How about auto deploying some flaps in case of a stall approaching? We're talking about slow flight aren't we?
This already exists on the 777 it’s called auto slats and on the 787 it’s called auto gap. It moves the slats to the full position but ONLY when the slats are in the mid position. So not when Flaps and Slats are up.
It’s been to long since Iv flown a 737 I can’t remember if they have this, but the technology is there.
Based on which sensors would the flaps be deployed? How many redundant sensors? Calculated by which computers? What if they disagree? The erroneous activation of that trigger would need to be avoided at all cost too.
The Transport Canada memo seems to be saying that either way it goes (MCAS or no MCAS), the MAX won't meet certification standards, but by removing MCAS, it will not be meeting standards in a somewhat less dangerous manner.
The design of the MAX seems really to be broken. Think about it: abandoning regulatory requirements alltogether shall be safer than providing a solution to comply with them? Whats wrong with Boeing? Why are they not capable to provide a functioning solution to address the regulatory requirement?
As we all know, there exists no “MCAS OFF” switch on the MAX. So, in order to fly the plane normally, in all configurations, but without MCAS, the plane would require custom modification to its software to disable MCAS functions. I’d also be curious what method they would use to simulate a MCAS-caused runaway trim, on a real plane. It’s this kind of flying where the test pilots really earn their salt.
Take off today afternoon with any of the stored MAX and use the cut-off switch to demonstrate the "benign" MCAS-off behaviour. Boeing should have done that the first day, MCAS was ever mentioned. The lack of such evidence probably means, that there is no "benign" MCAS-off behaviour.
Or is the NY Times now not a credible source?
How can people continue to ignore articles like these?
Because they are off topic in the MAX grounding thread. They describe a general problem. In general Lionair might have room for improvement. But in regards of the MAX crash, they crossed way with an airplane, which happened to become a death trap so much more frequent than all other aircraft, that all these weaknesses are only ground noise compared to the glaring deficiencies of the MAX.
At best such articles serve as parable about what happened at Boeing during the MAX development. Only the impact on statistics due to Boeings manglings are much more evident...
Look, it is no secret, that safety standards differ world wide. Focus is laid differently. There are some countrys, in which people could not afford aviation services at all, if the trade off between safety and cost would not tend to focus on cost a bit more than in other places. That's just how it is.
But in the end aviation safety is measured in crashes and deaths. And looking very soberly at Lionair and similar airlines, you have to admit that people don't die frequently onboard their aircraft. The safety stats of Lionair are e.g. quite close to the global average and certainly not a magnitude of order worse as you make it sound like. They are e.g. an NG power user and not a single person died on one of their NGs so far.
Yes MCAS is a terrible design and the MAX should probably not fly it is unsafe unaugmented. But then neither should any other design that can't pass the same test. It leads me to question what other flaws in basic aerodynamic stability are being hidden by the regs on modern augmented designs.
That many aircraft have augmented control systems is not the issue. Prior the MAX the other aircraft proved that augmented aircraft work well and safe. The MAX simply had a broken augmentation system. Therefore the MAX does not throw a shadow on the other augmented aircraft, it only throws a shadow on Boeings capability to ever upgrade their old models again.