And if you have to trim up 22 times, one can expect a reasonably skilled crew to come up with the runaway trim checklist and disable the system. The crews showed unacceptable bad crew resource management and lacked basic flying skills, which must be seen as the final factors for the crash.
Trimming happens as you steer your car. You are not really aware of the corrections and dont notice the directions and dont count the inputs. And as small stick forces were continuously canceled out, the corrections were small and it felt naturally. There was no clue from the system, that the small mistrims that occured 26 times were coming froming a hidden trim system itself. And the frequent small corrections masked the brutally long cycle, MCAS would have ran otherwise.
Please also consider, that the accident report does not nearly put weight on the crew errors that you do. In other words, you are making stuff up.
Are you a pilot? Have you ever flown a plane?
I completed half of a Swiss Sphair training. So the answers are no and yes. I therefore have hands on experience on the things I wrote. I even bought a force feedback joystick later on for no other reason, than to get the best possible feeling of trimming away control forces even in the flight simulator.
Then you would realize how ridiculous the above statement is as it is entirely wrong. The FO noticed that the controls were getting heavier and remarked on it. You can see it below in another quote where you attacked me. He just didn't understand that he had to trim longer ANU to offset the forces. He must not have noticed the trim wheel spinning away.
Why ridiculous? Seahawk talked about the trim inputs of the captain, my reply was also about the captain and you talk about the FO. Did you not notice that Seahwak and I did not talk about the FO?
Seahawk said, that trimming 22 times up (as the captain did) should lead to the runaway trim checklist. I explained why the repetitive nature of the inputs was not easy to notice by the PIC. I stand by that statement. Because of these reasons:
- As I tried to explain, canceling out control forces typically is done with little to no conscious effort.
- Secondly did the Captain apply the countering trim inputs always quickly after an MCAS cycle has started, thus stopping MCAS. Therefore the corrections by the captain were small too.
- So about 4 times per minute the captain had to quickly provide a small nose up input. The problem is, that doing only 4 trim inputs per minutes makes it hard to conciously realize the iterative characteristic of the correction.
- Also that the required correction was always in the same direction was not easy detect. Assume you drive on a straight road. After 1km I would ask you unexpectedly a) how frequent you had to make corrections with the steering wheel and b) how often in which direction. You would not be able to answer either question.
Therefore when Seahawk says, "When handing over control the pilot failed to inform the FO of the constant need to counter a trim movement manually. That is bad crew management." I just said, that this is not fair, because the captain (under the intense pressure to cognitvely work through the numerous wrong fault indications) very likely could not have consciously told "how" he was applying the trim inputs in the past few minutes. Recognizing and guessing the unknown pattern in these inputs was very hard.
Try to pass the concentration test in this video to understand, what could have happened:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGQmdoK_ZfY
Even after the JT final report has been released showing multiple significant factors to the crashes and it pointed out things that have to change (Maintenance, training) - you are still trying to Pin the accident 100% on Boeing and ignoring everything else.
I never said 100%. Out of 98 findings in the report 7 mention crew errors. On the other hand I count 42 findings that blame Boeing or the FAA. From that alone we see that findings targeting Boeing/FAA outweight crew error findings with a ratio of 6:1. If you then consider, that that there are 25 findings, which explicitely take away blame from the crew (in other words, weaken the case to blame the pilots by explaining the fault provoking nature of the incident), you get an overall picture, in which crew errors account for a really small portion of the overall blame. And that Boeing indeed deserves the largest majority of it. Not 100%, but enough to understand, that pilot actions are a minor side show in the whole tragedy.
Have a look at this:
It is a noble goal to lower the curve even more at the right end. But it is not related to the MAX grounding. Erasing design flaws of aircraft by mandating more training is putting the cart before the horse. It will not work.
Aircraft designs need to be as failure proof as demonstrated by all other aircraft except the MAX. Then even bad pilots won't make dents into the curve above.
Isn't about time that the Boeing is evil crowd (and BTW I do believe what happened inside Boeing was beyond bad) and nothing else matters need to put some sort of disclaimer on there statements as well? "Granted there were serious mistakes that were made in Maintenance and Training that need to be fixed" or something like that before ranting on?
It is not about the disclaimer. Look at the grounding threads. You and others are so obsessed to focus on a small minority of findings from the accident report, that the discussed topics are totally out of balance. The crew fault topic is pushed so dominatly in these threads, that you can really not complain that anybody is putting too much focus on Boeings failures. I encourage you just to go through any of these pages and count how many posts belong to "which camp" to see whether Boeing is thrown under the bus unfairly.
Have just a look at the post from glideslope (last post previous page). How is that balanced? It clearly does not just miss the "Boeing-did-it" disclaimer.