So we all know what's wrong.
1. Boeing designed a stupid system.
2. Boeing screwed up big time by not telling pilots about stupid system.
3. Regulatory oversight that left much to be desired.
4. Repair shop that didn't do something right.
5. Maintenance that didn't check AoA vane installation.
6. Half incapacitated pilot and incompetent copilot that couldn't even remember memorized items.
7. Mishandling by copilot when it's handed to him by the pilot.
If one of them didn't exist, we wouldn't have the chain of disaster. Now of course a system shouldn't try to kill someone, and without their knowledge. That's a big screw up. But the root cause is still there, the stupid system that tried to kill you and not telling anybody about it's existence. Too bad it happened on a developing country airline first. Now imagine the difference of reaction in here if it happened in the developed country airline.
Just a couple of comments from a retired Captain (still teach in the Sim on my schedule)
I agree with the list, to a certain degree, but there are a few things missing.
The previous flight had the same issues, but they managed to complete the flight and maintenance never informed the new crew of the incident. I would assume it was not written up. If that is indicative of JT's procedures there are systemic problems with the airline which combined with the MCAS malfunction led to the crash.
I have never flown the 737, but did fly the 727, 757, 747 (all models except the -8), 777 and 787. In the Boeings, any movement of the trim wheel or unusual stick forces the action items are first to move the yoke in the opposite direction to see if the yoke cutout will work, if not then both red guarded electric trim switches are activated. And you trim with the trim wheel. Every LPC/OPC I ever took had the scenario where you are told to accelerate to 300 KIAS and once there you have runaway trim. It was a handful but it was not something which would cause loss of control. If done properly, it took both pilots and good communication in the cockpit.
Was it a big mistake for Boeing to not mention MCAS, certainly was, but I can understand their rationale for not having any reference to it. The thinking was if you went to the runaway stab trim NNP, you were covered. Having the system information really wouldn't have made any difference as the NNP for runaway stab trim would have covered you. And, like the current problem with the FBW logic on the Airbus, the odds are pretty slim you would end up being in the weight/cg where you would have an MCAS activation. But, it is part of the certification process.
Having spent many hours flying with and instructing in the sim and aircraft FOs and Captains from non-Western countries, personally, I am not surprised the FO was overwhelmed. The following comment is not meant as a slur, a dig, a racial commentary, but it is an observation based on my experiences. The culture and therefore the training environment in some countries is not conducive to western methods of training. For instance, FOs could recite the SOP word for word, but if you asked them what it meant, in their own words, that is where the problem was. For example, going into DUB, wet runway, gusty winds right at MLW. Company recommendation was always 30 flaps and autothrottles off, min autobrakes and min reverse for hand flown approaches. I briefed flaps 25, autothrottles on and Med autobrakes and reverse on the as required. What then ensued was a 30 minute discussion on the FCTW and why with autothrottles you don't the gust factor and the subsequent recommendation for Flaps 25 on gusty wind conditions as the drag with 30 flaps makes it more likely you will encounter large excursion on the autothrottles and the increased risk of becoming slow due to the gust conditions. The entire issue was his ability to implement the procedures in a practical manner versus parroting back what the SOP was without any thought of the actual environment he was flying in. The problem was you saw that type of thinking more and more. There was a sever short in the brain to hand connection.
Anyhow, the Max 8 process is so bogged down in politics, finger-pointing and misinformation it will be a miracle if the FAA certifies it before the end of the year, let alone any other regulatory body outside the US.