767333ER wrote:morrisond wrote:flipdewaf wrote:But that’s the point, the Likelihood of stalling increases with the nonlinear (in the form reducing force per g) stick forces vs linear or positive increase per g. It’s like saying you don’t need engine fire suppression, just make sure the engines don’t catch fire.
If the nonlinearity is slight it may be a trivial increase in risk. But the regs are there for good reason.
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If the non-linearity is slight yes it is a slight increase in risk. But we have to remember that it (MCAS) would not actually prevent a stall - it is just one more warning system that you are getting close to one by making the controls heavier. You also have multiple other types of warnings triggering as well (stick shaker, audio alarms, frame buffeting) hopefully the Pilots would pay attention to one of them.
If not do they really don't belong in a ...........? I'll let you fill in the missing word.
MCAS is not the equivalent of a stick pusher that will prevent a stall.morrisond wrote:PixelFlight wrote:https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/part_107_waivers/waiver_safety_explanation_guidelines/
Waiver Safety Explanation Guidelines for Part 107 Waiver Applications
Maybe a scenario, but not going to make a safer aircraft even safer...
No it wouldn't be quite as safe as an NG but if an NG crashes in 1 in 100 million flights a Max may crash in 1 in 99,999,999 flights without MCAS due to a stall.
If that 1 in 10,000 pilot or co-pilot gets into a Scenario where they are in a stall situation and ignore all the other warnings and they don't know enough to push the Control column forward and the Pilot/Co-pilot doesn't catch it either following along with the movement in the control column (impossible to do on an FBW aircraft that has controls that are not back driven) then yes it would be less safe than an NG.
I'm exaggerating my point above - but you are most likely talking about a very minor decrease in safety.
You cannot say such a thing if you do not know how a 737 MAX behaves approaching a stall without MCAS and until Boeing shows us what happens (that’s starting to get like Trump’s tax returns?) we can’t say it’s for sure a small increase in risk. The only sort of evidence we have is the apparent authority MCAS has AND the fact that they increased the authority it has during the development period. Take all this into account and we can’t say anything is likely or not likely, but we can make an inference and to me it looks like there is something sinister about the stall characteristics of the MAX. I don’t know for sure, nor do you, but to me these things make it look worse than it is “said” to be. Would they increase that authority if it was just a small risk of stick force lightening?
Now for the love of all things holy stop referring to pilot and co-pilot. A captain and a first officer are both pilots. Co-pilot is an inaccurate term.
Back driven controls Have zero relevance in this discussion. Arguing off point again.
Yes you are right - we don't know if the MAX has some unknown handling quirk. I just forgot to put that qualifier on this one post - but I have been doing that repeatedly.
I think I said yesterday that if it does have handling quirks that are impossible to offset without augmentation - it's time to put a bullet in it.
OK - on the First Officer/Co-Pilot thing - I get your point and that is a better way to describe the roles.
On the back driven vs non-back driven FBW systems I was just preempting one of the normal refrains we hear on this thread - the MAX should be redesigned with a full FBW system or not be RTS at all. Sure as long as it's back driven.
Non-back driven systems have been one of the primary causes of more fatalities than MCAS.