morrisond wrote:

MartijnNL wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I totally second the 1,500 Hour requirement (...) Having 200 hours and being put into a 737 is insane.

Not this again. Installing MCAS on the 737 without telling anyone, that's insane.

Did you dig that up from a few weeks ago?

What do you mean? Why do you bring up the 1,500 hour requirement (again) which only the U.S. aviation industry knows? Just stop blaming the pilots. The Max itself is unsafe. That's why it is grounded.

To be honest even if both sets of pilots had saved their planes there should have been a grounding.

It was only a matter of time with the completely messed up implementation of MCAS on the MAX.

It was as they say an accident waiting to happen.

keesje wrote:

Let's keep things in perspective instead of confusing the public as a form of damage control.

Why, do you feel confused?

It's all spelled out across 322 pages.

As the result of the investigation safety actions have been taken by related parties. KNKT
issued safety recommendations to address safety issues identified in this investigation to Lion
Air, Batam Aero Technic, Airnav Indonesia, Boeing Company, Xtra Aerospace, Indonesia
DGCA, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Ref: KNKT.18.10.35.04

astuteman wrote:

Revelation wrote:

astuteman wrote:

Nobody fails to recognise the complexity of causes that go into crashes like these, and nobody has posted on here like fault is a cartoon bomb, as you see to think - not in my judgement.

The issue is that if these same pilots in the same conditions had been in a 737NG or an A320 there would have been no crashes, threads, or comments.

When there is a step change in outcome like there has been for the MAX, you have to look at what has changed. And what changed wasn't the pilots, the training or the maintenance. It was the aircraft. Period.

And that is why the focus on the MAX grounding HAS to be on the MAX.

Personally, I'm not at all confident this crew with the flu-addled pilot and incompetent co-pilot could operate a NG with a failed AoA sensor without a crash.

Would you disallow a discussion of crew performance in a hypothetical RN ship disaster even if the ship itself had a serious design shortcoming?

Or would you say they would not have crashed the previous generation RN ship so let's not discuss the crew's performance?

Can you please stop inventing hyperbole around my posting please - I'm sure you would react if someone did it to you.
I have clearly stated that its clear all the points are relevant, and have at no time mentioned "disallowing" any related topic.
Why would I be that stupid?
This is about focus rather than "disallowing" a conversation.

For a bit of rough context ..
On the basis that Lionair 737NG's have a fatal crash rate of 1 in 3.8 million versus the MAX fatal crash rate of 1 in 200 000, on a pro-rata basis of their significance I would have reasonably expected 38 out of 40 posts on this thread about the MAX to be about the MAX, and 2 out of 40 posts to be about the pilots.
As I said above, the thing that changed here and resulted in a step deterioration in safety performance was the MAX, not the pilots.

You are right that the findings of the Lionair report are absolutely valid, valuable and deeply concerning to all.
Hopefully they will lead to mandated and governed improvements to both pilot training/qualification and maintenance procedures so that all aircraft become safer, including the MAX.

But the MAX un-grounding cannot be dependent on global training.
It has to be dependent upon the specific redesign of the system and specific associated training.
That is where the focus of this thread should be

It is glaringly obvious that one particular poster has never questioned or challenged any of the system design or specific training but instead has obsessed with global training standards. It is just not rational, or understandable IMO

I've questioned the system design many times and I have ton's of posts on ET's lack of training the new procedure's - and I said many times before the Lion Air Final report that Lion Air was somewhat understandable in that they knew nothing about MCAS. However that was before we knew about the Pilot's actual condition on the day of the flight and the Co-pilot's lack of abilities.

There just isn't a lot of information in particular of how Boeing screwed up - there is no CVR transcript of how Boeing went about the design process of MCAS in detail.

So far we don't have an fully detailed example (meaning a Final non-biased report) of an Normal Crew crashing the plane. Yes on the previous Lion Air flight - the third pilot definitely helped but they might have figured it out themselves eventually.

To get the right idea of safety performance you have to look at situations of how pilots performed when the there was problems with the automation/control systems and count how many times they saved it vs lost - that would give you a lot more meaningful number than comparing to overall number of flights.

Thankfully planes are getting so reliable the instances where Pilot's have to show there real skills are few and far between - it just doesn't happen that often.

That is really hard to do as it would be really hard to figure out how many times Pilot's Successfully saved a plane from bad automation as those flights rarely make the news.

For Example:

AF447 - Automation/Control Problem - Pilot's lost
Lufthansa 1829 - Automation Control Problem - Pilot's won
Asiana 214 - Automation Control Problem - Pilot's lost
Colgan 3407 - Automation/Control Problem - Pilot's lost
Lion Air Previous Flight - Pilot's Won
Lion Air 610 - Pilot's lost
ET 302 - Pilot's lost

There are probably hundred's of instances over the past few decades and it would need a major project by a graduate student to discern trends and to see what is really going on with Pilot standards.

It would be a small cost for someone to pay for this - and someone should. That is a good study for the NTSB or someone like that.

StTim wrote:

To be honest even if both sets of pilots had saved their planes there should have been a grounding.

It was only a matter of time with the completely messed up implementation of MCAS on the MAX.

It was as they say an accident waiting to happen.

It should never have been certified the way it was and allowed to enter commercial service.

rheinwaldner wrote:

3. Findings blaming the crew: 7
4. Findings explicitly exonerating the crew (this kind of: "This would lead to the inability of the flight crew to predict and be prepared …."): 25

So Boeing (and FAA) is blamed the most in the report. By far. 6 times more than pilots. And for the 7 findings of pilot errors, 25 findings exist that explicitely exonerate the pilots.

morrisond wrote:

I think some people on here would absolve the Pilots of any wrongdoing even if they were found to never have possessed a Pilot's license as in their minds Boeing should have accounted for that in the design.

Absurd hypothetical claim. It is a red herring because in that case, the pilot would have crashed an NG much earlier.

I'm going to ignore most of what you wrote above - sorry I made a typo or two "airspeed runaway - OOPS" other than do you really think it's okay for a Pilot to fly with the FLU and ignore procedures (reviewing the Previous flight) that could have probably saved the aircraft?

On the two above.

My son is a Soccer Goalie and we focus on how many saves he has vs Goals let in. But 25 saves with 7 goals in a night is usually a pretty bad night for the team.

A number of the findings are applicable to designs as per the NTSB are not specific to the MAX - the industry needs to change - cockpits are too complex with too many bells and alarms.

The compatriat to the ET302 captain - who went through training at the same time crashed an NG in ET409

astuteman wrote:

Revelation wrote:

astuteman wrote:

Nobody fails to recognise the complexity of causes that go into crashes like these, and nobody has posted on here like fault is a cartoon bomb, as you see to think - not in my judgement.

The issue is that if these same pilots in the same conditions had been in a 737NG or an A320 there would have been no crashes, threads, or comments.

When there is a step change in outcome like there has been for the MAX, you have to look at what has changed. And what changed wasn't the pilots, the training or the maintenance. It was the aircraft. Period.

And that is why the focus on the MAX grounding HAS to be on the MAX.

Personally, I'm not at all confident this crew with the flu-addled pilot and incompetent co-pilot could operate a NG with a failed AoA sensor without a crash.

Would you disallow a discussion of crew performance in a hypothetical RN ship disaster even if the ship itself had a serious design shortcoming?

Or would you say they would not have crashed the previous generation RN ship so let's not discuss the crew's performance?

Can you please stop inventing hyperbole around my posting please - I'm sure you would react if someone did it to you.
I have clearly stated that its clear all the points are relevant, and have at no time mentioned "disallowing" any related topic.
Why would I be that stupid?
This is about focus rather than "disallowing" a conversation.

You wrote "It was the aircraft. Period" followed by "And that is why the focus on the MAX grounding HAS to be on the MAX".

Maybe you didn't intend this to be a unilateral statement, but it sure came across as one to me.

What other conclusion should one reach after reading such words?

"The focus HAS to be on the MAX" doesn't leave any wiggle room to discuss anything else, IMO.

Maybe capitalize FOCUS rather than HAS next time?

astuteman wrote:

But the MAX un-grounding cannot be dependent on global training.
It has to be dependent upon the specific redesign of the system and specific associated training.
That is where the focus of this thread should be

The thing is, there is no disagreement that Boeing screwed up the design, so discussion of that naturally diminishes with time.

How often should we re-discuss that just to meet some "focus" comfort level?

The JATR report was great and thorough and largely confirmed what many suspected here all along, so it got very little comment.

The comment it did get was yet another deep dive into minutia, again since everyone already agreed/knew Boeing screwed up the MAX design.

The thing that people do not agree upon is crew performance, both in terms of what Boeing expected from the crew (which was too much) and what was actually observed (which IMO suggests even deeper problems than one imagined before the KNKT accident report).

I'm also not sure why people get upset by what other people find worthy of discussion.

We all have different perspectives.

Personally I find page after page of AoA / stall / anti-stall / stick force discussions boring, but not upsetting.

It's easy enough to skip over stuff you don't want to read.

Regarding the grounding of the 737MAX.

The grounding lead to serious scrutiny of the 737MAX. There were several complaints unrelated to MCAS or the accidents. Pointing to some things being the same in the NG would be a red Hering having had exceptions from the rules for 30 years, is no reason for continuing to give those exceptions the next 30 years. Switching from one model to the other is exactly the point in time to correct know deficiencies.

- The pilot machine interface in the 737 cockpit does not fulfil all FARs regarding those interfaces, exceptions from the rules were needed also for the NG. Here we are not talking about new rules, but rather rules stretching back to the 80ties. The 757 and 767 fulfil those rules. We have the second upgrade of the 737 since than without the interface being made compliant with the rules.
- The manual trim wheel. It is known since the 737-200, that the manual trim wheel will not work throughout the flight envelope. The last change to the NG made the situation worse, by making the wheel smaller and increasing the size of the stabilizer.
- Insufficient protection and redundancy of flight control cables, made worse by the bigger engines in case of uncontained engine failure
- cabling in the tanks not conforming to current standards
- to high surface temperature aloud in the fuel tanks
- insufficient fireproofing around the APU in the tail (perhaps something has been done about it with the new tail)

I would not be astonished if some of the regulators will not accept the MAX again in the air, before Boeing does a lot more than only MCAS 2.0. Or Boeing has to bring a time plan for removing those faults.

I do not know if the above list is exhaustive, but that is what I remember in the moment.

morrisond wrote:

astuteman wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Personally, I'm not at all confident this crew with the flu-addled pilot and incompetent co-pilot could operate a NG with a failed AoA sensor without a crash.

Would you disallow a discussion of crew performance in a hypothetical RN ship disaster even if the ship itself had a serious design shortcoming?

Or would you say they would not have crashed the previous generation RN ship so let's not discuss the crew's performance?

Can you please stop inventing hyperbole around my posting please - I'm sure you would react if someone did it to you.
I have clearly stated that its clear all the points are relevant, and have at no time mentioned "disallowing" any related topic.
Why would I be that stupid?
This is about focus rather than "disallowing" a conversation.

For a bit of rough context ..
On the basis that Lionair 737NG's have a fatal crash rate of 1 in 3.8 million versus the MAX fatal crash rate of 1 in 200 000, on a pro-rata basis of their significance I would have reasonably expected 38 out of 40 posts on this thread about the MAX to be about the MAX, and 2 out of 40 posts to be about the pilots.
As I said above, the thing that changed here and resulted in a step deterioration in safety performance was the MAX, not the pilots.

You are right that the findings of the Lionair report are absolutely valid, valuable and deeply concerning to all.
Hopefully they will lead to mandated and governed improvements to both pilot training/qualification and maintenance procedures so that all aircraft become safer, including the MAX.

But the MAX un-grounding cannot be dependent on global training.
It has to be dependent upon the specific redesign of the system and specific associated training.
That is where the focus of this thread should be

It is glaringly obvious that one particular poster has never questioned or challenged any of the system design or specific training but instead has obsessed with global training standards. It is just not rational, or understandable IMO

I've questioned the system design many times and I have ton's of posts on ET's lack of training the new procedure's - and I said many times before the Lion Air Final report that Lion Air was somewhat understandable in that they knew nothing about MCAS. However that was before we knew about the Pilot's actual condition on the day of the flight and the Co-pilot's lack of abilities.

There just isn't a lot of information in particular of how Boeing screwed up - there is no CVR transcript of how Boeing went about the design process of MCAS in detail.

So far we don't have an fully detailed example (meaning a Final non-biased report) of an Normal Crew crashing the plane. Yes on the previous Lion Air flight - the third pilot definitely helped but they might have figured it out themselves eventually.

To get the right idea of safety performance you have to look at situations of how pilots performed when the there was problems with the automation/control systems and count how many times they saved it vs lost - that would give you a lot more meaningful number than comparing to overall number of flights.

Thankfully planes are getting so reliable the instances where Pilot's have to show there real skills are few and far between - it just doesn't happen that often.

That is really hard to do as it would be really hard to figure out how many times Pilot's Successfully saved a plane from bad automation as those flights rarely make the news.

For Example:

AF447 - Automation/Control Problem - Pilot's lost
Lufthansa 1829 - Automation Control Problem - Pilot's won
Asiana 214 - Automation Control Problem - Pilot's lost
Colgan 3407 - Automation/Control Problem - Pilot's lost
Lion Air Previous Flight - Pilot's Won
Lion Air 610 - Pilot's lost
ET 302 - Pilot's lost

There are probably hundred's of instances over the past few decades and it would need a major project by a graduate student to discern trends and to see what is really going on with Pilot standards.

It would be a small cost for someone to pay for this - and someone should. That is a good study for the NTSB or someone like that.

Countless articles and studies about the man/machine interface since Cali.

Revelation wrote:

Personally, I'm not at all confident this crew with the flu-addled pilot and incompetent co-pilot could operate a NG with a failed AoA sensor without a crash.

Would you disallow a discussion of crew performance in a hypothetical RN ship disaster even if the ship itself had a serious design shortcoming?

Or would you say they would not have crashed the previous generation RN ship so let's not discuss the crew's performance?

We can speculate all we want about whether this specific team would have inevitably crashed a perfectly maintained aircraft but the stats speak for themselves - even in areas where pilots allegedly aren't trained as well we still don't have NGs crashing twice a year.

Maybe we haven't seen the full effects of the deterioration in training methodology and the nect five years will see a greatly increased accident rate, or what I expect is that other plane models will continue to be extremely safe and the MAX will have been a stark outlier.

morrisond wrote:

AF447 - Automation/Control Problem - Pilot's lost

Sorry what?

There was no problem at all, this was pure Pilot fault and not the fault of the automation. It was partially Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation but it did not fail at all. The flight would have been absolutely safe it the pilots would have done nothing, just nothing.

They crashed that aircraft, not the aircraft crashed them. This is actually the perfect opposite to the MAX problem. In the AF case doing nothing would have safed the aircraft, in the MAX case the right action was requiered.

Revelation wrote:

What other conclusion should one reach after reading such words?

"The focus HAS to be on the MAX" doesn't leave any wiggle room to discuss anything else, IMO.

Maybe capitalize FOCUS rather than HAS next time?

The focus absolutely has to be on the MAX. Pilot training is a red herring. If now and then somebody would mention pilot performance, it would be no problem. But in this thread the focus and the obsession lays on the pilots. Cant you see that? Otherwise you should study the meaning of the thread title for a couple of minutes.

Both the accident report and the crash statistics of the MAX (Astuteman has even be too generous imo) clearly show, that the focus on the pilot mistakes is not warranted.

FluidFlow wrote:

morrisond wrote:

AF447 - Automation/Control Problem - Pilot's lost

Sorry what?

There was no problem at all, this was pure Pilot fault and not the fault of the automation. It was partially Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation but it did not fail at all. The flight would have been absolutely safe it the pilots would have done nothing, just nothing.

They crashed that aircraft, not the aircraft crashed them. This is actually the perfect opposite to the MAX problem. In the AF case doing nothing would have safed the aircraft, in the MAX case the right action was requiered.

Valid point - Pilot's needed more training to understand the automation then and Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation (the missing AOA light in the MAX ring a bell?) the crew didn't understand what is going on.

I was just trying to point out situations where the crew had to do deal with something unexpected - The NTSB cited Airbus for deficiencies in the AF447 crash in it's MAX report. Have they fixed all the confusing alarms and bells in the A330?

In safety management every deficit is equally important.

Just because you had a design error in the your machine, does not mean you can not improve operator training or maintainenace. All points contribute to improving the overall safety, but they are not connected. A design error in the machine is still a design error, regardless of the operator being able to overcome the problem or not. A badly trained operator is still a badly trained operator, regardless of the machine having a fault or not.

But in the end it is always easier to change machines than to train and change human behaviour. Th design gaol for the machine must always be to make the operation as easy and safe as possible for the operator.

seahawk wrote:

In the end it does not matter. A competent crew might have saved the planes, but the plane should not put the plane into that situation in the first place. Although it is very likely, that no crash would have meant no grounding.

And few would argue that the irony is that the MAX should have been grounded. Actually its certification should have been delayed. No grounding, no crashes, FAA and EASA would have been criticized for being CS - but that is what regulators should do, and being a little CS is OK.

CS, term in the 50s related to BS, but chickens, and implies misuse of power

seahawk wrote:

In safety management every deficit is equally important.

Just because you had a design error in the your machine, does not mean you can not improve operator training or maintainenace. All points contribute to improving the overall safety, but they are not connected. A design error in the machine is still a design error, regardless of the operator being able to overcome the problem or not. A badly trained operator is still a badly trained operator, regardless of the machine having a fault or not.

But in the end it is always easier to change machines than to train and change human behaviour. Th design gaol for the machine must always be to make the operation as easy and safe as possible for the operator.

Agreed - and hope the operators can at least meet a minimum standard of performance.

morrisond wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

morrisond wrote:

AF447 - Automation/Control Problem - Pilot's lost

Sorry what?

There was no problem at all, this was pure Pilot fault and not the fault of the automation. It was partially Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation but it did not fail at all. The flight would have been absolutely safe it the pilots would have done nothing, just nothing.

They crashed that aircraft, not the aircraft crashed them. This is actually the perfect opposite to the MAX problem. In the AF case doing nothing would have safed the aircraft, in the MAX case the right action was requiered.

Valid point - Pilot's needed more training to understand the automation then and Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation (the missing AOA light in the MAX ring a bell?) the crew didn't understand what is going on.

I was just trying to point out situations where the crew had to do deal with something unexpected - The NTSB cited Airbus for deficiencies in the AF447 crash in it's MAX report. Have they fixed all the confusing alarms and bells in the A330?

i do not like that discussion because its off topic

but really ... AF447 is a complete other animal

airbus never recommended that pitot tubes AF has fitted on their planes
then airbus had a recall (or an AD?) for that non-recommended pitot tubes
the recall had a deathline
AF ignored that deathline
AF literaly flew planes with a not implement ADs - if i remember correct

and then there have been two rookies at the front
they had - as rumours said - a very recent personal problem with each other
and the captain was on his rest

well
ok
it was a airbus
and the crash had to do with sensors

but thats it

no more context to the MCAS trim-of-death @ the 737MAX

edit: corrected "AoA-Sensors" to "pitot tubes"

asdf wrote:

morrisond wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

Sorry what?

There was no problem at all, this was pure Pilot fault and not the fault of the automation. It was partially Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation but it did not fail at all. The flight would have been absolutely safe it the pilots would have done nothing, just nothing.

They crashed that aircraft, not the aircraft crashed them. This is actually the perfect opposite to the MAX problem. In the AF case doing nothing would have safed the aircraft, in the MAX case the right action was requiered.

Valid point - Pilot's needed more training to understand the automation then and Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation (the missing AOA light in the MAX ring a bell?) the crew didn't understand what is going on.

I was just trying to point out situations where the crew had to do deal with something unexpected - The NTSB cited Airbus for deficiencies in the AF447 crash in it's MAX report. Have they fixed all the confusing alarms and bells in the A330?

i do not like that discussion because izs off topic

but really ... AF447 is a complete other animal

airbus never recommended that AoA sensors AF has fitted on their planes
then airbus had a recall (or an AD?) for that AoA n on-recommended sensors
the recall had a deathline
AF ignored that deathline
AF literaly flew planes with not implement ADs

and then there have been two rookies ata the front
they had - as rumours said - a very recent personal problem with each other
and the captain was on his rest

well
ok
it was a airbus
and the crash had to do with sensors

but thats it

no more context to the MCAS trim-of-death @ the 737MAX

Other than Crew performance sucking in both as they didin't understand what was going on.

morrisond wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

morrisond wrote:

AF447 - Automation/Control Problem - Pilot's lost

Sorry what?

There was no problem at all, this was pure Pilot fault and not the fault of the automation. It was partially Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation but it did not fail at all. The flight would have been absolutely safe it the pilots would have done nothing, just nothing.

They crashed that aircraft, not the aircraft crashed them. This is actually the perfect opposite to the MAX problem. In the AF case doing nothing would have safed the aircraft, in the MAX case the right action was requiered.

Valid point - Pilot's needed more training to understand the automation then and Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation (the missing AOA light in the MAX ring a bell?) the crew didn't understand what is going on.

I was just trying to point out situations where the crew had to do deal with something unexpected - The NTSB cited Airbus for deficiencies in the AF447 crash in it's MAX report. Have they fixed all the confusing alarms and bells in the A330?

There were four ADs from EASA to change procedures to avoid the same situation again, one of them was this:

EASA_AD_2010-0271_1

The others got superseded by other newer ADs (which I therefore cant find, but there were 4 according to this interview: https://www.aerotime.aero/aerotime.team/21361-interview-would-air-france-f447-have-happened-with-boeing).


So there must have been improvements as it did not happen again after the new ADs were out.
The Airbus citation was, as far as I remember the report, based on the overload of pilots with alarms and no clear statement in the cockpit what is going on. As you mentioned the AoA disagree light for example would have been a clear indication, if it would have worked.

asdf wrote:

morrisond wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

Sorry what?

There was no problem at all, this was pure Pilot fault and not the fault of the automation. It was partially Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation but it did not fail at all. The flight would have been absolutely safe it the pilots would have done nothing, just nothing.

They crashed that aircraft, not the aircraft crashed them. This is actually the perfect opposite to the MAX problem. In the AF case doing nothing would have safed the aircraft, in the MAX case the right action was requiered.

Valid point - Pilot's needed more training to understand the automation then and Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation (the missing AOA light in the MAX ring a bell?) the crew didn't understand what is going on.

I was just trying to point out situations where the crew had to do deal with something unexpected - The NTSB cited Airbus for deficiencies in the AF447 crash in it's MAX report. Have they fixed all the confusing alarms and bells in the A330?

i do not like that discussion because its off topic

but really ... AF447 is a complete other animal

airbus never recommended that AoA sensors AF has fitted on their planes
then airbus had a recall (or an AD?) for that non-recommended AoA sensors
the recall had a deathline
AF ignored that deathline
AF literaly flew planes with a not implement ADs - if i remember correct

and then there have been two rookies at the front
they had - as rumours said - a very recent personal problem with each other
and the captain was on his rest

well
ok
it was a airbus
and the crash had to do with sensors

but thats it

no more context to the MCAS trim-of-death @ the 737MAX

Mostly correct but it was pitot tubes no AoA sensors

morrisond wrote:

Other than Crew performance sucking in both as they didin't understand what was going on.

yes
kinda

on the AF because of a questionable competence in piloting (complete break down of CRM) and because they have both probably been in a mental state of exception

on Lion Air because of a very questionable competence of the FO and a possible harm from a flu for the captain

FluidFlow wrote:

morrisond wrote:

AF447 - Automation/Control Problem - Pilot's lost

Sorry what?

There was no problem at all, this was pure Pilot fault and not the fault of the automation. It was partially Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation but it did not fail at all. The flight would have been absolutely safe it the pilots would have done nothing, just nothing.

They crashed that aircraft, not the aircraft crashed them. This is actually the perfect opposite to the MAX problem. In the AF case doing nothing would have safed the aircraft, in the MAX case the right action was requiered.

Sure there was a problem. The pitot tube icing over thus giving unreliable airspeed. Sure, it should have been easily handled by the crew and was in no way comparable to the MAX, but it was certainly a problem.

StTim wrote:

Mostly correct but it was pitot tubes no AoA sensors

thank you
i corrected in the original posting

asdf wrote:

it seems kinda obsession, doesnt it?


viewtopic.php?f=5&t=766823&p=11068127#p11068127

a thread from eight years ago

how boeing could gain on adding engines with larger diameter on the 737....

„..... How much more efficient would the 737 be by literally slapping new engines on using existing hookups and no other changes to the frame? I call this the 737AEO (Alternative Engine Option) I've read that fan diameter does not mean as much below a certain distance - is this 500nm, 1000nm or 1500nm where what 90% of NB operations take place? What percentage of efficiency gain would you get by going this route? 75% of what you would get be resizing and optimizing? Please correct my assumptions below if I am wrong. But in this scenario I'm assuming that Boeings involvement in this would be very limited,....“

ok, boeing named it MAX instead of AEO but actually they did exactly this
slapping bigger engines on the frame and dont involve a lot ...

Thanks for reminding me of this. You misunderstood what I was writing and took it out of context. I was suggesting that instead of going the bigger fan route I was suggesting that Boeing keep the NG Fan diameter and Nacelle and build a new engine using Leap technology that fit within it, with the engines in the same spot so no Aero or control changes either.

This would have have been a stop gap measure to stretch out the NG line and give time for Boeing to get to NSA (as there was no way they could have done it in 6-7 years) - at a minimal cost to them (AEO option vs MAX program) - it could have been on the market sooner than MAX and NSA would have probably been entering service about now or within the next 12 months or so.

It was actually quite prescient - and in retrospect if Boeing had gone down that route we would have not been where we are now as no MCAS needed.

It would probably have gotten to within a few % of Max efficiency over a majority of routes NB's fly.

asdf wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Other than Crew performance sucking in both as they didin't understand what was going on.

yes
kinda

on the AF because of a questionable competence in piloting (complete break down of CRM) and because they have both probably been in a mental state of exception

on Lion Air because of a very questionable competence of the FO and a possible harm from a flu for the captain

And complete breakdown of CRM and procedures before departing.

Revelation wrote:

astuteman wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Personally, I'm not at all confident this crew with the flu-addled pilot and incompetent co-pilot could operate a NG with a failed AoA sensor without a crash.

Would you disallow a discussion of crew performance in a hypothetical RN ship disaster even if the ship itself had a serious design shortcoming?

Or would you say they would not have crashed the previous generation RN ship so let's not discuss the crew's performance?

Can you please stop inventing hyperbole around my posting please - I'm sure you would react if someone did it to you.
I have clearly stated that its clear all the points are relevant, and have at no time mentioned "disallowing" any related topic.
Why would I be that stupid?
This is about focus rather than "disallowing" a conversation.

You wrote "It was the aircraft. Period" followed by "And that is why the focus on the MAX grounding HAS to be on the MAX".

Maybe you didn't intend this to be a unilateral statement, but it sure came across as one to me.

What other conclusion should one reach after reading such words?

"The focus HAS to be on the MAX" doesn't leave any wiggle room to discuss anything else, IMO.

Maybe capitalize FOCUS rather than HAS next time?

astuteman wrote:

But the MAX un-grounding cannot be dependent on global training.
It has to be dependent upon the specific redesign of the system and specific associated training.
That is where the focus of this thread should be

The thing is, there is no disagreement that Boeing screwed up the design, so discussion of that naturally diminishes with time.

How often should we re-discuss that just to meet some "focus" comfort level?

The JATR report was great and thorough and largely confirmed what many suspected here all along, so it got very little comment.

The comment it did get was yet another deep dive into minutia, again since everyone already agreed/knew Boeing screwed up the MAX design.

The thing that people do not agree upon is crew performance, both in terms of what Boeing expected from the crew (which was too much) and what was actually observed (which IMO suggests even deeper problems than one imagined before the KNKT accident report).

I'm also not sure why people get upset by what other people find worthy of discussion.

We all have different perspectives.

Personally I find page after page of AoA / stall / anti-stall / stick force discussions boring, but not upsetting.

It's easy enough to skip over stuff you don't want to read.

What is the intention for you to keep using one paragraph for one sentence? Rendering your postings more relevant? Or giving them more volume?

astuteman wrote:

It is glaringly obvious that one particular poster has never questioned or challenged any of the system design or specific training but instead has obsessed with global training standards. It is just not rational, or understandable IMO

That's false. You're usually better than this. The system design has been questioned to death and I don't see anyone defending it. How many more times do we have to say it? Thing is, though, any time anything else was questioned, a number of posters here jumped all over it. Shifting blame! Blaming the pilots, mustn't do that! Trying to deflect from Boeing!

Well, no. We wouldn't be here after thousands of posts if some more rational discussion had taken place early on. That didn't happen.

benbeny wrote:

So we all know what's wrong.
1. Boeing designed a stupid system.
2. Boeing screwed up big time by not telling pilots about stupid system.
3. Regulatory oversight that left much to be desired.
4. Repair shop that didn't do something right.
5. Maintenance that didn't check AoA vane installation.
6. Half incapacitated pilot and incompetent copilot that couldn't even remember memorized items.
7. Mishandling by copilot when it's handed to him by the pilot.

If one of them didn't exist, we wouldn't have the chain of disaster. Now of course a system shouldn't try to kill someone, and without their knowledge. That's a big screw up. But the root cause is still there, the stupid system that tried to kill you and not telling anybody about it's existence. Too bad it happened on a developing country airline first. Now imagine the difference of reaction in here if it happened in the developed country airline.

Just a couple of comments from a retired Captain (still teach in the Sim on my schedule)

I agree with the list, to a certain degree, but there are a few things missing.

The previous flight had the same issues, but they managed to complete the flight and maintenance never informed the new crew of the incident. I would assume it was not written up. If that is indicative of JT's procedures there are systemic problems with the airline which combined with the MCAS malfunction led to the crash.

I have never flown the 737, but did fly the 727, 757, 747 (all models except the -8), 777 and 787. In the Boeings, any movement of the trim wheel or unusual stick forces the action items are first to move the yoke in the opposite direction to see if the yoke cutout will work, if not then both red guarded electric trim switches are activated. And you trim with the trim wheel. Every LPC/OPC I ever took had the scenario where you are told to accelerate to 300 KIAS and once there you have runaway trim. It was a handful but it was not something which would cause loss of control. If done properly, it took both pilots and good communication in the cockpit.

Was it a big mistake for Boeing to not mention MCAS, certainly was, but I can understand their rationale for not having any reference to it. The thinking was if you went to the runaway stab trim NNP, you were covered. Having the system information really wouldn't have made any difference as the NNP for runaway stab trim would have covered you. And, like the current problem with the FBW logic on the Airbus, the odds are pretty slim you would end up being in the weight/cg where you would have an MCAS activation. But, it is part of the certification process.

Having spent many hours flying with and instructing in the sim and aircraft FOs and Captains from non-Western countries, personally, I am not surprised the FO was overwhelmed. The following comment is not meant as a slur, a dig, a racial commentary, but it is an observation based on my experiences. The culture and therefore the training environment in some countries is not conducive to western methods of training. For instance, FOs could recite the SOP word for word, but if you asked them what it meant, in their own words, that is where the problem was. For example, going into DUB, wet runway, gusty winds right at MLW. Company recommendation was always 30 flaps and autothrottles off, min autobrakes and min reverse for hand flown approaches. I briefed flaps 25, autothrottles on and Med autobrakes and reverse on the as required. What then ensued was a 30 minute discussion on the FCTW and why with autothrottles you don't the gust factor and the subsequent recommendation for Flaps 25 on gusty wind conditions as the drag with 30 flaps makes it more likely you will encounter large excursion on the autothrottles and the increased risk of becoming slow due to the gust conditions. The entire issue was his ability to implement the procedures in a practical manner versus parroting back what the SOP was without any thought of the actual environment he was flying in. The problem was you saw that type of thinking more and more. There was a sever short in the brain to hand connection.

Anyhow, the Max 8 process is so bogged down in politics, finger-pointing and misinformation it will be a miracle if the FAA certifies it before the end of the year, let alone any other regulatory body outside the US.

Well said MMO, and double for the "misinformation" part.

mmo wrote:

benbeny wrote:

So we all know what's wrong.
1. Boeing designed a stupid system.
2. Boeing screwed up big time by not telling pilots about stupid system.
3. Regulatory oversight that left much to be desired.
4. Repair shop that didn't do something right.
5. Maintenance that didn't check AoA vane installation.
6. Half incapacitated pilot and incompetent copilot that couldn't even remember memorized items.
7. Mishandling by copilot when it's handed to him by the pilot.

If one of them didn't exist, we wouldn't have the chain of disaster. Now of course a system shouldn't try to kill someone, and without their knowledge. That's a big screw up. But the root cause is still there, the stupid system that tried to kill you and not telling anybody about it's existence. Too bad it happened on a developing country airline first. Now imagine the difference of reaction in here if it happened in the developed country airline.

Just a couple of comments from a retired Captain (still teach in the Sim on my schedule)

I agree with the list, to a certain degree, but there are a few things missing.

The previous flight had the same issues, but they managed to complete the flight and maintenance never informed the new crew of the incident. I would assume it was not written up. If that is indicative of JT's procedures there are systemic problems with the airline which combined with the MCAS malfunction led to the crash.

I have never flown the 737, but did fly the 727, 757, 747 (all models except the -8), 777 and 787. In the Boeings, any movement of the trim wheel or unusual stick forces the action items are first to move the yoke in the opposite direction to see if the yoke cutout will work, if not then both red guarded electric trim switches are activated. And you trim with the trim wheel. Every LPC/OPC I ever took had the scenario where you are told to accelerate to 300 KIAS and once there you have runaway trim. It was a handful but it was not something which would cause loss of control. If done properly, it took both pilots and good communication in the cockpit.

Was it a big mistake for Boeing to not mention MCAS, certainly was, but I can understand their rationale for not having any reference to it. The thinking was if you went to the runaway stab trim NNP, you were covered. Having the system information really wouldn't have made any difference as the NNP for runaway stab trim would have covered you. And, like the current problem with the FBW logic on the Airbus, the odds are pretty slim you would end up being in the weight/cg where you would have an MCAS activation. But, it is part of the certification process.

Having spent many hours flying with and instructing in the sim and aircraft FOs and Captains from non-Western countries, personally, I am not surprised the FO was overwhelmed. The following comment is not meant as a slur, a dig, a racial commentary, but it is an observation based on my experiences. The culture and therefore the training environment in some countries is not conducive to western methods of training. For instance, FOs could recite the SOP word for word, but if you asked them what it meant, in their own words, that is where the problem was. For example, going into DUB, wet runway, gusty winds right at MLW. Company recommendation was always 30 flaps and autothrottles off, min autobrakes and min reverse for hand flown approaches. I briefed flaps 25, autothrottles on and Med autobrakes and reverse on the as required. What then ensued was a 30 minute discussion on the FCTW and why with autothrottles you don't the gust factor and the subsequent recommendation for Flaps 25 on gusty wind conditions as the drag with 30 flaps makes it more likely you will encounter large excursion on the autothrottles and the increased risk of becoming slow due to the gust conditions. The entire issue was his ability to implement the procedures in a practical manner versus parroting back what the SOP was without any thought of the actual environment he was flying in. The problem was you saw that type of thinking more and more. There was a sever short in the brain to hand connection.

Anyhow, the Max 8 process is so bogged down in politics, finger-pointing and misinformation it will be a miracle if the FAA certifies it before the end of the year, let alone any other regulatory body outside the US.

Great post - would the inability to think outside the box help to account for all the 737 NG runway excursions - inappropriate AT use with the wrong flap settings?

Or in your opinion - why are there so many 737 Runway excursions?

morrisond wrote:

asdf wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Other than Crew performance sucking in both as they didin't understand what was going on.

yes
kinda

on the AF because of a questionable competence in piloting (complete break down of CRM) and because they have both probably been in a mental state of exception
on Lion Air because of a very questionable competence of the FO and a possible harm from a flu for the captain

And complete breakdown of CRM and procedures before departing.

i think we can agree that the lion air cockpit crew has not been pioneeres of aviation
As always, it remains unanswered how many percent of first world crews would have delivered a comparable performance

morrisond wrote:

I'm going to ignore most of what you wrote above.

So you want to remain in complete denial about these crucial viewpoints? Imo a cheap attitude avoid the topic at hand (which is the MAX grounding).

morrisond wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

3. Findings blaming the crew: 7
4. Findings explicitly exonerating the crew (this kind of: "This would lead to the inability of the flight crew to predict and be prepared …."): 25

So Boeing (and FAA) is blamed the most in the report. By far. 6 times more than pilots. And for the 7 findings of pilot errors, 25 findings exist that explicitely exonerate the pilots.

morrisond wrote:

do you really think it's okay for a Pilot to fly with the FLU and ignore procedures (reviewing the Previous flight) that could have probably saved the aircraft?

The flu is no mentioned in the list of findings. It is another example of you distorting things out of proportion. Why dont you put the main focus where the accident report puts the main focus?

The procedures have been accomplished by three pilots in the first flight. You are basically saying, that the MAX was safe only with three pilots in the cockpit.

morrisond wrote:

My son is a Soccer Goalie and we focus on how many saves he has vs Goals let in. But 25 saves with 7 goals in a night is usually a pretty bad night for the team.

This comparison is absurd. There is zero commonality with what I wrote.

I repeat my explanation once more:
7 findings are direct pilot errors (which is b.t.w. an overwhelming minority vs findings which blame Boeing or the FAA). On the other hand, there are a total 25 findings (more than 3 times more!) of findings that relativise the the pilot errors, they e.g. explain how the MAX design flaws provoked the pilot errors or how the incident developped into an overwhelming situation.

rheinwaldner wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I'm going to ignore most of what you wrote above.

So you want to remain in complete denial about these crucial viewpoints? Imo a cheap attitude avoid the topic at hand (which is the MAX grounding).

morrisond wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

3. Findings blaming the crew: 7
4. Findings explicitly exonerating the crew (this kind of: "This would lead to the inability of the flight crew to predict and be prepared …."): 25

So Boeing (and FAA) is blamed the most in the report. By far. 6 times more than pilots. And for the 7 findings of pilot errors, 25 findings exist that explicitely exonerate the pilots.


The flu is no mentioned in the list of findings. It is another example of you distorting things out of proportion. Why dont you put the main focus where the accident report puts the main focus?

The procedures have been accomplished by three pilots in the first flight. You are basically saying, that the MAX was safe only with three pilots in the cockpit.

This comparison is absurd. There is zero commonality with what I wrote.

I repeat my explanation once more:
7 findings are direct pilot errors (which is b.t.w. an overwhelming minority vs findings which blame Boeing or the FAA). On the other hand, there are a total 25 findings (more than 3 times more!) of findings that relativise the the pilot errors, they e.g. explain how the MAX design flaws provoked the pilot errors or how the incident developped into an overwhelming situation.

Yes - but when many of those 7 can kill you you can't weight them the same.

asdf wrote:

morrisond wrote:

asdf wrote:

yes
kinda

on the AF because of a questionable competence in piloting (complete break down of CRM) and because they have both probably been in a mental state of exception
on Lion Air because of a very questionable competence of the FO and a possible harm from a flu for the captain

And complete breakdown of CRM and procedures before departing.

i think we can agree that the lion air cockpit crew has not been pioneeres of aviation
As always, it remains unanswered how many percent of first world crews would have delivered a comparable performance

Unfortunately as many have related on this forum there are many examples of crew's or particular pilots they have witnessed in the first world not deserving a seat in a cockpit either.

If you look back through the posts there are examples of North American and Western Europe Pilot's not knowing the trim wheels or the trim wheel handles even existed or hadn't practiced with it since initial type rating.

You can just assume for yourself what I would have typed next - but I won't to keep some from going around the bend.

morrisond wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

morrisond wrote:

AF447 - Automation/Control Problem - Pilot's lost

Sorry what?

There was no problem at all, this was pure Pilot fault and not the fault of the automation. It was partially Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation but it did not fail at all. The flight would have been absolutely safe it the pilots would have done nothing, just nothing.

They crashed that aircraft, not the aircraft crashed them. This is actually the perfect opposite to the MAX problem. In the AF case doing nothing would have safed the aircraft, in the MAX case the right action was requiered.

Valid point - Pilot's needed more training to understand the automation then and Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation (the missing AOA light in the MAX ring a bell?) the crew didn't understand what is going on.

I was just trying to point out situations where the crew had to do deal with something unexpected - The NTSB cited Airbus for deficiencies in the AF447 crash in it's MAX report. Have they fixed all the confusing alarms and bells in the A330?

Admitting that this is a valid point is admitting that your’s is not so valid. The only thing the A330 suffered were false stall warnings and kicking down into degraded FBW law, totally flyable. Your argument for the MAX has been that the crew should be able to handle something a lot worse than that at every angle you look at it from, so AF447 is not good supporting evidence since the severity of everything that happened was tenfold of that of AF447 to the point where things happened that a crew should not be expected to have to deal with. Even if the NTSB uses it doesn’t really make it valid in backing up your narrative.

The moment you put might have in any argument is the moment you make your argument a lot more likely to be true but also a lot weaker. Like you said there was a third crew member and even if there wasn’t they might have figured it out. Or the chain of events could’ve been different here in so many ways. The problem with might have is you will have someone from and opposing camp say it might not have and then it’s a stalemate. It also shows that there is so much unknown due to human factors making it a far more unfixable issue so far as fixing the humans themselves. Where there is no might have is saying this particular accident and the following one would not have happened without the 737 MAX and MCAS. This shows where the ultimate accountability needs to be found and where the expectations need to be met first before we address anything else.

If you agreed that the MAX is a botched design in this respect and want to present your other argument in a better way, rather than saying “Boeing screwed up, but...”, say that we all already basically agree on that part of the issue so let’s discuss some of the other factors. It looks less like presenting a red herring, it looks less defensive of Boeing, and it looks less like you are trying to deflect attention away from the root cause by saying “but...”. Using the “but” is often a tactic where someone admits to something they can’t logically argue while being able to go on and usually contradict that same subject Following the “but”. That may not be the case here; however, that is how people will read it.

asdf wrote:

i do not like that discussion because its off topic

but really ... AF447 is a complete other animal

airbus never recommended that pitot tubes AF has fitted on their planes
then airbus had a recall (or an AD?) for that non-recommended pitot tubes
the recall had a deathline
AF ignored that deathline
AF literaly flew planes with a not implement ADs - if i remember correct

and then there have been two rookies at the front
they had - as rumours said - a very recent personal problem with each other
and the captain was on his rest

well
ok
it was a airbus
and the crash had to do with sensors

but thats it

no more context to the MCAS trim-of-death @ the 737MAX

edit: corrected "AoA-Sensors" to "pitot tubes"

The only comparison with the MAX grounding is what Mjoelnr mentioned, in that the grounding revealed other items, such as the stall horn ceasing when the speed got too low then starting up again when recovery speed built up thus creating the impression that the stall was continuing.

767333ER wrote:

morrisond wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

Sorry what?

There was no problem at all, this was pure Pilot fault and not the fault of the automation. It was partially Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation but it did not fail at all. The flight would have been absolutely safe it the pilots would have done nothing, just nothing.

They crashed that aircraft, not the aircraft crashed them. This is actually the perfect opposite to the MAX problem. In the AF case doing nothing would have safed the aircraft, in the MAX case the right action was requiered.

Valid point - Pilot's needed more training to understand the automation then and Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation (the missing AOA light in the MAX ring a bell?) the crew didn't understand what is going on.

I was just trying to point out situations where the crew had to do deal with something unexpected - The NTSB cited Airbus for deficiencies in the AF447 crash in it's MAX report. Have they fixed all the confusing alarms and bells in the A330?

Admitting that this is a valid point is admitting that your’s is not so valid. The only thing the A330 suffered were false stall warnings and kicking down into degraded FBW law, totally flyable. Your argument for the MAX has been that the crew should be able to handle something a lot worse than that at every angle you look at it from, so AF447 is not good supporting evidence since the severity of everything that happened was tenfold of that of AF447 to the point where things happened that a crew should not be expected to have to deal with. Even if the NTSB uses it doesn’t really make it valid in backing up your narrative.

The moment you put might have in any argument is the moment you make your argument a lot more likely to be true but also a lot weaker. Like you said there was a third crew member and even if there wasn’t they might have figured it out. Or the chain of events could’ve been different here in so many ways. The problem with might have is you will have someone from and opposing camp say it might not have and then it’s a stalemate. It also shows that there is so much unknown due to human factors making it a far more unfixable issue so far as fixing the humans themselves. Where there is no might have is saying this particular accident and the following one would not have happened without the 737 MAX and MCAS. This shows where the ultimate accountability needs to be found and where the expectations need to be met first before we address anything else.

If you agreed that the MAX is a botched design in this respect and want to present your other argument in a better way, rather than saying “Boeing screwed up, but...”, say that we all already basically agree on that part of the issue so let’s discuss some of the other factors. It looks less like presenting a red herring, it looks less defensive of Boeing, and it looks less like you are trying to deflect attention away from the root cause by saying “but...”. Using the “but” is often a tactic where someone admits to something they can’t logically argue while being able to go on and usually contradict that same subject Following the “but”. That may not be the case here; however, that is how people will read it.

There are still so many unknowns (Mostly about how Boeing screwed up) but Yes we do know that the MAX was a botched a design and should never have been certified and we now know that neither of the crew should have been in the cockpit that day either.

Everything else is just guess work at this point.

morrisond wrote:

mmo wrote:

benbeny wrote:

So we all know what's wrong.
1. Boeing designed a stupid system.
2. Boeing screwed up big time by not telling pilots about stupid system.
3. Regulatory oversight that left much to be desired.
4. Repair shop that didn't do something right.
5. Maintenance that didn't check AoA vane installation.
6. Half incapacitated pilot and incompetent copilot that couldn't even remember memorized items.
7. Mishandling by copilot when it's handed to him by the pilot.

If one of them didn't exist, we wouldn't have the chain of disaster. Now of course a system shouldn't try to kill someone, and without their knowledge. That's a big screw up. But the root cause is still there, the stupid system that tried to kill you and not telling anybody about it's existence. Too bad it happened on a developing country airline first. Now imagine the difference of reaction in here if it happened in the developed country airline.

Just a couple of comments from a retired Captain (still teach in the Sim on my schedule)

I agree with the list, to a certain degree, but there are a few things missing.

The previous flight had the same issues, but they managed to complete the flight and maintenance never informed the new crew of the incident. I would assume it was not written up. If that is indicative of JT's procedures there are systemic problems with the airline which combined with the MCAS malfunction led to the crash.

I have never flown the 737, but did fly the 727, 757, 747 (all models except the -8), 777 and 787. In the Boeings, any movement of the trim wheel or unusual stick forces the action items are first to move the yoke in the opposite direction to see if the yoke cutout will work, if not then both red guarded electric trim switches are activated. And you trim with the trim wheel. Every LPC/OPC I ever took had the scenario where you are told to accelerate to 300 KIAS and once there you have runaway trim. It was a handful but it was not something which would cause loss of control. If done properly, it took both pilots and good communication in the cockpit.

Was it a big mistake for Boeing to not mention MCAS, certainly was, but I can understand their rationale for not having any reference to it. The thinking was if you went to the runaway stab trim NNP, you were covered. Having the system information really wouldn't have made any difference as the NNP for runaway stab trim would have covered you. And, like the current problem with the FBW logic on the Airbus, the odds are pretty slim you would end up being in the weight/cg where you would have an MCAS activation. But, it is part of the certification process.

Having spent many hours flying with and instructing in the sim and aircraft FOs and Captains from non-Western countries, personally, I am not surprised the FO was overwhelmed. The following comment is not meant as a slur, a dig, a racial commentary, but it is an observation based on my experiences. The culture and therefore the training environment in some countries is not conducive to western methods of training. For instance, FOs could recite the SOP word for word, but if you asked them what it meant, in their own words, that is where the problem was. For example, going into DUB, wet runway, gusty winds right at MLW. Company recommendation was always 30 flaps and autothrottles off, min autobrakes and min reverse for hand flown approaches. I briefed flaps 25, autothrottles on and Med autobrakes and reverse on the as required. What then ensued was a 30 minute discussion on the FCTW and why with autothrottles you don't the gust factor and the subsequent recommendation for Flaps 25 on gusty wind conditions as the drag with 30 flaps makes it more likely you will encounter large excursion on the autothrottles and the increased risk of becoming slow due to the gust conditions. The entire issue was his ability to implement the procedures in a practical manner versus parroting back what the SOP was without any thought of the actual environment he was flying in. The problem was you saw that type of thinking more and more. There was a sever short in the brain to hand connection.

Anyhow, the Max 8 process is so bogged down in politics, finger-pointing and misinformation it will be a miracle if the FAA certifies it before the end of the year, let alone any other regulatory body outside the US.

Great post - would the inability to think outside the box help to account for all the 737 NG runway excursions - inappropriate AT use with the wrong flap settings?

Or in your opinion - why are there so many 737 Runway excursions?

737 flying is really high for any given time. Even if it has same 1:2000 chance for excursion per month, sheer number of 737 or A320 alone gives you more amount of accident per any given time.

And @mmo I agree. Too many times people think procedurally, not rationally. People should understand the rationale of each procedure. Unfortunately, if we consider factory line type pilot training, we lack important education of rational thinking. Now it's deep in culture and education. But that's beyond the scope of this. I agree that their training system left much to be desired. So yes, maybe we should look at their training system too.

Question for the group - does anyone know if Boeing has finalized their 2nd software fix (the CPU related one). As of last wk they said it should be done "in the next few days"? Thanks

One thing I might add, flu in Indonesia is usually mild. You'll get sore throat, runny nose, mild coughs, and sometimes low-grade fever. Not unusual to go to work (office work) mildly sick in Indonesia. But of course I won't want any sick pilots flying.

benbeny wrote:

One thing I might add, flu in Indonesia is usually mild. You'll get sore throat, runny nose, mild coughs, and sometimes low-grade fever. Not unusual to go to work (office work) mildly sick in Indonesia. But of course I won't want any sick pilots flying.

Where I live we have what is called a "man" flu, or cold. Symptoms are much more pronounced and last a lot longer than the similar flu or cold that women get. These harsh symptoms associated with the man flu, or cold usually results a lot of complaining, and sympathy is often sought for, but rarely given. Typically the man flu will run its course in about a week to 10 days, for the women, it may only manifest as a sniffle, and last a day or two at the worst.

morrisond wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I'm going to ignore most of what you wrote above.

So you want to remain in complete denial about these crucial viewpoints? Imo a cheap attitude avoid the topic at hand (which is the MAX grounding).

morrisond wrote:

This comparison is absurd. There is zero commonality with what I wrote.

I repeat my explanation once more:
7 findings are direct pilot errors (which is b.t.w. an overwhelming minority vs findings which blame Boeing or the FAA). On the other hand, there are a total 25 findings (more than 3 times more!) of findings that relativise the the pilot errors, they e.g. explain how the MAX design flaws provoked the pilot errors or how the incident developped into an overwhelming situation.

Yes - but when many of those 7 can kill you you can't weight them the same.

What kind of criteria is that? How could there be findings in an accident report that would not cause potential death? This applies to all 89 findings.

Unsurprisingly you would like to weight the findings to suit your narrative.

If the investigators intended to weight the findings, we would have to assume, that the order in the list does represent the weight. In that case the couple of pilot errors follows far behind nearly almost all of the large number of findings that blames Boeing. Pilot errors would be nothing than a second-tier topic in the long list of findings.

If the investigators on the other hand did not intend to weight the findings (as I assume they did), then why are you?

In the end it does not matter, because you can shift the weight of findings as long as you want, the crew fault findings will never make up for the massive prevalence of findings, that blame Boeing and the FAA. Anybody who claims, that the crash report lists pilot and system issues in a balanced fashion clearly has not read the report well. It is symptomatic, that you and others were the first to throw the pilots under the bus once more after the report was out: after all you had to read only 2 pages of the 322 page report to get all the findings that support your viewpoint. 2 pages out of 322!

morrisond wrote:

There are still so many unknowns (Mostly about how Boeing screwed up) but Yes we do know that the MAX was a botched a design and should never have been certified and we now know that neither of the crew should have been in the cockpit that day either.

They should only have been forbidden to fly the MAX. Thousands of crews about as proficient as these guys are flying NGs every single day. No problem.

No, the MAX is the problem. The proof is this: fix the MAX, do nothing else and global aviation safety will be as good as before the MAX. Beating the safety in nearly any other kind of transportation.

airnorth wrote:

benbeny wrote:

One thing I might add, flu in Indonesia is usually mild. You'll get sore throat, runny nose, mild coughs, and sometimes low-grade fever. Not unusual to go to work (office work) mildly sick in Indonesia. But of course I won't want any sick pilots flying.

Where I live we have what is called a "man" flu, or cold. Symptoms are much more pronounced and last a lot longer than the similar flu or cold that women get. These harsh symptoms associated with the man flu, or cold usually results a lot of complaining, and sympathy is often sought for, but rarely given. Typically the man flu will run its course in about a week to 10 days, for the women, it may only manifest as a sniffle, and last a day or two at the worst.

I believe it's a missed translation. In medical community we understand that it is "common cold", but people on the street will still call it flu. Couldn't complain though, it's still caused by influenza virus.

767333ER wrote:

morrisond wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

Sorry what?

There was no problem at all, this was pure Pilot fault and not the fault of the automation. It was partially Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation but it did not fail at all. The flight would have been absolutely safe it the pilots would have done nothing, just nothing.

They crashed that aircraft, not the aircraft crashed them. This is actually the perfect opposite to the MAX problem. In the AF case doing nothing would have safed the aircraft, in the MAX case the right action was requiered.

Valid point - Pilot's needed more training to understand the automation then and Airbus fault because of bad display of the change in automation (the missing AOA light in the MAX ring a bell?) the crew didn't understand what is going on.

I was just trying to point out situations where the crew had to do deal with something unexpected - The NTSB cited Airbus for deficiencies in the AF447 crash in it's MAX report. Have they fixed all the confusing alarms and bells in the A330?

Admitting that this is a valid point is admitting that your’s is not so valid. The only thing the A330 suffered were false stall warnings and kicking down into degraded FBW law, totally flyable. Your argument for the MAX has been that the crew should be able to handle something a lot worse than that at every angle you look at it from, so AF447 is not good supporting evidence since the severity of everything that happened was tenfold of that of AF447 to the point where things happened that a crew should not be expected to have to deal with. Even if the NTSB uses it doesn’t really make it valid in backing up your narrative.

The moment you put might have in any argument is the moment you make your argument a lot more likely to be true but also a lot weaker. Like you said there was a third crew member and even if there wasn’t they might have figured it out. Or the chain of events could’ve been different here in so many ways. The problem with might have is you will have someone from and opposing camp say it might not have and then it’s a stalemate. It also shows that there is so much unknown due to human factors making it a far more unfixable issue so far as fixing the humans themselves. Where there is no might have is saying this particular accident and the following one would not have happened without the 737 MAX and MCAS. This shows where the ultimate accountability needs to be found and where the expectations need to be met first before we address anything else.

If you agreed that the MAX is a botched design in this respect and want to present your other argument in a better way, rather than saying “Boeing screwed up, but...”, say that we all already basically agree on that part of the issue so let’s discuss some of the other factors. It looks less like presenting a red herring, it looks less defensive of Boeing, and it looks less like you are trying to deflect attention away from the root cause by saying “but...”. Using the “but” is often a tactic where someone admits to something they can’t logically argue while being able to go on and usually contradict that same subject Following the “but”. That may not be the case here; however, that is how people will read it.

“Yo, Taylor, I'm really happy for you, I'mma let you finish, but Beyoncé had one of the best videos of all time! ”

rheinwaldner wrote:

morrisond wrote:

There are still so many unknowns (Mostly about how Boeing screwed up) but Yes we do know that the MAX was a botched a design and should never have been certified and we now know that neither of the crew should have been in the cockpit that day either.

They should only have been forbidden to fly the MAX. Thousands of crews about as proficient as these guys are flying NGs every single day. No problem.

No, the MAX is the problem. The proof is this: fix the MAX, do nothing else and global aviation safety will be as good as before the MAX. Beating the safety in nearly any other kind of transportation.

So you are saying you would be good with putting your Loved ones on a crew of the same abilities of Lion Air 610 on any type of aircraft other than an MAX?

Too bad we don't have a Poll feature on Anut - somehow I think you would very much be in the minority of people willing to fly with crews of this caliber.

I am not trying to deflect from the problems of the MAX - people are just being incredibly myopic to see other problems don't exist. Talking about one does not mean I don't think the other doesn't exist. Until we have more information there just isn't much to talk about how Boeing screwed up.

The lack of crashes does not prove how good pilots are these days - it just shows how reliable aircraft and systems have become. Sometimes you still need Pilots to do what they were trained for and are paid to do - actually fly the aircraft when things go south.

Hopefully someday we will be able to design the perfect AI flown aircraft - until such time we still need well trained Pilots as backup.

morrisond wrote:

until such time we still need well trained Pilots as backup.

And we need well designed aircraft, of which the MAX clearly is not.

bgm wrote:

morrisond wrote:

until such time we still need well trained Pilots as backup.

And we need well designed aircraft, of which the MAX clearly is not.

Agreed - it's a really crappy design.

morrisond wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

morrisond wrote:

There are still so many unknowns (Mostly about how Boeing screwed up) but Yes we do know that the MAX was a botched a design and should never have been certified and we now know that neither of the crew should have been in the cockpit that day either.

They should only have been forbidden to fly the MAX. Thousands of crews about as proficient as these guys are flying NGs every single day. No problem.

No, the MAX is the problem. The proof is this: fix the MAX, do nothing else and global aviation safety will be as good as before the MAX. Beating the safety in nearly any other kind of transportation.

So you are saying you would be good with putting your Loved ones on a crew of the same abilities of Lion Air 610 on any type of aircraft other than an MAX?

Too bad we don't have a Poll feature on Anut - somehow I think you would very much be in the minority of people willing to fly with crews of this caliber.

I am not trying to deflect from the problems of the MAX - people are just being incredibly myopic to see other problems don't exist. Talking about one does not mean I don't think the other doesn't exist. Until we have more information there just isn't much to talk about how Boeing screwed up.

The lack of crashes does not prove how good pilots are these days - it just shows how reliable aircraft and systems have become. Sometimes you still need Pilots to do what they were trained for and are paid to do - actually fly the aircraft when things go south.

Hopefully someday we will be able to design the perfect AI flown aircraft - until such time we still need well trained Pilots as backup.

I can go on Avherald right now and pull up hundreds of examples of failures that pilots had to step up and get the job done so while aircraft have gotten better, better training and CRM standards have done much more than new aircraft technologies IMO (If technology really changed that much MD80's and 737 classic's would still have an incident rate as they did in the late 80's and early 90's). The MAX created a situation that required both pilots to be 100% on the ball or plummet into the ground. If this specific Lion Air crew hadn't crashed, it would have been some other airline since the flaw would still be there and some poor crew was going to encounter it at some point.

I think that we can all agree that Lion Air has training deficiencies but to compare those issues to Boeing creating this mess is a bit of a stretch.

benbeny wrote:

airnorth wrote:

benbeny wrote:

One thing I might add, flu in Indonesia is usually mild. You'll get sore throat, runny nose, mild coughs, and sometimes low-grade fever. Not unusual to go to work (office work) mildly sick in Indonesia. But of course I won't want any sick pilots flying.

Where I live we have what is called a "man" flu, or cold. Symptoms are much more pronounced and last a lot longer than the similar flu or cold that women get. These harsh symptoms associated with the man flu, or cold usually results a lot of complaining, and sympathy is often sought for, but rarely given. Typically the man flu will run its course in about a week to 10 days, for the women, it may only manifest as a sniffle, and last a day or two at the worst.

I believe it's a missed translation. In medical community we understand that it is "common cold", but people on the street will still call it flu. Couldn't complain though, it's still caused by influenza virus.

Yes I suspect people are getting carried away with the Flu issue, people say they have flu all the time when they only medically have a cold. He does not seem to have been anywhere nearly incapacitated enough for it to have been flu (people tend not to realise just how bad actual flu is compared to a cold).

Now, of course he probably still shouldn't have been flying, but I strongly doubt that pilots anywhere in the world are calling in sick for a cold. From what we see on various pilot fora pilots are regularly going in sick with far worse because of fear of the repercussions of being sick too often. Indeed, pilots are regularly flying with fatigue that makes them unfit to fly, and that could be far more debilitating than a cold.