You could acutally train for MCAS1.0, but that would require the system to be simulated in the simulators, mentioned in the manuals, having checklists redone to include MCAS failure and an working AoA disagree warning would be nice too.
It would break Boeings business case.
I do not agree with that. The problem with that statement (and in particular the "pilot did it gang") is not distinguishing between the three levels of pilot training:
1) General Pilot Proficiency Worldwide
2) Type Specific Proficiency
3) Conversion Training from one model to another (sub) model.
If you are discussing 1), the I totally agree with you. But we cannot exclude 2) and 3) from the discussion.
I was discussing 1)! As was morrison (see next quote). 2) and 3) would break Boeings business model.
Now that we have seen the Lion Air final report I think it's back more in the court of #1.
Have you forgotten, that global aviation safety excluding the MAX is astonishingly good? Also, have you not noticed that the crash rate of Lionair mentioned in an earlier post is in the same ballpark as the global crash rate?
I don't know how you rank the egregious-nous of one over the other.
Like this: by categorizing the findings and contributional factors of the accident report. That puts blame as follows:
1. Findings blaming Boeing, the FAA or Xtra: 36
2. Findings blaming Maintenance deficiencies: 10
3. Findings blaming the crew: 7
4. Findings explicitly exonerating the crew (this kind of: "This would lead to the inability of the flight crew to predict and be prepared …."): 25
So Boeing (and FAA) is blamed the most in the report. By far. 6 times more than pilots. And for the 7 findings of pilot errors, 25 findings exist that explicitely exonerate the pilots.
From the JT610 report:
The MCAS was needed in order to make the Boeing 737-8 (MAX) handling characteristics so similar to the NG versions that no simulator training was needed for type rating. It was also required so that the 737 MAX passed the certification that the pitch controls could not get lighter on the approach to stall. If the aircraft had substantially different pitch behavior, then there would be a simulator training requirement for the pilots.
Does this put to rest the MCAS is a stall prevention system argument?
No! Ask yourself: Why should controls not get lighter on the approach to stall? Continue to ask, until there is no more "why is this?". The final answer will be, that controls should not get lighter on the approach to stall in order to prevent stalls.
But they never even finished the runaway airspeed checklist - which was required to be an Memory item.
At least they were not as confused as you seem to be. There is no runaway airspeed checklist.
They never though of trying the Runaway trim checklist - if you read the full transcript - it really does seem the Pilot is totally incapacitated due to the flu and can't handle the complexity
Can't you think of other reasons, why the complexity could not be handled? Could it be the complexity of the flawed design itself? There are 25 findings in the report, mostly blaming Boeing, that made it hard to handle the complexity for the crew. Only the flu is not mentioned.
This accident will be used as a textbook case of what not to do as a crew for years.
You seem to assume, that pilot errors in a flawed aircraft are not normal. You seem to ignore the overwhelming nature how this incident was presented to them. The issue they focused on was not even the trim. All because the aircraft told them nothing about a failure in a trimming system but about several other things (stick shaker, ias disagree, alt disagree).
I think some people on here would absolve the Pilots of any wrongdoing even if they were found to never have possessed a Pilot's license as in their minds Boeing should have accounted for that in the design.
Absurd hypothetical claim. It is a red herring because in that case, the pilot would have crashed an NG much earlier.