This leadership team at Boeing is arguably the biggest disgrace by any American company of the 21st century - even more so than the Wells Fargo/Equifax crises. At least nobody died from their misdoings.

I don't understand what the Board of Directors could possibly be waiting for. Dennis has already shot himself in both feet with a .22. He is untrustworthy and has clearly demonstrated he is a failure when in crisis. Forget the billions of dollars lost on the actual program - the value of the brand as a whole has bottomed out.

What an utter disappointment and shame. There will be hell to pay for many many years to come. I am at a loss for words at today's news.

asdf wrote:

IF the 737MAX is not neutral enough in normal flight to let the automation do a fail-over to the pilots in case of a AoA (or airspeed, or altidude, or ...) disagree you can stop that whole software thing immidiatly, cant you?

Now you seem to be ignoring what the initial testing prior to MCAS version 1 discovered, the stick fell forces during the required wind up turn did not meet specifications. We are now going back full circle to whether MCAS was a stall prevention system or required to ensure the MAX met the required FARS.

BigPlaneGuy13 wrote:

This leadership team at Boeing is arguably the biggest disgrace by any American company of the 21st century - even more so than the Wells Fargo/Equifax crises. At least nobody died from their misdoings.

I don't understand what the Board of Directors could possibly be waiting for. Dennis has already shot himself in both feet with a .22. He is untrustworthy and has clearly demonstrated he is a failure when in crisis. Forget the billions of dollars lost on the actual program - the value of the brand as a whole has bottomed out.

What an utter disappointment and shame. There will be hell to pay for many many years to come. I am at a loss for words at today's news.

This is just wrong. Plenty of people killed themselves when they lost all their money. Boeing never set out to hurt anyone. A flawed system paired with inept pilots created a lethal combination. But plenty of financial firms were knowingly ripping off their clients and knew their life savings would be wiped out.

Boeing is making it clear production won't restart until the FAA says ok:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN1YK18Q

"Boeing did not say how long the shutdown might last, stressing this was up to the FAA. Previous efforts to predict when the 737 MAX might return to service after software training changes had drawn a sharp response from the U.S. regulator.".

My back of the envelope math says 90,000 jobs were just impacted directly.

I read posts here with... too much emotion.

I believe the FAA has belatedly taken the correct approach I also believe the behind close door meeting Boeing/FAA removed all hope of a return to service within a year of grounding.

This is the greatest turn off in Aerospace since the early 1990s. I'm safe, but OMG did this just free up talent.

I think many of my friends supporting Boeing as contractors don't realize the magnitude of the stop. Not one call... yet.

Lightsaber

CNN reports this:

"A Federal Aviation Administration analysis document dated December 2018, weeks after the first crash, predicted there would be more than 15 additional fatal crashes of the MAX over its lifetime. The document was made public Wednesday at a House Transportation Committee hearing."

The FAA chief didn't know of this document.

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/11/poli ... index.html

ClubCX wrote:

hivue wrote:

Noshow wrote:

How fast can Airbus increase the A220 rate? And the A321?

One important reason why Boeing's share price is still up is that their customers have no place else to go. Both Boeing and Airbus have solid backlogs of orders.

Russia and China both have brand new planes to compete with the MAX and A320.

But production rate for those 2 combined (when certified) would be below 50 a year, wouldn't it? Not high enough to make much of a dent in meetiing MAX demand.

par13del wrote:

asdf wrote:

IF the 737MAX is not neutral enough in normal flight to let the automation do a fail-over to the pilots in case of a AoA (or airspeed, or altidude, or ...) disagree you can stop that whole software thing immidiatly, cant you?

Now you seem to be ignoring what the initial testing prior to MCAS version 1 discovered, the stick fell forces during the required wind up turn did not meet specifications. We are now going back full circle to whether MCAS was a stall prevention system or required to ensure the MAX met the required FARS.

i think i do not ignore

JTAR report points to a much more flawed attitude as the simple „light stick“ explanation suggests

the stick load regulation is decades old
is is rule from the 1980ies to make shure that a plane behaves like a plane

it may be that boeing only recognised a deviation from the rules in wind up turns
maybe outside the wind up turns it only deviates imperceptible from the usual backforce

if its really a sinple wind up turn problem .... i am shure the 737MAx would have had its RTS months ago

lightsaber wrote:

Folks, the emergency stop on a freight train was just hit. I hope people realize Christmas was just ruined for 30,000+ people. Sadly, most won't know it for a week or more. So while I believe the FAA is doing their job, people will get an education in the cost of safety.

As others have noted, for many vendors, they have no slack Tomorrow morning they will be informing staff of the bad news. As in, enjoy your winter vacation, you will be on unemployment starting January 16th (assuming 30 day notice). Those notices must go out quick.
Lightsaber

Hindsight is always 20/20, but after the June fiasco, if Boeing had really slowed the train - say 20 per month - all and sundry would have been laser focused on getting the a/c repaired and dealt with the recriminations after.
Now the politicians are really going to get involved and it may get real messy, the new head of the FAA may not have the time to personally test fly the MAX.

kayik wrote:

scbriml wrote:

sharpley wrote:

Spirit have still been producing 52 fuselages a month, compared to Boeing assembling frames 42 p/m. With a large backlog of unused fuselages and now a shutdown, you have to fear for Spirit employees

That would mean about 90 surplus fuselages have been built so far. Where on Earth are they being stored?

At Spirit under a blanket

https://media.arkansasonline.com/img/ph ... 9a8f88077d

Incredible. If this is the end of MAX, would there be a sustainable way to reuse the already built parts? Like building a wind turbine tower out of the fuselages and use the wings as blades?

lightsaber wrote:

Folks, the emergency stop on a freight train was just hit. I hope people realize Christmas was just ruined for 30,000+ people. Sadly, most won't know it for a week or more. So while I believe the FAA is doing their job, people will get an education in the cost of safety.

As others have noted, for many vendors, they have no slack Tomorrow morning they will be informing staff of the bad news. As in, enjoy your winter vacation, you will be on unemployment starting January 16th (assuming 30 day notice). Those notices must go out quick.

Revelation wrote:

lightsaber wrote:

Slowing/halting production isn't one effect, it is many.

The landing gear vendor, UTX, will probably have to suck up costs, but will instead put MAX gear on rediced production.

Same with CFM. That is a freight train. It takes a year to stop, two years to start up again. So I expect slowed production just to allow a ramp up, but Boeing is taking advantage of risk sharing.

For consumables (tires, brakes, window seals, epoxy,), I expect a complete halt in accepting deliveries.

For Spirit, bodies, they cannot afford to keep producing if Boeing doesn't pay. This means temporary layoffs and there will be restart issues.

Boeing just made it clear RTS delays have a cost. It is too late for many to stop spending for Christmas. I expect Witchita retail was just hit by the Grinch.

Lightsaber

So if Boeing is going to resume delivery from the stored frames, I suppose this gives them some buffer to restart the production line more gradually than the earlier plan, which was to just start shipping the new builds and feed in the stored frames independently.

I speculate Boeing bet on ready mass produced parts (pilot tubes and wires) and now some gizmo seems likely. If a mechanical part is required, return to service was delayed by months. Even a cheap custom gizmo takes time to qualify, then produce in numbers to get the grounded fleet going.

Boeing cannot be back at full production within 6 months. This reduces 2020 production by at least 250 (from 630, or <380 MAX produced in 2020).

So it depends on how you look at this The US economy just shrank by a minimum of $9 billion/year direct plus another bit of indirect in 2020.

Big decisions were just made.

Lightsaber

That's not even the half of it. How about the Boeing employees? Anyone who thinks they will be immune has their head in the sand. And what about used prices and lease rates for A320s and 737NG's? What about the rates that maintenance contractors charge for overhauling old A320s and 737s, since that is all contracted out now (thank you Southwest)? As if the capacity even exists to ramp up. How about pilot hiring at major airlines? How many pilots won't get jobs because new airplanes won't be delivered? How many simulators won't be built? And what about airfares for next summer's travelers? "Capacity discipline" has just been forced on the airlines, yields and airfares should stay high. And what about the overall effect on the US economy of all of this unnecessary chaos? And what about media darling Southwest, that indirectly bears some responsibility? Gotta have that common pilot rating. How'd that work out?

I said months ago this was a full blown crisis. Many Boeing fanboys couldn't get their head out of the sand and see it. The responsible Boeing leaders should go to jail. This is a tragedy that began with the unnecessary deaths of almost 300 innocent people and continues to this very moment.

TTailedTiger wrote:

BigPlaneGuy13 wrote:

This leadership team at Boeing is arguably the biggest disgrace by any American company of the 21st century - even more so than the Wells Fargo/Equifax crises. At least nobody died from their misdoings.

I don't understand what the Board of Directors could possibly be waiting for. Dennis has already shot himself in both feet with a .22. He is untrustworthy and has clearly demonstrated he is a failure when in crisis. Forget the billions of dollars lost on the actual program - the value of the brand as a whole has bottomed out.

What an utter disappointment and shame. There will be hell to pay for many many years to come. I am at a loss for words at today's news.

This is just wrong. Plenty of people killed themselves when they lost all their money. Boeing never set out to hurt anyone. A flawed system paired with inept pilots created a lethal combination. But plenty of financial firms were knowingly ripping off their clients and knew their life savings would be wiped out.

Still blaming dead pilots. Unbelievable.

asdf wrote:

but how far does this go?
isnt it a paradigm shift in duties and hasnt it another dimension if the flightdeck crew needs to respond to a aerodynamical flaw and has to control a plane with a questionable attitude?

every curve, each decent, a single collision avoidance manoever, even a kinda simple TOGA applience in a 737MAX shifts the flightdeck crew into a dimension they never entered before...

can you make shure they will not very quick come to a point where the simple „dont pull“ command of the flight director is the smallest control problem ...

Where is the evidence that the MAX is such an unstable aircraft? I am going to make a wild guess that if it were so unstable, it would not be able to take off or even land by a human pilot. As to how far it goes - the essence of flying is to make constant adjustments. In the absence of automation or trim, the pilots will be making pitch and power adjustments for the entire duration of any flight.

speedking wrote:

kayik wrote:

scbriml wrote:

That would mean about 90 surplus fuselages have been built so far. Where on Earth are they being stored?

At Spirit under a blanket

https://media.arkansasonline.com/img/ph ... 9a8f88077d

Incredible. If this is the end of MAX, would there be a sustainable way to reuse the already built parts? Like building a wind turbine tower out of the fuselages and use the wings as blades?

i dont see that coming at all

if they really cant fix the underlying aerodynamics ( and for the sake of the employees i hope they can soon) they can put back the smaller engines on it and sell it to militaery customers worldwide

speedking wrote:

kayik wrote:

At Spirit under a blanket

https://media.arkansasonline.com/img/ph ... 9a8f88077d

Incredible. If this is the end of MAX, would there be a sustainable way to reuse the already built parts? Like building a wind turbine tower out of the fuselages and use the wings as blades?

No, that would be a waste of fine aluminum... and those wind turbine towers are comparably cheap anyway, so there's no need to replace them by 737 hulls.

Maybe they could be reworked into NG hulls.

SteelChair wrote:

TTailedTiger wrote:

BigPlaneGuy13 wrote:

This leadership team at Boeing is arguably the biggest disgrace by any American company of the 21st century - even more so than the Wells Fargo/Equifax crises. At least nobody died from their misdoings.

I don't understand what the Board of Directors could possibly be waiting for. Dennis has already shot himself in both feet with a .22. He is untrustworthy and has clearly demonstrated he is a failure when in crisis. Forget the billions of dollars lost on the actual program - the value of the brand as a whole has bottomed out.

What an utter disappointment and shame. There will be hell to pay for many many years to come. I am at a loss for words at today's news.

This is just wrong. Plenty of people killed themselves when they lost all their money. Boeing never set out to hurt anyone. A flawed system paired with inept pilots created a lethal combination. But plenty of financial firms were knowingly ripping off their clients and knew their life savings would be wiped out.

Still blaming dead pilots. Unbelievable.

Nope. I can read. They were a contributing factor in the official report.

asdf wrote:

if they really cant fix the underlying aerodynamics ( and for the sake of the employees i hope they can soon) they can put back the smaller engines on it and sell it to militaery customers worldwide

No military customers exist for 300+ stored frames, besides, production of the military variant will continue.
Also, the same regulators who are reviewing the safety of the a/c also ensure that special requirements must be met for lines where military and civilian variants are produced.
Nope, they stay grounded until the FAA makes a decision.

VS11 wrote:

asdf wrote:

but how far does this go?
isnt it a paradigm shift in duties and hasnt it another dimension if the flightdeck crew needs to respond to a aerodynamical flaw and has to control a plane with a questionable attitude?

every curve, each decent, a single collision avoidance manoever, even a kinda simple TOGA applience in a 737MAX shifts the flightdeck crew into a dimension they never entered before...

can you make shure they will not very quick come to a point where the simple „dont pull“ command of the flight director is the smallest control problem ...

Where is the evidence that the MAX is such an unstable aircraft? I am going to make a wild guess that if it were so unstable, it would not be able to take off or even land by a human pilot. As to how far it goes - the essence of flying is to make constant adjustments. In the absence of automation or trim, the pilots will be making pitch and power adjustments for the entire duration of any flight.

no evidence
i am not a boing test pilot
i can not have evidence

but strongest circumstances are
- the raise of value of MCAS impact from MCAS 0,9 to 1,0 ( light input seems not have been sufficient, i dont believe the low/high speed explanation)
- the JTAR didnt get the unaugmented testflight and the EASA didnt get it neither .... till more than half a year now ... in that situation ..... it would have helped boeing a lot to allow that test flight to sort out that fears from regulators ... but they resisted and demand a desition about the RTS without that test. well they got the desition now, but they dont like it ...

i can not find another explanation but REAL and not solvable problems, wide beyond a „light stick“

Well, this will put pressure on FAA to clear as quickly as possible. Country cannot afford to lose so many jobs. Ball is in FAA court.

How quickly BCA and its supply chain restart NG assembly.

If US declares MCAS as dual-use and imposes export controls under ITAR, BCA can sell non-MCAS MAXes with additional training to other countries. US Carriers can get MCAS option or additional training. This may be way out for current conundrum.

No delta training was Boeing's selling point, I don't think many airlines would be as adamant as WN to additional training.

lightsaber wrote:

Folks, the emergency stop on a freight train was just hit. I hope people realize Christmas was just ruined for 30,000+ people. Sadly, most won't know it for a week or more. So while I believe the FAA is doing their job, people will get an education in the cost of safety.

As others have noted, for many vendors, they have no slack Tomorrow morning they will be informing staff of the bad news. As in, enjoy your winter vacation, you will be on unemployment starting January 16th (assuming 30 day notice). Those notices must go out quick.

Revelation wrote:

lightsaber wrote:

Slowing/halting production isn't one effect, it is many.

The landing gear vendor, UTX, will probably have to suck up costs, but will instead put MAX gear on rediced production.

Same with CFM. That is a freight train. It takes a year to stop, two years to start up again. So I expect slowed production just to allow a ramp up, but Boeing is taking advantage of risk sharing.

For consumables (tires, brakes, window seals, epoxy,), I expect a complete halt in accepting deliveries.

For Spirit, bodies, they cannot afford to keep producing if Boeing doesn't pay. This means temporary layoffs and there will be restart issues.

Boeing just made it clear RTS delays have a cost. It is too late for many to stop spending for Christmas. I expect Witchita retail was just hit by the Grinch.

Lightsaber

So if Boeing is going to resume delivery from the stored frames, I suppose this gives them some buffer to restart the production line more gradually than the earlier plan, which was to just start shipping the new builds and feed in the stored frames independently.

I speculate Boeing bet on ready mass produced parts (pilot tubes and wires) and now some gizmo seems likely. If a mechanical part is required, return to service was delayed by months. Even a cheap custom gizmo takes time to qualify, then produce in numbers to get the grounded fleet going.

Boeing cannot be back at full production within 6 months. This reduces 2020 production by at least 250 (from 630, or <380 MAX produced in 2020).

So it depends on how you look at this The US economy just shrank by a minimum of $9 billion/year direct plus another bit of indirect in 2020.

Big decisions were just made.

Lightsaber

In Washington Boeing has around 80 k employees, the other 9 largest employers have 250K. As you noted 30K direct Boeing employees and a large number of supplier jobs in a short term layoff will hit the Renton area of the Puget Sound hard

par13del wrote:

asdf wrote:

if they really cant fix the underlying aerodynamics ( and for the sake of the employees i hope they can soon) they can put back the smaller engines on it and sell it to militaery customers worldwide

No military customers exist for 300+ stored frames, besides, production of the military variant will continue.
Also, the same regulators who are reviewing the safety of the a/c also ensure that special requirements must be met for lines where military and civilian variants are produced.
Nope, they stay grounded until the FAA makes a decision.

if you fit the smaller engines on the frames .... even if they are a little bit larger than the NG variant .... you do not need to move the engines in front and you do not need those problematic 737MAX nacells.

as a result you get a very flyable plane, no need for MCAS augmentation, but you do not get a significant economic advantage over the NG and you stay well below the NEO
but economic is not such a selling point for military users

it would eventually cannibalize the own military craft sales
but this is all wild guessing

they will fly

SteelChair wrote:

....This is a tragedy that began with the unnecessary deaths of almost 300 innocent people and continues to this very moment.

it may be petty ...

but this crisis began as managers in 2016 (?)
- decided to continue to offer the 737MAX to customers
- with no plan B
even though they experienced a problem in development

Not hat this isn’t big news and horrible for Boeing, but isn’t this what they said they would have to do several months ago if the MAX wasn’t back this year?

cledaybuck wrote:

Not hat this isn’t big news and horrible for Boeing, but isn’t this what they said they would have to do several months ago if the MAX wasn’t back this year?

Perhaps folks thought it was a bluff and an attempt to put undue pressure on the FAA.
As Revelation posted, I agree with him that this was the result of the tea and biscuits meeting with the FAA where they thought they had to remind Boeing that they were responsible for RTS.
Well......now the FAA also has to factor in their other function which some say is a conflict of interest, let's see how the FAA head does with this one.
We know the Boeing chief is walking the Green Mile, the head of the FAA is probably pissed at Boeing right now.

I'm trying to estimate jobs impacted by region.
Every 737 fusalage is about 63 worker years in Witchita.
Every pair of engines is about 90 worker years. About 25 in Cleveland, about 25 at SAFRAN, the rest spread about (including EU, mostly USA)
Every plane has perhaps 25 jobs for a year at UTC.
British Aerospace has about 20 worker years per Aircraft (I don't know where).
Meggitt has perhaps 5 worker years per Aircraft.
Plus another 20 worker years st sub vendors I couldn't place.
Zodiac just took a hit.
As did Ricarro and every other seat vendor.

The above are my back of the envelope estimates. Does anyone have links to how many work on the 737?

The risk sharing partners will be hit hatd.

I understand the lives lost are valuable. But as an old salt, I know there will be mistakes of this magnitude. Mismanagement did make this happen.

But I also know that the riskiest part of a MAX flight today would be the walk from Airport parking to the terminal, which unfortunately a relative and his wife experienced this year that risk, they'll recover, but my relative isn't healed by any stretch.

As I had two friends in 2019 commit suicide due to job loss, that is my greater concern. I look at risk of death a the original system didn't meet requirements, but I'll know more people who die each from vaping, marijuana, car accidents, diabetes (self inflicted, not juvenile), drunk driving, opiates, and staring at their cell phones while crossing streets than aircraft accidents than air disasters.

This must be fixed. I believe the stand down is required.

I am one of many who didn't think production would be stopped. I see easy solutions. Don't get me wrong, if I had known how serial the risks were, I would veto as I often do at work. The difference is many customers know me. If I say don't do that or transfer me, everyone listens.

But there was a certifiable solution. Involving everyone (EASA, China, India) is politically required. But while they debate, jobs are lost.

I personally believe Boeing cannot restart until there is an agreed solution. Since about 62% of SAFRAN's new production (or I guess about 25% of their jobs) just received a stop order, plus British Aerospace, Meggitt, Japanese suppliers, even China (finishing centers) all just received a stop notice. I believe every certification authority was just assigned enough job losses that instead of discussing this for months at Boeing's cost, they just became serious.

Boeing just told the world they will sit and listen. I bet there will be the most productive meetings this week. I bet all compensation negotiation was just put on hold.

This is now serious.

Lightsaber

checklist350 wrote:

MSPNWA wrote:

TTailedTiger wrote:

That doesn't answer my question. Where did this new found trust for the FAA come from? For months everyone has been saying that Boeing and the FAA could no longer be trusted. Why the sudden change of heart for the FAA?

If Boeing has completed every item to the FAA's requirements then I think an interesting legal battle may follow. Keeping an airplane that satisfies the FAA's requirements grounded just because they want a global RTS may very well be beyond the FAA's scope. That would be like the FDA forbidding a prescription drug that meets their standards from being sold because not every pharmacy wants to carry it.

I think the "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" principle applies here. That is the elephant in the room. There's a reason this thread generally goes quiet when the sun is shining directly over the Pacific Ocean. The change between the FAA being completely untrustworthy to now being unquestioned is noticeable.

Unquestioned FAA recertification is exactly the diametrically opposite to a global effort based on consensus finding. But consensus is an alien concept to many Americans so it seems. We already have two examples in this very thread.

In your opinion, that is.

dtw2hyd wrote:

Well, this will put pressure on FAA to clear as quickly as possible. Country cannot afford to lose so many jobs. Ball is in FAA court.

How quickly BCA and its supply chain restart NG assembly.

If US declares MCAS as dual-use and imposes export controls under ITAR, BCA can sell non-MCAS MAXes with additional training to other countries. US Carriers can get MCAS option or additional training. This may be way out for current conundrum.

No delta training was Boeing's selling point, I don't think many airlines would be as adamant as WN to additional training.

BCA can sell non-MCAS MAXes with additional training to other countries. No way! There is no way to sell new planes to "other countries", planes that don't comply with present regulation.

If US declares MCAS as dual-use.... That might work in the military. For commercial aviation, no way. This crisis has gone way too far. The public will be asking the airlines: Are we today flying an inferior plane with a super trained crew, or the other way around? No airline can line with that situation.

Try to look at it the other way around: Russian Superjet wanted to sell planes to AA, UA or any U.S. airline. And they told: "We know that the plane doesn't comply with FAA certification criteria, neither does it meet EASA or Russian criteria, but we have a crew training program to get around that". For how many thousand miles would the laughter be heard?

Country cannot afford to lose so many jobs. Yes, and 84% of those planes are made for "other countries".

This crisis really has a very binary solution: Either the MAX is modified to conform with world wide certification criteria, one way or another. OR it is not gonna fly again. It will fly, I'm sure, question is when, and how much modified.

I can't imagine that MCAS 2.0 doesn't solve the MCAS issue, and why it hasn't been solved ages ago. I am afraid that other problems have surfaced when the MAX was scrutinized, and the remedy of these issues are a lot more demanding than the MCAS issue.

SteelChair wrote:

lightsaber wrote:

Folks, the emergency stop on a freight train was just hit. I hope people realize Christmas was just ruined for 30,000+ people. Sadly, most won't know it for a week or more. So while I believe the FAA is doing their job, people will get an education in the cost of safety.

As others have noted, for many vendors, they have no slack Tomorrow morning they will be informing staff of the bad news. As in, enjoy your winter vacation, you will be on unemployment starting January 16th (assuming 30 day notice). Those notices must go out quick.

Revelation wrote:

So if Boeing is going to resume delivery from the stored frames, I suppose this gives them some buffer to restart the production line more gradually than the earlier plan, which was to just start shipping the new builds and feed in the stored frames independently.

I speculate Boeing bet on ready mass produced parts (pilot tubes and wires) and now some gizmo seems likely. If a mechanical part is required, return to service was delayed by months. Even a cheap custom gizmo takes time to qualify, then produce in numbers to get the grounded fleet going.

Boeing cannot be back at full production within 6 months. This reduces 2020 production by at least 250 (from 630, or <380 MAX produced in 2020).

So it depends on how you look at this The US economy just shrank by a minimum of $9 billion/year direct plus another bit of indirect in 2020.

Big decisions were just made.

Lightsaber

That's not even the half of it. How about the Boeing employees? Anyone who thinks they will be immune has their head in the sand. And what about used prices and lease rates for A320s and 737NG's? What about the rates that maintenance contractors charge for overhauling old A320s and 737s, since that is all contracted out now (thank you Southwest)? As if the capacity even exists to ramp up. How about pilot hiring at major airlines? How many pilots won't get jobs because new airplanes won't be delivered? How many simulators won't be built? And what about airfares for next summer's travelers? "Capacity discipline" has just been forced on the airlines, yields and airfares should stay high. And what about the overall effect on the US economy of all of this unnecessary chaos? And what about media darling Southwest, that indirectly bears some responsibility? Gotta have that common pilot rating. How'd that work out?

I said months ago this was a full blown crisis. Many Boeing fanboys couldn't get their head out of the sand and see it. The responsible Boeing leaders should go to jail. This is a tragedy that began with the unnecessary deaths of almost 300 innocent people and continues to this very moment.

I said this last Spring. If this thing goes really sideways it could destroy Boeing.

Couldnt some or all of this be alleviated if they dropped the type rating with the NG? I'd think at some point it would be cheaper for Boeing to kick in for training of MAX pilot pools than prolong or shut down the line.

prebennorholm wrote:

I am afraid that other problems have surfaced when the MAX was scrutinized, and the remedy of these issues are a lot more demanding than the MCAS issue.

It seems a lot of people are running with this theory, without any form of evidence other than circumstance.

I've been reading the aviation media pretty heavily and see no form of this argument being made.

If Boeing knows more and is not saying, this very well might be a case where they do get sued for misleading investors.

Also, I'd be very surprised an issue big enough to derail the MAX RTS could be kept secret.

There is a well established track record of these cats getting out of the bag pretty darn quickly.

The theory that Boeing is responding in kind to the FAA Administrator flexing his muscles by disrupting the economy is just as credible as some sort of major undisclosed flaw being the stumbling block.

I'm more inclined to believe the more mundane theory that Boeing simply decided the RTS date is unknowable and they could not continue to keep flowing billions of dollars into building more MAXes that will sit in storage for many many months. Also I am inclined to buy the theory that smartplane floated that said not just regulators but airlines and financiers decided the US-first RTS was unworkable so Boeing had no choice but adapt the global RTS.

lightsaber wrote:

I'm trying to estimate jobs impacted by region.
Every 737 fusalage is about 63 worker years in Witchita.
Every pair of engines is about 90 worker years. About 25 in Cleveland, about 25 at SAFRAN, the rest spread about (including EU, mostly USA)
Every plane has perhaps 25 jobs for a year at UTC.
British Aerospace has about 20 worker years per Aircraft (I don't know where).
Meggitt has perhaps 5 worker years per Aircraft.
Plus another 20 worker years st sub vendors I couldn't place.
Zodiac just took a hit.
As did Ricarro and every other seat vendor.

The above are my back of the envelope estimates. Does anyone have links to how many work on the 737?

The risk sharing partners will be hit hatd.

I understand the lives lost are valuable. But as an old salt, I know there will be mistakes of this magnitude. Mismanagement did make this happen.

But I also know that the riskiest part of a MAX flight today would be the walk from Airport parking to the terminal, which unfortunately a relative and his wife experienced this year that risk, they'll recover, but my relative isn't healed by any stretch.

As I had two friends in 2019 commit suicide due to job loss, that is my greater concern. I look at risk of death a the original system didn't meet requirements, but I'll know more people who die each from vaping, marijuana, car accidents, diabetes (self inflicted, not juvenile), drunk driving, opiates, and staring at their cell phones while crossing streets than aircraft accidents than air disasters.

This must be fixed. I believe the stand down is required.

I am one of many who didn't think production would be stopped. I see easy solutions. Don't get me wrong, if I had known how serial the risks were, I would veto as I often do at work. The difference is many customers know me. If I say don't do that or transfer me, everyone listens.

But there was a certifiable solution. Involving everyone (EASA, China, India) is politically required. But while they debate, jobs are lost.

I personally believe Boeing cannot restart until there is an agreed solution. Since about 62% of SAFRAN's new production (or I guess about 25% of their jobs) just received a stop order, plus British Aerospace, Meggitt, Japanese suppliers, even China (finishing centers) all just received a stop notice. I believe every certification authority was just assigned enough job losses that instead of discussing this for months at Boeing's cost, they just became serious.

Boeing just told the world they will sit and listen. I bet there will be the most productive meetings this week. I bet all compensation negotiation was just put on hold.

This is now serious.

Lightsaber

Its been serious for quite a while now, unlike you I always thought that we would arrive at this point.

I don't believe the MAX is certifiable under current rules without the safety wavers that its gotten and that should be the end of it no matter the jobs fallout, you can't dump unsafe products on the market just because not to do so would mean job losses.

Boeing has brought us to this point with its aggressive use of politics and political lobbyists to subvert the certification and oversight functions of the FAA so only has itself to blame for the blowback. Which means that even if the MAX is somehow recertified this will only last until the next (unfortunately inevitable) crash when it will be grounded again. The program is on borrowed time and the best thing that Boeing can do it announce a NSA program and attempt to switch the orders as they will not be building MAX's in 2025.

TTailedTiger wrote:

BigPlaneGuy13 wrote:

This leadership team at Boeing is arguably the biggest disgrace by any American company of the 21st century - even more so than the Wells Fargo/Equifax crises. At least nobody died from their misdoings.

I don't understand what the Board of Directors could possibly be waiting for. Dennis has already shot himself in both feet with a .22. He is untrustworthy and has clearly demonstrated he is a failure when in crisis. Forget the billions of dollars lost on the actual program - the value of the brand as a whole has bottomed out.

What an utter disappointment and shame. There will be hell to pay for many many years to come. I am at a loss for words at today's news.

This is just wrong. Plenty of people killed themselves when they lost all their money. Boeing never set out to hurt anyone. A flawed system paired with inept pilots created a lethal combination. But plenty of financial firms were knowingly ripping off their clients and knew their life savings would be wiped out.

That's certainly why I said the word "arugably" in the first sentence. What I don't think is questionable is Muilenburg's handling of this situation - as well as other senior leadership. Safety was willfully compromised in a way that proved to be lethal. I just don't understand why anyone should believe anything that comes out of these leaders' mouths. Their products killed people. And now we seem to actually be further from a resolution than we were on March 10th. Utterly disgraceful mishandling of the situation. Let's also not forget all the issues with the 777X for that matter, too. Why are these guys still at the helm?

Someone upthread mentioned that there needs to be a probe and prosecution and I agree. However, I have doubts anything like that would ever come to fruition because it would likely implicate the FAA.

dtw2hyd wrote:

Well, this will put pressure on FAA to clear as quickly as possible. Country cannot afford to lose so many jobs. Ball is in FAA court.

How quickly BCA and its supply chain restart NG assembly.

If US declares MCAS as dual-use and imposes export controls under ITAR, BCA can sell non-MCAS MAXes with additional training to other countries. US Carriers can get MCAS option or additional training. This may be way out for current conundrum.

No delta training was Boeing's selling point, I don't think many airlines would be as adamant as WN to additional training.

WN has been brought up a number of times and I'd say that's unwarranted.
Even if it is the case (do we really have any evidence?) that WN said "Can you make the MAX not require any new training?", Boeing didn't have to say yes. But they did and they failed in delivering that product.

Lots of comments about Boeing not doing a test flight without MCAS to show regulators the actual behaviour. What evidence do you have that this hasn't occurred? We don't get to see all of that information.

Lots of comments about inherent instability of the MAX near stall, it "pitches up". Do you have actual data or citations that is what occurs, or are those saying this just being hyperbolic for no good reason?

We should all calm down instead of claiming extreme positions on things where we really are speculating and don't have any data. Lord knows there is enough extreme stuff going on where we DO have data - such as the production shutdown.

asdf wrote:

JTAR report points to a much more flawed attitude as the simple „light stick“ explanation suggests

the stick load regulation is decades old
is is rule from the 1980ies to make shure that a plane behaves like a plane

it may be that boeing only recognised a deviation from the rules in wind up turns
maybe outside the wind up turns it only deviates imperceptible from the usual backforce

if its really a sinple wind up turn problem .... i am shure the 737MAx would have had its RTS months ago

JTAR report points to Boeing never testing the "light stick" aerodynamics without MCAS, Boeing has been very reluctant to give EASA test flights without augmentation. This is the red flag / smoking gun here.

par13del wrote:

lightsaber wrote:

Folks, the emergency stop on a freight train was just hit. I hope people realize Christmas was just ruined for 30,000+ people. Sadly, most won't know it for a week or more. So while I believe the FAA is doing their job, people will get an education in the cost of safety.

As others have noted, for many vendors, they have no slack Tomorrow morning they will be informing staff of the bad news. As in, enjoy your winter vacation, you will be on unemployment starting January 16th (assuming 30 day notice). Those notices must go out quick.
Lightsaber

Hindsight is always 20/20, but after the June fiasco, if Boeing had really slowed the train - say 20 per month - all and sundry would have been laser focused on getting the a/c repaired and dealt with the recriminations after.
Now the politicians are really going to get involved and it may get real messy, the new head of the FAA may not have the time to personally test fly the MAX.

I agree - the suppliers will be putting a lot of pressure on congress.

lightsaber wrote:

This is now serious.

Lightsaber

It got serious already the first second after the second crash. But it seems reality struck Boeing with a delay of nine months, where they thought they could get away with a quick software fix and minimal disruption to the supply line.

BigPlaneGuy13 wrote:

This leadership team at Boeing is arguably the biggest disgrace by any American company of the 21st century - even more so than the Wells Fargo/Equifax crises. At least nobody died from their misdoings.

I don't understand what the Board of Directors could possibly be waiting for. Dennis has already shot himself in both feet with a .22. He is untrustworthy and has clearly demonstrated he is a failure when in crisis. Forget the billions of dollars lost on the actual program - the value of the brand as a whole has bottomed out.

What an utter disappointment and shame. There will be hell to pay for many many years to come. I am at a loss for words at today's news.

You are absolutely correct. A complete failure of leadership.

BoeingVista wrote:

asdf wrote:

JTAR report points to a much more flawed attitude as the simple „light stick“ explanation suggests

the stick load regulation is decades old
is is rule from the 1980ies to make shure that a plane behaves like a plane

it may be that boeing only recognised a deviation from the rules in wind up turns
maybe outside the wind up turns it only deviates imperceptible from the usual backforce

if its really a sinple wind up turn problem .... i am shure the 737MAx would have had its RTS months ago

JTAR report points to Boeing never testing the "light stick" aerodynamics without MCAS, Boeing has been very reluctant to give EASA test flights without augmentation. This is the red flag / smoking gun here.

What do you think the bad thing would be? That it gets to 12 degrees AOA and quickly pitches up another few degrees into a stall, or it doesn't meet the stick force regulations starting at 8 or 9 degrees? I could see why a lower trigger degree would not be trivial news.

The FAA is underfunded and in disarray. Part of the fix and return to service is funding the FAA so it can function with the task at hand.

BoeingVista wrote:

asdf wrote:

JTAR report points to a much more flawed attitude as the simple „light stick“ explanation suggests

the stick load regulation is decades old
is is rule from the 1980ies to make shure that a plane behaves like a plane

it may be that boeing only recognised a deviation from the rules in wind up turns
maybe outside the wind up turns it only deviates imperceptible from the usual backforce

if its really a sinple wind up turn problem .... i am shure the 737MAx would have had its RTS months ago

JTAR report points to Boeing never testing the "light stick" aerodynamics without MCAS, Boeing has been very reluctant to give EASA test flights without augmentation. This is the red flag / smoking gun here.

It is but they were reportedly doing a lot of stall testing this past weekend maybe for EASA or in preparation for EASA. Maybe it failed ( but we know they were able to recover it so the stall characteristics can't be that bad) and it requires hardware changes to pass and hence the shutdown as it will take time to implement and why build more if you have to retrofit frames with changes that are unknown at this point.

Many possibilities.

Revelation wrote:

I'm more inclined to believe the more mundane theory that Boeing simply decided the RTS date is unknowable and they could not continue to keep flowing billions of dollars into building more MAXes that will sit in storage for many many months. Also I am inclined to buy the theory that smartplane floated that said not just regulators but airlines and financiers decided the US-first RTS was unworkable so Boeing had no choice but adapt the global RTS.

If that is the case, now that the production line has been stopped they will no longer have Boeing expected dates to rely on for their contingency planning, they will now have to work with the FAA. One can expect Boeing to not pay much compensation until they get an idea on RTS, the continued loss of income to those carriers of their inability to use their MAX a/c or have them delivered along with the continued high cost of using older a/c if not already biting will soon become a major concern.
Now that the train has stopped, all interested parties who previously just sat on the sidelines and allowed others to speak for them will now have to find their own voice.

checklist350 wrote:

lightsaber wrote:

This is now serious.

Lightsaber

It got serious already the first second after the second crash. But it seems reality struck Boeing with a delay of nine months, where they thought they could get away with a quick software fix and minimal disruption to the supply line.

So what did it do to the regulator other than after requesting the MCAS fix decided to go for bit flip?
We heard anything about where they are reviewing the fixes Boeing provided for the bit flip issue, they have been reviewing for a month or so, no news.

DenverTed wrote:

The FAA is underfunded and in disarray. Part of the fix and return to service is funding the FAA so it can function with the task at hand.

The impeachment hearings should not get in the way of the congress getting together in a bi-partisan manner to properly fund the FAA and eliminate the influence Boeing has based on the FAA out-sourcing and lack of supervision, the other shoe is falling.

morrisond wrote:

It is but they were reportedly doing a lot of stall testing this past weekend maybe for EASA or in preparation for EASA. Maybe it failed ( but we know they were able to recover it so the stall characteristics can't be that bad) and it requires hardware changes to pass and hence the shutdown as it will take time to implement and why build more if you have to retrofit frames with changes that are unknown at this point.

Many possibilities.

Will be interesting to see what hardware changes they will think of now that they could not test and or implement when the problem first appeared during testing, we do know that those suggested at the time did not work, it did not read that MCAS was their first choice.

DenverTed wrote:

BoeingVista wrote:

asdf wrote:

JTAR report points to a much more flawed attitude as the simple „light stick“ explanation suggests

the stick load regulation is decades old
is is rule from the 1980ies to make shure that a plane behaves like a plane

it may be that boeing only recognised a deviation from the rules in wind up turns
maybe outside the wind up turns it only deviates imperceptible from the usual backforce

if its really a sinple wind up turn problem .... i am shure the 737MAx would have had its RTS months ago

JTAR report points to Boeing never testing the "light stick" aerodynamics without MCAS, Boeing has been very reluctant to give EASA test flights without augmentation. This is the red flag / smoking gun here.

What do you think the bad thing would be? That it gets to 12 degrees AOA and quickly pitches up another few degrees into a stall, or it doesn't meet the stick force regulations starting at 8 or 9 degrees? I could see why a lower trigger degree would not be trivial news.

There was an incident report from years back where some NG pilots were not paying attention and nearly got their plane to flip when AOA raised quickly, so yes with the lager engines placed further forward that would be the risk.

BigPlaneGuy13 wrote:

And now we seem to actually be further from a resolution than we were on March 10th.

I understand some of the other sentiments you expressed, even though I don't agree with all of them. I do not understand this one. There is nothing to support the supposition the response has moved backwards since the second crash. Ignore the wild speculation in the thread and look for firm information.

Also while it is not firm, the outlets that typically have halfway decent sources like the Seattle Times and the Wall Street Journal are still pointing towards training and documentation concerns to be addressed. These are not taken lightly nor as simple as it may be tempting to treat them.

BigPlaneGuy13 wrote:

Someone upthread mentioned that there needs to be a probe and prosecution and I agree. However, I have doubts anything like that would ever come to fruition because it would likely implicate the FAA.

The probe began shortly after the first crash, and became widely known when it was expanded after the second.
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/20/business ... index.html

The focus will be thoroughness, not speed. I don't expect anything significant until after the Ethiopian final report is released and investigators have a chance to compare its findings to their own, and perhaps do some additional information gathering as a result.

DenverTed wrote:

The FAA is underfunded and in disarray. Part of the fix and return to service is funding the FAA so it can function with the task at hand.

Which is the part Congress should focus on, but likely not the part they will focus on. They have consistently demonstrated for years far more talent for pointing fingers and shouting in front of cameras than for managing a budget.

BoeingVista wrote:

asdf wrote:

JTAR report points to a much more flawed attitude as the simple „light stick“ explanation suggests

the stick load regulation is decades old
is is rule from the 1980ies to make shure that a plane behaves like a plane

it may be that boeing only recognised a deviation from the rules in wind up turns
maybe outside the wind up turns it only deviates imperceptible from the usual backforce

if its really a sinple wind up turn problem .... i am shure the 737MAx would have had its RTS months ago

JTAR report points to Boeing never testing the "light stick" aerodynamics without MCAS, Boeing has been very reluctant to give EASA test flights without augmentation. This is the red flag / smoking gun here.

Since today seems to be make up theory day, I don't think you are correct. If behavior without MCAS in the event of a sensor failure was a huge issue, they would have been working on a solution to add a 3rd sensor months ago. A 3rd sensor and processing to get an accurate AoA with a single sensor failure is the simplest solution if the plane can't fly without MCAS active.

BTW, Lion Air 043 proves that the MAX doesn't fall out of the sky without MCAS or have any poor characteristics in normal operation. The crew flew for quite a while with the manual trim wheel and didn't note anything abnormal after they cut off the electric trim.

For all the other wacky theories, Boeing stated months ago that they would consider shutting down production if the RTS wasn't by the end of the year. The FAA told them it isn't going to be by the end of the year so they are shutting down production like they said they would.

planecane wrote:

Since today seems to be make up theory day, I don't think you are correct. If behavior without MCAS in the event of a sensor failure was a huge issue, they would have been working on a solution to add a 3rd sensor months ago. A 3rd sensor and processing to get an accurate AoA with a single sensor failure is the simplest solution if the plane can't fly without MCAS active.

Not my theory, its part of the JTAR report

planecane wrote:

BTW, Lion Air 043 proves that the MAX doesn't fall out of the sky without MCAS or have any poor characteristics in normal operation. The crew flew for quite a while with the manual trim wheel and didn't note anything abnormal after they cut off the electric trim.

Sure, totally normal just fly with the sector with the stick shaker permanently on. Riding a unicycle down a motorway won't kill you every single time but that does not make it a safe thing to do..

I have an MRO and overhaul question. How much capacity exists - and on what timeline - for airlines to put 737NGs and A32Xs through another HMV visit to make up for lost MAX capacity? I imagine that older aircraft that were supposed to retire are getting much closer to running out of hours and cycles before required maintenance, and that large MAX operators like American and Southwest have got to be scrambling to arrange capacity in the event that this debacle extends through all of 2020.

I am not yet a sky-is-falling person who thinks the MAX is dead and we are just going to have to wait for the NMA. But with today's news, summer 2020 is happening without the MAX. So especially given that a number of industrialized economies are doing pretty well, plans have to be under way to keep summer 2020 capacity at a reasonable level. My question is if the MRO or in-house maintenance operation can absorb this.

Recertificaion by FAA is not a issue , they can do it in a jiffy. But the laws of physics are unforgiving. If it's a inherently unsafe plane , then as the number of Max in the sky increase , so does the chances of a crash.
Problem is that Boeing is as secretive of its findings as the Pentagon, so leads to a lot of speculation. Why don't they just release their findings in the public domain and let the chips fall? After all America is a open democracy, not a secretive 3rd world coterie dominated society !!

The question, that needs an answer is:
Why does Boeing consider continued production to be more expensive than suspended production?

I mean, why does continued production not work for a much longer time? There certainly is space enough to store them. The cost to park aircraft surely can not be so high, that this would not be the best or cheapest solution.

The only reason I can see, why continued production would be more expensive than stopping production, is that serious rework on the already built frames has become more likely recently.