Planetalk wrote:

benbeny wrote:

airnorth wrote:

Where I live we have what is called a "man" flu, or cold. Symptoms are much more pronounced and last a lot longer than the similar flu or cold that women get. These harsh symptoms associated with the man flu, or cold usually results a lot of complaining, and sympathy is often sought for, but rarely given. Typically the man flu will run its course in about a week to 10 days, for the women, it may only manifest as a sniffle, and last a day or two at the worst.

I believe it's a missed translation. In medical community we understand that it is "common cold", but people on the street will still call it flu. Couldn't complain though, it's still caused by influenza virus.

Yes I suspect people are getting carried away with the Flu issue, people say they have flu all the time when they only medically have a cold. He does not seem to have been anywhere nearly incapacitated enough for it to have been flu (people tend not to realise just how bad actual flu is compared to a cold).

Now, of course he probably still shouldn't have been flying, but I strongly doubt that pilots anywhere in the world are calling in sick for a cold. From what we see on various pilot fora pilots are regularly going in sick with far worse because of fear of the repercussions of being sick too often. Indeed, pilots are regularly flying with fatigue that makes them unfit to fly, and that could be far more debilitating than a cold.

Sorry my response was a joke. Often when a man has the cold or flu, it is called a man flu or cold.....

Anyway was trying to inject some humour.

SierraPacific wrote:

morrisond wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

They should only have been forbidden to fly the MAX. Thousands of crews about as proficient as these guys are flying NGs every single day. No problem.

No, the MAX is the problem. The proof is this: fix the MAX, do nothing else and global aviation safety will be as good as before the MAX. Beating the safety in nearly any other kind of transportation.

So you are saying you would be good with putting your Loved ones on a crew of the same abilities of Lion Air 610 on any type of aircraft other than an MAX?

Too bad we don't have a Poll feature on Anut - somehow I think you would very much be in the minority of people willing to fly with crews of this caliber.

I am not trying to deflect from the problems of the MAX - people are just being incredibly myopic to see other problems don't exist. Talking about one does not mean I don't think the other doesn't exist. Until we have more information there just isn't much to talk about how Boeing screwed up.

The lack of crashes does not prove how good pilots are these days - it just shows how reliable aircraft and systems have become. Sometimes you still need Pilots to do what they were trained for and are paid to do - actually fly the aircraft when things go south.

Hopefully someday we will be able to design the perfect AI flown aircraft - until such time we still need well trained Pilots as backup.

I can go on Avherald right now and pull up hundreds of examples of failures that pilots had to step up and get the job done so while aircraft have gotten better, better training and CRM standards have done much more than new aircraft technologies IMO (If technology really changed that much MD80's and 737 classic's would still have an incident rate as they did in the late 80's and early 90's). The MAX created a situation that required both pilots to be 100% on the ball or plummet into the ground. If this specific Lion Air crew hadn't crashed, it would have been some other airline since the flaw would still be there and some poor crew was going to encounter it at some point.

I think that we can all agree that Lion Air has training deficiencies but to compare those issues to Boeing creating this mess is a bit of a stretch.

It is not comparing it to Boeing - it is just saying we can't ignore the pilot training issues in this case and most likely the ET flight as well. It would be a disservice to those who perished to ignore them.

But that is the point - failures in CRM, the basic ability to fly and before flight procedures were so bad - that is totally plausible that a normally trained crew from one of those hundred's of other incidents would/could have saved it.

In the scheme of problems crews have had to deal with (in flight fires, losing control surfaces entirely - Uncontained Engine failure severing hydraulics) etc..- this one was not that bad - they both had minutes to figure things out and in the case of Lion Air they almost got it right 22 times. They were that close. If any one of those hundred's of other crews had reviewed the problems with the previous flight - it would be hard to make the argument that they wouldn't have understood that cutting off electric trim is what saved the previous flight and though of it one of those 22 times.

So far no one has convinced me that anyone had to die due to Boeing's colossal screw up - other than the fact that the MAX may have not been put under so much scrutiny unless they had and the MAX would never have been fixed properly, and that is really sad - and right back on Boeing and the FAA.

And in Grounding news - Mullengerger's Opening statement - https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... 102919.pdf

Planetalk wrote:

benbeny wrote:

airnorth wrote:

Where I live we have what is called a "man" flu, or cold. Symptoms are much more pronounced and last a lot longer than the similar flu or cold that women get. These harsh symptoms associated with the man flu, or cold usually results a lot of complaining, and sympathy is often sought for, but rarely given. Typically the man flu will run its course in about a week to 10 days, for the women, it may only manifest as a sniffle, and last a day or two at the worst.

I believe it's a missed translation. In medical community we understand that it is "common cold", but people on the street will still call it flu. Couldn't complain though, it's still caused by influenza virus.

Yes I suspect people are getting carried away with the Flu issue, people say they have flu all the time when they only medically have a cold. He does not seem to have been anywhere nearly incapacitated enough for it to have been flu (people tend not to realise just how bad actual flu is compared to a cold).

Now, of course he probably still shouldn't have been flying, but I strongly doubt that pilots anywhere in the world are calling in sick for a cold. From what we see on various pilot fora pilots are regularly going in sick with far worse because of fear of the repercussions of being sick too often. Indeed, pilots are regularly flying with fatigue that makes them unfit to fly, and that could be far more debilitating than a cold.

Yes it is impossible to know - but when you read the CVR transcript it sounds like he would as if he was sick or the equivalent of drunk. They noted that he had 15 coughing fits in the 45 minutes before flight. That does not sound like a cold. Who knows what he might have taken to suppress the cough (if he did take anything).

morrisond wrote:

And in Grounding news - Mullengerger's Opening statement - https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... 102919.pdf

"Our people also have donated more than
$750,000 of their own money to these funds—a tremendous example of the giving spirit our
teams consistently display in the communities where they live and work across the globe."

The most cynical part of my head translated the above to this:
"I could have donated less than 2 weeks of my own income, but I let our peoples that have less than 100 times my income doing that."

I accept blame for this bad post.

Hopefully this isn't considered off topic in this thread, not sure if I should ask in the old ET302 crash thread instead but anyways...

I was looking over the Ethiopian preliminary report again now that we have the final from Indonesia just to go over similarities/differences between the two and noticed something that I hadn't really thought too much of before. It's where the pilot asks the FO to communicate that they're experiencing flight control problems, but this is 3 seconds before the first MCAS AND activation:

At 05:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems.

Was this just due to the errors that were going off from the busted AOA vane saying that something is wrong with their instruments or was he already having trouble with flying the plane the way he intended? To people who have looked at more FDR charts than I have think that the outputs from before 05:40:00 look like a standard takeoff? Not suggesting anything is out of place I just don't have a background that would let me figure that out.

It looks like the climb flattens out several seconds before MCAS kicks in for the first time.

Also is this part just writing out explicitly the normal variations experienced while in flight or is there a reason they put it in the report?

Six seconds after the autopilot engagement, there were small amplitude roll oscillations accompanied by lateral acceleration, rudder oscillations and slight heading changes. These oscillations continued also after the autopilot was disengaged.

Thanks

morrisond wrote:

Planetalk wrote:

benbeny wrote:

I believe it's a missed translation. In medical community we understand that it is "common cold", but people on the street will still call it flu. Couldn't complain though, it's still caused by influenza virus.

Yes I suspect people are getting carried away with the Flu issue, people say they have flu all the time when they only medically have a cold. He does not seem to have been anywhere nearly incapacitated enough for it to have been flu (people tend not to realise just how bad actual flu is compared to a cold).

Now, of course he probably still shouldn't have been flying, but I strongly doubt that pilots anywhere in the world are calling in sick for a cold. From what we see on various pilot fora pilots are regularly going in sick with far worse because of fear of the repercussions of being sick too often. Indeed, pilots are regularly flying with fatigue that makes them unfit to fly, and that could be far more debilitating than a cold.

Yes it is impossible to know - but when you read the CVR transcript it sounds like he would as if he was sick or the equivalent of drunk. They noted that he had 15 coughing fits in the 45 minutes before flight. That does not sound like a cold. Who knows what he might have taken to suppress the cough (if he did take anything).

Yet again, the embroidery does not help your cause. I recommend that you include the relevant quotes so everyone knows which bits are actually supportable.

From the report:
' The CVR recorded the Captain coughed about 15 times within an hour during the preflight. '

15 coughs in 1 hour is a long way from '15 fits in 45 minutes'. Additionally, whilst recording all information none of the, approaching, 100 findings of the report make any suggestion that the pilot was medically unfit either due to a cold or treatments.

The rest of your post is ridiculous speculation (unless you've heard the CVR? No? didn't think so).

Ray

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

And in Grounding news - Mullengerger's Opening statement - https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... 102919.pdf

"Our people also have donated more than
$750,000 of their own money to these funds—a tremendous example of the giving spirit our
teams consistently display in the communities where they live and work across the globe."

The most cynical part of my head translated the above to this:
"I could have donated less than 2 weeks of my own income, but I let our peoples that have less than 100 times my income doing that."

I accept blame for this bad post.

No - it was a good one and Muilenberger deserves it. I wonder how many lawyers wrote that statement.

They have brought "the best of Boeing" to the fix.

Shame they didnt do that for the original design.!

rheinwaldner wrote:

planecane wrote:

From the JT610 report:

The MCAS was needed in order to make the Boeing 737-8 (MAX) handling characteristics so similar to the NG versions that no simulator training was needed for type rating. It was also required so that the 737 MAX passed the certification that the pitch controls could not get lighter on the approach to stall. If the aircraft had substantially different pitch behavior, then there would be a simulator training requirement for the pilots.

Does this put to rest the MCAS is a stall prevention system argument?

No! Ask yourself: Why should controls not get lighter on the approach to stall? Continue to ask, until there is no more "why is this?". The final answer will be, that controls should not get lighter on the approach to stall in order to prevent stalls.

And there is also the JATR report . . . :

JTAR Final Report wrote:

Observation O3.4-B: Extension of MCAS to the low-speed and 1g environment during the flight program WAS DUE TO UNACCEPTABLE STALL CHARACTERISTICS WITH STS ONLY. The possibility of a pitch-up tendency during approach to stall was identified for the flaps-up configuration prior to the implementation of MCAS.

Finding F3.5-C: The JATR team considers that the STS/MCAS and EFS functions could be considered as stall identification systems or stall protection systems, depending on the natural (unaugmented) stall characteristics of the aircraft.

morrisond wrote:

And in Grounding news - Mullengerger's Opening statement - https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... 102919.pdf

Why is this dated October 29th? Is it to be released tomorrow, or is it a typo?

"Our airline customers and their pilots
have told us they don’t believe we communicated enough about MCAS—and we’ve heard
them"

Weasel words. Thats very different to admitting fault about lack of communication about MCAS.

"Our airline customers and their pilots
have told us they don’t believe we communicated enough about MCAS—and we’ve heard
them"

Weasel words. Thats very different to admitting fault about lack of communication about MCAS.

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Planetalk wrote:

Yes I suspect people are getting carried away with the Flu issue, people say they have flu all the time when they only medically have a cold. He does not seem to have been anywhere nearly incapacitated enough for it to have been flu (people tend not to realise just how bad actual flu is compared to a cold).

Now, of course he probably still shouldn't have been flying, but I strongly doubt that pilots anywhere in the world are calling in sick for a cold. From what we see on various pilot fora pilots are regularly going in sick with far worse because of fear of the repercussions of being sick too often. Indeed, pilots are regularly flying with fatigue that makes them unfit to fly, and that could be far more debilitating than a cold.

Yes it is impossible to know - but when you read the CVR transcript it sounds like he would as if he was sick or the equivalent of drunk. They noted that he had 15 coughing fits in the 45 minutes before flight. That does not sound like a cold. Who knows what he might have taken to suppress the cough (if he did take anything).

Yet again, the embroidery does not help your cause. I recommend that you include the relevant quotes so everyone knows which bits are actually supportable.

From the report:
' The CVR recorded the Captain coughed about 15 times within an hour during the preflight. '

15 coughs in 1 hour is a long way from '15 fits in 45 minutes'. Additionally, whilst recording all information none of the, approaching, 100 findings of the report make any suggestion that the pilot was medically unfit either due to a cold or treatments.

The rest of your post is ridiculous speculation (unless you've heard the CVR? No? didn't think so).

Ray

Sorry Ray - On page 79 of the opening recorded event on the VCR was 22:18 and push back was 23:09 - I took that as about 45 minutes of preflight - which is within 1 hour last time I checked.

How the hell could they find him unfit - were they able to do an Autopsy on his body?

Give a better explanation of the CVR then - as all you have left as an alternative is really bad CRM - it's a lot better to think that the FLU was influencing his performance and his performance would have been a lot better if he was not sick.

airnorth wrote:

morrisond wrote:

And in Grounding news - Mullengerger's Opening statement - https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... 102919.pdf

Why is this dated October 29th? Is it to be released tomorrow, or is it a typo?

He is testifying tomorrow.

morrisond wrote:

seahawk wrote:

In the end it does not matter. A competent crew might have saved the planes, but the plane should not put the plane into that situation in the first place. Although it is very likely, that no crash would have meant no grounding.

Agreed - unfortunately it probably would not have meant a grounding.
No meaningful Changes at Boeing would have been made
No changes at the FAA
No Changes in Maintenance practices - Actually it doesn't sound like all that many will be made
No Changes in Pilot training - Some changes will be made - but probably not enough - Legislation is needed to enforce more recurrent training in actual flying skills.
It's incredibly sad that People had to die - however the only upside is that it has not taken 4 separate incidents to expose all these cracks and hopefully the loss of their lives will be not in vain.
The only thing sadder than the loss of those lives is if we don't push for a lot more scrutiny of all 4 main parties to the crash(es). , with of course Boeing being the Root Cause.

All that (conveniently?) forgets that if that JT would not have crashed, likelihood of another crash after AoA failure would still be unacceptably high.
Orders of magnitude higher than anything seen in modern times.

In 200 000 flight hours we have seen 3 AoA failures on the MAX.
Two of them led to 347 graves. And the one that did not lead to a crash had the benefit of an off-duty third crew member, not occupied with the “high workload environment”.

If JT would not have crashed, one could only have hoped that Boeing would be implementing MCAS 2.0 in a timely fashion before the next deadly lesson.
Hope is not what made aviation so safe (even for subpar crews as evidenced by flying herds of NGs).

And that, ultimately, is difference between causal factors (like below average crew) and root cause factors (like MCAS 1.0 design and associated factors like poor/non -existing type-training/conversion).

It took Boeing an early crash to realize that MCAS 1.0 was a potential dead trap, unseen in modern aviation. And to get working on a better version.
Without that crash, it just would have taken a next crash.
Without that crash, it would not have changed anything (remember, root cause), only the time frame, and different crash.

Agrajag wrote:

"Our airline customers and their pilots
have told us they don’t believe we communicated enough about MCAS—and we’ve heard
them"

Weasel words. Thats very different to admitting fault about lack of communication about MCAS.

Such outrage over something you knew would not be present.

His comments are part of a "made for TV" moment and have been scrubbed by the best PR and legal minds Boeing could hire.

The comments admit regrets but not liabilities.

By the time he hits the witness chair he will have spent hours being coached on what he can and what he cannot say.

Early release of these comments are designed to tamper down expectations and drive home talking points in advance.

Agrajag wrote:

"Our airline customers and their pilots
have told us they don’t believe we communicated enough about MCAS—and we’ve heard
them"

Weasel words. Thats very different to admitting fault about lack of communication about MCAS.

Yes. And he ignore that all safety certification agencies told Boeing the same.

PW100 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

seahawk wrote:

In the end it does not matter. A competent crew might have saved the planes, but the plane should not put the plane into that situation in the first place. Although it is very likely, that no crash would have meant no grounding.

Agreed - unfortunately it probably would not have meant a grounding.
No meaningful Changes at Boeing would have been made
No changes at the FAA
No Changes in Maintenance practices - Actually it doesn't sound like all that many will be made
No Changes in Pilot training - Some changes will be made - but probably not enough - Legislation is needed to enforce more recurrent training in actual flying skills.
It's incredibly sad that People had to die - however the only upside is that it has not taken 4 separate incidents to expose all these cracks and hopefully the loss of their lives will be not in vain.
The only thing sadder than the loss of those lives is if we don't push for a lot more scrutiny of all 4 main parties to the crash(es). , with of course Boeing being the Root Cause.

All that (conveniently?) forgets that if that JT would not have crashed, likelihood of another crash after AoA failure would still be unacceptably high.
Orders of magnitude higher than anything seen in modern times.

In 200 000 flight hours we have seen 3 AoA failures on the MAX.
Two of them led to 347 graves. And the one that did not lead to a crash had the benefit of an off-duty third crew member, not occupied with the “high workload environment”.

If JT would not have crashed, one could only have hoped that Boeing would be implementing MCAS 2.0 in a timely fashion before the next deadly lesson.
Hope is not what made aviation so safe (even for subpar crews as evidenced by flying herds of NGs).

And that, ultimately, is difference between causal factors (like below average crew) and root cause factors (like MCAS 1.0 design and associated factors like poor/non -existing type-training/conversion).

It took Boeing an early crash to realize that MCAS 1.0 was a potential dead trap, unseen in modern aviation. And to get working on a better version.
Without that crash, it just would have taken a next crash.
Without that crash, it would not have changed anything (remember, root cause), only the time frame, and different crash.

That's what I said - if there was no crash unfortunately the MAX might not have been fixed by now - but no way of knowing how history would have unfolded if Lion Air 610 had turned out differently.

astuteman wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Personally, I'm not at all confident this crew with the flu-addled pilot and incompetent co-pilot could operate a NG with a failed AoA sensor without a crash.
. . .

For a bit of rough context ..
On the basis that Lionair 737NG's have a fatal crash rate of 1 in 3.8 million versus the MAX fatal crash rate of 1 in 200 000, on a pro-rata basis of their significance I would have reasonably expected 38 out of 40 posts on this thread about the MAX to be about the MAX, and 2 out of 40 posts to be about the pilots.
As I said above, the thing that changed here and resulted in a step deterioration in safety performance was the MAX, not the pilots.

*You are right that the findings of the Lionair report are absolutely valid, valuable and deeply concerning to all.
Hopefully they will lead to mandated and governed improvements to both pilot training/qualification and maintenance procedures so that all aircraft become safer, including the MAX.*

Ironically, this MAX accident will make the already reasonably safe Lionair NG operation even safer. Even in Lionair hands . . .

Revelation wrote:

Agrajag wrote:

"Our airline customers and their pilots
have told us they don’t believe we communicated enough about MCAS—and we’ve heard
them"

Weasel words. Thats very different to admitting fault about lack of communication about MCAS.

Such outrage over something you knew would not be present.

His comments are part of a "made for TV" moment and have been scrubbed by the best PR and legal minds Boeing could hire.

The comments admit regrets but not liabilities.

By the time he hits the witness chair he will have spent hours being coached on what he can and what he cannot say.

Early release of these comments are designed to tamper down expectations and drive home talking points in advance.

Yes, of course, we all know that. Doesnt make it right though does it. If anyone has the power to 'do the right thing' its him. Set an example. Leadership!

morrisond wrote:

How the hell could they find him unfit - were they able to do an Autopsy on his body?

Maybe, given that you were somehow...

morrisond wrote:

Give a better explanation of the CVR then - as all you have left as an alternative is really bad CRM -

No, that's not the only alternative. How about the possibility, that they faced multiple complex failure indications, had to run multiple conflicting NNCs and finally missed the part, that really was really going to kill them?

morrisond wrote:

PW100 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Agreed - unfortunately it probably would not have meant a grounding.
No meaningful Changes at Boeing would have been made
No changes at the FAA
No Changes in Maintenance practices - Actually it doesn't sound like all that many will be made
No Changes in Pilot training - Some changes will be made - but probably not enough - Legislation is needed to enforce more recurrent training in actual flying skills.
It's incredibly sad that People had to die - however the only upside is that it has not taken 4 separate incidents to expose all these cracks and hopefully the loss of their lives will be not in vain.
The only thing sadder than the loss of those lives is if we don't push for a lot more scrutiny of all 4 main parties to the crash(es). , with of course Boeing being the Root Cause.

All that (conveniently?) forgets that if that JT would not have crashed, likelihood of another crash after AoA failure would still be unacceptably high.
Orders of magnitude higher than anything seen in modern times.

In 200 000 flight hours we have seen 3 AoA failures on the MAX.
Two of them led to 347 graves. And the one that did not lead to a crash had the benefit of an off-duty third crew member, not occupied with the “high workload environment”.

If JT would not have crashed, one could only have hoped that Boeing would be implementing MCAS 2.0 in a timely fashion before the next deadly lesson.
Hope is not what made aviation so safe (even for subpar crews as evidenced by flying herds of NGs).

And that, ultimately, is difference between causal factors (like below average crew) and root cause factors (like MCAS 1.0 design and associated factors like poor/non -existing type-training/conversion).

It took Boeing an early crash to realize that MCAS 1.0 was a potential dead trap, unseen in modern aviation. And to get working on a better version.
Without that crash, it just would have taken a next crash.
Without that crash, it would not have changed anything (remember, root cause), only the time frame, and different crash.

That's what I said - if there was no crash unfortunately the MAX might not have been fixed by now - but no way of knowing how history would have unfolded if Lion Air 610 had turned out differently.

The really interesting question is what would have happened if these crashes had happened with a fleet of 3000 rather than 300. Would it have been grounded?

airnorth wrote:

morrisond wrote:

And in Grounding news - Mullengerger's Opening statement - https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... 102919.pdf

Why is this dated October 29th? Is it to be released tomorrow, or is it a typo?

The hearing is tomorrow but Boeing released the statement today.

I don't feel sorry for Muilenburg. I think he will get through the testimony. I bet we will see him sweat when he is grilled. I think just after RTS, he will be toast. Boeing will be offering him up as a sacrifice to everyone. It did happen on his watch. He is responsible. Can him.

rheinwaldner wrote:

morrisond wrote:

How the hell could they find him unfit - were they able to do an Autopsy on his body?

Maybe, given that you were somehow...

morrisond wrote:

Give a better explanation of the CVR then - as all you have left as an alternative is really bad CRM -

No, that's not the only alternative. How about the possibility, that they faced multiple complex failure indications, had to run multiple conflicting NNCs and finally missed the part, that really was really going to kill them?

Given that I was somehow what? So supposedly I now flew to Indonesia and pulled the body out of the wreckage so they couldn't do an autopsy? How could I do that when I had a day Job as James McNerney and/or as a Boeing paid troll here on Anut?

That is why CRM exists for situations like Lion Air 610 - the reasons for good CRM were written in blood.

I'm being kind to the pilot and giving him a pass for being sick that he did not realize what he had to do - although he should never have been in the cockpit in that state and should have reviewed the previous flight that would have most likely have saved those passengers as it was the missing piece of information he needed. He also forgot to declare any type of Emergency with the tower to reduce the workload in the cockpit by having to react to them by declaring PAN PAN PAN or MAYDAY MAYDAY.

You can't even admit that him being sick might have been a contributing factor because that would destroy the narrative that it would have taken a test pilot to save it.

MrBretz wrote:

I don't feel sorry for Muilenburg. I think he will get through the testimony. I bet we will see him sweat when he is grilled. I think just after RTS, he will be toast. Boeing will be offering him up as a sacrifice to everyone. It did happen on his watch. He is responsible. Can him.

Good idea - and maybe his pension compensation is dependent on the MAX returning safely to service and not having any Boeing created issues for a long time.

What time is the barbecue session at congress tomorrow? Any live streams e.g. cnn? Will they grill Dennis medium rare or does he come out charcoal?

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

morrisond wrote:

So you are saying you would be good with putting your Loved ones on a crew of the same abilities of Lion Air 610 on any type of aircraft other than an MAX?

That's not relevant. First the safety stats of MAX will not be different anymore in the future, second we never fly in Indonesia.

On the other hand, I am able to separate facts from emotions and I thus can say, that the crash rate mentioned by Astuteman and others of Lionair is close to the global average. If most airlines would be better than Lionair, some considerable worse airlines must be around somewhere too.

morrisond wrote:

Too bad we don't have a Poll feature on Anut - somehow I think you would very much be in the minority of people willing to fly with crews of this caliber.

Somehow I think a poll about flying with the MAX could be an eye opener to you.

morrisond wrote:

I am not trying to deflect from the problems of the MAX

Why then is nobody else posting nearly as much about the problems of the MAX vs your elaborations about pilot errors?

Other issues may exist. The global crash rate of one crash per 4.1 million flights could be improved. But that is an entirely different topic and has nothing to do with the MAX.

morrisond wrote:

The lack of crashes does not prove how good pilots are these days - it just shows how reliable aircraft and systems have become.

That's wrong. Don't forget, pilot errors have always been the main cause of accidents. Therefore crash statistics closely correlate with pilot proficiency and we absolutely can say "lack of crashes = pilots proficiency is good". You are spoiled from the MAX if you think otherwise, because these rules are not applicable to the MAX crashes.

morrisond wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Yes it is impossible to know - but when you read the CVR transcript it sounds like he would as if he was sick or the equivalent of drunk. They noted that he had 15 coughing fits in the 45 minutes before flight. That does not sound like a cold. Who knows what he might have taken to suppress the cough (if he did take anything).

Yet again, the embroidery does not help your cause. I recommend that you include the relevant quotes so everyone knows which bits are actually supportable.

From the report:
' The CVR recorded the Captain coughed about 15 times within an hour during the preflight. '

15 coughs in 1 hour is a long way from '15 fits in 45 minutes'. Additionally, whilst recording all information none of the, approaching, 100 findings of the report make any suggestion that the pilot was medically unfit either due to a cold or treatments.

The rest of your post is ridiculous speculation (unless you've heard the CVR? No? didn't think so).

Ray

Sorry Ray - On page 79 of the opening recorded event on the VCR was 22:18 and push back was 23:09 - I took that as about 45 minutes of preflight - which is within 1 hour last time I checked.

How the hell could they find him unfit - were they able to do an Autopsy on his body?

Give a better explanation of the CVR then - as all you have left as an alternative is really bad CRM - it's a lot better to think that the FLU was influencing his performance and his performance would have been a lot better if he was not sick.

Not for me (or you to explain). We have an a multi-national expert report developed over a period of 12 months that we can read.

From the report.
'Typical markers for high workload include dropped task, reduced task performance, and reduced verbalization. High workload for the Captain could be identified by his short responses to the FO, his difficulty to maintain an assigned heading and altitude due to repetitive MCAS activation, and his failure to manage speed and thrust, and call out flap retraction points. '

Overwhelmed I think is the word for it.

Ray

MrBretz wrote:

I don't feel sorry for Muilenburg. I think he will get through the testimony. I bet we will see him sweat when he is grilled. I think just after RTS, he will be toast. Boeing will be offering him up as a sacrifice to everyone. It did happen on his watch. He is responsible. Can him.

For his sake, I hope he flew commercial to DC.

Remember the [email protected] a few years ago when the 3 US auto maker CEO's

were before congress and they had to admit they took private jets to DC?

PW100 wrote:

And that, ultimately, is difference between causal factors (like below average crew) and root cause factors (like MCAS 1.0 design and associated factors like poor/non -existing type-training/conversion).

By saying "below average crew", you're implying that only "better" crews such as "average or better" have the required training and skills to operate the airplane. No, this wasn't a "below average" crew. It was a crew that had no business being in the cockpit. That's not "below average", that's unqualified.

In your opinion those are the root and causal causes. But is it a fair portrayal to single out one as a root cause? Is MCAS 1.0 really a lone root cause when it exposed previously hidden underlying factors that also ultimately caused the crash? Ironically that sounds a lot like MCAS, in how it took a string of breakdowns to expose its major shortfall. Is there really a root cause at all when it's a wide systemic failure that took all links failing at once?

There's a major problem with the idea of root causes and causal factors, and thank goodness the NTSB doesn't assign the cause of the crash that way in their accident reports. The end result is that everything it took for the crash is in viewed in isolation and ranked in importance to fix, and of course the "root" cause is the focus, distracting attention away from the other causes. For example, let's take the ET crash. Is MCAS really a "root cause" when we include ET409 into the evaluation of ET airlines as a whole? Ah, now we see a different root cause coming into view. Now MCAS appears as a causal link as it's only present in one crash.

The bottom line is that people didn't have to die to discover and correct a design flaw. That's what's truly sad about JT610. Continuing to point fingers at just one party that you feel is most culpable is like arresting only the leader of a bank robbing gang and letting the rest go free to commit more crimes. It's the opposite of a strong safety culture. It's a willfully weak safety culture, one that relies on perfection in one area to compensate for weakness in another.

MrBretz wrote:

I don't feel sorry for Muilenburg. I think he will get through the testimony. I bet we will see him sweat when he is grilled. I think just after RTS, he will be toast. Boeing will be offering him up as a sacrifice to everyone. It did happen on his watch. He is responsible. Can him.

So once we have satisfied the public demands, do we anticipate Boeing clearing out the folks who actually initiated / caused and did not prevent the disasters?

Sooner787 wrote:

MrBretz wrote:

I don't feel sorry for Muilenburg. I think he will get through the testimony. I bet we will see him sweat when he is grilled. I think just after RTS, he will be toast. Boeing will be offering him up as a sacrifice to everyone. It did happen on his watch. He is responsible. Can him.

For his sake, I hope he flew commercial to DC.

Remember the [email protected] a few years ago when the 3 US auto maker CEO's

were before congress and they had to admit they took private jets to DC?

Flying on a MAX would be a best of both worlds and a strong statement

kalvado wrote:

Sooner787 wrote:

MrBretz wrote:

I don't feel sorry for Muilenburg. I think he will get through the testimony. I bet we will see him sweat when he is grilled. I think just after RTS, he will be toast. Boeing will be offering him up as a sacrifice to everyone. It did happen on his watch. He is responsible. Can him.

For his sake, I hope he flew commercial to DC.

Remember the [email protected] a few years ago when the 3 US auto maker CEO's

were before congress and they had to admit they took private jets to DC?

Flying on a MAX would be a best of both worlds and a strong statement

lol! So what will he do? Declare it a ferry flight?

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

kalvado wrote:

Sooner787 wrote:

MrBretz wrote:

I don't feel sorry for Muilenburg. I think he will get through the testimony. I bet we will see him sweat when he is grilled. I think just after RTS, he will be toast. Boeing will be offering him up as a sacrifice to everyone. It did happen on his watch. He is responsible. Can him.

For his sake, I hope he flew commercial to DC.

Remember the [email protected] a few years ago when the 3 US auto maker CEO's

were before congress and they had to admit they took private jets to DC?

Flying on a MAX would be a best of both worlds and a strong statement

He should if they would give a permit for that. They might not like it flying into Reagan but I'm sure they could land outside DC in an unpopulated area.

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

Yet again, the embroidery does not help your cause. I recommend that you include the relevant quotes so everyone knows which bits are actually supportable.

From the report:
' The CVR recorded the Captain coughed about 15 times within an hour during the preflight. '

15 coughs in 1 hour is a long way from '15 fits in 45 minutes'. Additionally, whilst recording all information none of the, approaching, 100 findings of the report make any suggestion that the pilot was medically unfit either due to a cold or treatments.

The rest of your post is ridiculous speculation (unless you've heard the CVR? No? didn't think so).

Ray

Sorry Ray - On page 79 of the opening recorded event on the VCR was 22:18 and push back was 23:09 - I took that as about 45 minutes of preflight - which is within 1 hour last time I checked.

How the hell could they find him unfit - were they able to do an Autopsy on his body?

Give a better explanation of the CVR then - as all you have left as an alternative is really bad CRM - it's a lot better to think that the FLU was influencing his performance and his performance would have been a lot better if he was not sick.

Not for me (or you to explain). We have an a multi-national expert report developed over a period of 12 months that we can read.

From the report.
'Typical markers for high workload include dropped task, reduced task performance, and reduced verbalization. High workload for the Captain could be identified by his short responses to the FO, his difficulty to maintain an assigned heading and altitude due to repetitive MCAS activation, and his failure to manage speed and thrust, and call out flap retraction points. '

Overwhelmed I think is the word for it.

Ray

Another marker for high workload would be failure to review issues from the previous flight in your preflight due to being too busy coughing and dealing with the Flu.

morrisond wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

Yet again, the embroidery does not help your cause. I recommend that you include the relevant quotes so everyone knows which bits are actually supportable.
From the report:
' The CVR recorded the Captain coughed about 15 times within an hour during the preflight. '
15 coughs in 1 hour is a long way from '15 fits in 45 minutes'. Additionally, whilst recording all information none of the, approaching, 100 findings of the report make any suggestion that the pilot was medically unfit either due to a cold or treatments.
The rest of your post is ridiculous speculation (unless you've heard the CVR? No? didn't think so).
Ray

Sorry Ray - On page 79 of the opening recorded event on the VCR was 22:18 and push back was 23:09 - I took that as about 45 minutes of preflight - which is within 1 hour last time I checked.

How the hell could they find him unfit - were they able to do an Autopsy on his body?

Well, if the investigation team is unable to find him unfit, how the hell can you declare him unfit???

morrisond wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Sorry Ray - On page 79 of the opening recorded event on the VCR was 22:18 and push back was 23:09 - I took that as about 45 minutes of preflight - which is within 1 hour last time I checked.

How the hell could they find him unfit - were they able to do an Autopsy on his body?

Give a better explanation of the CVR then - as all you have left as an alternative is really bad CRM - it's a lot better to think that the FLU was influencing his performance and his performance would have been a lot better if he was not sick.

Not for me (or you to explain). We have an a multi-national expert report developed over a period of 12 months that we can read.

From the report.
'Typical markers for high workload include dropped task, reduced task performance, and reduced verbalization. High workload for the Captain could be identified by his short responses to the FO, his difficulty to maintain an assigned heading and altitude due to repetitive MCAS activation, and his failure to manage speed and thrust, and call out flap retraction points. '

Overwhelmed I think is the word for it.

Ray

Another marker for high workload would be failure to review issues from the previous flight in your preflight due to being too busy coughing and dealing with the Flu.

'Indonesian authorities have confirmed identification of the body of Capt.Bhavya Suneja. The remains will be handed over to the family in the presence of @IndianEmbJkt today. My heartfelt condolences to the bereaved family.'
www.newindianexpress.com/world/2018/nov ... 02778.html

From the report
'1.13 Medical and Pathological Information Not relevant to this accident. '

Ray

Exactly one year ago at this very minute, 6:33 a.m. Jakarta time, JT610 crashed into the Java Sea. RIP.

Brazilian authorities aiding FAA to have 73Max fly before yr end
https://airlinerwatch.com/brazilian-reg ... fore-2020/

FAA still don't want to give a timeline

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... fe-461836/

airnorth wrote:

Planetalk wrote:

benbeny wrote:

I believe it's a missed translation. In medical community we understand that it is "common cold", but people on the street will still call it flu. Couldn't complain though, it's still caused by influenza virus.

Yes I suspect people are getting carried away with the Flu issue, people say they have flu all the time when they only medically have a cold. He does not seem to have been anywhere nearly incapacitated enough for it to have been flu (people tend not to realise just how bad actual flu is compared to a cold).

Now, of course he probably still shouldn't have been flying, but I strongly doubt that pilots anywhere in the world are calling in sick for a cold. From what we see on various pilot fora pilots are regularly going in sick with far worse because of fear of the repercussions of being sick too often. Indeed, pilots are regularly flying with fatigue that makes them unfit to fly, and that could be far more debilitating than a cold.

Sorry my response was a joke. Often when a man has the cold or flu, it is called a man flu or cold.....

Anyway was trying to inject some humour.

Oh yeh I caught that, no worries,my reply wasn't aimed at you but a couple of others who have leaped on the flu thing as evidence the Captain was critically incapacitated. I was just suggesting its very possible this captain had 'man-flu' rather than actual flu, and probably likely given he made it to the airport and performed reasonably well, .

The reality is there will be pilots in the US flying every day with just as bad or worse. That doesn't make it right, but it would need a huge change in culture in airline management and how sickness/fatigue is treated to put that right.

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

Not for me (or you to explain). We have an a multi-national expert report developed over a period of 12 months that we can read.

From the report.
'Typical markers for high workload include dropped task, reduced task performance, and reduced verbalization. High workload for the Captain could be identified by his short responses to the FO, his difficulty to maintain an assigned heading and altitude due to repetitive MCAS activation, and his failure to manage speed and thrust, and call out flap retraction points. '

Overwhelmed I think is the word for it.

Ray

Another marker for high workload would be failure to review issues from the previous flight in your preflight due to being too busy coughing and dealing with the Flu.

'Indonesian authorities have confirmed identification of the body of Capt.Bhavya Suneja. The remains will be handed over to the family in the presence of @IndianEmbJkt today. My heartfelt condolences to the bereaved family.'
http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2 ... 02778.html

From the report
'1.13 Medical and Pathological Information Not relevant to this accident. '

Ray

That doesn't mean that he didn't have the FLU. It just means they did not consider medical factors which seems to be one of the only areas where the Report fell down - especially when he admits on the CVR having the FLU.

The CVR was not recovered until January 14, 2019 when they would have learned about him being sick long after when they would have been able to examine the body and they might have just decided the family had suffered enough if the body had not been cremated and it was possible to exhume the body. Who knows if they would actually have been able to detect the Flu that long after the crash.

Sad all around.

mmo wrote:

Just a couple of comments from a retired Captain (still teach in the Sim on my schedule)

I agree with the list, to a certain degree, but there are a few things missing.

The previous flight had the same issues, but they managed to complete the flight and maintenance never informed the new crew of the incident. I would assume it was not written up. If that is indicative of JT's procedures there are systemic problems with the airline which combined with the MCAS malfunction led to the crash.

I have never flown the 737, but did fly the 727, 757, 747 (all models except the -8), 777 and 787. In the Boeings, any movement of the trim wheel or unusual stick forces the action items are first to move the yoke in the opposite direction to see if the yoke cutout will work, if not then both red guarded electric trim switches are activated. And you trim with the trim wheel. Every LPC/OPC I ever took had the scenario where you are told to accelerate to 300 KIAS and once there you have runaway trim. It was a handful but it was not something which would cause loss of control. If done properly, it took both pilots and good communication in the cockpit.

On the first bolded part, it seems like not all the information from the previous flight was passed on by the crew and not only maintenance. The Captain did not pass on the information that once he cut the switches to the trim the aircraft was back under their control and they could continue the flight. He did pass on that the IAS and altitude disagree they experienced and this was written up.

On the second bolded part, do you not think it is a little simple to identify a runaway trim stabilizer when it is not continuously moving AND while you are dealing with two other disagreements with the instruments and a stick shaker at the same time? I think what is apparent with this flight and AF447 is at the end there was too much information for the crews to process and while the solution was simple in either case with hindsight, it is too easy to be smart after the fact.

As for Lion Air, I hope they will use this report to improve training as there are obvious shortcomings that has been identified. Much like AF447 I think any airline in the world will find shortcomings at their companies when the focus is shined on them and this has happened to Lion Air and will happen at ET as well. Your hope is that they and the industry will learn from these and improve an already safe system worldwide.

Sooner787 wrote:

MrBretz wrote:

I don't feel sorry for Muilenburg. I think he will get through the testimony. I bet we will see him sweat when he is grilled. I think just after RTS, he will be toast. Boeing will be offering him up as a sacrifice to everyone. It did happen on his watch. He is responsible. Can him.

For his sake, I hope he flew commercial to DC.

Remember the [email protected] a few years ago when the 3 US auto maker CEO's

were before congress and they had to admit they took private jets to DC?

That was because they were there to ask for bailouts from congress. Very different situation.

planecane wrote:

Sooner787 wrote:

Remember the [email protected] a few years ago when the 3 US auto maker CEO's

were before congress and they had to admit they took private jets to DC?

That was because they were there to ask for bailouts from congress. Very different situation.

Yeah, absolutely.

Dear Congress
We need shedloads of money in order to pay for our executive lifestyles and private jets.

p.s. if you could also spare a few bucks for our production line workers, that would be good too.

morrisond wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

That doesn't mean that he didn't have the FLU. It just means they did not consider medical factors which seems to be one of the only areas where the Report fell down - especially when he admits on the CVR having the FLU.

The CVR was not recovered until January 14, 2019 when they would have learned about him being sick long after when they would have been able to examine the body and they might have just decided the family had suffered enough if the body had not been cremated and it was possible to exhume the body. Who knows if they would actually have been able to detect the Flu that long after the crash.

Sad all around.

Well in Indonesia, any degree of cough and sneeze is called flu so you can not judge how severe his "flu" is only from hearing someone admitted that he has flu

flyingphil wrote:

I was a bit suprised to read in Dominic Gates twitter feed that the FAA seems to have given a Boeing a free pass for the following:
#Lack of redundancy in the rudder cables (I thought it was lack of protection from fan blades due to the forward position of the engines)
#Too high surface temperature allowed in the fuel tank
#Insufficient fireproofing around the APU in the tail
#Using high-power wiring to connect a switch inside the fuel tank

Apparently all non-compliant with current safety standards.
All new to me. Anybody else heard of this?

Nope, but don't worry - you can trust Dennis.

Dennis Muilenburg opening statement wrote:

"When the 737 MAX returns to service, it will be one of the safest airplanes ever to fly."

The usual suspects here on a.net have been repeating this line for months, as if curing MCAS faults will transform the MAX from top to bottom.
Then again, the accident statistics (for the NG) suggest that they are not entirely wrong.

Are these "problems" identified by Dominic Gates new to the MAX, or grandfathered down from the NG?

enzo011 wrote:

On the second bolded part, do you not think it is a little simple to identify a runaway trim stabilizer when it is not continuously moving AND while you are dealing with two other disagreements with the instruments and a stick shaker at the same time? I think what is apparent with this flight and AF447 is at the end there was too much information for the crews to process and while the solution was simple in either case with hindsight, it is too easy to be smart after the fact.

Personally, I think it's very easy. If you are hand flying the aircraft and the trim wheel moves without you activating it by the trim switches, you have a problem. Very simple. The instrument and the stick shaker are basic airmanship. In the QRH, you have a pitch power chart for unreliable airspeed. if you have climb thrust set and have the correct pitch you are good, the aircraft is climbing and you can concentrate on the highest priority problem. Part of the "airmanship" issue is understanding what you are being told by the aircraft. It is up to the crew to prioritize their actions to ensure they can remain safe. It's the old adage, "Aviate, navigate and communicate", in that order. The accident report cited the distraction by ATC. That is easily remedied by saying, "stand by". ATC can wait, but flying the aircraft can't.