing
the dont get the crash details from FAA till now
and no flight test without augmentatin since half a year

as long as a bunch of circumstantses point to a fact ...
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 12:33 pm

morrisond wrote:
Stop with this nonsense ...
If totally linear stick force is your criteria for an aircraft being airworthy then you better ground every aircraft certified before 1995/1996 when the regulation came into place.


i would kindly ask to not call my postings nonsens if they
- are in accordance to the forum rules and
- are based on assumptions created from pubilc sources
specialy in a case when a manufactor denies the proof of the opposite over half a year even though international regulators are asking for

its called personal opinion and it has become a standard in the western world


Linear stickforce is not a condition
Linear stickforce is a result

A result of a balanced and aerodynamical neutral aircraft

You want the pilots to have handflying skills?
You want them to have their planes properly under control in case of non-normal incidents?

give them a plane with stabile aerodynamical attidudes
they will bring it home in one piece

otherwise we may begin counting craters .....
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 12:41 pm

asdf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
asdf wrote:

Level flight at zero stick input in usual terms is called "a stabile flight attidude"
a transport category aircraft with a need to electronically augment a non-linear (or even negativ) stick load can be called a aircraft with an unstable flight attidude.

the foundingfathers of aircraft certification and regulations wanted only stable and safe aircrafts certifiable
as we all want, wont we?

those days they thought it would be sufficient to make a rule that .....stick needs to be neutral within the whole flight enevelope ...... and thought that would make shure that there is not a construction in the future with is pitching itself up unexpectly for the cockpit crew

they didnt had any idea of electronic possibilities half a century later

if they would had an idea that it would be possible to build a potential unstable aircraft and augment the stickload to meet regulations they would have inserted the word "unaugmented" in that regulations ...

because you can augment the stick load
but the aircraft is still a unstable aircraft if you need to fly it manual by hand
we didnt build such aircrafts till Charles Lindberghs time ...

its kinda pioneer achievment what boeing is doing here with the 737MAX


Stop with this nonsense - as far as anyone knows the MAX is not unstable, the stick force does not go negative and it does not pitch up unexpectedly.

If totally linear stick force is your criteria for an aircraft being airworthy then you better ground every aircraft certified before 1995/1996 when the regulation came into place.


all circumstantials point to a unstabe flight behaviour of the 737MAX
go read the JATR report

they pointed it out more than once
but they didnt get a flight test to proof

EASA same thing
the dont get the crash details from FAA till now
and no flight test without augmentatin since half a year

as long as a bunch of circumstantses point to a fact ...


Or it could be participants in the JATR report and at EASA repeating assertions they have heard in the media. The JATR report was not a consensus report.

Augmentation of the Elevator would not change the stall characteristics of the Main wing. Boeing did make changes to the aero devices on the MAX wing pre-initial certification to give it the same "benign stall characteristics as the NG" as they had to compensate for the different engines.

I believe EASA is getting that test flight and that is one of the main reasons it probably won't return to service at the same time as the FAA. But at this point you would have to assume that the FAA is pretty confident of the MAX's handling. Boeing would be as well or they wouldn't be applying for a Return to Service.

Or do you think Boeing is still hiding something and the FAA or EASA won't catch it in the final RTS flights? How could they possibly do that? It will be tested to stall - it's kind of hard to hide the fact that you don't actually get to stall - you know when a plane is stalled.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 12:44 pm

asdf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Stop with this nonsense ...
If totally linear stick force is your criteria for an aircraft being airworthy then you better ground every aircraft certified before 1995/1996 when the regulation came into place.


i would kindly ask to not call my postings nonsens if they
- are in accordance to the forum rules and
- are based on assumptions created from pubilc sources
specialy in a case when a manufactor denies the proof of the opposite over half a year even though international regulators are asking for

its called personal opinion and it has become a standard in the western world


Linear stickforce is not a condition
Linear stickforce is a result

A result of a balanced and aerodynamical neutral aircraft

You want the pilots to have handflying skills?
You want them to have their planes properly under control in case of non-normal incidents?

give them a plane with stabile aerodynamical attidudes
they will bring it home in one piece

otherwise we may begin counting craters .....


Sorry - I shouldn't have used the word nonsense. You are entitled to your personal opinion.
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24300
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 12:46 pm

asdf wrote:
Linear stickforce is not a condition
Linear stickforce is a result

A result of a balanced and aerodynamical neutral aircraft

You want the pilots to have handflying skills?
You want them to have their planes properly under control in case of non-normal incidents?

give them a plane with stabile aerodynamical attidudes
they will bring it home in one piece

otherwise we may begin counting craters .....

Since you have such 'grave' concerns, maybe you should post this to viewtopic.php?t=1427225 as well.

You never know when a non-normal event pops up and you need to start hand flying, after all...
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
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PW100
Posts: 4123
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 3:06 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
hivue wrote:
I feel confused. Boeing implemented MCAS to operate in total secrecy so there is no possibility it could have identified an impending stall to a flight crew. But I take your meaning. If MCAS 1.0 were set up to alert the crew when it activated as anticipated with no failures in the airplane then that could be considered a form of impending stall identification. But the crew could still go ahead and stall the airplane.
. . . .
Downloads available here: https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CFR ... -sec25-203

The MCAS is there merely to maintain the required trimmed speed stability until the stall break. It is NOT there to identify or prevent the stall. If you disagree, present your engineering test pilot credentials, please.


The JATR report uses a somewhat diferent wording, which seems to be 180 degrees opposite to your words:

JTAR Final Report wrote:
Observation O3.4-B: Extension of MCAS to the low-speed and 1g environment during the flight program WAS DUE TO UNACCEPTABLE STALL CHARACTERISTICS WITH STS ONLY. The possibility of a pitch-up tendency during approach to stall was identified for the flaps-up configuration prior to the implementation of MCAS.

Finding F3.5-C: The JATR team considers that the STS/MCAS and EFS functions could be considered as stall identification systems or stall protection systems, depending on the natural (unaugmented) stall characteristics of the aircraft.



I guess the JATR group will be needing to present their engineering test pilot credentials to you then . . .
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
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Polot
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 3:12 pm

PW100 wrote:
GalaxyFlyer wrote:
aerolimani wrote:

The MCAS is there merely to maintain the required trimmed speed stability until the stall break. It is NOT there to identify or prevent the stall. If you disagree, present your engineering test pilot credentials, please.


The JATR report uses a somewhat diferent wording, which seems to be 180 degrees opposite to your words:

JTAR Final Report wrote:
Observation O3.4-B: Extension of MCAS to the low-speed and 1g environment during the flight program WAS DUE TO UNACCEPTABLE STALL CHARACTERISTICS WITH STS ONLY. The possibility of a pitch-up tendency during approach to stall was identified for the flaps-up configuration prior to the implementation of MCAS.

Finding F3.5-C: The JATR team considers that the STS/MCAS and EFS functions could be considered as stall identification systems or stall protection systems, depending on the natural (unaugmented) stall characteristics of the aircraft.



I guess the JATR group will be needing to present their engineering test pilot credentials to you then . . .

Having unacceptable stall characteristics without MCAS doesn’t necessarily mean MCAS identifies or prevents stalls. It just means that MCAS gives the aircraft the expected characteristics during or lead up to a stall that the pilot may be counting on to successfully get out of or avoid a stall. It also noted that they could be considered a stall detection or prevention device, but doesn’t outright state MCAS is.
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 3:19 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
If people wouldn't keep coming on here and insisting that the pilot's actions were not a contributing factor at all and the state of training is absolutely fine worldwide - then I (and others) wouldn't have to keep bringing it up.

Average global crash rate before the MAX was 1 in 4.16 million flights. As pilot errors far outweigh system failures this can be directly considered as the safety level reached by global aviation training standards. Are you saying, this is not fine? You can compare it with other transportation means and find out it is phenomenal.

The MAX on the other had a technical flaw, which caused it to crash in 1 of 0.125 million flights, which is 37 times more frequent than an average proficient crews would have crashed it if it would have been flawless.

That gap can never be closed by "more training". Training simply has not the leverage to fix fatally flawed aircraft designs.

Pilot training exists to erase pilot flaws. It does not exist to erase the impact of bad aircraft designs and reconcile flawed aircraft like the MCASv1 equipped MAX with normal safety standards.


I do not agree with that. The problem with that statement (and in particular the "pilot did it gang") is not distinguishing between the three levels of pilot training:
1) General Pilot Proficiency Worldwide
2) Type Specific Proficiency
3) Conversion Training from one model to another (sub) model.

If you are discussing 1), the I totally agree with you. But we cannot exclude 2) and 3) from the discussion.

I'm fairly confident that if crews had been trained in a genuine 737MAX sim on the severe consequences of MCAS run-away, in combination with (MCAS-induced) out-of-trim situation at speeds of 250 kts and above, that neither accident would have happened. So yes, pilot training does play an important role.

The problem with morrison is that he is pointing at 2) and 3), but the wor5ds he chosen (carefully?) is firmly suggesting 1).
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
wiss
Posts: 13
Joined: Sun Dec 23, 2007 6:44 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 3:57 pm

I haven't read the thousands of posts regarding this topic. Still, I want to ask, does anybody know if Ethiopian will operate the MAX again once the grounding is lifted? Also if I'm not mistaken, there are 2 MAX for Ethiopian ready for delivery, will they still receive them after the groundings?
 
kalvado
Posts: 2817
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 5:09 pm

wiss wrote:
I haven't read the thousands of posts regarding this topic. Still, I want to ask, does anybody know if Ethiopian will operate the MAX again once the grounding is lifted? Also if I'm not mistaken, there are 2 MAX for Ethiopian ready for delivery, will they still receive them after the groundings?

Nobody can tell with certainty if grounding will be lifted at all. 99.9% it will happen sooner or later, but nothing is fully guaranteed until it is guaranteed.
With that, ET boss went on record saying they need MAX flying and they actually want those birds back in the air. Which, in turn, hinges on the assumption that people will not have hard feelings on MAX after all.
So, it is totally likely that ET will operate MAX, but nothing is beyond reasonable doubt.
 
DenverTed
Posts: 475
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 11:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 5:45 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Boeing built it that way as they screwed up big time and it I don't believe it was the intent to have it fire multiple times. They would not be able to get MCAS V2 past the regulators if they required it to fire more than once.
Again an another false claim.
Boeing description of the MCAS v2 fix: https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/737-max-software-updates.page
If MCAS is activated in non-normal conditions, it will only provide one input for each elevated AOA event. There are no known or envisioned failure conditions where MCAS will provide multiple inputs.

The limitation of one input for each elevated AOA event is only if activated in non-normal condition.
So in normal condition, even MCAS v2 can still generate multiple inputs for each elevated AOA event.

So you think Boeing has defined two realms, 'normal' and non-normal'? I think non-normal is just a Boeing public relations term to try to downplay the issue by pointing out the rarity. But maybe there are two separate operations for MCAS programmed.
I just think, a lot of this gets lost in semantics, not to mention horrible technical writing on Boeing's part.
If they had a solid definition of "runaway stabilizer" before this, they would have a better defense. Then the AD after the LionAir crash, "may retrim with electric trim" not MUST? I guess they didn't want to draw to much attention and worry with a word like "must". Sounds like a soft sell written by crappy lawyers.
Last edited by DenverTed on Fri Oct 25, 2019 5:55 pm, edited 2 times in total.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 5:51 pm

PW100 wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
If people wouldn't keep coming on here and insisting that the pilot's actions were not a contributing factor at all and the state of training is absolutely fine worldwide - then I (and others) wouldn't have to keep bringing it up.

Average global crash rate before the MAX was 1 in 4.16 million flights. As pilot errors far outweigh system failures this can be directly considered as the safety level reached by global aviation training standards. Are you saying, this is not fine? You can compare it with other transportation means and find out it is phenomenal.

The MAX on the other had a technical flaw, which caused it to crash in 1 of 0.125 million flights, which is 37 times more frequent than an average proficient crews would have crashed it if it would have been flawless.

That gap can never be closed by "more training". Training simply has not the leverage to fix fatally flawed aircraft designs.

Pilot training exists to erase pilot flaws. It does not exist to erase the impact of bad aircraft designs and reconcile flawed aircraft like the MCASv1 equipped MAX with normal safety standards.


I do not agree with that. The problem with that statement (and in particular the "pilot did it gang") is not distinguishing between the three levels of pilot training:
1) General Pilot Proficiency Worldwide
2) Type Specific Proficiency
3) Conversion Training from one model to another (sub) model.

If you are discussing 1), the I totally agree with you. But we cannot exclude 2) and 3) from the discussion.

I'm fairly confident that if crews had been trained in a genuine 737MAX sim on the severe consequences of MCAS run-away, in combination with (MCAS-induced) out-of-trim situation at speeds of 250 kts and above, that neither accident would have happened. So yes, pilot training does play an important role.

The problem with morrison is that he is pointing at 2) and 3), but the wor5ds he chosen (carefully?) is firmly suggesting 1).


Now that we have seen the Lion Air final report I think it's back more in the court of #1.

#1 The Pilot did not review the issues from the Previous Flight - that is a huge No-no. If he had he probably would have had the knowledge that would have saved everyone on board.

#2 The Co-Pilot was cited as basically being incompetent and did not even have a mastery over the basics of Manual flight (did not know how to even use Manual Electric Trim properly) therefore should not have even be licensed as a pilot but kept getting passes through the Lion Air system.

#3 While the Pilot missed the review of the previous flight and showed relatively okay skills in the cockpit - it's one thing to look at the traces and see him counteracting MCAS activation 22 times - it's another thing to read about it in the timeline and say - why the hell didn't he throw the switches?

Then you read in the detailed CVR transcript that he admitted having the flu - which makes the fact he missed it 22 times and didn't brief his co-pilot properly on handover more understandable - but there is no way in hell he should have been in a cockpit. The Flu would have made him functionally impaired and possibly no better than drunk off his ass.

It's an incredibly detailed report - but after reading it you still think the pilots actions were not egregiously bad - symptomatic of a very broken training system I don't know what to say.

Boeing is still the root cause - but neither of those pilots should have been in that cockpit that day.
 
AirBoat
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 6:28 pm

planecane wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
planecane wrote:
I still don't understand how a larger stabilizer would have helped with this issue.

Because destabilizing surfaces in front of CG can be compensated with larger surfaces behind the CG.


But how would it help maintain a constant stick force gradient when the destabilization is non-linear with increasing AoA? I guess you could make the stabilizer large enough that the induced lift becomes negligible. However, if the size needed to be increased too much then the added weight and drag could make it very inefficient.

I would think that PROPERLY DESIGNED and implemented software would be preferable to losing a significant amount of the efficiency benefit of the new engines.


The extra lift due to the engine nacelles probably require a bigger stabilizer area to help the aircraft weather vane back into level flight after an nose-up upset.
This would of course have increased wetted area and caused more drag and more fuel burn. This might even have caused mcas to not be needed. It was too late in the program to do this, so it did not happen.

The item that is quietly receding in to the back ground is the only partly-usable manual trim wheel. If its an issue on the max then surely the ng has a problem too. The lack of accidents does not make that plane safe.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 6:54 pm

morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
Average global crash rate before the MAX was 1 in 4.16 million flights. As pilot errors far outweigh system failures this can be directly considered as the safety level reached by global aviation training standards. Are you saying, this is not fine? You can compare it with other transportation means and find out it is phenomenal.

The MAX on the other had a technical flaw, which caused it to crash in 1 of 0.125 million flights, which is 37 times more frequent than an average proficient crews would have crashed it if it would have been flawless.

That gap can never be closed by "more training". Training simply has not the leverage to fix fatally flawed aircraft designs.

Pilot training exists to erase pilot flaws. It does not exist to erase the impact of bad aircraft designs and reconcile flawed aircraft like the MCASv1 equipped MAX with normal safety standards.


I do not agree with that. The problem with that statement (and in particular the "pilot did it gang") is not distinguishing between the three levels of pilot training:
1) General Pilot Proficiency Worldwide
2) Type Specific Proficiency
3) Conversion Training from one model to another (sub) model.

If you are discussing 1), the I totally agree with you. But we cannot exclude 2) and 3) from the discussion.

I'm fairly confident that if crews had been trained in a genuine 737MAX sim on the severe consequences of MCAS run-away, in combination with (MCAS-induced) out-of-trim situation at speeds of 250 kts and above, that neither accident would have happened. So yes, pilot training does play an important role.

The problem with morrison is that he is pointing at 2) and 3), but the wor5ds he chosen (carefully?) is firmly suggesting 1).


Now that we have seen the Lion Air final report I think it's back more in the court of #1.

#1 The Pilot did not review the issues from the Previous Flight - that is a huge No-no. If he had he probably would have had the knowledge that would have saved everyone on board.

#2 The Co-Pilot was cited as basically being incompetent and did not even have a mastery over the basics of Manual flight (did not know how to even use Manual Electric Trim properly) therefore should not have even be licensed as a pilot but kept getting passes through the Lion Air system.

#3 While the Pilot missed the review of the previous flight and showed relatively okay skills in the cockpit - it's one thing to look at the traces and see him counteracting MCAS activation 22 times - it's another thing to read about it in the timeline and say - why the hell didn't he throw the switches?

Then you read in the detailed CVR transcript that he admitted having the flu - which makes the fact he missed it 22 times and didn't brief his co-pilot properly on handover more understandable - but there is no way in hell he should have been in a cockpit. The Flu would have made him functionally impaired and possibly no better than drunk off his ass.

It's an incredibly detailed report - but after reading it you still think the pilots actions were not egregiously bad - symptomatic of a very broken training system I don't know what to say.

Boeing is still the root cause - but neither of those pilots should have been in that cockpit that day.

Indeed. Problem number one is still the aircraft. Of all the holes in the Swiss cheese, the Boeing hole is still the most egregious. While this flight had problems with the company’s crew and maintenance, not to mention an improperly factory-calibrated AOA sensor, absolutely every single MAX had the MCAS problem.

This report does nothing to diminish Boeing’s responsibility in the matter. It certainly doesn’t affect the legitimacy of the grounding.

It is right to expect proper maintenance, responsible crew behaviour, properly calibrated parts, and well-trained crews. It is right to expect crews to be the backstop against unforeseeable or non-preventable emergencies, and for that, I’m all in favour of better training. It is wrong to expect the pilots to be the backstop against a bad design.

Is this unreasonable?

Also, just a friendly reminder that Boeing is the party most opposed to any difference training. I’m sure WN doesn’t mind, as long as Boeing is willing to pay for it.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 7:20 pm

aerolimani wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:

I do not agree with that. The problem with that statement (and in particular the "pilot did it gang") is not distinguishing between the three levels of pilot training:
1) General Pilot Proficiency Worldwide
2) Type Specific Proficiency
3) Conversion Training from one model to another (sub) model.

If you are discussing 1), the I totally agree with you. But we cannot exclude 2) and 3) from the discussion.

I'm fairly confident that if crews had been trained in a genuine 737MAX sim on the severe consequences of MCAS run-away, in combination with (MCAS-induced) out-of-trim situation at speeds of 250 kts and above, that neither accident would have happened. So yes, pilot training does play an important role.

The problem with morrison is that he is pointing at 2) and 3), but the wor5ds he chosen (carefully?) is firmly suggesting 1).


Now that we have seen the Lion Air final report I think it's back more in the court of #1.

#1 The Pilot did not review the issues from the Previous Flight - that is a huge No-no. If he had he probably would have had the knowledge that would have saved everyone on board.

#2 The Co-Pilot was cited as basically being incompetent and did not even have a mastery over the basics of Manual flight (did not know how to even use Manual Electric Trim properly) therefore should not have even be licensed as a pilot but kept getting passes through the Lion Air system.

#3 While the Pilot missed the review of the previous flight and showed relatively okay skills in the cockpit - it's one thing to look at the traces and see him counteracting MCAS activation 22 times - it's another thing to read about it in the timeline and say - why the hell didn't he throw the switches?

Then you read in the detailed CVR transcript that he admitted having the flu - which makes the fact he missed it 22 times and didn't brief his co-pilot properly on handover more understandable - but there is no way in hell he should have been in a cockpit. The Flu would have made him functionally impaired and possibly no better than drunk off his ass.

It's an incredibly detailed report - but after reading it you still think the pilots actions were not egregiously bad - symptomatic of a very broken training system I don't know what to say.

Boeing is still the root cause - but neither of those pilots should have been in that cockpit that day.

Indeed. Problem number one is still the aircraft. Of all the holes in the Swiss cheese, the Boeing hole is still the most egregious. While this flight had problems with the company’s crew and maintenance, not to mention an improperly factory-calibrated AOA sensor, absolutely every single MAX had the MCAS problem.

This report does nothing to diminish Boeing’s responsibility in the matter. It certainly doesn’t affect the legitimacy of the grounding.

It is right to expect proper maintenance, responsible crew behaviour, properly calibrated parts, and well-trained crews. It is right to expect crews to be the backstop against unforeseeable or non-preventable emergencies, and for that, I’m all in favour of better training. It is wrong to expect the pilots to be the backstop against a bad design.

Is this unreasonable?

Also, just a friendly reminder that Boeing is the party most opposed to any difference training. I’m sure WN doesn’t mind, as long as Boeing is willing to pay for it.


I don't know how you rank the egregious-nous of one over the other. At least In the case of Lion Air 610 they were all bad. The jury is still out on ET 302 - however I will be really surprised if we will see the same level of detail or admission of things that were done wrongly in that report.

Kudos to Indonesia for providing the detail and disclosure they did.

I'll give you the grounding though as it should never have been certified this way and obviously pilots don't have the assumed skill - however I'll stick with my belief that no one had to die if the rest of the system had been working like it should have.

Is it wrong to expect Pilots to be a backstop against bad design? That depends - I think MCAS really falls into the grey area where properly trained pilots should have been able to catch it - it was close enough to runaway stabilizer that the required runaway stabilizer memory checklist should have come immediately to mind or at least be tried one of the 22 times - but then again the pilot had the Flu and it seems like the Co-pilot couldn't recall any of the required memory checklists.

It was painful reading the transcript and all the times Pilot properly counteracted MCAS and for it never to occur to him to turn off the electric trim. Rereading with the knowledge that he had the flu and he was the equivalent of drunk made it a lot more understandable.

I'm not sure difference training really would have made much difference in this case - this was a failure of procedures (never fly when you have the Flu - remember to review the problems from the previous flight) and basic training.
 
Chemist
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 9:04 pm

aerolimani wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:

I do not agree with that. The problem with that statement (and in particular the "pilot did it gang") is not distinguishing between the three levels of pilot training:
1) General Pilot Proficiency Worldwide
2) Type Specific Proficiency
3) Conversion Training from one model to another (sub) model.

If you are discussing 1), the I totally agree with you. But we cannot exclude 2) and 3) from the discussion.

I'm fairly confident that if crews had been trained in a genuine 737MAX sim on the severe consequences of MCAS run-away, in combination with (MCAS-induced) out-of-trim situation at speeds of 250 kts and above, that neither accident would have happened. So yes, pilot training does play an important role.

The problem with morrison is that he is pointing at 2) and 3), but the wor5ds he chosen (carefully?) is firmly suggesting 1).


Now that we have seen the Lion Air final report I think it's back more in the court of #1.

#1 The Pilot did not review the issues from the Previous Flight - that is a huge No-no. If he had he probably would have had the knowledge that would have saved everyone on board.

#2 The Co-Pilot was cited as basically being incompetent and did not even have a mastery over the basics of Manual flight (did not know how to even use Manual Electric Trim properly) therefore should not have even be licensed as a pilot but kept getting passes through the Lion Air system.

#3 While the Pilot missed the review of the previous flight and showed relatively okay skills in the cockpit - it's one thing to look at the traces and see him counteracting MCAS activation 22 times - it's another thing to read about it in the timeline and say - why the hell didn't he throw the switches?

Then you read in the detailed CVR transcript that he admitted having the flu - which makes the fact he missed it 22 times and didn't brief his co-pilot properly on handover more understandable - but there is no way in hell he should have been in a cockpit. The Flu would have made him functionally impaired and possibly no better than drunk off his ass.

It's an incredibly detailed report - but after reading it you still think the pilots actions were not egregiously bad - symptomatic of a very broken training system I don't know what to say.

Boeing is still the root cause - but neither of those pilots should have been in that cockpit that day.

Indeed. Problem number one is still the aircraft. Of all the holes in the Swiss cheese, the Boeing hole is still the most egregious. While this flight had problems with the company’s crew and maintenance, not to mention an improperly factory-calibrated AOA sensor, absolutely every single MAX had the MCAS problem.

This report does nothing to diminish Boeing’s responsibility in the matter. It certainly doesn’t affect the legitimacy of the grounding.

It is right to expect proper maintenance, responsible crew behaviour, properly calibrated parts, and well-trained crews. It is right to expect crews to be the backstop against unforeseeable or non-preventable emergencies, and for that, I’m all in favour of better training. It is wrong to expect the pilots to be the backstop against a bad design.

Is this unreasonable?

Also, just a friendly reminder that Boeing is the party most opposed to any difference training. I’m sure WN doesn’t mind, as long as Boeing is willing to pay for it.


There's an analogy here.
Say you are a mediocre automobile driver. You drive all the time and don't have accidents.
Then you get in a high performance race car with skittish behavior and you kill yourself by wrapping the car around a tree.
The MAX is the skittish car, due to MCAS. And the pilots were the mediocre drivers. Well-trained pilots would probably have been ok with the skittish plane. But combine the skittish plane (that should not have been) and the poor pilots (which also should not have been) and there is your death scenario.
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 9:31 pm

morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:


Now that we have seen the Lion Air final report I think it's back more in the court of #1.

#1 The Pilot did not review the issues from the Previous Flight - that is a huge No-no. If he had he probably would have had the knowledge that would have saved everyone on board.

#2 The Co-Pilot was cited as basically being incompetent and did not even have a mastery over the basics of Manual flight (did not know how to even use Manual Electric Trim properly) therefore should not have even be licensed as a pilot but kept getting passes through the Lion Air system.

#3 While the Pilot missed the review of the previous flight and showed relatively okay skills in the cockpit - it's one thing to look at the traces and see him counteracting MCAS activation 22 times - it's another thing to read about it in the timeline and say - why the hell didn't he throw the switches?

Then you read in the detailed CVR transcript that he admitted having the flu - which makes the fact he missed it 22 times and didn't brief his co-pilot properly on handover more understandable - but there is no way in hell he should have been in a cockpit. The Flu would have made him functionally impaired and possibly no better than drunk off his ass.

It's an incredibly detailed report - but after reading it you still think the pilots actions were not egregiously bad - symptomatic of a very broken training system I don't know what to say.

Boeing is still the root cause - but neither of those pilots should have been in that cockpit that day.


Boeing is still the root cause - but neither of those pilots should have been in that cockpit that day.

I haven't read the report yet, but I can perfectly accept that line of verbiage with the key words: Root Cause.

PS. Can you perhaps clarify the word "egregiously"? I have read it before (I did see what you did there), but as a non-native speaker I'm struggling to find the correct meaning.
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 9:36 pm

morrisond wrote:
Is it wrong to expect Pilots to be a backstop against bad design?


Yes, that is wrong. If at all, that is test pilot territory, not your (below) average airline pilot.

The design must factor in the (below) average airline pilot (even if its standards are a bit lower than USA standards), not the other way around.
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 9:36 pm

morrisond wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Now that we have seen the Lion Air final report I think it's back more in the court of #1.

#1 The Pilot did not review the issues from the Previous Flight - that is a huge No-no. If he had he probably would have had the knowledge that would have saved everyone on board.

#2 The Co-Pilot was cited as basically being incompetent and did not even have a mastery over the basics of Manual flight (did not know how to even use Manual Electric Trim properly) therefore should not have even be licensed as a pilot but kept getting passes through the Lion Air system.

#3 While the Pilot missed the review of the previous flight and showed relatively okay skills in the cockpit - it's one thing to look at the traces and see him counteracting MCAS activation 22 times - it's another thing to read about it in the timeline and say - why the hell didn't he throw the switches?

Then you read in the detailed CVR transcript that he admitted having the flu - which makes the fact he missed it 22 times and didn't brief his co-pilot properly on handover more understandable - but there is no way in hell he should have been in a cockpit. The Flu would have made him functionally impaired and possibly no better than drunk off his ass.

It's an incredibly detailed report - but after reading it you still think the pilots actions were not egregiously bad - symptomatic of a very broken training system I don't know what to say.

Boeing is still the root cause - but neither of those pilots should have been in that cockpit that day.

Indeed. Problem number one is still the aircraft. Of all the holes in the Swiss cheese, the Boeing hole is still the most egregious. While this flight had problems with the company’s crew and maintenance, not to mention an improperly factory-calibrated AOA sensor, absolutely every single MAX had the MCAS problem.

This report does nothing to diminish Boeing’s responsibility in the matter. It certainly doesn’t affect the legitimacy of the grounding.

It is right to expect proper maintenance, responsible crew behaviour, properly calibrated parts, and well-trained crews. It is right to expect crews to be the backstop against unforeseeable or non-preventable emergencies, and for that, I’m all in favour of better training. It is wrong to expect the pilots to be the backstop against a bad design.

Is this unreasonable?

Also, just a friendly reminder that Boeing is the party most opposed to any difference training. I’m sure WN doesn’t mind, as long as Boeing is willing to pay for it.


I don't know how you rank the egregious-nous of one over the other. At least In the case of Lion Air 610 they were all bad. The jury is still out on ET 302 - however I will be really surprised if we will see the same level of detail or admission of things that were done wrongly in that report.

Kudos to Indonesia for providing the detail and disclosure they did.

I'll give you the grounding though as it should never have been certified this way and obviously pilots don't have the assumed skill - however I'll stick with my belief that no one had to die if the rest of the system had been working like it should have.

Is it wrong to expect Pilots to be a backstop against bad design? That depends - I think MCAS really falls into the grey area where properly trained pilots should have been able to catch it - it was close enough to runaway stabilizer that the required runaway stabilizer memory checklist should have come immediately to mind or at least be tried one of the 22 times - but then again the pilot had the Flu and it seems like the Co-pilot couldn't recall any of the required memory checklists.

It was painful reading the transcript and all the times Pilot properly counteracted MCAS and for it never to occur to him to turn off the electric trim. Rereading with the knowledge that he had the flu and he was the equivalent of drunk made it a lot more understandable.

I'm not sure difference training really would have made much difference in this case - this was a failure of procedures (never fly when you have the Flu - remember to review the problems from the previous flight) and basic training.

Well… the likely truth is that the same crew, in the same personal circumstances, in an NG, with an improperly calibrated AOA sensor, probably would not have crashed. The other likely truth is that the same crew, in the same personal circumstances, in a future ungrounded and updated MAX, with an improperly calibrated AOA sensor, probably would not crash.

So yes, it may seem harsh, especially in shadow of the massive loss of life, but I still feel that Boeing’s failure is the most egregious. You yourself have acknowledge that the poor design is the root cause.

Humans are fallible. A plane just has two pilots. Only one of them needs to fail, and that can cause a tragedy. Even the best training can’t guarantee that humans will always perform as well as a situation asks. On the other hand, a large organization with many brains working on a design, and a certifying agency to oversee them, and with a century of aviation knowledge behind us, there ought to be way more than sufficient human redundancy to have prevented MCAS 1.0, and prevented this tragedy.

Now, as regards training. One of the problems is that nobody knew about MCAS, and nobody understood how much it increased the risk of a runaway stabilizer. On top of that, Boeing’s own literature is far too vague on what a runaway stabilizer even means. We would not have so much debate here, if Boejng’s literature were actually clear on this matter. In any case, it would have been proper to recommend that runaway stab be trained as regularly as loss of an engine on takeoff. Of course, Boeing didn’t even want to inform pilot’s about the existence of MCAS, let alone recommend proper training for it. They were trying to say that the MAX is the same as an NG, and required no better/different training than an NG.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 10:01 pm

PW100 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:


Now that we have seen the Lion Air final report I think it's back more in the court of #1.

#1 The Pilot did not review the issues from the Previous Flight - that is a huge No-no. If he had he probably would have had the knowledge that would have saved everyone on board.

#2 The Co-Pilot was cited as basically being incompetent and did not even have a mastery over the basics of Manual flight (did not know how to even use Manual Electric Trim properly) therefore should not have even be licensed as a pilot but kept getting passes through the Lion Air system.

#3 While the Pilot missed the review of the previous flight and showed relatively okay skills in the cockpit - it's one thing to look at the traces and see him counteracting MCAS activation 22 times - it's another thing to read about it in the timeline and say - why the hell didn't he throw the switches?

Then you read in the detailed CVR transcript that he admitted having the flu - which makes the fact he missed it 22 times and didn't brief his co-pilot properly on handover more understandable - but there is no way in hell he should have been in a cockpit. The Flu would have made him functionally impaired and possibly no better than drunk off his ass.

It's an incredibly detailed report - but after reading it you still think the pilots actions were not egregiously bad - symptomatic of a very broken training system I don't know what to say.

Boeing is still the root cause - but neither of those pilots should have been in that cockpit that day.


Boeing is still the root cause - but neither of those pilots should have been in that cockpit that day.

I haven't read the report yet, but I can perfectly accept that line of verbiage with the key words: Root Cause.

PS. Can you perhaps clarify the word "egregiously"? I have read it before (I did see what you did there), but as a non-native speaker I'm struggling to find the correct meaning.


You need to read it then we can have a discussion. They were well below competent - one mostly due to sickness one just due to being a really bad pilot.
 
SEU
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 10:09 pm

Has a fix been submitted by Boeing yet?
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 10:12 pm

PW100 wrote:
Can you perhaps clarify the word "egregiously"? I have read it before (I did see what you did there), but as a non-native speaker I'm struggling to find the correct meaning.


It's the word of the week. :sarcastic:

Egregious
adjective
1.
outstandingly bad; shocking.
"egregious abuses of copyright"


Boeing's implementation of MCAS was clearly more egregiouser than anything else here.
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9Patch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 11:24 pm

PW100 wrote:
PS. Can you perhaps clarify the word "egregiously"? I have read it before (I did see what you did there), but as a non-native speaker I'm struggling to find the correct meaning.


e·gre·gious·ly:
In an outstandingly bad way; shockingly.
 
ikramerica
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 11:35 pm

scbriml wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Can you perhaps clarify the word "egregiously"? I have read it before (I did see what you did there), but as a non-native speaker I'm struggling to find the correct meaning.


It's the word of the week. :sarcastic:

Egregious
adjective
1.
outstandingly bad; shocking.
"egregious abuses of copyright"


Boeing's implementation of MCAS was clearly more egregiouser than anything else here.

I will go out on a limb and say having a FO who can’t fly a plane is egregious too.

A question might be why this guy was promoted into that position instead of having more training.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Oct 25, 2019 11:52 pm

egregious, boards of directors, non-profit boards can be held responsible for egregious error, they normally are immune from lesser errors. More or less it is assumed if you have a pulse and are conscious you will not make an egregious error.
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