Some parts of this business cannot be just turned off. For example, CFM will receive the last rotors, shafts, and turbine blades started pre-grounding in January. They are committed to casings another six months out.
The write up from Dominic Gates at ST ( https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... employees/
For the 737’s global supply chain — which includes engine parts from the U.S and France, fuselages from Wichita, Kansas, and tail rudders from China—the stoppage in Renton is potentially very disruptive. But Boeing gave no information about how that will be handled.
Some major suppliers have contracts that require Boeing to continue to take delivery of their parts, and to pay for them. Others may have to suspend their own production.
So it could be that some of the bigger vendors providing major parts have contractual protection.
It's also interesting that the "pain" extends to China, who makes rudders for 737.
As an aside, I read that entire article and not once found a hint of the theory that production is being stopped because of some deeper flaw in the MAX.
This article comes from the same guy who has shown he has a broad network of contacts within Boeing and FAA.
I've also read reports from NYT, WaPo, CNBC, CNN, WSJ, AvWeek, etc and no one is floating the deeper flaw theory despite all the clicks it would generate.
If the deeper flaw does exist, I'm having a hard time seeing how the media would not have gotten wind of it by now.
I do find articles like the following, all saying the MCAS fix works and RTS is expected soon, including quotes from the EASA chief:
Actually, the "whisper" I got from my normally silent source is that is the problem. "We don't even know what the standards are - they keep changing."
IMO there is no need for a deeper theory than one that we are seeing reported, that Boeing has been saying for months now that if they could not RTS by end of the year they would consider halting production, and they chose to halt production because the actual situation with regard to them being able to predict the RTS time line is now worse than anticipated due to the decision to go with global RTS rather than US-first RTS.
I can imagine this is frustrating for insiders because of exactly what you say, the more people in the decision loop, the more difficult it is to get an agreement.
This thread shows a wide spectrum of concerns, and I'm sure the actual regulators who are experts in their field can come up with just as many if not more concerns, and with nothing motivating closure the process of addressing each concern being raised could go on indefinitely.
I think Boeing was willing to continue production as long as they had some confidence in the RTS procedure and time line, but once the CEO sat down with the new FAA chief such confidence was lost, and without that, there really was no other decision but to halt production.