mjoelnir wrote:

The thread has again been successfully moved away from the big problems, Boeing and the FAA, to the side shows in the report.

Yes Lion Air is an horrible airline, Yes the regulator on Indonesia has to do something about it. Nobody else can, as blacklisting them by the FAA and/or the European agencies has no influence, if they do not fly there.

I for myself do not travel in Indonesia, but I travel a lot in Europe and North America. So my concern are the regulators in this area.

What will be done about Boeing, bringing such a dangerous frame on the market, and the FAA certifying it. Will the USA bring it´s agency up to scratch again? Do we accept that Boeing will do better next just on their say so.

If we think about all of this for a moment, what seems to be the logical response. Will all Boeing Execs, and FAA execs get locked up and blacklisted? Probably not, should they? Lets argue about that for the next few weeks. Has there been at least some additional scrutiny towards Boeing, the FAA, the processes and procedures? Geez I sure hope so. There are other agencies in Europe, Canada, and China, one would hope they no longer rubber stamp everything that they receive from other authorities. Are those other agencies responsible as well since there seemed to be no issues from any of them at the time the MAX started flying, I really find this odd, and asked that question months ago, but I guess that is how the system works.

But if i read your comment correctly about your lack of faith in Boeing and the FAA, then that cuts your choices of aircraft roughly in half, but it is still totally doable!

mjoelnir wrote:

airnorth wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

The thread has again been successfully moved away from the big problems, Boeing and the FAA, to the side shows in the report.

Yes Lion Air is an horrible airline, Yes the regulator on Indonesia has to do something about it. Nobody else can, as blacklisting them by the FAA and/or the European agencies has no influence, if they do not fly there.

I for myself do not travel in Indonesia, but I travel a lot in Europe and North America. So my concern are the regulators in this area.

What will be done about Boeing, bringing such a dangerous frame on the market, and the FAA certifying it. Will the USA bring it´s agency up to scratch again? Do we accept that Boeing will do better next just on their say so.

If we think about all of this for a moment, what seems to be the logical response. Will all Boeing Execs, and FAA execs get locked up and blacklisted? Probably not, should they? Lets argue about that for the next few weeks. Has there been at least some additional scrutiny towards Boeing, the FAA, the processes and procedures? Geez I sure hope so. There are other agencies in Europe, Canada, and China, one would hope they no longer rubber stamp everything that they receive from other authorities. Are those other agencies responsible as well since there seemed to be no issues from any of them at the time the MAX started flying, I really find this odd, and asked that question months ago, but I guess that is how the system works.

But if i read your comment correctly about your lack of faith in Boeing and the FAA, then that cuts your choices of aircraft roughly in half, but it is still totally doable!

I did comment wrongly here comes my sentence, that I put in the middle of his text

I would rather see a working FAA again, that gets Boeing by the testicles and such stupid stuff not happening again.

From my view the 3 root problems are:
1. some political failure in the US to properly fund and staff the FAA to do it's job independently from any possible industrial collisions of interest and
2. the Boeing investors not providing enough money in time for some new aircraft program to follow the 737NG instead of only warming it up at the final second in a hurry after CSeries and A320neo were launched.
3. Boeing loosing it's own systems oversight with not enough redundancy and not enough training provided for some physically different MAX flight behavior.

Do we have ANY idea on how high up in the Boeing hierarchy the approval of the original MCAS design went? Was McAllister (or his predecassor Conner) ever aware of its existence before JT 610?

Or was there a discrepancy, where the original high speed only MCAS was approved by some (who) high ranking manager whereas the modified low speed version never went as far up? Do we have any clue about this? Can we ever get the answer?

14ccKemiskt wrote:

Do we have ANY idea on how high up in the Boeing hierarchy the approval of the original MCAS design went? Was McAllister (or his predecassor Conner) ever aware of its existence before JT 610?

Or was there a discrepancy, where the original high speed only MCAS was approved by some (who) high ranking manager whereas the modified low speed version never went as far up? Do we have any clue about this? Can we ever get the answer?

well
pretty simple

the test pilots knew

ask them to whom they reported
and then ask them the same

will bring you to the responsible person
or to a scape goat

There hasn't been much discussion (I think) on the new FAA Administrator, Steve Dickson. His CV looks impressive. Does anybody know him, what his reputation is, especially in the context of the MAX ungrounding saga?

Boeing considered system redesign before accidents: NTSB report

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indo ... SKBN1X41Y5

Boeing new about the possibility of multible activation of MCAS before the accidents and decided to do nothing.

Not sure if this article was posted earlier, as threads seems to be moving quite fast.

Boeing has started dry runs for eventual certification flights reports Aviation Week.

Boeing 737 MAX Dry Runs Underway

Boeing completed the first of what is expected to be several practice dry-runs of the certification test flight of the 737 MAX updated flight control computer software using the first 737-7 development aircraft on Oct 17.
...

Noshow wrote:

From my view the 3 root problems are:
1. some political failure in the US to properly fund and staff the FAA to do it's job independently from any possible industrial collisions of interest and
2. the Boeing investors not providing enough money in time for some new aircraft program to follow the 737NG instead of only warming it up at the final second in a hurry after CSeries and A320neo were launched.
3. Boeing loosing it's own systems oversight with not enough redundancy and not enough training provided for some physically different MAX flight behavior.

There would have been heaps of cash at Boeing, when they would not have blown huge amounts on share buy backs. Something forbidden until the Reagan administration came along. It sums up to about 55 billion USD up to now, enough to finance all the new projects of commercial frames anybody could think about. Instead you see a company stripped of equity. Boeing increased their loans by 10 billion USD this year and shows similar cash reserves as last year., so the flow out of cash is huge this year.

mjoelnir wrote:

Boeing considered system redesign before accidents: NTSB report

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indo ... SKBN1X41Y5

Boeing new about the possibility of multible activation of MCAS before the accidents and decided to do nothing.

Yes Boeing screwed up big time.

But at least we now know that they weren't stupid enough to not consider the effects of Multiple MCAS activations.

They were just stupid enough to assume Co-pilots actually knew how to fly a plane and that a Pilot wouldn't get in the cockpit when they had the Flu and were incapacitated.

Who knows what an average crew would have done in the exact same situation with the same lack of information on MCAS - because so far based on the Lion Air final report the first crew was well below normal in terms of capacity.

And no the MAX should not have flown with MCAS v1.0, those were really bad assumptions Boeing made - but in some ways maybe not totally unreasonable. Lion Air with a Pilot who had the Flu and a Co-pilot who couldn't fly almost made it.

That Reuters article is just flame bait - you think they would have pointed out the crews deficiencies as well they were well below normal.

mjoelnir wrote:

Noshow wrote:

From my view the 3 root problems are:
1. some political failure in the US to properly fund and staff the FAA to do it's job independently from any possible industrial collisions of interest and
2. the Boeing investors not providing enough money in time for some new aircraft program to follow the 737NG instead of only warming it up at the final second in a hurry after CSeries and A320neo were launched.
3. Boeing loosing it's own systems oversight with not enough redundancy and not enough training provided for some physically different MAX flight behavior.

There would have been heaps of cash at Boeing, when they would not have blown huge amounts on share buy backs. Something forbidden until the Reagan administration came along. It sums up to about 55 billion USD up to now, enough to finance all the new projects of commercial frames anybody could think about. Instead you see a company stripped of equity. Boeing increased their loans by 10 billion USD this year and shows similar cash reserves as last year., so the flow out of cash is huge this year.

Everyone knows that Boeing was fully prepared to do NSA - it was not a preservation of cash thing - but the Market voted and wanted MAX sooner as a good enough solution.

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

Boeing considered system redesign before accidents: NTSB report

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indo ... SKBN1X41Y5

Boeing new about the possibility of multible activation of MCAS before the accidents and decided to do nothing.

Yes Boeing screwed up big time.

But at least we now know that they weren't stupid enough to not consider the effects of Multiple MCAS activations.

They were just stupid enough to assume Co-pilots actually knew how to fly a plane and that a Pilot wouldn't get in the cockpit when they had the Flu and were incapacitated...............

Boeing was not nearly as stupid as it was greedy in making those assumptions.
As for the decision not to ground after Lion crash, it was plain cold blooded.

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

Boeing considered system redesign before accidents: NTSB report

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indo ... SKBN1X41Y5

Boeing new about the possibility of multible activation of MCAS before the accidents and decided to do nothing.

Yes Boeing screwed up big time.

But at least we now know that they weren't stupid enough to not consider the effects of Multiple MCAS activations.

They were just stupid enough to assume Co-pilots actually knew how to fly a plane and that a Pilot wouldn't get in the cockpit when they had the Flu and were incapacitated.

Who knows what an average crew would have done in the exact same situation with the same lack of information on MCAS - because so far based on the Lion Air final report the first crew was well below normal in terms of capacity.

And no the MAX should not have flown with MCAS v1.0, those were really bad assumptions Boeing made - but in some ways maybe not totally unreasonable. Lion Air with a Pilot who had the Flu and a Co-pilot who couldn't fly almost made it.

That Reuters article is just flame bait - you think they would have pointed out the crews deficiencies as well they were well below normal.

Wow. Do you honestly think aviation got as safe as it is by assuming 'no-one will die as long as the captain doesn't have flu.'?

You still seem to be trying to say that it wasn't that bad as long as you had competent pilots. Could you just admit that every aviation authority on earth has deemed that this plane is not certifiable and that MCAS 1 is a non-airworthy design? Your editorial comments are your baseless conjecture, do you actually think if you repeat it enough you will persuade anyone?

Again, people far, far more qualified to comment on this than you have stated that MCAS was a danger to planes regardless of the competence of the pilots. Pilots who knew what was coming in the sim after the crashes struggled with it. So why do you keep ignoring that evidence and sticking with your own completely baseless assertions that it was no problem for competent pilots? To miss the information once or twice could be careless, to keep deliberately ignoring facts that are inconvenient to your position suggests something else.

Given the number of completely incorrect statement's you've made throughout this discussion, which you generally just ignore and hope everyone forgets, I hope you're not too surprised your theories aren't taken too seriously. Everyone needs a hobby though I guess.

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

Boeing considered system redesign before accidents: NTSB report

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indo ... SKBN1X41Y5

Boeing new about the possibility of multible activation of MCAS before the accidents and decided to do nothing.

Yes Boeing screwed up big time.

But at least we now know that they weren't stupid enough to not consider the effects of Multiple MCAS activations.

They were just stupid enough to assume Co-pilots actually knew how to fly a plane and that a Pilot wouldn't get in the cockpit when they had the Flu and were incapacitated.

Who knows what an average crew would have done in the exact same situation with the same lack of information on MCAS - because so far based on the Lion Air final report the first crew was well below normal in terms of capacity.

And no the MAX should not have flown with MCAS v1.0, those were really bad assumptions Boeing made - but in some ways maybe not totally unreasonable. Lion Air with a Pilot who had the Flu and a Co-pilot who couldn't fly almost made it.

That Reuters article is just flame bait - you think they would have pointed out the crews deficiencies as well they were well below normal.

Your old ways of beating up on pilots to defend Boeing.

Now we know, that Boeing considered multible activation of MCAS. Now we know that Boeing did consider how the multible error messages would overload the crew. They considered how their automation failure mode could lead to catastrophic events in a short span of time and accepted a reaction time of 3 seconds to find the right action.
No separate turn of button, no cut out the automation with a heave pull on the column like in the KC-46. No new interface for the error message chaos like the EICAS on the P-8.
But still Boeing removed MCAS from the manuals, did hide it from the pilots and sabotaged training for MCAS if somebody got wind of it, by keeping it out of commercial 737MAX simulators.

Yes the pilots and mechanics at Lion Air are sub par, but IMO bringing that frame to market looks more and more like a criminal act by Boeing.

Planetalk wrote:

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

Boeing considered system redesign before accidents: NTSB report

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indo ... SKBN1X41Y5

Boeing new about the possibility of multible activation of MCAS before the accidents and decided to do nothing.

Yes Boeing screwed up big time.

But at least we now know that they weren't stupid enough to not consider the effects of Multiple MCAS activations.

They were just stupid enough to assume Co-pilots actually knew how to fly a plane and that a Pilot wouldn't get in the cockpit when they had the Flu and were incapacitated.

Who knows what an average crew would have done in the exact same situation with the same lack of information on MCAS - because so far based on the Lion Air final report the first crew was well below normal in terms of capacity.

And no the MAX should not have flown with MCAS v1.0, those were really bad assumptions Boeing made - but in some ways maybe not totally unreasonable. Lion Air with a Pilot who had the Flu and a Co-pilot who couldn't fly almost made it.

That Reuters article is just flame bait - you think they would have pointed out the crews deficiencies as well they were well below normal.

Wow. Do you honestly think aviation got as safe as it is by assuming 'no-one will die as long as the captain doesn't have flu.'?

You still seem to be trying to say that it wasn't that bad as long as you had competent pilots. Could you just admit that every aviation authority on earth has deemed that this plane is not certifiable and that MCAS 1 is a non-airworthy design? Your editorial comments are your baseless conjecture, do you actually think if you repeat it enough you will persuade anyone?

Again, people far, far more qualified to comment on this than you have stated that MCAS was a danger to planes regardless of the competence of the pilots. Pilots who knew what was coming in the sim after the crashes struggled with it. So why do you keep ignoring that evidence and sticking with your own completely baseless assertions that it was no problem for competent pilots? To miss the information once or twice could be careless, to keep deliberately ignoring facts that are inconvenient to your position suggests something else.

Given the number of completely incorrect statement's you've made throughout this discussion, which you generally just ignore and hope everyone forgets, I hope you're not too surprised your theories aren't taken too seriously. Everyone needs a hobby though I guess.

I've said multiple times Boeing really screwed up and that MCAS should never have been certified.

All I'm saying is that people needn't have died in this case if the pilots were not incapacitated and were properly trained. It is not a foregone conclusion that a properly trained average crew with proper CRM even if they didn't know anything about MCAS would not have saved it.

The SIM scenario's were putting people in the cockpit at the tail end of the crashes when MCAS had fired multiple times and the plane was too far gone - not at the beginning when proper procedures would have saved the aircraft.

Actually by the almost total silence after the Lion Air final report came out - I think I am a lot closer to the mark than many will admit.

So far the only "evidence" we have is that one crew with a pilot who was incapacitated and a co-pilot who was cited for lacking basic flying skills was unable to save it.

The previous flight managed to make it.

I would be interested to hear what Sully has to say about Lion Air now that we know the condition/ability of the pilots.

MrBretz wrote:

Here is an interesting article about Doug Parker. He says AA lost 540 million in profit in the last year because of the grounding of 24 737MAXs. He says Boeing shareholders should bear the responsibility for that loss. He has about 50 MAXs on order. Looks to me he is asking for a 10 million discount on each.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/25/america ... lders.html

Pretty hard to believe they make a profit of 22.5 million PER plane.

Noshow wrote:

From my view the 3 root problems are:
1. some political failure in the US to properly fund and staff the FAA to do it's job independently from any possible industrial collisions of interest and
2. the Boeing investors not providing enough money in time for some new aircraft program to follow the 737NG instead of only warming it up at the final second in a hurry after CSeries and A320neo were launched.
3. Boeing loosing it's own systems oversight with not enough redundancy and not enough training provided for some physically different MAX flight behavior.

It wasn't a lack of funding that led to MAX.

Boeing's engineers could not find a way to manufacture CFRP parts at the rate and the cost needed to be competitive with A320, and they needed CFRP to provide the kind of improvements needed to justify doing an all new plane.

At the time the state of the art was the 787 and it was having problems getting to 12/month.

No one involved could figure out a way to get to 50/month with acceptable cost.

In fact no one to this day says they can do so.

NMA is in essence a technology bootstrap that hopes to prove out many of the techniques needed for NSA.

Back in 2011 trying to replace NG with NSA would have been the best gift Boeing could have given to Airbus.

Airbus would have to do nothing but build the NEO and watch Boeing lose millions on each of the very few planes it could build.

Of course Boeing is now losing billions, but that has nothing to do with the NSA vs MAX decision.

Decision makers have to presume some level of competence from engineering, and in this case they were let down.

If it just didn't work out to build something CFRP new they should have decided to go MAX earlier. The long wait and then the rush were the main problems. They were too late. Somebody just did not decide in time.
Boeing sure must have monitored the market and competition all the time?

morrisond wrote:

So far the only "evidence" we have is that one crew with a pilot who was incapacitated and a co-pilot who was cited for lacking basic flying skills was unable to save .

That’s the only “evidence”? I thought a second MAX crashed.

Revelation wrote:

Noshow wrote:

From my view the 3 root problems are:
1. some political failure in the US to properly fund and staff the FAA to do it's job independently from any possible industrial collisions of interest and
2. the Boeing investors not providing enough money in time for some new aircraft program to follow the 737NG instead of only warming it up at the final second in a hurry after CSeries and A320neo were launched.
3. Boeing loosing it's own systems oversight with not enough redundancy and not enough training provided for some physically different MAX flight behavior.

It wasn't a lack of funding that led to MAX.

Boeing's engineers could not find a way to manufacture CFRP parts at the rate and the cost needed to be competitive with A320, and they needed CFRP to provide the kind of improvements needed to justify doing an all new plane.

At the time the state of the art was the 787 and it was having problems getting to 12/month.

No one involved could figure out a way to get to 50/month with acceptable cost.

In fact no one to this day says they can do so.

NMA is in essence a technology bootstrap that hopes to prove out many of the techniques needed for NSA.

Back in 2011 trying to replace NG with NSA would have been the best gift Boeing could have given to Airbus.

Airbus would have to do nothing but build the NEO and watch Boeing lose millions on each of the very few planes it could build.

Of course Boeing is now losing billions, but that has nothing to do with the NSA vs MAX decision.

Decision makers have to presume some level of competence from engineering, and in this case they were let down.

If cost cutting, retaining type certificate and presenting Southwest with minimum training costs, would not have been the overreaching considerations. If just for example safety consideration would have had a high priority at Boeing, there would not be this total mess that the 7373MAX represents.

Boeing had no problem integrating EICAS into the P-8. That would have done away with the Christmas light chaos in the 737MAX cockpit and would have made the 737 cockpit compliant with current FARs.

Boeing had no problem designing a better MCAS for the KC-46, with a cutout to the automatic by pulling heavily on the column.

It would have not been any problem redesigning the manual trim to work through the flight envelope and something about protecting the control wires better from a uncontained engine failure of the bigger LEAP engines.

Everything above inside normal engineering. No revolutionary new stuff needed. All above are things doable when there would have been a will to do it.

But Boeing just had to implement shortcuts to cut cost, cutting training to sell minimum training to at least Southwest and design knowingly a dangerous automation.

Noshow wrote:

If it just didn't work out to build something CFRP new they should have decided to go MAX earlier. The long wait and then the rush were the main problems. They were too late. Somebody just did not decide in time.
Boeing sure must have monitored the market and competition all the time?

What is the rush people keep talking about?
MAX announced on August 30, 2011, first flight: January 29, 2016 (4 years 5 months); service entry May 22, 2017 (5 years 9 months).
For reference
NG was announced on November 17, 1993, First flight February 9, 1997 (3 years 3 months), EIS December 17, 1997 (4 years 1 month)
One could argue that NG is a bigger development than MAX...

kalvado wrote:

Noshow wrote:

If it just didn't work out to build something CFRP new they should have decided to go MAX earlier. The long wait and then the rush were the main problems. They were too late. Somebody just did not decide in time.
Boeing sure must have monitored the market and competition all the time?

What is the rush people keep talking about?
MAX announced on August 30, 2011, first flight: January 29, 2016 (4 years 5 months); service entry May 22, 2017 (5 years 9 months).
For reference
NG was announced on November 17, 1993, First flight February 9, 1997 (3 years 3 months), EIS December 17, 1997 (4 years 1 month)
One could argue that NG is a bigger development than MAX...

IMO the main problem with the design of the MAX was trying to minimize changes,where changes were necessary. If the message would have been, to hell with strict commonality, keep what is good and change what is good to change, they would have got a better more straight forward design, still being able to be produced on the current lines.

in NYTimes today:
"Before Deadly Crashes, Boeing Pushed for Law That Undercut Oversight
With a few short paragraphs tucked into 463 pages of legislation last year, Boeing scored one of its biggest lobbying wins: a law that undercuts the government’s role in approving the design of new airplanes.
For years, the government had been handing over more responsibility to manufacturers as a way to reduce bureaucracy. But those paragraphs cemented the industry’s power, allowing manufacturers to challenge regulators over safety disputes and making it difficult for the government to usurp companies’ authority."
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/busi ... ashes.html

mjoelnir wrote:

If cost cutting, retaining type certificate and presenting Southwest with minimum training costs, would not have been the overreaching considerations. If just for example safety consideration would have had a high priority at Boeing, there would not be this total mess that the 7373MAX represents.

Boeing had no problem integrating EICAS into the P-8. That would have done away with the Christmas light chaos in the 737MAX cockpit and would have made the 737 cockpit compliant with current FARs.

Boeing had no problem designing a better MCAS for the KC-46, with a cutout to the automatic by pulling heavily on the column.

It would have not been any problem redesigning the manual trim to work through the flight envelope and something about protecting the control wires better from a uncontained engine failure of the bigger LEAP engines.

Everything above inside normal engineering. No revolutionary new stuff needed. All above are things doable when there would have been a will to do it.

But Boeing just had to implement shortcuts to cut cost, cutting training to sell minimum training to at least Southwest and design knowingly a dangerous automation.

Yes, Boeing's priorities on MAX were all fouled up.

Hopefully, many of the things I listed in an earlier post will make a difference.

Or, if nothing else, the sheer amount of reputational damage that MAX represents for both Boeing and FAA will change the attitudes and cultures.

Not to mention the sheer financial damage should show Boeing managers that putting cost over everything is a false economy.

Meanwhile, no one says nothing about Indonesia still flying MAXes and A320s with not much chance of them or their pax surviving if anything outside the norm happens.

Some of us were called racists for pointing out some of the shortcomings.

By that standard, it's even more racist to now know the shortcomings are real and choose to look the other way, IMO.

Revelation wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

If cost cutting, retaining type certificate and presenting Southwest with minimum training costs, would not have been the overreaching considerations. If just for example safety consideration would have had a high priority at Boeing, there would not be this total mess that the 7373MAX represents.

Boeing had no problem integrating EICAS into the P-8. That would have done away with the Christmas light chaos in the 737MAX cockpit and would have made the 737 cockpit compliant with current FARs.

Boeing had no problem designing a better MCAS for the KC-46, with a cutout to the automatic by pulling heavily on the column.

It would have not been any problem redesigning the manual trim to work through the flight envelope and something about protecting the control wires better from a uncontained engine failure of the bigger LEAP engines.

Everything above inside normal engineering. No revolutionary new stuff needed. All above are things doable when there would have been a will to do it.

But Boeing just had to implement shortcuts to cut cost, cutting training to sell minimum training to at least Southwest and design knowingly a dangerous automation.

Yes, Boeing's priorities on MAX were all fouled up.

Hopefully, many of the things I listed in an earlier post will make a difference.

Or, if nothing else, the sheer amount of reputational damage that MAX represents for both Boeing and FAA will change the attitudes and cultures.

Not to mention the sheer financial damage should show Boeing managers that putting cost over everything is a false economy.

Meanwhile, no one says nothing about Indonesia still flying MAXes and A320s with not much chance of them or their pax surviving if anything outside the norm happens.

Some of us were called racists for pointing out some of the shortcomings.

By that standard, it's even more racist to now know the shortcomings are real and choose to look the other way, IMO.

Just to show things in perspective: it took 5 months for MAX to get a second deadly crash with about 300 planes flying.
Lion air runs for a year after Boeing - induced crash with 117 planes - and may have a few years till next one.
Think about it: Boeing has WORSE safety performance with MAX than the most junky of junkiest airlines in the world. Tells you something about Boeing, heh.

morrisond wrote:

Planetalk wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Yes Boeing screwed up big time.

But at least we now know that they weren't stupid enough to not consider the effects of Multiple MCAS activations.

They were just stupid enough to assume Co-pilots actually knew how to fly a plane and that a Pilot wouldn't get in the cockpit when they had the Flu and were incapacitated.

Who knows what an average crew would have done in the exact same situation with the same lack of information on MCAS - because so far based on the Lion Air final report the first crew was well below normal in terms of capacity.

And no the MAX should not have flown with MCAS v1.0, those were really bad assumptions Boeing made - but in some ways maybe not totally unreasonable. Lion Air with a Pilot who had the Flu and a Co-pilot who couldn't fly almost made it.

That Reuters article is just flame bait - you think they would have pointed out the crews deficiencies as well they were well below normal.

Wow. Do you honestly think aviation got as safe as it is by assuming 'no-one will die as long as the captain doesn't have flu.'?

You still seem to be trying to say that it wasn't that bad as long as you had competent pilots. Could you just admit that every aviation authority on earth has deemed that this plane is not certifiable and that MCAS 1 is a non-airworthy design? Your editorial comments are your baseless conjecture, do you actually think if you repeat it enough you will persuade anyone?

Again, people far, far more qualified to comment on this than you have stated that MCAS was a danger to planes regardless of the competence of the pilots. Pilots who knew what was coming in the sim after the crashes struggled with it. So why do you keep ignoring that evidence and sticking with your own completely baseless assertions that it was no problem for competent pilots? To miss the information once or twice could be careless, to keep deliberately ignoring facts that are inconvenient to your position suggests something else.

Given the number of completely incorrect statement's you've made throughout this discussion, which you generally just ignore and hope everyone forgets, I hope you're not too surprised your theories aren't taken too seriously. Everyone needs a hobby though I guess.

I've said multiple times Boeing really screwed up and that MCAS should never have been certified.

All I'm saying is that people needn't have died in this case if the pilots were not incapacitated and were properly trained. It is not a foregone conclusion that a properly trained average crew with proper CRM even if they didn't know anything about MCAS would not have saved it.

The SIM scenario's were putting people in the cockpit at the tail end of the crashes when MCAS had fired multiple times and the plane was too far gone - not at the beginning when proper procedures would have saved the aircraft.

Actually by the almost total silence after the Lion Air final report came out - I think I am a lot closer to the mark than many will admit.

So far the only "evidence" we have is that one crew with a pilot who was incapacitated and a co-pilot who was cited for lacking basic flying skills was unable to save it.

The previous flight managed to make it.

I would be interested to hear what Sully has to say about Lion Air now that we know the condition/ability of the pilots.

You use always the same schema since many months to loop at every possible opportunity to blame the pilots.
1) Drop a "Boeing screwed up big time" line to protect you against any reaction.
2) Spread a long text of a random choices of arguments in your long list of arguments to blame the pilots.
3) Change a bit the text to not look as copy-and-past arguments.
4) Divert the initial discussion with random question.
5) Repeat a dozen time per day.
Did you get money based on the number of post to blame the pilots ? Because outside of that goal, your astonish number of posts aren't contributing as much with new and valuable information.
This forum is not just for you.

Revelation wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

If cost cutting, retaining type certificate and presenting Southwest with minimum training costs, would not have been the overreaching considerations. If just for example safety consideration would have had a high priority at Boeing, there would not be this total mess that the 7373MAX represents.

Boeing had no problem integrating EICAS into the P-8. That would have done away with the Christmas light chaos in the 737MAX cockpit and would have made the 737 cockpit compliant with current FARs.

Boeing had no problem designing a better MCAS for the KC-46, with a cutout to the automatic by pulling heavily on the column.

It would have not been any problem redesigning the manual trim to work through the flight envelope and something about protecting the control wires better from a uncontained engine failure of the bigger LEAP engines.

Everything above inside normal engineering. No revolutionary new stuff needed. All above are things doable when there would have been a will to do it.

But Boeing just had to implement shortcuts to cut cost, cutting training to sell minimum training to at least Southwest and design knowingly a dangerous automation.

Yes, Boeing's priorities on MAX were all fouled up.

Hopefully, many of the things I listed in an earlier post will make a difference.

Or, if nothing else, the sheer amount of reputational damage that MAX represents for both Boeing and FAA will change the attitudes and cultures.

Not to mention the sheer financial damage should show Boeing managers that putting cost over everything is a false economy.

Meanwhile, no one says nothing about Indonesia still flying MAXes and A320s with not much chance of them or their pax surviving if anything outside the norm happens.

Some of us were called racists for pointing out some of the shortcomings.

By that standard, it's even more racist to now know the shortcomings are real and choose to look the other way, IMO.

The Lion Air crash report is out. I do not see anywhere a whitewash of the role of the Lion Air or Indonesian regulators as many posters here have been afraid of.. I have the feeling it is a honest report with all the necessary warts and paints a nasty picture of Indonesien aviation, but it is perhaps also unfair to paint other airlines in this part of the world with the same brush without further proof.
Perhaps I am naive to expect changes to how Indonesian aviation is run after this report. You say that there are no changes, but both language and distance make it difficult to follow if there are any developments there.

Anyway, I do not expect Lion Air or another Indonesian airline to fly a lot of 737MAX as it is.

We are still waiting for the report of the Ethiopian crash and that does not have to present the same picture of a dysfunctional airline, but we will see.

It is just that nothing in the Lion Air report draws from the responsibility that has to be placed on Boeing and the FAA. In regards to the USA regulator, the FAA, no changes in laws, regulations or rules have been implemented.

mjoelnir wrote:

The thread has again been successfully moved away from the big problems, Boeing and the FAA, to the side shows in the report.

Yes Lion Air is an horrible airline, Yes the regulator on Indonesia has to do something about it. Nobody else can, as blacklisting them by the FAA and/or the European agencies has no influence, if they do not fly there.

I for myself do not travel in Indonesia, but I travel a lot in Europe and North America. So my concern are the regulators in this area.

Nice: Lets focus on first world problems and ignore third world problems when it suits us.

mjoelnir wrote:

What will be done about Boeing, bringing such a dangerous frame on the market, and the FAA certifying it. Will the USA bring it´s agency up to scratch again? Do we accept that Boeing will do better next just on their say so.

The only one that can change the dynamics of the situation is the US Congress, by giving FAA back the powers it once had and by giving it the funding to do a high quality job.

Given how dysfunctional the US Congress now is, I can't see this happening.

mjoelnir wrote:

Anyway, I do not expect Lion Air or another Indonesian airline to fly a lot of 737MAX as it is.

Yet they still fly A320s and NGs with crews whose skills and training are dubious.

mjoelnir wrote:

It is just that nothing in the Lion Air report draws from the responsibility that has to be placed on Boeing and the FAA. In regards to the USA regulator, the FAA, no changes in laws, regulations or rules have been implemented.

And given how dysfunctional the US Congress is, I would not expect such any time soon.

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Planetalk wrote:

Wow. Do you honestly think aviation got as safe as it is by assuming 'no-one will die as long as the captain doesn't have flu.'?

You still seem to be trying to say that it wasn't that bad as long as you had competent pilots. Could you just admit that every aviation authority on earth has deemed that this plane is not certifiable and that MCAS 1 is a non-airworthy design? Your editorial comments are your baseless conjecture, do you actually think if you repeat it enough you will persuade anyone?

Again, people far, far more qualified to comment on this than you have stated that MCAS was a danger to planes regardless of the competence of the pilots. Pilots who knew what was coming in the sim after the crashes struggled with it. So why do you keep ignoring that evidence and sticking with your own completely baseless assertions that it was no problem for competent pilots? To miss the information once or twice could be careless, to keep deliberately ignoring facts that are inconvenient to your position suggests something else.

Given the number of completely incorrect statement's you've made throughout this discussion, which you generally just ignore and hope everyone forgets, I hope you're not too surprised your theories aren't taken too seriously. Everyone needs a hobby though I guess.

I've said multiple times Boeing really screwed up and that MCAS should never have been certified.

All I'm saying is that people needn't have died in this case if the pilots were not incapacitated and were properly trained. It is not a foregone conclusion that a properly trained average crew with proper CRM even if they didn't know anything about MCAS would not have saved it.

The SIM scenario's were putting people in the cockpit at the tail end of the crashes when MCAS had fired multiple times and the plane was too far gone - not at the beginning when proper procedures would have saved the aircraft.

Actually by the almost total silence after the Lion Air final report came out - I think I am a lot closer to the mark than many will admit.

So far the only "evidence" we have is that one crew with a pilot who was incapacitated and a co-pilot who was cited for lacking basic flying skills was unable to save it.

The previous flight managed to make it.

I would be interested to hear what Sully has to say about Lion Air now that we know the condition/ability of the pilots.

You use always the same schema since many months to loop at every possible opportunity to blame the pilots.
1) Drop a "Boeing screwed up big time" line to protect you against any reaction.
2) Spread a long text of a random choices of arguments in your long list of arguments to blame the pilots.
3) Change a bit the text to not look as copy-and-past arguments.
4) Divert the initial discussion with random question.
5) Repeat a dozen time per day.
Did you get money based on the number of post to blame the pilots ? Because outside of that goal, your astonish number of posts aren't contributing as much with new and valuable information.
This forum is not just for you.

Do you have something to contribute to the discussion or want to refute something up above or do you just want to attack me which is against the forum rules?

Revelation wrote:

Nice: Lets focus on first world problems and ignore third world problems when it suits us.

Yes, third world grade problems at Boeing are pretty bad. One would exepct Boeing to suffer from the lack of sex-neutral bathrooms and insufficient diversity of engineering teams. Instead, we observe third-world grade inability to organize workflow and analyze data, on par with Lion Air, if not worse.

Revelation wrote:

Meanwhile, no one says nothing about Indonesia still flying MAXes and A320s with not much chance of them or their pax surviving if anything outside the norm happens.

Factually false and a very very biased interpretation of what flight safety is all about.
No other aircraft are anything close to be as dangerous in case of a single AoA failure.

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Planetalk wrote:

Wow. Do you honestly think aviation got as safe as it is by assuming 'no-one will die as long as the captain doesn't have flu.'?

You still seem to be trying to say that it wasn't that bad as long as you had competent pilots. Could you just admit that every aviation authority on earth has deemed that this plane is not certifiable and that MCAS 1 is a non-airworthy design? Your editorial comments are your baseless conjecture, do you actually think if you repeat it enough you will persuade anyone?

Again, people far, far more qualified to comment on this than you have stated that MCAS was a danger to planes regardless of the competence of the pilots. Pilots who knew what was coming in the sim after the crashes struggled with it. So why do you keep ignoring that evidence and sticking with your own completely baseless assertions that it was no problem for competent pilots? To miss the information once or twice could be careless, to keep deliberately ignoring facts that are inconvenient to your position suggests something else.

Given the number of completely incorrect statement's you've made throughout this discussion, which you generally just ignore and hope everyone forgets, I hope you're not too surprised your theories aren't taken too seriously. Everyone needs a hobby though I guess.

I've said multiple times Boeing really screwed up and that MCAS should never have been certified.

All I'm saying is that people needn't have died in this case if the pilots were not incapacitated and were properly trained. It is not a foregone conclusion that a properly trained average crew with proper CRM even if they didn't know anything about MCAS would not have saved it.

The SIM scenario's were putting people in the cockpit at the tail end of the crashes when MCAS had fired multiple times and the plane was too far gone - not at the beginning when proper procedures would have saved the aircraft.

Actually by the almost total silence after the Lion Air final report came out - I think I am a lot closer to the mark than many will admit.

So far the only "evidence" we have is that one crew with a pilot who was incapacitated and a co-pilot who was cited for lacking basic flying skills was unable to save it.

The previous flight managed to make it.

I would be interested to hear what Sully has to say about Lion Air now that we know the condition/ability of the pilots.

You use always the same schema since many months to loop at every possible opportunity to blame the pilots.
1) Drop a "Boeing screwed up big time" line to protect you against any reaction.
2) Spread a long text of a random choices of arguments in your long list of arguments to blame the pilots.
3) Change a bit the text to not look as copy-and-past arguments.
4) Divert the initial discussion with random question.
5) Repeat a dozen time per day.
Did you get money based on the number of post to blame the pilots ? Because outside of that goal, your astonish number of posts aren't contributing as much with new and valuable information.
This forum is not just for you.

it seems kinda obsession, doesnt it?


viewtopic.php?f=5&t=766823&p=11068127#p11068127

a thread from eight years ago

how boeing could gain on adding engines with larger diameter on the 737....

„..... How much more efficient would the 737 be by literally slapping new engines on using existing hookups and no other changes to the frame? I call this the 737AEO (Alternative Engine Option) I've read that fan diameter does not mean as much below a certain distance - is this 500nm, 1000nm or 1500nm where what 90% of NB operations take place? What percentage of efficiency gain would you get by going this route? 75% of what you would get be resizing and optimizing? Please correct my assumptions below if I am wrong. But in this scenario I'm assuming that Boeings involvement in this would be very limited,....“

ok, boeing named it MAX instead of AEO but actually they did exactly this
slapping bigger engines on the frame and dont involve a lot ...

Revelation wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

Anyway, I do not expect Lion Air or another Indonesian airline to fly a lot of 737MAX as it is.

Yet they still fly A320s and NGs with crews whose skills and training are dubious.

And yet these crews "whose skills and training are dubious" manage to fly these A320's and NG's (and every other type) with benchmark low levels of fatal accidents (1 in 10 000 000 or so).

It is good that the report highlights the shortcomings in both crew training and maintenance.
I think all of us are aware that the meteoric expansion of air travel in developing countries inevitably has stretched the infrastructure very thin.
These are generic issues that the Air Safety Regulators need to tackle.

However, given the huge numbers of A320's and NG's flying, it is statistically factual that those planes manage to present a safety environment that is pretty much proof against poor maintenance and crew shortcomings.
Poorly calibrated AOA sensors are not causing A320's or 737NG's to crash. Their system architecture appears to deal with it.
And they don't appear to present crews with bewildering displays of symptoms.

That doesn't excuse any of the shortcomings, and it is not my intention to do so.

But it IS why the focus has been, is, and should be, around the MAX architecture that was so deeply flawed as to be utterly vulnerable to these shortcomings.
The OEM's know how to make planes that demonstrably aren't anything like as vulnerable to these shortcomings.
The MAX's immediate predecessor amongst them.
And it is why one individual's unending diversion of this, the MAX grounding thread into crew training has been seriously inappropriate.

If the MAX is so unsafe that it has to wait until worldwide crew training and maintenance have been completely overhauled and verified, it will be grounded for 5 years or more, minimum.
It needs to be made at least as robust from a safety viewpoint as all of the other aircraft around it, so that it can be safely flown in the existing environment.
For what its worth, the simple expedients of a) multiple sensor functionality and b) essentially switching off if the sensors do fail, lead me to have confidence that the MAX that comes out of this process will be a very safe aircraft

Of course, the comments about training and maintenance are completely appropriate in the Lionair Report thread.

Rgds

morrisond wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I've said multiple times Boeing really screwed up and that MCAS should never have been certified.

All I'm saying is that people needn't have died in this case if the pilots were not incapacitated and were properly trained. It is not a foregone conclusion that a properly trained average crew with proper CRM even if they didn't know anything about MCAS would not have saved it.

The SIM scenario's were putting people in the cockpit at the tail end of the crashes when MCAS had fired multiple times and the plane was too far gone - not at the beginning when proper procedures would have saved the aircraft.

Actually by the almost total silence after the Lion Air final report came out - I think I am a lot closer to the mark than many will admit.

So far the only "evidence" we have is that one crew with a pilot who was incapacitated and a co-pilot who was cited for lacking basic flying skills was unable to save it.

The previous flight managed to make it.

I would be interested to hear what Sully has to say about Lion Air now that we know the condition/ability of the pilots.

You use always the same schema since many months to loop at every possible opportunity to blame the pilots.
1) Drop a "Boeing screwed up big time" line to protect you against any reaction.
2) Spread a long text of a random choices of arguments in your long list of arguments to blame the pilots.
3) Change a bit the text to not look as copy-and-past arguments.
4) Divert the initial discussion with random question.
5) Repeat a dozen time per day.
Did you get money based on the number of post to blame the pilots ? Because outside of that goal, your astonish number of posts aren't contributing as much with new and valuable information.
This forum is not just for you.

Do you have something to contribute to the discussion or want to refute something up above or do you just want to attack me which is against the forum rules?

The topic of this thread is "Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide", not "pilots blaming".

astuteman wrote:

...But it IS why the focus has been, is, and should be, around the MAX architecture that was so deeply flawed as to be utterly vulnerable to these shortcomings.
The OEM's know how to make planes that demonstrably aren't anything like as vulnerable to these shortcomings.
The MAX's immediate predecessor amongst them.
And it is why one individual's unending diversion of this, the MAX grounding thread into crew training has been seriously inappropriate. ...

I agree with most of what you are saying, except the last sentence. Many posters here, especially in the earlier parts of the threads, seem to think that fault is like a cartoon bomb that has to be handed to one and only one entity, and that's just not how it works. My take on the one individual's posting is that they were mostly an attempt to introduce the notion that perhaps multiple faults were involved. I have no idea why this was seen as an attempt to protect Boeing, given the multiple and repeated statements from him saying that MCAS 1 was clearly at fault.

What have been seriously inappropriate throughout these threads were the attempts to fix fault in one place, whether training or airplane, without giving due recognition to the (rather disturbing) number of areas that critically contributed, from training to maintenance to piloting to aircraft design.

This is what Sully said about it, it's not so much the pilots it's the aircraft:

...As one of the few pilots who have lived to tell about being in the left seat of an airliner when things went horribly wrong, with seconds to react, I know a thing or two about overcoming an unimagined crisis. I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator, replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design. These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS. The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The National Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so. Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies.

http://www.sullysullenberger.com/my-let ... -magazine/

mjoelnir wrote:

You accept that the government is not function in a first world country, but expect more from a third world country?
.

Fair point, but I am confident that at the end of this saga FAA and Boeing will be treating safety issues much differently whereas I feel Indonesian regulators and JT will not.

Of course, others are free to have different opinions.

I was a bit suprised to read in Dominic Gates twitter feed that the FAA seems to have given a Boeing a free pass for the following:
#Lack of redundancy in the rudder cables (I thought it was lack of protection from fan blades due to the forward position of the engines)
#Too high surface temperature allowed in the fuel tank
#Insufficient fireproofing around the APU in the tail
#Using high-power wiring to connect a switch inside the fuel tank

Apparently all non-compliant with current safety standards.
All new to me. Anybody else heard of this?

flyingphil wrote:

I was a bit suprised to read in Dominic Gates twitter feed that the FAA seems to have given a Boeing a free pass for the following:
#Lack of redundancy in the rudder cables (I thought it was lack of protection from fan blades due to the forward position of the engines)
#Too high surface temperature allowed in the fuel tank
#Insufficient fireproofing around the APU in the tail
#Using high-power wiring to connect a switch inside the fuel tank

Apparently all non-compliant with current safety standards.
All new to me. Anybody else heard of this?

Yes, this was already posted some months ago.
I also found curious that those points don't seem to be handled by the re-certification process.
I wonder how a return to service could be done without proper public explanation to each of those points.

PixelFlight wrote:

Yes, this was already posted some months ago.
I also found curious that those points don't seem to be handled by the re-certification process.
I wonder how a return to service could be done without proper public explanation to each of those points.

If FAA will not look into those issues again, and there will be no clear review and explanation - automatic FAA-EASA certification should just end.

Thanks Pixel Flight

The APU is a curious one, thought they redesigned the tail cone of the MAX.

These don't look like trivial matters to me.. but I suppose Boeing pointed to the 737NG safety record?
Not sure how the flying public feels about it!

PixelFlight wrote:

The topic of this thread is "Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide", not "pilots blaming".

Pilots are a key reason how hundreds died and the plane came to be grounded. Yes, the dramatically deteriorating state of pilot ability in segments of the industry deserve blame. Sorry, those are the facts. Nobody in this thread made them. Anyone who focuses on one problem of a wide systematic failure of safety protocols is part of the problem that led to the crashes and grounding. We will have more accidents and groundings if such anti-safety attitudes are allowed to continue and flourish.

Revelation wrote:

MrBretz wrote:

Here is an interesting article about Doug Parker. He says AA lost 540 million in profit in the last year because of the grounding of 24 737MAXs. He says Boeing shareholders should bear the responsibility for that loss. He has about 50 MAXs on order. Looks to me he is asking for a 10 million discount on each.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/25/america ... lders.html

Boeing should find a way to call his bluff such as giving him 50 MAXes for free and tell him he can keep them if he makes $540M profit on less than a year's flying, otherwise he pays full catalog price. AA got great pricing on their MAXes so paying catalog price would be a big kick in Doug's nuts, one I'd love to see happen.

I'm thinking it might average out to around 30 missing aicraft for 10 months, so about 300 aircraft.months, at 1M a month is 300 million. WN might be missing 500 aircraft.months, so for them 500 million seems ballpark.
Based on current assumptions, it looks like Boeing is on the hook for about 6,000 missing aircraft.months, so 6 billion compensation to airlines.

MSPNWA wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

The topic of this thread is "Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide", not "pilots blaming".

Pilots are a key reason how hundreds died and the plane came to be grounded. Yes, the dramatically deteriorating state of pilot ability in segments of the industry deserve blame. Sorry, those are the facts. Nobody in this thread made them. Anyone who focuses on one problem of a wide systematic failure of safety protocols is part of the problem that led to the crashes and grounding. We will have more accidents and groundings if such anti-safety attitudes are allowed to continue and flourish.

The report made it clear, that the primary and therefor key reason for the crash was the faulty activation of MCAS. Pilot errors come in as contributing.

Dear Revelation and others,
I am afraid You got too much prejudice about Indonesia in general and Lion in particular (yet I do not remember anyone mentioning that their last flight with casualties was in 2004). as bad as this airline is, it is NOT the worst around. Doing very rough calculations, O get that since 2000 they had about 1 out of 3,200,000 flights ending with casualties. Compare it to MAX and see how it ranks.
I can only judge as a passenger, but I am a regular visitor in Indonesia, and I have taken more that 50 domestic flights there (I even flew PK-CJC 5 months before her crashlanding) including 18 on Lion. I sincerely get the impression that things have recently been improving lately, and the progress that was achieved between 2013 and 2018 was astounding.
You still judge them by standards of Mandala crash in Medan-Polonia, Adam off Sulawesi and Garuda in Jogja. Those were scandalous.
Indonesia has extremely unforgiving environment (weather, terrain and infrastructure) coupled with modest financial resources. I strongly doubt whether Southwest or British airways would be doing there much better under the same circumstances.
Some people are showing too much prejudice without facing the changes in reality.
Sorry, guys, it seems the standards of Indonesia right now are higher than those of Boeing. And that's a sorry fact.

mjoelnir wrote:

MSPNWA wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

The topic of this thread is "Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide", not "pilots blaming".

Pilots are a key reason how hundreds died and the plane came to be grounded. Yes, the dramatically deteriorating state of pilot ability in segments of the industry deserve blame. Sorry, those are the facts. Nobody in this thread made them. Anyone who focuses on one problem of a wide systematic failure of safety protocols is part of the problem that led to the crashes and grounding. We will have more accidents and groundings if such anti-safety attitudes are allowed to continue and flourish.

The report made it clear, that the primary and therefor key reason for the crash was the faulty activation of MCAS. Pilot errors come in as contributing.

Then how does one explain away how two competent pilots the night before didn’t crash the plane?

The bad design and bad repair presented the pilots with a very difficult aircraft to fly. But it’s rare that we have direct evidence that despite such a defect, competent crew could effectively recover. In this case we do.

The ET situation isn’t the same. This thread is about the grounding due to both crashes. But you can’t dismiss the utter incompetence at JT, from part procurement, to maintenance, to documentation, to log checks, to pilot training and qualification, to CRM. It was a systemic CF.

ikramerica wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

MSPNWA wrote:

Pilots are a key reason how hundreds died and the plane came to be grounded. Yes, the dramatically deteriorating state of pilot ability in segments of the industry deserve blame. Sorry, those are the facts. Nobody in this thread made them. Anyone who focuses on one problem of a wide systematic failure of safety protocols is part of the problem that led to the crashes and grounding. We will have more accidents and groundings if such anti-safety attitudes are allowed to continue and flourish.

The report made it clear, that the primary and therefor key reason for the crash was the faulty activation of MCAS. Pilot errors come in as contributing.

Then how does one explain away how two competent pilots the night before didn’t crash the plane?

The bad design and bad repair presented the pilots with a very difficult aircraft to fly. But it’s rare that we have direct evidence that despite such a defect, competent crew could effectively recover. In this case we do.

The ET situation isn’t the same. This thread is about the grounding due to both crashes. But you can’t dismiss the utter incompetence at JT, from part procurement, to maintenance, to documentation, to log checks, to pilot training and qualification, to CRM. It was a systemic CF.

You are confusing the causes and consequences.
The cause of 737-8/9 MAX grounding is a flawed functional hazard assessment (FHA), triggering many wrong design choices, and the consequence of the flawed functional hazard assessment (FHA) was two crashes. The fact is that the 737-8/9 MAX will not return into service until the functional hazard assessment (FHA) will be fixed as well as all the related design choices.

ikramerica wrote:

Then how does one explain away how two competent pilots the night before didn’t crash the plane?

you got that answer about three dozens times in that thread now, didnt you?

that crew didnt find out neither
it was a third person in the jumpseat who found out

he wasnt death straped in working incomplete checklists, not containing the fact that a hidden anti stall device is going nuts

ZKCIF wrote:

Dear Revelation and others,
I am afraid You got too much prejudice about Indonesia in general and Lion in particular (yet I do not remember anyone mentioning that their last flight with casualties was in 2004). as bad as this airline is, it is NOT the worst around. Doing very rough calculations, O get that since 2000 they had about 1 out of 3,200,000 flights ending with casualties. Compare it to MAX and see how it ranks.
I can only judge as a passenger, but I am a regular visitor in Indonesia, and I have taken more that 50 domestic flights there (I even flew PK-CJC 5 months before her crashlanding) including 18 on Lion. I sincerely get the impression that things have recently been improving lately, and the progress that was achieved between 2013 and 2018 was astounding.
You still judge them by standards of Mandala crash in Medan-Polonia, Adam off Sulawesi and Garuda in Jogja. Those were scandalous.
Indonesia has extremely unforgiving environment (weather, terrain and infrastructure) coupled with modest financial resources. I strongly doubt whether Southwest or British airways would be doing there much better under the same circumstances.
Some people are showing too much prejudice without facing the changes in reality.
Sorry, guys, it seems the standards of Indonesia right now are higher than those of Boeing. And that's a sorry fact.

Thank you for the excellent post!

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

PixelFlight wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

I was a bit suprised to read in Dominic Gates twitter feed that the FAA seems to have given a Boeing a free pass for the following:
#Lack of redundancy in the rudder cables (I thought it was lack of protection from fan blades due to the forward position of the engines)
#Too high surface temperature allowed in the fuel tank
#Insufficient fireproofing around the APU in the tail
#Using high-power wiring to connect a switch inside the fuel tank

Apparently all non-compliant with current safety standards.
All new to me. Anybody else heard of this?

Yes, this was already posted some months ago.
I also found curious that those points don't seem to be handled by the re-certification process.
I wonder how a return to service could be done without proper public explanation to each of those points.

Aspects other than those having a direct bearing on the two crashes and grounding, were quarantined in the discussions between FAA and EASA at the very outset (just like airbags fitted to vehicles earlier than 2000 are excluded from the global recalls - a stop loss position).

Whenever you put a project or product under a microscope, you always find other defects, shortcomings and issues, especially multi-generational models, which exploited grandfathering and scaling (even before the terminology was used) to the nth degree, and even pre-dates the 737.

Presumably the FAA hinted that if the scope was wider, the same reviews and treatment would be required for models manufactured outside the USA.

Given these are known deficiencies, there must be a timetable to either remedy or mitigate announced within a reasonable time period, otherwise it's tantamount to the FAA and EASA re-writing standards.