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flipdewaf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 4:29 pm

morrisond wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
I think you can reasonably assume that if a Western Airline was found to have the same issues as pointed out in the NY Times article and they were not corrected they would be grounded.

People are not saying that training isn't an issue that needs sorting but what has that got to do with the increased risk associated with the MAX and its grounding? That's what this thread is about


Fred


There are some saying that training doesn't need to be addressed. You are not one of them.

Point to one of them, I'm not particularly precious which...
morrisond wrote:

All civil aircraft have been certified with an assumed level of competence in the cockpit. If that level does not exist you have to change the certification standards and then re-certify all aircraft - or change the Training standards and ensure that pilots are in compliance with them.

I'd kind of agree, that's why the 737max has been grounded, it doesn't meet the certification standards.
morrisond wrote:

Basically the MAX should not be allowed to Return to service if Pilot training standards and there compliance or lack thereof are allowed to remain as is or not allowed to return to service with airlines that cannot demonstrate that proficiency. It was certified to a different level of assumed competence that is not in evidence worldwide.


Nope, it was incorrectly certificated due to not understanding the level of competence required by the pilots to complete successful flights at the same or better rates than required.
morrisond wrote:

At this point I would suggest it should not be allowed to Return to service with Lionair until they can demonstrate they have fixed there training system. The jury is out on ET but it's not looking good.

When the updated MAX returns to service it should be assessed in conjunction with the training records and competence of the pilots in question along with any type specific training required.
morrisond wrote:

Before MAX RTS - All other Airlines should have to at least have there pilots complete a flight from takeoff to touchdown using the manual trim wheel, and to demonstrate how to properly defeat the electric trim system and use said Manual trim system after being put in a position that is out of trim while in flight in the SIM. This does not need to be a MAX simulator.

or Boeing have a MCAS system that is suitably robust to failures such that the NG type rating still applies.
morrisond wrote:

I suggest this training be applied to all other 737 models or any other Airplane that has manual trim as a back up system within a reasonable period of time.

For what reason?
morrisond wrote:

That is why training is relevant to the 737 grounding and it's eventual RTS. Fixing MCAS or deleting it plus an iPad course is not enough.

Because of the f*ck up on the implementation of the MCAS system training will probably happen weather its needed or not, politics happens.

Fred
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 4:31 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
morrisond wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
People are not saying that training isn't an issue that needs sorting but what has that got to do with the increased risk associated with the MAX and its grounding? That's what this thread is about


Fred


There are some saying that training doesn't need to be addressed. You are not one of them.

All civil aircraft have been certified with an assumed level of competence in the cockpit. If that level does not exist you have to change the certification standards and then re-certify all aircraft - or change the Training standards and ensure that pilots are in compliance with them.

Basically the MAX should not be allowed to Return to service if Pilot training standards and there compliance or lack thereof are allowed to remain as is or not allowed to return to service with airlines that cannot demonstrate that proficiency. It was certified to a different level of assumed competence that is not in evidence worldwide.

At this point I would suggest it should not be allowed to Return to service with Lionair until they can demonstrate they have fixed there training system. The jury is out on ET but it's not looking good.

Before MAX RTS - All other Airlines should have to at least have there pilots complete a flight from takeoff to touchdown using the manual trim wheel, and to demonstrate how to properly defeat the electric trim system and use said Manual trim system after being put in a position that is out of trim while in flight in the SIM. This does not need to be a MAX simulator.

I suggest this training be applied to all other 737 models or any other Airplane that has manual trim as a back up system within a reasonable period of time.

That is why training is relevant to the 737 grounding and it's eventual RTS. Fixing MCAS or deleting it plus an iPad course is not enough.

What you are talking about is a specific training for the 737-8/9 MAX that nobody have defined yet. So this is total speculation at this point of time. But even if this will be the case, Boeing would be required by the airlines to provides all the support to make that happen at the Boeing expense. Boeing might agree of not, but either ways, I see little incentive to make it effective and right instead of quick and cheap. But this is the subject of a new thread, right ?

I suggest Boeing to demo a 737-8 MAX with stab trim full nose down runaway at high speed and low altitude, just to see how effective the manual trim wheels are...


I think a lot of aircraft would have difficulty with that scenario.

If training is needed to unground it then it belongs in this thread.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 4:36 pm

flipdewaf wrote:
I suggest this training be applied to all other 737 models or any other Airplane that has manual trim as a back up system within a reasonable period of time.

For what reason?

Fred[/quote]

Uhm - because Pilots are actually supposed to have knowledge of and be able use all the controls available to them?
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 4:40 pm

morrisond wrote:
It was certified to a different level of assumed competence that is not in evidence worldwide.

No… it was certified based on an incorrect hazard assessment that wrongly decided that the results of a failure were not overly dangerous, and thus it was okay to design a crap system, and rely on the pilots as a backstop. There are many scenarios in aircraft design where "we think the pilots can handle it" is simply not good enough, and this should have been one of them.

morrisond wrote:
Basically the MAX should not be allowed to Return to service if Pilot training standards and there compliance or lack thereof are allowed to remain as is or not allowed to return to service with airlines that cannot demonstrate that proficiency.

So… until there is better training, I would think that you would not be getting on any aircraft. After all, our worldwide pilot pool is still trained to the same standard as they were before the MAX grounding began. Or, is it just the MAX that requires better worldwide pilot training?

And, while I'm writing here, I suggest you show Captain Sully a little more respect. Saying "Sully agrees with me" is, in my opinion, arrogant. At most, I think you can say that you agree with the last two sentences of his letter. Personally, I agree with the entirety of his letter, and I would hope you do too, including the part where he says "Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap." Or, is death trap too strong a wording for you?

The kind of training that happens with MAX RTS is entirely dependent on the nature of the revisions to the aircraft itself. Maybe it will need the training, or maybe it won't. Goodness knows, Boeing seems to still be doing its damndest to avoid such training.

Regardless, worldwide training standards should not be tied to the MAX. What counts for the MAX, and for this thread, is what training is needed for the MAX. At this point, it is not certain whether the revised MAX will require special trim runaway training, or manual trim wheel training, any more than any other aircraft. Any suggestion that it does or doesn't is pure speculation and opinion. Any suggestion that all pilots need this training is part of the discussion on worldwide standards. That discussion, as you well know, can be found here: viewtopic.php?f=5&t=1431655

However, I remember you complained that this thread was located in the Tech Ops forum. I wouldn't think that this would bother you, as my impression is that worldwide pilot training standards are of great concern to you. I also would think that you would have chosen to post in that thread more than twice.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 4:46 pm

morrisond wrote:
Transport Canada may disagree with you on how serious the controls getting light is an issue.

Please stop saying that "Transport Canada" has said anything. They have not. One leaked inter-organizational email, from one employee at Transport Canada, does NOT define the position of the organization.
 
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767333ER
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 4:56 pm

morrisond wrote:
767333ER wrote:
morrisond wrote:
FBW hasn't been the magic bullet to prevent stalls that develop into fatal crashes - this would be a Worldwide Global Pilot Training Issue.

Of course, there are no magic bullets, but tell me how many times an Airbus equipped with FBW has stalled when in normal law and not in a failure mode. Alpha protection is a very effective tool, it responds much faster than a human could.


None that I'm aware of - but things can happen (AF447 blocked pitot tubes) or AirAsia 8501 - crew turning off the protections that result in the pilots actually needing to know how to fly an airplane and not stall it.

This is highly illogical. First you claim that a FBW flight envelope protected system is not so effective in preventing stalls. Then I raise the point that AFAIK probably only once an Airbus for example has “stalled” in normal law. So then you say it doesn’t work when it’s not working. This doesn’t follow. Very few aircraft with said system have stalled and crashed in general. Even the handful of times it has shut down, it’s so rare when you consider how many hours worth of flights it has worked for. You can measure how many times a plane has stalled and crashed but you cannot measure how many times the alpha protection kicked in because that is not significant enough of an event for common people like us to get our hands on the information of. You are right in this case about training, but I fail to see how a crashing a broken plane proves FBW is not so effective. Besides the point, I fail to see how this is relevant regarding the grounding and recertification of the MAX and the associated causes. You are off point again.
morrisond wrote:
maint123 wrote:
morrisond wrote:

People keep posting this however they are always ignoring the last two sentences.

"We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies."

I would say Sully agrees with the more balanced posters in this discussion. Those who would like to see everything addressed and fixed. Versus just closing there eyes sticking their fingers in there ears and screaming "No-No-No - Boeing must burn - everything else in aviation is perfect and if only we could shut Boeing down we will never have a crash again"

Morrisond if you don't mind my asking are you a engineer with hands on experience in any industry?
I am from a non aviation industry but in my experience you can't play with the laws of physics for long. They always win.
When hundreds of Max re enter service, if the plane still has serious issues, large probability of another accident.
People are going to again wonder why pilots with 6000 hours of flying and maintenance teams don't have a issue with NG or neo, but can't control a Max.
The Neo has had more than 100 PW engine failures in less than a year and half but the plane still managed to land safely with a single engine in all these cases. Dont remember even one emergency declared. Because the inbuilt safety is in a broad band and not in a narrow band.
Boeing is not going to close but no one wants to see another crash.


No - I am not an engineer - just a Private citizen with Minimal (115 hours) of flying experience - not much less than those put into a cockpit of a 737/A320 these days.

So in whatever Industry you are - say Nuclear - and there was a design issue with the plant causing an accident but during the investigation it was determined that faulty parts were installed and the Operators had made errors.

Option A - Fix the design issue and ignore everything else.

Option B - Fix the design issue, the maintenance issues and the training issues

Are you suggesting Option A is the right answer? What happens if another design issue pops up or a critical safety part fails due to manufacturing or installation issues? Cross your fingers and hope for the best?

The problem here is no one is saying Option A. That’s something you are inferring from nothing. Generally most of us agree with sully (I never thought I would on anything he has to say). He is saying first and foremost the MAX is a dangerous design. It is the main cause of this entire problem. As well there is the lingering issue of crews and maintenance, but that exists exactly the same outside the context of the MAX. That really is the point here: context. These other issues have existed as long as planes have been flying or as long as any machinery has been operated. We have been trying to fix said problems for just as long. We have done a pretty good job in the last 20 years. We can still improve a lot. If we didn’t have the MAX this would still be an important discussion. The 737 MAX wasn’t grounded because of training issues. If it was all aircraft would be grounded. What we are discussing here is the MAX and it’s flaws that caused it to be grounded. Focusing most of your efforts on human factors is arguing off point here. Bringing the topic of training and human factors into it puts you under a lot of heat because in this context it makes you look like you are one of those idiotic “Boeing is not at fault” despite this not being your intention. This is the same as you believing that I support “Option A” because I say that that training is not the paramount issue here. Its much like a conservative supporter calling a liberal supporter a communist or a liberal supporter calling a conservative supporter a fascist. You are doing this and some other are doing to you. Some others of us see your point and agree that there is something to look at there but just think it’s off topic or otherwise a distraction from why the MAX is not legal to fly. It’s just off topic here to focus most of your efforts on discussing human factors. It’s a small percentage of this problem, and as such it should be a small percentage of what is discussed.
Been on: 732 733 734 73G 738 752 763 A319 A320 A321 CRJ CR7 CRA/CR9 E145 E175 E190 F28 MD-82 MD-83 C172R C172S P2006T PA-28-180

2 ears for spatial hearing, 2 eyes for depth perception, 2 ears for balance... How did Boeing think 1 sensor was good enough?!
 
flipdewaf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 4:56 pm

morrisond wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
I suggest this training be applied to all other 737 models or any other Airplane that has manual trim as a back up system within a reasonable period of time.

For what reason?

Fred


Uhm - because Pilots are actually supposed to have knowledge of and be able use all the controls available to them?[/quote]
They generally do, if there are circumstances where they don't meet the minimum standard measures should be taken to make sure this is rectified but as mentioned, that's for a different thread, the pilots are supposed to be given the knowledge of the systems and controls and be given systems and controls they can use...

Fred
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rheinwaldner
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 5:04 pm

morrisond wrote:
There are some saying that training doesn't need to be addressed.


Training adresses only the tiny bit of accidents that remain after decade long progress in aviation safety. I call it the "morrisond gap" right at the lower right corner here:
Image

It is totally unrelated to the MAX grounding though.

morrisond wrote:
All civil aircraft have been certified with an assumed level of competence in the cockpit.

Which resulted in excellent aviation safety (see the diagram above). Until the MAX appeared.

morrisond wrote:
If that level (of pilot proficiency) does not exist you have to change the certification standards and then re-certify all aircraft

That level does exist. 1st proof: See the diagram above. 2nd proof: all aircraft except the MAX have excellent safety records nowadays.

Why on earth are you polluting the MAX grounding thread with your crusade to close the "morrisond-gap"?

morrisond wrote:
Basically the MAX should not be allowed to Return to service if Pilot training standards and there compliance or lack thereof are allowed to remain as is.

Once the MAX will work as robustely and fault tolerant as the other aircraft, there is no reason why the same pilots will not fly as safe with it as they fly with the other aircraft.

morrisond wrote:
Before MAX RTS - All other Airlines should have to at least have there pilots complete a flight from takeoff to touchdown using the manual trim wheel, and to demonstrate how to properly defeat the electric trim system and use said Manual trim system after being put in a position that is out of trim while in flight in the SIM. This does not need to be a MAX simulator.

That would break Boeings business case. A MAX with different training requirements has a lot less value for the airlines than the status quo. Therefore the status quo (no additional training) is defended by Boeing even more than fiercly than you are calling for the opposite.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
rheinwaldner
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 5:36 pm

And as images tell more than 1000 words, I quickly have drawn in the safety level of the MAX in the above diagram. To do this I even had to extend the scale of the diagram, as the safety level of the MAX reaches to heights not known after 1970 (where the diagram starts). The shown value for the MAX is 4550 fatalities per trillion RPKs:
Image

I get this number as follows:

- km per average flight: 2000
- MAX total flights: 250k
- pax on average: 150

This gives 75000000000 RPK.

Which is 1/13 of a trillion. 13 times the 350 fatalities yield the 4550 fatalities per trillion RPK.

This should answer, why we really should not focus on anything else than the MAX in this thread.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
pune
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 5:39 pm

kalvado wrote:
If you think about it, a previous NYT's big article, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html on the subject was about how pilots were at fault in crashes - although, to be fair to NYT, they published Sully's responce a week or two later.
Hardly qualifies NYT as an objective source in the situation.


Could you share Sully's article please, thank you.
 
pune
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 5:48 pm

MrBretz wrote:
Not that we didn’t know this already, but here is a highly unfavorable article about Lion Air. I might be flying a MAX someday but never on Lion.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/worl ... nesia.html


I don't fly much but still but whatever I have read of India and seen in India, the article could have been of all and any airlines operating in India and the regulator DGCA . It perhaps is it do that only a very small percentage of the people fly (even though the industry itself has been expanding for over a decade or more.) and even then it's only a miniscule number of people who are either aware or are enthused about flying and operations and what goes on. I could share dozens of instances, many of which have been shared by many posters in the Indian civil aviation thread posters how DGCA has often overlooked safety and done with perfunctory fines so that the money keeps coming in. So will Boeing stop selling planes to Indian airline industry or would they continue to sell ? And if they do, wouldn't that be blood on their hands because it isn't that they know how the industry players are, how for better or worse the regulators are in the Indian scene, if tomorrow a 737 Max were to crash ?
 
P1aneMad
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 5:49 pm

pune wrote:
kalvado wrote:
If you think about it, a previous NYT's big article, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html on the subject was about how pilots were at fault in crashes - although, to be fair to NYT, they published Sully's responce a week or two later.
Hardly qualifies NYT as an objective source in the situation.


Could you share Sully's article please, thank you.


Letter to the Editor
Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
New York Times Magazine
Published in print on October 13, 2019

In “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?” William Langewiesche draws the conclusion that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal design flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a threat to the flying public. I have long stated, as he does note, that pilots must be capable of absolute mastery of the aircraft and the situation at all times, a concept pilots call airmanship. Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap.

As one of the few pilots who have lived to tell about being in the left seat of an airliner when things went horribly wrong, with seconds to react, I know a thing or two about overcoming an unimagined crisis. I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator, replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design. These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS. The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

The National Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so. Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies.

Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
http://www.sullysullenberger.com/my-letter-to-the-editor-of-new-york-times-magazine/
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 5:50 pm

pune wrote:
kalvado wrote:
If you think about it, a previous NYT's big article, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html on the subject was about how pilots were at fault in crashes - although, to be fair to NYT, they published Sully's responce a week or two later.
Hardly qualifies NYT as an objective source in the situation.


Could you share Sully's article please, thank you.

Fully quoted a few times, e.g. in a post right below yours.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:16 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
That would break Boeings business case.

Which business case is that, the one prior to the crash or the one after the crash that has already cost over 10 billion and the number goes up each day?
How do you expect Boeing to get the previous business case back on track if ever? One of the things that the regulators are talking about is additional training, thankfully, a separate thread will be opened for that discussion when the time comes.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:21 pm

So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:28 pm

P1aneMad wrote:
morrisond wrote:
P1aneMad wrote:
What we should keep in our minds while Boeing's PR machine has fluff pieces who are trying to deflect blame from Boeing published on a range of "reputable" newspapers and magazines is captain Sully's open letter to the editor of one such publication who published one such fluff piece:



Letter to the Editor
Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
New York Times Magazine
Published in print on October 13, 2019

In “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?” William Langewiesche draws the conclusion that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal design flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a threat to the flying public. I have long stated, as he does note, that pilots must be capable of absolute mastery of the aircraft and the situation at all times, a concept pilots call airmanship. Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap.

As one of the few pilots who have lived to tell about being in the left seat of an airliner when things went horribly wrong, with seconds to react, I know a thing or two about overcoming an unimagined crisis. I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator, replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design. These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS. The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

The National Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so. Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies.

Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
http://www.sullysullenberger.com/my-letter-to-the-editor-of-new-york-times-magazine/


People keep posting this however they are always ignoring the last two sentences.

"We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies."

I would say Sully agrees with the more balanced posters in this discussion. Those who would like to see everything addressed and fixed. Versus just closing there eyes sticking their fingers in there ears and screaming "No-No-No - Boeing must burn - everything else in aviation is perfect and if only we could shut Boeing down we will never have a crash again"

You really need to accept the fact that those two tragedies happened because those pilots were flying the MAX.
Those two tragedies would not have happened if they were flying the NG. Or any version of the A320. Or a 737Classic.
So quit trying to shift the blame away from the aircraft and on to the airlines and their pilots.
You really need to accept this fact and move on.


I totally accept the fact that these particular crashes that resulted would not have happened on any other aircraft.

I also accept the fact that the Crashes would not have resulted in Fatalities if the other holes in the swiss cheese did not line up. Namely failures in the maintenance, training and operation of the aircraft.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:29 pm

DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.


No, they came to the conclusion that the MAX might be safer without MCAS than with MCAS, but they also had big questions on the safety without MCAS. Questions Boeing has been strangely unwilling to answer. Imho this is not a solution, that is a huge problem for Boeing and very close to a death sentence for the MAX, when you need binding safety regulation to be waived to improve the safety of the product.
 
djm18
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:30 pm

Bjorn’s Corner: Analysing the Lion Air JT610 crash, Part 4

November 21, 2019, ©. Leeham News: We continue the series on analyzing the Lion Air JT610 crash by analyzing MCAS in more depth before we go to the final part of the flight.

https://leehamnews.com/2019/11/22/bjorn ... sh-part-4/

Interesting commentary from the article...all the below is a direct quote:

"Isn’t MCAS needed for the safe flight of the 737 MAX? No! This is where most articles about MCAS are lacking. The 737 MAX works without MCAS.

Nothing in normal flying changes, in fact very little in non-normal flying as well. The pilot can do brusk Go-Arounds where he slams the throttles to full power and we won’t even get close to where MCAS steps in. First, because in a Go-Around he has slats and flaps deployed and as the aircraft cleans up he’s way below 11° AoA.

I have problems finding any case where a pilot would fly in a way where an inop MCAS would be missed. And if we for some extreme reason sometimes, somewhere, somehow find us in such a flight situation, the probability that MCAS then is inop is virtually nil.

But still, it all the holes in the cheese line up, flying without MCAS between 11° AoA and up to stall is doable. The aircraft is not unstable, just nose-up happy. If you then swing into stall warning (which starts at say 13°) you will as a pilot let go of the stick, this is an instinctive reaction of all trained pilots. You get out of stall warning and most likely the nose-up happy region.

And even if the MAX swings into stall it’s not the end of the world. Stall in an airliner like the 737 MAX is controllable, just release stick pressure and you are out of it. Not the big deal it’s made to be.

I describe all this to get some proportion into the discussion after the feel of doom around the 737 MAX which has been created by all the MCAS articles. Make no mistake about it, the original MCAS was terrible and dangerous but the revised is not. And the base aircraft has deficiencies, like most airliners, but it’s not a fundamentally dangerous aircraft."
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:33 pm

DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.


As long as the MAX doesn't have some really weird stall characteristics I would argue it's a lot safer to remove MCAS.

If you get to an AOA that is close to stall - you have a stick shaker going off, audio warnings and the FCC also helping by using the STS system (this part is from Memory - I might have this part wrong) to help point the nose down.

I don't think any pilot no matter how poorly trained would miss those clues and actually stall the aircraft. They are easy to interpret and the solution is simple - push the control column forward.

Or is that too much to assume from Pilots?
Last edited by morrisond on Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:39 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:38 pm

djm18 wrote:
Bjorn’s Corner: Analysing the Lion Air JT610 crash, Part 4

November 21, 2019, ©. Leeham News: We continue the series on analyzing the Lion Air JT610 crash by analyzing MCAS in more depth before we go to the final part of the flight.

https://leehamnews.com/2019/11/22/bjorn ... sh-part-4/

Interesting commentary from the article...all the below is a direct quote:

"Isn’t MCAS needed for the safe flight of the 737 MAX? No! This is where most articles about MCAS are lacking. The 737 MAX works without MCAS.

Nothing in normal flying changes, in fact very little in non-normal flying as well. The pilot can do brusk Go-Arounds where he slams the throttles to full power and we won’t even get close to where MCAS steps in. First, because in a Go-Around he has slats and flaps deployed and as the aircraft cleans up he’s way below 11° AoA.

I have problems finding any case where a pilot would fly in a way where an inop MCAS would be missed. And if we for some extreme reason sometimes, somewhere, somehow find us in such a flight situation, the probability that MCAS then is inop is virtually nil.

But still, it all the holes in the cheese line up, flying without MCAS between 11° AoA and up to stall is doable. The aircraft is not unstable, just nose-up happy. If you then swing into stall warning (which starts at say 13°) you will as a pilot let go of the stick, this is an instinctive reaction of all trained pilots. You get out of stall warning and most likely the nose-up happy region.

And even if the MAX swings into stall it’s not the end of the world. Stall in an airliner like the 737 MAX is controllable, just release stick pressure and you are out of it. Not the big deal it’s made to be.

I describe all this to get some proportion into the discussion after the feel of doom around the 737 MAX which has been created by all the MCAS articles. Make no mistake about it, the original MCAS was terrible and dangerous but the revised is not. And the base aircraft has deficiencies, like most airliners, but it’s not a fundamentally dangerous aircraft."


Great article.
 
dtw2hyd
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:42 pm

DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.


First remove MCAS and if there is a crash it is on the crew.

IMHO, any below average pilot can figure out to safely land as long as plane responds to pilot inputs without hidden force working against them.
All posts are just opinions.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:46 pm

DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.

So no thought that the individual who sent the leaked e-mail really understands why MCAS existed in the first place and the certification rules it was meant to address?
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 6:52 pm

seahawk wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.


No, they came to the conclusion that the MAX might be safer without MCAS than with MCAS, but they also had big questions on the safety without MCAS. Questions Boeing has been strangely unwilling to answer. Imho this is not a solution, that is a huge problem for Boeing and very close to a death sentence for the MAX, when you need binding safety regulation to be waived to improve the safety of the product.

It's not they. Transport Canada has not floated any ideas about granting a waiver to allow the removal of MCAS. This is the leaked, private email of one Transport Canada employee.

I'm glad that the agencies are having these discussions. All ideas should be considered. Indeed, it's an interesting discussion that we've been given a brief glance into. Yes, the email is VERY interesting indeed, but it should not be misconstrued as the position of TC itself. It's an important distinction.

Just as an elected member of government (or even a bureaucrat) might make a comment, that doesn't mean it's the official position of the government.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:00 pm

aerolimani wrote:
seahawk wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.


No, they came to the conclusion that the MAX might be safer without MCAS than with MCAS, but they also had big questions on the safety without MCAS. Questions Boeing has been strangely unwilling to answer. Imho this is not a solution, that is a huge problem for Boeing and very close to a death sentence for the MAX, when you need binding safety regulation to be waived to improve the safety of the product.

It's not they. Transport Canada has not floated any ideas about granting a waiver to allow the removal of MCAS. This is the leaked, private email of one Transport Canada employee.

I'm glad that the agencies are having these discussions. All ideas should be considered. Indeed, it's an interesting discussion that we've been given a brief glance into. Yes, the email is VERY interesting indeed, but it should not be misconstrued as the position of TC itself. It's an important distinction.

Just as an elected member of government (or even a bureaucrat) might make a comment, that doesn't mean it's the official position of the government.


True - it is not the official Transport Canada position.

Us Canadians usually have some pretty good ideas though. Living in the cold tends make us more innovative and figure out what is really necessary vs a nice to have luxury.
 
astuteman
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:00 pm

morrisond wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.


As long as the MAX doesn't have some really weird stall characteristics I would argue it's a lot safer to remove MCAS.

If you get to an AOA that is close to stall - you have a stick shaker going off, audio warnings and the FCC also helping by using the STS system (this part is from Memory - I might have this part wrong) to help point the nose down.

I don't think any pilot no matter how poorly trained would miss those clues and actually stall the aircraft. They are easy to interpret and the solution is simple - push the control column forward.

Or is that too much to assume from Pilots?


So no pilot, no matter how poorly trained, would have a problem flying the plane (i.e. MAX) if MCAS was removed?
Is that what I just read?
Perhaps we're getting somewhere. :)

For what its worth, in the same way that the "pitch up characteristic" found on the NEO is said to be "at the edge of the edge of the flight envelope", I have wondered for some time if Boeing managed to create a sledgehammer to crack a particular nut which is statistically unlikely ever to happen, just to satisfy a certification criteria?

On top of the genuine concerns raised over pilot, training and maintenance quality, this surely has to raise fundamental questions over the whole architecture of certification. Questions we are asking in my own industry, by the way, where the ALARP principle is capable of producing a disproportionate response to risks that will almost certainly never happen, whilst diluting the attention from things that really matter ...

Rgds
 
flipdewaf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:01 pm

morrisond wrote:

As long as the MAX doesn't have some really weird stall characteristics I would argue it's a lot safer to remove MCAS.

I

Oh-good-fu*king-lord!!! If you can avoid having to comply with regulations because your solutions are bad then what’s the point in the regulations?

There has just been another fume event on the A320 I believe. If the Airbus solution of putting a sock in the pipe as a filter doesn’t work should should they just allow the time events to continue?

Solving this properly isn’t beyond the guys at Boeing, it’s a time and a cost issue.

Fred


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
Image
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:04 pm

flipdewaf wrote:
morrisond wrote:

As long as the MAX doesn't have some really weird stall characteristics I would argue it's a lot safer to remove MCAS.

I

Oh-good-fu*king-lord!!! If you can avoid having to comply with regulations because your solutions are bad then what’s the point in the regulations?

There has just been another fume event on the A320 I believe. If the Airbus solution of putting a sock in the pipe as a filter doesn’t work should should they just allow the time events to continue?

Solving this properly isn’t beyond the guys at Boeing, it’s a time and a cost issue.

Fred


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk


Read Astuteman's post - all regulations aren't necessarily good or improve overall safety.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:06 pm

djm18 wrote:
Bjorn’s Corner: Analysing the Lion Air JT610 crash, Part 4

November 21, 2019, ©. Leeham News: We continue the series on analyzing the Lion Air JT610 crash by analyzing MCAS in more depth before we go to the final part of the flight.

https://leehamnews.com/2019/11/22/bjorn ... sh-part-4/

Interesting commentary from the article...all the below is a direct quote:

"Isn’t MCAS needed for the safe flight of the 737 MAX? No! This is where most articles about MCAS are lacking. The 737 MAX works without MCAS.

Nothing in normal flying changes, in fact very little in non-normal flying as well. The pilot can do brusk Go-Arounds where he slams the throttles to full power and we won’t even get close to where MCAS steps in. First, because in a Go-Around he has slats and flaps deployed and as the aircraft cleans up he’s way below 11° AoA.

I have problems finding any case where a pilot would fly in a way where an inop MCAS would be missed. And if we for some extreme reason sometimes, somewhere, somehow find us in such a flight situation, the probability that MCAS then is inop is virtually nil.

But still, it all the holes in the cheese line up, flying without MCAS between 11° AoA and up to stall is doable. The aircraft is not unstable, just nose-up happy. If you then swing into stall warning (which starts at say 13°) you will as a pilot let go of the stick, this is an instinctive reaction of all trained pilots. You get out of stall warning and most likely the nose-up happy region.

And even if the MAX swings into stall it’s not the end of the world. Stall in an airliner like the 737 MAX is controllable, just release stick pressure and you are out of it. Not the big deal it’s made to be.

I describe all this to get some proportion into the discussion after the feel of doom around the 737 MAX which has been created by all the MCAS articles. Make no mistake about it, the original MCAS was terrible and dangerous but the revised is not. And the base aircraft has deficiencies, like most airliners, but it’s not a fundamentally dangerous aircraft."

Interesting article. However, he doesn't cite any source where he can speak definitively about the plane's un-augmented aerodynamics. So, it's only his opinion. Not only that, but it's an opinion which is not necessarily shared by the regulating agencies, as evidenced by EASA's stated requirement for MCAS-off testing. Even though he emphasizes his belief that the MAX is perfectly fine without MCAS, he still does not go so far as to suggest that MCAS could be removed.

I find it difficult to imagine that Boeing would not have pursued a waiver, if it were as reasonable a proposal as some here suggest. Heck… the way things were so cozy between Boeing the FAA, I would have imagined they could have got the waiver, and still not required additional training to move over from the NG.
 
art
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:06 pm

If Boeing's submissions to FAA do not meet approval, what happens after that?
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:10 pm

astuteman wrote:
morrisond wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.


As long as the MAX doesn't have some really weird stall characteristics I would argue it's a lot safer to remove MCAS.

If you get to an AOA that is close to stall - you have a stick shaker going off, audio warnings and the FCC also helping by using the STS system (this part is from Memory - I might have this part wrong) to help point the nose down.

I don't think any pilot no matter how poorly trained would miss those clues and actually stall the aircraft. They are easy to interpret and the solution is simple - push the control column forward.

Or is that too much to assume from Pilots?


So no pilot, no matter how poorly trained, would have a problem flying the plane (i.e. MAX) if MCAS was removed?
Is that what I just read?
Perhaps we're getting somewhere. :)

For what its worth, in the same way that the "pitch up characteristic" found on the NEO is said to be "at the edge of the edge of the flight envelope", I have wondered for some time if Boeing managed to create a sledgehammer to crack a particular nut which is statistically unlikely ever to happen, just to satisfy a certification criteria?

On top of the genuine concerns raised over pilot, training and maintenance quality, this surely has to raise fundamental questions over the whole architecture of certification. Questions we are asking in my own industry, by the way, where the ALARP principle is capable of producing a disproportionate response to risks that will almost certainly never happen, whilst diluting the attention from things that really matter ...

Rgds


Great post - as yes as long as they can keep from stalling an aircraft they should be safe flying a MAX even without MCAS. I believe US based pilots are now required to do stall training and Sims in the US have to be able to be stall capable.

I believe this is probably in response to AF447, Colgan, ET409 and AirAsia 8501 regardless of the Root cause - all ended in tragedy as the Pilots stalled the aircraft.

Roll stall training out to the rest of the world and recurrent training on that should take care of the issue.
 
flipdewaf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:32 pm

morrisond wrote:
astuteman wrote:
morrisond wrote:

As long as the MAX doesn't have some really weird stall characteristics I would argue it's a lot safer to remove MCAS.

If you get to an AOA that is close to stall - you have a stick shaker going off, audio warnings and the FCC also helping by using the STS system (this part is from Memory - I might have this part wrong) to help point the nose down.

I don't think any pilot no matter how poorly trained would miss those clues and actually stall the aircraft. They are easy to interpret and the solution is simple - push the control column forward.

Or is that too much to assume from Pilots?


So no pilot, no matter how poorly trained, would have a problem flying the plane (i.e. MAX) if MCAS was removed?
Is that what I just read?
Perhaps we're getting somewhere. :)

For what its worth, in the same way that the "pitch up characteristic" found on the NEO is said to be "at the edge of the edge of the flight envelope", I have wondered for some time if Boeing managed to create a sledgehammer to crack a particular nut which is statistically unlikely ever to happen, just to satisfy a certification criteria?

On top of the genuine concerns raised over pilot, training and maintenance quality, this surely has to raise fundamental questions over the whole architecture of certification. Questions we are asking in my own industry, by the way, where the ALARP principle is capable of producing a disproportionate response to risks that will almost certainly never happen, whilst diluting the attention from things that really matter ...

Rgds


Great post - as yes as long as they can keep from stalling an aircraft they should be safe flying a MAX even without MCAS. I believe US based pilots are now required to do stall training and Sims in the US have to be able to be stall capable.


But that’s the point, the Likelihood of stalling increases with the nonlinear (in the form reducing force per g) stick forces vs linear or positive increase per g. It’s like saying you don’t need engine fire suppression, just make sure the engines don’t catch fire.

If the nonlinearity is slight it may be a trivial increase in risk. But the regs are there for good reason.

Fred



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Image
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:38 pm

DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.

Misrepresentation. Mr Markos strawman is to demonstrate compliance with the Longitudinal Stability requirements and to modify the FCC software to comply with the Stall Characteristics requirement - not to change the requirements.

The regulations are not a subjective attempt to quantify safety. The have been developed to improve safety (on the graves of many) and that is what they do.

Ray
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 7:53 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.

Misrepresentation. Mr Markos strawman is to demonstrate compliance with the Longitudinal Stability requirements and to modify the FCC software to comply with the Stall Characteristics requirement - not to change the requirements.

The regulations are not a subjective attempt to quantify safety. The have been developed to improve safety (on the graves of many) and that is what they do.

Ray


. . . and to modify the FCC software to comply with the Stall Characteristics requirement . . .

In other words, put in software coding into the FCC introducing some level of FBW functionality for manual flight . . . that sounds like real a can of worms to me.
Not to mention that the the same FCC seemingly can't handle MCAS 2.0 coding and manual electric trimming at the same time, under certain conditions.
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:14 pm

PW100 wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
So now that Transport Canada has floated the idea of simply changing the FAA rules, the rules are just a subjective attempt to quantify safety, so I don't disagree with that, but. Which is statistically safer? Removing MCAS 2.0 and just dealing with the pitch behavior before stall, or leaving MCAS 2.0 on there? Seems like it is one very low probability event versus another. Flip a coin and choose either.

Misrepresentation. Mr Markos strawman is to demonstrate compliance with the Longitudinal Stability requirements and to modify the FCC software to comply with the Stall Characteristics requirement - not to change the requirements.

The regulations are not a subjective attempt to quantify safety. The have been developed to improve safety (on the graves of many) and that is what they do.

Ray


. . . and to modify the FCC software to comply with the Stall Characteristics requirement . . .

In other words, put in software coding into the FCC introducing some level of FBW functionality for manual flight . . . that sounds like real a can of worms to me.
Not to mention that the the same FCC seemingly can't handle MCAS 2.0 coding and manual electric trimming at the same time, under certain conditions.

I'm sorry. I'm not following this, as it relates to the Jim Marko email. From what I read, he is advocating for a waiver. He doesn't say anything about changing regulations, nor about changing the way the software works. Regarding the software, he says that the version 12.1 MCAS is still not effective, as it does not meet the requirements of a more recently changed hazard assessment. As to the regulations, he says that eliminating MCAS brings about issues with handling and compliance, but that it looks like something they "could easily find a way to accept." I highly doubt that "accept" means changing regulations. It sounds like more of a "look the other way" policy, which in regulatory terms means a waiver.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:33 pm

flipdewaf wrote:
morrisond wrote:
astuteman wrote:

So no pilot, no matter how poorly trained, would have a problem flying the plane (i.e. MAX) if MCAS was removed?
Is that what I just read?
Perhaps we're getting somewhere. :)

For what its worth, in the same way that the "pitch up characteristic" found on the NEO is said to be "at the edge of the edge of the flight envelope", I have wondered for some time if Boeing managed to create a sledgehammer to crack a particular nut which is statistically unlikely ever to happen, just to satisfy a certification criteria?

On top of the genuine concerns raised over pilot, training and maintenance quality, this surely has to raise fundamental questions over the whole architecture of certification. Questions we are asking in my own industry, by the way, where the ALARP principle is capable of producing a disproportionate response to risks that will almost certainly never happen, whilst diluting the attention from things that really matter ...

Rgds


Great post - as yes as long as they can keep from stalling an aircraft they should be safe flying a MAX even without MCAS. I believe US based pilots are now required to do stall training and Sims in the US have to be able to be stall capable.


But that’s the point, the Likelihood of stalling increases with the nonlinear (in the form reducing force per g) stick forces vs linear or positive increase per g. It’s like saying you don’t need engine fire suppression, just make sure the engines don’t catch fire.

If the nonlinearity is slight it may be a trivial increase in risk. But the regs are there for good reason.

Fred



Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk



If the non-linearity is slight yes it is a slight increase in risk. But we have to remember that it (MCAS) would not actually prevent a stall - it is just one more warning system that you are getting close to one by making the controls heavier. You also have multiple other types of warnings triggering as well (stick shaker, audio alarms, frame buffeting) hopefully the Pilots would pay attention to one of them.

If not do they really don't belong in a ...........? I'll let you fill in the missing word.

MCAS is not the equivalent of a stick pusher that will prevent a stall.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:33 pm

flipdewaf wrote:
Oh-good-fu*king-lord!!! If you can avoid having to comply with regulations because your solutions are bad then what’s the point in the regulations?

There has just been another fume event on the A320 I believe. If the Airbus solution of putting a sock in the pipe as a filter doesn’t work should should they just allow the time events to continue?

Solving this properly isn’t beyond the guys at Boeing, it’s a time and a cost issue.

Fred


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

In the line of thinking with this thread the proper question would be why Airbus has not fixed the fume event and where is the AD from the regulators demanding a fix?
Boeing was attempting to meet the regulators requirements and they screwed up, unless there is no regulation requiring no fumes in the a/c?
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:33 pm

aerolimani wrote:
PW100 wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
Misrepresentation. Mr Markos strawman is to demonstrate compliance with the Longitudinal Stability requirements and to modify the FCC software to comply with the Stall Characteristics requirement - not to change the requirements.

The regulations are not a subjective attempt to quantify safety. The have been developed to improve safety (on the graves of many) and that is what they do.

Ray


. . . and to modify the FCC software to comply with the Stall Characteristics requirement . . .

In other words, put in software coding into the FCC introducing some level of FBW functionality for manual flight . . . that sounds like real a can of worms to me.
Not to mention that the the same FCC seemingly can't handle MCAS 2.0 coding and manual electric trimming at the same time, under certain conditions.

I'm sorry. I'm not following this, as it relates to the Jim Marko email. From what I read, he is advocating for a waiver. He doesn't say anything about changing regulations, nor about changing the way the software works. Regarding the software, he says that the version 12.1 MCAS is still not effective, as it does not meet the requirements of a more recently changed hazard assessment. As to the regulations, he says that eliminating MCAS brings about issues with handling and compliance, but that it looks like something they "could easily find a way to accept." I highly doubt that "accept" means changing regulations. It sounds like more of a "look the other way" policy, which in regulatory terms means a waiver.

https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/part_107_waivers/waiver_safety_explanation_guidelines/
Waiver Safety Explanation Guidelines for Part 107 Waiver Applications

Maybe a scenario, but not going to make a safer aircraft even safer...
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:35 pm

art wrote:
If Boeing's submissions to FAA do not meet approval, what happens after that?

They do not meet approval and they are sent back to the drawing board to ensure that they do meet approval.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:36 pm

par13del wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
Oh-good-fu*king-lord!!! If you can avoid having to comply with regulations because your solutions are bad then what’s the point in the regulations?

There has just been another fume event on the A320 I believe. If the Airbus solution of putting a sock in the pipe as a filter doesn’t work should should they just allow the time events to continue?

Solving this properly isn’t beyond the guys at Boeing, it’s a time and a cost issue.

Fred


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

In the line of thinking with this thread the proper question would be why Airbus has not fixed the fume event and where is the AD from the regulators demanding a fix?
Boeing was attempting to meet the regulators requirements and they screwed up, unless there is no regulation requiring no fumes in the a/c?


Or why is there not a worldwide grounding of the frame until the issue is fixed?
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:44 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
PW100 wrote:

. . . and to modify the FCC software to comply with the Stall Characteristics requirement . . .

In other words, put in software coding into the FCC introducing some level of FBW functionality for manual flight . . . that sounds like real a can of worms to me.
Not to mention that the the same FCC seemingly can't handle MCAS 2.0 coding and manual electric trimming at the same time, under certain conditions.

I'm sorry. I'm not following this, as it relates to the Jim Marko email. From what I read, he is advocating for a waiver. He doesn't say anything about changing regulations, nor about changing the way the software works. Regarding the software, he says that the version 12.1 MCAS is still not effective, as it does not meet the requirements of a more recently changed hazard assessment. As to the regulations, he says that eliminating MCAS brings about issues with handling and compliance, but that it looks like something they "could easily find a way to accept." I highly doubt that "accept" means changing regulations. It sounds like more of a "look the other way" policy, which in regulatory terms means a waiver.

https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/part_107_waivers/waiver_safety_explanation_guidelines/
Waiver Safety Explanation Guidelines for Part 107 Waiver Applications

Maybe a scenario, but not going to make a safer aircraft even safer...


No it wouldn't be quite as safe as an NG but if an NG crashes in 1 in 100 million flights a Max may crash in 1 in 99,999,999 flights without MCAS due to a stall.

If that 1 in 10,000 pilot or co-pilot gets into a Scenario where they are in a stall situation and ignore all the other warnings and they don't know enough to push the Control column forward and the Pilot/Co-pilot doesn't catch it either following along with the movement in the control column (impossible to do on an FBW aircraft that has controls that are not back driven) then yes it would be less safe than an NG.

I'm exaggerating my point above - but you are most likely talking about a very minor decrease in safety.
 
User avatar
aerolimani
Posts: 1321
Joined: Tue Jun 18, 2013 5:46 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:48 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
PW100 wrote:

. . . and to modify the FCC software to comply with the Stall Characteristics requirement . . .

In other words, put in software coding into the FCC introducing some level of FBW functionality for manual flight . . . that sounds like real a can of worms to me.
Not to mention that the the same FCC seemingly can't handle MCAS 2.0 coding and manual electric trimming at the same time, under certain conditions.

I'm sorry. I'm not following this, as it relates to the Jim Marko email. From what I read, he is advocating for a waiver. He doesn't say anything about changing regulations, nor about changing the way the software works. Regarding the software, he says that the version 12.1 MCAS is still not effective, as it does not meet the requirements of a more recently changed hazard assessment. As to the regulations, he says that eliminating MCAS brings about issues with handling and compliance, but that it looks like something they "could easily find a way to accept." I highly doubt that "accept" means changing regulations. It sounds like more of a "look the other way" policy, which in regulatory terms means a waiver.

https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/part_107_waivers/waiver_safety_explanation_guidelines/
Waiver Safety Explanation Guidelines for Part 107 Waiver Applications

Maybe a scenario, but not going to make a safer aircraft even safer...

Again, I'm confused. This section of Part 107 is an application for drone operators to operate in areas where they would normally be restricted. I don't see the comparison to the certification of Part 25 transport aircraft.
 
checklist350
Posts: 49
Joined: Fri Nov 01, 2019 5:40 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 8:54 pm

morrisond wrote:
par13del wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
Oh-good-fu*king-lord!!! If you can avoid having to comply with regulations because your solutions are bad then what’s the point in the regulations?

There has just been another fume event on the A320 I believe. If the Airbus solution of putting a sock in the pipe as a filter doesn’t work should should they just allow the time events to continue?

Solving this properly isn’t beyond the guys at Boeing, it’s a time and a cost issue.

Fred


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

In the line of thinking with this thread the proper question would be why Airbus has not fixed the fume event and where is the AD from the regulators demanding a fix?
Boeing was attempting to meet the regulators requirements and they screwed up, unless there is no regulation requiring no fumes in the a/c?


Or why is there not a worldwide grounding of the frame until the issue is fixed?


The way you play down MAX issues and try to equate it to issues with other planes is non-relenting. In spite of all the sugar coating ('not denying Boeing screwed up big time' etc. ) you continue your apologetics.

I hope you aren't too hung up on your current fantasy for a flight envelope / stick force waiver. A statement that is basically calling MCASv2 less safe then the regulation it is supposed to meet is somehow read by some ias an argument that said regulation is simply unnecessary.

A kiss of death to the solution Boeing worked on for over a year is somehow interpreted by some as an indulgence.
Last edited by checklist350 on Mon Nov 25, 2019 9:16 pm, edited 5 times in total.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 9:00 pm

aerolimani wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
I'm sorry. I'm not following this, as it relates to the Jim Marko email. From what I read, he is advocating for a waiver. He doesn't say anything about changing regulations, nor about changing the way the software works. Regarding the software, he says that the version 12.1 MCAS is still not effective, as it does not meet the requirements of a more recently changed hazard assessment. As to the regulations, he says that eliminating MCAS brings about issues with handling and compliance, but that it looks like something they "could easily find a way to accept." I highly doubt that "accept" means changing regulations. It sounds like more of a "look the other way" policy, which in regulatory terms means a waiver.

https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/part_107_waivers/waiver_safety_explanation_guidelines/
Waiver Safety Explanation Guidelines for Part 107 Waiver Applications

Maybe a scenario, but not going to make a safer aircraft even safer...

Again, I'm confused. This section of Part 107 is an application for drone operators to operate in areas where they would normally be restricted. I don't see the comparison to the certification of Part 25 transport aircraft.

Oups, didn't catch the Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the path.
But a unmanned 737-8/9 MAX will at least not kill crews and passengers... :duck:
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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scbriml
Posts: 19113
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 9:01 pm

morrisond wrote:
Or why is there not a worldwide grounding of the frame until the issue is fixed?


You know why it hasn't been grounded.
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2728
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 9:12 pm

checklist350 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
par13del wrote:
In the line of thinking with this thread the proper question would be why Airbus has not fixed the fume event and where is the AD from the regulators demanding a fix?
Boeing was attempting to meet the regulators requirements and they screwed up, unless there is no regulation requiring no fumes in the a/c?


Or why is there not a worldwide grounding of the frame until the issue is fixed?


The way you play down MAX issues and try to equate it to issues with other planes is non-relenting. In spite of all the sugar coating ('not denying Boeing screwed up big tme' etc. ) you continue your apologetics.


No the MAX has big issues - but no approach is perfect as some would have us believe.

Personally I think the lack of back driven controls on some FBW aircraft has created issues and needs to be fixed as well - or not allowed on future clean sheets.

If the MAX is replaced - I hope it is FBW as the envelope protections are a good thing - but with the controls and throttles being backdriven which gives important telltales to the pilots on what is going on with the aircraft and what the other pilot is attempting to do.

The MAX without MCAS and possibly the controls being a little light and pilots lacking that one (of many ) precise tactile feedbacks doesn't seem to be an issue with a lot of current FBW designs that have little to no feedback at all.

But I think overall all Aircraft should have that feedback.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2728
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 9:13 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/part_107_waivers/waiver_safety_explanation_guidelines/
Waiver Safety Explanation Guidelines for Part 107 Waiver Applications

Maybe a scenario, but not going to make a safer aircraft even safer...

Again, I'm confused. This section of Part 107 is an application for drone operators to operate in areas where they would normally be restricted. I don't see the comparison to the certification of Part 25 transport aircraft.

Oups, didn't catch the Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the path.
But a unmanned 737-8/9 MAX will at least not kill crews and passengers... :duck:


True - just look out below.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2728
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 9:16 pm

scbriml wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Or why is there not a worldwide grounding of the frame until the issue is fixed?


You know why it hasn't been grounded.


Because it hasn't killed anyone yet? It sounds like they might have come close though. Is that really the standard now - people have to die before something that should be fixed it taken out of service?
 
User avatar
767333ER
Posts: 1170
Joined: Wed Jun 15, 2016 5:14 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 9:22 pm

morrisond wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Great post - as yes as long as they can keep from stalling an aircraft they should be safe flying a MAX even without MCAS. I believe US based pilots are now required to do stall training and Sims in the US have to be able to be stall capable.


But that’s the point, the Likelihood of stalling increases with the nonlinear (in the form reducing force per g) stick forces vs linear or positive increase per g. It’s like saying you don’t need engine fire suppression, just make sure the engines don’t catch fire.

If the nonlinearity is slight it may be a trivial increase in risk. But the regs are there for good reason.

Fred



Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk



If the non-linearity is slight yes it is a slight increase in risk. But we have to remember that it (MCAS) would not actually prevent a stall - it is just one more warning system that you are getting close to one by making the controls heavier. You also have multiple other types of warnings triggering as well (stick shaker, audio alarms, frame buffeting) hopefully the Pilots would pay attention to one of them.

If not do they really don't belong in a ...........? I'll let you fill in the missing word.

MCAS is not the equivalent of a stick pusher that will prevent a stall.

morrisond wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
I'm sorry. I'm not following this, as it relates to the Jim Marko email. From what I read, he is advocating for a waiver. He doesn't say anything about changing regulations, nor about changing the way the software works. Regarding the software, he says that the version 12.1 MCAS is still not effective, as it does not meet the requirements of a more recently changed hazard assessment. As to the regulations, he says that eliminating MCAS brings about issues with handling and compliance, but that it looks like something they "could easily find a way to accept." I highly doubt that "accept" means changing regulations. It sounds like more of a "look the other way" policy, which in regulatory terms means a waiver.

https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/part_107_waivers/waiver_safety_explanation_guidelines/
Waiver Safety Explanation Guidelines for Part 107 Waiver Applications

Maybe a scenario, but not going to make a safer aircraft even safer...


No it wouldn't be quite as safe as an NG but if an NG crashes in 1 in 100 million flights a Max may crash in 1 in 99,999,999 flights without MCAS due to a stall.

If that 1 in 10,000 pilot or co-pilot gets into a Scenario where they are in a stall situation and ignore all the other warnings and they don't know enough to push the Control column forward and the Pilot/Co-pilot doesn't catch it either following along with the movement in the control column (impossible to do on an FBW aircraft that has controls that are not back driven) then yes it would be less safe than an NG.

I'm exaggerating my point above - but you are most likely talking about a very minor decrease in safety.

You cannot say such a thing if you do not know how a 737 MAX behaves approaching a stall without MCAS and until Boeing shows us what happens (that’s starting to get like Trump’s tax returns?) we can’t say it’s for sure a small increase in risk. The only sort of evidence we have is the apparent authority MCAS has AND the fact that they increased the authority it has during the development period. Take all this into account and we can’t say anything is likely or not likely, but we can make an inference and to me it looks like there is something sinister about the stall characteristics of the MAX. I don’t know for sure, nor do you, but to me these things make it look worse than it is “said” to be. Would they increase that authority if it was just a small risk of stick force lightening?

Now for the love of all things holy stop referring to pilot and co-pilot. A captain and a first officer are both pilots. Co-pilot is an inaccurate term.

Back driven controls Have zero relevance in this discussion. Arguing off point again.
Been on: 732 733 734 73G 738 752 763 A319 A320 A321 CRJ CR7 CRA/CR9 E145 E175 E190 F28 MD-82 MD-83 C172R C172S P2006T PA-28-180

2 ears for spatial hearing, 2 eyes for depth perception, 2 ears for balance... How did Boeing think 1 sensor was good enough?!
 
pasen
Posts: 24
Joined: Sat Mar 28, 2015 9:03 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 9:24 pm

morrisond wrote:
Basically the MAX should not be allowed to Return to service if Pilot training standards and there compliance or lack thereof are allowed to remain as is or not allowed to return to service with airlines that cannot demonstrate that proficiency. It was certified to a different level of assumed competence that is not in evidence worldwide.


The training for the MAX is the same as for the NG. Wouldn't that mean, that all NGs need to be grounded too then? Or are you finally admitting that the training standards that were good enough for the NG are no longer adequate for the Max?
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 870
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Nov 25, 2019 9:43 pm

morrisond wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
morrisond wrote:

As long as the MAX doesn't have some really weird stall characteristics I would argue it's a lot safer to remove MCAS.

I

Oh-good-fu*king-lord!!! If you can avoid having to comply with regulations because your solutions are bad then what’s the point in the regulations?

There has just been another fume event on the A320 I believe. If the Airbus solution of putting a sock in the pipe as a filter doesn’t work should should they just allow the time events to continue?

Solving this properly isn’t beyond the guys at Boeing, it’s a time and a cost issue.

Fred


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk


Read Astuteman's post - all regulations aren't necessarily good or improve overall safety.

And you are both wrong, at least in this case.

Incompetent design to meet the Longitudinal Stability and Stall Characteristic requirements justified by inappropriate use of test demonstration regulation and incorrect application of probability assessment to incorrectly demonstrate compliance with requirements does not question the validity of either the Longitudinal Stability and stall Characteristic requirements, or the test demonstration requirement, or the safety assessment or probability principals.

If it demonstrates anything it is a systemically flawed design and validation process. Additionally, JATR reported that there was effectively no Safety Management System in place and has been demonstrated that 'Red Flags' were not addressed to correct these deficiencies/prevent significant events in 2015, 2016 and 2018 (prior to JT610), 2018 (JT610 itself), Late 2018 reported Boeing/FAA meeting MCAS was 'dangerous' and JT610 scenario was 'likely' to occur again, early 2019 additional Flight Control system 'Catastrophic' failure mode identified.

Stall recovery in a Cessna or Top Gun fighter jet might be gung-ho and fun. In commercial aviation, stall is Hazardous and folks can be injured and killed, even if easily recoverable, and increase the potential for Catastrophic events. Stall shall be avoided in all reasonably practical circumstances and that means meet the requirements as set (without dodgy assessments) as the bare minimum. This includes a recognition that atmospheric disturbances occur that do not require the pilots assistance to push the airframe thought to stall rapidly.

Ray

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