hilram wrote:

The bad idea was to spend all that Boeing cash on Share-buybacks over the years leading up to the A320 neo, as well as outsourcing engineering and expertise?
What if money had been spent on an NSA right away?

Excellent point. Boeing could have been farsighted way back before the A320NEO was even being considered, and come up with a new FBW single aisle design to replace the 40+ year-old 737 design (now 50 year-old) as an A320 competitor. But the 737 has been Boeing's cash (to give to share holders, execs and managers, for buybacks) cow. Since it worked so well in that capacity, the temptation to keep milking it was impossible to resist for the executive suite and the bean counters. Unfortunately, karma struck big time, and the cash cow now has to be fed on cash.

jollo wrote:

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

We were talking about what Boeing and the FAA did after the LionAir crash and what the FAA and Boeing did after the Etiopian Air crash, before they were forced to ground the MAX.
Perhaps you point out where in the emergency AD, MCAS is mentioned, explained how it works, mentioned that MCAS cuts out the column switch off, that the AoA disagree warning is not working and mentioned that the manual trim wheel will not work. Neither it is mentioned the time MCAS trims, the rate of those trim action and that the will start after 5 seconds again. You will find non of the above.

Also the ops manual buletin does not mention or even explain the working of MCAS. Neither does it mention that the manual trim wheel will not work and that you can only use the cut out switches after having electrical trimmed the nose up.

It is actually not mentioned, that a MAX will behave differently from a NG.

I'll assume you didn't see my last post before responding to my previous one.

Actually if you read all three sources it about covers everything you mentioned as well. The OPS bulletin covers the 5 second issue.

You said Boeing and the FAA did nothing after Lionair and kept it secret.

You would be wrong on that point.

Do they really need to point out that one of the controls might not work if they are outside the normal operating envelope?

Most of the controls won't work so well below stall speed either.

Please notice that I was responding to the question "Did the recommended actions include trimming electrically to neutral trim before cutting the switches?". You may argue that puzzling together bits and pieces of various communications would have enabled inquiring minds to string together a set of "recommended actions" which would have saved the accident flights. Maybe in a courtroom this would be accepted as evidence, but this would be strictly with the benefit of hindsight and the luxury of lots of idle time.

The middle of an upset is no time to assemble sources. The only things pilots should turn to in a crisis are: training, NNCs and ADs. MAX-specific training was actively prevented, the relevant NNC went through MAX certification and the aftermath of a fatal accident unchanged, and FAA's AD (verbatim copy of Boeing's OMB) mentioned only as a footnote that electric trim can - not "must" - be used (before stab trim cut out, obviously) to help overcome excessive aero loads. So IMO the answer to the original question is: no, not where it would have mattered.

It's right in the middle of the Ops bulletin that you can use Electric Trim to neutralize the control forces - in the section Operating instructions - What are you talking about?

You need to read the OPS bulletin as well and not just the AD. The crews would have gone off the OPS Bulletin. Here it is again on this page if you missed it about half way down - number MLI-15 http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm

It's a note as it's left up to the pilots discretion whether or not they wanted to use it. The plane might not have been that out of trim and might not have needed to use the Electric trim. Maybe Boeing thought that after the Lionair crash that crews might take MCAS seriously and might actually take the time to understand the Ops bulletin.

And again does Boeing need to warn it's crews in every bulletin that they need to maintain sufficient thrust to remain above stall speed? No - just like they should not have to warn them about the dangers of excess thrusts and remaining above Vmo.

This is basic pilot stuff they are required to know. Or should there whole training manual be part of every OPS bulletin?

767333ER wrote:

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

We were talking about what Boeing and the FAA did after the LionAir crash and what the FAA and Boeing did after the Etiopian Air crash, before they were forced to ground the MAX.
Perhaps you point out where in the emergency AD, MCAS is mentioned, explained how it works, mentioned that MCAS cuts out the column switch off, that the AoA disagree warning is not working and mentioned that the manual trim wheel will not work. Neither it is mentioned the time MCAS trims, the rate of those trim action and that the will start after 5 seconds again. You will find non of the above.

Also the ops manual buletin does not mention or even explain the working of MCAS. Neither does it mention that the manual trim wheel will not work and that you can only use the cut out switches after having electrical trimmed the nose up.

It is actually not mentioned, that a MAX will behave differently from a NG.

I'll assume you didn't see my last post before responding to my previous one.

Actually if you read all three sources it about covers everything you mentioned as well. The OPS bulletin covers the 5 second issue.

You said Boeing and the FAA did nothing after Lionair and kept it secret.

You would be wrong on that point.

Do they really need to point out that one of the controls might not work if they are outside the normal operating envelope?

Most of the controls won't work so well below stall speed either.

That AD 2018-23-51 draws on the recovery technique for runaway trim for the NG. It erroneously does not mention that if you hit the cutout once the trim has been running and is out of trim, you won’t get it back manually. Neither the AD or the OPS bulletin precisely describe how MCAS works or mention it by name. It says it can go “up to” 10 seconds with a 5 second delay between increments. It is not specific enough as to how long it will run or how much trim it can apply in that window even though it should be.

They most definitely do need to point out that the trim wheel doesn’t work when overspeed since a runaway trim would have you over speed in no time. Again it is vague/indecisive as it says one “can” use electric trim to recover the trim before hitting the cutout. Words like “can” and “up to” do not belong in ADs and OPS Bulletins. With this language one has to encounter the situation before they know for sure what is actually the case rather than what “can” be the case. The AD and OPS aren’t technically wrong, but they make me scratch my head with imprecise language like that.

You need to read the OPS bulletin as well and not just the AD and also read the Boeing Memo from Nov 10, 2018 talking about MCAS from the AVherald. Look on the last page for links.

They have to leave some wiggle room as not every situation is precisely the same - otherwise you would need 10 different versions of the OPS bulletin to handle specific situations.

Pilots are used to these and are expected to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.

hivue wrote:

hilram wrote:

The bad idea was to spend all that Boeing cash on Share-buybacks over the years leading up to the A320 neo, as well as outsourcing engineering and expertise?
What if money had been spent on an NSA right away?

Excellent point. Boeing could have been farsighted way back before the A320NEO was even being considered, and come up with a new FBW single aisle design to replace the 40+ year-old 737 design (now 50 year-old) as an A320 competitor.

That's exactly what they investigated doing. Their conclusion is that they needed an all new CFRP narrow body aircraft to provide any advantage relative to the incumbent A320 and the technology of the day could not produce one at the desired rate and at a price point that could make a profit.

It's not clear to me that even today one could build an all new CFRP aircraft comparable to A320 and make it at the required price point and rate. In fact a main goal of NMA is to mature the manufacturing tech to get to that point at some point in the future. Therefore it should be clear Boeing doesn't think they are at that point right now.

hivue wrote:

But the 737 has been Boeing's cash (to give to share holders, execs and managers, for buybacks) cow. Since it worked so well in that capacity, the temptation to keep milking it was impossible to resist for the executive suite and the bean counters. Unfortunately, karma struck big time, and the cash cow now has to be fed on cash.

I think this is a false narrative. I think you need to show how Boeing could have produced a new small airplane in 2011 that could have competed with A320 and projected a profit never mind a ROI, and I'm confident that you cannot. Without such an airplane they would be abandoning their customers and their part of the market which is madness.

The reality is that MAX was the right business strategy in 2011, and no matter how you look at it Boeing's engineering team let the company down by producing a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane. I'm sure they were facing heavy pressure from managers, but it is part of an engineer's job to resist such pressure and not produce a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane.

Revelation wrote:

The reality is that MAX was the right business strategy in 2011, and no matter how you look at it Boeing's engineering team let the company down by producing a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane. I'm sure they were facing heavy pressure from managers, but it is part of an engineer's job to resist such pressure and not produce a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane.

I don't disagree about the MAX being the right decision for the time. However, I must say that you have a really cynical view of an engineer's job. Having to deal with the added stress of resisting management, is absolutely antithetical to doing a good job. Under such conditions, how is an engineer supposed to do a good job? You can't be constantly saying no to the people who control your salary, promotions, holiday time, bonuses, and so on. The system needs to be different. Engineers need to be guided by management, yes. In a constant battle with management, no.

I truly hope that the system at Boeing is changing for the better. I know they've already adjusted their reporting structure. However, in my mind, the smartest thing to do would be to move the management back to Seattle. The two "sides" need way more face time. If face-to-face meetings weren't so effective, the aviation industry would barely exist, and certainly not business. Half the flying in the world wouldn't happen; particularly not the lucrative business travellers.

where are the mods?

bringing up worldwide training standards every second post in this thread is not relevant to the topic. For all the strict moderation I can't believe we have thousands of posts in this thread that have been completely irrelevant to the subject. Instead of deleting this post like hundreds of other that mentioned this it's about time a moderator explain to us why they keep allowing one person to spam this thread to death and bury all relevant discussion to the ungrounding.

checklist350 wrote:

where are the mods?

bringing up worldwide training standards every second post in this thread is not relevant to the topic. For all the strict moderation I can't believe we have thousands of posts in this thread that have been completely irrelevant to the subject. Instead of deleting this post like hundreds of other that mentioned this it's about time a moderator explain to us why they keep allowing one person to spam this thread to death and bury all relevant discussion to the ungrounding.

I'm not the one who keeps bringing it back up. Others do by making factually incorrect statements - I am just correcting them.

These are issues specific to the MAX and why it was grounded.

If it turns out I'm right - lack of training is a lot bigger factor in why the crashes happened and needs to be a lot bigger part of the discussion on how the MAX is safely returned to service.

Who doesn't think all 737NG and MAX pilots shouldn't take a refresher course on the various electric and manual trim systems (if they are not already)?

However who also doesn't think that additional Stall training or prevention of stall training wouldn't be a good idea for all pilots/aircraft and especially if the MAX is allowed to RTS without MCAS?

morrisond wrote:

If it turns out I'm right - lack of training is a lot bigger factor in why the crashes happened and needs to be a lot bigger part of the discussion on how the MAX is safely returned to service.

Who doesn't think all 737NG and MAX pilots shouldn't take a refresher course on the various electric and manual trim systems (if they are not already)?

However who also doesn't think that additional Stall training or prevention of stall training wouldn't be a good idea for all pilots/aircraft and especially if the MAX is allowed to RTS without MCAS?

More training is always better.

But yours is a circular argument.

The trigger for more training is the latest model 737, which should have inherently raised (or at least maintained) the safety bar in comparison to all current 737 models, irrespective of training.

All other factors unchanged, EVERY new aircraft model should raise the safety bar, not lower it.

The challenge for airworthiness authorities and Boeing, is to make the MAX at least as safe (it should be a requirement it is safer) as the NG, without additional training.

smartplane wrote:

morrisond wrote:

If it turns out I'm right - lack of training is a lot bigger factor in why the crashes happened and needs to be a lot bigger part of the discussion on how the MAX is safely returned to service.

Who doesn't think all 737NG and MAX pilots shouldn't take a refresher course on the various electric and manual trim systems (if they are not already)?

However who also doesn't think that additional Stall training or prevention of stall training wouldn't be a good idea for all pilots/aircraft and especially if the MAX is allowed to RTS without MCAS?

More training is always better.

But yours is a circular argument.

The trigger for more training is the latest model 737, which should have inherently raised (or at least maintained) the safety bar in comparison to all current 737 models, irrespective of training.

All other factors unchanged, EVERY new aircraft model should raise the safety bar, not lower it.

The challenge for airworthiness authorities and Boeing, is to make the MAX at least as safe (it should be a requirement it is safer) as the NG, without additional training.

Agreed and yes every model should raise the safety bar.

However even I don't believe no extra training is possible with the MAX there should have at least been more differences training - or at least a bloody 1 hour in class session with a quiz and an instructor.

The same should have happened with the MAX OPS bulletin ( it needed a one hour in class session and a quiz - sending out an email to your pilots and not even requiring a read receipt should not be considered adequate).

I believe the issue with most derivatives of existing designs is that as they keep pushing the MTOW and landings weights higher approach speeds are going up and up which when you look through the crash stats - landings are the most frequent accident events.

This is not a good trend.

morrisond wrote:

PW100 wrote:

RickNRoll wrote:

The ET pilots had an idea but were still overloaded.

They even performed the recommended action: Stabelizer Cut off Switches. But were still overlaoded and did not manage to regain sufficient control.

Everyone here accuses me of making it all about the training/pilots when in reality it's people like yourselves that keep bringing up these issues.

I'm not on here every Six hours doing the lack of training equivalent of a "It's a deadly airplane, All the executives at Boeing should hang".

But if you really want to go there every day so you have a place to vent your frustrations - so be it.

Yes they did hit the cut-off switches but given that they did not put the plane back in trim before doing so, did not disengage the auto throttle and allowed the plane to accelerate past Vmo, barely tried the Manual wheels (it's debatable they even did this - they may not have extended the helper handle and they both didn't try together) and then they re-engaged the electric trim with no crew communication whatsoever I would say turning it off at first was a lucky guess and in no way shape or form proves that they understood the issue or the way to counteract it.

It just strongly suggests that even if they did have the proper procedure they barely glanced at it - did not have it in the cockpit with them and basically put about as much personal effort into being a good safe pilot who have the responsibility of safely getting there passengers back to the ground in one piece as big city cab drivers do in following the rules of the road.

A poster reminded me of an old Latin wording I had long forgotten. But it struck me that it applies very well.

'...barely tried the Manual wheels (it's debatable they even did this - they may not have extended the helper handle and they both didn't try together)...'
Ad Ignorantiam. No facts, not evidenced.

'.... and then they re-engaged the electric trim with no crew communication whatsoever....'
Ad Ignorantiam. No Facts, not evidenced.

'......I would say turning it off at first was a lucky guess and in no way shape or form proves that they understood the issue or the way to counteract it.....'
Ad Ignorantiam. No facts, not evidenced.

'....It just strongly suggests that even if they did have the proper procedure they barely glanced at it.....'
Ad Ignorantiam. No facts, not evidenced.

'......- did not have it in the cockpit with them.....'
Ad Ignorantiam. No facts, not evidenced.

'..... and basically put about as much personal effort into being a good safe pilot who have the responsibility of safely getting there passengers back to the ground...'
Ad Ignorantiam. No facts, not evidenced and despicably sick charge.

Pilots were overwhelmed.

How refreshing and sober was this thread, when morrisond gave it a rest at least for six hours. It seems he has found some spare time again to cover this topic again with his accusations.

morrisond wrote:

If you read the three sources there was quite a lot of information out there that should have given any crew all they needed to safely operate the MAX and not generate Rheinwaldner's the MAX was 260 less times safe than anything else stat.

The MAX has 260 times higher crash causing system failure rate than any other aircraft. That is a fact. When other aircraft don't crash at all during the first 5 to 10 years after EIS, the MAX already had two crashes. Primarily because of a horrible design by the vendor. This is explained in great detail by the first accident report, which provides an overwhelming evidence to blame Boeing and hardly any material to blame the pilots. To say otherwise, you must demonstrate an extraordinary level of selective reading, by picking sparse information from a small number of pages, all while being in complete denial about dozens of pages full of horror stories about Boeings and the FAAs failures.

No, the MAX has the worst safety record of any new aircraft since many decades and will probably in many years not be able to reach normal levels for fatalities per RPK again. The amplitude of the MAX in the crash statistics is so dramatic, that the pilots are not in focus anymore. Pilots do contribute the majority to the 100 or so fatalities per RPK that we see with other aircraft. But if one single aircraft has 4550 fatalities per RPK, the share of the contributions is clear: all fault is the MAXs. This follows without doubt from the theory of failure rate additivity. The worldwide pool of pilots, who were good enough and trained enough to fly NGs entirely without any notable impact on the safety statistics, now suddenly are causing an aicraft to crash about a hundred times more often than we would expect. That should really make it clear, that your posts mostly are red herrings which are in denial of the real issue and the complex and overwhelming situation these pilots faced.

morrisond wrote:

If it turns out I'm right - lack of training is a lot bigger factor in why the crashes happened and needs to be a lot bigger part of the discussion on how the MAX is safely returned to service.

It is high grade cynical if you are asking that part of the discussion to become a lot bigger. It is impossible, that it can become bigger than it already is! You should really give it a rest for 6 hours from time to time.

morrisond wrote:

767333ER wrote:

morrisond wrote:

You need to read the OPS bulletin as well and not just the AD and also read the Boeing Memo from Nov 10, 2018 talking about MCAS from the AVherald. Look on the last page for links.

They have to leave some wiggle room as not every situation is precisely the same - otherwise you would need 10 different versions of the OPS bulletin to handle specific situations.

Pilots are used to these and are expected to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.

But that’s the point. Their language is not to the point even though they know full well how the system works and SHOULD know the risks it poses. It leaves too much wiggle room that doesn’t need to be there because we have seen that this problem repeats the same way as one would expect with a computer program. It’s too wish washy. As well, I don’t care how many versions of bulletins are needed, safety comes first.

You analogy is faulty, the situation more like expecting someone to text, drive, comb their hair, and eat at the same time.

I'm of the opinion if that any pilot that was intelligent enough to get there initial PPL should have easily been able to understand these OP's bulletins. I surmise they never actually took the time to properly understand them or commit them to memory or have them on hand in the cockpit - which you would assume a reasonably competent safety minded pilot would do.

They are not that difficult to folllow. It is nowhere near the type of complicated procedure Pilots need to master (Landing in a gusty crosswind probably being the most complex) to successfully operate a flight.

However as I have speculated before I don't really believe ET put a lot of effort into making sure there pilots had these procedures or ensured they understood them.

I pin that right back on ET.

'.......I surmise they never actually took the time to properly understand them or commit them to memory or have them on hand in the cockpit - which you would assume a reasonably competent safety minded pilot would do...…..'
Not supported or evidenced. Those who new the PIC personally have been reported as stating he was conscientious and would even report early for his scheduled flight to ensure he was fully prepared and appraised of status. Despicable.

morrisond wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Everyone here accuses me of making it all about the training/pilots when in reality it's people like yourselves that keep bringing up these issues.

I'm not on here every Six hours doing the lack of training equivalent of a "It's a deadly airplane, All the executives at Boeing should hang".

But if you really want to go there every day so you have a place to vent your frustrations - so be it.

Yes they did hit the cut-off switches but given that they did not put the plane back in trim before doing so, did not disengage the auto throttle and allowed the plane to accelerate past Vmo, barely tried the Manual wheels (it's debatable they even did this - they may not have extended the helper handle and they both didn't try together) and then they re-engaged the electric trim with no crew communication whatsoever I would say turning it off at first was a lucky guess and in no way shape or form proves that they understood the issue or the way to counteract it.

It just strongly suggests that even if they did have the proper procedure they barely glanced at it - did not have it in the cockpit with them and basically put about as much personal effort into being a good safe pilot who have the responsibility of safely getting there passengers back to the ground in one piece as big city cab drivers do in following the rules of the road.

A poster reminded me of an old Latin wording I had long forgotten. But it struck me that it applies very well.

'...barely tried the Manual wheels (it's debatable they even did this - they may not have extended the helper handle and they both didn't try together)...'
Ad Ignorantiam. No facts, not evidenced.

'.... and then they re-engaged the electric trim with no crew communication whatsoever....'
Ad Ignorantiam. No Facts, not evidenced.

'......I would say turning it off at first was a lucky guess and in no way shape or form proves that they understood the issue or the way to counteract it.....'
Ad Ignorantiam. No facts, not evidenced.

'....It just strongly suggests that even if they did have the proper procedure they barely glanced at it.....'
Ad Ignorantiam. No facts, not evidenced.

'......- did not have it in the cockpit with them.....'
Ad Ignorantiam. No facts, not evidenced.

'..... and basically put about as much personal effort into being a good safe pilot who have the responsibility of safely getting there passengers back to the ground...'
Ad Ignorantiam. No facts, not evidenced and despicably sick charge.

Pilots were overwhelmed.

How did the ET crash present differently than what is laid out in the OPS bulletin? It was an almost perfect recreation of what Boeing said to look for in the OPS bulletin and further information given to it's operators and was what the pilots should have been looking for given what happened to Lionair. This should have been a non-event to handle if it was top of mind.

Besides Boeing's really shitty design it's despicably sick that ET put so little effort into giving there pilots the knowledge and skills necessary to safely operate the aircraft.

'.....ET put so little effort into giving there pilots the knowledge and skills necessary to safely operate the aircraft....'
Ad Ignorantiam. No Facts, not evidenced.

Pilots were overwhelmed.

XRAYretired wrote:

Not supported or evidenced. Those who new the PIC personally have been reported as stating he was conscientious and would even report early for his scheduled flight to ensure he was fully prepared and appraised of status. Despicable.

It's absolutely supported and evidenced. Saying otherwise is simply looking at the evidence, and then turning around and saying it doesn't exist.

It's evidenced by . . . wait for it . . . their failure to properly apply the actions. So logically that leaves us only three options.

1) They had no knowledge of the past procedures/new EAD.

2) they had some knowledge of the procedure, but not enough to identify if it was applicable to the issue at hand

3) They had strong knowledge of the procedure, and knew it was applicable, but didn't have enough application knowledge to use the procedure correctly.

In any case, the evidence strongly suggests that their knowledge of the procedure and/or when to apply it was inadequate. Making the excuse that they were "overwhelmed" enforces the point that these are memory items - actions that will be remembered under a stressful scenario.

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

aerolimani wrote:

The switches are on the control column. The captain was holding the control column, flying the plane manually. His hands were literally right there by the switches. Why would he need to ask the FO to do anything other than turn the manual wheel? Or, are you suggesting that the captain couldn't "walk and chew gum at the same time"?

He might have thought that his electric trim switch on his yoke was faulty or that it should have still been working and was asking the First Officer to try his on his yoke not understanding they had turned off the whole system using the Stab Trim cutoff switches (or they just flipped one of them like they would have on the NG) mounted just below the throttles. He was certified on the NG as well and might have assumed that he still had Electric Trim available and was confused as to why it was not working.

Flipping only one of the switches on the MAX which would have stopped MCAS (according to http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm). Whereas just flipping one of the swtiches on the NG would have still left him with Manual Electric Trim but turning off the ability of things like STS to affect the trim of the aircraft.

It's entirely possible this is what happened.

MISS-INFORMATION - There are no NG procedures, in the QRHs I have seen, that infer or require the operation of only one of the cut-out switches. Operation of both at the same time is required.

MISS-REPRESNTATION - b737.org does not state or imply that there is any NG procedure that require the operation of only one of the cut-out switches (probably because there aren't any).

No there is no procedure - but did they actually call out they were following a procedure? All he (the First Officer) basically said was should I hit the cut-out switch. He did not call out lets do a procedure.

We do not know what he was thinking or how many switches he turned off.

rheinwaldner wrote:

How refreshing and sober was this thread, when morrisond gave it a rest at least for six hours. It seems he has found some spare time again to cover this topic again with his accusations.

morrisond wrote:

If you read the three sources there was quite a lot of information out there that should have given any crew all they needed to safely operate the MAX and not generate Rheinwaldner's the MAX was 260 less times safe than anything else stat.

The MAX has 260 times higher crash causing system failure rate than any other aircraft. That is a fact. When other aircraft don't crash at all during the first 5 to 10 years after EIS, the MAX already had two crashes. Primarily because of a horrible design by the vendor. This is explained in great detail by the first accident report, which provides an overwhelming evidence to blame Boeing and hardly any material to blame the pilots. To say otherwise, you must demonstrate an extraordinary level of selective reading, by picking sparse information from a small number of pages, all while being in complete denial about dozens of pages full of horror stories about Boeings and the FAAs failures.

No, the MAX has the worst safety record of any new aircraft since many decades and will probably in many years not be able to reach normal levels for fatalities per RPK again. The amplitude of the MAX in the crash statistics is so dramatic, that the pilots are not in focus anymore. Pilots do contribute the majority to the 100 or so fatalities per RPK that we see with other aircraft. But if one single aircraft has 4550 fatalities per RPK, the share of the contributions is clear: all fault is the MAXs. This follows without doubt from the theory of failure rate additivity. The worldwide pool of pilots, who were good enough and trained enough to fly NGs entirely without any notable impact on the safety statistics, now suddenly are causing an aicraft to crash about a hundred times more often than we would expect. That should really make it clear, that your posts mostly are red herrings which are in denial of the real issue and the complex and overwhelming situation these pilots faced.

morrisond wrote:

If it turns out I'm right - lack of training is a lot bigger factor in why the crashes happened and needs to be a lot bigger part of the discussion on how the MAX is safely returned to service.

It is high grade cynical if you are asking that part of the discussion to become a lot bigger. It is impossible, that it can become bigger than it already is! You should really give it a rest for 6 hours from time to time.

Yes that final crash report that was called seriously into question by the NYT for what it omitted.

And you are right - the MAX did have awful stats. However the second crash was easily preventable by the information that was freely available at the time and should have been supplied to the pilots by their airline. Cutting your stat in half.

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

767333ER wrote:

But that’s the point. Their language is not to the point even though they know full well how the system works and SHOULD know the risks it poses. It leaves too much wiggle room that doesn’t need to be there because we have seen that this problem repeats the same way as one would expect with a computer program. It’s too wish washy. As well, I don’t care how many versions of bulletins are needed, safety comes first.

You analogy is faulty, the situation more like expecting someone to text, drive, comb their hair, and eat at the same time.

I'm of the opinion if that any pilot that was intelligent enough to get there initial PPL should have easily been able to understand these OP's bulletins. I surmise they never actually took the time to properly understand them or commit them to memory or have them on hand in the cockpit - which you would assume a reasonably competent safety minded pilot would do.

They are not that difficult to folllow. It is nowhere near the type of complicated procedure Pilots need to master (Landing in a gusty crosswind probably being the most complex) to successfully operate a flight.

However as I have speculated before I don't really believe ET put a lot of effort into making sure there pilots had these procedures or ensured they understood them.

I pin that right back on ET.

'.......I surmise they never actually took the time to properly understand them or commit them to memory or have them on hand in the cockpit - which you would assume a reasonably competent safety minded pilot would do...…..'
Not supported or evidenced. Those who new the PIC personally have been reported as stating he was conscientious and would even report early for his scheduled flight to ensure he was fully prepared and appraised of status. Despicable.

And went through ET primary training as the same time as the Captain of ET409.

If in the final report they are found to utter the words - hey this seems like it's the MCAS system - let's run the procedure we just learned. Then I'll freely admit I had this all wrong.

morrisond wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

How refreshing and sober was this thread, when morrisond gave it a rest at least for six hours. It seems he has found some spare time again to cover this topic again with his accusations.

morrisond wrote:

If you read the three sources there was quite a lot of information out there that should have given any crew all they needed to safely operate the MAX and not generate Rheinwaldner's the MAX was 260 less times safe than anything else stat.

The MAX has 260 times higher crash causing system failure rate than any other aircraft. That is a fact. When other aircraft don't crash at all during the first 5 to 10 years after EIS, the MAX already had two crashes. Primarily because of a horrible design by the vendor. This is explained in great detail by the first accident report, which provides an overwhelming evidence to blame Boeing and hardly any material to blame the pilots. To say otherwise, you must demonstrate an extraordinary level of selective reading, by picking sparse information from a small number of pages, all while being in complete denial about dozens of pages full of horror stories about Boeings and the FAAs failures.

No, the MAX has the worst safety record of any new aircraft since many decades and will probably in many years not be able to reach normal levels for fatalities per RPK again. The amplitude of the MAX in the crash statistics is so dramatic, that the pilots are not in focus anymore. Pilots do contribute the majority to the 100 or so fatalities per RPK that we see with other aircraft. But if one single aircraft has 4550 fatalities per RPK, the share of the contributions is clear: all fault is the MAXs. This follows without doubt from the theory of failure rate additivity. The worldwide pool of pilots, who were good enough and trained enough to fly NGs entirely without any notable impact on the safety statistics, now suddenly are causing an aicraft to crash about a hundred times more often than we would expect. That should really make it clear, that your posts mostly are red herrings which are in denial of the real issue and the complex and overwhelming situation these pilots faced.

morrisond wrote:

If it turns out I'm right - lack of training is a lot bigger factor in why the crashes happened and needs to be a lot bigger part of the discussion on how the MAX is safely returned to service.

It is high grade cynical if you are asking that part of the discussion to become a lot bigger. It is impossible, that it can become bigger than it already is! You should really give it a rest for 6 hours from time to time.

Yes that final crash report that was called seriously into question by the NYT for what it omitted.

And you are right - the MAX did have awful stats. However the second crash was easily preventable by the information that was freely available at the time and should have been supplied to the pilots by their airline. Cutting your stat in half.

Even with the most perfectly trained humans, everyone has bad days. People have sudden and terminal brain aneurysms. Even if the ET302 crash had been prevented, a hypothetical perfect pilot world, it would still be only a matter of time before a second crash. And then, we'd be right back where we are. Training standards notwithstanding, the plane has a major problem. The grounding is justified.

Pilots are not there to compensate for crappy design. How many times need it be said? If training is really so absolutely important, then why did the entire world decided to ground the aircraft? Heck… post-grounding, some countries wouldn't even let the MAX overfly their territory for any reason; neither test nor ferry flights.

morrisond wrote:

I'm not the one who keeps bringing it back up. Others do by making factually incorrect statements - I am just correcting them.

Why exactly do persist in this? You do show rather a tendency to do little else in this thread other than serve the function of making corrections to what you feel is correct.

morrisond wrote:

If it turns out I'm right - lack of training is a lot bigger factor in why the crashes happened and needs to be a lot bigger part of the discussion on how the MAX is safely returned to service.

It doesn't matter how "right" you are or not. The specific circumstances of ET302 are not relevant to the grounding or ungrounding. Suggesting that they are is a delusion on your part. The second crash merely triggered the regulators to investigate the MAX more closely, and those investigations triggered the grounding. The crashes themselves was not required to justify the grounding. While the crashes provide insight for us to understand MCAS, the pilot factors of the specific incidents are irrelevant to the nature of any ungrounding. Any new training requirements will not be based on the results of the ET302 or JT610 final reports. Instead, they will be based on any differences between the NG and the MAX. Frankly, upon RTS, I'd very be surprised if the new MAX training regimen is any more rigorous than what was previously provided.

At best, the ET302 final report is likely to recommend changes at ET. I highly doubt that the FAA, the EASA, the TCCA, or any other civil aviation agency, is going to recommend changes to pilot training regimens as a result of the report. So… what I'm saying is, don't hold your breath.

In the meantime, feel free to go complain in the thread that was started on your behalf: Pilots, good, bad, how well trained

hivue wrote:

hilram wrote:

The bad idea was to spend all that Boeing cash on Share-buybacks over the years leading up to the A320 neo, as well as outsourcing engineering and expertise?
What if money had been spent on an NSA right away?

Excellent point. Boeing could have been farsighted way back before the A320NEO was even being considered, and come up with a new FBW single aisle design to replace the 40+ year-old 737 design (now 50 year-old) as an A320 competitor. But the 737 has been Boeing's cash (to give to share holders, execs and managers, for buybacks) cow. Since it worked so well in that capacity, the temptation to keep milking it was impossible to resist for the executive suite and the bean counters. Unfortunately, karma struck big time, and the cash cow now has to be fed on cash.

Are you missing the point where Boeing has sold thousands of them to customers? The myopic and biased opinion that misses reality doesn’t become more true the more times you say it. The A320 is not a spring chicken age wise. Boeing has been considering NSA for years. If they could have developed it, to sell at a price to airlines that makes the profit and ROI, and their sole goal is to line the greedy exec/managers profits, they would have. If their greedy goal is profit maximization, why would they not have scrapped the 737?

The thousands of frames, the hundreds of direct and indirect companies supporting the supply chain, a billions of dollar supply chain, pushes all of the incentive towards iterating on the proven platform. Something all businesses do.

Designing new planes is not easy, only Airbus and Boeing can do it. BBD and EMB both failed on their own to create critical mass outside of the commercial space and are now owned by A and B.

But yes, with current engine tech and materials, they could have spent $10-$15 billion dollars to sell a plane that is marginally better than the 737/A320, but they would lose all the pricing power that Airbus would have. Cash flow would take a decade plus to hit the bottom line. Airlines would be happy to operate the “ancient” A320NEO relative to the NSA. Meanwhile their 737 residual income from support and maintenance would continue to dwindle. Would you be applauding the greedy execs and bean counters for not lining their pockets, instead developing an expensive plane that marginally moves the needle?

Does the government work over the christmas/new year holiday in the US?

And I think it is now safe to say Boeings early Q4 RTS is now out of the window. Depending on the US government work schedule and also if there is another government shut down Q1 2020 might become Q2.
Kind of a massive insentive to keep your government running when the wellbeing of your nr.1 exporter is effected.

FluidFlow wrote:

Does the government work over the christmas/new year holiday in the US?

And I think it is now safe to say Boeings early Q4 RTS is now out of the window. Depending on the US government work schedule and also if there is another government shut down Q1 2020 might become Q2.
Kind of a massive insentive to keep your government running when the wellbeing of your nr.1 exporter is effected.

I disagree, as that is exactly the line of thought that caused the problem in the first place. Boeing must not get special treatment with the regulator. If the FAA closes shop for smaller company during the holidays, it should close shop for Boeing too.

EASA is flying the MAX in the second half of December. Then they will need to digest, figure out and decide about. When is the ET final report due?
Are there any FAA progress reports available, what modifications might be already accepted on their part?

FAAs turn under the spotlight confirmed for Dec 11th in the house.

Process toward RTS is progressing smoothly - not.
'...U.S. officials told Reuters last week it is extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that the FAA will unground the plane before the end of December....'
https://money.usnews.com/investing/news ... ng-737-max

Ray

Approaching the FAA green light there should be some minor steps visible by now ahead of the final permit? Or are they on hold for some reason? Are we coming closer at all?

Based on a Reuter's report in the last 18 hours, the software documentation revisions are still not complete. Many posters here surmised this was just dotting i's and crossing t's formality. Or is the audit itself incomplete / suspended for more fundamental reasons?

Also the test flight still hasn't occurred. That suggests the audit isn't complete, because the MCAS re-work isn't complete, hence there still isn't a signed off MCAS 2.0 to fly / test / certify.

smartplane wrote:

Based on a Reuter's report in the last 18 hours, the software documentation revisions are still not complete. Many posters here surmised this was just dotting i's and crossing t's formality. Or is the audit itself incomplete / suspended for more fundamental reasons?

Also the test flight still hasn't occurred. That suggests the audit isn't complete, because the MCAS re-work isn't complete, hence there still isn't a signed off MCAS 2.0 to fly / test / certify.

The software rewrite involves a complete change in how the flight computers operate; which his far more complicated than MCAS. This came from the "5 specific Bit Flip" issue identified in June. MCAS itself represents a rather simple change in comparison; and reports in June was that MCAS V2.0 tested OK at the time. My personal guess is that without the Bit Flip issue that the RTS based on MCAS only would have been late July or August.

Have a great day,

smartplane wrote:

Based on a Reuter's report in the last 18 hours, the software documentation revisions are still not complete. Many posters here surmised this was just dotting i's and crossing t's formality. Or is the audit itself incomplete / suspended for more fundamental reasons?

Also the test flight still hasn't occurred. That suggests the audit isn't complete, because the MCAS re-work isn't complete, hence there still isn't a signed off MCAS 2.0 to fly / test / certify.

Sorry - where is this Reuter's report? I have not seen it. Thanks.

morrisond wrote:

767333ER wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I'll assume you didn't see my last post before responding to my previous one.

Actually if you read all three sources it about covers everything you mentioned as well. The OPS bulletin covers the 5 second issue.

You said Boeing and the FAA did nothing after Lionair and kept it secret.

You would be wrong on that point.

Do they really need to point out that one of the controls might not work if they are outside the normal operating envelope?

Most of the controls won't work so well below stall speed either.

That AD 2018-23-51 draws on the recovery technique for runaway trim for the NG. It erroneously does not mention that if you hit the cutout once the trim has been running and is out of trim, you won’t get it back manually. Neither the AD or the OPS bulletin precisely describe how MCAS works or mention it by name. It says it can go “up to” 10 seconds with a 5 second delay between increments. It is not specific enough as to how long it will run or how much trim it can apply in that window even though it should be.

They most definitely do need to point out that the trim wheel doesn’t work when overspeed since a runaway trim would have you over speed in no time. Again it is vague/indecisive as it says one “can” use electric trim to recover the trim before hitting the cutout. Words like “can” and “up to” do not belong in ADs and OPS Bulletins. With this language one has to encounter the situation before they know for sure what is actually the case rather than what “can” be the case. The AD and OPS aren’t technically wrong, but they make me scratch my head with imprecise language like that.

You need to read the OPS bulletin as well and not just the AD and also read the Boeing Memo from Nov 10, 2018 talking about MCAS from the AVherald. Look on the last page for links.

They have to leave some wiggle room as not every situation is precisely the same - otherwise you would need 10 different versions of the OPS bulletin to handle specific situations.

Pilots are used to these and are expected to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.

In your reference I found the AD and the OPS bulletin, none mentions MCAS, but not the reference to a Boeing Memo from the 10th of November 2018. I looked at the AVHerald, but could not find it there either.

In regards to the AD and the OPS bulletin, both do not mention, that after MCAS skewed the trim, the manual trim wheel will not work, or be to heavy to turn.

mjoelnir wrote:

morrisond wrote:

767333ER wrote:

That AD 2018-23-51 draws on the recovery technique for runaway trim for the NG. It erroneously does not mention that if you hit the cutout once the trim has been running and is out of trim, you won’t get it back manually. Neither the AD or the OPS bulletin precisely describe how MCAS works or mention it by name. It says it can go “up to” 10 seconds with a 5 second delay between increments. It is not specific enough as to how long it will run or how much trim it can apply in that window even though it should be.

They most definitely do need to point out that the trim wheel doesn’t work when overspeed since a runaway trim would have you over speed in no time. Again it is vague/indecisive as it says one “can” use electric trim to recover the trim before hitting the cutout. Words like “can” and “up to” do not belong in ADs and OPS Bulletins. With this language one has to encounter the situation before they know for sure what is actually the case rather than what “can” be the case. The AD and OPS aren’t technically wrong, but they make me scratch my head with imprecise language like that.

You need to read the OPS bulletin as well and not just the AD and also read the Boeing Memo from Nov 10, 2018 talking about MCAS from the AVherald. Look on the last page for links.

They have to leave some wiggle room as not every situation is precisely the same - otherwise you would need 10 different versions of the OPS bulletin to handle specific situations.

Pilots are used to these and are expected to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.

In your reference I found the AD and the OPS bulletin, none mentions MCAS, but not the reference to a Boeing Memo from the 10th of November 2018. I looked at the AVHerald, but could not find it there either.

In regards to the AD and the OPS bulletin, both do not mention, that after MCAS skewed the trim, the manual trim wheel will not work, or be to heavy to turn.

Check your inbox - I sent the AVherald excerpt to that yesterday so I didn't have to post it here.

Yes above Vmo the trim wheel would be pretty hard to turn - just like it would be pretty useless below stall speed as well.

morrisond wrote:

Yes above Vmo the trim wheel would be pretty hard to turn

Aircraft safety require pitch control up to Vd.

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

morrisond wrote:

You need to read the OPS bulletin as well and not just the AD and also read the Boeing Memo from Nov 10, 2018 talking about MCAS from the AVherald. Look on the last page for links.

They have to leave some wiggle room as not every situation is precisely the same - otherwise you would need 10 different versions of the OPS bulletin to handle specific situations.

Pilots are used to these and are expected to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.

In your reference I found the AD and the OPS bulletin, none mentions MCAS, but not the reference to a Boeing Memo from the 10th of November 2018. I looked at the AVHerald, but could not find it there either.

In regards to the AD and the OPS bulletin, both do not mention, that after MCAS skewed the trim, the manual trim wheel will not work, or be to heavy to turn.

Check your inbox - I sent the AVherald excerpt to that yesterday so I didn't have to post it here.

Yes above Vmo the trim wheel would be pretty hard to turn - just like it would be pretty useless below stall speed as well.

Yes I found it now on AVHerald.

but have a look at the message and how misleading and unaccact that message is.

A pitch augmentation system function called 'Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’ (MCAS) is implemented on the 737-8, -9 (MAX) to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and dunng flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column tnm switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using Input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

When MCAS activated the frame was not in a step turn. There was no elevated load factor. The frame was not flown at a speed approaching stall.

The flight control computer does not use sensors (plural indicates multiple sensors) and input from other airplane systems, but input from exactly one sensor only. It seems to point to how MCAS was first designed, but not how it ended up to be. Nowhere is mentioned, that the failure of one AoA sensor can start the MCAS action.

The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer Incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer Input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function Is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.

What altitude is necessary, so that MCAS goes active?
It mentions a second MCAS activation, but not multiple, or how do English speakers understand the word another?
What means reset in this case? Usually reset, would be mean reset to be able to act again. MCAS is acting again, with or without reset.

If my technicians would have written this inexact description for a safety critical feature, they would have heard something from me. Does nobody at Boeing reviews messages for accuracy?

2175301 wrote:

smartplane wrote:

Based on a Reuter's report in the last 18 hours, the software documentation revisions are still not complete. Many posters here surmised this was just dotting i's and crossing t's formality. Or is the audit itself incomplete / suspended for more fundamental reasons?

Also the test flight still hasn't occurred. That suggests the audit isn't complete, because the MCAS re-work isn't complete, hence there still isn't a signed off MCAS 2.0 to fly / test / certify.

The software rewrite involves a complete change in how the flight computers operate; which his far more complicated than MCAS. This came from the "5 specific Bit Flip" issue identified in June. MCAS itself represents a rather simple change in comparison; and reports in June was that MCAS V2.0 tested OK at the time. My personal guess is that without the Bit Flip issue that the RTS based on MCAS only would have been late July or August.

Have a great day,

I'm not sure that the issue is the bit flip software change, it looks as if Boeing has been testing MCAS software thoroughly up until at least Nov. 23:

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/BOE ... /KBFI/KBFI

XRAYretired wrote:

FAAs turn under the spotlight confirmed for Dec 11th in the house.

Process toward RTS is progressing smoothly - not.
'...U.S. officials told Reuters last week it is extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that the FAA will unground the plane before the end of December....'
https://money.usnews.com/investing/news ... ng-737-max

Ray

On Nov. 14, Dickson told his team to "take whatever time is needed" in their review of the 737 MAX. The comments came days after Boeing said it expected the FAA to certify the 737 MAX, issue an airworthiness directive and unground the plane in mid-December, even as it acknowledged it would not win approval for changes to pilot training until January.

I wonder if this means the FAA is not on board with ungrounding the plane without the approved pilot training changes?

cledaybuck wrote:

On Nov. 14, Dickson told his team to "take whatever time is needed" in their review of the 737 MAX. The comments came days after Boeing said it expected the FAA to certify the 737 MAX, issue an airworthiness directive and unground the plane in mid-December, even as it acknowledged it would not win approval for changes to pilot training until January.

I wonder if this means the FAA is not on board with ungrounding the plane without the approved pilot training changes?

It's probably more that the FAA needs to appear dominant and that the timeline put forth by Boeing was another classic project manager's "most optimistic situation possible" prediction, i.e. everything goes perfectly smoothly and everyone nails it the first time through while working overtime (which never actually pans out in the real world.

Judging on past timelines put out by Boeing over the past year I'd bet it's safe to at least double any amount of time they give until RTS

cledaybuck wrote:

On Nov. 14, Dickson told his team to "take whatever time is needed" in their review of the 737 MAX. The comments came days after Boeing said it expected the FAA to certify the 737 MAX, issue an airworthiness directive and unground the plane in mid-December, even as it acknowledged it would not win approval for changes to pilot training until January.

I wonder if this means the FAA is not on board with ungrounding the plane without the approved pilot training changes?

If pilot proficiency had nothing to do with the fatal crashes why would the FAA use them as a issue with RTS?
If they think training is an issue it can certainly be addressed, but including it with the MAX RTS is what, piling on?
I guess this may be the result of the FAA having internal battles on their roles in the aviation industry in the USA.

mjoelnir wrote:

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

In your reference I found the AD and the OPS bulletin, none mentions MCAS, but not the reference to a Boeing Memo from the 10th of November 2018. I looked at the AVHerald, but could not find it there either.

In regards to the AD and the OPS bulletin, both do not mention, that after MCAS skewed the trim, the manual trim wheel will not work, or be to heavy to turn.

Check your inbox - I sent the AVherald excerpt to that yesterday so I didn't have to post it here.

Yes above Vmo the trim wheel would be pretty hard to turn - just like it would be pretty useless below stall speed as well.

Yes I found it now on AVHerald.

but have a look at the message and how misleading and unaccact that message is.

A pitch augmentation system function called 'Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’ (MCAS) is implemented on the 737-8, -9 (MAX) to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and dunng flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column tnm switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using Input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

When MCAS activated the frame was not in a step turn. There was no elevated load factor. The frame was not flown at a speed approaching stall.

The flight control computer does not use sensors (plural indicates multiple sensors) and input from other airplane systems, but input from exactly one sensor only. It seems to point to how MCAS was first designed, but not how it ended up to be. Nowhere is mentioned, that the failure of one AoA sensor can start the MCAS action.

The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer Incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer Input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function Is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.

What altitude is necessary, so that MCAS goes active?
It mentions a second MCAS activation, but not multiple, or how do English speakers understand the word another?
What means reset in this case? Usually reset, would be mean reset to be able to act again. MCAS is acting again, with or without reset.

If my technicians would have written this inexact description for a safety critical feature, they would have heard something from me. Does nobody at Boeing reviews messages for accuracy?

That was just an explanation on the background of the system. I do not know for sure but I expect there is more detail in the Maintenance manual that was available before Lionair.

If you look at the OPS bulletin here http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm - Look at MLI-15 - it talks about what happens "in the event of erroneous AOA data".

MCAS 1.0 remains active as long as the AOA remains above the threshold and will keep firing until the AOA is below the threshold. I think reset just means stops acting unless AOA goes too high again.

I wish there was a way to mark certain posts are important, for example those with new information. Instead we have a back and forth with zero new information going back thousands of posts.

For anyone seeking to know the gist of the situation, these threads are now almost meaningless.

par13del wrote:

cledaybuck wrote:

On Nov. 14, Dickson told his team to "take whatever time is needed" in their review of the 737 MAX. The comments came days after Boeing said it expected the FAA to certify the 737 MAX, issue an airworthiness directive and unground the plane in mid-December, even as it acknowledged it would not win approval for changes to pilot training until January.

I wonder if this means the FAA is not on board with ungrounding the plane without the approved pilot training changes?

If pilot proficiency had nothing to do with the fatal crashes why would the FAA use them as a issue with RTS?
If they think training is an issue it can certainly be addressed, but including it with the MAX RTS is what, piling on?
I guess this may be the result of the FAA having internal battles on their roles in the aviation industry in the USA.

Oh dear. It is Boeing that is trying to manipulate the process so that they can deliver before the full package, including the type specific training requirements, is in place. All types have specific training requirements, as I'm sure you know.

Ray

Revelation wrote:

The reality is that MAX was the right business strategy in 2011, and no matter how you look at it Boeing's engineering team let the company down by producing a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane. I'm sure they were facing heavy pressure from managers, but it is part of an engineer's job to resist such pressure and not produce a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane.

I'm not sure I agree. I think one of the reasons that HQ moved the Chicago was to allow situations like compromised engineering to happen if deemed necessary by management. Engineers aren't the types of people to let shoddy work happen, especially in the aerospace industry. From my experience anyhow. I've heard, and this may be wrong, that Boeing compartmentalized engineering to such a level that very few but management had a full view of the overall systems.

Even so, I think it's management's job to let engineers do their job properly, without management allowing a situation that would compromise such critical elements of design.

Jesus, still blaming the pilots..... Glad I barely read this thread anymore.

Any substantive news about RTS?

par13del wrote:

cledaybuck wrote:

On Nov. 14, Dickson told his team to "take whatever time is needed" in their review of the 737 MAX. The comments came days after Boeing said it expected the FAA to certify the 737 MAX, issue an airworthiness directive and unground the plane in mid-December, even as it acknowledged it would not win approval for changes to pilot training until January.

I wonder if this means the FAA is not on board with ungrounding the plane without the approved pilot training changes?

If pilot proficiency had nothing to do with the fatal crashes why would the FAA use them as a issue with RTS?
If they think training is an issue it can certainly be addressed, but including it with the MAX RTS is what, piling on?
I guess this may be the result of the FAA having internal battles on their roles in the aviation industry in the USA.

Would you call A320 pilots not proficient enough if they have problems handling 747? They need to be trained for that task, chances are they will be OK after proper training. .
Same story - NG proficient pilots may not be such for MAX. Maybe not a fully new type, though, but definitely something. I assume that meaning of "something" is under discussion

It's the start of December. Return to service is delayed until early April for WN, AA, and UA starting in 10, 9, 8...

XRAYretired wrote:

Oh dear. It is Boeing that is trying to manipulate the process so that they can deliver before the full package, including the type specific training requirements, is in place. All types have specific training requirements, as I'm sure you know.

Ray

You do know that the FAA is responsible for the RTS and that Boeing has admitted that as much as they would like the a/c RTS in June-2019, July-2019, Nov-2019 and Dec-2019 they have stated that it is up to the regulators to approve RTS, do we really have to go and obtain the Boeing press release where they made that statement?
Additional, why are we talking about Boeing, the question raised relates to the FAA and whether they are holding the RTS while waiting for a decision on training, that is the domain of
the FAA not Boeing, you restating Boeing's position assist with the question how?

kalvado wrote:

Would you call A320 pilots not proficient enough if they have problems handling 747? They need to be trained for that task, chances are they will be OK after proper training. .
Same story - NG proficient pilots may not be such for MAX. Maybe not a fully new type, though, but definitely something. I assume that meaning of "something" is under discussion

The question was raised whether the FAA was holding RTS of the MAX due to training requirements.

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Check your inbox - I sent the AVherald excerpt to that yesterday so I didn't have to post it here.

Yes above Vmo the trim wheel would be pretty hard to turn - just like it would be pretty useless below stall speed as well.

Yes I found it now on AVHerald.

but have a look at the message and how misleading and unaccact that message is.

A pitch augmentation system function called 'Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’ (MCAS) is implemented on the 737-8, -9 (MAX) to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and dunng flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column tnm switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using Input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

When MCAS activated the frame was not in a step turn. There was no elevated load factor. The frame was not flown at a speed approaching stall.

The flight control computer does not use sensors (plural indicates multiple sensors) and input from other airplane systems, but input from exactly one sensor only. It seems to point to how MCAS was first designed, but not how it ended up to be. Nowhere is mentioned, that the failure of one AoA sensor can start the MCAS action.

The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer Incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer Input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function Is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.

What altitude is necessary, so that MCAS goes active?
It mentions a second MCAS activation, but not multiple, or how do English speakers understand the word another?
What means reset in this case? Usually reset, would be mean reset to be able to act again. MCAS is acting again, with or without reset.

If my technicians would have written this inexact description for a safety critical feature, they would have heard something from me. Does nobody at Boeing reviews messages for accuracy?

That was just an explanation on the background of the system. I do not know for sure but I expect there is more detail in the Maintenance manual that was available before Lionair.

If you look at the OPS bulletin here http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm - Look at MLI-15 - it talks about what happens "in the event of erroneous AOA data".

MCAS 1.0 remains active as long as the AOA remains above the threshold and will keep firing until the AOA is below the threshold. I think reset just means stops acting unless AOA goes too high again.

We are not backpadeling suddenly?
You declared that the AD, the OPS and the memo would give full picture for a pilot flying the 737MAX, what he would have to expect and how he would have to react.
A perfect set of information.
Such information is not allowd to be ambiguous.
The first part of the message is worthy of a story teller. Nearly nothing to do with the reality of MCAS. The second part is ambiguous and ambiguous should a technical description never be. It does not matter what you think it means or what I thing it means, their should be no room for interpretations, technical descriptions have to be exact.

And once again,we are not talking about the maintenance manual, it has absolutely nothing to do with this discussion, we are talking about the information available to the pilot.

mjoelnir wrote:

morrisond wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

Yes I found it now on AVHerald.

but have a look at the message and how misleading and unaccact that message is.

A pitch augmentation system function called 'Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’ (MCAS) is implemented on the 737-8, -9 (MAX) to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and dunng flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column tnm switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using Input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

When MCAS activated the frame was not in a step turn. There was no elevated load factor. The frame was not flown at a speed approaching stall.

The flight control computer does not use sensors (plural indicates multiple sensors) and input from other airplane systems, but input from exactly one sensor only. It seems to point to how MCAS was first designed, but not how it ended up to be. Nowhere is mentioned, that the failure of one AoA sensor can start the MCAS action.

The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer Incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer Input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function Is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.

What altitude is necessary, so that MCAS goes active?
It mentions a second MCAS activation, but not multiple, or how do English speakers understand the word another?
What means reset in this case? Usually reset, would be mean reset to be able to act again. MCAS is acting again, with or without reset.

If my technicians would have written this inexact description for a safety critical feature, they would have heard something from me. Does nobody at Boeing reviews messages for accuracy?

That was just an explanation on the background of the system. I do not know for sure but I expect there is more detail in the Maintenance manual that was available before Lionair.

If you look at the OPS bulletin here http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm - Look at MLI-15 - it talks about what happens "in the event of erroneous AOA data".

MCAS 1.0 remains active as long as the AOA remains above the threshold and will keep firing until the AOA is below the threshold. I think reset just means stops acting unless AOA goes too high again.

We are not backpadeling suddenly?
You declared that the AD, the OPS and the memo would give full picture for a pilot flying the 737MAX, what he would have to expect and how he would have to react.
A perfect set of information.
Such information is not allowd to be ambiguous.
The first part of the message is worthy of a story teller. Nearly nothing to do with the reality of MCAS. The second part is ambiguous and ambiguous should a technical description never be. It does not matter what you think it means or what I thing it means, their should be no room for interpretations, technical descriptions have to be exact.

And once again,we are not talking about the maintenance manual, it has absolutely nothing to do with this discussion, we are talking about the information available to the pilot.

Yes it gives them more than enough information. What else would they need between the three that would be useful in a situation where they were faced with a MCAS failure?

Pilots don't need a full technical description to operate something safely - they just need to know what to look out for and what to do if it happens.

If this had been the information in the infamous iPad course we would not be having this discussion.

Are you finally willing to retract your statement that Boeing disclosed nothing about MCAS after the Lionair crash? Give up - you were wrong.

seahawk wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

Does the government work over the christmas/new year holiday in the US?

And I think it is now safe to say Boeings early Q4 RTS is now out of the window. Depending on the US government work schedule and also if there is another government shut down Q1 2020 might become Q2.
Kind of a massive insentive to keep your government running when the wellbeing of your nr.1 exporter is effected.

I disagree, as that is exactly the line of thought that caused the problem in the first place. Boeing must not get special treatment with the regulator. If the FAA closes shop for smaller company during the holidays, it should close shop for Boeing too.

Ah my questions were more general:

Does the FAA shut down over christmas and new year?
How high is the chance of a government shut down due to R and D fighting over the budget?
Is the certification squad of the FAA deemed important for national security and would work on even if the govt is shut down?

I dont know the answers but in a proper risk assessment this questions need to be asked and answered to determine when the most likely RTS could be.

E.q.: FAA closed over the holiday, possible RTS + one week.

FluidFlow wrote:

seahawk wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

Does the government work over the christmas/new year holiday in the US?

And I think it is now safe to say Boeings early Q4 RTS is now out of the window. Depending on the US government work schedule and also if there is another government shut down Q1 2020 might become Q2.
Kind of a massive insentive to keep your government running when the wellbeing of your nr.1 exporter is effected.

I disagree, as that is exactly the line of thought that caused the problem in the first place. Boeing must not get special treatment with the regulator. If the FAA closes shop for smaller company during the holidays, it should close shop for Boeing too.

Ah my questions were more general:

Does the FAA shut down over christmas and new year?
How high is the chance of a government shut down due to R and D fighting over the budget?
Is the certification squad of the FAA deemed important for national security and would work on even if the govt is shut down?

I dont know the answers but in a proper risk assessment this questions need to be asked and answered to determine when the most likely RTS could be.

E.q.: FAA closed over the holiday, possible RTS + one week.

Given how quiet things are I would be amazed if it happens in February at this point.

Revelation wrote:

hivue wrote:

hilram wrote:

The bad idea was to spend all that Boeing cash on Share-buybacks over the years leading up to the A320 neo, as well as outsourcing engineering and expertise?
What if money had been spent on an NSA right away?

Excellent point. Boeing could have been farsighted way back before the A320NEO was even being considered, and come up with a new FBW single aisle design to replace the 40+ year-old 737 design (now 50 year-old) as an A320 competitor.

That's exactly what they investigated doing. Their conclusion is that they needed an all new CFRP narrow body aircraft to provide any advantage relative to the incumbent A320 and the technology of the day could not produce one at the desired rate and at a price point that could make a profit.

It's not clear to me that even today one could build an all new CFRP aircraft comparable to A320 and make it at the required price point and rate. In fact a main goal of NMA is to mature the manufacturing tech to get to that point at some point in the future. Therefore it should be clear Boeing doesn't think they are at that point right now.

hivue wrote:

But the 737 has been Boeing's cash (to give to share holders, execs and managers, for buybacks) cow. Since it worked so well in that capacity, the temptation to keep milking it was impossible to resist for the executive suite and the bean counters. Unfortunately, karma struck big time, and the cash cow now has to be fed on cash.

I think this is a false narrative. I think you need to show how Boeing could have produced a new small airplane in 2011 that could have competed with A320 and projected a profit never mind a ROI, and I'm confident that you cannot. Without such an airplane they would be abandoning their customers and their part of the market which is madness.

The reality is that MAX was the right business strategy in 2011, and no matter how you look at it Boeing's engineering team let the company down by producing a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane. I'm sure they were facing heavy pressure from managers, but it is part of an engineer's job to resist such pressure and not produce a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane.

No, the MAX wasn't the right business strategy in 2011. 737 MAX R&D costs + grounding costs are approaching the cost of that of an all new single aisle aircraft.

That's exactly what they investigated doing. Their conclusion is that they needed an all new CFRP narrow body aircraft to provide any advantage relative to the incumbent A320 and the technology of the day could not produce one at the desired rate and at a price point that could make a profit.

The notion that you have to bury the competition seems to be a uniquely American trait. With the 787, Boeing apparently believed that they would "bury" the A330. At the 2012 Phoenix ISTAT conference, Boeing's Mike Bair spoke of eliminating Airbus from the large twin market.

With that kind of mindset, it's easy to understand why the management at Boeing thought that if they couldn't "kill" the A320 outright, they'd just copy what Airbus was doing with the A320neo, with their 737NG -- damn the consequences.

If Boeing, on the other hand, had decided to just better the A320neo family -- i.e. more modern A320-type fuselage with a LD3-45 compatible lower hold, aluminium wings/fuselage structure and 787-derived systems (etc.) -- they could have had that aircraft in service by now.

There is no doubt that in terms of passenger appeal the A320 trumps the 737. When the A320 was designed in the 1980s, Airbus purposely chose a cabin seven inches wider than the 737’s -- and yet, the Airbus designers knew that the wider cabin came at a cost; the wider the tube, the heavier the structure and the more the aerodynamic drag, and weight and drag translate into higher fuel consumption and higher operating costs. The difference is actually small but it still enabled Boeing to crow about having “the most profitable single-aisle ever.”

So after having been talking down the A320neo -- even before the A320neo programme was launched in December 2010 and until the Paris Air Show in 2011 -- it would perhaps have been awkward for Boeing to backtrack. Hence, Boeing's top management were seemingly trapped in their own falsity and mind-set.

and no matter how you look at it Boeing's engineering team let the company down by producing a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane.

No, Boeing's management let the company down. Boeing's engineering team had a damn near impossible task making the MAX fully competitive with the A320neo family. Even before the MAX disasters, Boeing had gone from a 50/50 split in the single aisle market to nearly a 60/40 split in favour of Airbus.

I'm sure they were facing heavy pressure from managers, but it is part of an engineer's job to resist such pressure and not produce a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane

Boeing engineers are also human -- many of whom being afraid of losing their jobs in a system where benefits are so closely tied to the employer-employee relationship.

Engineers working for Airbus in Europe, however, won’t have to worry about missing an insurance premium, getting sick, becoming homeless, and "having to live in their car," if they were to resist heavy pressure from Airbus managers in order not to be responsible for the production of a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane.