This thread has really gotten out of control now...I've vigorously defended the pilots throughout, but it really doesn't help advance aviation safety when people say things like it's 'irrelevant' what Lionair maintenance did, or what pilot standards are etc. Of course it's relevant, each is a link in a chain and if any one factor hadn't been present, the crash wouldn't have happened.
Yes the basic flaw in MCAS is in my opinion likely criminal, yes Boeing have blood on their hands, yes I personally despise the leadership and corporate culture of the company as it stands. But, there may also be other incidents in the future, could be a 737, could be an A321, could be a A220, when pilot training makes a difference. And anyone who says now 'that's irrelevant' because they want to indict only Boeing, is doing aviation generally a disservice.
All my previous replies in this thread have been defending the pilots, from one poster in particular, but I'm equally alarmed by people saying identified factors in an accident are 'irrelevant'. They are not irrelevant to people in Indonesia who have to fly on a plane of any type and could do with lessons being learned. There are lessons from these accidents that apply broadly to aviation, as there always are.
I didn't think it was especially controversial that we would all like pilot training globally to be improved. That is something we should always be pushing for. Of course I say that in the knowledge it was Boeing who deliberately denied the pilots training this time. Hey, you can be angry at Lionair and don't worry, no'one will think you are absolving Boeing.
It's interesting how some posters here used ugly terms like racist when people had questions about how the pilots responded to the conditions they were presented with, but those same people now are showing very little concern about the fact that disadvantaged people are still being flown around by an airline whose training and maintenance shortcomings have been so vividly displayed.
I too have defended the dead pilots in the past on here. None of us were there on those two aircraft, having to deal with something very unusual, confusing, alarming, frightening and ultimately deadly. They probably knew quite early on that their actions would not save them.
The problem now is to not muddy the water so much, that Boeing get off so lightly, only partly to blame, the pilots bought it on themselves, they were useless etc etc. Boeing is completely to blame here. No other aircraft type would have done what the MAX did to them. That is all Boeing, not the pilots. If you apportion blame elsewhere, future safety will suffer.
That's a great illustration of the problem: any questioning is interpreted as statements such as "the pilots bought it on themselves, they were useless etc etc.".
I believe we're capable of more refined and rational thought processes than this, but it seems some can only hold a small number of simple binary thoughts in their heads, or just choose to over simplify to try to conform to a predetermined narrative.
Agree, the 787 did have engineering issue. I understand that Boeing is in trouble and that some Airbus projects was debatable on cost and delay, but I disagree that this is enough to define a "global aviation design engineer standards", especially since management is far from unrelated. There are examples of projects going well and I hope that this will more the case in the future, but for sure this require a good culture too.
Agree. We need more changes on corporate and management culture than on engineering. Considering that laws of Newtonian physics isn't changing that much for past hundred years, I can't see the inherent issue in engineering. I actually think that this is more of management than engineering.
The inherent issue in engineering in the case of the 737MAX is, that the responsible engineers did do this negligent design. If management forced those engineers to cut corners, they should have refused.
I've personally seen a decline in engineering ethics during my three decades of work, largely created by managers creating unacceptably high levels of pressure and by engineers failing to stand their ground when it came to doing professional quality work when subject to such pressure.
As I wrote earlier, the fact that Boeing felt they needed to beef up their anonymous reporting system and have all safety engineers report to the Chief Engineer rather than product line managers is an admission that they haven't protected engineers from managers well enough in the past.