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XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 1:40 pm

planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:
As I previously said the crew performance and the design error are not directly connected.

Just if you look at the trim inputs, it becomes obvious that without coming to the conclusion that it is a runaway trim, they could not win the struggle. In 10 seconds MCAS trimmed from 6,1 units to 3,8 units, while 5 seconds of manual trim only set the trim back to 4,7 units. So MCAS did trim for 0,23 units per second, while manual electric trim only trims for 0,18 units per second.

But we also see the the pilot used manul inputs to stop the MCAS quickly and was able to control the trim quite well. The FO re-acted slower and counter trimmed less. When handing over control the pilot failed to inform the FO of the constant need to counter a trim movement manually. That is bad crew management.

It does not make the mistakes by Boeing any better.


They could have won the struggle. If, each time, they trimmed back to neutral column force (like is supposed to be done as part of normal manual flight) then they would have just kept oscillating back and forth between neutral and 2.5 units out of trim nose down until they set flaps 1 in preparation for landing. It doesn't matter if it took them longer to offset MCAS than it took MCAS to reach a particular point. Trim is not done by time, it is done by feel.

Pilots were overwhelmed. Read the JATR and JT610 reports and NTSB finding. Ask human factors experts what can happen in such overwhelming situations and the answer is basically anything. More training and experience can reduce the potential impact but can not eradicate it. What makes a more telling difference is not exposing humans to overwhelming circumstances with a catastrophic consequence at the end. This is why the pre-emptive practice of FHA and design to remove potential hazardous and catastrophic failure modes (rather than rely on the operator as a backstop as a first resort) has been the standard design practice for decades, and systems such as EICAS/ECAM exist to help diagnose and prioritise action.

The silly arguments about this and that specific action by the pilots are precisely that - silly. Get the big picture like Sully, De-Fazio, Lemme, Brady et al.

Ray
 
benbeny
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 2:05 pm

One question: how tiring it is to constantly counter trim? Finger wise and brain wise?
 
shmerik
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 2:30 pm

Veering away from the main discussion that's been ongoing in this thread somewhat, what does everyone make of the witness accounts from the Ethiopian crash claiming that the plane was smoking and rattling as it flew overhead?

Could these just have been from exceeding Vmo, witnesses remembering things incorrectly in the aftermath, or is it possible that there were manufacturing problems on that specific plane?

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethi ... SKBN1QS1LJ

Some tidbits from satcom's analysis:

The data provided in the preliminary report does not show Vertical Speed. I plotted Vertical Speed Vs. Altitude, and it appears the airplane did not climb out smoothly. The guidance on a normal takeoff is to climb at about V2+15 at a stead pitch attitude of about 15 degrees, and surely to maintain positive rate of climb.


Six seconds after the autopilot engagement, there were small amplitude roll oscillations accompanied by lateral acceleration, rudder oscillations and slight heading changes. These oscillations continued also after the autopilot was disengaged.



The source of the roll and rudder oscillations was not revealed, nor was wheel or rudder control inputs. What factor this has is not known.
 
benbeny
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 2:43 pm

shmerik wrote:
Veering away from the main discussion that's been ongoing in this thread somewhat, what does everyone make of the witness accounts from the Ethiopian crash claiming that the plane was smoking and rattling as it flew overhead?

Could these just have been from exceeding Vmo, witnesses remembering things incorrectly in the aftermath, or is it possible that there were manufacturing problems on that specific plane?

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethi ... SKBN1QS1LJ

Some tidbits from satcom's analysis:

The data provided in the preliminary report does not show Vertical Speed. I plotted Vertical Speed Vs. Altitude, and it appears the airplane did not climb out smoothly. The guidance on a normal takeoff is to climb at about V2+15 at a stead pitch attitude of about 15 degrees, and surely to maintain positive rate of climb.


Six seconds after the autopilot engagement, there were small amplitude roll oscillations accompanied by lateral acceleration, rudder oscillations and slight heading changes. These oscillations continued also after the autopilot was disengaged.



The source of the roll and rudder oscillations was not revealed, nor was wheel or rudder control inputs. What factor this has is not known.

Well I'd like to see the IRS. Does it mean that the recorder was fed with bad data, or the data itself was right and they have control issues?
 
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smithbs
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 3:23 pm

planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:
As I previously said the crew performance and the design error are not directly connected.

Just if you look at the trim inputs, it becomes obvious that without coming to the conclusion that it is a runaway trim, they could not win the struggle. In 10 seconds MCAS trimmed from 6,1 units to 3,8 units, while 5 seconds of manual trim only set the trim back to 4,7 units. So MCAS did trim for 0,23 units per second, while manual electric trim only trims for 0,18 units per second.

But we also see the the pilot used manul inputs to stop the MCAS quickly and was able to control the trim quite well. The FO re-acted slower and counter trimmed less. When handing over control the pilot failed to inform the FO of the constant need to counter a trim movement manually. That is bad crew management.

It does not make the mistakes by Boeing any better.


They could have won the struggle. If, each time, they trimmed back to neutral column force (like is supposed to be done as part of normal manual flight) then they would have just kept oscillating back and forth between neutral and 2.5 units out of trim nose down until they set flaps 1 in preparation for landing. It doesn't matter if it took them longer to offset MCAS than it took MCAS to reach a particular point. Trim is not done by time, it is done by feel.


From the Indonesian report, we saw that:

* The Captain fought MCAS for some time and appeared to more-or-less succeed. His style was to add opposing trim in longer amounts, and so the net effect between pilot vs MCAS was roughly even. However, the Captain on that flight did not recognize he was in a pitch trim battle against the machine. Don't know why - maybe because he was sick and distracted. But he appeared to never verbalize this phenomenon, and so never addressed it directly. However, it appeared that he was preoccupied enough to not really track a course nor altitude.

* The FO fought MCAS and quickly lost. His style was to use the column more and trim less. MCAS overcomes that style pretty quickly. I think I read in the report that MCAS would need just two applications against this kind of pilot before column force was ineffective. To the FO's defense, the Captain didn't tell him about needing so much pitch trim when he handed over control, and the FO seemed to quickly realize the airplane was flying differently but used column force to try to fly it.

The Boeing analysis hinged on the pilot recognizing an apparent runaway stab, which this crew didn't demonstrate. And these pilots were more-or-less 5000 hour pilots. And so the accident report encouraged Boeing to re-assess pilot capabilities in the face of confusing phenomenon in their FHAs.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 3:44 pm

smithbs wrote:
planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:
As I previously said the crew performance and the design error are not directly connected.

Just if you look at the trim inputs, it becomes obvious that without coming to the conclusion that it is a runaway trim, they could not win the struggle. In 10 seconds MCAS trimmed from 6,1 units to 3,8 units, while 5 seconds of manual trim only set the trim back to 4,7 units. So MCAS did trim for 0,23 units per second, while manual electric trim only trims for 0,18 units per second.

But we also see the the pilot used manul inputs to stop the MCAS quickly and was able to control the trim quite well. The FO re-acted slower and counter trimmed less. When handing over control the pilot failed to inform the FO of the constant need to counter a trim movement manually. That is bad crew management.

It does not make the mistakes by Boeing any better.


They could have won the struggle. If, each time, they trimmed back to neutral column force (like is supposed to be done as part of normal manual flight) then they would have just kept oscillating back and forth between neutral and 2.5 units out of trim nose down until they set flaps 1 in preparation for landing. It doesn't matter if it took them longer to offset MCAS than it took MCAS to reach a particular point. Trim is not done by time, it is done by feel.


From the Indonesian report, we saw that:

* The Captain fought MCAS for some time and appeared to more-or-less succeed. His style was to add opposing trim in longer amounts, and so the net effect between pilot vs MCAS was roughly even. However, the Captain on that flight did not recognize he was in a pitch trim battle against the machine. Don't know why - maybe because he was sick and distracted. But he appeared to never verbalize this phenomenon, and so never addressed it directly. However, it appeared that he was preoccupied enough to not really track a course nor altitude.

* The FO fought MCAS and quickly lost. His style was to use the column more and trim less. MCAS overcomes that style pretty quickly. I think I read in the report that MCAS would need just two applications against this kind of pilot before column force was ineffective. To the FO's defense, the Captain didn't tell him about needing so much pitch trim when he handed over control, and the FO seemed to quickly realize the airplane was flying differently but used column force to try to fly it.

The Boeing analysis hinged on the pilot recognizing an apparent runaway stab, which this crew didn't demonstrate. And these pilots were more-or-less 5000 hour pilots. And so the accident report encouraged Boeing to re-assess pilot capabilities in the face of confusing phenomenon in their FHAs.


And much more to the defence of the FO. The AoA disagree warning available in the NG was not functional in the MAX, the override of stick movement backwards over any automatic nose down trim movement in the NG was no longer functional in the MAX with MCAS active, they did not even know MCAS existed,

One has to understand that every crash offers different findings. Just because the pilot showed deficiencies in skill and CRM, does not mean they are to blame for the crash. I think the report is crystal clear in MCAS being the root cause. But for safety it would be a huge mistake to only look at the MCAS fault, with the huge number of frames on order at Boeing and Airbus, training crews will become an even bigger challenge. The market in Asia is already empty and you have pilots flying, which should not be flying. (see the TransAsia ATR crash)
 
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JetBuddy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 3:55 pm

"Leaked email reveals a Boeing executive tried to convince a congressman to avoid discussing another troubled plane during the 737 Max hearing"

https://markets.businessinsider.com/new ... 1028646106

Apparantly a Boeing executive reached out to Rep. John Garamendi asking him to avoid bringing discussion on the KC-46 into the hearing about the 737 MAX.

It's understandable that Boeing would have this perspective, but it's also questionable to instruct, or firmly ask a political representative to not touch a certain subject in a political hearing.

It has also been previously reported that multiple lawmakers had been contacted by Boeing to not bring up the KC-46 in the hearing.

https://twitter.com/cheddar/status/1189547519614881793

Boeing denies everything.
 
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smithbs
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 4:01 pm

seahawk wrote:
smithbs wrote:
planecane wrote:

They could have won the struggle. If, each time, they trimmed back to neutral column force (like is supposed to be done as part of normal manual flight) then they would have just kept oscillating back and forth between neutral and 2.5 units out of trim nose down until they set flaps 1 in preparation for landing. It doesn't matter if it took them longer to offset MCAS than it took MCAS to reach a particular point. Trim is not done by time, it is done by feel.


From the Indonesian report, we saw that:

* The Captain fought MCAS for some time and appeared to more-or-less succeed. His style was to add opposing trim in longer amounts, and so the net effect between pilot vs MCAS was roughly even. However, the Captain on that flight did not recognize he was in a pitch trim battle against the machine. Don't know why - maybe because he was sick and distracted. But he appeared to never verbalize this phenomenon, and so never addressed it directly. However, it appeared that he was preoccupied enough to not really track a course nor altitude.

* The FO fought MCAS and quickly lost. His style was to use the column more and trim less. MCAS overcomes that style pretty quickly. I think I read in the report that MCAS would need just two applications against this kind of pilot before column force was ineffective. To the FO's defense, the Captain didn't tell him about needing so much pitch trim when he handed over control, and the FO seemed to quickly realize the airplane was flying differently but used column force to try to fly it.

The Boeing analysis hinged on the pilot recognizing an apparent runaway stab, which this crew didn't demonstrate. And these pilots were more-or-less 5000 hour pilots. And so the accident report encouraged Boeing to re-assess pilot capabilities in the face of confusing phenomenon in their FHAs.


And much more to the defence of the FO. The AoA disagree warning available in the NG was not functional in the MAX, the override of stick movement backwards over any automatic nose down trim movement in the NG was no longer functional in the MAX with MCAS active, they did not even know MCAS existed,

One has to understand that every crash offers different findings. Just because the pilot showed deficiencies in skill and CRM, does not mean they are to blame for the crash. I think the report is crystal clear in MCAS being the root cause. But for safety it would be a huge mistake to only look at the MCAS fault, with the huge number of frames on order at Boeing and Airbus, training crews will become an even bigger challenge. The market in Asia is already empty and you have pilots flying, which should not be flying. (see the TransAsia ATR crash)


Yes, and this report from Indonesia was good because it had findings and action items for everyone, even the Indonesian regulators who apparently had some findings against them. Everyone can, should and will improve from this.

For AoA Disagree, the report was interesting because it said:
* Boeing went back, thought about it and said the AoA Disagree light would not have helped because that is a signal to the flight crew that airspeed and altitude readings are not reliable. But this flight crew already knew that and was already focused on that issue. The regulators seemed to agree with Boeing's assessment.
* The AoA Disagree light is more useful for maintenance.
* The AoA Disagree light should be standard going forward. Boeing has agreed and will make it so.
* Regulators should encourage sympathetic fault exclusion to reduce distractions, and the AoA detection could help on that front. The hope here is that fault indicators are more direct and there are fewer sympathetic faults to cause distraction and fixation.

Root cause can vary depending on viewpoint, especially in an accident like this where so many factors had to line up just so to create the fatal outcome. One could say the AoA sensor failure was really the root cause - it kicked off the march to destruction after all. But component failure is a fact of life, and so you can then say MCAS was the root cause because it was activating in a hazardous and inadvertent manner. But Boeing considered this and said pilots would be the countermeasure/mitigation against that inadvertent MCAS activation, and so you could say the pilots were the root cause for not reacting according to Boeing's intentions. So it depends how you frame the question, and in reality everyone involved has homework to do now.
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 4:06 pm

AirBoat wrote:
For the Lion air case: the question is why did they stop trimming nose up?
there are 2 possibilities:
1. they did not know how.
2. the electric trim drive motor failed. There are signs of intermittent trim action just before the final moments.
This could open up another can of worms. What was the duty cycle of the trim motor. If is was designed for 100% duty continuously then there is no problem.
And by the way, both pilots were pulling with all their strength on the yoke at the end, the pilot 100lbs and co-pilot 40lbs.


3. Crews were learned not to put in looong trims at high speed, but rather short blips.
4. Crews were learned that auto trim would stop when pulling/pushing the control column beyond a certain point, by means of control column cut-out switches
5. Crews were never told this functionality of item 4 was silently removed from the Max.
6. Item 4 would obviously no apply to real trim runaway (like stuck relay, stuck thump switch, electrical short in motor). But as trim was reacting normal to thump trim switch, 4) obviously was not the case.
7. Trimming is usually done later in the game once when you have re-established control over the airplane by means of elevator/control column. You first fly the control column, then trim the thing out.
8. Trimming wasn't initially seen as the highest priority, with stall warnings, stick shaker, unreliable airspeed, anti-ice warning all going off at the same time. By the time it became clear it was already too late.
9. The Boeing assumed reaction time of identifying and correcting trim runaway was not realistic. As demonstrated by this crew. As identified by ET crew. As identified by the JATR report. As identified by other industry specialists. The easy blame game is putting that on the crew, but that is closing the eyes for the real problem). Really, that is a bit like sticking your head in the sand thinking someone else will not be able to see you (as you can't see them).
10. Did the airplane experience blow back on the control surfaces, and if so at what point
11. Mechanical/electrical reasons in trim motor and its controlller logic (though this seems to be rather unlikely, as that should have been covered by the JT Report).
12. Other factors I have missed.

Having said that, I agree you did ask the correct question. I wish the JT report would dig deeper into human factors, and crew performance with respect to the (lack of) trimming by the FO. It would have been even better if they did a comprehensive study how pilots worldwide use trimming in general. Although I expect that will be a fall out of the JATR report, and certification standards in this respect will certainly be reviewed by the likes of FAA, EASA, TCCA etc.
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 4:10 pm

seahawk wrote:
smithbs wrote:
planecane wrote:

They could have won the struggle. If, each time, they trimmed back to neutral column force (like is supposed to be done as part of normal manual flight) then they would have just kept oscillating back and forth between neutral and 2.5 units out of trim nose down until they set flaps 1 in preparation for landing. It doesn't matter if it took them longer to offset MCAS than it took MCAS to reach a particular point. Trim is not done by time, it is done by feel.


From the Indonesian report, we saw that:

* The Captain fought MCAS for some time and appeared to more-or-less succeed. His style was to add opposing trim in longer amounts, and so the net effect between pilot vs MCAS was roughly even. However, the Captain on that flight did not recognize he was in a pitch trim battle against the machine. Don't know why - maybe because he was sick and distracted. But he appeared to never verbalize this phenomenon, and so never addressed it directly. However, it appeared that he was preoccupied enough to not really track a course nor altitude.

* The FO fought MCAS and quickly lost. His style was to use the column more and trim less. MCAS overcomes that style pretty quickly. I think I read in the report that MCAS would need just two applications against this kind of pilot before column force was ineffective. To the FO's defense, the Captain didn't tell him about needing so much pitch trim when he handed over control, and the FO seemed to quickly realize the airplane was flying differently but used column force to try to fly it.

The Boeing analysis hinged on the pilot recognizing an apparent runaway stab, which this crew didn't demonstrate. And these pilots were more-or-less 5000 hour pilots. And so the accident report encouraged Boeing to re-assess pilot capabilities in the face of confusing phenomenon in their FHAs.


And much more to the defence of the FO. The AoA disagree warning available in the NG was not functional in the MAX, the override of stick movement backwards over any automatic nose down trim movement in the NG was no longer functional in the MAX with MCAS active, they did not even know MCAS existed,

One has to understand that every crash offers different findings. Just because the pilot showed deficiencies in skill and CRM, does not mean they are to blame for the crash. I think the report is crystal clear in MCAS being the root cause. But for safety it would be a huge mistake to only look at the MCAS fault, with the huge number of frames on order at Boeing and Airbus, training crews will become an even bigger challenge. The market in Asia is already empty and you have pilots flying, which should not be flying. (see the TransAsia ATR crash)


The fact that pulling back on the column did not stop the nose down trim was more reason that they should have determined that they were dealing with some kind of runway stabilizer. Since they didn't know about MCAS, they assumed that pulling back on the control column would stop any nose down trim movement like on an NG. If doing so on an NG failed to stop the trim from trimming nose down by itself shouldn't they have thought of a runaway stabilizer being a strong possibility?

Also, my comment that started this latest discussion was meant only to respond to the FACT that they COULD HAVE won the battle with MCAS. I'm not saying that they should have but that it was possible based on what the captain was achieving before handing off to the FO.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 4:23 pm

JetBuddy wrote:
"Leaked email reveals a Boeing executive tried to convince a congressman to avoid discussing another troubled plane during the 737 Max hearing"

https://markets.businessinsider.com/new ... 1028646106

Apparantly a Boeing executive reached out to Rep. John Garamendi asking him to avoid bringing discussion on the KC-46 into the hearing about the 737 MAX.

It's understandable that Boeing would have this perspective, but it's also questionable to instruct, or firmly ask a political representative to not touch a certain subject in a political hearing.

It has also been previously reported that multiple lawmakers had been contacted by Boeing to not bring up the KC-46 in the hearing.

https://twitter.com/cheddar/status/1189547519614881793

Boeing denies everything.

Since Boeing is footing the bill for all the delays, the congress could care less, its not as if the program was going to be any further ahead if they were paying, probably even more delayed. Besides, who in America will the congress be educating on the troubles with the KC-46?
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 4:28 pm

smithbs wrote:
seahawk wrote:
smithbs wrote:

From the Indonesian report, we saw that:

* The Captain fought MCAS for some time and appeared to more-or-less succeed. His style was to add opposing trim in longer amounts, and so the net effect between pilot vs MCAS was roughly even. However, the Captain on that flight did not recognize he was in a pitch trim battle against the machine. Don't know why - maybe because he was sick and distracted. But he appeared to never verbalize this phenomenon, and so never addressed it directly. However, it appeared that he was preoccupied enough to not really track a course nor altitude.

* The FO fought MCAS and quickly lost. His style was to use the column more and trim less. MCAS overcomes that style pretty quickly. I think I read in the report that MCAS would need just two applications against this kind of pilot before column force was ineffective. To the FO's defense, the Captain didn't tell him about needing so much pitch trim when he handed over control, and the FO seemed to quickly realize the airplane was flying differently but used column force to try to fly it.

The Boeing analysis hinged on the pilot recognizing an apparent runaway stab, which this crew didn't demonstrate. And these pilots were more-or-less 5000 hour pilots. And so the accident report encouraged Boeing to re-assess pilot capabilities in the face of confusing phenomenon in their FHAs.


And much more to the defence of the FO. The AoA disagree warning available in the NG was not functional in the MAX, the override of stick movement backwards over any automatic nose down trim movement in the NG was no longer functional in the MAX with MCAS active, they did not even know MCAS existed,

One has to understand that every crash offers different findings. Just because the pilot showed deficiencies in skill and CRM, does not mean they are to blame for the crash. I think the report is crystal clear in MCAS being the root cause. But for safety it would be a huge mistake to only look at the MCAS fault, with the huge number of frames on order at Boeing and Airbus, training crews will become an even bigger challenge. The market in Asia is already empty and you have pilots flying, which should not be flying. (see the TransAsia ATR crash)


Yes, and this report from Indonesia was good because it had findings and action items for everyone, even the Indonesian regulators who apparently had some findings against them. Everyone can, should and will improve from this.

For AoA Disagree, the report was interesting because it said:
* Boeing went back, thought about it and said the AoA Disagree light would not have helped because that is a signal to the flight crew that airspeed and altitude readings are not reliable. But this flight crew already knew that and was already focused on that issue. The regulators seemed to agree with Boeing's assessment.
* The AoA Disagree light is more useful for maintenance.
* The AoA Disagree light should be standard going forward. Boeing has agreed and will make it so.
* Regulators should encourage sympathetic fault exclusion to reduce distractions, and the AoA detection could help on that front. The hope here is that fault indicators are more direct and there are fewer sympathetic faults to cause distraction and fixation.

Root cause can vary depending on viewpoint, especially in an accident like this where so many factors had to line up just so to create the fatal outcome. One could say the AoA sensor failure was really the root cause - it kicked off the march to destruction after all. But component failure is a fact of life, and so you can then say MCAS was the root cause because it was activating in a hazardous and inadvertent manner. But Boeing considered this and said pilots would be the countermeasure/mitigation against that inadvertent MCAS activation, and so you could say the pilots were the root cause for not reacting according to Boeing's intentions. So it depends how you frame the question, and in reality everyone involved has homework to do now.

No. MCAS existed in its V1.0 form due to incompetent design, incompetent FHA and SSA justified by using incorrect use of unsupported 4 second response time and flawed quantitative analysis . You cannot then claim the pilots as cause because they failed to comply with Boeings incorrect and unsupported assumptions.

Ray
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 4:36 pm

planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:
smithbs wrote:

From the Indonesian report, we saw that:

* The Captain fought MCAS for some time and appeared to more-or-less succeed. His style was to add opposing trim in longer amounts, and so the net effect between pilot vs MCAS was roughly even. However, the Captain on that flight did not recognize he was in a pitch trim battle against the machine. Don't know why - maybe because he was sick and distracted. But he appeared to never verbalize this phenomenon, and so never addressed it directly. However, it appeared that he was preoccupied enough to not really track a course nor altitude.

* The FO fought MCAS and quickly lost. His style was to use the column more and trim less. MCAS overcomes that style pretty quickly. I think I read in the report that MCAS would need just two applications against this kind of pilot before column force was ineffective. To the FO's defense, the Captain didn't tell him about needing so much pitch trim when he handed over control, and the FO seemed to quickly realize the airplane was flying differently but used column force to try to fly it.

The Boeing analysis hinged on the pilot recognizing an apparent runaway stab, which this crew didn't demonstrate. And these pilots were more-or-less 5000 hour pilots. And so the accident report encouraged Boeing to re-assess pilot capabilities in the face of confusing phenomenon in their FHAs.


And much more to the defence of the FO. The AoA disagree warning available in the NG was not functional in the MAX, the override of stick movement backwards over any automatic nose down trim movement in the NG was no longer functional in the MAX with MCAS active, they did not even know MCAS existed,

One has to understand that every crash offers different findings. Just because the pilot showed deficiencies in skill and CRM, does not mean they are to blame for the crash. I think the report is crystal clear in MCAS being the root cause. But for safety it would be a huge mistake to only look at the MCAS fault, with the huge number of frames on order at Boeing and Airbus, training crews will become an even bigger challenge. The market in Asia is already empty and you have pilots flying, which should not be flying. (see the TransAsia ATR crash)


The fact that pulling back on the column did not stop the nose down trim was more reason that they should have determined that they were dealing with some kind of runway stabilizer. Since they didn't know about MCAS, they assumed that pulling back on the control column would stop any nose down trim movement like on an NG. If doing so on an NG failed to stop the trim from trimming nose down by itself shouldn't they have thought of a runaway stabilizer being a strong possibility?

Also, my comment that started this latest discussion was meant only to respond to the FACT that they COULD HAVE won the battle with MCAS. I'm not saying that they should have but that it was possible based on what the captain was achieving before handing off to the FO.


There is no failure condition in the NG, where the override of the stick would fail and electric manual trim would work.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 4:58 pm

planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:
smithbs wrote:

From the Indonesian report, we saw that:

* The Captain fought MCAS for some time and appeared to more-or-less succeed. His style was to add opposing trim in longer amounts, and so the net effect between pilot vs MCAS was roughly even. However, the Captain on that flight did not recognize he was in a pitch trim battle against the machine. Don't know why - maybe because he was sick and distracted. But he appeared to never verbalize this phenomenon, and so never addressed it directly. However, it appeared that he was preoccupied enough to not really track a course nor altitude.

* The FO fought MCAS and quickly lost. His style was to use the column more and trim less. MCAS overcomes that style pretty quickly. I think I read in the report that MCAS would need just two applications against this kind of pilot before column force was ineffective. To the FO's defense, the Captain didn't tell him about needing so much pitch trim when he handed over control, and the FO seemed to quickly realize the airplane was flying differently but used column force to try to fly it.

The Boeing analysis hinged on the pilot recognizing an apparent runaway stab, which this crew didn't demonstrate. And these pilots were more-or-less 5000 hour pilots. And so the accident report encouraged Boeing to re-assess pilot capabilities in the face of confusing phenomenon in their FHAs.


And much more to the defence of the FO. The AoA disagree warning available in the NG was not functional in the MAX, the override of stick movement backwards over any automatic nose down trim movement in the NG was no longer functional in the MAX with MCAS active, they did not even know MCAS existed,

One has to understand that every crash offers different findings. Just because the pilot showed deficiencies in skill and CRM, does not mean they are to blame for the crash. I think the report is crystal clear in MCAS being the root cause. But for safety it would be a huge mistake to only look at the MCAS fault, with the huge number of frames on order at Boeing and Airbus, training crews will become an even bigger challenge. The market in Asia is already empty and you have pilots flying, which should not be flying. (see the TransAsia ATR crash)


The fact that pulling back on the column did not stop the nose down trim was more reason that they should have determined that they were dealing with some kind of runway stabilizer. Since they didn't know about MCAS, they assumed that pulling back on the control column would stop any nose down trim movement like on an NG. If doing so on an NG failed to stop the trim from trimming nose down by itself shouldn't they have thought of a runaway stabilizer being a strong possibility?

Also, my comment that started this latest discussion was meant only to respond to the FACT that they COULD HAVE won the battle with MCAS. I'm not saying that they should have but that it was possible based on what the captain was achieving before handing off to the FO.


The point is that the MCAS action did stop. And what other reason has Boeing for disconnecting the column cutout, but to make it difficult to stop MCAS.
 
AABusDrvr
Posts: 158
Joined: Sat Dec 03, 2016 6:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 4:58 pm

PW100 wrote:
AirBoat wrote:
For the Lion air case: the question is why did they stop trimming nose up?
there are 2 possibilities:
1. they did not know how.
2. the electric trim drive motor failed. There are signs of intermittent trim action just before the final moments.
This could open up another can of worms. What was the duty cycle of the trim motor. If is was designed for 100% duty continuously then there is no problem.
And by the way, both pilots were pulling with all their strength on the yoke at the end, the pilot 100lbs and co-pilot 40lbs.


3. Crews were learned not to put in looong trims at high speed, but rather short blips.
4. Crews were learned that auto trim would stop when pulling/pushing the control column beyond a certain point, by means of control column cut-out switches
5. Crews were never told this functionality of item 4 was silently removed from the Max.
6. Item 4 would obviously no apply to real trim runaway (like stuck relay, stuck thump switch, electrical short in motor). But as trim was reacting normal to thump trim switch, 4) obviously was not the case.
7. Trimming is usually done later in the game once when you have re-established control over the airplane by means of elevator/control column. You first fly the control column, then trim the thing out.
8. Trimming wasn't initially seen as the highest priority, with stall warnings, stick shaker, unreliable airspeed, anti-ice warning all going off at the same time. By the time it became clear it was already too late.
9. The Boeing assumed reaction time of identifying and correcting trim runaway was not realistic. As demonstrated by this crew. As identified by ET crew. As identified by the JATR report. As identified by other industry specialists. The easy blame game is putting that on the crew, but that is closing the eyes for the real problem). Really, that is a bit like sticking your head in the sand thinking someone else will not be able to see you (as you can't see them).
10. Did the airplane experience blow back on the control surfaces, and if so at what point
11. Mechanical/electrical reasons in trim motor and its controlller logic (though this seems to be rather unlikely, as that should have been covered by the JT Report).
12. Other factors I have missed.

Having said that, I agree you did ask the correct question. I wish the JT report would dig deeper into human factors, and crew performance with respect to the (lack of) trimming by the FO. It would have been even better if they did a comprehensive study how pilots worldwide use trimming in general. Although I expect that will be a fall out of the JATR report, and certification standards in this respect will certainly be reviewed by the likes of FAA, EASA, TCCA etc.



3. No one I know has ever been trained like that. All the controls are more effective at higher speeds, so you learn to have a lighter touch when you are flying at higher speeds, however as I stated before, you use as much trim as is required by the situation. Even at Vmo/Mmo, if you need full trim travel all in one input to control the airplane, you use it.

4-6. At least in all my training the NG, we were made aware of the column cutout switches, but were never trained to use them to stop a runaway stabilizer trim.

7. Although trim is normally used to receive control column forces, any competent pilot, if faced with control column forces beyond what they could overcome with brute force, would use the trim, as necessary to try and control the airplane. This often happens in unusual attitude recoveries in the simulator, but you have to be careful with it. That airmanship stuff again.

8. Flying the airplane is always the first priority, no matter what else is going on. the stick shaker becomes simply an annoyance, after you determine it's a false warning. The master caution, and anti-ice would simply be noted and ignored, until you had the airplane under control. Prioritization of tasks is a big deal when flying, aircraft control must always be #1. In certain unreliable airspeed scenarios, you will have the stick shaker, and overspeed clacker going on at the same time, the airplane however is still perfectly flyable.

9. I'm sure there will be changes to accepted past practice here. The trimmable horizontal stabilizer on big airplanes is a very powerful control surface, and it would appear that some changes in how pilots are trained about it are probably in order.
 
djm18
Posts: 104
Joined: Mon Feb 24, 2014 6:19 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 6:13 pm

dtw2hyd wrote:

FO used ANU trim six times.

23:30:48 - Captain asked FO to take control (Pitch Trim 4.8)
23:30:49 - FO ANU trim for 3 seconds
23:30:52 - FO - I have control
23:31:00 - Automatic trim for 8 seconds (Pitch Trim from 5.4 to 3.4)
23:31:08 - FO - ANU trim for 1 second (Pitch 3.5)
23:31:15 - MCAS for 3 seconds
23:31:17 - FO - ANU trim for 1 second (Pitch 2.9, back pressure 65 lbs)
23:31:19 - FO - ANU trim for 4 seconds (Pitch 3.4)
23:31:27 - MCAS for 8 seconds (Pitch 1.8, back pressure 82 lbs)
23:31:37 - FO - ANU trim for 2 seconds (Pitch 1.3)
23:31:43 - MCAS for 4 seconds (Pitch 0.3, back pressure 93 lbs)
23:31:46 - FO - ANU trim for 2 seconds (Captain PFD 3200ft, FO PFD 3600ft, rate of descent 10,000 ft/sec)
23:31:51 - TERRAIN and SINK RATE warnings
23:31:53 - MCAS activated until recording stopped. This must be a proud moment for the software team.


I want to again ask a question from the above data. It is strange to me that the pitch went from 1.8 to 1.3 after the FO ANU trim input of 2 seconds at 23:31:37. This seems to the opposite of what he achieved in his prior inputs where the pitch increased. Could it be that he grew increasingly frustrated with the increasing pressure and since he did not know about MCAS thought that perhaps he would try trimming in the opposite direction? In essence, I am saying that perhaps he second guessed himself given that he must have been under incredible stress and was not achieving a desired result. I realize this may sound silly to an experienced pilot but I an trying to make sense of this data point.

Thanks in advance.
 
planecane
Posts: 1585
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 6:22 pm

seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:

And much more to the defence of the FO. The AoA disagree warning available in the NG was not functional in the MAX, the override of stick movement backwards over any automatic nose down trim movement in the NG was no longer functional in the MAX with MCAS active, they did not even know MCAS existed,

One has to understand that every crash offers different findings. Just because the pilot showed deficiencies in skill and CRM, does not mean they are to blame for the crash. I think the report is crystal clear in MCAS being the root cause. But for safety it would be a huge mistake to only look at the MCAS fault, with the huge number of frames on order at Boeing and Airbus, training crews will become an even bigger challenge. The market in Asia is already empty and you have pilots flying, which should not be flying. (see the TransAsia ATR crash)


The fact that pulling back on the column did not stop the nose down trim was more reason that they should have determined that they were dealing with some kind of runway stabilizer. Since they didn't know about MCAS, they assumed that pulling back on the control column would stop any nose down trim movement like on an NG. If doing so on an NG failed to stop the trim from trimming nose down by itself shouldn't they have thought of a runaway stabilizer being a strong possibility?

Also, my comment that started this latest discussion was meant only to respond to the FACT that they COULD HAVE won the battle with MCAS. I'm not saying that they should have but that it was possible based on what the captain was achieving before handing off to the FO.


There is no failure condition in the NG, where the override of the stick would fail and electric manual trim would work.


Then why does the runaway stabilizer NNC exist on the NG and have one of the early steps be to to use manual electric trim?
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 870
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 6:55 pm

djm18 wrote:
dtw2hyd wrote:

FO used ANU trim six times.

23:30:48 - Captain asked FO to take control (Pitch Trim 4.8)
23:30:49 - FO ANU trim for 3 seconds
23:30:52 - FO - I have control
23:31:00 - Automatic trim for 8 seconds (Pitch Trim from 5.4 to 3.4)
23:31:08 - FO - ANU trim for 1 second (Pitch 3.5)
23:31:15 - MCAS for 3 seconds
23:31:17 - FO - ANU trim for 1 second (Pitch 2.9, back pressure 65 lbs)
23:31:19 - FO - ANU trim for 4 seconds (Pitch 3.4)
23:31:27 - MCAS for 8 seconds (Pitch 1.8, back pressure 82 lbs)
23:31:37 - FO - ANU trim for 2 seconds (Pitch 1.3)
23:31:43 - MCAS for 4 seconds (Pitch 0.3, back pressure 93 lbs)
23:31:46 - FO - ANU trim for 2 seconds (Captain PFD 3200ft, FO PFD 3600ft, rate of descent 10,000 ft/sec)
23:31:51 - TERRAIN and SINK RATE warnings
23:31:53 - MCAS activated until recording stopped. This must be a proud moment for the software team.


I want to again ask a question from the above data. It is strange to me that the pitch went from 1.8 to 1.3 after the FO ANU trim input of 2 seconds at 23:31:37. This seems to the opposite of what he achieved in his prior inputs where the pitch increased. Could it be that he grew increasingly frustrated with the increasing pressure and since he did not know about MCAS thought that perhaps he would try trimming in the opposite direction? In essence, I am saying that perhaps he second guessed himself given that he must have been under incredible stress and was not achieving a desired result. I realize this may sound silly to an experienced pilot but I an trying to make sense of this data point.

Thanks in advance.

Not an opposite trim. There would be a Manual AND trace and there is not (the investigators would have been immensely interested as well). Looks like pilot just took relief and eased off on the yoke from a peak approaching 100lbs would be my best attempt.

Ray
 
rheinwaldner
Posts: 1865
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 7:24 pm

morrisond wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
seahawk wrote:
And if you have to trim up 22 times, one can expect a reasonably skilled crew to come up with the runaway trim checklist and disable the system. The crews showed unacceptable bad crew resource management and lacked basic flying skills, which must be seen as the final factors for the crash.

Trimming happens as you steer your car. You are not really aware of the corrections and dont notice the directions and dont count the inputs. And as small stick forces were continuously canceled out, the corrections were small and it felt naturally. There was no clue from the system, that the small mistrims that occured 26 times were coming froming a hidden trim system itself. And the frequent small corrections masked the brutally long cycle, MCAS would have ran otherwise.

Please also consider, that the accident report does not nearly put weight on the crew errors that you do. In other words, you are making stuff up.


Are you a pilot? Have you ever flown a plane?

I completed half of a Swiss Sphair training. So the answers are no and yes. I therefore have hands on experience on the things I wrote. I even bought a force feedback joystick later on for no other reason, than to get the best possible feeling of trimming away control forces even in the flight simulator.

morrisond wrote:
Then you would realize how ridiculous the above statement is as it is entirely wrong. The FO noticed that the controls were getting heavier and remarked on it. You can see it below in another quote where you attacked me. He just didn't understand that he had to trim longer ANU to offset the forces. He must not have noticed the trim wheel spinning away.

Why ridiculous? Seahawk talked about the trim inputs of the captain, my reply was also about the captain and you talk about the FO. Did you not notice that Seahwak and I did not talk about the FO?

Seahawk said, that trimming 22 times up (as the captain did) should lead to the runaway trim checklist. I explained why the repetitive nature of the inputs was not easy to notice by the PIC. I stand by that statement. Because of these reasons:
- As I tried to explain, canceling out control forces typically is done with little to no conscious effort.
- Secondly did the Captain apply the countering trim inputs always quickly after an MCAS cycle has started, thus stopping MCAS. Therefore the corrections by the captain were small too.
- So about 4 times per minute the captain had to quickly provide a small nose up input. The problem is, that doing only 4 trim inputs per minutes makes it hard to conciously realize the iterative characteristic of the correction.
- Also that the required correction was always in the same direction was not easy detect. Assume you drive on a straight road. After 1km I would ask you unexpectedly a) how frequent you had to make corrections with the steering wheel and b) how often in which direction. You would not be able to answer either question.

Therefore when Seahawk says, "When handing over control the pilot failed to inform the FO of the constant need to counter a trim movement manually. That is bad crew management." I just said, that this is not fair, because the captain (under the intense pressure to cognitvely work through the numerous wrong fault indications) very likely could not have consciously told "how" he was applying the trim inputs in the past few minutes. Recognizing and guessing the unknown pattern in these inputs was very hard.

Try to pass the concentration test in this video to understand, what could have happened:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGQmdoK_ZfY

morrisond wrote:
Even after the JT final report has been released showing multiple significant factors to the crashes and it pointed out things that have to change (Maintenance, training) - you are still trying to Pin the accident 100% on Boeing and ignoring everything else.

I never said 100%. Out of 98 findings in the report 7 mention crew errors. On the other hand I count 42 findings that blame Boeing or the FAA. From that alone we see that findings targeting Boeing/FAA outweight crew error findings with a ratio of 6:1. If you then consider, that that there are 25 findings, which explicitely take away blame from the crew (in other words, weaken the case to blame the pilots by explaining the fault provoking nature of the incident), you get an overall picture, in which crew errors account for a really small portion of the overall blame. And that Boeing indeed deserves the largest majority of it. Not 100%, but enough to understand, that pilot actions are a minor side show in the whole tragedy.

Have a look at this:
Image

It is a noble goal to lower the curve even more at the right end. But it is not related to the MAX grounding. Erasing design flaws of aircraft by mandating more training is putting the cart before the horse. It will not work.

Aircraft designs need to be as failure proof as demonstrated by all other aircraft except the MAX. Then even bad pilots won't make dents into the curve above.


morrisond wrote:
Isn't about time that the Boeing is evil crowd (and BTW I do believe what happened inside Boeing was beyond bad) and nothing else matters need to put some sort of disclaimer on there statements as well? "Granted there were serious mistakes that were made in Maintenance and Training that need to be fixed" or something like that before ranting on?

It is not about the disclaimer. Look at the grounding threads. You and others are so obsessed to focus on a small minority of findings from the accident report, that the discussed topics are totally out of balance. The crew fault topic is pushed so dominatly in these threads, that you can really not complain that anybody is putting too much focus on Boeings failures. I encourage you just to go through any of these pages and count how many posts belong to "which camp" to see whether Boeing is thrown under the bus unfairly.

Have just a look at the post from glideslope (last post previous page). How is that balanced? It clearly does not just miss the "Boeing-did-it" disclaimer.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
User avatar
AirlineCritic
Posts: 1771
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 7:39 pm

morrisond wrote:
Any pilot who successfully completes the first few hours of basic training should be able to do that


Again, you've cherrypicked a particular question, completely ignoring context. I think a Lemme quote is appropriate here:

The new risks were "written off" by clever analysis that

* failed to properly account for expected pilot action
* ignored workload increase from simultaneous failures in multiple systems
* gave short-shrift to repetitive malfunction without workload increase
* discounted an obvious mandate for fail-safe design
* did not reveal the hazards from excessive mistrim
* without any basis, assumed pilot would use manual electric trim as quickly as before when pilots were only expected to pull on the column in response to runaway


Shall we talk about the decline of global aviation design engineer standards? That is the real problem.

Also, I'm sorry but if there's a undetected runaway, it is in this thread. For every correct input, it trims the the blame trim towards the dead pilots five times.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2858
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 8:08 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
Aircraft designs need to be as failure proof as demonstrated by all other aircraft except the MAX. Then even bad pilots won't make dents into the curve above.



We finally agree - designs need to be as safe as possible - and finally you admit that the Pilots were bad. Hallelujah!

The Passengers on the planes needn't have died if Boeing and the FAA had done there Jobs and/or if the Pilots had the skills they are required to have as the basis for their licensing.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 1026
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 8:09 pm

AirlineCritic wrote:
Shall we talk about the decline of global aviation design engineer standards? That is the real problem.
:?:
What indication show that this problem is not limited to the Boeing 737-8/9 MAX project ?
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 870
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 8:36 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:

Trimming happens as you steer your car. You are not really aware of the corrections and dont notice the directions and dont count the inputs. And as small stick forces were continuously canceled out, the corrections were small and it felt naturally. There was no clue from the system, that the small mistrims that occured 26 times were coming froming a hidden trim system itself. And the frequent small corrections masked the brutally long cycle, MCAS would have ran otherwise.

Please also consider, that the accident report does not nearly put weight on the crew errors that you do. In other words, you are making stuff up.


Are you a pilot? Have you ever flown a plane?

I completed half of a Swiss Sphair training. So the answers are no and yes. I therefore have hands on experience on the things I wrote. I even bought a force feedback joystick later on for no other reason, than to get the best possible feeling of trimming away control forces even in the flight simulator.

morrisond wrote:
Then you would realize how ridiculous the above statement is as it is entirely wrong. The FO noticed that the controls were getting heavier and remarked on it. You can see it below in another quote where you attacked me. He just didn't understand that he had to trim longer ANU to offset the forces. He must not have noticed the trim wheel spinning away.

Why ridiculous? Seahawk talked about the trim inputs of the captain, my reply was also about the captain and you talk about the FO. Did you not notice that Seahwak and I did not talk about the FO?

Seahawk said, that trimming 22 times up (as the captain did) should lead to the runaway trim checklist. I explained why the repetitive nature of the inputs was not easy to notice by the PIC. I stand by that statement. Because of these reasons:
- As I tried to explain, canceling out control forces typically is done with little to no conscious effort.
- Secondly did the Captain apply the countering trim inputs always quickly after an MCAS cycle has started, thus stopping MCAS. Therefore the corrections by the captain were small too.
- So about 4 times per minute the captain had to quickly provide a small nose up input. The problem is, that doing only 4 trim inputs per minutes makes it hard to conciously realize the iterative characteristic of the correction.
- Also that the required correction was always in the same direction was not easy detect. Assume you drive on a straight road. After 1km I would ask you unexpectedly a) how frequent you had to make corrections with the steering wheel and b) how often in which direction. You would not be able to answer either question.

Therefore when Seahawk says, "When handing over control the pilot failed to inform the FO of the constant need to counter a trim movement manually. That is bad crew management." I just said, that this is not fair, because the captain (under the intense pressure to cognitvely work through the numerous wrong fault indications) very likely could not have consciously told "how" he was applying the trim inputs in the past few minutes. Recognizing and guessing the unknown pattern in these inputs was very hard.

Try to pass the concentration test in this video to understand, what could have happened:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGQmdoK_ZfY

morrisond wrote:
Even after the JT final report has been released showing multiple significant factors to the crashes and it pointed out things that have to change (Maintenance, training) - you are still trying to Pin the accident 100% on Boeing and ignoring everything else.

I never said 100%. Out of 98 findings in the report 7 mention crew errors. On the other hand I count 42 findings that blame Boeing or the FAA. From that alone we see that findings targeting Boeing/FAA outweight crew error findings with a ratio of 6:1. If you then consider, that that there are 25 findings, which explicitely take away blame from the crew (in other words, weaken the case to blame the pilots by explaining the fault provoking nature of the incident), you get an overall picture, in which crew errors account for a really small portion of the overall blame. And that Boeing indeed deserves the largest majority of it. Not 100%, but enough to understand, that pilot actions are a minor side show in the whole tragedy.

Have a look at this:
Image

It is a noble goal to lower the curve even more at the right end. But it is not related to the MAX grounding. Erasing design flaws of aircraft by mandating more training is putting the cart before the horse. It will not work.

Aircraft designs need to be as failure proof as demonstrated by all other aircraft except the MAX. Then even bad pilots won't make dents into the curve above.


morrisond wrote:
Isn't about time that the Boeing is evil crowd (and BTW I do believe what happened inside Boeing was beyond bad) and nothing else matters need to put some sort of disclaimer on there statements as well? "Granted there were serious mistakes that were made in Maintenance and Training that need to be fixed" or something like that before ranting on?

It is not about the disclaimer. Look at the grounding threads. You and others are so obsessed to focus on a small minority of findings from the accident report, that the discussed topics are totally out of balance. The crew fault topic is pushed so dominatly in these threads, that you can really not complain that anybody is putting too much focus on Boeings failures. I encourage you just to go through any of these pages and count how many posts belong to "which camp" to see whether Boeing is thrown under the bus unfairly.

Have just a look at the post from glideslope (last post previous page). How is that balanced? It clearly does not just miss the "Boeing-did-it" disclaimer.

Bravo

Ray
 
MSPNWA
Posts: 3698
Joined: Thu Apr 23, 2009 2:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 8:36 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
It is a noble goal to lower the curve even more at the right end. But it is not related to the MAX grounding. Erasing design flaws of aircraft by mandating more training is putting the cart before the horse. It will not work.

Aircraft designs need to be as failure proof as demonstrated by all other aircraft except the MAX. Then even bad pilots won't make dents into the curve above.


Then why even have pilots?

Your logic is backwards. Look at your graph. Why is that line dropping? Largely technology, design, maintenance, and less-risky operational improvements over the decades. Aircraft designs ARE becoming "future proof", allowing for degradation in other safety-critical areas (putting your horse before the cart). Bad pilots aren't making noticeable dents in that curve. You know it wasn't long ago in these threads that the talk was we shouldn't rely on pilots to compensate for design issues. I totally agree. We also shouldn't rely on design improvements to compensate for maintenance lapses, unqualified/unskilled pilots, and overall lax safety cultures. The majority of this thread is about Boeing's link in the chain because hundreds died. But if we truly care about hundreds dying (safety), we wouldn't focus on only one link, nor attempt to shutdown talk about other links. If one does, they only care about who is to blame, snubbing their nose at the human toll as they pretend to care.

The bottom line is this. Designers are human. They WILL make more mistakes. Expecting perfection is simply illogical. What is your backup for when design fails? Hope? Nothing?
 
kalvado
Posts: 2931
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 8:38 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
AirlineCritic wrote:
Shall we talk about the decline of global aviation design engineer standards? That is the real problem.
:?:
What indication show that this problem is not limited to the Boeing 737-8/9 MAX project ?

Story of 787 launch...
 
dtw2hyd
Posts: 8452
Joined: Wed Jan 09, 2013 12:11 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 8:56 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
AirlineCritic wrote:
Shall we talk about the decline of global aviation design engineer standards? That is the real problem.
:?:
What indication show that this problem is not limited to the Boeing 737-8/9 MAX project ?


I think it became more prevalent with the 787 program, had great success in blaming airlines for their maintenance practices for brand new component failures and even software issues.

That is the reason it is very difficult now to comprehend why people are not accepting when the majority of the blame is appropriated to airline maintenance and/or crew. The company strategy hasn't changed, the world has changed, unfair I guess.
All posts are just opinions.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 8:57 pm

kalvado wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
AirlineCritic wrote:
Shall we talk about the decline of global aviation design engineer standards? That is the real problem.
:?:
What indication show that this problem is not limited to the Boeing 737-8/9 MAX project ?

Story of 787 launch...

OK, but still far from a "global aviation design engineer".
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
kalvado
Posts: 2931
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 9:04 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
kalvado wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
:?:
What indication show that this problem is not limited to the Boeing 737-8/9 MAX project ?

Story of 787 launch...

OK, but still far from a "global aviation design engineer".

I would argue that Boeing didn't have a fully successful project in more than a decade, since 773ER and its derivatives.
So, out of latest Boeing projects:
787 - lemon.
748 - who cares
737 MAX - lemon
777X - TBD.
Pretty grim picture, heh.

Other flops: Airbus did funny with 380, Bomabdier struggled with C-series to total exhaustion. Embraer sails relatively smooth...
 
airnorth
Posts: 462
Joined: Thu Jun 09, 2011 7:30 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 9:13 pm

kalvado wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Story of 787 launch...

OK, but still far from a "global aviation design engineer".

I would argue that Boeing didn't have a fully successful project in more than a decade, since 773ER and its derivatives.
So, out of latest Boeing projects:
787 - lemon.
748 - who cares
737 MAX - lemon
777X - TBD.
Pretty grim picture, heh.

Other flops: Airbus did funny with 380, Bomabdier struggled with C-series to total exhaustion. Embraer sails relatively smooth...


Just curious what your definition of a lemon is?
 
kalvado
Posts: 2931
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 9:20 pm

airnorth wrote:
kalvado wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
OK, but still far from a "global aviation design engineer".

I would argue that Boeing didn't have a fully successful project in more than a decade, since 773ER and its derivatives.
So, out of latest Boeing projects:
787 - lemon.
748 - who cares
737 MAX - lemon
777X - TBD.
Pretty grim picture, heh.

Other flops: Airbus did funny with 380, Bomabdier struggled with C-series to total exhaustion. Embraer sails relatively smooth...


Just curious what your definition of a lemon is?

Classic definition - a lemon is a car that is found to be defective only after it has been bought.
Here we can talk about a product that was found to be a problem after it was designed and made.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 9411
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 9:34 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
It is a noble goal to lower the curve even more at the right end. But it is not related to the MAX grounding. Erasing design flaws of aircraft by mandating more training is putting the cart before the horse. It will not work.

Aircraft designs need to be as failure proof as demonstrated by all other aircraft except the MAX. Then even bad pilots won't make dents into the curve above.


Then why even have pilots?

Your logic is backwards. Look at your graph. Why is that line dropping? Largely technology, design, maintenance, and less-risky operational improvements over the decades. Aircraft designs ARE becoming "future proof", allowing for degradation in other safety-critical areas (putting your horse before the cart). Bad pilots aren't making noticeable dents in that curve. You know it wasn't long ago in these threads that the talk was we shouldn't rely on pilots to compensate for design issues. I totally agree. We also shouldn't rely on design improvements to compensate for maintenance lapses, unqualified/unskilled pilots, and overall lax safety cultures. The majority of this thread is about Boeing's link in the chain because hundreds died. But if we truly care about hundreds dying (safety), we wouldn't focus on only one link, nor attempt to shutdown talk about other links. If one does, they only care about who is to blame, snubbing their nose at the human toll as they pretend to care.

The bottom line is this. Designers are human. They WILL make more mistakes. Expecting perfection is simply illogical. What is your backup for when design fails? Hope? Nothing?


Aircraft design are getting future prove, a strange sentence. I would say aircraft design lead to safer aircraft. But when a company like Boeing looks past 60 years of advance in aircraft design and tries to safe a botched design change of an aged aircraft, with a botched add on automation, than we get a deathtrap like the 737MAX.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 9:39 pm

airnorth wrote:
kalvado wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
OK, but still far from a "global aviation design engineer".

I would argue that Boeing didn't have a fully successful project in more than a decade, since 773ER and its derivatives.
So, out of latest Boeing projects:
787 - lemon.
748 - who cares
737 MAX - lemon
777X - TBD.
Pretty grim picture, heh.

Other flops: Airbus did funny with 380, Bomabdier struggled with C-series to total exhaustion. Embraer sails relatively smooth...


Just curious what your definition of a lemon is?

The lemon tree is very pretty and its flowers are so sweet, but the fruit of the poor lemon is impossible to eat.

Ray
 
pasen
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 10:04 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
The bottom line is this. Designers are human. They WILL make more mistakes. Expecting perfection is simply illogical. What is your backup for when design fails? Hope? Nothing?


This is ridiculous. Yes, humans will make mistakes - that includes pilots, designers, engineers, and everybody else. That's why the whole system must be fault tolerant enough so that one mistake cannot cause a disaster.

However, MCAS 1.0 was not a “design mistake”. It was inexcusable negligence and a violation of the most basic engineering principles like Fail-Fast and Fail-Safe. I regularly give software security and quality training to software engineers and these principles are literally one of the first things I teach - and I’m not even working in a safety sensitive industry.

The damage caused by MCAS 1.0 should be considered negligent homicide and the people involved in this should all be in jail by now. Calling such negligence a “design mistake” is an absurd trivialization.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Fri Nov 01, 2019 10:39 pm

kalvado wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Story of 787 launch...

OK, but still far from a "global aviation design engineer".

I would argue that Boeing didn't have a fully successful project in more than a decade, since 773ER and its derivatives.
So, out of latest Boeing projects:
787 - lemon.
748 - who cares
737 MAX - lemon
777X - TBD.
Pretty grim picture, heh.

Other flops: Airbus did funny with 380, Bomabdier struggled with C-series to total exhaustion. Embraer sails relatively smooth...

The A320neo family and the A350 family seem to be successful engineering from the actual records.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
Chemist
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:47 am

rheinwaldner wrote:
....You and others are so obsessed to focus on a small minority of findings from the accident report, that the discussed topics are totally out of balance.


The way I see it is different. I've seen almost everybody without exception say that Boeing bears almost all of the blame for the crashes. But morrison and others have been saying "You can't stop there, what about the contributing factors of the crew, the poor responses - let's try and address those things, too". But that got all sorts of pushback and of course people are going to continue to argue both ways. That's what is creating the "topics totally out of balance".

I think we're mostly violently agreeing.

If everybody could just say:

"Boeing screwed up. It's the vast majority Boeing's fault. The MAX was fatally flawed. There are big problems in Boeing and FAA that need to be addressed. And the crew responded poorly and we should improve crew training where basic airmanship seems to be poor, as that's important, too"

then we would not have the "totally out of balance" thread volume. Would YOU agree with the above statement? Would morrison? Would other posters?
What would be YOUR statement about Boeing AND crew training? Is crew training unimportant? Is this not an issue? Or do you actually agree and just want so see more negative Boeing volume? Because I suspect deep inside, we mostly all see the entire situation and would agree more than not.

As a regular private pilot, I'm astonished that a 200 hr FO could not have memorized important checklists or know how to react to strong yoke pressures, as those are things I knew before I soloed. That's why I've posted what I have. It doesn't exonerate Boeing at all.
 
art
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Joined: Tue Feb 08, 2005 11:46 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:00 am

So how is RTS looking at this point? As a light hearted gesture and as a betting man, my odds on RTS are as follows:

Never 1000/1
2020 Mar 10/1
2020 Feb 5/1
2020 Jan 3/1
2019 Dec 5/1
2019 Nov 20/1

I wonder if anyone is running a book on MAX RTS. I fancy a flutter.

Amyone out there think I've got the odds badly wrong?
 
morrisond
Posts: 2858
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:20 am

Chemist wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
....You and others are so obsessed to focus on a small minority of findings from the accident report, that the discussed topics are totally out of balance.


The way I see it is different. I've seen almost everybody without exception say that Boeing bears almost all of the blame for the crashes. But morrison and others have been saying "You can't stop there, what about the contributing factors of the crew, the poor responses - let's try and address those things, too". But that got all sorts of pushback and of course people are going to continue to argue both ways. That's what is creating the "topics totally out of balance".

I think we're mostly violently agreeing.

If everybody could just say:

"Boeing screwed up. It's the vast majority Boeing's fault. The MAX was fatally flawed. There are big problems in Boeing and FAA that need to be addressed. And the crew responded poorly and we should improve crew training where basic airmanship seems to be poor, as that's important, too"

then we would not have the "totally out of balance" thread volume. Would YOU agree with the above statement? Would morrison? Would other posters?
What would be YOUR statement about Boeing AND crew training? Is crew training unimportant? Is this not an issue? Or do you actually agree and just want so see more negative Boeing volume? Because I suspect deep inside, we mostly all see the entire situation and would agree more than not.

As a regular private pilot, I'm astonished that a 200 hr FO could not have memorized important checklists or know how to react to strong yoke pressures, as those are things I knew before I soloed. That's why I've posted what I have. It doesn't exonerate Boeing at all.


Good statement. I basically agree with it. I would just remove "it's the vast majority Boeings fault" - its 100% their and the FAA's fault the issue was created
In the first place but at this point I would be hard pressed to go much beyond 50% of the fault for the deaths on JT given what we have learned about the maintenance practises and poor quality of the pilots. Especially after reading about AirAsia 8501 today. It seems like those people died in vain as Indonesia did nothing to improve their system.

Just like we may unfortunately be sitting here in the future and saying why didn't we change the training system after the MAX crashes.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2858
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:29 am

art wrote:
So how is RTS looking at this point? As a light hearted gesture and as a betting man, my odds on RTS are as follows:

Never 1000/1
2020 Mar 10/1
2020 Feb 5/1
2020 Jan 3/1
2019 Dec 5/1
2019 Nov 20/1

I wonder if anyone is running a book on MAX RTS. I fancy a flutter.

Amyone out there think I've got the odds badly wrong?


Those are great odds - you almost can't lose. Put $1 down on each of Dec-Mar and worst case you lose 33% , MAX return (Ha-Ha) 250%

The odds of November are almost 0.

Even I would put $50 on never - why not at 1000-1
 
MSPNWA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 4:18 am

pasen wrote:
This is ridiculous. Yes, humans will make mistakes - that includes pilots, designers, engineers, and everybody else. That's why the whole system must be fault tolerant enough so that one mistake cannot cause a disaster.


Great start. I agree wholeheartedly. You must agree that we're falling well short in the pilot and maintenance departments at certain airlines.

pasen wrote:
However, MCAS 1.0 was not a “design mistake”. It was inexcusable negligence and a violation of the most basic engineering principles like Fail-Fast and Fail-Safe. I regularly give software security and quality training to software engineers and these principles are literally one of the first things I teach - and I’m not even working in a safety sensitive industry.


And now you go off the rails. What you're describing is still a mistake. You contradict yourself, and I'm speculating it's because you must make the evidence fit your pre-conceived conclusion instead of letting the evidence create your conclusion.

pasen wrote:
The damage caused by MCAS 1.0 should be considered negligent homicide and the people involved in this should all be in jail by now. Calling such negligence a “design mistake” is an absurd trivialization.


You're entitled to your opinion. The authorities currently don't agree with you, but we shall see if they do in the end.

We still have a mistake, and I will stick to that description. You can't change what the dictionary tells me.
 
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767333ER
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 4:58 am

morrisond wrote:
767333ER wrote:
morrisond wrote:

No that is not what I said - I said I expected they would have crashed an NG that had a control issue (anything out of the ordinary) that day as well. I would extend that to any aircraft that they flew with a control issue.

Stop misrepresenting what I said.

People still can't get the basic concept that the crash rate is going down because planes are getting more reliable - not because Pilot's are getting any better.

If Pilot's actually had the abilities they were supposed to have It's possible we might not have seen any fatal crashes for quite some time.

You say you expect which is fair, but I do not expect such because a control failure on a 737NG for example will not involve a system that has no information published about it in the manual or malfunctions in a way that was not understood at the time. We cannot prove much by saying what if we changed the crew or what if the crew was on a different type of control failure. What we can prove is that if the MAX is taken out in the context of is accident and replaced by a 737NG for example an accident of this nature most certainly would not have happened. It would just follow the same level of rust any Lion Air flight goes by and that would most likely have not resulted in an accident.

Crash rates are going down because aircraft are getting designed with less allowance for risk, not necessarily because they are more reliable because that points more towards maintenance or issues that don’t cause accidents. Right now the A220 is unreliable due to engine issues, yet it it’s statistically safer than the 737 MAX.

I am reaffirming your statement that pilots are not getting better, although in some ways they are. You are mostly right which furthers my point that the chiefly relevant topic here is the 737 MAX design and not the crew because the MAX is the variable that has changed from the past.


You can say if you take a particular plane out of the Equation on almost any accident the result would have been different.

I highly doubt that on that day that crew could have handled a normal runaway elevator possibly brought upon by a mechanical failure on an NG. At the end of the flight - how did it not present as Runaway Elevator to the co-pilot? The elevator was all the way down, the controls were incredibly heavy - why was he not trimming more? Do you really think that after 22 times that the possibility it was something about the elevator not doing what it should do and turning it off is not a reasonable expectation? Or should the design have fault tolerant enough to get to 23?

OK - designed with less allowance for risk instead of more reliable - I'm fine with that wording.

But think, does a 737NG have MCAS? No, It most certainly does not. So if this flight is operated by a 737NG it does not have the MCAS trim nose down; therefore, the flight does not crash due to this failure as a result. Put any other mainstream aircraft in that place and have an AOA vane fail (the initiating event of the whole chain) either the redundancy kicks in, or in the case of a less sophisticated plane the AOA disagrees and at worst the autopilot disconnects. None of these other planes would start trimming the nose into the ground. Does that mean it guaranteed wouldn’t have crashed if it was not operated by a MAX, no, but it does mean that the odds of it happening were the same as any other 737NG flight that day, none of which did crash. That is relatively close to a guarantee. Besides, how many flight hours pass between every time a 737NG has a runaway trim event... Conversely, put a North American crew on there for example, can we prove that the odds of the plane not crashing would’ve been much better; I’d argue not necessarily because unsafe practices happen here too very often. Just look at some of the recent North American accidents (or near misses) due to pilot error which were generally due to some massive breakdown in training. It happens here too.

You can hypothesize that this crew would not have handled a traditional runaway trim and there is a good chance this could’ve been true, but again that’s dealing with people is far more complicated than computers. We have argued and it has become accepted that Boeing was wrong to assume that failed MCAS would be easily recognized as runaway trim by the crew as evident by both crashes. So if we draw this conclusion from both crashes, why do you then say that they wouldn’t recognize real runaway trim either? That logic doesn’t follow. Runaway trim either would’ve crashed them sooner or been dealt with and over sooner because I don’t imagine the trim switches would be of much use so they wouldn’t be constantly be fighting it with success for some while. They would likely come to the conclusion rather quickly to shut the trim off, whether or not too late is where your position could be right.
Been on: 732 733 734 73G 738 752 763 A319 A320 A321 CRJ CR7 CRA/CR9 E145 E175 E190 F28 MD-82 MD-83 C172R C172S P2006T PA-28-180

2 ears for spatial hearing, 2 eyes for depth perception, 2 ears for balance... How did Boeing think 1 sensor was good enough?!
 
benbeny
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:00 am

PixelFlight wrote:
AirlineCritic wrote:
Shall we talk about the decline of global aviation design engineer standards? That is the real problem.
:?:
What indication show that this problem is not limited to the Boeing 737-8/9 MAX project ?


How about delays and cost runaways?
 
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767333ER
Posts: 1171
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:25 am

MSPNWA wrote:
pasen wrote:
This is ridiculous. Yes, humans will make mistakes - that includes pilots, designers, engineers, and everybody else. That's why the whole system must be fault tolerant enough so that one mistake cannot cause a disaster.


Great start. I agree wholeheartedly. You must agree that we're falling well short in the pilot and maintenance departments at certain airlines.

pasen wrote:
However, MCAS 1.0 was not a “design mistake”. It was inexcusable negligence and a violation of the most basic engineering principles like Fail-Fast and Fail-Safe. I regularly give software security and quality training to software engineers and these principles are literally one of the first things I teach - and I’m not even working in a safety sensitive industry.


And now you go off the rails. What you're describing is still a mistake. You contradict yourself, and I'm speculating it's because you must make the evidence fit your pre-conceived conclusion instead of letting the evidence create your conclusion.

pasen wrote:
The damage caused by MCAS 1.0 should be considered negligent homicide and the people involved in this should all be in jail by now. Calling such negligence a “design mistake” is an absurd trivialization.


You're entitled to your opinion. The authorities currently don't agree with you, but we shall see if they do in the end.

We still have a mistake, and I will stick to that description. You can't change what the dictionary tells me.

Well the problem is the ambiguity of mistake. A mistake and be inadvertent or deliberate, both mistakes but both very different. Why are they different? Well they are because in the case it is inadvertent the action itself is a mistake as it happens without intent. In the case it is deliberate the mistake is the choice that precedes the action, the action itself is not a mistake. The difference as well is one is sinister and one is not. MCAS not being redundantly fed and not being included in the proper manuals was not by accident and as such are not a mistake but were deliberate choices based on a decision from before that was a mistake. It isn’t as if they designed thing this way because they forgot what manuals are or what proper redundancy is. I think in this case it was mostly deliberate in that they didn’t want to waste time and money doing a better job. The only thing close inadvertence was their assumption that it would be handled as runaway trim.

I believe there should be some prison sentences handed out; after all, criminal negligence is a real thing, but this is more than criminal negligence. I do believe everyone will get off Scott free due to either American nationalism or just the justice system yet again bowing down to corporations too big to fail.
Been on: 732 733 734 73G 738 752 763 A319 A320 A321 CRJ CR7 CRA/CR9 E145 E175 E190 F28 MD-82 MD-83 C172R C172S P2006T PA-28-180

2 ears for spatial hearing, 2 eyes for depth perception, 2 ears for balance... How did Boeing think 1 sensor was good enough?!
 
sgrow787
Posts: 450
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:43 am

smithbs wrote:
Root cause can vary depending on viewpoint, especially in an accident like this where so many factors had to line up just so to create the fatal outcome. One could say the AoA sensor failure was really the root cause - it kicked off the march to destruction after all. But component failure is a fact of life, and so you can then say MCAS was the root cause because it was activating in a hazardous and inadvertent manner. But Boeing considered this and said pilots would be the countermeasure/mitigation against that inadvertent MCAS activation, and so you could say the pilots were the root cause for not reacting according to Boeing's intentions. So it depends how you frame the question, and in reality everyone involved has homework to do now.


But if one of the holes in the Swiss cheese is in the design itself, it becomes the root cause, because the regulations for safety require designs that are to an extent fool proof. It's no longer "sh** happens".

And I wouldn't put any faith into what Boeing said they assumed about pilot performance. Not when they resorted to concealing design changes from regulators. Not when the truth indicated they needed dual AOA sensor design, which would push out their certification date another year.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
sgrow787
Posts: 450
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 6:16 am

767333ER wrote:
I believe there should be some prison sentences handed out; after all, criminal negligence is a real thing, but this is more than criminal negligence. I do believe everyone will get off Scott free due to either American nationalism or just the justice system yet again bowing down to corporations too big to fail.


:checkmark: :checkmark: :checkmark:
But the Boeing CEO told congress this week that they "made mistakes", that they're "learning", and that they've made the necessary design changes. Shouldn't we give them another chance? It's only 346 lives over a potential millions of flight hours.

If RTS is by the end of the year, then the cost to Boeing for the crashes is about $10B. With 5000 orders at $120M per plane, that's a $600B in revenue. If their profit is just 20% of cost, that's $120B, still outweighing the cost of two crashes, including litigation.

If they're too big to fail, then maybe jail time is the only solution to deter future transgression.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
Scotron12
Posts: 496
Joined: Fri Mar 01, 2019 2:13 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 6:47 am

They should include money as a root cause too in the cause of the two crashes.

$1Million per frame payable to Southwest if any simulator training required!!
 
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seahawk
Posts: 9744
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 7:39 am

planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:

The fact that pulling back on the column did not stop the nose down trim was more reason that they should have determined that they were dealing with some kind of runway stabilizer. Since they didn't know about MCAS, they assumed that pulling back on the control column would stop any nose down trim movement like on an NG. If doing so on an NG failed to stop the trim from trimming nose down by itself shouldn't they have thought of a runaway stabilizer being a strong possibility?

Also, my comment that started this latest discussion was meant only to respond to the FACT that they COULD HAVE won the battle with MCAS. I'm not saying that they should have but that it was possible based on what the captain was achieving before handing off to the FO.


There is no failure condition in the NG, where the override of the stick would fail and electric manual trim would work.


Then why does the runaway stabilizer NNC exist on the NG and have one of the early steps be to to use manual electric trim?


Because then it was an Autopilot malfunction and the checklist ends before you hit the cut out switches.
 
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PixelFlight
Posts: 1026
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 9:25 am

benbeny wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
AirlineCritic wrote:
Shall we talk about the decline of global aviation design engineer standards? That is the real problem.
:?:
What indication show that this problem is not limited to the Boeing 737-8/9 MAX project ?


How about delays and cost runaways?

Depend if delay and cost define "global aviation design engineer standards". I admit that my view was only focused on the safety of the design.
The features, safety, delay and cost are always very challenging to all get as initially expected. Especially on big projects, this is usually the upper management that set the priorities.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
kalvado
Posts: 2931
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 10:03 am

PixelFlight wrote:
benbeny wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
:?:
What indication show that this problem is not limited to the Boeing 737-8/9 MAX project ?


How about delays and cost runaways?

Depend if delay and cost define "global aviation design engineer standards". I admit that my view was only focused on the safety of the design.
The features, safety, delay and cost are always very challenging to all get as initially expected. Especially on big projects, this is usually the upper management that set the priorities.

787 had massive problems with safety. Battery fires are one thing, probably least at-fault. Then (actually before) there were overstressed structure in wing root of first batch which was correctly simulated during design, but was not noticed. Massive manual rework partially helped - at a cost. Then (again before) assembly with improper hardware just to save the face with rollout date at a cost of scrapping LN1.
If you think about it in terms of engineering culture, MAX situation just continue the trend, and there are no signs of trend reversal.
Costs may be unrelated as things often gets more complicated than expected. Not dealing with problems is a different story
 
Planetalk
Posts: 470
Joined: Thu Aug 27, 2015 5:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 10:12 am

klm617 wrote:
I think it's very telling that the FAA wants the new system to be trained on by 'Average pilots" meaning to me that the lack of understanding and awareness in the cockpit was a very large contributing factors in the 2 MAX 8 crashes. I see this as similar to letting your 14 year old child drive your new Ferrari and some point you are just asking for trouble.


How is it telling? Do you understand what average means? And why a 14 year old driving a car is a completely irrelevant comparison? You seem to be suggesting there should be no such thing as an average pilot, in which case you have completely misunderstood how it relates to certifying aircraft.
 
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PixelFlight
Posts: 1026
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 10:26 am

Chemist wrote:
"Boeing screwed up. It's the vast majority Boeing's fault. The MAX was fatally flawed. There are big problems in Boeing and FAA that need to be addressed. And the crew responded poorly and we should improve crew training where basic airmanship seems to be poor, as that's important, too"

All the officials reports and reviews are mainly about why the design is not safe enough, and how the crew situation was not addressed correctly in the design, not documented, and not trained. In that specific context of this exact design error, I found inappropriate to evaluate the "crew training" and "basic airmanship" on how "crew responded" to an erratic design not documented and not trained. My disagreement is on term like "the crew responded poorly" supporting the view that the crew was expected to respond better to Boeing erratic design. I can't support that view because according to the officials reports and reviews, the Boeing expectations/assumptions on the crew response are identified as the fundamental error that flawed the safety analysis and allowed the erratic design to exists. The crew response to Boeing errors was a consequence of the Boeing errors on the crew response.

Unrelated to the Boeing design error on the 737-8/9 MAX that need to be fixed before returning to service, the official report did identify crews training issues that need to be addressed.
Last edited by PixelFlight on Sat Nov 02, 2019 10:47 am, edited 3 times in total.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:

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