Yes they did hit the cut-off switches but given that they did not put the plane back in trim before doing so, did not disengage the auto throttle and allowed the plane to accelerate past Vmo, barely tried the Manual wheels (it's debatable they even did this - they may not have extended the helper handle and they both didn't try together) and then they re-engaged the electric trim with no crew communication whatsoever
[I removed from your message the paranoid and the questionable respect]
* ~10% over Vmo is not an issue from a design and technical point of view. There should not, but this have no consequences know to them. This small over speed was the last of there priority compared to the very dangerous nose down MCAS actions at low altitude.
* The pilots have only two possibles ways to control the trim in manual flight mode: the electrical trim thumb switches, or the manual trim wheels. The ET302 CVR transcript have a clear communication that indicate that there tried two possibles ways to control the trim in manual flight mode. Guess what there can be ?
* The control deficiency of the manual trim wheels was not known to them and there was no procedure nor training to overcome that unexpected problem in implementing the Boeing runaway procedure.
* The re-engagement of the electrical trim was a desperate tentative to trim because the runaway procedure failed to solve that problem.
* It must be noted that the runaway stab trim is badly redacted and did not emphasis how important is to trim electrically before the cutoff, instead the procedure allow to manually trim after the cutoff.
* It must be noted that no procedure warned them that the MCAS will reset 5 seconds after there last electrical trim.
* It must be noted that no procedure instructed them to set flaps not up to disable MCAS.
* It must be noted that the constant noise of the left stick shaker certainly make the noise of the automatic trim less perceptible.
* It must be noted that the situation forced the pilots to heavily pitch up together, reducing there ability to do others tasks.
* It must be noted that the situation produced both high stress and high workload, reducing even more the pilots performances.
* It's only within the last minute of the flight that the pilots was able to recognize that the cause of there problems is the "left alpha vane" because the AoA disagreement indication was not working as expected.
But you perfectly known all of those facts already.