morrisond wrote:Yes I believe that crew on that day if they were faced with anything out of the ordinary that relied on memory procedures or taking manual control of an NG would have crashed it as well
You must be joking. They faced three types of fault indications
which were all false positives (ALT DISAGREE, IAS DISAGREE and stick shaker). But for the one fault, which silently worked to kill them, they got no warning. So the things they were lead to focus on were false trails and then only thing that really went havoc was working under the hood and it was undocumented and unteached.
Any pilot, who claims to handle incidents of this nature safely in my opinion is showing an unhealthy dose of over-confidence. Handling one warning is a no brainer. Handling multiple warnings might be more difficult. Handling multiple warnings which you sense they could be false alarms can quickly overwhelm any pilot. The workload to detect just whether the warnings are correct or false can be considerable.
Think also, what your statement would mean for the reliability of the NG vs the MAX, if you considered that the same kind of pilots has no issues to fly the NG safely. Crash rates of the NG as well as the crash rate of Lion Air are in the same ballpark as the global average.
morrisond wrote:Training is relevant to the grounding as does anything need to change in training before RTS is a valid topic of discussion.
Only if you demand special training for the MAX. Accident statistics for the other planes are generally considered sufficient.
morrisond wrote:Ironically as the Lion Air crew was so bad that may suggest Boeing is right and type specific training in the sim for the MAX with MCAS 2.0 is not needed.
This crew was not so bad as you like them to see because the MAX created an extremely challenging and fault provoking environment to them (see the explanation about the false positives above).
morrisond wrote:As an airline you just have to make sure your crews could actually pass a real flight test including proper CRM procedures and not have the FLU before getting in the cockpit.
The flu is not mentioned as finding in this accident. You would come across more balanced and safety oriented, if you would more focus on the big findings of the report and not push the small or non-existing ones.