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TTailedTiger
Posts: 2492
Joined: Sun Aug 26, 2018 5:19 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 4:47 pm

seahawk wrote:
TaromA380 wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:

You can say it all you want. But the fact remains that the crew was a component of the accident. A more competent Lion Air crew faced the exact same situation and landed safely. The crew was literally the difference between life and death.

More competent or more numerous - as that flight had, by chance, three pilots instead of two in the cockpit.


Which makes a lot sense, ass from the Jump Seat the movement of the trim wheels is much more in your focus and easy to see.


By that logic planes with 3+ crew should have been the safest in the sky. But they were routinely ending up in a thousand peices. The addition of flight engineers, navigators, and radio operators didn't seem to help them.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2715
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 5:13 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:
When you don't understand what the automation is doing, you shut it off and take back (manual) control.

But then, there still is some automation running in the back ground (STS, MCAS). And contrary to STS, MCAS would not stop with control column inputs.

So there are layer after layer after layer of confusing automation, even when shut off.
And worst of all, pilots were kept pretty much in the dark on most of that. Traditional NG pilot standards, even those of substandard level that did sort of OK on the NG, obviously did not match with Max MCAS failure scenarios. That is fully on Boeing (and perhaps FAA/EASA etc), but not worldwide pilot standards.

Conversion training would probably could have solved some of that, but you can't put that in a 60 minute iPad course.

Apart from whether we should allow such a situation to fly, when the changes of mishandling such failure scenario are large, and consequences of mishandling are gross (loss of aircraft), sim sessions would be required. Pilots were sent out there totally unprepared for MCAS failure. That is fully on Boeing (and perhaps FAA/EASA etc), but not worldwide pilot standards.


If you turn off the Electric Trim and disengage Autopilot and Autothrottle like you are supposed to then there isn't anything left running in the background that can affect the flightpath or the Airspeed.

I agree Lionair was sent out there totally unprepared - but ET is a different matter.

It was up to ET to prepare there crews to handle an MCAS misfire. By the time of the crash ET had all the information they needed from Boeing to safely handle an MCAS misfire.

ET training failed to train there pilots sufficiently, resulting in the second crash and the grounding.

It says right in the ET FCOM what to do (disengage AT and do not reengage the electric trim) contrary to what the ET CEO says they did not follow all procedures.

I am not blaming the pilots I am blaming ET training. Apparently all they did was send out an email to their pilots on MCAS and did not do anything more than that. The ET First Officer was in the Sim after the first crash close to his fatal flight and there are no reports that MCAS was part of that session.

So people can keep personally attacking me but stop trying to deny what most likely happened.

In the final crash report transcript if the crews mention MCAS once I'll retract everything I've said.

MISINFORMATION - Neither Capt. or FO training records have been released as far as I can tell. The preliminary report shows the dates of Line and Proficiency checks of both to be prior to MCAS SIM being available at Ethiopian (one of the first in the world). The MAX Sim, in any case, did not include MCAS functionality.

The Email story (you like) as you know, was offered by a pilot contributor as NORMAL practice in most airlines and is not confirmed anyway. The usual add on you like to give is that no receipt response was required. This you made up as far as I can see.

It is clear from all the reports and commentary that pilots were overwhelmed. It is further demonstrated by the reports recent pilot group sessions with MCAS 2.0 and revised procedures, that even with fore-knowledge and specific training, the scenarios presented were such that half of the pilots still were confused enough not to respond as expected/trained.

Give us all a break. I for one, don't want to read your stories every week or two until March.


Give us a break. You know that those pilots were not put into the sim at the beginning of incident simulation but at the end after MCAS had fired multiple times.

Stop the disinformation.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2715
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 5:19 pm

Francoflier wrote:
morrisond wrote:

I am not blaming the pilots I am blaming ET training. Apparently all they did was send out an email to their pilots on MCAS and did not do anything more than that. The ET First Officer was in the Sim after the first crash close to his fatal flight and there are no reports that MCAS was part of that session.


All they sent their pilots was an email because an email is essentially all they got from Boeing who was, at the time, still in denial of the issue and had not published any training syllabus to address it. My guess is that they were trying to avoid liability and hoping for no more crashes while they hastily and quietly fixed the software...

A bulletin is not how you tackle such a serious failure mode. It's like trying to teach pilots how to handle an engine failure on takeoff by having them read about it. There is a reason such failures are trained in a simulator, especially those, very much like the MCAS events, that require immediate actions and manual handling close to the ground.

You are once again displaying your ignorance when it comes to aviation safety systems and airline training.
Maybe you can tell us what other operators were doing differently vis-a-vis MCAS training after JT610?


Probably refamiliarizing themselves with the Runaway Trim NNC. That is what the ET documents say to do if you experience MCAS symptoms.

This is something that is supposed to be regularly practised by all crew worldwide and is a required memory item. This is not a new procedure - crews just had to know that if symptoms exactly like ET experienced happened run the Runaway trim NNC.

This did not require new training - they just needed to know that MCAS would not present like normal runaway trim.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2715
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 5:22 pm

Agrajag wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:
When you don't understand what the automation is doing, you shut it off and take back (manual) control.

But then, there still is some automation running in the back ground (STS, MCAS). And contrary to STS, MCAS would not stop with control column inputs.

So there are layer after layer after layer of confusing automation, even when shut off.
And worst of all, pilots were kept pretty much in the dark on most of that. Traditional NG pilot standards, even those of substandard level that did sort of OK on the NG, obviously did not match with Max MCAS failure scenarios. That is fully on Boeing (and perhaps FAA/EASA etc), but not worldwide pilot standards.

Conversion training would probably could have solved some of that, but you can't put that in a 60 minute iPad course.

Apart from whether we should allow such a situation to fly, when the changes of mishandling such failure scenario are large, and consequences of mishandling are gross (loss of aircraft), sim sessions would be required. Pilots were sent out there totally unprepared for MCAS failure. That is fully on Boeing (and perhaps FAA/EASA etc), but not worldwide pilot standards.


If you turn off the Electric Trim and disengage Autopilot and Autothrottle like you are supposed to then there isn't anything left running in the background that can affect the flightpath or the Airspeed.

I agree Lionair was sent out there totally unprepared - but ET is a different matter.

It was up to ET to prepare there crews to handle an MCAS misfire. By the time of the crash ET had all the information they needed from Boeing to safely handle an MCAS misfire.

ET training failed to train there pilots sufficiently, resulting in the second crash and the grounding.

It says right in the ET FCOM what to do (disengage AT and do not reengage the electric trim) contrary to what the ET CEO says they did not follow all procedures.

I am not blaming the pilots I am blaming ET training. Apparently all they did was send out an email to their pilots on MCAS and did not do anything more than that. The ET First Officer was in the Sim after the first crash close to his fatal flight and there are no reports that MCAS was part of that session.

So people can keep personally attacking me but stop trying to deny what most likely happened.

In the final crash report transcript if the crews mention MCAS once I'll retract everything I've said.


How could MCAS be part of the 'session' if MCAS wasnt on the sim? What chance did these poor pilots have to train for MCAS?


MCAS was not part of the sim software at that point - but they could have simulated it easily by repeatedly having the trim runaway and then stopping and then repeating. That should not have been that hard to do in a sim.

Or at least spent time practising the Runaway Trim NNC Memory item.
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 870
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 5:33 pm

morrisond wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
morrisond wrote:

If you turn off the Electric Trim and disengage Autopilot and Autothrottle like you are supposed to then there isn't anything left running in the background that can affect the flightpath or the Airspeed.

I agree Lionair was sent out there totally unprepared - but ET is a different matter.

It was up to ET to prepare there crews to handle an MCAS misfire. By the time of the crash ET had all the information they needed from Boeing to safely handle an MCAS misfire.

ET training failed to train there pilots sufficiently, resulting in the second crash and the grounding.

It says right in the ET FCOM what to do (disengage AT and do not reengage the electric trim) contrary to what the ET CEO says they did not follow all procedures.

I am not blaming the pilots I am blaming ET training. Apparently all they did was send out an email to their pilots on MCAS and did not do anything more than that. The ET First Officer was in the Sim after the first crash close to his fatal flight and there are no reports that MCAS was part of that session.

So people can keep personally attacking me but stop trying to deny what most likely happened.

In the final crash report transcript if the crews mention MCAS once I'll retract everything I've said.

MISINFORMATION - Neither Capt. or FO training records have been released as far as I can tell. The preliminary report shows the dates of Line and Proficiency checks of both to be prior to MCAS SIM being available at Ethiopian (one of the first in the world). The MAX Sim, in any case, did not include MCAS functionality.

The Email story (you like) as you know, was offered by a pilot contributor as NORMAL practice in most airlines and is not confirmed anyway. The usual add on you like to give is that no receipt response was required. This you made up as far as I can see.

It is clear from all the reports and commentary that pilots were overwhelmed. It is further demonstrated by the reports recent pilot group sessions with MCAS 2.0 and revised procedures, that even with fore-knowledge and specific training, the scenarios presented were such that half of the pilots still were confused enough not to respond as expected/trained.

Give us all a break. I for one, don't want to read your stories every week or two until March.


Give us a break. You know that those pilots were not put into the sim at the beginning of incident simulation but at the end after MCAS had fired multiple times.

Stop the disinformation.

Wrong! again.

Get yourself up to date. The pilot group sessions were performed to test out training and revised procedures with MCAS 2.0 as part of the RTS activity within the last fortnight.
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 870
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 5:39 pm

morrisond wrote:
Francoflier wrote:
morrisond wrote:

I am not blaming the pilots I am blaming ET training. Apparently all they did was send out an email to their pilots on MCAS and did not do anything more than that. The ET First Officer was in the Sim after the first crash close to his fatal flight and there are no reports that MCAS was part of that session.


All they sent their pilots was an email because an email is essentially all they got from Boeing who was, at the time, still in denial of the issue and had not published any training syllabus to address it. My guess is that they were trying to avoid liability and hoping for no more crashes while they hastily and quietly fixed the software...

A bulletin is not how you tackle such a serious failure mode. It's like trying to teach pilots how to handle an engine failure on takeoff by having them read about it. There is a reason such failures are trained in a simulator, especially those, very much like the MCAS events, that require immediate actions and manual handling close to the ground.

You are once again displaying your ignorance when it comes to aviation safety systems and airline training.
Maybe you can tell us what other operators were doing differently vis-a-vis MCAS training after JT610?


Probably refamiliarizing themselves with the Runaway Trim NNC. That is what the ET documents say to do if you experience MCAS symptoms.

This is something that is supposed to be regularly practised by all crew worldwide and is a required memory item. This is not a new procedure - crews just had to know that if symptoms exactly like ET experienced happened run the Runaway trim NNC.

This did not require new training - they just needed to know that MCAS would not present like normal runaway trim.


Runaway Stabiliser NNC was not added to the training syllabus until February 2019, no doubt as part of belated response to the incompetent MCAS design and safety assessment that was brought to light by JT610.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 5:41 pm

TTailedTiger wrote:
seahawk wrote:
TaromA380 wrote:
More competent or more numerous - as that flight had, by chance, three pilots instead of two in the cockpit.


Which makes a lot sense, ass from the Jump Seat the movement of the trim wheels is much more in your focus and easy to see.


By that logic planes with 3+ crew should have been the safest in the sky. But they were routinely ending up in a thousand peices. The addition of flight engineers, navigators, and radio operators didn't seem to help them.


There is flawed logic there, but it’s yours!

That flight was saved precisely because the third person in the cockpit had nothing to do. He was spare, surplus to requirement until the point he was required. Comparing that flight to three or four-man cockpits of yesteryear is less than pointless.
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 6:01 pm

scbriml wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
seahawk wrote:

Which makes a lot sense, ass from the Jump Seat the movement of the trim wheels is much more in your focus and easy to see.


By that logic planes with 3+ crew should have been the safest in the sky. But they were routinely ending up in a thousand peices. The addition of flight engineers, navigators, and radio operators didn't seem to help them.


There is flawed logic there, but it’s yours!

That flight was saved precisely because the third person in the cockpit had nothing to do. He was spare, surplus to requirement until the point he was required. Comparing that flight to three or four-man cockpits of yesteryear is less than pointless.

Well, there is some logic in everything. Like it or hate it, people are replaced by automation.
Radios improved, operations became easier - and radio operator was replaced. Engine control got computerized - and flight engineer is no more.
Did it help to have 4-5 people in the cockpit in case of an emergency? Maybe yes, maybe not - there were more tasks to do for those folks, with or without emergency.
A few of high profile accidents - QF32 comes to mind - benefited from extra people in the cockpit. AF447 COULD benefit if captain could make it in time. Asiana 214 COULD benefit if those extra pilots did speak up.
Problem is, 99 out of 100 flights don't need those extra hands..
 
Agrajag
Posts: 128
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 6:15 pm

morrisond wrote:
Agrajag wrote:
morrisond wrote:

If you turn off the Electric Trim and disengage Autopilot and Autothrottle like you are supposed to then there isn't anything left running in the background that can affect the flightpath or the Airspeed.

I agree Lionair was sent out there totally unprepared - but ET is a different matter.

It was up to ET to prepare there crews to handle an MCAS misfire. By the time of the crash ET had all the information they needed from Boeing to safely handle an MCAS misfire.

ET training failed to train there pilots sufficiently, resulting in the second crash and the grounding.

It says right in the ET FCOM what to do (disengage AT and do not reengage the electric trim) contrary to what the ET CEO says they did not follow all procedures.

I am not blaming the pilots I am blaming ET training. Apparently all they did was send out an email to their pilots on MCAS and did not do anything more than that. The ET First Officer was in the Sim after the first crash close to his fatal flight and there are no reports that MCAS was part of that session.

So people can keep personally attacking me but stop trying to deny what most likely happened.

In the final crash report transcript if the crews mention MCAS once I'll retract everything I've said.


How could MCAS be part of the 'session' if MCAS wasnt on the sim? What chance did these poor pilots have to train for MCAS?


MCAS was not part of the sim software at that point - but they could have simulated it easily by repeatedly having the trim runaway and then stopping and then repeating. That should not have been that hard to do in a sim.

Or at least spent time practising the Runaway Trim NNC Memory item.



As usual your 2020 hindsight and your lack of understanding of the real aviation world is very telling. I am baffled by your constant need to deflect from Boeing's obvious negligence. Youve been doing this for almost a year now.
The plural of anecdote is anecdotes, not data.
Slartibartfast had a point
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 7:08 pm

scbriml wrote:
That flight was saved precisely because the third person in the cockpit had nothing to do. He was spare, surplus to requirement until the point he was required. Comparing that flight to three or four-man cockpits of yesteryear is less than pointless.

Precisely? How can you assert that?

There's no proof that the lack of a task is what allowed the third pilot to come up with the right approach to dealing with MCAS.

Just because the man had no assigned task, there's no saying that he would not have sorted things out and came up with the right approach if he had an assigned task.

It could be that the same pilot could have saved the plane if he was captain that day and anyone else was FO or even if he was flying solo.

It could be that the same captain that ended up crashing JT could have saved the plane if he had a FO that could remember memory items and if he had used good CRM to tell the FO exactly what he was doing to save the plane before the FO took over.

But yeah, these arguments are silly.

Both Boeing and FAA said MCAS 1.0 put too much workload on the pilots, that should be the end of it.

Yet we all seem to enjoy merry go-rounds, so it's off to the races just when people may have thought this thread had moved on.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
morrisond
Posts: 2715
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 7:32 pm

Revelation wrote:
scbriml wrote:
That flight was saved precisely because the third person in the cockpit had nothing to do. He was spare, surplus to requirement until the point he was required. Comparing that flight to three or four-man cockpits of yesteryear is less than pointless.

Precisely? How can you assert that?

There's no proof that the lack of a task is what allowed the third pilot to come up with the right approach to dealing with MCAS.

Just because the man had no assigned task, there's no saying that he would not have sorted things out and came up with the right approach if he had an assigned task.

It could be that the same pilot could have saved the plane if he was captain that day and anyone else was FO or even if he was flying solo.

It could be that the same captain that ended up crashing JT could have saved the plane if he had a FO that could remember memory items and if he had used good CRM to tell the FO exactly what he was doing to save the plane before the FO took over.

But yeah, these arguments are silly.

Both Boeing and FAA said MCAS 1.0 put too much workload on the pilots, that should be the end of it.

Yet we all seem to enjoy merry go-rounds, so it's off to the races just when people may have thought this thread had moved on.


I'll stop if people will stop asserting that the pilots had nothing to do with it and there was nothing they could have done.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 7:37 pm

Agrajag wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Agrajag wrote:

How could MCAS be part of the 'session' if MCAS wasnt on the sim? What chance did these poor pilots have to train for MCAS?


MCAS was not part of the sim software at that point - but they could have simulated it easily by repeatedly having the trim runaway and then stopping and then repeating. That should not have been that hard to do in a sim.

Or at least spent time practising the Runaway Trim NNC Memory item.



As usual your 2020 hindsight and your lack of understanding of the real aviation world is very telling. I am baffled by your constant need to deflect from Boeing's obvious negligence. Youve been doing this for almost a year now.


Instead of just insulting me - which BTW is against forum rules - what did I get wrong above?

And BTW I have said that Boeing's design process was Negligent multiple times - so was the FAA process - so was Lionair's Maintenance and it appears so far Lionair and ET's training systems as well.

Something doesn't have to be the primary cause of an accident to identify the need to fix it.
 
smartplane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 7:53 pm

Revelation wrote:
scbriml wrote:
That flight was saved precisely because the third person in the cockpit had nothing to do. He was spare, surplus to requirement until the point he was required. Comparing that flight to three or four-man cockpits of yesteryear is less than pointless.

Precisely? How can you assert that?

There's no proof that the lack of a task is what allowed the third pilot to come up with the right approach to dealing with MCAS.

Just because the man had no assigned task, there's no saying that he would not have sorted things out and came up with the right approach if he had an assigned task.

It could be that the same pilot could have saved the plane if he was captain that day and anyone else was FO or even if he was flying solo.

It could be that the same captain that ended up crashing JT could have saved the plane if he had a FO that could remember memory items and if he had used good CRM to tell the FO exactly what he was doing to save the plane before the FO took over.

But yeah, these arguments are silly.

Both Boeing and FAA said MCAS 1.0 put too much workload on the pilots, that should be the end of it.

Yet we all seem to enjoy merry go-rounds, so it's off to the races just when people may have thought this thread had moved on.

Even Boeing and their crisis PR hacks have ceased the 'pilots are to blame' dialogue.

It's good to have mavericks on the site. But........... They reset every so often, and agree it's 80% the plane to blame, or similar, and then a post later focus almost exclusively on attributing the crashes to the pilots..................

I'm sure even Boeing wishes they could be silenced.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 8:01 pm

morrisond wrote:
Agrajag wrote:
morrisond wrote:

MCAS was not part of the sim software at that point - but they could have simulated it easily by repeatedly having the trim runaway and then stopping and then repeating. That should not have been that hard to do in a sim.

Or at least spent time practising the Runaway Trim NNC Memory item.



As usual your 2020 hindsight and your lack of understanding of the real aviation world is very telling. I am baffled by your constant need to deflect from Boeing's obvious negligence. Youve been doing this for almost a year now.


Instead of just insulting me - which BTW is against forum rules - what did I get wrong above?

And BTW I have said that Boeing's design process was Negligent multiple times - so was the FAA process - so was Lionair's Maintenance and it appears so far Lionair and ET's training systems as well.

Something doesn't have to be the primary cause of an accident to identify the need to fix it.


Again you try to equate the gross negligence of Boeing, that was identified as the main reason for the Lion Air crash, with minor contributing factors.
 
Agrajag
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 8:12 pm

morrisond wrote:
Agrajag wrote:
morrisond wrote:

MCAS was not part of the sim software at that point - but they could have simulated it easily by repeatedly having the trim runaway and then stopping and then repeating. That should not have been that hard to do in a sim.

Or at least spent time practising the Runaway Trim NNC Memory item.



As usual your 2020 hindsight and your lack of understanding of the real aviation world is very telling. I am baffled by your constant need to deflect from Boeing's obvious negligence. Youve been doing this for almost a year now.


Instead of just insulting me - which BTW is against forum rules - what did I get wrong above?

And BTW I have said that Boeing's design process was Negligent multiple times - so was the FAA process - so was Lionair's Maintenance and it appears so far Lionair and ET's training systems as well.

Something doesn't have to be the primary cause of an accident to identify the need to fix it.


You imply that both planes would have been saved had they had western crew. This i find particularly distasteful.
The plural of anecdote is anecdotes, not data.
Slartibartfast had a point
 
shmerik
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 8:28 pm

Further Boeing test flight carried out yesterday:

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/BOE1
 
SEU
Posts: 278
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 8:50 pm

shmerik wrote:
Further Boeing test flight carried out yesterday:

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/BOE1


Looks like some stall tests were done. I wonder why they are doing it on a MAX 7 and not a MAX 8
 
smartplane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sat Dec 14, 2019 9:23 pm

SEU wrote:
shmerik wrote:
Further Boeing test flight carried out yesterday:

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/BOE1


Looks like some stall tests were done. I wonder why they are doing it on a MAX 7 and not a MAX 8

Because the MAX 7 will exhibit the worst stall characteristics in relation to applying maximum engine thrust suddenly at high angles of attack?
Also, if there is a problem, does a smaller, lighter MAX, if the right corrective action is taken, also recover more quickly?

Presumably all versions will be tested as part of the approval process.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 2:35 am

Agrajag wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Agrajag wrote:


As usual your 2020 hindsight and your lack of understanding of the real aviation world is very telling. I am baffled by your constant need to deflect from Boeing's obvious negligence. Youve been doing this for almost a year now.


Instead of just insulting me - which BTW is against forum rules - what did I get wrong above?

And BTW I have said that Boeing's design process was Negligent multiple times - so was the FAA process - so was Lionair's Maintenance and it appears so far Lionair and ET's training systems as well.

Something doesn't have to be the primary cause of an accident to identify the need to fix it.


You imply that both planes would have been saved had they had western crew. This i find particularly distasteful.


No a properly trained crew. If you have been following this thread from the start there are many examples of crews lacking basic skills in the West as well.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 2:55 am

SEU wrote:
shmerik wrote:
Further Boeing test flight carried out yesterday:

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/BOE1


Looks like some stall tests were done. I wonder why they are doing it on a MAX 7 and not a MAX 8

Could they be using the MAX 7 because they have frames rigged up with sensors for certification testing already where a MAX 8 would have to be rigged up again?
 
Sooner787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 3:21 am

planecane wrote:
SEU wrote:
shmerik wrote:
Further Boeing test flight carried out yesterday:

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/BOE1


Looks like some stall tests were done. I wonder why they are doing it on a MAX 7 and not a MAX 8

Could they be using the MAX 7 because they have frames rigged up with sensors for certification testing already where a MAX 8 would have to be rigged up again?


Bingo...... That Max 7 is the only wired up test bird Boeing has available until the Max 10 test bird
starts flying
 
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Dahlgardo
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 9:05 am

morrisond wrote:
No a properly trained crew. If you have been following this thread from the start there are many examples of crews lacking basic skills in the West as well.


I wish you would hold Boeing to the same standards as you do the crews.
Boeing delivered aircraft with a poorly designed system with a lethal logic that killed 300+ innocent people.

I could respect your views if you were an airline pilot and had an understanding of what the crews went through.
But since you're not, the please refer to articles like this to get a better understanding of what happend, and why the shitshow that is the 737MAX is of Boeing own making.

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/19/politics/chesley-sullenberger-boeing-737-max-scenario/index.html
leave your nines at home and bring your skills to the battle
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 9:52 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
seahawk wrote:
TaromA380 wrote:
More competent or more numerous - as that flight had, by chance, three pilots instead of two in the cockpit.


Which makes a lot sense, ass from the Jump Seat the movement of the trim wheels is much more in your focus and easy to see.


By that logic planes with 3+ crew should have been the safest in the sky. But they were routinely ending up in a thousand peices. The addition of flight engineers, navigators, and radio operators didn't seem to help them.


It is just how the human mind works. Under stress humans only have a very small area of the things they see in actual focus and I am certain that no pilot looks at the trim wheels for a longer time to notice nay strange movement, as they will be looking at the instruments.

The guy on the jump seat however has the trim wheels in his field of view whenever he looks towards the cockpit. The reason why the 3 men crew worked it out and the 2 men did not could very well be a literal matter of perspective. It does not mean it would be safer to fly with a 3 person crew, but it could also be a hint on how to make the plane safer, maybe a pictogram of a trim wheel could be shown on the main instruments whenever there is an automatic trim input.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 11:00 am

seahawk wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
seahawk wrote:

Which makes a lot sense, ass from the Jump Seat the movement of the trim wheels is much more in your focus and easy to see.


By that logic planes with 3+ crew should have been the safest in the sky. But they were routinely ending up in a thousand peices. The addition of flight engineers, navigators, and radio operators didn't seem to help them.


It is just how the human mind works. Under stress humans only have a very small area of the things they see in actual focus and I am certain that no pilot looks at the trim wheels for a longer time to notice nay strange movement, as they will be looking at the instruments.

The guy on the jump seat however has the trim wheels in his field of view whenever he looks towards the cockpit. The reason why the 3 men crew worked it out and the 2 men did not could very well be a literal matter of perspective. It does not mean it would be safer to fly with a 3 person crew, but it could also be a hint on how to make the plane safer, maybe a pictogram of a trim wheel could be shown on the main instruments whenever there is an automatic trim input.


I don't know how audible they are over the stick shaker but the trim wheels aren't exactly quiet. Looking at them is not necessary to know they are moving.
 
Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 11:17 am

The trim wheels work "all the time" in bursts whenever the speed trim system is active. This is why no 737 pilot will be concerned or even be "alarmed" to see and hear the trim wheels spinning. This is routine.
Last edited by Noshow on Sun Dec 15, 2019 11:19 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 11:18 am

I would say stick shaker is louder. But your observation would probably add another option to improve the warning function, so that the pictogram only shows when automatic trim movement occurs with stick shaker active.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 12:18 pm

morrisond wrote:
Francoflier wrote:
morrisond wrote:

I am not blaming the pilots I am blaming ET training. Apparently all they did was send out an email to their pilots on MCAS and did not do anything more than that. The ET First Officer was in the Sim after the first crash close to his fatal flight and there are no reports that MCAS was part of that session.


All they sent their pilots was an email because an email is essentially all they got from Boeing who was, at the time, still in denial of the issue and had not published any training syllabus to address it. My guess is that they were trying to avoid liability and hoping for no more crashes while they hastily and quietly fixed the software...

A bulletin is not how you tackle such a serious failure mode. It's like trying to teach pilots how to handle an engine failure on takeoff by having them read about it. There is a reason such failures are trained in a simulator, especially those, very much like the MCAS events, that require immediate actions and manual handling close to the ground.

You are once again displaying your ignorance when it comes to aviation safety systems and airline training.
Maybe you can tell us what other operators were doing differently vis-a-vis MCAS training after JT610?


Probably refamiliarizing themselves with the Runaway Trim NNC. That is what the ET documents say to do if you experience MCAS symptoms.

This is something that is supposed to be regularly practised by all crew worldwide and is a required memory item. This is not a new procedure - crews just had to know that if symptoms exactly like ET experienced happened run the Runaway trim NNC.

This did not require new training - they just needed to know that MCAS would not present like normal runaway trim.


All the same what Boeing says and how they try to weasel out of their responsibility, there was no way that a pilot having not been trained on MCAS, a training Boeing sabotaged, would recognize MCAS action as run away trim.

So you are still confusing practicing run away trim often in a rather steril environment, with being able to recognize the failure mode of MCAS and react to that. That exactly required new training, and that training was sabotaged by Boeing.

If we look at ET, they specially bought a 737MAX simulator, a thing that was purposefully sabotaged by Boeing, to not being able to show MCAS and its failure modes.
 
art
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 12:18 pm

morrisond wrote:

And BTW I have said that Boeing's design process was Negligent multiple times


Out of curiosity, do you recall (roughly) when you first stated that? Did you previously state the opposite ie the crashes were the fault of the pilots ?
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 12:23 pm

Noshow wrote:
The trim wheels work "all the time" in bursts whenever the speed trim system is active. This is why no 737 pilot will be concerned or even be "alarmed" to see and hear the trim wheels spinning. This is routine.


Normal STS bursts are quite different from the wheels zipping away for 10 seconds straight while the column is getting heavy requiring extreme effort to keep the attitude normal.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 1:28 pm

seahawk wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
seahawk wrote:

Which makes a lot sense, ass from the Jump Seat the movement of the trim wheels is much more in your focus and easy to see.


By that logic planes with 3+ crew should have been the safest in the sky. But they were routinely ending up in a thousand peices. The addition of flight engineers, navigators, and radio operators didn't seem to help them.


It is just how the human mind works. Under stress humans only have a very small area of the things they see in actual focus and I am certain that no pilot looks at the trim wheels for a longer time to notice nay strange movement, as they will be looking at the instruments.

The guy on the jump seat however has the trim wheels in his field of view whenever he looks towards the cockpit. The reason why the 3 men crew worked it out and the 2 men did not could very well be a literal matter of perspective. It does not mean it would be safer to fly with a 3 person crew, but it could also be a hint on how to make the plane safer, maybe a pictogram of a trim wheel could be shown on the main instruments whenever there is an automatic trim input.


If Boeing would one day make the man machine interface in the 737 compliant to the rules, currently one of the exemptions, and install EICAS, such a pictogram would be a simple thing.
Boeing got that exemption with the argument, that it would be expensive to comply with the rules.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 1:43 pm

planecane wrote:
Noshow wrote:
The trim wheels work "all the time" in bursts whenever the speed trim system is active. This is why no 737 pilot will be concerned or even be "alarmed" to see and hear the trim wheels spinning. This is routine.


Normal STS bursts are quite different from the wheels zipping away for 10 seconds straight while the column is getting heavy requiring extreme effort to keep the attitude normal.

My impression is that something psychological. It is relatively easy to react to onset of something, especially unexpected onset. But onset of trim is routine. Recognizing that the pattern is different, it requires conscious attention to that particular process - and attention was focused on other issues as there are quite a few.
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 1:45 pm

morrisond wrote:
Agrajag wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Bla bla bla . . . .


How could MCAS be part of the 'session' if MCAS wasnt on the sim? What chance did these poor pilots have to train for MCAS?


MCAS was not part of the sim software at that point - but they could have simulated it easily by repeatedly having the trim runaway and then stopping and then repeating. That should not have been that hard to do in a sim.

Or at least spent time practising the Runaway Trim NNC Memory item.


So you agree that the Boeing training instructions were incomplete and insufficient to prepare crews? Before you answer that, you should realize that 80% of the airlines around the world, use the official Boeing instructions to set up the (conversion) training standards.
Boeing training and FCOM writers never understand the dangers of MCAS (except perhaps Mr Forkner, but he lied to FAA, and now keep his mouth shut). MCAS was not in the FCOM. MCAS was not in the training manuals. MCAS was not in the 90 minutes IPad training course. Yet ET is to blame. Right.

. . . they could have simulated it easily by repeatedly having the trim runaway and then stopping and then repeating .
If the training department need to set up training in this clumsy way, to compensate for OEM failures, then you know something is very very wrong. And it is not the airline's training department

But I understand that you are trying to take that away from Boeing and put that in ET shoes. Ignoring that such is the modus operandus of 80% of the training departments of world airlines.
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 1:55 pm

planecane wrote:
Noshow wrote:
The trim wheels work "all the time" in bursts whenever the speed trim system is active. This is why no 737 pilot will be concerned or even be "alarmed" to see and hear the trim wheels spinning. This is routine.


Normal STS bursts are quite different from the wheels zipping away for 10 seconds straight while the column is getting heavy requiring extreme effort to keep the attitude normal.


True, but stall warning, stick shaker going off, cockpit lighting up like Christmas tree is not normal. Somewhat unusual STS behaviour would not be unexpected in such situations?
Why would STS stand out as the lethal killer when there is a lot of things going on at the same time?
At the same time, electric trimming worked normally, indicating to the crew that there was no (classic) trim runaway.
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
SimonL
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 2:32 pm

ET crew flipped the switches after the 2nd time MCAS was activated. So they correctly identified the issue and performed the correct action to counter it. But they wherent aware of the fact that they couldnt manually trim the plane and thats where things went really bad. The message was pretty much "turn MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine" and it turned out to be wrong. Humans under great stress will make mistakes, and ET crew didnt trim the plane properly before cutting the switches. This is an understandable mistake given the situation and the fact that its very hard to determine the trim status when you are pulling the yoke. Had the manual trim worked they could have brought the plane back to a more controllable state and reduced the speed. But they where instead left to improvising.
The blame must in the end land mainly at Boeing since they designed a bad system with a single point of failure, they also ensured everyone that no additional training was needed, which gave the pilots less chance to handle the failure. And finally they didnt recognize that their fix had a major flaw in the fact that the pilots couldnt use the manual trim at high speeds.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 2:49 pm

SimonL wrote:
Humans under great stress will make mistakes, and ET crew didnt trim the plane properly before cutting the switches. This is an understandable mistake given the situation and the fact that its very hard to determine the trim status when you are pulling the yoke. Had the manual trim worked they could have brought the plane back to a more controllable state and reduced the speed. But they where instead left to improvising.

This is not pilots mistake, this is why Boeing engineers should face manslaughter charges. Lion ait failure scenario was not tested, the danger of improperly operating controls was forgotten since classic days, and procedures didn't stress something that turned out to be an extremely critical recovery aspect.
I am sort of OK with unqualified MCAS design, shit happens. But failure to analyze the crash is criminal negligence leading to human deaths, square and fair.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 3:17 pm

art wrote:
morrisond wrote:

And BTW I have said that Boeing's design process was Negligent multiple times


Out of curiosity, do you recall (roughly) when you first stated that? Did you previously state the opposite ie the crashes were the fault of the pilots ?



I have stated it multiple times probably starting at least six months ago when it became apparent that Boeing really screwed the pooch on the design. At first we only had the pilots actions to scrutinize. As what Boeing had done (or had not done) leaked out I changed my views.

Sometimes I forget to type "Boeing is the root cause" and people tend to go off the handle. They are trying to pin the accidents on one thing only and pretend everything else is perfect elsewhere but as in almost all aviation accidents it usually is never one thing. The MAX accidents are almost a textbook example of things going wrong with all things - Design, regulation, maintenance (so far at least in Lionair) and training.

And BTW - I wish People would stop characterizing me as blaming the pilots - if you read what I am writing I am blaming the training system at the individual airlines. That is a big difference. Pilots can't learn what they aren't taught. Just to forestall certain posters - I am talking about basic things that could have gone a long ways to saving both flights and not MCAS specific training. Things like better Crew CRM, how to use a QRH, more time handling the aircraft in manual mode. You know basic stuff a pilot needs to know. If the crew don't have these basic things down cold their airlines or regulators should not be putting them in a cockpit.

I believe the most plausible explanation for ET (and there are some media reports to back this up) quite possibly never even gave its pilots the basic procedures to handle MCAS, or was done in such an offhanded manner that they didn't pay sufficient attention. That is more understandable than a crew from an airline that has a reputation for being able to fly by procedure, not being able to do so.

However remember that even by ET's own documents it says if you experience MCAS like symptoms - run the Runaway trim NNC checklist which should be a memory item - which they did not do. Up post someone mentioned the runaway trim NNC procedure might have not been part of the syllabus at ET until shortly before the ET crash. That is a failure of the ET training system. Based on various media reports I wouldn't be surprised to find that an independent investigation finds that they did not even do this and are basically lying. They have a history of trying to manipulate the truth and provide alternative facts.

Quite frankly I feel terrible for the families of the pilots and if I were them I would be suing the ass off the Airlines (along with Boeing for there piss poor design) for failing to give there loved ones the basic skills to operate the aircraft safely in an emergency.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 3:26 pm

PW100 wrote:
planecane wrote:
Noshow wrote:
The trim wheels work "all the time" in bursts whenever the speed trim system is active. This is why no 737 pilot will be concerned or even be "alarmed" to see and hear the trim wheels spinning. This is routine.


Normal STS bursts are quite different from the wheels zipping away for 10 seconds straight while the column is getting heavy requiring extreme effort to keep the attitude normal.


True, but stall warning, stick shaker going off, cockpit lighting up like Christmas tree is not normal. Somewhat unusual STS behaviour would not be unexpected in such situations?
Why would STS stand out as the lethal killer when there is a lot of things going on at the same time?
At the same time, electric trimming worked normally, indicating to the crew that there was no (classic) trim runaway.


No matter the alarms and everything, I would think that the column getting extremely heavy would be the key symptom that points to an issue with the pitch control system. From there it's either some kind of elevator jam or a trim system issue. The trim wheel zipping away should lead that direction.

We keep ignoring the force required as part of the logical problem assessment. If you keep having to pull back with significant force and that coincides with trim movement that would logically point to where the main issue is.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 3:26 pm

PW100 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Agrajag wrote:

How could MCAS be part of the 'session' if MCAS wasnt on the sim? What chance did these poor pilots have to train for MCAS?


MCAS was not part of the sim software at that point - but they could have simulated it easily by repeatedly having the trim runaway and then stopping and then repeating. That should not have been that hard to do in a sim.

Or at least spent time practising the Runaway Trim NNC Memory item.


So you agree that the Boeing training instructions were incomplete and insufficient to prepare crews? Before you answer that, you should realize that 80% of the airlines around the world, use the official Boeing instructions to set up the (conversion) training standards.
Boeing training and FCOM writers never understand the dangers of MCAS (except perhaps Mr Forkner, but he lied to FAA, and now keep his mouth shut). MCAS was not in the FCOM. MCAS was not in the training manuals. MCAS was not in the 90 minutes IPad training course. Yet ET is to blame. Right.

. . . they could have simulated it easily by repeatedly having the trim runaway and then stopping and then repeating .
If the training department need to set up training in this clumsy way, to compensate for OEM failures, then you know something is very very wrong. And it is not the airline's training department

But I understand that you are trying to take that away from Boeing and put that in ET shoes. Ignoring that such is the modus operandus of 80% of the training departments of world airlines.


I agree that they were insufficient and incomplete before Lionair but by the time of ET they had all they need to know. ET's MCAS procedures were fine (as written in the Preliminary crash report) the crew just needed to follow them - however as I just said above I won't be surprised if an independent investigation found that the crew had no or just a passing knowledge of them. Which makes the accident sequence a lot more believable.
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 3:26 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
If Boeing would one day make the man machine interface in the 737 compliant to the rules, currently one of the exemptions, and install EICAS, such a pictogram would be a simple thing.
Boeing got that exemption with the argument, that it would be expensive to comply with the rules.


I seriously doubt a pictogram of the trim moving would be of any more help identifying the problem, than the two trim wheels spinning away right next to your knees. Something more along the lines of a large, red "MCAS ACTIVE" message on the PFD might be more helpful.

I wouldn't get so wound up about the lack of EICAS/ECAM on the 737, it's nice to have all the cautions and warnings centralized, but you can get along just fine without it, and without a specific warning that the MCAS was working, it wouldn't have made any difference in either of these accidents.

kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:
Noshow wrote:
The trim wheels work "all the time" in bursts whenever the speed trim system is active. This is why no 737 pilot will be concerned or even be "alarmed" to see and hear the trim wheels spinning. This is routine.


Normal STS bursts are quite different from the wheels zipping away for 10 seconds straight while the column is getting heavy requiring extreme effort to keep the attitude normal.

My impression is that something psychological. It is relatively easy to react to onset of something, especially unexpected onset. But onset of trim is routine. Recognizing that the pattern is different, it requires conscious attention to that particular process - and attention was focused on other issues as there are quite a few.


I'd argue that anyone who has flown the 737 for any length of time, should have developed awareness of what the trim is doing, all the time. Every time the trim runs for more than a few seconds, without one of us touching the trim switch, I automatically start paying attention to what it's doing. Always have, on every airplane I've flown.

During my last recurrent simulator, even when we were just about upside down during the upsets, or fully stalled, with the sim shaking so hard we could hardly read the instruments, while descending 10,000 FPM, both of us could have told you when the trim was running.


PW100 wrote:
True, but stall warning, stick shaker going off, cockpit lighting up like Christmas tree is not normal. Somewhat unusual STS behaviour would not be unexpected in such situations?
Why would STS stand out as the lethal killer when there is a lot of things going on at the same time?
At the same time, electric trimming worked normally, indicating to the crew that there was no (classic) trim runaway.


This phrase drives me nuts. There was a master caution, and a couple of other system caution lights presented, a very far cry from "lit up like a Christmas tree".
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 3:30 pm

SimonL wrote:
ET crew flipped the switches after the 2nd time MCAS was activated. So they correctly identified the issue and performed the correct action to counter it. But they wherent aware of the fact that they couldnt manually trim the plane and thats where things went really bad. The message was pretty much "turn MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine" and it turned out to be wrong. Humans under great stress will make mistakes, and ET crew didnt trim the plane properly before cutting the switches. This is an understandable mistake given the situation and the fact that its very hard to determine the trim status when you are pulling the yoke. Had the manual trim worked they could have brought the plane back to a more controllable state and reduced the speed. But they where instead left to improvising.
The blame must in the end land mainly at Boeing since they designed a bad system with a single point of failure, they also ensured everyone that no additional training was needed, which gave the pilots less chance to handle the failure. And finally they didnt recognize that their fix had a major flaw in the fact that the pilots couldnt use the manual trim at high speeds.


And they forgot to disengage Autothrottle and control their airspeed which is right in the ET runaway trim NNC procedure.

Being overspeed is just as bad as being underspeed - you just don't do it. I know enough from flying that that is a big no-no. It's as important as making sure the engines are turned on.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 3:36 pm

SimonL wrote:
ET crew flipped the switches after the 2nd time MCAS was activated. So they correctly identified the issue and performed the correct action to counter it. But they wherent aware of the fact that they couldnt manually trim the plane and thats where things went really bad. The message was pretty much "turn MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine" and it turned out to be wrong. Humans under great stress will make mistakes, and ET crew didnt trim the plane properly before cutting the switches. This is an understandable mistake given the situation and the fact that its very hard to determine the trim status when you are pulling the yoke. Had the manual trim worked they could have brought the plane back to a more controllable state and reduced the speed. But they where instead left to improvising.
The blame must in the end land mainly at Boeing since they designed a bad system with a single point of failure, they also ensured everyone that no additional training was needed, which gave the pilots less chance to handle the failure. And finally they didnt recognize that their fix had a major flaw in the fact that the pilots couldnt use the manual trim at high speeds.


The EAD did not say "turn off MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine." It said to perform the runaway stabilizer NNC. Early on in the NNC it said to use manual electric trim. Cutting off the electric trim only happens later in the checklist IF RUNAWAY CONTINUES.

You could argue that following he EAD/NNC literally a crew would just keep performing the NNC and never cut off electric trim because using the electric trim would temporarily stop the runaway. No matter what, the electric trim shouldn't have been cut off until the subsequent MCAS activation "continued" the runaway.

What do you mean it is very hard to determine the trim status when you are pulling the yoke? The fact that you are pulling it with abnormal force should indicate that you are out of trim.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 3:40 pm

AABusDrvr wrote:
I'd argue that anyone who has flown the 737 for any length of time, should have developed awareness of what the trim is doing, all the time. Every time the trim runs for more than a few seconds, without one of us touching the trim switch, I automatically start paying attention to what it's doing. Always have, on every airplane I've flown.

During my last recurrent simulator, even when we were just about upside down during the upsets, or fully stalled, with the sim shaking so hard we could hardly read the instruments, while descending 10,000 FPM, both of us could have told you when the trim was running.

While hard to argue with the actual experience, your last phrase is exactly where the problem is.
You could tell when it happened - but the difference between 10 second and 1-2 second may be more difficult to grasp under distraction. Words "tunnel vision" and "target fixation" exist for a reason.
Besides, I am pretty sure that being aware you're in a simulator, and retest is your worst possible outcome, does change the way things go.
 
frmrCapCadet
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 5:11 pm

Just a review of responsibility, and using car accidents as the example
Manufacturer is 100% responsible to design and build a proper car
Regulatory bodies are 100% responsible to evaluate safety and environmental aspects
Repair shops are 100% responsible to do maintenance in accordance with manufacturer guidelines
Road builders 100% responsible for safe and efficient roads
Driver 100% responsible to know the rules and their car

Accidents happen. Things go wrong. We do not limit ourselves to one line in the above list
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 5:46 pm

planecane wrote:
he EAD did not say "turn off MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine." It said to perform the runaway stabilizer NNC. Early on in the NNC it said to use manual electric trim. Cutting off the electric trim only happens later in the checklist IF RUNAWAY CONTINUES.

You could argue that following he EAD/NNC literally a crew would just keep performing the NNC and never cut off electric trim because using the electric trim would temporarily stop the runaway. No matter what, the electric trim shouldn't have been cut off until the subsequent MCAS activation "continued" the runaway.

ET302 CVR and FDR very clearly show that the pilots used the stab trim cutout switch after the second activation of the MCAS, so there perfectly followed the procedure.

First MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose
down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units."

First pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:12, approximately three seconds after AND stabilizer motion ends, electric trim (from
pilot activated switches on the yoke) in the Aircraft nose up (ANU) direction is recorded on the
DFDR and the stabilizer moved in the ANU direction to 2.4 units."

Second MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:20, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a second
instance of automatic AND stabilizer trim occurred and the stabilizer moved down and reached 0.4
units."

Second pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:28 Manual electric trim in the ANU direction was recorded and the stabilizer reversed
moving in the ANU direction and then the trim reached 2.3 units."

Pilot stab trim cutout:
"At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First-
Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out."
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 6:32 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
he EAD did not say "turn off MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine." It said to perform the runaway stabilizer NNC. Early on in the NNC it said to use manual electric trim. Cutting off the electric trim only happens later in the checklist IF RUNAWAY CONTINUES.

You could argue that following he EAD/NNC literally a crew would just keep performing the NNC and never cut off electric trim because using the electric trim would temporarily stop the runaway. No matter what, the electric trim shouldn't have been cut off until the subsequent MCAS activation "continued" the runaway.

ET302 CVR and FDR very clearly show that the pilots used the stab trim cutout switch after the second activation of the MCAS, so there perfectly followed the procedure.

First MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose
down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units."

First pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:12, approximately three seconds after AND stabilizer motion ends, electric trim (from
pilot activated switches on the yoke) in the Aircraft nose up (ANU) direction is recorded on the
DFDR and the stabilizer moved in the ANU direction to 2.4 units."

Second MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:20, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a second
instance of automatic AND stabilizer trim occurred and the stabilizer moved down and reached 0.4
units."

Second pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:28 Manual electric trim in the ANU direction was recorded and the stabilizer reversed
moving in the ANU direction and then the trim reached 2.3 units."

Pilot stab trim cutout:
"At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First-
Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out."



The check airman in me has to bring this up here. They didn't perfectly follow the procedure. They turned off a couple of switches, that happen to be part of the procedure.

Properly "doing the procedure" would require identifying the problem, confirming the problem, and the proper checklist with the other pilot, and then working through all the memory items, and the remainder of the QRH, in a deliberate manner.
 
art
Posts: 3432
Joined: Tue Feb 08, 2005 11:46 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 6:34 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
he EAD did not say "turn off MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine." It said to perform the runaway stabilizer NNC. Early on in the NNC it said to use manual electric trim. Cutting off the electric trim only happens later in the checklist IF RUNAWAY CONTINUES.

You could argue that following he EAD/NNC literally a crew would just keep performing the NNC and never cut off electric trim because using the electric trim would temporarily stop the runaway. No matter what, the electric trim shouldn't have been cut off until the subsequent MCAS activation "continued" the runaway.

ET302 CVR and FDR very clearly show that the pilots used the stab trim cutout switch after the second activation of the MCAS, so there perfectly followed the procedure.

First MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose
down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units."

First pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:12, approximately three seconds after AND stabilizer motion ends, electric trim (from
pilot activated switches on the yoke) in the Aircraft nose up (ANU) direction is recorded on the
DFDR and the stabilizer moved in the ANU direction to 2.4 units."

Second MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:20, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a second
instance of automatic AND stabilizer trim occurred and the stabilizer moved down and reached 0.4
units."

Second pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:28 Manual electric trim in the ANU direction was recorded and the stabilizer reversed
moving in the ANU direction and then the trim reached 2.3 units."

Pilot stab trim cutout:
"At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First-
Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out."


I have to say that I find the suggestion/accusation that the pilots on both fated flights killed all on board a gross defamation. Those who are seeking to make excuses for a manufacturer that actively concealed a new system (MCAS) rendering their product (737MAX) unusable unless immediate remedial action was taken when it failed (in an unknown way) should reflect a little on their ability to assess objectively what happened. I suggest that, had they been pilots on these unfortunate flights, there is a high likelihood that everyone involved would have died due to incomprehensible failure of the product they were using.

I'm saddened that there are some who seek to excuse the perpetrator. Why? Is it a form of tribalism? Some kind of blind nationalism? Would the same arguments for the OEM and against the pilots concerned pertain from those posters if the MAX were made in the Faroe Islands or Fiji or Finland? Or France?

PS pixelflight - my criticsim is not directed at you by dint of your post
 
rheinwaldner
Posts: 1859
Joined: Wed Jan 02, 2008 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 7:01 pm

morrisond wrote:
Lionair is somewhat understandable as they had no knowledge of MCAS but please explain ET then.

To answer this wrong claim I post this blogpost from a Canadian MAX pilot instructor, who was invited to a two-day meeting between Boeing’s executives and a handful of industry influencers:
https://www.avweb.com/insider/a-pilots- ... -response/

She said: "To make matters worse, initial accident data revealed the treacherous role of a feature that was unknown to most before the first crash and barely explained before the second—MCAS, for Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System."

Beside this statement, that directly refutes your position, there is also plenty of other evidence in her writing:

[*]Some statements from Dennis Muilenburg: “We were a little slow to take responsibility"
[*]She considers Boeings “no problem” reactions as "out-of-touch with reality, deceitful and unconcerned with safety."
[*]"70 to 80 percent of new Chinese pilots would prefer to fly an Airbus, if given a choice."
[*]less than 20 percent of airline passengers would definitely fly on the aircraft within six months of its return to service.
[*]More direct quotes from Muilenburg: “We take full responsibility,” he repeated several times. “We are sorry.”
[*]Recently revealed exchanges between officials suggested “no MCAS” as a way to return the aircraft to flight. That is not going to happen
[*]Part 25 regulations, not a need for feel similarity with the 737 NG, require a linear displacement for a given control force input to maintain handling predictability.
[*]MCAS does serve a safety purpose. It helps pilots avoid over-controlling the aircraft into a full stall.
[*]Another direct quote from Muilenburg: “We do not blame the pilots,” said Muilenburg. Nobody should.


Another report shows why RTS could be delayed again. The new MCAS design is specifically mentioned in opening new cans of worms due to new potentially confusing indications:
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... ax-return/

During the recent pilot trials, which to various scenarios involving the revised 737 Max flight control software and new checklists, all the pilots managed to get themselves out of trouble, but Boeing and regulators found that “more than half…of pilots responded with the wrong procedures,” according to one of the three people briefed on the results that are currently being analyzed by the FAA and other global regulators. The uncertain results of the evaluations are likely to re-energize the debate about the necessity for additional simulator training for pilots prior flying the 737 Max again.

The airline pilots were presented with different scenarios during the evaluations. The week-long trials inside Boeing’s 737 Max engineering simulator focused on the human response to a variety of angle of attack (AOA) indication failures and disagreements in real-world scenarios, including takeoff, landing and at cruise, the briefed people said. Troubleshooting “the failure presented wasn’t intuitive based on the checklist,” said another person familiar with the trials. The 737 Max now uses both of its flight control computers to compare AOA readings to prevent an erroneous activation of the MCAS function, as happened during both crashes, but the new software’s logic can now produce new or potentially confusing indications on the flight deck in certain rare, but possible, scenarios, according to those familiar with the testing.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
Nils75cz
Posts: 20
Joined: Mon Mar 25, 2019 10:18 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 7:07 pm

Maybe pilot error occured. I don't think they had an easy situation and I certainly believe they didn't have the knowledge we do. The training issue would have been a Real Issue IF:

MCAS would have been properly declared

If MCAS failure symptoms would have been properly declared

I am not sure that was the case.
 
StTim
Posts: 3711
Joined: Thu Aug 08, 2013 7:39 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 7:15 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
Just a review of responsibility, and using car accidents as the example
Manufacturer is 100% responsible to design and build a proper car
Regulatory bodies are 100% responsible to evaluate safety and environmental aspects
Repair shops are 100% responsible to do maintenance in accordance with manufacturer guidelines
Road builders 100% responsible for safe and efficient roads
Driver 100% responsible to know the rules and their car

Accidents happen. Things go wrong. We do not limit ourselves to one line in the above list


Current terminology is not to call them accidents as that implies no fault.

BUT there are very few on here who claim that there is a single reason for the two MAX accidents. I have read many accident reports (interested mechanical engineer) and not a single one I have read has a single cause. There are always contributory factors.

The problem is here we have a thread that discusses the grounding (and when it may be lifted with what changes) and we have posters relentlessly pushing the idea that the crashes only happened because the flights were in less developed countries/carriers, some with tainted MRO practices and with poor quality pilots etc. This is to the point that these crashes would not have happened in the US with their far superior pilots etc.

That people then push back against this faulty narrative causes further meltdown. It is all very unedifying.
 
frmrCapCadet
Posts: 4214
Joined: Thu May 29, 2008 8:24 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 7:33 pm

No one here who has limited their discussion to pilot error. Just about everyone has declared that Boeing is primarily responsible. There are several who are almost hysterically immune to discussing pilot error or inadequacies.
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