planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 4:32 pm

asdf wrote:
planecane wrote:
I believe that they really did believe that if there was a malfunction the pilots would recognize a runaway stabilizer, perform the NNC and land safely.


i dont

but anyway
after the lion air crash they knew

and what did they?
the through the mecanics and the pilots under the bus and carried on

from a legal perspective i think the ET crash will be catastrophic for some
they knew
they did not act


So you believe that they thought if MCAS failed, it would lead to pilots not knowing what to do and lead to an almost certain crash? That would make no sense at all. Any engineer or manager that had that thought and pushed the design out anyway would have to be a psychopathic killer. NO sane person would do that if they knew or strongly believed that a failure would lead to a crash.
 
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AirlineCritic
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 4:37 pm

Revelation wrote:
JibberJim wrote:
In a crisis you only get the sack the CEO once, and the replacement has to admit to everything that is ever going to come out immediately and with a plan to turn it around, the new CEO isn't likely able to do those things, so they have to keep the old one around until some clarity on those can emerge.

Excellent point, phrased better than I could. The only in-between action I could think of is the BoD deciding a change is now mandatory and then hiring an interim CEO with the mandate of steadying the course till the new CEO could be found.


Both of you have good points. I guess we'll see what happens. I think the board is poised to keep the CEO until all bad news have come out, but it is also possible that their hand is forced if the situation gets too far out of hand. Then we'll probably see an interim CEO.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 4:38 pm

The more the leadership and internal structure at Boeing come under pressure, the more problems the FAA will have to accept the fix, as in the end it is still the same people and organisation that declared v1.0 for okay. In their place I would not lift the grounding until the Europeans and Chinese do it on the same day, much less if they still voice any form of concern. Because if the FAA would do it, they would be the first to take the fall - even before Boeing.

At the moment I do not think the grounding will be lifted soon. Not because the problem can not be fixed, but because Boeing needs to change their way and how they handle the situation. I think the CEO will be gone in a few days and a successor will clean-up and probably change the tone at Boeing as well. With the technical work most likely done, I think the plane could fly late January 2020 to February 2020. Probably at more or less the same date around the globe.
 
BravoOne
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 4:41 pm

morrisond wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
morrisond wrote:

I think without MCAS it was more like
0%/0N, 20%/40N, 40%/70N, 60%/100N, 80%/80N, 100%/80N

MCAS would kick in after the Audio Alarm, before the stick shaker and before the Elevator Feel Computer Doubled the Force on the Elevator.

Not very smooth at all and very crude but theoretically MCAS 2.0 Should meet the regs.

It's not like driving a car on Dry asphalt where control response is very linear. You are flying through a medium that can be very inconsistent especially on days with mixed up weather.

If you never have flown an Airplane on a bumpy day you will never know how inconsistent the controls can be (because they are so light they get bounced around a lot and the controls go positive/negative all the time).



You would not feel this at all on an FBW aircraft and that isn't such a bad thing as you have to rely on your instruments and outside visual references you can't depend just on control feel.

There is still no evidence that the MAX is aerodynamically unstable.

It was two people discussing an airplane in flight test doing something unexpected that they weren't told about. But MCAS firing at Mach .2 is when it should be firing as that is it's stall speed.



I suspect that at the end of the day the issues in Boeing will be one part not talking to another about what they were changing and the consequences of going through an perpetual expand/contract cycle in the engineering ranks with the most expensive Senior engineers with all the tribal knowledge and the pull to be able to say stop having exited the company.


You try and you try and you try.

The first version of MCAS was not supposed to work at low speeds. It was designed for high speed high g turns.
That was one of the main reasons to keep it out of the Manuals.
That was what this Faulkner did sell to the FAA.
That was what he just had lied about. unintentional
That lie was unintentional because he had not been told about the change to MCAS
He also realized that the other guys at Boeing did not tell the whole truth, that was why he did not know about MCAS going active at 0.2 mach.

The hammer is: the whole truth about how the installed MCAS works never made it to the FAA.

So the question is now who all lied to whom.


I totally get it - and that's what I just said - what you interpret as one side of Boeing lying to the other could have just been a timing issue on communication - they hadn't told Test what there solution was to fix the low speed issues.

As the Chief test pilot he would/should have known that the MAX needed help in low speed situations as well - is just whether or not it had aerodynamic problems or the controls just got too light.

There still is no evidence on that. Other than the earlier AVweek article that talks about Boeing changing some of the Wing treatments on the MAX vs the NG to change the stall characteristics (which I assume was just changing the flow patterns on the wing).

The MAX may still have Aero issues at low speed other than just "too light" controls - and as I said before I would support them testing it without MCAS to find out.

By this point I would be stunned if the FAA doesn't fly that simple test.


Just a small point of order. Mr. Forkner was not a "test pilot", and certainly not the Chief Test Pilot. He was the Chief Technical Pilot with very few if any flight responsibilities out side the realm of the ECAB. His main efforts were directed at creating the supporting FCOM, FCTM and QRH with input from the Boeing Test and Evaluation group of "test pilots". It might not seem like much but as long as everyone is throwing darts at this guy, it's worth the distinction.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 4:46 pm

morrisond wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
morrisond wrote:

I think without MCAS it was more like
0%/0N, 20%/40N, 40%/70N, 60%/100N, 80%/80N, 100%/80N

MCAS would kick in after the Audio Alarm, before the stick shaker and before the Elevator Feel Computer Doubled the Force on the Elevator.

Not very smooth at all and very crude but theoretically MCAS 2.0 Should meet the regs.

It's not like driving a car on Dry asphalt where control response is very linear. You are flying through a medium that can be very inconsistent especially on days with mixed up weather.

If you never have flown an Airplane on a bumpy day you will never know how inconsistent the controls can be (because they are so light they get bounced around a lot and the controls go positive/negative all the time).

You would not feel this at all on an FBW aircraft and that isn't such a bad thing as you have to rely on your instruments and outside visual references you can't depend just on control feel.

There is still no evidence that the MAX is aerodynamically unstable.

It was two people discussing an airplane in flight test doing something unexpected that they weren't told about. But MCAS firing at Mach .2 is when it should be firing as that is it's stall speed.

I suspect that at the end of the day the issues in Boeing will be one part not talking to another about what they were changing and the consequences of going through an perpetual expand/contract cycle in the engineering ranks with the most expensive Senior engineers with all the tribal knowledge and the pull to be able to say stop having exited the company.


You try and you try and you try.

The first version of MCAS was not supposed to work at low speeds. It was designed for high speed high g turns.
That was one of the main reasons to keep it out of the Manuals.
That was what this Faulkner did sell to the FAA.
That was what he just had lied about. unintentional
That lie was unintentional because he had not been told about the change to MCAS
He also realized that the other guys at Boeing did not tell the whole truth, that was why he did not know about MCAS going active at 0.2 mach.

The hammer is: the whole truth about how the installed MCAS works never made it to the FAA.

So the question is now who all lied to whom.


I totally get it - and that's what I just said - what you interpret as one side of Boeing lying to the other could have just been a timing issue on communication - they hadn't told Test what there solution was to fix the low speed issues.

As the Chief test pilot he would/should have known that the MAX needed help in low speed situations as well - is just whether or not it had aerodynamic problems or the controls just got too light.

There still is no evidence on that. Other than the earlier AVweek article that talks about Boeing changing some of the Wing treatments on the MAX vs the NG to change the stall characteristics (which I assume was just changing the flow patterns on the wing).

The MAX may still have Aero issues at low speed other than just "too light" controls - and as I said before I would support them testing it without MCAS to find out.

By this point I would be stunned if the FAA doesn't fly that simple test.

It’s important to note that Forkner is not the Chief Test Pilot. He is the Chief Technical Pilot. In the exchange, he actually complains about not getting proper information from the test pilots. It highlights the communication issues within the organization.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 4:55 pm

Revelation wrote:
Boeing's defense wrt the MCAS activation changes is that since the work was delegated to them they did not have to communicate changes back to the FAA. That's a very thin and long branch to be standing on, but it's a lot different than deliberately installing a feature into the airplane that would activate different behavior during a test then signing paperwork saying no such device existed. VW really had no choice but to fall on its sword.

Boeing’s long, thin branch becomes even more precarious due to the release of this exchange. Chief Technical Pilot Forkner clearly felt that this information needed to be communicated to the FAA. Why would he have gone to the FAA to ask to remove MCAS from the documentation, if this was something that fell under Boeing’s own self-certifying purview? It rather negates Boeing’s defence tactic, doesn’t it?
 
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AirlineCritic
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 5:00 pm

Revelation wrote:
Forkner was just complaining about the behavior of the sim, nothing else.


I agree, but there's actually several possibilities here: 1/ in the sim, MCAS acting normally 2/ in the sim, MCAS acting after sensor or other failure 3/ in a real aircraft, MCAS acting normally and 4/ in a real aircraft, MCAS in failure state.

The question is not just what did Forkner complain about in the messages. It may look likely that it was case 1. But then, why is he complaining about the aggressive behaviour of MCAS? For an avoid-a-stall-situation, wouldn't the aggressive behaviour actually just bring down to more level flight and more stable condition? Or did he complain about his inability to push the envelope in the SIM and get to a stall? Or, was he testing a failure mode?

More importantly, which of these tests did Boeing actually do?
 
lowbank
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 5:04 pm

planecane wrote:
lowbank wrote:
This latest revelation unfortunately adds me to the list of people who will never fly on a MAX.


Which revelation was the straw that broke the camel's back? The texts about "lying" to the FAA?


As a signatory who signs parts to fly on commercial aircraft, yes.

I would prefer to be sacked, at least I could sleep at night.

If I lied to a regulator unknowingly, I would not hide behind any amendment.

I would come clean and accept what came my way.
Every days a school day.
 
Aptivaboy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 5:08 pm

At this point, a come to Jesus moment is passed, its an impossibility. Boeing clearly knew there was a serious issue with MCAS all along, and especially after the Lion Air crash. They prayed and gambled and hoped that they could push a software fix out the door before the next crash occurred and failed. This whole thing reminds me a lot of the Go Fever that NASA experienced in the months leading up to the Apollo 1 fire. People knew there were problems but managers and engineers were unwilling to step up and delay the program. Everyone hoped that the problems wouldn’t occur when the risks were highest, and no one possessed the moral courage to just stand up and say, “This isn’t right. We need to reevaluate this before someone gets hurt, before disaster strikes!” Gene Kranz’s speech to his controllers (below) after the fire sounds eerily similar to what Boeing should and really must be saying to itself internally. Can Boeing rebound? Can they come back from this? Yes, and like Apollo they can do so in phenomenal ways, but it will take a serious break from their current corporate culture. Substitute a few words from back then with Boeing and the 737-MAX and there is a way forward for Boeing.

Spaceflight will never tolerate carelessness, incapacity, and neglect. Somewhere, somehow, we screwed up. It could have been in design, build, or test. Whatever it was, we should have caught it. We were too gung ho about the schedule and we locked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work.

Every element of the program was in trouble and so were we. The simulators were not working, Mission Control was behind in virtually every area, and the flight and test procedures changed daily. Nothing we did had any shelf life. Not one of us stood up and said, ‘Dammit, stop!’ I don’t know what Thompson’s committee will find as the cause, but I know what I find. We are the cause! We were not ready! We did not do our job. We were rolling the dice, hoping that things would come together by launch day, when in our hearts we knew it would take a miracle. We were pushing the schedule and betting that the Cape would slip before we did.

From this day forward, Flight Control will be known by two words: ‘Tough’ and ‘Competent.’ Tough means we are forever accountable for what we do or what we fail to do. We will never again compromise our responsibilities. Every time we walk into Mission Control we will know what we stand for. Competent means we will never take anything for granted. We will never be found short in our knowledge and in our skills. Mission Control will be perfect.

When you leave this meeting today you will go to your office and the first thing you will do there is to write ‘Tough and Competent’ on your blackboards. It will never be erased. Each day when you enter the room these words will remind you of the price paid by Grissom, White, and Chaffee. These words are the price of admission to the ranks of Mission Control.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 5:17 pm

BravoOne wrote:
Just a small point of order. Mr. Forkner was not a "test pilot", and certainly not the Chief Test Pilot. He was the Chief Technical Pilot with very few if any flight responsibilities out side the realm of the ECAB. His main efforts were directed at creating the supporting FCOM, FCTM and QRH with input from the Boeing Test and Evaluation group of "test pilots". It might not seem like much but as long as everyone is throwing darts at this guy, it's worth the distinction.

Yes, I think that is a noteworthy distinction. It also shows why he is in the hot seat: it was a part of his job to communicate with FAA regarding FCOM, FCTM and QRH.

aerolimani wrote:
Boeing’s long, thin branch becomes even more precarious due to the release of this exchange. Chief Technical Pilot Forkner clearly felt that this information needed to be communicated to the FAA. Why would he have gone to the FAA to ask to remove MCAS from the documentation, if this was something that fell under Boeing’s own self-certifying purview? It rather negates Boeing’s defence tactic, doesn’t it?

My understanding is that FAA needs to review the entire document set, the delegated authorities need to provide input on their sections, he was saying Boeing's input is to remove it from that document. Some of the now revealed email refers to some other conversation where they had verbally reached agreement to do so. I think this email was part of the source material for earlier media reports attributed to unnamed sources since the context is familiar.

Aptivaboy wrote:
Spaceflight will never tolerate carelessness, incapacity, and neglect. Somewhere, somehow, we screwed up. It could have been in design, build, or test. Whatever it was, we should have caught it. We were too gung ho about the schedule and we locked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work.

Interestingly, this shows that "schedule fever" can occur even within not-for-profit entities such as NASA.

lowbank wrote:
I would prefer to be sacked, at least I could sleep at night.

I feel the same way. I have been put on the hot seat several times in my career and have stood my ground, and have the career damage to show for it. I'm not working on anything that could jeopardize human life so the stakes aren't as high for me, but I'd still make the same kind of decisions if I was in such a field. To be honest I probably would have gotten the sack if I was in the aerospace industry since I would have felt the need to be even firmer when standing my ground. Maybe that's why I never took a job in that industry.
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 5:33 pm

lowbank wrote:
planecane wrote:
lowbank wrote:
This latest revelation unfortunately adds me to the list of people who will never fly on a MAX.


Which revelation was the straw that broke the camel's back? The texts about "lying" to the FAA?


As a signatory who signs parts to fly on commercial aircraft, yes.

I would prefer to be sacked, at least I could sleep at night.

If I lied to a regulator unknowingly, I would not hide behind any amendment.

I would come clean and accept what came my way.


However, we don't yet know if that "lie" was corrected. Also, it was a "lie" in hindsight after he found new information. If it wasn't corrected, it is still wrong.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 5:58 pm

Leveling off at 4,000' and 230kts, is that a high AOA situation where MCAS was designed to kick in? If he was 'like what'? Then it sounds like he was not informed that MCAS had been amended for low speed, which points to somebody else at fault for lack of communication.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 6:00 pm

Did Forkner make the decision to design the system to rely on one AOA and not flight test a failed AOA, or was that somebody elses?
 
lowbank
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 6:01 pm

Revelation wrote:
BravoOne wrote:
Just a small point of order. Mr. Forkner was not a "test pilot", and certainly not the Chief Test Pilot. He was the Chief Technical Pilot with very few if any flight responsibilities out side the realm of the ECAB. His main efforts were directed at creating the supporting FCOM, FCTM and QRH with input from the Boeing Test and Evaluation group of "test pilots". It might not seem like much but as long as everyone is throwing darts at this guy, it's worth the distinction.

Yes, I think that is a noteworthy distinction. It also shows why he is in the hot seat: it was a part of his job to communicate with FAA regarding FCOM, FCTM and QRH.

aerolimani wrote:
Boeing’s long, thin branch becomes even more precarious due to the release of this exchange. Chief Technical Pilot Forkner clearly felt that this information needed to be communicated to the FAA. Why would he have gone to the FAA to ask to remove MCAS from the documentation, if this was something that fell under Boeing’s own self-certifying purview? It rather negates Boeing’s defence tactic, doesn’t it?

My understanding is that FAA needs to review the entire document set, the delegated authorities need to provide input on their sections, he was saying Boeing's input is to remove it from that document. Some of the now revealed email refers to some other conversation where they had verbally reached agreement to do so. I think this email was part of the source material for earlier media reports attributed to unnamed sources since the context is familiar.

Aptivaboy wrote:
Spaceflight will never tolerate carelessness, incapacity, and neglect. Somewhere, somehow, we screwed up. It could have been in design, build, or test. Whatever it was, we should have caught it. We were too gung ho about the schedule and we locked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work.

Interestingly, this shows that "schedule fever" can occur even within not-for-profit entities such as NASA.

lowbank wrote:
I would prefer to be sacked, at least I could sleep at night.

I feel the same way. I have been put on the hot seat several times in my career and have stood my ground, and have the career damage to show for it. I'm not working on anything that could jeopardize human life so the stakes aren't as high for me, but I'd still make the same kind of decisions if I was in such a field. To be honest I probably would have gotten the sack if I was in the aerospace industry since I would have felt the need to be even firmer when standing my ground. Maybe that's why I never took a job in that industry.




It has certainly restricted my promotion prospects but I have still earned a good living.
I have gone against my company on many occasions, however to be fair it’s never been about safety. It’s been quality, performance, cost but mainly workplace bullying .
Every days a school day.
 
Aptivaboy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 6:05 pm

I would prefer to be sacked, at least I could sleep at night.


I'm lucky, I'm in a field where I can't be fired for reporting wrongdoing or malfeasance, but I commend you for your position. I can be fired for not reporting, though, and I'm always amazed at the sheer number of people who willingly choose to not report to the appropriate authorities. Is it greed? Neglect? Carelessness? Whatever it is, its a sad commentary on the human condition.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 6:08 pm

aerolimani wrote:
morrisond wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:

You try and you try and you try.

The first version of MCAS was not supposed to work at low speeds. It was designed for high speed high g turns.
That was one of the main reasons to keep it out of the Manuals.
That was what this Faulkner did sell to the FAA.
That was what he just had lied about. unintentional
That lie was unintentional because he had not been told about the change to MCAS
He also realized that the other guys at Boeing did not tell the whole truth, that was why he did not know about MCAS going active at 0.2 mach.

The hammer is: the whole truth about how the installed MCAS works never made it to the FAA.

So the question is now who all lied to whom.


I totally get it - and that's what I just said - what you interpret as one side of Boeing lying to the other could have just been a timing issue on communication - they hadn't told Test what there solution was to fix the low speed issues.

As the Chief test pilot he would/should have known that the MAX needed help in low speed situations as well - is just whether or not it had aerodynamic problems or the controls just got too light.

There still is no evidence on that. Other than the earlier AVweek article that talks about Boeing changing some of the Wing treatments on the MAX vs the NG to change the stall characteristics (which I assume was just changing the flow patterns on the wing).

The MAX may still have Aero issues at low speed other than just "too light" controls - and as I said before I would support them testing it without MCAS to find out.

By this point I would be stunned if the FAA doesn't fly that simple test.

It’s important to note that Forkner is not the Chief Test Pilot. He is the Chief Technical Pilot. In the exchange, he actually complains about not getting proper information from the test pilots. It highlights the communication issues within the organization.


That would make more sense then why he wasn't up to speed on how they were adapting MCAS for low speed as well.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 6:10 pm

DenverTed wrote:
Leveling off at 4,000' and 230kts, is that a high AOA situation where MCAS was designed to kick in? If he was 'like what'? Then it sounds like he was not informed that MCAS had been amended for low speed, which points to somebody else at fault for lack of communication.

Sure, but once he knew, and presuming what he is commenting on is something he believed represented the actual product rather than a sim problem, we're back to it being part of his job to communicate things relevant to FCOM, FCTM and QRH back to FAA. He can claim he wasn't fully informed, but once he discovered it on his own, he's now squarely in the hot seat. He can point fingers at others, but that doesn't absolve him. Being Chief Technical Pilot comes with responsibilities I would think.

I would think his ability to point fingers at others may be useful to him and his lawyer at some point in the future.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
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saab2000
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 6:17 pm

Aptivaboy wrote:
I would prefer to be sacked, at least I could sleep at night.


I'm lucky, I'm in a field where I can't be fired for reporting wrongdoing or malfeasance, but I commend you for your position. I can be fired for not reporting, though, and I'm always amazed at the sheer number of people who willingly choose to not report to the appropriate authorities. Is it greed? Neglect? Carelessness? Whatever it is, its a sad commentary on the human condition.


It’s a sad commentary on a toxic, possibly punitive corporate culture.
smrtrthnu
 
uta999
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 6:43 pm

Any idea why the AoA failed on both aircraft? Presumably on the same side. What would be the result of a failure on the other side, or would that affect the FO in the same way?

No other a/c models seem to have faulty AoA at this high rate of failure.
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kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 7:02 pm

uta999 wrote:
Any idea why the AoA failed on both aircraft? Presumably on the same side. What would be the result of a failure on the other side, or would that affect the FO in the same way?

No other a/c models seem to have faulty AoA at this high rate of failure.

Discussed quite a while ago. No, AoA ate not the most reliable devices out there. Fragile small part in the airstream - what can go wrong?
On other planes, AoA failures are non-event, though...
 
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alberchico
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 7:08 pm

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN1WY0RG

Is it normal to hold a meeting like this on a Sunday ?
short summary of every jewish holiday: they tried to kill us ,we won , lets eat !
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 7:16 pm

alberchico wrote:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-board/boeing-board-to-meet-in-texas-as-scrutiny-intensifies-sources-idUSKBN1WY0RG

Is it normal to hold a meeting like this on a Sunday ?

If you are interested you may want to go back to the previous page, this was discussed a few hours ago.

They are flying in the head of BCA and the production chief along with execs from production partners which suggests some change in production.

Either that, or they sack DM and everyone moves up a slot. :scratchchin:
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mysfit
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 7:41 pm

I keep reading where people think the egregious behavior of the SIM was due to the SIM not being programmed correctly.

But what if it was correct and Boeing missed the issue because they didn't believe the data? A lack of imagination.

My experience in development and manufacturing tells me that cutting corners and quality in order to hit deadlines is all too common. The priority is stockholders. That's a country wide problem, not just one industry.
 
BravoOne
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 8:07 pm

mysfit wrote:
I keep reading where people think the egregious behavior of the SIM was due to the SIM not being programmed correctly.

But what if it was correct and Boeing missed the issue because they didn't believe the data? A lack of imagination.

My experience in development and manufacturing tells me that cutting corners and quality in order to hit deadlines is all too common. The priority is stockholders. That's a country wide problem, not just one industry.



You guys are so far off the mark as you keep tossing around terms that have different meaning within the indusry. There was no "sim", just an ECAB for this work. (ECAB=Engineering CAB) Boeing contracted with TRU in Montreal to build five or six 737 MAX simulators which were not certified until after the MAX was certified. The closest one to Seattle was in Miami, which is another story all together. None of these simulators emulated the MCAS. Apparently the ECAB could emulate MCAS, but to what degree remains an unknown at this time. It sounds as if the data apcks Boeing sold to the sim builders did not select this added feature but that remains an unknown.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 8:36 pm

Revelation wrote:
Aptivaboy wrote:
Spaceflight will never tolerate carelessness, incapacity, and neglect. Somewhere, somehow, we screwed up. It could have been in design, build, or test. Whatever it was, we should have caught it. We were too gung ho about the schedule and we locked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work.

Interestingly, this shows that "schedule fever" can occur even within not-for-profit entities such as NASA.

NASA was under enormous political and social pressure. The space race was very real, and losing was not considered an option. However, while the events of Apollo 1 were tragic, the deaths of the three astronauts (who understood the risks of their career choice) pales in comparison to JT610 and ET302. And, while this may be rather a moral judgement, NASA’s failure, under immense political and social pressure, is significantly more forgivable than Boeing’s failure under profit-motivated pressure. I wouldn’t describe Boeing’s situation as “go fever.” Even calling it “schedule fever” is rather sugar-coating things. The situation at Boeing sounds a lot more like plain old greed.

I see the parallels in this comparison, but it’s extremely important to note that parallels don’t necessarily translate to equivalencies.
 
RickNRoll
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 8:48 pm

PW100 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
Situation: approaching a stall. . ..


I think without MCAS it was more like
. . ..


I more and more get the feeling that he stick force theory belongs to the high-speed regime (winding turn), but that he low speed regime is more related to poor (andf perhaps unpredictable) stall characteristics. Hence the brutal authority given to MCAS.

The defining moment is when MCAS was used to solve the low speed stall characteristics. This was not (properly) communicated to FAA, and the resulting risk analysis (which form the basis of the certification plan) was never updated.

Forkner realized early that the certification plan and the basis for not including MCAS in the FCOM (pilot manual) and DT requirements (differences training table from NG to MAX) were no longer valid.

Knowing this, but not communicating this to regulator will become Boeings version of the VW scandal.
The problem is that we know what happens to whistle blowers. Their lives are usually ruined and no one will employ them.
 
rheinwaldner
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Sun Oct 20, 2019 9:06 pm

Aptivaboy wrote:
This whole thing reminds me a lot of the Go Fever that NASA experienced in the months leading up to the Apollo 1 fire. People knew there were problems but managers and engineers were unwilling to step up and delay the program....

Same story, same root cause and even the same organization was this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DT7Yx5kxYco
(the Challenger crash)
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prebennorholm
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 12:26 am

LJ wrote:
Maybe a few will actively avoid the MAX, however the vast majority won't. The only relevant question is how profiable are the clients who will avoid the MAX at all cost.

The 1% who will avoid the MAX at all cost is hardly the main issue. Far more serious are large companies with many business travelers.

When a single employee, or a few, tells that they won't fly on MAX, then the company will tell the travel agency to book for their employees on MAX-free airlines only whenever possible. Simply because the company management doesn't want to risk to spend time on arguing about it with the employees.

In those cases 99% of the employees may get excluded from flying on the MAX without even knowing it.
Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 2:43 am

prebennorholm wrote:
LJ wrote:
Maybe a few will actively avoid the MAX, however the vast majority won't. The only relevant question is how profiable are the clients who will avoid the MAX at all cost.

The 1% who will avoid the MAX at all cost is hardly the main issue. Far more serious are large companies with many business travelers.

When a single employee, or a few, tells that they won't fly on MAX, then the company will tell the travel agency to book for their employees on MAX-free airlines only whenever possible. Simply because the company management doesn't want to risk to spend time on arguing about it with the employees.

In those cases 99% of the employees may get excluded from flying on the MAX without even knowing it.


This is only an issue if the FAA approves it alone. If EASA and other agencies certify it is safe, there will be no reason to avoid it. No aircraft will have had the flight control system scrutinized so closely.
 
MrBretz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:54 am

planecane, you make a valid point. Let’s see how and when it pans out.
 
astuteman
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 4:54 am

aerolimani wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Aptivaboy wrote:
Spaceflight will never tolerate carelessness, incapacity, and neglect. Somewhere, somehow, we screwed up. It could have been in design, build, or test. Whatever it was, we should have caught it. We were too gung ho about the schedule and we locked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work.

Interestingly, this shows that "schedule fever" can occur even within not-for-profit entities such as NASA.

NASA was under enormous political and social pressure. The space race was very real, and losing was not considered an option. However, while the events of Apollo 1 were tragic, the deaths of the three astronauts (who understood the risks of their career choice) pales in comparison to JT610 and ET302. And, while this may be rather a moral judgement, NASA’s failure, under immense political and social pressure, is significantly more forgivable than Boeing’s failure under profit-motivated pressure. I wouldn’t describe Boeing’s situation as “go fever.” Even calling it “schedule fever” is rather sugar-coating things. The situation at Boeing sounds a lot more like plain old greed.


For me the MAX issue stems from 2 corporate drives.

Firstly - the significant ramp up we've seen in recent years to play "hard-ball" in every way possible (the "greed" aspect)..

Ramping up the WTO activities (I know, not just Boeing, but they will have been lobbying hard)
Massive push to up 787 output and drive down cost, deliberately aiming to cut the A330NEO off at the knees
The Dumping case against the C-series
The intense (unparalleled in Lightsaber's experience) pressure on suppliers

It has felt like Boeing management has been racheting up the pressure in every way possible in order to

Record record profits
Execute record share buy-backs
Secure record executive bonuses

The second aspect is that into this environment, the A320NEO specifically caught Boeing completely off-side.
Look at the AA order for the MAX.
"Yeah we've ordered 230 planes. don't know what they are yet but Boeing are working that out"

It's clear that in order to make the MAX hurried response fit in to the racheting up of pressure, exceptional things were going to have to happen.
But the MAX had to fit into the corporate "greed" profile, come what may.

It is surprising what pressures a corporate culture like that can set up amongst line management and workforce.
BOD's have to be really careful how they message out corporate imperatives.
People ultimately behave the way they are measured.

Rgds
 
virage
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 5:09 am

Revelation wrote:
virage wrote:
To me, the Forkner - Gustavsson exchange seems to be about the MCAS simulation rather than the actual system installed on the plane.

If so, the question is whether the described MCAS simulation behavior was correct w.r.t. the actual MCAS.

Yes, this is what Forkner's lawyer asserted, Forkner was just complaining about the behavior of the sim, nothing else.

The reality is we don't know much about the context of the situation that led to the texts.

Ideally we'd know a lot more, but Forkner has lawyered up.

We do know he felt very pressured and reported that other people he needed to communicate with were too busy to give him the info he needed.

It's definitely not something that shows anyone involved in a good light.


That may well be, but I see no obvious evidence to interpret this conversation as being related to MCAS rather than the simulator.
From that perspective, I believe the story is not all that dire, and Congress, the FAA and media may have overreacted (but in their defense, it's their mission as public watchdogs).
 
oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 5:42 am

This story sounds "interesting" to say the least! Is Boeing trying to move the blame back to FAA? They knew about it all?

https://www.smh.com.au/business/compani ... 532km.html

Boeing says FAA was told 'multiple times' of changes to 737 Max as spat intensifies.

Boeing said it told US regulators "multiple times" that it had expanded the role of flight-control software later linked to two fatal crashes, and that Federal Aviation Administration personnel observed the system operating in flight tests before the 737 Max was certified for service.

The statement, posted online Sunday, provided a broader explanation to last week's bombshell revelation that a former senior Boeing pilot had described the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, also known as MCAS, as "egregious" to a colleague. In an instant-message exchange after a rocky simulator run in August 2016, Mark Forkner, now a Southwest Airlines pilot, said he had unknowingly "lied" to the FAA about its behavior. The latest controversy swirling around the grounded 737 Max adds to the pressure on the planemaker and Chief Executive Officer Dennis Muilenburg as directors and senior executives gather in San Antonio, Texas, for a regularly scheduled board meeting Sunday evening and Monday. Delays in getting approval to return the plane to service have cost Boeing at least $8.4 billion and Muilenburg his post as chairman.

The FAA said in an email Sunday that it would stand by comments it released October 18, when it called the pilot's comments "concerning" and chastised Boeing for not revealing the information sooner. "The FAA is reviewing this information to determine what action is appropriate," the US regulator said. The public rupture comes as Boeing and the regulator are working to get the 737 Max back into the skies and rebuild public trust after months of bruising publicity. The commercial return of Boeing's best-selling plane has slipped repeatedly and now isn't likely before 2020



https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethi ... SKBN1WZ0MA

Boeing expresses regret over ex-pilot's 737 MAX messages, faults simulator

Boeing Co said on Sunday it understood the outcry over leaked messages from a former test pilot over erratic software behavior on its 737 MAX jet two years before recent crashes, and added it was still investigating what they meant. On Sunday, Boeing said it has not been able to speak to Forkner directly about his understanding of the document. “He has stated through his attorney that his comments reflected a reaction to a simulator program that was not functioning properly and that was still undergoing testing,” Boeing said.

“The simulator software used during the Nov. 15 session was still undergoing testing and qualification and had not been finalized,” Boeing added. Reuters reported on Friday that the simulator had a number of software problems, citing a former Boeing test pilot who analyzed the transcript and who had direct knowledge of the flight simulator at the time. Such calibration problems may have contributed in some way to Forkner’s observations and conclusions about MCAS’ behavior, the former pilot, and a second former Boeing engineering employee, Rick Ludtke, said.
 
2175301
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 6:09 am

Concerning the importance of the IM message and discussion.

I see two major different possibilities:

1) IF the trimming problems observed were documented in the appropriate internal Boeing test reports, those reports were analyzed and the the trimming problem explained somehow (Possible situation where problems were found with the simulator being used, problems fixed, similar test flight without the same issue) - then the IM messages have little real impact, other than generating a lot of press by people who don't know the rest of the story.

2) If the trimming problems observed were not documented in the appropriate reports.... Then there are real questions as to why not...

Of course, it could be somewhere between those two situations depending on what was reported in internal test reports and what actions occurred when those reports were reviewed.

Since Boeing supplied the document to the DOJ in February, I fail to see the claim that they withheld the document. The FAA may not have been doing anything in that area where the document was relevant at the time.

Have a great day,
 
maint123
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 7:36 am

People are over thinking the technical issue and the pilots response.
In other planes, when the AOA sensor malfunctions, the pilot would have just manually trimmed it to a level position and then turned back or proceeded to his destination.
The Lion air pilot tried this trimming 20 times, and eventually MCAS Prevailed.
So unless the max is unable to fly without MCAS, just have a switch for putting it off and the pilots have a NG on their hands.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 7:42 am

maint123 wrote:
People are over thinking the technical issue and the pilots response.
In other planes, when the AOA sensor malfunctions, the pilot would have just manually trimmed it to a level position and then turned back or proceeded to his destination.
The Lion air pilot tried this trimming 20 times, and eventually MCAS Prevailed.
So unless the max is unable to fly without MCAS, just have a switch for putting it off and the pilots have a NG on their hands.


Very much this. And if the system compares 2 sensors and turns itself off when they disagree, the worst problems are solved. (it still would need some changes to the switches in the MAX cockpit, a different checklist for runaway trim and a working AoA disagree warning, as well as changes to the computers, so that the date from 2 sensors can be compared)
 
FluidFlow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 8:02 am

seahawk wrote:
maint123 wrote:
People are over thinking the technical issue and the pilots response.
In other planes, when the AOA sensor malfunctions, the pilot would have just manually trimmed it to a level position and then turned back or proceeded to his destination.
The Lion air pilot tried this trimming 20 times, and eventually MCAS Prevailed.
So unless the max is unable to fly without MCAS, just have a switch for putting it off and the pilots have a NG on their hands.


Very much this. And if the system compares 2 sensors and turns itself off when they disagree, the worst problems are solved. (it still would need some changes to the switches in the MAX cockpit, a different checklist for runaway trim and a working AoA disagree warning, as well as changes to the computers, so that the date from 2 sensors can be compared)


This will lead to additional training mandated (probably in the sim) in how to handle this situation because of the changes to the cockpit and a new checklist. That is a no-go for Boeing. In hindsight it probably would have been best to actually include sim-training in the difference training and how to handle a MCAS misfire. This would have only cost a couple of hundred million penalties to certain customers instead of at least $8.4B.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 8:07 am

I think ipad training is enough for this. The changes to the switches are imho unavoidable, as there needs to be an option to turn automatic trim systems off and still keep manual electric trim. (otherwise the whole trim wheel problems will come to bite)
 
FluidFlow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 8:12 am

seahawk wrote:
I think ipad training is enough for this. The changes to the switches are imho unavoidable, as there needs to be an option to turn automatic trim systems off and still keep manual electric trim. (otherwise the whole trim wheel problems will come to bite)


After the whole sh*tshow mostly created by Boeing and now the whole pointing at the FAA it would not surprise me when Sim-training will be mandated anyway but if there is a new switch function connected with a new memory item then they will mandate that for sure.

Boeing pointing the finger at the agency they rely on to bring their cash cow back up in the air is the worst you can do.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 8:40 am

planecane wrote:
prebennorholm wrote:
LJ wrote:
Maybe a few will actively avoid the MAX, however the vast majority won't. The only relevant question is how profiable are the clients who will avoid the MAX at all cost.

The 1% who will avoid the MAX at all cost is hardly the main issue. Far more serious are large companies with many business travelers.

When a single employee, or a few, tells that they won't fly on MAX, then the company will tell the travel agency to book for their employees on MAX-free airlines only whenever possible. Simply because the company management doesn't want to risk to spend time on arguing about it with the employees.

In those cases 99% of the employees may get excluded from flying on the MAX without even knowing it.


This is only an issue if the FAA approves it alone. If EASA and other agencies certify it is safe, there will be no reason to avoid it. No aircraft will have had the flight control system scrutinized so closely.


Scrutinized closely, but fixed? The close scrutiny lead to further points not in compliance apart from MCAS. I do not see yet the whole list of the EASA complaints to be fixed for example. Will the regulators allow the frame to fly with known defects?
 
SteinarN
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 9:45 am

“The simulator software used during the Nov. 15 session was still undergoing testing and qualification and had not been finalized,” Boeing added. Reuters reported on Friday that the simulator had a number of software problems, citing a former Boeing test pilot who analyzed the transcript and who had direct knowledge of the flight simulator at the time. Such calibration problems may have contributed in some way to Forkner’s observations and conclusions about MCAS’ behavior, the former pilot, and a second former Boeing engineering employee, Rick Ludtke, said.



One thing that puzzles me with this is that this statement from Boeing consequently means that Boeing have used a non qualified beta version of the software in the e-cab while doing all the various tests in which the results of those tests is the basis for a large number of documents required for the certification of the Max.

Shouldn't this mean that all those test results and documents produced before the qualified and finalized version of the e-cab software was released should be regarded as invalid?
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 10:26 am

SteinarN wrote:
“The simulator software used during the Nov. 15 session was still undergoing testing and qualification and had not been finalized,” Boeing added. Reuters reported on Friday that the simulator had a number of software problems, citing a former Boeing test pilot who analyzed the transcript and who had direct knowledge of the flight simulator at the time. Such calibration problems may have contributed in some way to Forkner’s observations and conclusions about MCAS’ behavior, the former pilot, and a second former Boeing engineering employee, Rick Ludtke, said.



One thing that puzzles me with this is that this statement from Boeing consequently means that Boeing have used a non qualified beta version of the software in the e-cab while doing all the various tests in which the results of those tests is the basis for a large number of documents required for the certification of the Max.

Shouldn't this mean that all those test results and documents produced before the qualified and finalized version of the e-cab software was released should be regarded as invalid?

Yes, and charges for knowingly submitting inaccurate documents to regulators and airlines are warranted.
And, as I said many times, Boeing apparently lost control of design. Full recertification, including new flight test campaign, is a must. Who knows if the problem of inconsistent configs spreads beyond engineering setups? Certainly not Boeing...
 
SteelChair
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 11:10 am

One wonders what else they have hidden.

Full recertification is warranted. If it were up to me, I would make them start from scratch and recertify under a new type certificate. There is no way the FAA should trust anyone at Boeing to tell the truth. Make them prove everything.
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 11:14 am

oschkosch wrote:
This story sounds "interesting" to say the least! Is Boeing trying to move the blame back to FAA? They knew about it all?

https://www.smh.com.au/business/compani ... 532km.html

Boeing says FAA was told 'multiple times' of changes to 737 Max as spat intensifies.

Boeing said it told US regulators "multiple times" that it had expanded the role of flight-control software later linked to two fatal crashes, and that Federal Aviation Administration personnel observed the system operating in flight tests before the 737 Max was certified for service.

The statement, posted online Sunday, provided a broader explanation to last week's bombshell revelation that a former senior Boeing pilot had described the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, also known as MCAS, as "egregious" to a colleague. In an instant-message exchange after a rocky simulator run in August 2016, Mark Forkner, now a Southwest Airlines pilot, said he had unknowingly "lied" to the FAA about its behavior. The latest controversy swirling around the grounded 737 Max adds to the pressure on the planemaker and Chief Executive Officer Dennis Muilenburg as directors and senior executives gather in San Antonio, Texas, for a regularly scheduled board meeting Sunday evening and Monday. Delays in getting approval to return the plane to service have cost Boeing at least $8.4 billion and Muilenburg his post as chairman.

The FAA said in an email Sunday that it would stand by comments it released October 18, when it called the pilot's comments "concerning" and chastised Boeing for not revealing the information sooner. "The FAA is reviewing this information to determine what action is appropriate," the US regulator said. The public rupture comes as Boeing and the regulator are working to get the 737 Max back into the skies and rebuild public trust after months of bruising publicity. The commercial return of Boeing's best-selling plane has slipped repeatedly and now isn't likely before 2020



https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethi ... SKBN1WZ0MA

Boeing expresses regret over ex-pilot's 737 MAX messages, faults simulator

Boeing Co said on Sunday it understood the outcry over leaked messages from a former test pilot over erratic software behavior on its 737 MAX jet two years before recent crashes, and added it was still investigating what they meant. On Sunday, Boeing said it has not been able to speak to Forkner directly about his understanding of the document. “He has stated through his attorney that his comments reflected a reaction to a simulator program that was not functioning properly and that was still undergoing testing,” Boeing said.

“The simulator software used during the Nov. 15 session was still undergoing testing and qualification and had not been finalized,” Boeing added. Reuters reported on Friday that the simulator had a number of software problems, citing a former Boeing test pilot who analyzed the transcript and who had direct knowledge of the flight simulator at the time. Such calibration problems may have contributed in some way to Forkner’s observations and conclusions about MCAS’ behavior, the former pilot, and a second former Boeing engineering employee, Rick Ludtke, said.


4 months before certification in 2017 the flight simulator was still undergoing qualification? I don't think so. Unlike grandfathered a/c systems that have designs carried over for decades, simulator hardware and software is state of the art, getting upgrades much more frequently. And the capability of their NG simulator, which would have been already qualified, would have been up to the task with little to no upgrades. Same sensors on the plane. Just different aerodynamic tables, CG. Same wings, fuel tanks, fuselage (so same cargo data).

Also I find it coincidental this board meeting is happening in Mr. Forkner's backyard, where they can talk in person, without using trackable smartphones or IM tools.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 11:33 am

oschkosch wrote:
Boeing Co said on Sunday it understood the outcry over leaked messages from a former test pilot over erratic software behavior on its 737 MAX jet two years before recent crashes, and added it was still investigating what they meant. On Sunday, Boeing said it has not been able to speak to Forkner directly about his understanding of the document. “He has stated through his attorney that his comments reflected a reaction to a simulator program that was not functioning properly and that was still undergoing testing,” Boeing said.

“The simulator software used during the Nov. 15 session was still undergoing testing and qualification and had not been finalized,” Boeing added. Reuters reported on Friday that the simulator had a number of software problems, citing a former Boeing test pilot who analyzed the transcript and who had direct knowledge of the flight simulator at the time. Such calibration problems may have contributed in some way to Forkner’s observations and conclusions about MCAS’ behavior, the former pilot, and a second former Boeing engineering employee, Rick Ludtke, said.

Pretty evasive statement, IMO.

Nothing's the final product till it's the final product, but its MCAS implementation could have been the same as the final one, or close enough to serve as a representative example.

This statement is a great example of damage control: say something that is undeniably true and serves your purpose while avoiding the central issue: did this simulator model MCAS to a meaningful degree or not?

My guess it did, that's why we see the spin doctors out in full force.

ST ( https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... l-problem/ ) says:

In a Sunday morning statement, Boeing insisted this doesn’t mean it had prior knowledge of the system flaws that two years later would play a major role in the two deadly crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia. Instead, Boeing said, Forkner’s “comments reflected a reaction to a simulator program that was not functioning properly.”

If Forkner was reacting to a simulator he felt had problems, then why did he say he had (inadvertently) lied to FAA?

Wouldn't he give himself and his company the benefit of the doubt and complain about the simulator rather than implicate himself?

Especially if he knew Skype for Business would be storing his IMs as email?

Or is he just very self-unaware?

Or under so much stress he lost his sense of self preservation?

Or maybe we go with Occam's Razor and say he knew the sim was realistic and that he had (inadvertently) lied to FAA.
Last edited by Revelation on Mon Oct 21, 2019 11:45 am, edited 1 time in total.
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Amiga500
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 11:41 am

That Boeing bull stinks the place out and doesn't remotely pass the sniff test.


The conversation clearly inferred Vince was aero group[1] - and he was expecting MCAS to cut in at Mach 0.2[2]. He subsequently said Vince would present a spreadsheet showing when it would cut in.


[1]Gustavsson, Patrik H 6:52 PM: No, i think we need aero to confirm what its supposed to be doing
Mark Forkner 6:53 PM: Vince is going to get me some spreadsheet table that shows when it's supposed to kick in. why are we just now hearing about this?

[2]Mark Forkner 6:50 PM: Oh shocker alerT! MCAS is now active down to M .2 It's running rampant in the sim on me at least that's what Vince thinks is happening


Which means programmed ECAB behaviour was as expected.

The lack of interaction with flight test pilots is concerning. It really should be several of those confirming that ECAB represents the aircraft in several critical phases of flight where behaviour is notably different from baseline (i.e. NG).
 
sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 11:45 am

Revelation wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
Boeing Co said on Sunday it understood the outcry over leaked messages from a former test pilot over erratic software behavior on its 737 MAX jet two years before recent crashes, and added it was still investigating what they meant. On Sunday, Boeing said it has not been able to speak to Forkner directly about his understanding of the document. “He has stated through his attorney that his comments reflected a reaction to a simulator program that was not functioning properly and that was still undergoing testing,” Boeing said.

“The simulator software used during the Nov. 15 session was still undergoing testing and qualification and had not been finalized,” Boeing added. Reuters reported on Friday that the simulator had a number of software problems, citing a former Boeing test pilot who analyzed the transcript and who had direct knowledge of the flight simulator at the time. Such calibration problems may have contributed in some way to Forkner’s observations and conclusions about MCAS’ behavior, the former pilot, and a second former Boeing engineering employee, Rick Ludtke, said.

Pretty evasive statement, IMO.

Nothing's the final product till it's the final product, but its MCAS implementation could have been the same as the final one, or close enough to serve as a representative example.

This statement is a great example of damage control: say something that is undeniably true and serves your purpose while avoiding the central issue: did this simulator model MCAS to a meaningful degree or not?

My guess it did, that's why we see the spin doctors out in full force.


The simulator wouldn't model MCAS. At least not the one a Boeing (chief) technical pilot would be using 4 months before certification. It would simulate sensor input and then, using the outputs from the FCC that command control surface actuation (that don't exist), simulate a/c flight path and attitude into a 3D model, then generate that 3D representation of the real world onto a screen representing the cockpit window. The production version of the actual a/c FCCs would have been used.
Last edited by sgrow787 on Mon Oct 21, 2019 12:03 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
Amiga500
Posts: 2438
Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2015 8:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 11:51 am

Its also worth noting that Mark Forkner had his conversation with the FAA *before* the transcript which has come to light.

You cannot note that you've lied to the authorities before you spoke to them!

It'd be interesting to see a timeline of where this all sits with regards FCOM gestation.
 
klm617
Posts: 4630
Joined: Sat Jul 04, 2015 8:57 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 11:58 am

This is so much over kill here. With their problems the Lockheed Electra, Boeing 737-300, Airbus A320, Boeing 767, and The DC-10 were never grounded. Directives were put out and adhered to and all went well. It's of note that when the DC-10 was grounded after the AA 191 crash it wasn't the fault of the plane either. There needs to be proper training done and if the airlines in some countries can't provide adequate training for their novice pilots the they should be required to send their recruits to Boeing and Airbus for proper training. In times of trouble pilots need to rely on their flying skills to get them out of harms way not on the computer system. How many pitot tube accidents have their been where the crew were given erroneous air speed readings and flew their aircraft into the ground and those planes were not grounded.
the truth does matter, guys. too bad it's often quite subjective. the truth is beyond the mere facts and figures. it's beyond good and bad, right and wrong...
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 8802
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Mon Oct 21, 2019 12:46 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
Boeing Co said on Sunday it understood the outcry over leaked messages from a former test pilot over erratic software behavior on its 737 MAX jet two years before recent crashes, and added it was still investigating what they meant. On Sunday, Boeing said it has not been able to speak to Forkner directly about his understanding of the document. “He has stated through his attorney that his comments reflected a reaction to a simulator program that was not functioning properly and that was still undergoing testing,” Boeing said.

“The simulator software used during the Nov. 15 session was still undergoing testing and qualification and had not been finalized,” Boeing added. Reuters reported on Friday that the simulator had a number of software problems, citing a former Boeing test pilot who analyzed the transcript and who had direct knowledge of the flight simulator at the time. Such calibration problems may have contributed in some way to Forkner’s observations and conclusions about MCAS’ behavior, the former pilot, and a second former Boeing engineering employee, Rick Ludtke, said.

Pretty evasive statement, IMO.

Nothing's the final product till it's the final product, but its MCAS implementation could have been the same as the final one, or close enough to serve as a representative example.

This statement is a great example of damage control: say something that is undeniably true and serves your purpose while avoiding the central issue: did this simulator model MCAS to a meaningful degree or not?

My guess it did, that's why we see the spin doctors out in full force.


The simulator wouldn't model MCAS. At least not the one a Boeing (chief) technical pilot would be using 4 months before certification. It would simulate sensor input and then, using the outputs from the FCC that command control surface actuation (that don't exist), simulate a/c flight path and attitude into a 3D model, then generate that 3D representation of the real world onto a screen representing the cockpit window. The production version of the actual a/c FCCs would have been used.


If the simulator would not model MCAS, what use does this simulator than had for Faulkner? His job was to explain to the FAA why Boeing did not want any mentioning of MCAS in the Manuals and pilot training. If Boeing at the same time does not even provide him with the whole truth about MCAS and how it does work, it is a clear sign that Boeing, or certain people and departments at Boeing, had something to hide.

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