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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 10:39 am

kalvado wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
benbeny wrote:

How about delays and cost runaways?

Depend if delay and cost define "global aviation design engineer standards". I admit that my view was only focused on the safety of the design.
The features, safety, delay and cost are always very challenging to all get as initially expected. Especially on big projects, this is usually the upper management that set the priorities.

787 had massive problems with safety. Battery fires are one thing, probably least at-fault. Then (actually before) there were overstressed structure in wing root of first batch which was correctly simulated during design, but was not noticed. Massive manual rework partially helped - at a cost. Then (again before) assembly with improper hardware just to save the face with rollout date at a cost of scrapping LN1.
If you think about it in terms of engineering culture, MAX situation just continue the trend, and there are no signs of trend reversal.
Costs may be unrelated as things often gets more complicated than expected. Not dealing with problems is a different story

Agree, the 787 did have engineering issue. I understand that Boeing is in trouble and that some Airbus projects was debatable on cost and delay, but I disagree that this is enough to define a "global aviation design engineer standards", especially since management is far from unrelated. There are examples of projects going well and I hope that this will more the case in the future, but for sure this require a good culture too.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 11:05 am

767333ER wrote:
morrisond wrote:
767333ER wrote:
You say you expect which is fair, but I do not expect such because a control failure on a 737NG for example will not involve a system that has no information published about it in the manual or malfunctions in a way that was not understood at the time. We cannot prove much by saying what if we changed the crew or what if the crew was on a different type of control failure. What we can prove is that if the MAX is taken out in the context of is accident and replaced by a 737NG for example an accident of this nature most certainly would not have happened. It would just follow the same level of rust any Lion Air flight goes by and that would most likely have not resulted in an accident.

Crash rates are going down because aircraft are getting designed with less allowance for risk, not necessarily because they are more reliable because that points more towards maintenance or issues that don’t cause accidents. Right now the A220 is unreliable due to engine issues, yet it it’s statistically safer than the 737 MAX.

I am reaffirming your statement that pilots are not getting better, although in some ways they are. You are mostly right which furthers my point that the chiefly relevant topic here is the 737 MAX design and not the crew because the MAX is the variable that has changed from the past.


You can say if you take a particular plane out of the Equation on almost any accident the result would have been different.

I highly doubt that on that day that crew could have handled a normal runaway elevator possibly brought upon by a mechanical failure on an NG. At the end of the flight - how did it not present as Runaway Elevator to the co-pilot? The elevator was all the way down, the controls were incredibly heavy - why was he not trimming more? Do you really think that after 22 times that the possibility it was something about the elevator not doing what it should do and turning it off is not a reasonable expectation? Or should the design have fault tolerant enough to get to 23?

OK - designed with less allowance for risk instead of more reliable - I'm fine with that wording.

But think, does a 737NG have MCAS? No, It most certainly does not. So if this flight is operated by a 737NG it does not have the MCAS trim nose down; therefore, the flight does not crash due to this failure as a result. Put any other mainstream aircraft in that place and have an AOA vane fail (the initiating event of the whole chain) either the redundancy kicks in, or in the case of a less sophisticated plane the AOA disagrees and at worst the autopilot disconnects. None of these other planes would start trimming the nose into the ground. Does that mean it guaranteed wouldn’t have crashed if it was not operated by a MAX, no, but it does mean that the odds of it happening were the same as any other 737NG flight that day, none of which did crash. That is relatively close to a guarantee. Besides, how many flight hours pass between every time a 737NG has a runaway trim event... Conversely, put a North American crew on there for example, can we prove that the odds of the plane not crashing would’ve been much better; I’d argue not necessarily because unsafe practices happen here too very often. Just look at some of the recent North American accidents (or near misses) due to pilot error which were generally due to some massive breakdown in training. It happens here too.

You can hypothesize that this crew would not have handled a traditional runaway trim and there is a good chance this could’ve been true, but again that’s dealing with people is far more complicated than computers. We have argued and it has become accepted that Boeing was wrong to assume that failed MCAS would be easily recognized as runaway trim by the crew as evident by both crashes. So if we draw this conclusion from both crashes, why do you then say that they wouldn’t recognize real runaway trim either? That logic doesn’t follow. Runaway trim either would’ve crashed them sooner or been dealt with and over sooner because I don’t imagine the trim switches would be of much use so they wouldn’t be constantly be fighting it with success for some while. They would likely come to the conclusion rather quickly to shut the trim off, whether or not too late is where your position could be right.


Explain ET302 then - they were in the same position as they would have been in an NG if they were dealing with real runaway trim - No electric trim and they weren't able to save it. They didn't have the knowledge to control it without electric trim. Pulling the thrust out of TOGA and reducing speed would have been the first thing to do in both cases.

Maintaining speed within normal ranges should not have to be put in a Procedure and it is common knowledge that controls become ineffective at high speed.
 
Planetalk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 11:35 am

This thread has really gotten out of control now...I've vigorously defended the pilots throughout, but it really doesn't help advance aviation safety when people say things like it's 'irrelevant' what Lionair maintenance did, or what pilot standards are etc. Of course it's relevant, each is a link in a chain and if any one factor hadn't been present, the crash wouldn't have happened.

Yes the basic flaw in MCAS is in my opinion likely criminal, yes Boeing have blood on their hands, yes I personally despise the leadership and corporate culture of the company as it stands. But, there may also be other incidents in the future, could be a 737, could be an A321, could be a A220, when pilot training makes a difference. And anyone who says now 'that's irrelevant' because they want to indict only Boeing, is doing aviation generally a disservice.

All my previous replies in this thread have been defending the pilots, from one poster in particular, but I'm equally alarmed by people saying identified factors in an accident are 'irrelevant'. They are not irrelevant to people in Indonesia who have to fly on a plane of any type and could do with lessons being learned. There are lessons from these accidents that apply broadly to aviation, as there always are.

I didn't think it was especially controversial that we would all like pilot training globally to be improved. That is something we should always be pushing for. Of course I say that in the knowledge it was Boeing who deliberately denied the pilots training this time. Hey, you can be angry at Lionair and don't worry, no'one will think you are absolving Boeing.
 
StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 11:40 am

No crash results in a single recommendation and rarely will ever identify a single cause.

This one is no different.

This thread however is about the grounding.

I find it hard to understand why anyone is not supportive of the grounding considering what we know about MCAS 1.0

Blaming the deceased pilots for the grounding is just plain wrong and certainly shouldn't be on this thread.
 
Planetalk
Posts: 470
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 11:44 am

morrisond wrote:
767333ER wrote:
morrisond wrote:

You can say if you take a particular plane out of the Equation on almost any accident the result would have been different.

I highly doubt that on that day that crew could have handled a normal runaway elevator possibly brought upon by a mechanical failure on an NG. At the end of the flight - how did it not present as Runaway Elevator to the co-pilot? The elevator was all the way down, the controls were incredibly heavy - why was he not trimming more? Do you really think that after 22 times that the possibility it was something about the elevator not doing what it should do and turning it off is not a reasonable expectation? Or should the design have fault tolerant enough to get to 23?

OK - designed with less allowance for risk instead of more reliable - I'm fine with that wording.

But think, does a 737NG have MCAS? No, It most certainly does not. So if this flight is operated by a 737NG it does not have the MCAS trim nose down; therefore, the flight does not crash due to this failure as a result. Put any other mainstream aircraft in that place and have an AOA vane fail (the initiating event of the whole chain) either the redundancy kicks in, or in the case of a less sophisticated plane the AOA disagrees and at worst the autopilot disconnects. None of these other planes would start trimming the nose into the ground. Does that mean it guaranteed wouldn’t have crashed if it was not operated by a MAX, no, but it does mean that the odds of it happening were the same as any other 737NG flight that day, none of which did crash. That is relatively close to a guarantee. Besides, how many flight hours pass between every time a 737NG has a runaway trim event... Conversely, put a North American crew on there for example, can we prove that the odds of the plane not crashing would’ve been much better; I’d argue not necessarily because unsafe practices happen here too very often. Just look at some of the recent North American accidents (or near misses) due to pilot error which were generally due to some massive breakdown in training. It happens here too.

You can hypothesize that this crew would not have handled a traditional runaway trim and there is a good chance this could’ve been true, but again that’s dealing with people is far more complicated than computers. We have argued and it has become accepted that Boeing was wrong to assume that failed MCAS would be easily recognized as runaway trim by the crew as evident by both crashes. So if we draw this conclusion from both crashes, why do you then say that they wouldn’t recognize real runaway trim either? That logic doesn’t follow. Runaway trim either would’ve crashed them sooner or been dealt with and over sooner because I don’t imagine the trim switches would be of much use so they wouldn’t be constantly be fighting it with success for some while. They would likely come to the conclusion rather quickly to shut the trim off, whether or not too late is where your position could be right.


Explain ET302 then - they were in the same position as they would have been in an NG if they were dealing with real runaway trim - No electric trim and they weren't able to save it. They didn't have the knowledge to control it without electric trim. Pulling the thrust out of TOGA and reducing speed would have been the first thing to do in both cases.

Maintaining speed within normal ranges should not have to be put in a Procedure and it is common knowledge that controls become ineffective at high speed.


When you write posts like this, perhaps you could acknowledge that you are not writing on any factual basis. Until the accident report is released, literally nothing in your post is supported by fact, so please stop repeatedly presenting it as so. As for your point about it being 'common knowledge that controls become ineffective at high speed' you may have damned yourself and Boeing with your own words.

Also have a think about where you said 'Maintaining speed within normal ranges should not have to be put in a Procedure' . You could equally say 'maintaining altitude within normal ranges should not have to be put in a procedure' . In which case you're saying no plane ever should be outside 'normal' speed and altitude, whatever the circumstances. Which is clearly absurd.
 
uta999
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 11:50 am

I too have defended the dead pilots in the past on here. None of us were there on those two aircraft, having to deal with something very unusual, confusing, alarming, frightening and ultimately deadly. They probably knew quite early on that their actions would not save them.

The problem now is to not muddy the water so much, that Boeing get off so lightly, only partly to blame, the pilots bought it on themselves, they were useless etc etc. Boeing is completely to blame here. No other aircraft type would have done what the MAX did to them. That is all Boeing, not the pilots. If you apportion blame elsewhere, future safety will suffer.
Your computer just got better
 
benbeny
Posts: 240
Joined: Thu Nov 03, 2016 1:44 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 12:16 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
kalvado wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Depend if delay and cost define "global aviation design engineer standards". I admit that my view was only focused on the safety of the design.
The features, safety, delay and cost are always very challenging to all get as initially expected. Especially on big projects, this is usually the upper management that set the priorities.

787 had massive problems with safety. Battery fires are one thing, probably least at-fault. Then (actually before) there were overstressed structure in wing root of first batch which was correctly simulated during design, but was not noticed. Massive manual rework partially helped - at a cost. Then (again before) assembly with improper hardware just to save the face with rollout date at a cost of scrapping LN1.
If you think about it in terms of engineering culture, MAX situation just continue the trend, and there are no signs of trend reversal.
Costs may be unrelated as things often gets more complicated than expected. Not dealing with problems is a different story

Agree, the 787 did have engineering issue. I understand that Boeing is in trouble and that some Airbus projects was debatable on cost and delay, but I disagree that this is enough to define a "global aviation design engineer standards", especially since management is far from unrelated. There are examples of projects going well and I hope that this will more the case in the future, but for sure this require a good culture too.

Agree. We need more changes on corporate and management culture than on engineering. Considering that laws of Newtonian physics isn't changing that much for past hundred years, I can't see the inherent issue in engineering. I actually think that this is more of management than engineering.
 
itchief
Posts: 247
Joined: Sun Dec 06, 2015 10:15 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 12:39 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Chemist wrote:
"Boeing screwed up. It's the vast majority Boeing's fault. The MAX was fatally flawed. There are big problems in Boeing and FAA that need to be addressed. And the crew responded poorly and we should improve crew training where basic airmanship seems to be poor, as that's important, too"

All the officials reports and reviews are mainly about why the design is not safe enough, and how the crew situation was not addressed correctly in the design, not documented, and not trained. In that specific context of this exact design error, I found inappropriate to evaluate the "crew training" and "basic airmanship" on how "crew responded" to an erratic design not documented and not trained. My disagreement is on term like "the crew responded poorly" supporting the view that the crew was expected to respond better to Boeing erratic design. I can't support that view because according to the officials reports and reviews, the Boeing expectations/assumptions on the crew response are identified as the fundamental error that flawed the safety analysis and allowed the erratic design to exists. The crew response to Boeing errors was a consequence of the Boeing errors on the crew response.

Unrelated to the Boeing design error on the 737-8/9 MAX that need to be fixed before returning to service, the official report did identify crews training issues that need to be addressed.


I sure hope that the crew's that fly the aircraft that I am on are not just doing the minimum when it comes to training and learning the aircraft they fly. These crews do this for their job and they are responsible for many lives. I would hope that they have a passion for the job and that they put that passion into it and do not just get by on basic airmanship. I am making this comment on the fact that I have more than a few friends that fly for Delta, United, American, Southwest, Fedex and UPS. I know my friends and how they approach their jobs, none of them are the kind of men and women that just try to get by with basic airmanship. Yes, Boeing screwed up, but good airmanship would have saved these aircraft.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 12:51 pm

itchief wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Chemist wrote:
"Boeing screwed up. It's the vast majority Boeing's fault. The MAX was fatally flawed. There are big problems in Boeing and FAA that need to be addressed. And the crew responded poorly and we should improve crew training where basic airmanship seems to be poor, as that's important, too"

All the officials reports and reviews are mainly about why the design is not safe enough, and how the crew situation was not addressed correctly in the design, not documented, and not trained. In that specific context of this exact design error, I found inappropriate to evaluate the "crew training" and "basic airmanship" on how "crew responded" to an erratic design not documented and not trained. My disagreement is on term like "the crew responded poorly" supporting the view that the crew was expected to respond better to Boeing erratic design. I can't support that view because according to the officials reports and reviews, the Boeing expectations/assumptions on the crew response are identified as the fundamental error that flawed the safety analysis and allowed the erratic design to exists. The crew response to Boeing errors was a consequence of the Boeing errors on the crew response.

Unrelated to the Boeing design error on the 737-8/9 MAX that need to be fixed before returning to service, the official report did identify crews training issues that need to be addressed.


I sure hope that the crew's that fly the aircraft that I am on are not just doing the minimum when it comes to training and learning the aircraft they fly. These crews do this for their job and they are responsible for many lives. I would hope that they have a passion for the job and that they put that passion into it and do not just get by on basic airmanship. I am making this comment on the fact that I have more than a few friends that fly for Delta, United, American, Southwest, Fedex and UPS. I know my friends and how they approach their jobs, none of them are the kind of men and women that just try to get by with basic airmanship. Yes, Boeing screwed up, but good airmanship would have saved these aircraft.


Have you asked your many pilot friends, that I assume are all in the western superior pilot classification, how they do train for a frame, where the producer of said frame, tries to minimize the possibility of training for it, going so far as hiding information about it by keeping it out of the manuals and even fix simulators, so they do not show certain actions and failure modes regarding said frame?
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 12:52 pm

seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:

There is no failure condition in the NG, where the override of the stick would fail and electric manual trim would work.


Then why does the runaway stabilizer NNC exist on the NG and have one of the early steps be to to use manual electric trim?


Because then it was an Autopilot malfunction and the checklist ends before you hit the cut out switches.

I'm glad to have one of the engineers that worked on the 737 trim system on this board.

Not that it is very likely but if both thumb switches on one yoke broke and commanded a nose down trim in the neutral position but still made proper contact for nose up trim you could have a runaway with electric trim working for nose up. That's just one possible scenario that refutes your claim even though it would be extremely unlikely to ever happen.

I'm sure there are other possibilities.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 12:55 pm

benbeny wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
kalvado wrote:
787 had massive problems with safety. Battery fires are one thing, probably least at-fault. Then (actually before) there were overstressed structure in wing root of first batch which was correctly simulated during design, but was not noticed. Massive manual rework partially helped - at a cost. Then (again before) assembly with improper hardware just to save the face with rollout date at a cost of scrapping LN1.
If you think about it in terms of engineering culture, MAX situation just continue the trend, and there are no signs of trend reversal.
Costs may be unrelated as things often gets more complicated than expected. Not dealing with problems is a different story

Agree, the 787 did have engineering issue. I understand that Boeing is in trouble and that some Airbus projects was debatable on cost and delay, but I disagree that this is enough to define a "global aviation design engineer standards", especially since management is far from unrelated. There are examples of projects going well and I hope that this will more the case in the future, but for sure this require a good culture too.

Agree. We need more changes on corporate and management culture than on engineering. Considering that laws of Newtonian physics isn't changing that much for past hundred years, I can't see the inherent issue in engineering. I actually think that this is more of management than engineering.


The inherent issue in engineering in the case of the 737MAX is, that the responsible engineers did do this negligent design. If management forced those engineers to cut corners, they should have refused.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 1:03 pm

uta999 wrote:
I too have defended the dead pilots in the past on here. None of us were there on those two aircraft, having to deal with something very unusual, confusing, alarming, frightening and ultimately deadly. They probably knew quite early on that their actions would not save them.

The problem now is to not muddy the water so much, that Boeing get off so lightly, only partly to blame, the pilots bought it on themselves, they were useless etc etc. Boeing is completely to blame here. No other aircraft type would have done what the MAX did to them. That is all Boeing, not the pilots. If you apportion blame elsewhere, future safety will suffer.

If you don't apportion blame elsewhere safety will suffer. It's only a matter of time before shoddy maintenance at Lion Air does something that causes another crash where the design was fine. It's only a matter of time before a Lion Air pilot who fails simulator checks constantly and shouldn't be in a cockpit fails to perform a procedure properly that has been trained for and crashes a plane.

Yes, Boeing's design and decisions are what created the conditions for these two crashes. However, for sure in the Lion Air case, if a runaway stabilizer had been caused on an NG by shoddy maintenance, that crew on that day still would have crashed.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 1:07 pm

planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:

Then why does the runaway stabilizer NNC exist on the NG and have one of the early steps be to to use manual electric trim?


Because then it was an Autopilot malfunction and the checklist ends before you hit the cut out switches.

I'm glad to have one of the engineers that worked on the 737 trim system on this board.

Not that it is very likely but if both thumb switches on one yoke broke and commanded a nose down trim in the neutral position but still made proper contact for nose up trim you could have a runaway with electric trim working for nose up. That's just one possible scenario that refutes your claim even though it would be extremely unlikely to ever happen.

I'm sure there are other possibilities.


Could we get your judgement of the likelihood of that happening? Both switches would than need to fail closed at exactly the same time, with I assume the pilot not pressing them at that time? And how would you imagine trim for nose up than still working with constant signal to the trim motor to trim in the other direction?

We would also need to assume a rather bad design for those switches to be able to burn closed.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 1:07 pm

planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:

Then why does the runaway stabilizer NNC exist on the NG and have one of the early steps be to to use manual electric trim?


Because then it was an Autopilot malfunction and the checklist ends before you hit the cut out switches.

I'm glad to have one of the engineers that worked on the 737 trim system on this board.

Not that it is very likely but if both thumb switches on one yoke broke and commanded a nose down trim in the neutral position but still made proper contact for nose up trim you could have a runaway with electric trim working for nose up. That's just one possible scenario that refutes your claim even though it would be extremely unlikely to ever happen.

I'm sure there are other possibilities.


You see, this is about statistics. How probable is the failure scenario you described? Switch broken in a pretty specific manner? 1e-5, maybe, if not 1e-6? - and two of them at the same time? square that. Without first failed being noted?
It can very well be in the probability range where the crash is an unfortunate, but an acceptable outcome. You cannot really consider every possible scenario - that is why planes crash.
It seems that there is no general understanding of double and triple failures as a concept, those are not dealt with "and I can come up with such scenario!". Of course, there will be a lot of messy scenarios... 7 bullets of checklist can take care of only that many situations.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 1:24 pm

planecane wrote:
uta999 wrote:
I too have defended the dead pilots in the past on here. None of us were there on those two aircraft, having to deal with something very unusual, confusing, alarming, frightening and ultimately deadly. They probably knew quite early on that their actions would not save them.

The problem now is to not muddy the water so much, that Boeing get off so lightly, only partly to blame, the pilots bought it on themselves, they were useless etc etc. Boeing is completely to blame here. No other aircraft type would have done what the MAX did to them. That is all Boeing, not the pilots. If you apportion blame elsewhere, future safety will suffer.

If you don't apportion blame elsewhere safety will suffer. It's only a matter of time before shoddy maintenance at Lion Air does something that causes another crash where the design was fine. It's only a matter of time before a Lion Air pilot who fails simulator checks constantly and shouldn't be in a cockpit fails to perform a procedure properly that has been trained for and crashes a plane.

Yes, Boeing's design and decisions are what created the conditions for these two crashes. However, for sure in the Lion Air case, if a runaway stabilizer had been caused on an NG by shoddy maintenance, that crew on that day still would have crashed.


No safety will mainly suffer by diverting attention from the terrible Boeing design and terrible Boeing actions.

Boeing designed the MCAS with complete disregard for standard practices regarding safe design for safety critical applications.

Boeing actions:
- Boeing did hide MCAS so no pilot could train for it or know about it.
- After the Lion Air crash, Boeing tried to divert attention (as you try to do now) away from the MAX, pointing to pilots and maintenance, while knowing that their design was responsible. The right action would have been to ask the FAA to ground the MAX
- Second crash, rinse and repeat. Even trying to appeal to the president of the USA to influence the FAA to not ground.

No, through this catastrophic events, the tendency to divert from the real problem, the negligent deadly design of the 737MAX, has slowed the necessary actions and is responsible for the second crash.

There is no basis for your claim, that a 737NG would have crashed that day.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 1:37 pm

itchief wrote:
Yes, Boeing screwed up, but good airmanship would have saved these aircraft.

Then define was is "good". Fact is that the current global airmainship actually provides the historically safest records. Look like it's "good" enough, except on the 737-8/9 MAX that all agree have a safety design error.

Contrary to your friends point of view, the official view of the safety agencies it quite different:
KNKT: "recommends that Boeing include a larger tolerance in the design is required to allow operability by a larger population of flight-rated pilots."
EASA: "Pilot training requirements are not meant to compensate for non-acceptable design on the compliance and safety standpoint."
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
Saintor
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:02 pm

StTim wrote:

I find it hard to understand why anyone is not supportive of the grounding considering what we know about MCAS 1.0

Blaming the deceased pilots for the grounding is just plain wrong .


These grounding should have not been so long, if any. As soon there was a validated method how to handle this situation correctly, there should have been a publication and those birds should be flying with possible updates coming. All the simulations who took the proper course of actions were successful. It is not as if it was only pitfall that can send the pilots & passenger to their death, there are zillions of them.

Including the Boeing 737 rudder issues with 2 full crashes and many close-calls.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues

As a result of the NTSB's findings, the Federal Aviation Administration ordered that the servo valves be replaced on all 737s by November 12, 2002.[8] The FAA also ordered new training protocols for pilots to handle in an unexpected movement of flight controls.


A real solution to handle the risk. No socio-drama and groundings. ** That was the right course of actions. **

Awareness, knowledge and competence is why we have pilots. Yes, in this 737 MAX case, there is serious ground to blame the human factor and that sealed the deal. We must assume they know the basics. Trying to manually trim at full trust and high speed is ... :banghead:
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:12 pm

Planetalk wrote:
This thread has really gotten out of control now...I've vigorously defended the pilots throughout, but it really doesn't help advance aviation safety when people say things like it's 'irrelevant' what Lionair maintenance did, or what pilot standards are etc. Of course it's relevant, each is a link in a chain and if any one factor hadn't been present, the crash wouldn't have happened.

Yes the basic flaw in MCAS is in my opinion likely criminal, yes Boeing have blood on their hands, yes I personally despise the leadership and corporate culture of the company as it stands. But, there may also be other incidents in the future, could be a 737, could be an A321, could be a A220, when pilot training makes a difference. And anyone who says now 'that's irrelevant' because they want to indict only Boeing, is doing aviation generally a disservice.

All my previous replies in this thread have been defending the pilots, from one poster in particular, but I'm equally alarmed by people saying identified factors in an accident are 'irrelevant'. They are not irrelevant to people in Indonesia who have to fly on a plane of any type and could do with lessons being learned. There are lessons from these accidents that apply broadly to aviation, as there always are.

I didn't think it was especially controversial that we would all like pilot training globally to be improved. That is something we should always be pushing for. Of course I say that in the knowledge it was Boeing who deliberately denied the pilots training this time. Hey, you can be angry at Lionair and don't worry, no'one will think you are absolving Boeing.

It's interesting how some posters here used ugly terms like racist when people had questions about how the pilots responded to the conditions they were presented with, but those same people now are showing very little concern about the fact that disadvantaged people are still being flown around by an airline whose training and maintenance shortcomings have been so vividly displayed.

uta999 wrote:
I too have defended the dead pilots in the past on here. None of us were there on those two aircraft, having to deal with something very unusual, confusing, alarming, frightening and ultimately deadly. They probably knew quite early on that their actions would not save them.

The problem now is to not muddy the water so much, that Boeing get off so lightly, only partly to blame, the pilots bought it on themselves, they were useless etc etc. Boeing is completely to blame here. No other aircraft type would have done what the MAX did to them. That is all Boeing, not the pilots. If you apportion blame elsewhere, future safety will suffer.

That's a great illustration of the problem: any questioning is interpreted as statements such as "the pilots bought it on themselves, they were useless etc etc.".

I believe we're capable of more refined and rational thought processes than this, but it seems some can only hold a small number of simple binary thoughts in their heads, or just choose to over simplify to try to conform to a predetermined narrative.

mjoelnir wrote:
benbeny wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
Agree, the 787 did have engineering issue. I understand that Boeing is in trouble and that some Airbus projects was debatable on cost and delay, but I disagree that this is enough to define a "global aviation design engineer standards", especially since management is far from unrelated. There are examples of projects going well and I hope that this will more the case in the future, but for sure this require a good culture too.

Agree. We need more changes on corporate and management culture than on engineering. Considering that laws of Newtonian physics isn't changing that much for past hundred years, I can't see the inherent issue in engineering. I actually think that this is more of management than engineering.

The inherent issue in engineering in the case of the 737MAX is, that the responsible engineers did do this negligent design. If management forced those engineers to cut corners, they should have refused.

I've personally seen a decline in engineering ethics during my three decades of work, largely created by managers creating unacceptably high levels of pressure and by engineers failing to stand their ground when it came to doing professional quality work when subject to such pressure.

As I wrote earlier, the fact that Boeing felt they needed to beef up their anonymous reporting system and have all safety engineers report to the Chief Engineer rather than product line managers is an admission that they haven't protected engineers from managers well enough in the past.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:24 pm

Saintor wrote:
Trying to manually trim at full trust and high speed is ... :banghead:

The horizontal stabilizer is a safety critical control surface. It must be designed to be controllable not only at full speed, but even at higher speed to take in account safety margin.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:25 pm

Saintor wrote:
StTim wrote:

I find it hard to understand why anyone is not supportive of the grounding considering what we know about MCAS 1.0

Blaming the deceased pilots for the grounding is just plain wrong .


These grounding should have not been so long, if any. As soon there was a validated method how to handle this situation correctly, there should have been a publication and those birds should be flying with possible updates coming. All the simulations who took the proper course of actions were successful. It is not as if it was only pitfall that can send the pilots & passenger to their death, there are zillions of them.

Including the Boeing 737 rudder issues with 2 full crashes and many close-calls.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues

As a result of the NTSB's findings, the Federal Aviation Administration ordered that the servo valves be replaced on all 737s by November 12, 2002.[8] The FAA also ordered new training protocols for pilots to handle in an unexpected movement of flight controls.


A real solution to handle the risk. No socio-drama and groundings. ** That was the right course of actions. **

Awareness, knowledge and competence is why we have pilots. Yes, in this 737 MAX case, there is serious ground to blame the human factor and that sealed the deal. We must assume they know the basics. Trying to manually trim at full trust and high speed is ... :banghead:


That all simulators flight simulating those two crashes and were pilots took the proper action, were successful, is simply a misinformation.
To blame the pilots in the 737MAX disasters is simply done to divert from the real problem.

The 737 rudder issue is simply showing that Boeing gets away with keeping an unsafe frame in the air.

The question is not, should the 737MAX be grounded, but rather, why the hell was the 737 with the rudder issue not grounded.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:30 pm

Revelation wrote:
[
I've personally seen a decline in engineering ethics during my three decades of work, largely created by managers creating unacceptably high levels of pressure and by engineers failing to stand their ground when it came to doing professional quality work when subject to such pressure.

As I wrote earlier, the fact that Boeing felt they needed to beef up their anonymous reporting system and have all safety engineers report to the Chief Engineer rather than product line managers is an admission that they haven't protected engineers from managers well enough in the past.

Thing is, engineering qualification is another weak link in MCAS situation.
You can blame a lot of things on management pressure - but two things in present situation that are very hard to justify by external influence: multiple actuations and no input sanitation. I am sort of OK even with idea that single sensor was a cost-conscious thing (a very slippery slope, actually). But multiple actuations are fair and square on underqualified engineering only.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:46 pm

Planetalk wrote:
morrisond wrote:
767333ER wrote:
But think, does a 737NG have MCAS? No, It most certainly does not. So if this flight is operated by a 737NG it does not have the MCAS trim nose down; therefore, the flight does not crash due to this failure as a result. Put any other mainstream aircraft in that place and have an AOA vane fail (the initiating event of the whole chain) either the redundancy kicks in, or in the case of a less sophisticated plane the AOA disagrees and at worst the autopilot disconnects. None of these other planes would start trimming the nose into the ground. Does that mean it guaranteed wouldn’t have crashed if it was not operated by a MAX, no, but it does mean that the odds of it happening were the same as any other 737NG flight that day, none of which did crash. That is relatively close to a guarantee. Besides, how many flight hours pass between every time a 737NG has a runaway trim event... Conversely, put a North American crew on there for example, can we prove that the odds of the plane not crashing would’ve been much better; I’d argue not necessarily because unsafe practices happen here too very often. Just look at some of the recent North American accidents (or near misses) due to pilot error which were generally due to some massive breakdown in training. It happens here too.

You can hypothesize that this crew would not have handled a traditional runaway trim and there is a good chance this could’ve been true, but again that’s dealing with people is far more complicated than computers. We have argued and it has become accepted that Boeing was wrong to assume that failed MCAS would be easily recognized as runaway trim by the crew as evident by both crashes. So if we draw this conclusion from both crashes, why do you then say that they wouldn’t recognize real runaway trim either? That logic doesn’t follow. Runaway trim either would’ve crashed them sooner or been dealt with and over sooner because I don’t imagine the trim switches would be of much use so they wouldn’t be constantly be fighting it with success for some while. They would likely come to the conclusion rather quickly to shut the trim off, whether or not too late is where your position could be right.


Explain ET302 then - they were in the same position as they would have been in an NG if they were dealing with real runaway trim - No electric trim and they weren't able to save it. They didn't have the knowledge to control it without electric trim. Pulling the thrust out of TOGA and reducing speed would have been the first thing to do in both cases.

Maintaining speed within normal ranges should not have to be put in a Procedure and it is common knowledge that controls become ineffective at high speed.


When you write posts like this, perhaps you could acknowledge that you are not writing on any factual basis. Until the accident report is released, literally nothing in your post is supported by fact, so please stop repeatedly presenting it as so. As for your point about it being 'common knowledge that controls become ineffective at high speed' you may have damned yourself and Boeing with your own words.

Also have a think about where you said 'Maintaining speed within normal ranges should not have to be put in a Procedure' . You could equally say 'maintaining altitude within normal ranges should not have to be put in a procedure' . In which case you're saying no plane ever should be outside 'normal' speed and altitude, whatever the circumstances. Which is clearly absurd.


+1 million
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:48 pm

planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:

Then why does the runaway stabilizer NNC exist on the NG and have one of the early steps be to to use manual electric trim?


Because then it was an Autopilot malfunction and the checklist ends before you hit the cut out switches.

I'm glad to have one of the engineers that worked on the 737 trim system on this board.

Not that it is very likely but if both thumb switches on one yoke broke and commanded a nose down trim in the neutral position but still made proper contact for nose up trim you could have a runaway with electric trim working for nose up. That's just one possible scenario that refutes your claim even though it would be extremely unlikely to ever happen.

I'm sure there are other possibilities.


And how is this gonna work? If the thumb switches in the control stick would break, they should break in neutral position, but even if they would break in an active position, the activation of the up trim would not override the down trim signal, so you still can not trim up, at best you could stop the down trim. (I would need to dive into the details of the control stick to see if that would happen or if the up trim signal would have no effect)
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:52 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
Saintor wrote:
StTim wrote:

I find it hard to understand why anyone is not supportive of the grounding considering what we know about MCAS 1.0

Blaming the deceased pilots for the grounding is just plain wrong .


These grounding should have not been so long, if any. As soon there was a validated method how to handle this situation correctly, there should have been a publication and those birds should be flying with possible updates coming. All the simulations who took the proper course of actions were successful. It is not as if it was only pitfall that can send the pilots & passenger to their death, there are zillions of them.

Including the Boeing 737 rudder issues with 2 full crashes and many close-calls.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues

As a result of the NTSB's findings, the Federal Aviation Administration ordered that the servo valves be replaced on all 737s by November 12, 2002.[8] The FAA also ordered new training protocols for pilots to handle in an unexpected movement of flight controls.


A real solution to handle the risk. No socio-drama and groundings. ** That was the right course of actions. **

Awareness, knowledge and competence is why we have pilots. Yes, in this 737 MAX case, there is serious ground to blame the human factor and that sealed the deal. We must assume they know the basics. Trying to manually trim at full trust and high speed is ... :banghead:


That all simulators flight simulating those two crashes and were pilots took the proper action, were successful, is simply a misinformation.
To blame the pilots in the 737MAX disasters is simply done to divert from the real problem.

The 737 rudder issue is simply showing that Boeing gets away with keeping an unsafe frame in the air.

The question is not, should the 737MAX be grounded, but rather, why the hell was the 737 with the rudder issue not grounded.


Politics. Perception. The power of Boeing.

Its fascinating to me that, over the years, the 737 has had multiple fatal accidents due to both pitch and yaw flight control deficiencies, yet there are still those in what I call the "pilot is God flight control mafia" (mostly Boeing types btw) that continue to disparage the Airbus FBW flight control system architecture.
 
dtw2hyd
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:54 pm

It is an a.net myth that third world airlines are typing their own manuals and crew are getting trained on FSX.

The fact is when it comes to civil aviation third world airlines blindly follow manufacturers' recommendations, because they have no clue, and don't want to deal with deaths. Crew training is one of the most expensive part of airline business. For new types, they send their crew to reputed brand training centers in Singapore, Australia, Europe or the US.

The argument that third world crew training not up to the mark comes back right at manufacturers and brand name training centers.

MCAS v1 designers and coders had years to debate and mitigate risk, this crew had few minutes to deal with the beast.

Even if hardware redundancy is expensive and time-consuming to implement, there are ways to mitigate the single sensor failure within the software. A cumulative pitch trim would have given a hint something is wrong. Assuming the same FMC also handles other interrupts like terrain warning, it could be used to stop the MCAS nose dive loop.

I still don't understand why MCAS presence couldn't be included in the iPad training. "To keep the same type rating we developed a software if you notice any trim issues extend flaps or cutoff both stab trim switches". I am sure the FAA would be fine with carefully crafted lawyers' approved text.

JT601 was the perfect storm. Sloppy design, sloppy oversight, and sloppy repair shops came together.
All posts are just opinions.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 2:56 pm

Planetalk wrote:
morrisond wrote:
767333ER wrote:
But think, does a 737NG have MCAS? No, It most certainly does not. So if this flight is operated by a 737NG it does not have the MCAS trim nose down; therefore, the flight does not crash due to this failure as a result. Put any other mainstream aircraft in that place and have an AOA vane fail (the initiating event of the whole chain) either the redundancy kicks in, or in the case of a less sophisticated plane the AOA disagrees and at worst the autopilot disconnects. None of these other planes would start trimming the nose into the ground. Does that mean it guaranteed wouldn’t have crashed if it was not operated by a MAX, no, but it does mean that the odds of it happening were the same as any other 737NG flight that day, none of which did crash. That is relatively close to a guarantee. Besides, how many flight hours pass between every time a 737NG has a runaway trim event... Conversely, put a North American crew on there for example, can we prove that the odds of the plane not crashing would’ve been much better; I’d argue not necessarily because unsafe practices happen here too very often. Just look at some of the recent North American accidents (or near misses) due to pilot error which were generally due to some massive breakdown in training. It happens here too.

You can hypothesize that this crew would not have handled a traditional runaway trim and there is a good chance this could’ve been true, but again that’s dealing with people is far more complicated than computers. We have argued and it has become accepted that Boeing was wrong to assume that failed MCAS would be easily recognized as runaway trim by the crew as evident by both crashes. So if we draw this conclusion from both crashes, why do you then say that they wouldn’t recognize real runaway trim either? That logic doesn’t follow. Runaway trim either would’ve crashed them sooner or been dealt with and over sooner because I don’t imagine the trim switches would be of much use so they wouldn’t be constantly be fighting it with success for some while. They would likely come to the conclusion rather quickly to shut the trim off, whether or not too late is where your position could be right.


Explain ET302 then - they were in the same position as they would have been in an NG if they were dealing with real runaway trim - No electric trim and they weren't able to save it. They didn't have the knowledge to control it without electric trim. Pulling the thrust out of TOGA and reducing speed would have been the first thing to do in both cases.

Maintaining speed within normal ranges should not have to be put in a Procedure and it is common knowledge that controls become ineffective at high speed.


When you write posts like this, perhaps you could acknowledge that you are not writing on any factual basis. Until the accident report is released, literally nothing in your post is supported by fact, so please stop repeatedly presenting it as so. As for your point about it being 'common knowledge that controls become ineffective at high speed' you may have damned yourself and Boeing with your own words.

Also have a think about where you said 'Maintaining speed within normal ranges should not have to be put in a Procedure' . You could equally say 'maintaining altitude within normal ranges should not have to be put in a procedure' . In which case you're saying no plane ever should be outside 'normal' speed and altitude, whatever the circumstances. Which is clearly absurd.


Yes - we don't know for sure exactly what happened but we do know that the AT was still engaged at TOGA and the rest about controls becoming ineffective at high speed comes right from Private Pilot Ground school 101.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:07 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
That all simulators flight simulating those two crashes and were pilots took the proper action, were successful, is simply a misinformation.

In https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -controls/ we read:

In sessions in a Boeing flight simulator in Seattle, two FAA engineering test pilots, typically ex-military test pilots, and a pilot from the FAA’s Flight Standards Aircraft Evaluation Group (AEG), typically an ex-airline pilot, set up a session to test 33 different scenarios that might be sparked by a rare, random microprocessor fault in the jet’s flight-control computer.

This was standard testing that’s typically done in certifying an airplane, but this time it was deliberately set up to produce specific effects similar to what happened on the Lion Air and Ethiopian flights.
...
What happened in the initial simulated run of this fault scenario in June is that the FAA test pilots handled the emergency using the standard procedure for a “runaway stabilizer” and recovered the aircraft. But they felt it took too long and that a less attentive pilot caught by surprise might have had a worse outcome.
...
So again in light of what happened in the crashes, the FAA pilots took a further step. They flew the same fault scenario again, this time deliberately allowing the fault to run for some time before responding. This time, one of the three pilots didn’t manage to recover and lost the aircraft.

In this report, 3 of 3 pilots handled the standard scenario, 2 of 3 handled the delayed reaction scenario.

If you have another report, please share.

kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:
[
I've personally seen a decline in engineering ethics during my three decades of work, largely created by managers creating unacceptably high levels of pressure and by engineers failing to stand their ground when it came to doing professional quality work when subject to such pressure.

As I wrote earlier, the fact that Boeing felt they needed to beef up their anonymous reporting system and have all safety engineers report to the Chief Engineer rather than product line managers is an admission that they haven't protected engineers from managers well enough in the past.

Thing is, engineering qualification is another weak link in MCAS situation.
You can blame a lot of things on management pressure - but two things in present situation that are very hard to justify by external influence: multiple actuations and no input sanitation.

I don't find it hard to blame engineering management pressure for that kind of result. Typically managers will partition the work by department and by engineer so an individual engineer only considers the impact over a small scope, then they can say their work is done. No manager will want to be responsible for the big picture since that's too much pressure, and they won't want to push back on lower level managers to get them to expand the scope of the work. No one wants to be the long pole in the tent. We see lots of evidence of "it worked well enough in the past, why reconcider the big picture" thinking in the article I linked above, along with https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-ne ... afeguards/
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:15 pm

seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:

Because then it was an Autopilot malfunction and the checklist ends before you hit the cut out switches.

I'm glad to have one of the engineers that worked on the 737 trim system on this board.

Not that it is very likely but if both thumb switches on one yoke broke and commanded a nose down trim in the neutral position but still made proper contact for nose up trim you could have a runaway with electric trim working for nose up. That's just one possible scenario that refutes your claim even though it would be extremely unlikely to ever happen.

I'm sure there are other possibilities.


And how is this gonna work? If the thumb switches in the control stick would break, they should break in neutral position, but even if they would break in an active position, the activation of the up trim would not override the down trim signal, so you still can not trim up, at best you could stop the down trim. (I would need to dive into the details of the control stick to see if that would happen or if the up trim signal would have no effect)

I was inventing a highly unlikely scenario to show a way that there could be a runaway stabilizer where electric trim would still work.

You said that it was impossible. I'm sure there are other ways for it to happen but I'm not an expert on the trim system fault tree so I can't give specific examples.

However the NNC, after saying to disengage autopilot and trim with the manual electric trim says to move the cutout switches IF RUNAWAY CONTINUES. That indicates a scenario is possible where the autopilot wasn't the cause and electric trim functioned but there was a runaway stabilizer.
 
art
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:20 pm

Revelation wrote:
I've personally seen a decline in engineering ethics during my three decades of work, largely created by managers creating unacceptably high levels of pressure and by engineers failing to stand their ground when it came to doing professional quality work when subject to such pressure..


f such a situation exists in any company designing safety-critical products I would say that company should stop designing safety-critical products.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:20 pm

dtw2hyd wrote:
It is an a.net myth that third world airlines are typing their own manuals and crew are getting trained on FSX.

The fact is when it comes to civil aviation third world airlines blindly follow manufacturers' recommendations, because they have no clue, and don't want to deal with deaths. Crew training is one of the most expensive part of airline business. For new types, they send their crew to reputed brand training centers in Singapore, Australia, Europe or the US.

The argument that third world crew training not up to the mark comes back right at manufacturers and brand name training centers.

Langeweische's article said that Lion Air runs its own training center at Lion City that charges each applicant $60,000 (in a country with a per-capita GDP of $2,500) and has a 95% pass rate, and I've heard no correction made on his report.

If you think this is a Boeing-only thing, check out Airbus Takes Aim At Inconsistent Pilot Training Quality

dtw2hyd wrote:
JT601 was the perfect storm. Sloppy design, sloppy oversight, and sloppy repair shops came together.

I would say it as "Terrible design, terrible communication, terrible oversight, terrible maintenance and terrible piloting came together".

A pilot that cannot remember memory items and takes four minutes to find the very first MMC in the QRH is pretty terrible in my book. A Captain that doesn't communicate exactly what he has been doing to keep the plane flying when handing off to the FO is pretty terrible in my book. Whatever changes in training that get proposed due to the MAX tragedy still presume the bad apples are getting weeded out of the system, and there's no evidence that is going to be happening.
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:24 pm

planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:
I'm glad to have one of the engineers that worked on the 737 trim system on this board.

Not that it is very likely but if both thumb switches on one yoke broke and commanded a nose down trim in the neutral position but still made proper contact for nose up trim you could have a runaway with electric trim working for nose up. That's just one possible scenario that refutes your claim even though it would be extremely unlikely to ever happen.

I'm sure there are other possibilities.


And how is this gonna work? If the thumb switches in the control stick would break, they should break in neutral position, but even if they would break in an active position, the activation of the up trim would not override the down trim signal, so you still can not trim up, at best you could stop the down trim. (I would need to dive into the details of the control stick to see if that would happen or if the up trim signal would have no effect)

I was inventing a highly unlikely scenario to show a way that there could be a runaway stabilizer where electric trim would still work.

You said that it was impossible. I'm sure there are other ways for it to happen but I'm not an expert on the trim system fault tree so I can't give specific examples.

However the NNC, after saying to disengage autopilot and trim with the manual electric trim says to move the cutout switches IF RUNAWAY CONTINUES. That indicates a scenario is possible where the autopilot wasn't the cause and electric trim functioned but there was a runaway stabilizer.


I said there is no scenario in which manual electric trim would work and the stick override for nose down trim movement would not work.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:34 pm

Revelation wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:
[
I've personally seen a decline in engineering ethics during my three decades of work, largely created by managers creating unacceptably high levels of pressure and by engineers failing to stand their ground when it came to doing professional quality work when subject to such pressure.

As I wrote earlier, the fact that Boeing felt they needed to beef up their anonymous reporting system and have all safety engineers report to the Chief Engineer rather than product line managers is an admission that they haven't protected engineers from managers well enough in the past.

Thing is, engineering qualification is another weak link in MCAS situation.
You can blame a lot of things on management pressure - but two things in present situation that are very hard to justify by external influence: multiple actuations and no input sanitation.

I don't find it hard to blame engineering management pressure for that kind of result. Typically managers will partition the work by department and by engineer so an individual engineer only considers the impact over a small scope, then they can say their work is done. No manager will want to be responsible for the big picture since that's too much pressure, and they won't want to push back on lower level managers to get them to expand the scope of the work. No one wants to be the long pole in the tent. We see lots of evidence of "it worked well enough in the past, why reconcider the big picture" thinking in the article I linked above, along with https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-ne ... afeguards/

Again, hard to believe. There should be a single document, request for coding of a MCAS procedure. Are you saying the document was not put together by someone in engineering position nor checked by an engineer? Then blanket scrap order is really overdue...
 
Saintor
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:35 pm

Revelation wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
That all simulators flight simulating those two crashes and were pilots took the proper action, were successful, is simply a misinformation.


In this report, 3 of 3 pilots handled the standard scenario, 2 of 3 handled the delayed reaction scenario.

If you have another report, please share.


Mentioned in the JT610 investigation final report, 4 simulations were done and no crash was reported. I have seen one simulation done that resulted to a crash and it was done without following the basic steps... it was more bad journalism.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:44 pm

Saintor wrote:
Revelation wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
That all simulators flight simulating those two crashes and were pilots took the proper action, were successful, is simply a misinformation.


In this report, 3 of 3 pilots handled the standard scenario, 2 of 3 handled the delayed reaction scenario.

If you have another report, please share.


Mentioned in the JT610 investigation final report, 4 simulations were done and no crash was reported. I have seen one simulation done that resulted to a crash and it was done without following the basic steps... it was more bad journalism.

Basically threshold is set incorrectly. If successful outcome is the criteria, test 1000 crews, half of them deprived of proper sleep, the other one with fire alarm playing full volume behind them.
If 999 handle this successfully, then return to square one - this is an unsafe design.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:51 pm

Saintor wrote:
Revelation wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
That all simulators flight simulating those two crashes and were pilots took the proper action, were successful, is simply a misinformation.


In this report, 3 of 3 pilots handled the standard scenario, 2 of 3 handled the delayed reaction scenario.

If you have another report, please share.


Mentioned in the JT610 investigation final report, 4 simulations were done and no crash was reported. I have seen one simulation done that resulted to a crash and it was done without following the basic steps... it was more bad journalism.


Could you please point to the page in the report where you find your statement?
 
Saintor
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:56 pm

kalvado wrote:
Saintor wrote:
Revelation wrote:

In this report, 3 of 3 pilots handled the standard scenario, 2 of 3 handled the delayed reaction scenario.

If you have another report, please share.


Mentioned in the JT610 investigation final report, 4 simulations were done and no crash was reported. I have seen one simulation done that resulted to a crash and it was done without following the basic steps... it was more bad journalism.


Basically threshold is set incorrectly. If successful outcome is the criteria, test 1000 crews, half of them deprived of proper sleep, the other one with fire alarm playing full volume behind them.
If 999 handle this successfully, then return to square one - this is an unsafe design.



What you are basically saying is that it is not relevant that pilots manage the situation correctly or not and all systems must be idiot-proof. Wrong assumption.
Last edited by Saintor on Sat Nov 02, 2019 4:01 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
dtw2hyd
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 3:57 pm

Revelation wrote:
dtw2hyd wrote:
JT601 was the perfect storm. Sloppy design, sloppy oversight, and sloppy repair shops came together.

I would say it as "Terrible design, terrible communication, terrible oversight, terrible maintenance and terrible piloting came together".


The first three are decade-old first world practices and two are third world 10-minute mistakes. Is Xtra even allowed to refurbish an AoA sensor? FAA notice seems to be vague.

Revelation wrote:
A pilot that cannot remember memory items and takes four minutes to find the very first MMC in the QRH is pretty terrible in my book. A Captain that doesn't communicate exactly what he has been doing to keep the plane flying when handing off to the FO is pretty terrible in my book. Whatever changes in training that get proposed due to the MAX tragedy still presume the bad apples are getting weeded out of the system, and there's no evidence that is going to be happening.


At 23:23:09 UTC, the Captain commanded “memory item, memory item”.
...
At 23:23:17 UTC, the FO advised the Captain “Feel differential already done, auto brake, engine start switches off, what’s the memory item here”. The Captain then responded, “check”.
...
At 23:23:34 UTC, the FO asked “Flight control?” and the Captain responded “yeah”.
...
At 23:23:48 UTC, the FO called “flight control low pressure” and 4 seconds later the CVR recorded the sound of an altitude alert tone.
...
At 23:24:05 UTC, the FO called “Feel Differential Pressure”. Afterwards, the Captain commanded to perform the checklist for air speed unreliable, which was acknowledged by the FO.
...
At 23:24:31 UTC, the FO advised the Captain that he was unable to locate the Airspeed Unreliable checklist.


If manufacturers are not confident that these airlines can keep planes in the air, stop selling in thousands.
All posts are just opinions.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 9396
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 4:13 pm

After the constant attacks on the pilots of JT610, I have to ask, did some people realy read the report?

Perhaps posters here should read beginning on page 314 about JATR´s findings related to MCAS.
It finds a whole row of things wrong with the MAX and Boeing.

In sum, the JATR found that the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft should not have been certified as airworthy....

I want to quote a few points in regards to maintenance and pilots

B. Lion Air's pilots, engineers, and maintenance personal should not be faulted for their reasonable attempts to detect, diagnose, and correct an unknowable defect.

and

1. The Lion Air flight JT610 crew should not be faulted for their response to a latent and unknowable defect.

It is very clear were this accident report puts the blame, straight at Boeing's feet. Nowhere else.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 4:23 pm

art wrote:
Revelation wrote:
I've personally seen a decline in engineering ethics during my three decades of work, largely created by managers creating unacceptably high levels of pressure and by engineers failing to stand their ground when it came to doing professional quality work when subject to such pressure..

If such a situation exists in any company designing safety-critical products I would say that company should stop designing safety-critical products.

I haven't been involved in engineering safety critical products, but definitely see engineers caving to managers very often.

Boeing's response to criticism:

Regarding the much more significant flight-control software that was triggered by a single bad sensor and caused the planes to nose-dive — the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) — Muilenburg stuck by Boeing’s insistence that the design and certification of that system was done according to “long-standing industry standards.”

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... unscathed/

Yet the media reports from ST and others are full of reports of engineers feeling pressured to do the minimum possible work to achieve "long-standing industry standards” some of which are now shown to be outdated yet were not questioned very strenuously within Boeing. In fact you can make a pretty convincing argument that Boeing took advantages of those "long-standing industry standards" to avoid having to deal with the costly implications of those standards being out of date.

dtw2hyd wrote:
If manufacturers are not confident that these airlines can keep planes in the air, stop selling in thousands.

From my link above, Airbus Takes Aim At Inconsistent Pilot Training Quality, there is an industry wide concern:

Airbus has created an ab initio pilot training program and intends to implement it in its global network of partner flying schools. The plan signals rising concerns about the varying levels of pilot training by country. The airframer is striving to standardize initial training, although national authorities have the final say.

National authorities lack uniformity in pilot training regulation. Airbus safety experts also see “strange things in poor countries where air transport is growing very fast—suspiciously quick pilot qualification and fraudulent flight-hour accounting.” They are addressing the problem at the airline level. Especially for Asian carriers, it is useful to continue giving information on weather issues, they say. For example, a video was created recently to reexplain operations in convective conditions in a straightforward manner.

Airbus is adopting a “lead by example” approach. The national authority of a pilot training organization is responsible for approving its programs. “Our implementing a program with this standard is encouraging the authority to follow us and raise the bar at other schools,” says Jean-Michel Bigarre, head of global flight training at Airbus.

I think Airbus is following a good path, but it's not likely to solve the problem.

Also the Langeweische article had good commentary from a former Boeing pilot who worked in training pilots in emerging markets, and it's not too hard to read through the lines to come up with the idea that he thinks standards need improving. Too bad people's gag reflexes kicked in before they read the whole article.

The idea of not selling airliners to countries with questionable regulatory and training standards is not one likely to catch on, for either vendor, for obvious reasons. They always have the "get out of jail free" / "cover my back side" card that my quotes above contain, namely "national authorities have the final say".
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kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 4:28 pm

Saintor wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Saintor wrote:

Mentioned in the JT610 investigation final report, 4 simulations were done and no crash was reported. I have seen one simulation done that resulted to a crash and it was done without following the basic steps... it was more bad journalism.


Basically threshold is set incorrectly. If successful outcome is the criteria, test 1000 crews, half of them deprived of proper sleep, the other one with fire alarm playing full volume behind them.
If 999 handle this successfully, then return to square one - this is an unsafe design.



What you are basically saying is that it is not relevant that pilots manage the situation correctly or not and all systems must be idiot-proof. Wrong assumption.

No, I am basically saying that FAR has to be followed. We are talking about 1e-5 event, so crew ability to handle events has to be better than 9999/10000 for the plane to be certifiable.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ch ... 251309.png
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 4:41 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
After the constant attacks on the pilots of JT610, I have to ask, did some people realy read the report?

Perhaps posters here should read beginning on page 314 about JATR´s findings related to MCAS.
It finds a whole row of things wrong with the MAX and Boeing.

In sum, the JATR found that the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft should not have been certified as airworthy....

I want to quote a few points in regards to maintenance and pilots

B. Lion Air's pilots, engineers, and maintenance personal should not be faulted for their reasonable attempts to detect, diagnose, and correct an unknowable defect.

and

1. The Lion Air flight JT610 crew should not be faulted for their response to a latent and unknowable defect.

It is very clear were this accident report puts the blame, straight at Boeing's feet. Nowhere else.

Since you are big on the word "blame", yes, Boeing and FAA have accepted "blame" weeks ago, when both the FAA and Boeing were in front of Congress, and again with Muilenberg in front of Congress last week.

The JATR report is not an accident report, its scope is given in the intro:

The FAA chartered the JATR to review the work conducted during the B737 MAX certification
program, to assess whether compliance was shown with the required applicable airworthiness
standards related to the flight control system and its interfaces, and to recommend improvements
to the certification process if warranted.
Of particular concern to the FAA in chartering the JATR
was the function, evaluation, and certification of the MCAS function on the B737 MAX. 3 The
JATR team’s review also focused on flight crew training and operational suitability of the
design. The JATR team considered whether the appropriate regulations and policy were applied,
as well as how applicable regulations and policy material could be improved to enhance safety.

The FAA did not charter the JATR to review the entire certification process for all aspects of the
aircraft, nor did it task the team to review details related to returning the B737 MAX to service.
The FAA made clear that it did not create the JATR to inform its decision on returning the B737
MAX to service.

The actual KNKT accident report does point out the shortcomings in JT's crews and maintainers.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
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kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 4:41 pm

Revelation wrote:
Also the Langeweische article had good commentary from a former Boeing pilot who worked in training pilots in emerging markets, and it's not too hard to read through the lines to come up with the idea that he thinks standards need improving. Too bad people's gag reflexes kicked in before they read the whole article.

Training is always in need of improvement. There were 2 crashes of commercial airliners in US alone this year due to piloting errors, luckily just a few casualties. One has to keep in mind that such improvement is unlikely to solve more fundamental issues. Airbus plan to make standards more uniform definitely would simplify some things for operations and support, and likely make them some extra money - but wouldn't be a deal-breaker in terms of global safety.
Problem is that training improvement is brought up in this thread in the context of a massive design issue, and is not properly considered as a minor contributing factor.
 
dtw2hyd
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 4:46 pm

Revelation wrote:
...
The idea of not selling airliners to countries with questionable regulatory and training standards is not one likely to catch on, for either vendor, for obvious reasons. They always have the "get out of jail free" / "cover my back side" card that my quotes above contain, namely "national authorities have the final say".


If their national regulator is not up to mark what are FAA and ICAO doing? FAA downgrades and upgrades are just political tools?

Slightly off-topic but to give you a context, if a spoiler actuator on a brand new AI 787 goes bad on taxi-out ex-FRA (last checked by MX contractor at FRA), how is it AI Engineering MX practices issue? But Boeing was very successful rubbing these design/build quality issues as AI MX practice issues and entire aviation community joined the bandwagon.

The same approach has been used for MAX.
Why a new AoA sensor failed pre-maturely, It happens, parts fail.
Why an FAA authorized repair shop didn't calibrate properly, it happens.
Why line MX didn't record the value prior to the test? OMG, Improper install by third-world airline maintenance lead to disaster.
The bias is glaring.
All posts are just opinions.
 
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Revelation
Posts: 24655
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:02 pm

kalvado wrote:
Problem is that training improvement is brought up in this thread in the context of a massive design issue, and is not properly considered as a minor contributing factor.

My thoughts are that the "massive design issue" is well understood and well on its way to being addressed.

Even the detailed JATR report didn't trigger much discussion here since people already knew enough from the various pieces of the puzzle that we'd already seen what the final picture would be.

The main thing that continues to generate controversy is what Boeing assumed about the capabilities of the pilots during the design process, vs what the pilots actual capabilities were.

We have a "fear of absolution" / "don't muddy the waters" contingent that dislikes discussion outside the scope of Boeing and/or FAA actions, but that's not the way the actual accident reports address the situation, all contributing parties get examined.

dtw2hyd wrote:
The same approach has been used for MAX.
Why a new AoA sensor failed pre-maturely, It happens, parts fail.
Why an FAA authorized repair shop didn't calibrate properly, it happens.
Why line MX didn't record the value prior to the test? OMG, Improper install by third-world airline maintenance lead to disaster.
The bias is glaring.

The FAA authorized repair shop got shut down once the evidence was shown by KNKT's report, so your rendition of events may be viewed as displaying a bias as well.

Haven't seen JT's maintenance shop get shut down (like ValuJet did after its crash in the 90s), but a top to bottom scrub of its records seems to be in order, if nothing else to photocopy the logs/records before more pages go missing and spot check the maintenance practices being applied to the current fleet.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 9396
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:02 pm

Revelation wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
After the constant attacks on the pilots of JT610, I have to ask, did some people realy read the report?

Perhaps posters here should read beginning on page 314 about JATR´s findings related to MCAS.
It finds a whole row of things wrong with the MAX and Boeing.

In sum, the JATR found that the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft should not have been certified as airworthy....

I want to quote a few points in regards to maintenance and pilots

B. Lion Air's pilots, engineers, and maintenance personal should not be faulted for their reasonable attempts to detect, diagnose, and correct an unknowable defect.

and

1. The Lion Air flight JT610 crew should not be faulted for their response to a latent and unknowable defect.

It is very clear were this accident report puts the blame, straight at Boeing's feet. Nowhere else.

Since you are big on the word "blame", yes, Boeing and FAA have accepted "blame" weeks ago, when both the FAA and Boeing were in front of Congress, and again with Muilenberg in front of Congress last week.

The JATR report is not an accident report, its scope is given in the intro:

The FAA chartered the JATR to review the work conducted during the B737 MAX certification
program, to assess whether compliance was shown with the required applicable airworthiness
standards related to the flight control system and its interfaces, and to recommend improvements
to the certification process if warranted.
Of particular concern to the FAA in chartering the JATR
was the function, evaluation, and certification of the MCAS function on the B737 MAX. 3 The
JATR team’s review also focused on flight crew training and operational suitability of the
design. The JATR team considered whether the appropriate regulations and policy were applied,
as well as how applicable regulations and policy material could be improved to enhance safety.

The FAA did not charter the JATR to review the entire certification process for all aspects of the
aircraft, nor did it task the team to review details related to returning the B737 MAX to service.
The FAA made clear that it did not create the JATR to inform its decision on returning the B737
MAX to service.

The actual KNKT accident report does point out the shortcomings in JT's crews and maintainers.


You just showed that you did not read the accident report. What I quoted is part of the accident report.
Many people here seems to have read the accident report until they found some bit to move responsibility away from Boing and we have the resulting endless bashing here of all that is not Boeing.

I take the word of JATR, as most likely most of the world today, over the disgraced FAA, an organisation hat can hardly be called a certification agency any longer.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:12 pm

Revelation wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Problem is that training improvement is brought up in this thread in the context of a massive design issue, and is not properly considered as a minor contributing factor.

My thoughts are that the "massive design issue" is well understood and well on its way to being addressed.

Even the detailed JATR report didn't trigger much discussion here since people already knew enough from the various pieces of the puzzle that we'd already seen what the final picture would be.

The main thing that continues to generate controversy is what Boeing assumed about the capabilities of the pilots during the design process, vs what the pilots actual capabilities were.

We have a "fear of absolution" / "don't muddy the waters" contingent that dislikes discussion outside the scope of Boeing and/or FAA actions, but that's not the way the actual accident reports address the situation, all contributing parties get examined.

dtw2hyd wrote:
The same approach has been used for MAX.
Why a new AoA sensor failed pre-maturely, It happens, parts fail.
Why an FAA authorized repair shop didn't calibrate properly, it happens.
Why line MX didn't record the value prior to the test? OMG, Improper install by third-world airline maintenance lead to disaster.
The bias is glaring.

The FAA authorized repair shop got shut down once the evidence was shown by KNKT's report, so your rendition of events may be viewed as displaying a bias as well.

Haven't seen JT's maintenance shop get shut down (like ValuJet did after its crash in the 90s), but a top to bottom scrub of its records seems to be in order, if nothing else to photocopy the logs/records before more pages go missing and spot check the maintenance practices being applied to the current fleet.


The massive design issues are perhaps fully understood, but are hardly on the way to being addressed.
It is not only MCAS that is faulted, but the way the 737MAX presents error alarms and faults.
I assume Boeing has know, that they need a new interface and designed EICAS for the 757/767 in the eighties. It made its way on all Boeing frames since than, with the exception of commercial 737. The P-8, a military version of the 737, has EICAS
 
User avatar
Polot
Posts: 10741
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:20 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
After the constant attacks on the pilots of JT610, I have to ask, did some people realy read the report?

Perhaps posters here should read beginning on page 314 about JATR´s findings related to MCAS.
It finds a whole row of things wrong with the MAX and Boeing.

In sum, the JATR found that the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft should not have been certified as airworthy....

I want to quote a few points in regards to maintenance and pilots

B. Lion Air's pilots, engineers, and maintenance personal should not be faulted for their reasonable attempts to detect, diagnose, and correct an unknowable defect.

and

1. The Lion Air flight JT610 crew should not be faulted for their response to a latent and unknowable defect.

It is very clear were this accident report puts the blame, straight at Boeing's feet. Nowhere else.

You need to reread that section again a bit more critically. Those quotes are Lion Air’s comments on the final report (section 6.10). They quote some of JTAR’a findings which is why that header is on page 314, but only the indented bulleted parts are from JTAR. Your quotes are not words that JTAR or the the accident investigation team wrote. It is not surprising that Lionair is saying Lionair should hold no responsibility. JTAR was not investigating the Lion air crash, they were investigating the 737MAX controls and certification process and would not (and do not) talk about fault in the crashes because that was not their job to investigate. In fact the JTAR report states: Observation O11.2-C: Maintenance and ground handling errors have contributed to several accidents and multiple incidents, and maintenance issues might also be relevant to the Lion Air B737 MAX accident based on the preliminary report.

An investigative team is not going to spend pages detailing failures with Lionairs mechanics and pilots that allowed holes in the Swiss cheese to line up and then write ‘but hey can’t fault them for anything!’ Reports like this in general try to minimize talking about blame period, they just stage the factors that lead to the crash.
Last edited by Polot on Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:48 pm, edited 4 times in total.
 
kalvado
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Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:23 pm

Revelation wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Problem is that training improvement is brought up in this thread in the context of a massive design issue, and is not properly considered as a minor contributing factor.

My thoughts are that the "massive design issue" is well understood and well on its way to being addressed.

Even the detailed JATR report didn't trigger much discussion here since people already knew enough from the various pieces of the puzzle that we'd already seen what the final picture would be.

The main thing that continues to generate controversy is what Boeing assumed about the capabilities of the pilots during the design process, vs what the pilots actual capabilities were.

We have a "fear of absolution" / "don't muddy the waters" contingent that dislikes discussion outside the scope of Boeing and/or FAA actions, but that's not the way the actual accident reports address the situation, all contributing parties get examined.


Again, wrong parallel. MCAS proble is understood - as well as most of pilot's actions and possible other avenues to avoid crashes.
If pilot training is to be discussed, a parallel discussion on engineering and qualifications is more important for most people outside Indonesia. Later is not really being addressed, which turns the situation really scary. changing reporting paths is a good step forward. A really great stroke of lipstick on that pig.
Somehow understanding of MCAS didn't evolve into a real discussion of cultural and education - and I doubt it belongs to this thread; but is a must in a grand scheme of things.
 
planecane
Posts: 1579
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:43 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
planecane wrote:
uta999 wrote:
I too have defended the dead pilots in the past on here. None of us were there on those two aircraft, having to deal with something very unusual, confusing, alarming, frightening and ultimately deadly. They probably knew quite early on that their actions would not save them.

The problem now is to not muddy the water so much, that Boeing get off so lightly, only partly to blame, the pilots bought it on themselves, they were useless etc etc. Boeing is completely to blame here. No other aircraft type would have done what the MAX did to them. That is all Boeing, not the pilots. If you apportion blame elsewhere, future safety will suffer.

If you don't apportion blame elsewhere safety will suffer. It's only a matter of time before shoddy maintenance at Lion Air does something that causes another crash where the design was fine. It's only a matter of time before a Lion Air pilot who fails simulator checks constantly and shouldn't be in a cockpit fails to perform a procedure properly that has been trained for and crashes a plane.

Yes, Boeing's design and decisions are what created the conditions for these two crashes. However, for sure in the Lion Air case, if a runaway stabilizer had been caused on an NG by shoddy maintenance, that crew on that day still would have crashed.


No safety will mainly suffer by diverting attention from the terrible Boeing design and terrible Boeing actions.

Boeing designed the MCAS with complete disregard for standard practices regarding safe design for safety critical applications.

Boeing actions:
- Boeing did hide MCAS so no pilot could train for it or know about it.
- After the Lion Air crash, Boeing tried to divert attention (as you try to do now) away from the MAX, pointing to pilots and maintenance, while knowing that their design was responsible. The right action would have been to ask the FAA to ground the MAX
- Second crash, rinse and repeat. Even trying to appeal to the president of the USA to influence the FAA to not ground.

No, through this catastrophic events, the tendency to divert from the real problem, the negligent deadly design of the 737MAX, has slowed the necessary actions and is responsible for the second crash.

There is no basis for your claim, that a 737NG would have crashed that day.


Some of you are truly unbelievable in your mission to get Boeing. Nobody (at least I'm not) is diverting from the issue with the MCAS design and related decisions.

You are diverting from other issues that were discovered in the investigation. To avoid addressing those issues before they cause a crash is irresponsible.

Will you be happy if Lion Air maintenance screws something up on an A330 and the pilots are not skilled enough to recover and it crashes?

Just because this crash wouldn't have happened if not for MCAS does not mean another crash won't happen on an aircraft without design flaws due to shoddy maintenance and/or a borderline incompetent flight crew member.
 
planecane
Posts: 1579
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Nov 02, 2019 5:47 pm

seahawk wrote:
planecane wrote:
seahawk wrote:

And how is this gonna work? If the thumb switches in the control stick would break, they should break in neutral position, but even if they would break in an active position, the activation of the up trim would not override the down trim signal, so you still can not trim up, at best you could stop the down trim. (I would need to dive into the details of the control stick to see if that would happen or if the up trim signal would have no effect)

I was inventing a highly unlikely scenario to show a way that there could be a runaway stabilizer where electric trim would still work.

You said that it was impossible. I'm sure there are other ways for it to happen but I'm not an expert on the trim system fault tree so I can't give specific examples.

However the NNC, after saying to disengage autopilot and trim with the manual electric trim says to move the cutout switches IF RUNAWAY CONTINUES. That indicates a scenario is possible where the autopilot wasn't the cause and electric trim functioned but there was a runaway stabilizer.


I said there is no scenario in which manual electric trim would work and the stick override for nose down trim movement would not work.


If the stick override works there is no runaway stabilizer situation as the trim will stop moving. Explain why the NNC is written the way it is if these scenarios can't exist.

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