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sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 7:34 pm

SimonL wrote:
ET crew flipped the switches after the 2nd time MCAS was activated. So they correctly identified the issue and performed the correct action to counter it. But they wherent aware of the fact that they couldnt manually trim the plane and thats where things went really bad. The message was pretty much "turn MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine" and it turned out to be wrong.


Hopefully Ethiopian Airlines will keep one of their currently grounded Maxes 'preserved' with MCAS 1.0. Once it's updated to 2.0 there's no going back later, should they find the need to investigate something they missed, eg was there an additional issue with electric trim that prevents it from counteracting MCAS.
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 8:11 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
SimonL wrote:
ET crew flipped the switches after the 2nd time MCAS was activated. So they correctly identified the issue and performed the correct action to counter it. But they wherent aware of the fact that they couldnt manually trim the plane and thats where things went really bad. The message was pretty much "turn MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine" and it turned out to be wrong.


Hopefully Ethiopian Airlines will keep one of their currently grounded Maxes 'preserved' with MCAS 1.0. Once it's updated to 2.0 there's no going back later, should they find the need to investigate something they missed, eg was there an additional issue with electric trim that prevents it from counteracting MCAS.


There is a 0% chance that they do that. Also, any issue with the electric trim that is systematic should be discovered in the investigation. Unless it was a failure on just that airframe, in which case it wouldn't matter if they preserved a different one.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 8:14 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
Another report shows why RTS could be delayed again. The new MCAS design is specifically mentioned in opening new cans of worms due to new potentially confusing indications:
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... ax-return/

During the recent pilot trials, which to various scenarios involving the revised 737 Max flight control software and new checklists, all the pilots managed to get themselves out of trouble, but Boeing and regulators found that “more than half…of pilots responded with the wrong procedures,” according to one of the three people briefed on the results that are currently being analyzed by the FAA and other global regulators. The uncertain results of the evaluations are likely to re-energize the debate about the necessity for additional simulator training for pilots prior flying the 737 Max again.

The airline pilots were presented with different scenarios during the evaluations. The week-long trials inside Boeing’s 737 Max engineering simulator focused on the human response to a variety of angle of attack (AOA) indication failures and disagreements in real-world scenarios, including takeoff, landing and at cruise, the briefed people said. Troubleshooting “the failure presented wasn’t intuitive based on the checklist,” said another person familiar with the trials. The 737 Max now uses both of its flight control computers to compare AOA readings to prevent an erroneous activation of the MCAS function, as happened during both crashes, but the new software’s logic can now produce new or potentially confusing indications on the flight deck in certain rare, but possible, scenarios, according to those familiar with the testing.


This should be a huge red flag to all those blaming the pilots directly or indirectly via the “better training” meme.

These were pilots who were 100% aware of what was about to happen to them in a simulator session (so zero risk even if they screw up) and they still struggled to sort it out. To the extent that neither Boeing nor the FAA were happy with the results. :scratchchin:
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frmrCapCadet
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 9:41 pm

By definition in any accident chain, any one actor could have stopped the accident. Elementary logic.
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StTim
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 9:43 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
By definition in any accident chain, any one actor could have stopped the accident. Elementary logic.



And it is bad if it is the last - the pilot - as this means all other actors have failed.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 9:51 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Lionair is somewhat understandable as they had no knowledge of MCAS but please explain ET then.

To answer this wrong claim I post this blogpost from a Canadian MAX pilot instructor, who was invited to a two-day meeting between Boeing’s executives and a handful of industry influencers:
https://www.avweb.com/insider/a-pilots- ... -response/

She said: "To make matters worse, initial accident data revealed the treacherous role of a feature that was unknown to most before the first crash and barely explained before the second—MCAS, for Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System."

Beside this statement, that directly refutes your position, there is also plenty of other evidence in her writing:

[*]Some statements from Dennis Muilenburg: “We were a little slow to take responsibility"
[*]She considers Boeings “no problem” reactions as "out-of-touch with reality, deceitful and unconcerned with safety."
[*]"70 to 80 percent of new Chinese pilots would prefer to fly an Airbus, if given a choice."
[*]less than 20 percent of airline passengers would definitely fly on the aircraft within six months of its return to service.
[*]More direct quotes from Muilenburg: “We take full responsibility,” he repeated several times. “We are sorry.”
[*]Recently revealed exchanges between officials suggested “no MCAS” as a way to return the aircraft to flight. That is not going to happen
[*]Part 25 regulations, not a need for feel similarity with the 737 NG, require a linear displacement for a given control force input to maintain handling predictability.
[*]MCAS does serve a safety purpose. It helps pilots avoid over-controlling the aircraft into a full stall.
[*]Another direct quote from Muilenburg: “We do not blame the pilots,” said Muilenburg. Nobody should.


Another report shows why RTS could be delayed again. The new MCAS design is specifically mentioned in opening new cans of worms due to new potentially confusing indications:
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... ax-return/

During the recent pilot trials, which to various scenarios involving the revised 737 Max flight control software and new checklists, all the pilots managed to get themselves out of trouble, but Boeing and regulators found that “more than half…of pilots responded with the wrong procedures,” according to one of the three people briefed on the results that are currently being analyzed by the FAA and other global regulators. The uncertain results of the evaluations are likely to re-energize the debate about the necessity for additional simulator training for pilots prior flying the 737 Max again.

The airline pilots were presented with different scenarios during the evaluations. The week-long trials inside Boeing’s 737 Max engineering simulator focused on the human response to a variety of angle of attack (AOA) indication failures and disagreements in real-world scenarios, including takeoff, landing and at cruise, the briefed people said. Troubleshooting “the failure presented wasn’t intuitive based on the checklist,” said another person familiar with the trials. The 737 Max now uses both of its flight control computers to compare AOA readings to prevent an erroneous activation of the MCAS function, as happened during both crashes, but the new software’s logic can now produce new or potentially confusing indications on the flight deck in certain rare, but possible, scenarios, according to those familiar with the testing.


They are testing MCAS 2.0 which has not much to do with 1.0. It sounds like they have added more complexity complicating matters. Adding complexity is generally never a good idea.

As I've said for a while they may be better off to ditch MCAS assuming the MAX stalls somewhat normally and implement the mandatory US stall training.

Someone mentioned it looked like they were doing stall tests this past weekend - they may be checking to see if this is a feasible path.
Last edited by morrisond on Sun Dec 15, 2019 9:57 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
frmrCapCadet
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 9:59 pm

StTim wrote:
frmrCapCadet wrote:
By definition in any accident chain, any one actor could have stopped the accident. Elementary logic.



And it is bad if it is the last - the pilot - as this means all other actors have failed.


Indeed! this is true. And indicative of systemic unacceptable failures.
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 9:59 pm

morrisond wrote:
They are testing MCAS 2.0 which has not much to do with 1.0. It sounds like they have added more complexity complicating matters.


Yes, which makes it worse!

Not only did the pilots know what was going to happen, MCAS was supposed to be fixed. Yet they still struggled.

Might be a while yet before we see MAX flying in service again.
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flipdewaf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 10:02 pm

morrisond wrote:

They are testing MCAS 2.0 which has not much to do with 1.0. It sounds like they have added more complexity complicating matters.

As I've said for a while they may be better off to ditch MCAS assuming the MAX stalls somewhat normally and implement the mandatory US stall training.




Dear Regulators,

We have found it very difficult to meet the regulations with our old plane within the costs and promises we have made to airlines, would it be ok if we were to just ignore that regulation (you can see what a cluster fuck we made last time) and instead tell training departments that they need to ensure the pilots undertake training of increased risk to make up for our incompetence.

Yours hopefully,

Boeing.



In my finest Australian accent... yea..nar.

Fred




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Image
 
rnav2dlrey
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 10:39 pm

new WSJ reporting this evening:

Boeing is considering either halting or further cutting production of the 737 MAX amid growing uncertainty over the troubled airplane’s return to service and could disclose a decision as soon as Monday, according to people familiar with the matter.


https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-wei ... 1576448990
(it's not behind a paywall at this point)
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 10:42 pm

flipdewaf wrote:
morrisond wrote:

They are testing MCAS 2.0 which has not much to do with 1.0. It sounds like they have added more complexity complicating matters.

As I've said for a while they may be better off to ditch MCAS assuming the MAX stalls somewhat normally and implement the mandatory US stall training.




Dear Regulators,

We have found it very difficult to meet the regulations with our old plane within the costs and promises we have made to airlines, would it be ok if we were to just ignore that regulation (you can see what a cluster fuck we made last time) and instead tell training departments that they need to ensure the pilots undertake training of increased risk to make up for our incompetence.

Yours hopefully,

Boeing.



In my finest Australian accent... yea..nar.

Fred




Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk


You made me laugh. That was funny.

Irrespective of MAX the US regulation for increased stall training is a pretty good idea. It could have saved quite a few flights in the past 10-15 years.

BTW - the training can be done in a full motion SIM - US sims have been modified to be able to do this.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 11:45 pm

rnav2dlrey wrote:
new WSJ reporting this evening:

Boeing is considering either halting or further cutting production of the 737 MAX amid growing uncertainty over the troubled airplane’s return to service and could disclose a decision as soon as Monday, according to people familiar with the matter.


https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-wei ... 1576448990
(it's not behind a paywall at this point)


Being reported that halting production is preferred option. :shock:
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Draken21fx
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Dec 15, 2019 11:51 pm

scbriml wrote:
rnav2dlrey wrote:
new WSJ reporting this evening:

Boeing is considering either halting or further cutting production of the 737 MAX amid growing uncertainty over the troubled airplane’s return to service and could disclose a decision as soon as Monday, according to people familiar with the matter.


https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-wei ... 1576448990
(it's not behind a paywall at this point)


Being reported that halting production is preferred option. :shock:


Ouch....thats bad news for Boeing. Let's see what they announce tmr as no "real" news have been out recently.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 1:00 am

planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
Hopefully Ethiopian Airlines will keep one of their currently grounded Maxes 'preserved' with MCAS 1.0. Once it's updated to 2.0 there's no going back later, should they find the need to investigate something they missed, eg was there an additional issue with electric trim that prevents it from counteracting MCAS.


There is a 0% chance that they do that. Also, any issue with the electric trim that is systematic should be discovered in the investigation. Unless it was a failure on just that airframe, in which case it wouldn't matter if they preserved a different one.


I haven't seen a report that Ethiopia's regulatory authority has issued a grounding, only that Ethiopian Airlines did. So they'd be in their own power to do what they want, including flight tests with the current MCAS 1.0 (but at 32000 ft). I don't see why they haven't done that. Or maybe they have and they plan to divulge the info in their upcoming report in March.
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SFOtoORD
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 1:05 am

rnav2dlrey wrote:
new WSJ reporting this evening:

Boeing is considering either halting or further cutting production of the 737 MAX amid growing uncertainty over the troubled airplane’s return to service and could disclose a decision as soon as Monday, according to people familiar with the matter.


https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-wei ... 1576448990
(it's not behind a paywall at this point)


It was bound to happen at some point if they couldn’t get the plane back in the air. In retrospect, they probably should have slowed the line sooner. With the timeline seemingly uncertain full stop on the line might be best.
 
Draken21fx
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 1:11 am

Draken21fx wrote:
scbriml wrote:
rnav2dlrey wrote:
new WSJ reporting this evening:



https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-wei ... 1576448990
(it's not behind a paywall at this point)


Being reported that halting production is preferred option. :shock:


Ouch....thats bad news for Boeing. Let's see what they announce tmr as no "real" news have been out recently.


https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/shutdown-likely-at-boeing-renton-as-737-max-crisis-extends/

Reported from the Seattle Times as well as the above link is under paywall (at least for me).

I do not understand sth in that article though.

The person close to the discussions said Boeing intends to do what it can to have “as little impact on employees as possible.” He said the company will transfer some of the roughly 12,000 people who work in Renton to other production facilities in the region, including the Auburn parts plant and the Everett widebody jet plant.

However, the other facilities don’t have the capacity to absorb all the Renton workers, and substantial layoffs are likely.


Surely if you are planning shutting down production for 2-3 months you are better off retaining and paying full time the qualified workforce instead of sending them around the region and laying off the rest, or am I missing sth?
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 1:16 am

PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
he EAD did not say "turn off MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine." It said to perform the runaway stabilizer NNC. Early on in the NNC it said to use manual electric trim. Cutting off the electric trim only happens later in the checklist IF RUNAWAY CONTINUES.

You could argue that following he EAD/NNC literally a crew would just keep performing the NNC and never cut off electric trim because using the electric trim would temporarily stop the runaway. No matter what, the electric trim shouldn't have been cut off until the subsequent MCAS activation "continued" the runaway.

ET302 CVR and FDR very clearly show that the pilots used the stab trim cutout switch after the second activation of the MCAS, so there perfectly followed the procedure.

First MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose
down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units."

First pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:12, approximately three seconds after AND stabilizer motion ends, electric trim (from
pilot activated switches on the yoke) in the Aircraft nose up (ANU) direction is recorded on the
DFDR and the stabilizer moved in the ANU direction to 2.4 units."

Second MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:20, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a second
instance of automatic AND stabilizer trim occurred and the stabilizer moved down and reached 0.4
units."

Second pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:28 Manual electric trim in the ANU direction was recorded and the stabilizer reversed
moving in the ANU direction and then the trim reached 2.3 units."

Pilot stab trim cutout:
"At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First-
Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out."


It seems strange that they (the pilots) unflipped the stab cutout switches near the end of the DFDR data so that they could use the electric trim again, yet their use of that electric trim is just two short ANU blips at 05:43:10.

Also, why was there no additional MCAS AND trim recorded after 05:40:51 up to the final MCAS AND at 05:43:21?
That's two and a half minutes of flight where all the prerequisites for MCAS 'recording' were satisfied (MCAS 'operation' on the trim is only satisfied with (c) stab cutouts unflipped):
(a) flaps up
(b) autopilot disengaged

The preliminary report says that the lack of change in 'Pitch Trim' for the MCAS AND cycle at 05:40:42 is proof that the stab cutout switches were flipped, yet they don't say why there are no further MCAS AND cycles (we know the stab wasn't at its lower AND limit because of the minimum recorded of 0.5 degrees at 05:40:28).
Last edited by sgrow787 on Mon Dec 16, 2019 1:27 am, edited 2 times in total.
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frmrCapCadet
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 1:25 am

Workers can collect unemployment, take overdue vacations, possibly allowed to draw on sick leave, there may be a fair amount of training to catch up on. A lot of workers have second jobs they do or can do. Workers and Boeing are fairly sure at this time that work will resume. A lay-off which could extend for several months or go permanent is a much bigger deal than a few months. And when work resumes there will be a lot of overtime what with all of the mothballed planes coming into first service.
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 1:26 am

sgrow787 wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
he EAD did not say "turn off MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine." It said to perform the runaway stabilizer NNC. Early on in the NNC it said to use manual electric trim. Cutting off the electric trim only happens later in the checklist IF RUNAWAY CONTINUES.

You could argue that following he EAD/NNC literally a crew would just keep performing the NNC and never cut off electric trim because using the electric trim would temporarily stop the runaway. No matter what, the electric trim shouldn't have been cut off until the subsequent MCAS activation "continued" the runaway.

ET302 CVR and FDR very clearly show that the pilots used the stab trim cutout switch after the second activation of the MCAS, so there perfectly followed the procedure.

First MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose
down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units."

First pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:12, approximately three seconds after AND stabilizer motion ends, electric trim (from
pilot activated switches on the yoke) in the Aircraft nose up (ANU) direction is recorded on the
DFDR and the stabilizer moved in the ANU direction to 2.4 units."

Second MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:20, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a second
instance of automatic AND stabilizer trim occurred and the stabilizer moved down and reached 0.4
units."

Second pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:28 Manual electric trim in the ANU direction was recorded and the stabilizer reversed
moving in the ANU direction and then the trim reached 2.3 units."

Pilot stab trim cutout:
"At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First-
Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out."


It seems strange that they (the pilots) unflipped the stab cutout switches near the end of the DFDR data so that they could use the electric trim again, yet their use of that electric trim is just two short ANU blips at 05:43:10.

Also, why was there no additional AND trim recorded after 05:40:51 up to the final AND at 05:43:21?
That's two and a half minutes of flight where all the prerequisites for MCAS 'recording' were satisfied (MCAS 'operation' on the trim is only satisfied with (c) stab cutouts unflipped):
(a) flaps up
(b) autopilot disengaged

The preliminary report says that the lack of change in 'Pitch Trim' for the MCAS AND cycle at 05:40:42 is proof that the stab cutout switches were flipped, yet they don't say why there are no further MCAS AND cycles (we know the stab wasn't at its lower AND limit because of the minimum recorded of 0.5 degrees at 05:40:28).


There were no further cycles while the cutout switches were cut out because with no manual electric trim input, MCAS doesn't reset. With no power to the thumb switches, the MCAS algorithm wouldn't know if a pilot hit the switch. Once they switched the electric trim back on and hit the thumb switch it reset MCAS for an additional cycle.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 1:32 am

Draken21fx wrote:
Surely if you are planning shutting down production for 2-3 months you are better off retaining and paying full time the qualified workforce instead of sending them around the region and laying off the rest, or am I missing sth?

Boeing has been doing that since March 219 when the a/c was grounded, it was just lost in the shuffle of all the other revelations, they continued production of a/c at 40+ per month and have them parked all over the place. In addition to paying their employees they have also been paying their vendors who provided the parts to make all those parked a/c, there will be job impacts there as well and they may not have alternative jobs at their disposal to retain staff.

I fear this is something that Boeing should have done sooner, at least a more significant production cut after the June fiasco instead of continuing to hope for the Dec-2019 RTS, as usual, hindsight is 20/20
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 1:32 am

planecane wrote:
There were no further cycles while the cutout switches were cut out because with no manual electric trim input, MCAS doesn't reset. With no power to the thumb switches, the MCAS algorithm wouldn't know if a pilot hit the switch. Once they switched the electric trim back on and hit the thumb switch it reset MCAS for an additional cycle.

That's not the description of MCAS 1.0 that I've been hearing and reading about since day 1. It was first described as repetitive cycles divided by 5 second pauses. Then we found out that there was a 5 second pause after the end of electric trim use.
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 2:18 am

sgrow787 wrote:
planecane wrote:
There were no further cycles while the cutout switches were cut out because with no manual electric trim input, MCAS doesn't reset. With no power to the thumb switches, the MCAS algorithm wouldn't know if a pilot hit the switch. Once they switched the electric trim back on and hit the thumb switch it reset MCAS for an additional cycle.

That's not the description of MCAS 1.0 that I've been hearing and reading about since day 1. It was first described as repetitive cycles divided by 5 second pauses. Then we found out that there was a 5 second pause after the end of electric trim use.


MCAS 1.0 only cycles if it is reset either by exiting the high AoA condition or by a manual trim input (I believe in the opposite direction). It was never designed to cycle in normal operations.
 
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767333ER
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 3:41 am

morrisond wrote:
767333ER wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Yes I have - the great increase in Aviation safety can be attributed greatly to the Automation getting better and more reliable with the introduction of Airbus and Boeing FBW types and even the 737 NG replacing the 300/400/500 - but when the automation fails the lack of basic piloting skills is quite apparent. The number of fatal crashes would be almost basically zero for the past 20 years if more time had been spent on basic pilot training and pilot's were able to perform at the level they are expected too. Most of the fatal crashes in the past 20 years have resulted from this very basic lack of skills.

We should expect better training of Airline pilots for when the Autonannies try to kill us - that is what Pilots are there for.

Every statistician knows that correlation doesn’t necessary equal causation. I would have to see what cut in costs correlates with what reduction in training (something that I will argue doesn’t exist because training has actually improved over the course of the last 40 years), but I don’t expect that anyone here could provide such numbers. Your point about safety improving when Airbus and Boeing FBW planes and the 737NG replaced the older generation aircraft is inaccurate. Safety began improving before the old “less safe” generation of planes was replaced. When the A320 and 777 came in and didn’t crash, we didn’t have a lot of 737 classics and 767s and 757s crashing still; furthermore, the 737NG isn’t really any different than a 737 classic for safety other than some of the cabin safety features (of course some argue it is less safe structurally). Your argument is simply a post hoc fallacy here, or it would be if we did see safety increase only after new types were introduced meaning safety increased because of this, but that’s just not how it went.

The number of crashes wouldn’t be basically zero under a training regime you suggest because no amount of training fully tame human factors or fatigue especially in a self crashing aircraft. What do you define as basic training and what is the level pilots are expected to perform at? What do you define as failed automation? Failed autopilot? That happens a lot more than you thing depending on the type? Failed flight director/command bar? Yep, that too. failed flight augmentation? In normal law you can still easily crash an A320; you just can’t fly outside of the flight envelope, which doesn’t generally happen anyway on 737s. A 777 or 787 has soft limit protection so you can break the limits, but again they don’t It has happened before and sadly probably will happen again. How about this, you are in IMC and your AHRS fails, how will your basic skills training bail you out then? We don’t have planes like the CRJ for example that are even more archaic than the 737 falling out of the sky because they lack basic things like autothrottles. Or is it a plane’s automation actively trying to crash itself, or is that beyond conventional failed automation. What you’re saying here is simply baseless. These 737 MAX crashes are isolated incidents outside of the rest of the aviation world and its issues because MCAS is a new variable that has proven to be far more dangerous than others that doesn’t exist on any other type. Again training issues may exist (not in the nature that you suggest they do), but they have little to nothing to do with the 737 MAX MCAS as that is a totally different animal and one that won’t exist as it has in the future, so going on rants about training have little bearing here. Overcoming an actively self-crashing aircraft such as this should never be considered a basic skill nor is it something we should expect from most pilots as evident in the report from the other day outlining the fact that most pilots tested in a study got the procedure wrong. I don’t see why you can’t seem to accept this.

I ought to know this too because I know an airline pilot very, very well and this is about all we talk about and that’s about a daily discussion. I don’t just base my conclusions off of 100 odd hours in a C172 and a job in some sector finance.


I chat with and listen to the actual airline pilots in this forum who have actually logged hours in the MAX or 737 that everyone seems to ignore.

I believe the biggest reason other than planes and safety systems growing more reliable/redundant was the advent of crew CRM - which seems to have been lacking in both crashes and most of the crashes in the past 20 years.

Boeing isn't the only one who has produced self crashing aircraft that point the nose down when the automation fails - look at Lufthansa 1829 - they were able to successfully save the flight and continue on as they had the training they needed.

I expect crews to be able to follow a simple checklist which they did not on ET302 as per the published ET procedure in the pre-liminary crash report and when the automation tried to crash Lionair 22 times they didn't turn it off.

If the Autopilot tried to turn you left 22 times and you didn't turn it off is it your fault or the planes?

If you are in IMC and the AHRS fails you should be able to complete the flight to suitable destination using the back-up compass the radio and the ISFD. Any Instrument rated pilot should be able to do that any day of the week and fatigued.

CRJ's that don't have Autothrottles aren't falling out of the sky as the crews understand that they have to control the thrust and keep the aircraft within the normal speed envelope. One of the great contributors to the ET302 crash seems to be an over reliance on Autothrottle and a reluctance to disengage it. Also the ET 302 crew went straight to the 320 from basically I assume something like an 172 and never had those few thousand of hours of time on an CRJ learning to control thrust manually and be comfortable with it.

Most of the other non-max crashes of the last 20 years could probably have been saved with basic recurring stall training that is now coming into place in the US. I suggest that is a good idea for the rest of the world.

Yes I'm in finance and my job is to spot patterns - I have been doing that very successfully for thirty years - and when looking at the commercial airline crash reports of the past 20 years I see a recurring theme - lack of basic training that is leading to unnecessary fatalities.

Talking to people on a website is only so good, I live with a pilot and talk to them every day. They fly a plane that requires more skill and effort to fly than a 737. The problem with talking to a lot of 737 pilots is that many of them are at companies where that’s all they have and where the 737 is the only jet they’ve flown other than maybe the CRJunk. These people will usually think the 737 is fine because they don’t know any better. Some of them are also American nationalists (unfortunate to have to say that but it’s true). I have also have known people who have flown thousands of hours in the 737. What you say here doesn’t sound like what anyone with more than just 100 hours in a Cessna would say because someone with more knowledge in the industry and the job would not obviously lack so much knowledge and make so many factual missteps as you do as others have pointed out. Evidently you cherry-pick who you listen to on here only to the ones that confirm your narrative because many of the pilots on here, if not either do not even bother with this thread or do not agree with you. Again outside of this website the general consensus I have heard is overwhelmingly anti-MAX.

You failed to answer or come up with a logical rebuttal to anything I’ve said here. Half if not most of the crashes in the last 20 years weren’t because of stall recovery skills because like real airline pilots have said here and have told me personally you don’t EVER want to be in a position where you have to stall recover transport category aircraft because no matter your skills it usually doesn’t end well. Explain how two instructors here at a flying school where I lived crashed a plane trying to recover from a stall. Was it training? I should hope not as one was a career airline pilot at a very reputable company and the other was military. In large aircraft you train for stall avoidance. Nevertheless, many of the crashes in the past 20 years have been other issues such as mechanical or fatigue or other human factors that show the unavoidable flaws that may appear to the untrained eye as just lack of training. Sure there are things that can be improved but there always will be. If you want to be right, you should argue that pilots should be replaced by computers because that’s where your argument really could be right.

I don’t believe anyone needs nor should have to put up with getting experience on a jet without auto throttle, it’s more challenging than a prop. Besides the point, I was challenging you on the notion of some form of automation being basically the only reason air travel has become safer.

Now don’t compare MCAS to an autopilot turning a plane, that is another fallacy, this time faulty analogy. MCAS is far more sinister than that.

As for the AHRS failure, let’s take a plane that would have AHRS rather than a proper IRS or ADIRS. Such planes would not have an ISFD first off. Now to take the words of not me but an actual airline pilot that has been through hours upon hours of training, it’s not as easy as you say. By the time you figure out what’s going on in IMC you are very likely in a spiral dive or another dangerous situation. Again, not my thoughts or words there, but thoughts and words of someone qualified on the matter.

I do have to point out that you are as per usual backpedaling here. You said before that automation has carried aviation safety to where it is today. Now you admit that it’s only part of it when you can’t provide proof of your original position. I still argue it isn’t even half. There is so much risk attributed with a given flight every day. Not much of it is mitigated by just the automation. The safeguards of the automation don’t usually even get used. Having said that, when automation fails to the biblical proportions MCAS has, a crew should not be expected or required to sort it out. It’s just too much for two humans to deal with as evident with the recent sun sessions where most failed to get the procedures right. There’s training and then there’s training-proof fatally flawed engineering.
Been on: 732 733 734 73G 738 752 763 A319 A320 A321 CRJ CR7 CRA/CR9 E145 E175 E190 F28 MD-82 MD-83 C172R C172S P2006T PA-28-180

2 ears for spatial hearing, 2 eyes for depth perception, 2 ears for balance... How did Boeing think 1 sensor was good enough?!
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 4:18 am

767333ER wrote:
Talking to people on a website is only so good, I live with a pilot and talk to them every day. They fly a plane that requires more skill and effort to fly than a 737. The problem with talking to a lot of 737 pilots is that many of them are at companies where that’s all they have and where the 737 is the only jet they’ve flown other than maybe the CRJunk. These people will usually think the 737 is fine because they don’t know any better. Some of them are also American nationalists (unfortunate to have to say that but it’s true). I have also have known people who have flown thousands of hours in the 737. What you say here doesn’t sound like what anyone with more than just 100 hours in a Cessna would say because someone with more knowledge in the industry and the job would not obviously lack so much knowledge and make so many factual missteps as you do as others have pointed out. Evidently you cherry-pick who you listen to on here only to the ones that confirm your narrative because many of the pilots on here, if not either do not even bother with this thread or do not agree with you. Again outside of this website the general consensus I have heard is overwhelmingly anti-MAX.

You failed to answer or come up with a logical rebuttal to anything I’ve said here. Half if not most of the crashes in the last 20 years weren’t because of stall recovery skills because like real airline pilots have said here and have told me personally you don’t EVER want to be in a position where you have to stall recover transport category aircraft because no matter your skills it usually doesn’t end well. Explain how two instructors here at a flying school where I lived crashed a plane trying to recover from a stall. Was it training? I should hope not as one was a career airline pilot at a very reputable company and the other was military. In large aircraft you train for stall avoidance. Nevertheless, many of the crashes in the past 20 years have been other issues such as mechanical or fatigue or other human factors that show the unavoidable flaws that may appear to the untrained eye as just lack of training. Sure there are things that can be improved but there always will be. If you want to be right, you should argue that pilots should be replaced by computers because that’s where your argument really could be right.

I don’t believe anyone needs nor should have to put up with getting experience on a jet without auto throttle, it’s more challenging than a prop. Besides the point, I was challenging you on the notion of some form of automation being basically the only reason air travel has become safer.

Now don’t compare MCAS to an autopilot turning a plane, that is another fallacy, this time faulty analogy. MCAS is far more sinister than that.

As for the AHRS failure, let’s take a plane that would have AHRS rather than a proper IRS or ADIRS. Such planes would not have an ISFD first off. Now to take the words of not me but an actual airline pilot that has been through hours upon hours of training, it’s not as easy as you say. By the time you figure out what’s going on in IMC you are very likely in a spiral dive or another dangerous situation. Again, not my thoughts or words there, but thoughts and words of someone qualified on the matter.

I do have to point out that you are as per usual backpedaling here. You said before that automation has carried aviation safety to where it is today. Now you admit that it’s only part of it when you can’t provide proof of your original position. I still argue it isn’t even half. There is so much risk attributed with a given flight every day. Not much of it is mitigated by just the automation. The safeguards of the automation don’t usually even get used. Having said that, when automation fails to the biblical proportions MCAS has, a crew should not be expected or required to sort it out. It’s just too much for two humans to deal with as evident with the recent sun sessions where most failed to get the procedures right. There’s training and then there’s training-proof fatally flawed engineering.



As a professional pilot, I'm genuinely curious about some of the points you make in your argument here.

What kind of airplane does your roommate fly that you feel "requires more skill and effort" than a 737? I've flown several different types over the years, and generally most transport airplanes are pretty close in workload, and "skill required" if you can quantify that beyond passing a type check.

There are plenty of us who have flown many other transport jets, besides the 737, that still believe the 737 is a good airplane. I've even flown the CL65 "CRJunk" as you say. Granted, I've only flown the -700, but it's a wonderful airplane. I hear the -200 isn't so nice, however.

You are correct, that we don't ever want to be in a position where we actually stall a transport airplane, but history has proven that's not a real possibility. Thats why we are all doing EET, or Enhanced Envelope training now.

Your comment about experience in aircraft without auto throttles is just asinine. There have been thousands of jets flying without auto throttles for decades, it's perfectly safe, and experience on such a type is a great foundation. Flying jets is the easiest thing I've done in my career. Don't kid yourself, moist complex propellor driven airplanes are much harder to fly than a modern jet. The props, and gearboxes add a level of complexity, and many more possible failures.

Every transport airplane has a standby attitude indicator, it may not be called an ISFD, but it's there. And if a trained crew can't keep the wings level using the standby instruments, they need to look for another line of work.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 6:40 am

It must not be allowed that Boeing needs to lay off 12.000 American workers. the FAA needs to lift the grounding now. MCAS 1.0 was safe enough. Especially as everybody now knows how it works.
 
oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 6:51 am

seahawk wrote:
It must not be allowed that Boeing needs to lay off 12.000 American workers. the FAA needs to lift the grounding now. MCAS 1.0 was safe enough. Especially as everybody now knows how it works.
Ok. Unground it in USA only with MCAS 1.0.



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:stirthepot: :airplane: "This airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys" :airplane: :stirthepot:
 
Kikko19
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 6:56 am

oschkosch wrote:
seahawk wrote:
It must not be allowed that Boeing needs to lay off 12.000 American workers. the FAA needs to lift the grounding now. MCAS 1.0 was safe enough. Especially as everybody now knows how it works.
Ok. Unground it in USA only with MCAS 1.0.



Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk


agree, unground in USA.
in EU MOL said he's not going to say which FR flights will be op by the maxes if ever returning (i don't believe it)? i'll vote with my wallet and avoid Ryanair and anyone else. my life is more worth than the few bucks i'd save with them.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 7:22 am

Unground for flights between Renton and Chicago only.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
pewpew320
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 7:48 am

Kikko19 wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
seahawk wrote:
It must not be allowed that Boeing needs to lay off 12.000 American workers. the FAA needs to lift the grounding now. MCAS 1.0 was safe enough. Especially as everybody now knows how it works.
Ok. Unground it in USA only with MCAS 1.0.



Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk


agree, unground in USA.
in EU MOL said he's not going to say which FR flights will be op by the maxes if ever returning (i don't believe it)? i'll vote with my wallet and avoid Ryanair and anyone else. my life is more worth than the few bucks i'd save with them.


I'd do exactly the same. Life isn't worth a few $$.
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 8:04 am

seahawk wrote:
It must not be allowed that Boeing needs to lay off 12.000 American workers. the FAA needs to lift the grounding now. MCAS 1.0 was safe enough. Especially as everybody now knows how it works.


what are you talking about?

if boeing goes bankrupt the factories and production lines do not disappear magically and leave the workers unemployed.

they simply get another owner.


its a nightmare for investors
not for the workers
 
uta999
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 8:14 am

Stopping production of the MAX would be Boeing finally admitting there is a serious problem that cannot be fixed.

IMO the grounding just extended into 2022.
Your computer just got better
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 8:25 am

asdf wrote:
its a nightmare for investors
not for the workers


Oh, the poor investors. Any investment carries risk.
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
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Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 8:32 am

Does Boeing not expect some RTS within Q1 anymore? Until Q1 they had said they could keep the line open.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 8:34 am

This smells more and more fishy. We were to believe that the only challenge would be to avoid a faulty MCAS activation, which sounds rather simple. (Compare 2 sensors, if values are off more than a small amount, turn off MCAS). In the end you could have added the AoA disagree warning as standard and added a MCAS active warning message to the flight displays and have them crews turn MCAS manually if both warning are on.
 
iamlucky13
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 8:43 am

scbriml wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
Another report shows why RTS could be delayed again. The new MCAS design is specifically mentioned in opening new cans of worms due to new potentially confusing indications:
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... ax-return/

During the recent pilot trials, which to various scenarios involving the revised 737 Max flight control software and new checklists, all the pilots managed to get themselves out of trouble, but Boeing and regulators found that “more than half…of pilots responded with the wrong procedures,” according to one of the three people briefed on the results that are currently being analyzed by the FAA and other global regulators. The uncertain results of the evaluations are likely to re-energize the debate about the necessity for additional simulator training for pilots prior flying the 737 Max again.

The airline pilots were presented with different scenarios during the evaluations. The week-long trials inside Boeing’s 737 Max engineering simulator focused on the human response to a variety of angle of attack (AOA) indication failures and disagreements in real-world scenarios, including takeoff, landing and at cruise, the briefed people said. Troubleshooting “the failure presented wasn’t intuitive based on the checklist,” said another person familiar with the trials. The 737 Max now uses both of its flight control computers to compare AOA readings to prevent an erroneous activation of the MCAS function, as happened during both crashes, but the new software’s logic can now produce new or potentially confusing indications on the flight deck in certain rare, but possible, scenarios, according to those familiar with the testing.


This should be a huge red flag to all those blaming the pilots directly or indirectly via the “better training” meme.

These were pilots who were 100% aware of what was about to happen to them in a simulator session (so zero risk even if they screw up) and they still struggled to sort it out. To the extent that neither Boeing nor the FAA were happy with the results. :scratchchin:


I hadn't been thinking about it much lately, but it occurred to me probably several months ago now that at some point, the discussion of information overload and how to present flight crews with the right information, when they need it, would likely come up again. And now here we are. It's not a MAX-specific question. It was discussed after AF 447, as well as as after QF 32, with the latter being a case where good CRM helped assure a good outcome. Some discussion of this related to QF 32 was here:
https://www.aerosociety.com/news/comman ... from-qf32/

morrisond wrote:
They are testing MCAS 2.0 which has not much to do with 1.0. It sounds like they have added more complexity complicating matters. Adding complexity is generally never a good idea.


Hopefully we'll get a chance to learn more about the issues, but my first thought is mainly just curiosity what situations crews were having trouble with, and whether those actually vary significantly in complexity from other aircraft, where things are already known to sometimes get very confusing for a crew.

Theoretically, the updates should fairly effectively be limiting MCAS operation to only when it is helpful to the crew. Are they referring to near stall situations where MCAS is operating, or mismatched input situations where it is not?

Or are they referring to the unlikely but necessary to consider situation where both computers received incorrect but matching inputs, and MCAS operates erroneously for one cycle?

Most importantly, are the crews having trouble recovering from an upset, or determining the cause and choosing the best response after having recovered?
 
rheinwaldner
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 8:51 am

morrisond wrote:
As I've said for a while they may be better off to ditch MCAS assuming the MAX stalls somewhat normally and implement the mandatory US stall training.

Someone mentioned it looked like they were doing stall tests this past weekend - they may be checking to see if this is a feasible path.

The negative answer to this suggestion is in the blog post of the MAX instructor:

Quote1: "Recently revealed exchanges between officials suggested “no MCAS” as a way to return the aircraft to flight. That is not going to happen."

Included with detailed explanations, why not. The reason can be summarized as "Part 25 regulations … require ... handling predictability". Full quote:

Quote2: Part 25 regulations, not a need for feel similarity with the 737 NG, require a linear displacement for a given control force input to maintain handling predictability.

Quote3: MCAS does serve a safety purpose. It helps pilots avoid over-controlling the aircraft into a full stall. That is why MCAS is here to stay and why flying the aircraft as it is currently built without MCAS would not be wise.


Read here:
https://www.avweb.com/insider/a-pilots- ... -response/
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
uta999
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 9:16 am

rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
As I've said for a while they may be better off to ditch MCAS assuming the MAX stalls somewhat normally and implement the mandatory US stall training.

Someone mentioned it looked like they were doing stall tests this past weekend - they may be checking to see if this is a feasible path.

The negative answer to this suggestion is in the blog post of the MAX instructor:

Quote1: "Recently revealed exchanges between officials suggested “no MCAS” as a way to return the aircraft to flight. That is not going to happen."

Included with detailed explanations, why not. The reason can be summarized as "Part 25 regulations … require ... handling predictability". Full quote:

Quote2: Part 25 regulations, not a need for feel similarity with the 737 NG, require a linear displacement for a given control force input to maintain handling predictability.

Quote3: MCAS does serve a safety purpose. It helps pilots avoid over-controlling the aircraft into a full stall. That is why MCAS is here to stay and why flying the aircraft as it is currently built without MCAS would not be wise.


Read here:
https://www.avweb.com/insider/a-pilots- ... -response/


I amended it for you:

MCAS does serve a safety purpose. It helps pilots avoid controlling the aircraft into a full stall.
Your computer just got better
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 9:19 am

uta999 wrote:
Stopping production of the MAX would be Boeing finally admitting there is a serious problem that cannot be fixed.

IMO the grounding just extended into 2022.


That might not be far off the mark. (If the plane is ever ungrounded)

To halt production full stop is such a serious decision to take at this stage after so many months to find solutions

All they've done is found worse problems that need fixing or can't be fixed it appears.

And with all the budget and resource available to Boeing - if there were easy solutions they would be in place by now

So following on from recent discussions - today what happens with Boeing share price ?

Based on last few months I'm predicting a 10 per cent drop today

Then slowly but miraculously recover the next few weeks to be back to where it is now and everything carries on as though theres no problem to see here.
 
Draken21fx
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 9:46 am

frmrCapCadet wrote:
Workers can collect unemployment, take overdue vacations, possibly allowed to draw on sick leave, there may be a fair amount of training to catch up on. A lot of workers have second jobs they do or can do. Workers and Boeing are fairly sure at this time that work will resume. A lay-off which could extend for several months or go permanent is a much bigger deal than a few months. And when work resumes there will be a lot of overtime what with all of the mothballed planes coming into first service.



Still I find it strange.

I would rather think a big chunk of those 12k workers are rather specialised and it takes some time to train them. Is it worth for Boeing to sack some of them and then rehire, retrain etc? Is it really cheaper than giving them paid leave?
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 9:47 am

sgrow787 wrote:
planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
Hopefully Ethiopian Airlines will keep one of their currently grounded Maxes 'preserved' with MCAS 1.0. Once it's updated to 2.0 there's no going back later, should they find the need to investigate something they missed, eg was there an additional issue with electric trim that prevents it from counteracting MCAS.


There is a 0% chance that they do that. Also, any issue with the electric trim that is systematic should be discovered in the investigation. Unless it was a failure on just that airframe, in which case it wouldn't matter if they preserved a different one.


I haven't seen a report that Ethiopia's regulatory authority has issued a grounding, only that Ethiopian Airlines did. So they'd be in their own power to do what they want, including flight tests with the current MCAS 1.0 (but at 32000 ft). I don't see why they haven't done that. Or maybe they have and they plan to divulge the info in their upcoming report in March.

ECAA grounded 14th March. Don't see if you don't look.

Ray
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 10:03 am

AABusDrvr wrote:
PW100 wrote:
True, but stall warning, stick shaker going off, cockpit lighting up like Christmas tree is not normal. Somewhat unusual STS behaviour would not be unexpected in such situations?
Why would STS stand out as the lethal killer when there is a lot of things going on at the same time?
At the same time, electric trimming worked normally, indicating to the crew that there was no (classic) trim runaway.


This phrase drives me nuts. There was a master caution, and a couple of other system caution lights presented, a very far cry from "lit up like a Christmas tree".


It wasn't my phrase, not sure who introduced it. But I used it, so yes, I will take that on me.

What I take from it is that it is used as a metaphor, illustrating that there were several issues going on at the same time. And that crew were getting overwhelmed in short time frame, unable to prioritize the thing that was going to kill them from the issues going on.

I can see your issues with using the phrase, but I hope you can also understand why I chose to it. To the same extent that it drives you mad, it equally drives me mad when people are attacking crews and focussing on just one single element (either it be unusual trim, Vmo) not appreciating that multiple issues were going on at the same. time. And how any decent pilot would have handled such simple issue ( . . . when faced the issue as a standalone issue).

In any case, my question was if some sort of unusual STS behaviour could be expected in non-normal situations . . .
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flipdewaf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 10:06 am

morrisond wrote:
You made me laugh. That was funny.

Irrespective of MAX the US regulation for increased stall training is a pretty good idea. It could have saved quite a few flights in the past 10-15 years.

BTW - the training can be done in a full motion SIM - US sims have been modified to be able to do this.


Whilst more is never going to be a bad thing and there will always be diminishing returns. When you are given a budget to work within then one should be focusing on what gives you the most bang for you buck, in the highly procedural world of aviation then automation works very well as it can be done more efficiently and reliably than humans. This is why the engineer was removed from the cockpit, the automation did a better job for cheaper...

Would it be good to have pilots better at throttle and stick? Yes, undoubtedly. Would the costs associated with getting pilots better at throttle and stick be better placed in making the scenario that required that level of throttle and stick skills less likely and overall provide a safer system of operation?

If you have 1 "credit" available for improving safety, do you:
1. Award that credit to pilot training such that the average ability of pilots improves such that they can fly out of 50% of the stall upsets?
2. Award that credit to automation such that the chances of entering the stall upset is reduced by 90%

What about if you have more credits you ask, can you put a price on safety?
Put the second credit in to automation as well..

But what about training? Put credits in to training to avoid stalls, not handling them.

You are clearly emotionally wedded to this, have too much pride invested to back down and clearly don't understand human performance limitations and why aviation is safe.

Fred
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XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 10:11 am

morrisond wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Lionair is somewhat understandable as they had no knowledge of MCAS but please explain ET then.

To answer this wrong claim I post this blogpost from a Canadian MAX pilot instructor, who was invited to a two-day meeting between Boeing’s executives and a handful of industry influencers:
https://www.avweb.com/insider/a-pilots- ... -response/

She said: "To make matters worse, initial accident data revealed the treacherous role of a feature that was unknown to most before the first crash and barely explained before the second—MCAS, for Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System."

Beside this statement, that directly refutes your position, there is also plenty of other evidence in her writing:

[*]Some statements from Dennis Muilenburg: “We were a little slow to take responsibility"
[*]She considers Boeings “no problem” reactions as "out-of-touch with reality, deceitful and unconcerned with safety."
[*]"70 to 80 percent of new Chinese pilots would prefer to fly an Airbus, if given a choice."
[*]less than 20 percent of airline passengers would definitely fly on the aircraft within six months of its return to service.
[*]More direct quotes from Muilenburg: “We take full responsibility,” he repeated several times. “We are sorry.”
[*]Recently revealed exchanges between officials suggested “no MCAS” as a way to return the aircraft to flight. That is not going to happen
[*]Part 25 regulations, not a need for feel similarity with the 737 NG, require a linear displacement for a given control force input to maintain handling predictability.
[*]MCAS does serve a safety purpose. It helps pilots avoid over-controlling the aircraft into a full stall.
[*]Another direct quote from Muilenburg: “We do not blame the pilots,” said Muilenburg. Nobody should.


Another report shows why RTS could be delayed again. The new MCAS design is specifically mentioned in opening new cans of worms due to new potentially confusing indications:
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... ax-return/

During the recent pilot trials, which to various scenarios involving the revised 737 Max flight control software and new checklists, all the pilots managed to get themselves out of trouble, but Boeing and regulators found that “more than half…of pilots responded with the wrong procedures,” according to one of the three people briefed on the results that are currently being analyzed by the FAA and other global regulators. The uncertain results of the evaluations are likely to re-energize the debate about the necessity for additional simulator training for pilots prior flying the 737 Max again.

The airline pilots were presented with different scenarios during the evaluations. The week-long trials inside Boeing’s 737 Max engineering simulator focused on the human response to a variety of angle of attack (AOA) indication failures and disagreements in real-world scenarios, including takeoff, landing and at cruise, the briefed people said. Troubleshooting “the failure presented wasn’t intuitive based on the checklist,” said another person familiar with the trials. The 737 Max now uses both of its flight control computers to compare AOA readings to prevent an erroneous activation of the MCAS function, as happened during both crashes, but the new software’s logic can now produce new or potentially confusing indications on the flight deck in certain rare, but possible, scenarios, according to those familiar with the testing.


They are testing MCAS 2.0 which has not much to do with 1.0. It sounds like they have added more complexity complicating matters. Adding complexity is generally never a good idea.

As I've said for a while they may be better off to ditch MCAS assuming the MAX stalls somewhat normally and implement the mandatory US stall training.

Someone mentioned it looked like they were doing stall tests this past weekend - they may be checking to see if this is a feasible path.

The purpose of the exercise was to evaluate new/revised procedures and training. MCAS base functionality is not significantly changed from 1.0 to 2.0. It is neutered to reduce the probability of catastrophic failure modes.

As you have been advised many times. The overriding objective regarding stall is prevention. Any increase in propensity to stall is not acceptable trained or not.

Boeing have clearly ruled out removing MCAS as an option at this stage, sine it would still need to be replaced by some other change to the FCC software or aerodynamics.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 10:18 am

sgrow787 wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
he EAD did not say "turn off MCAS, trim manually and you will be fine." It said to perform the runaway stabilizer NNC. Early on in the NNC it said to use manual electric trim. Cutting off the electric trim only happens later in the checklist IF RUNAWAY CONTINUES.

You could argue that following he EAD/NNC literally a crew would just keep performing the NNC and never cut off electric trim because using the electric trim would temporarily stop the runaway. No matter what, the electric trim shouldn't have been cut off until the subsequent MCAS activation "continued" the runaway.

ET302 CVR and FDR very clearly show that the pilots used the stab trim cutout switch after the second activation of the MCAS, so there perfectly followed the procedure.

First MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose
down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units."

First pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:12, approximately three seconds after AND stabilizer motion ends, electric trim (from
pilot activated switches on the yoke) in the Aircraft nose up (ANU) direction is recorded on the
DFDR and the stabilizer moved in the ANU direction to 2.4 units."

Second MCAS activation:
"At 05:40:20, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a second
instance of automatic AND stabilizer trim occurred and the stabilizer moved down and reached 0.4
units."

Second pilot manual electric trim:
"At 05:40:28 Manual electric trim in the ANU direction was recorded and the stabilizer reversed
moving in the ANU direction and then the trim reached 2.3 units."

Pilot stab trim cutout:
"At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First-
Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out."


It seems strange that they (the pilots) unflipped the stab cutout switches near the end of the DFDR data so that they could use the electric trim again, yet their use of that electric trim is just two short ANU blips at 05:43:10.

Also, why was there no additional MCAS AND trim recorded after 05:40:51 up to the final MCAS AND at 05:43:21?
That's two and a half minutes of flight where all the prerequisites for MCAS 'recording' were satisfied (MCAS 'operation' on the trim is only satisfied with (c) stab cutouts unflipped):
(a) flaps up
(b) autopilot disengaged

The preliminary report says that the lack of change in 'Pitch Trim' for the MCAS AND cycle at 05:40:42 is proof that the stab cutout switches were flipped, yet they don't say why there are no further MCAS AND cycles (we know the stab wasn't at its lower AND limit because of the minimum recorded of 0.5 degrees at 05:40:28).

Thumb switch availability can therefore be reasonably deduced as a pre-requisite for MCAS initiation (as would seem prudent since it is the preferred counter measure for Boeing MCAS V1.0 design).

Ray
 
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keesje
Posts: 13929
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 10:36 am

Helped by congress Boeing may have been able to armtwist FAA into agreeing MCAS is not an anti stall system. Now EASA, JATR and other authorities want to have proof / test results.

Things can get complicated. Specially if e.g. NTSB, EASA start digging into the qualification of these certification topics and oldish requirements. And what drove this process.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/11/faa-failed-to-properly-review-737-max-jet-anti-stall-system-jatr-findings.html

JATR was outcommunicated a bit with bullish RTS expectations, but it did go away. Recommendations are on the table of some really inflexible, independent people now.
They even publicly complain if you put pressure on them and ask you to stop it, even if it is smart & indirect. Welcome to aircraft certification 2.0, Back to the Future.
"Never mistake motion for action." Ernest Hemingway
 
KLAXWOLF
Posts: 3
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 10:36 am

Grounding and no end in sight: Boeing is thinking loudly about further reducing the production of the 737 MAX or even temporarily ceasing it altogether. This would shut down about half of the company - and not only Boeing would have to worry about its employees.

Aircraft construction and maintenance account for 80 percent of Boeing's operating profit. The 737 series was previously the blockbuster of the American manufacturer: it accounted for 70 percent of deliveries in the civilian sectors. If Boeing ceased production of 737, almost half of the company would be shut down.
 
checklist350
Posts: 49
Joined: Fri Nov 01, 2019 5:40 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 11:42 am

Why have my posts been deleted? It was about the FAA estimate of February and a link to the Seattle times article. They were entirely on topic and there was nothing provocative or negative in these posts.

We have hundreds of repetitive posts that aren't even on topic which are allowed, yet actual news and discussion related to the ungrounding is deleted. I am completely bewildered and would like an explanation from the moderator in question.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 12:06 pm

checklist350 wrote:
Why have my posts been deleted? It was about the FAA estimate of February and a link to the Seattle times article. They were entirely on topic and there was nothing provocative or negative in these posts.


It may have been deleted for being factually inaccurate.

I replied to that post to point out that your “FAA estimate” of February was no such thing. That date came from Boeing and is just more of “early 4th quarter” type estimating. AFAIK, the FAA is still refusing to provide any guidance on when MAX will RTS and has asked Boeing to stop speculating on the date.
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 1019
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 12:18 pm

scbriml wrote:
checklist350 wrote:
Why have my posts been deleted? It was about the FAA estimate of February and a link to the Seattle times article. They were entirely on topic and there was nothing provocative or negative in these posts.


It may have been deleted for being factually inaccurate.

I replied to that post to point out that your “FAA estimate” of February was no such thing. That date came from Boeing and is just more of “early 4th quarter” type estimating. AFAIK, the FAA is still refusing to provide any guidance on when MAX will RTS and has asked Boeing to stop speculating on the date.

Possible. But frankly, if any inaccurate and/or off-topic posts will be deleted, this thread would be far more quiet (as we can sometime observe when a specific poster take a break).
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
B777LRF
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Dec 16, 2019 12:27 pm

Can we please, once and for all, stop with the insidious 'the pilots were (at least partially) to blame?

Straight from the mouth of a to-be B737 Max instructor pilot, and from Boeing itself.

Thus, all 737s, except for the 737 MAX, have a trim stop switch that interrupts a runaway trim event when pilots pull back the control column. MAX pilots should instead use electric trim to counter an undesired trim movement before shutting down the electric trim functionality with the Stab Trim Cutout, when appropriate.

It should come as no surprise, then, that the Ethiopian Airlines crew choose to reestablish electrical trim functionality when they realized that they were unable to trim manually after shutting down the electric trim system as instructed in the Boeing procedure published after the Lion Air crash.

“We do not blame the pilots,” said Muilenburg. Nobody should. Given the scope of changes to the software, cockpit indications and training developed by Boeing in the aftermath, it is clear that erroneous MCAS activation was a confusing, treacherous and serious challenge to be met with a unique, precise and timely set of actions to avoid excessive tail loading and related control issues.

Proper knowledge and prior exposure in simulators equipped with MCAS functionality—something no commercial B737 Max simulators had at the time of the accidents—were essential to give 737 MAX pilots the tools they needed to handle erroneous MCAS activation. The accident crews did not have it.

(..) The thoroughness and quality of the proposed MCAS training module Boeing allowed us to see this week is certainly far superior to the hurried and succinct details released in response to the first crash that left us with more questions than answers.

During the initial certification process, Boeing and the certification authorities overlooked potential scenarios. Murphy ’s Law applied.
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