Personally, I think it's very easy. If you are hand flying the aircraft and the trim wheel moves without you activating it by the trim switches, you have a problem. Very simple. The instrument and the stick shaker are basic airmanship. In the QRH, you have a pitch power chart for unreliable airspeed. if you have climb thrust set and have the correct pitch you are good, the aircraft is climbing and you can concentrate on the highest priority problem. Part of the "airmanship" issue is understanding what you are being told by the aircraft. It is up to the crew to prioritize their actions to ensure they can remain safe. It's the old adage, "Aviate, navigate and communicate", in that order. The accident report cited the distraction by ATC. That is easily remedied by saying, "stand by". ATC can wait, but flying the aircraft can't.
STS moves the trim all the time. So you first have to realize that it is not STS doing its normal work. For simple design MCAS was added on top of STS and column cutout removed.
So you should keep your big words like airmanship away from defending a terrible design. And the men machine interface on the 737 is an aged design flooding the pilots with alarms at the same time. That interface is not compliant with current FARs and depends on exemptions from the rules.
Do you want to ground the A330 as well?
From the NTSB report
"Multiple alerts and indications in the cockpit can increase pilots’ workload and can also
make it more difficult to identify which procedure the pilots should conduct. The NTSB notes that
the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accident pilots’ responses to multiple alerts and indications are
similar to the circumstances of a 2009 accident involving Air France flight 447, an Airbus A330,
which was traveling from Rio de Janeiro to Paris when it crashed in the Atlantic Ocean.19 In its
accident report, the Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses Pour la Sécurité de L’aviation Civile (BEA)
concluded that failure messages successively displayed on the electronic centralized aircraft
monitoring system did not allow the crew to rapidly and effectively diagnose the issue (the
blockage of the pitot probes) or make the connection between the messages that appeared and the
procedure to use. Accordingly, the BEA recommended that EASA “study the relevance of having
a dedicated warning provided to the crew when specific monitoring is triggered, in order to
facilitate comprehension of the situation.”
Let us now see, flood of error message in the 737MAX has little to do with MCAS. MCAS does not produce one error message. Perhaps it would be better if it would. Regarding the man machine interface the 737 uses very old technology, that can only be used with getting exceptions from the rules,
That 737 man machine interface is from before the advent of the 757/767 development. The 757/767 introduced EICAS, that have been used in all Boeing developments since than, but in the commercial 737. Boeing did not take the opportunity with the NG to introduce EICAS, neither with the MAX. The US Air Force was not prepared to live with that ancient man machine interface, so the P-8 got EICAS.
Now you try to compare this non compliant 737 interface, based on exceptions to the rules, with the situation on the A330. First, the A330 interface is compliant to the rules written down in the applicable FARs. And yes one can find most of the times something to do better.
But here come the some differences.
There was one A330 accident in this form, not a frame diving into the ground every few month.
The accident trigger in the chain in the A330 is a standard well know situation pilots should have been trained for, the primary cause for that accident was pilot action.
Nothing about the behavior of this frame in this situation had been hidden by Airbus from pilots.
The technical solution for the pilot tubes was already in place, but not yet installed on the frame, because airlines usually get a time frame for when the change out has to occur.
The absolute main difference is, that in the 737MAX, MCAS and it´s failure mode, has been identified as the primary cause, not the pilots.
MCAS was hidden from pilots, so it was not possible to train for its actions and Boeing cut a main feature for the MCAS action, the column cutout switch that in all other currently build Boeing frame cuts any and every automated trim action, but not MCAS in the 737MAX. Pilots were not supposed to have an easy way to cut of MCAS.
I know you are getting desperate in your defense of Boeing, but this is getting ridiculous.