DualQual wrote:

The speed profile was not fine. If it was, they’d be alive. No one pulled the power. They continued to accelerate. They raised the flaps which allowed the MCAS to fire.

please accept that the 737 checklist on
- AoA disagree and
- unreliable airspeed

simply says
-flaps up
- climb
- max thrust

thats what they did
they didnt pull the power because they were low and it would be against proceedures

no poor airmanship
maybe average

btw:
the 200hrs rookie was the one who suggested the cut out and would have safed that ship if the AD would have been written in the right sequence ...

We read this posts and how does Boeing is still responsible get into the discussion. It is about statements from the ex head maintenance guy about ethiopian airlines practices ? And if the records were as stated " It said that as soon as the accident happened, those documents were sealed, stored in a secure place and delivered to Ethiopia's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau " how is it even possible that while "a technician tried to see the aircraft records," its review found no data was changed or updated . Looks to us that the said technician did in fact see / access the aircraft records why else the statement " its review found no data was changed or updated " . And how would they even know if anything was changed all it was in a safe place for keeping not being annualized.

And how mcas get into the discussion ? On the max grounding thread you people delete posts that don't pertain to it , on this one which actually shows a really bad airline , you are not even discussing what was presented.

asdf wrote:

DualQual wrote:

The speed profile was not fine. If it was, they’d be alive. No one pulled the power. They continued to accelerate. They raised the flaps which allowed the MCAS to fire.

please accept that the 737 checklist on
- AoA disagree and
- unreliable airspeed

simply says
-flaps up
- climb
- max thrust

thats what they did
they didnt pull the power because they were low and it would be against proceedures

no poor airmanship
maybe average

btw:
the 200hrs rookie was the one who suggested the cut out and would have safed that ship if the AD would have been written in the right sequence ...

I’ll disagree. The checklist I’m looking at says nothing about changing configuration in either of those events and has a pitch and power setting to establish. It’s nowhere near max thrust.

I see my post from earlier has been deleted. Well it is again if you do not want my and my friends opinions please feel to just delete my account,, just send me an email saying it was deleted.
Ethiopian Airline said - as soon as the accident happened, those documents were sealed, stored in a secure place and delivered to Ethiopia's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau from the horses mouth.

Then an statement - while "a technician tried to see the aircraft records," its review found no data was changed or updated.

If the records were sealed and stored in a safe place , how does an technician even get close to them ? And again if the records were sealed , and stored , who reviewed the records and determined that they had not been tampered with.. And soes that mean the sealed records were open by who ever did this review , or the technician ?

And how does Boeing is still at fault get into this thread ? How does mcas discussion get into this thread ?

You people going to delete this post also , just send an email that non Boeing bashers are wanted here that''s all we ask..

jmry888 wrote:

I see my post from earlier has been deleted. Well it is again if you do not want my and my friends opinions please feel to just delete my account,, just send me an email saying it was deleted.
Ethiopian Airline said - as soon as the accident happened, those documents were sealed, stored in a secure place and delivered to Ethiopia's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau from the horses mouth.

Then an statement - while "a technician tried to see the aircraft records," its review found no data was changed or updated.

If the records were sealed and stored in a safe place , how does an technician even get close to them ? And again if the records were sealed , and stored , who reviewed the records and determined that they had not been tampered with.. And soes that mean the sealed records were open by who ever did this review , or the technician ?

And how does Boeing is still at fault get into this thread ? How does mcas discussion get into this thread ?

You people going to delete this post also , just send an email that non Boeing bashers are wanted here that''s all we ask..

Eh? I still see your earlier post.

asdf wrote:

DualQual wrote:

The speed profile was not fine. If it was, they’d be alive. No one pulled the power. They continued to accelerate. They raised the flaps which allowed the MCAS to fire.

please accept that the 737 checklist on
- AoA disagree and
- unreliable airspeed

simply says
-flaps up
- climb
- max thrust

thats what they did
they didnt pull the power because they were low and it would be against proceedures

no poor airmanship
maybe average

btw:
the 200hrs rookie was the one who suggested the cut out and would have safed that ship if the AD would have been written in the right sequence ...

And then it was time to deal with the stuck trim - which specifically says to not use Autothrottle.

Or the MCAS checklist which says no to Autothrottle as well.

asdf wrote:

DualQual wrote:

The speed profile was not fine. If it was, they’d be alive. No one pulled the power. They continued to accelerate. They raised the flaps which allowed the MCAS to fire.

please accept that the 737 checklist on
- AoA disagree and
- unreliable airspeed

simply says
-flaps up
- climb
- max thrust

thats what they did
they didnt pull the power because they were low and it would be against proceedures

no poor airmanship
maybe average

btw:
the 200hrs rookie was the one who suggested the cut out and would have safed that ship if the AD would have been written in the right sequence ...

Neither of the checklists that you referenced, say what you suggest.

Right now, the only people who know what the crew did, or didn't do are the Ethiopians who have heard the CVR. If they ever release a full, correct transcript, the rest of us will know. However just going by the preliminary report, I don't see much that suggests they did any proper checklists, or procedures.

We need to have the full transcript to know how they dealt with the initial stick shaker on liftoff, if they ever did, or considered the unreliable airspeed checklist, and if they actually did the runaway stabilizer checklist.

Calling "stab trim cutout" twice, and then turning off the stab trim cutout switches isn't doing the procedure. It's flipping switches. There should be some communication, and some challenge response between the crew. One would think that would have been mentioned in the preliminary report, if it occurred, as it would cast a better light on the crews performance.

jmry888 wrote:

If the records were sealed and stored in a safe place , how does an technician even get close to them ? And again if the records were sealed , and stored , who reviewed the records and determined that they had not been tampered with.. And soes that mean the sealed records were open by who ever did this review , or the technician ?
.

It is like saving a copy of the a.net forums onto DVD, and then you coming along to read the forums in a web browser. Reading the forum does nothing to the DVD archive.

These are electronic databases that record every access attempt and individual records cannot be modified once posted. The records are read only once posted.

AABusDrvr wrote:

asdf wrote:

DualQual wrote:

The speed profile was not fine. If it was, they’d be alive. No one pulled the power. They continued to accelerate. They raised the flaps which allowed the MCAS to fire.

please accept that the 737 checklist on
- AoA disagree and
- unreliable airspeed

simply says
-flaps up
- climb
- max thrust

thats what they did
they didnt pull the power because they were low and it would be against proceedures

no poor airmanship
maybe average

btw:
the 200hrs rookie was the one who suggested the cut out and would have safed that ship if the AD would have been written in the right sequence ...

Neither of the checklists that you referenced, say what you suggest.

checklists, this way:
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1432067&start=350#p21708437

btw i am not happy with discussing the ET flight and not only ET maintainance her
but i didnt start

this should all be about possible bad maintainance practice of ET because there is a whistle blower telling this
and about a chief engineer looking into - otherwise sealed - MX records
with this amount of information i would think this is a non issue
but well, maybe i am wrong ..

if a few posters always connect this to the fatal MAX flight to try to move a blame from boeing to ET one need to clarify

for now i dont see any connection to the accident

the maintainance in africa is for shure not on western level

and
way of live
salary
quality of enviroment
human rights
too

Does anyone here know whether the pilots correctly identified the issue?

VV wrote:

Does anyone here know whether the pilots correctly identified the issue?

they didnt publish the transscript of the FDR
they only published parts of it
so we dont know exactly

asdf wrote:

VV wrote:

Does anyone here know whether the pilots correctly identified the issue?

they didnt publish the transscript of the FDR
they only published parts of it
so we dont know exactly

And yet there are so many messages and comments about the event.

VV wrote:

asdf wrote:

VV wrote:

Does anyone here know whether the pilots correctly identified the issue?

they didnt publish the transscript of the FDR
they only published parts of it
so we dont know exactly

And yet there are so many messages and comments about the event.

for the accidents we are pretty off topic here

you know that thread?
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1432067

asdf wrote:

VV wrote:

asdf wrote:

they didnt publish the transscript of the FDR
they only published parts of it
so we dont know exactly

And yet there are so many messages and comments about the event.

for the accidents we are pretty off topic here

you know that thread?
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1432067

What accident?

ikramerica wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

Antarius wrote:

Boeing is unquestionably a major one, but you cant not blame customers when their pilots dont know how to fly an airplane outside a very narrow window of happy path.

If you want to talk about proportions of blame:
Lets see how broad this happy path normally is and in case of the MAX:
-> Global aviation crash rate 2012-2017: 0.00000024 per flight (-> one crash per 4.16 million flights)
-> Of these, likely contributed by pilot failures: 0.00000021 per flight (-> one crash every 4.76 million flights). This contribution reflects the average pilots proficiency.
-> This leaves the following difference to be contributed by technical failures: 0.00000003 per flight (-> one crash per 33.3 million flights)

The MAX had this crash rate: 0.000008 per flight (-> one crash every 0.125 million flights -> 33 times worse than the global aviation crash rate in the 5 years before the MAX)
As the same pilots were flying the MAX, that contributed 0.00000021 crashes per flight normally, we can take the 0.000008 minues the 0.00000021 to get the contribution of the MAX itself (components contribute to the total failure rate by simple addition). So we get 0.00000779 as the crash contributing failure rate of the MAX. Which is 260 times higher than the 0.00000003 crashes per flight, which are normally contributed by technical failure.

So, as you say, the MAX occasionally has left a very narrow window of happy path for the crews to react. 260 time narrower than with other aircraft so to speak. But we also have to say, that the subpar airlines were likely the first ones to expose this weakness of the MAX. And that migh be in line with this report about ET.

That's some really fancy math there. It's not based on any statistical modeling methodology I ever studied, but it's fancy.

On the second page of the grounding thread I provided the same calculation with the proper symbols.

With math, there is only one thing that counts: is it correct or wrong. I consider fancy as a flavor of correct. The simple theory behind it is, that the failure rate of a system is the sum of the failure rates of all components. The conclusion is stunning.

zeke wrote:

jmry888 wrote:

If the records were sealed and stored in a safe place , how does an technician even get close to them ? And again if the records were sealed , and stored , who reviewed the records and determined that they had not been tampered with.. And soes that mean the sealed records were open by who ever did this review , or the technician ?
.

It is like saving a copy of the a.net forums onto DVD, and then you coming along to read the forums in a web browser. Reading the forum does nothing to the DVD archive.

These are electronic databases that record every access attempt and individual records cannot be modified once posted. The records are read only once posted.

Good analogy.

Where I work, we have a backup system for our data, just in case some disaster hits HQ. That could be anything from an earthquake, to a cyber-attack.

Ours, and I guess most data backup systems are located off site for fairly obvious reasons.
The FAA, the FBI, the CIA and the KGB could all lock-down our offices and make our main system absolutely secure and inaccessible.

But the back-up will still be there, available on a read-only basis, miles away in a different zip code.

aerolimani wrote:

What fear? No amount of reasonably expectable blame distribution, in the case of either crash, will sufficiently exonerate Boeing for the massiveness of their design cock-up. Certainly, nothing approaching absolution, or at least not in the mind of someone thinking objectively.

In addition, with everything we now understand about MCAS, any such reasonable blame directed at the accident crews (or their airlines), would have zero effect on the validity of the grounding.

So, there’s really nothing to fear.

We are in agreement.

Boeing's screw up with regard to MCAS is massive.

In turn the punishment is massive.

Finances are massively impacted, reputation is massively damaged, relationships with customers, regulators and the public are massively damaged.

Eventual JT and ET reports will be scathing.

Therefore, discussing what things were expected of airlines and pilots in the context of the accident shouldn't worry people who think doing so will absolve Boeing.

Personally I find what is written in this article about ET to be quite depressing.

And the interesting thing is we find no one rushing to ET's defense, no one saying it is in fact a well run shop that does not use fear tactics to get employees to falsify records etc.

We also did not find anyone pushing back at Langeweische's report in NYT on JT's Lion City diploma mill or its pencil whipping with regard to pilot training.

In this day and age of electronic maintenance record keeping, aircraft health monitoring, predictive maintenance is it even possible to falsify mx records without Boeing and other vendors noticing?

asdf wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

asdf wrote:

please accept that the 737 checklist on
- AoA disagree and
- unreliable airspeed

simply says
-flaps up
- climb
- max thrust

thats what they did
they didnt pull the power because they were low and it would be against proceedures

no poor airmanship
maybe average

btw:
the 200hrs rookie was the one who suggested the cut out and would have safed that ship if the AD would have been written in the right sequence ...

Neither of the checklists that you referenced, say what you suggest.

checklists, this way:
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1432067&start=350#p21708437

btw i am not happy with discussing the ET flight and not only ET maintainance her
but i didnt start

this should all be about possible bad maintainance practice of ET because there is a whistle blower telling this
and about a chief engineer looking into - otherwise sealed - MX records
with this amount of information i would think this is a non issue
but well, maybe i am wrong ..

if a few posters always connect this to the fatal MAX flight to try to move a blame from boeing to ET one need to clarify

for now i dont see any connection to the accident

the maintainance in africa is for shure not on western level

and
way of live
salary
quality of enviroment
human rights
too

I have a set of 737 manuals containing both of those checklists, that I use every day when I go to work. I stand by my earlier statement, neither one says "flaps up, climb, max thrust". I think you may be confusing the 280kt/.76 climb chart from the performance manual that XRAY references in the other thread. That wouldn't be the chart you would use if maneuvering in the terminal area, for an immediate return for landing.

I'm not trying to move any blame anywhere. Boeing owns the poor design and implementation of the MCAS system. But people also need to realize there are human factors and crew performance issues going on here as well.

ikramerica wrote:

That's some really fancy math there. It's not based on any statistical modeling methodology I ever studied, but it's fancy.

Yes, in particular no methodology I know of would let one compare rates when the denominators being used for the rates being compared represent different things.

In fact it's a classic way to mislead people using statistics.

It provides the illusion that the things are comparable because they have the same units, but they represent different things.

Just for the record, it's not by any means irreconcilable to think that the guy is credible and that Boeing and the FAA are responsible for the accident.

GSOflyerDL wrote:

dtw2hyd wrote:

Polot wrote:

...
No one said it was ET fault, but brushing aside possible airline safety concerns because “BuT iT’s BoEiNg’S FaULt!!!” is both stupid and dangerous.

No one is saying that it is solely Boeing's fault, can you show me ET sponsored NYT, WP articles blaming BCA.

This discussion comes up only when some newspaper publishes a story with an inference that it is customers' fault.

Boeing has been very successful with blame the customer strategy since 787. Fortunately, no one died. So using the same old antics with MAX. Unfortunately, the result is different this time.

Not at all helping the reputation of the American aerospace industry.

Are you seriously suggesting that the recent spate of articles focused on the culture of Boeing, and now that of Ethiopian, are planted by one to damage the other? If so, that’s pure conspiratorial bile.

The William Langewiesche article in the NYT contained so much incorrect information that, considering the author's background, it's fairly obvious that it was written with the intent purpose of shifting the narrative towards blaming the crew. Very unlikely to be from Boeing directly, but I would be very surprised if one of Boeing's lobbying/PR firms had nothing to do with making sure it was published.

We live in the information age. In the information age, disinformation is a very powerful tool.

planecane wrote:

zkojq wrote:

planecane wrote:

It might not have happened to another flight. Boeing was working on the MCAS update after lion Air with the intention of rolling it out across the fleet.

They started working on that critical update nearly a year ago. Several fixes later the FAA still hasn't approved the new code.....

Based on all reports, the MCAS 2.0 code is fine.

How do we know? It hasn't been submitted to the FAA yet. Are we just going to trust Boeing again - "she'll be right, mate" ? Didn't work out so happily last time around.

AABusDrvr wrote:

asdf wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

Neither of the checklists that you referenced, say what you suggest.

checklists, this way:
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1432067&start=350#p21708437

btw i am not happy with discussing the ET flight and not only ET maintainance her
but i didnt start

this should all be about possible bad maintainance practice of ET because there is a whistle blower telling this
and about a chief engineer looking into - otherwise sealed - MX records
with this amount of information i would think this is a non issue
but well, maybe i am wrong ..

if a few posters always connect this to the fatal MAX flight to try to move a blame from boeing to ET one need to clarify

for now i dont see any connection to the accident

the maintainance in africa is for shure not on western level

and
way of live
salary
quality of enviroment
human rights
too

I have a set of 737 manuals containing both of those checklists, that I use every day when I go to work. I stand by my earlier statement, neither one says "flaps up, climb, max thrust". I think you may be confusing the 280kt/.76 climb chart from the performance manual that XRAY references in the other thread. That wouldn't be the chart you would use if maneuvering in the terminal area, for an immediate return for landing.

I'm not trying to move any blame anywhere. Boeing owns the poor design and implementation of the MCAS system. But people also need to realize there are human factors and crew performance issues going on here as well.

Hopefully effectively demonstrating that bits and pieces of checklists can not be used as de-facto proof of the 'dumb foreign pilots' scenario when it is clear to many now that they were overwhelmed and should not have been expected to respond immediately to a subsequently occurring potentially catastrophic failure mode in the presence of a number of potentially conflicted warnings/alerts (after NTSB) (but not including AOA DISAGREE that might actually have helped).

It remains true, like it or not, that four crews responded in pretty much the same way to single side stick shaker in those first couple of minutes, viz, maintained climb, maintained or increased thrust and, in three cases, attempted to engage A/P. This is real world data.

It remains to be seen if the human factors folks have come up with deficiencies or improvements (either generally or specific to the accident crews), in training/CRM etc. or, indeed in spelling out what the actions of the crew actually were, if deficiencies in responses were present or improvements to responses could have been made. The final reports will tell us.

Ray

asdf wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

asdf wrote:

please accept that the 737 checklist on
- AoA disagree and
- unreliable airspeed

simply says
-flaps up
- climb
- max thrust

thats what they did
they didnt pull the power because they were low and it would be against proceedures

no poor airmanship
maybe average

btw:
the 200hrs rookie was the one who suggested the cut out and would have safed that ship if the AD would have been written in the right sequence ...

Neither of the checklists that you referenced, say what you suggest.

checklists, this way:
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1432067&start=350#p21708437

btw i am not happy with discussing the ET flight and not only ET maintainance her
but i didnt start

this should all be about possible bad maintainance practice of ET because there is a whistle blower telling this
and about a chief engineer looking into - otherwise sealed - MX records
with this amount of information i would think this is a non issue
but well, maybe i am wrong ..

if a few posters always connect this to the fatal MAX flight to try to move a blame from boeing to ET one need to clarify

for now i dont see any connection to the accident

the maintainance in africa is for shure not on western level

and
way of live
salary
quality of enviroment
human rights
too

Again, no reputable or approved checklist will tell a pilot to change configuration with unreliable airspeed. Your premise is incorrect. Every Boeing airplane I’ve flown does not reference moving the flaps for either of these conditions. You. Are. Wrong.

NWADTWE16 wrote:

is this pro-boeing propaganda or what? the depths of this horrid trench continue to amaze. I am honestly in the camp that Boeing should be broken up at this point.

I like that some people just straight up suggest about hundreds of thousands of families to be left unemployeed, with no income, and lots of tax incomes reduced because Boeing goes under.

Come on.

Revelation wrote:

aerolimani wrote:

What fear? No amount of reasonably expectable blame distribution, in the case of either crash, will sufficiently exonerate Boeing for the massiveness of their design cock-up. Certainly, nothing approaching absolution, or at least not in the mind of someone thinking objectively.

In addition, with everything we now understand about MCAS, any such reasonable blame directed at the accident crews (or their airlines), would have zero effect on the validity of the grounding.

So, there’s really nothing to fear.

We are in agreement.

I have my doubts about that. A perhaps would have been good in that sentence of yours.

Revelation wrote:

Boeing's screw up with regard to MCAS is massive.

In turn the punishment is massive.

Finances are massively impacted, reputation is massively damaged, relationships with customers, regulators and the public are massively damaged.

Eventual JT and ET reports will be scathing.

Indeed… this is pretty close to empirical fact, IMO.

Revelation wrote:

Therefore, discussing what things were expected of airlines and pilots in the context of the accident shouldn't worry people who think doing so will absolve Boeing.

And, here is where my problem lies. You yourself say "in the context of the accident," and yet you contribute greatly to the discussion of pilot and airline expectations, outside the context of the accidents. The Ethiopian thread's last post was four months ago. The last post in the Lion Air thread was 6 months ago! If the context is the accident(s), then are those threads not the appropriate place?

Otherwise, it's just a lot of back and forth noise, much of which bears a strong aroma of good old A vs B, and mostly takes away from relevant discussion. You seem to carry yourself as though you are above this sort of thing. However, carrying yourself above would mean not replying with flamebait posts such as your first post (post #3) in this thread.

Now… the post you originally replied to with your fear of absolution:

SFOtoORD wrote:

Doesn’t absolve Boeing of anything at all, but it seems like Ethiopian needs a serious culture change.

How does this seem like a fear of absolution? To me, it seems like a pretty balanced statement. Boeing's fault is already acknowledged in this, and you yourself have acknowledged this many times. Indeed, continuing past SFOtoORD's first sentence (which I'm not sure you did), we find some hefty criticism of Ethiopian. If you can say that "fear of absolution is a real thing here on a.net," then anyone else can just as easily say that "the fear that nothing can help absolve Boeing is a real thing here on a.net." Maybe it's time to start playing like the adults are parents wanted us to be? As we were recently reminded:

lightsaber wrote:

Play nice.

If your post starts discussing another user, you probably will get warned. Hint, "You need... You believe..." or schoolyard insults are Flamebait.

Please discuss the technical, inform details, we encourage open discussion on the topic.

Discuss airlines in factual terms, not implied insults. Same rules apply to nations. If you cannot handle it said about you, your favorite aircraft, airline, or a nation you care about, perhaps do not post that part.

Lightsaber

AABusDrvr wrote:

That wouldn't be the chart you would use if maneuvering in the terminal area, for an immediate return for landing.
.

i guess that was what they really wanted..

DualQual wrote:

asdf wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

Neither of the checklists that you referenced, say what you suggest.

checklists, this way:
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1432067&start=350#p21708437

btw i am not happy with discussing the ET flight and not only ET maintainance her
but i didnt start

this should all be about possible bad maintainance practice of ET because there is a whistle blower telling this
and about a chief engineer looking into - otherwise sealed - MX records
with this amount of information i would think this is a non issue
but well, maybe i am wrong ..

if a few posters always connect this to the fatal MAX flight to try to move a blame from boeing to ET one need to clarify

for now i dont see any connection to the accident

the maintainance in africa is for shure not on western level

and
way of live
salary
quality of enviroment
human rights
too

Again, no reputable or approved checklist will tell a pilot to change configuration with unreliable airspeed. Your premise is incorrect. Every Boeing airplane I’ve flown does not reference moving the flaps for either of these conditions. You. Are. Wrong.

should be pretty clear ...
posting.php?mode=quote&f=3&p=21713601

aerolimani wrote:

The Ethiopian thread's last post was four months ago. The last post in the Lion Air thread was 6 months ago! If the context is the accident(s), then are those threads not the appropriate place?

If I remember correctly the mods locked those threads at the time and we are all told to post in the common grounding thread, as it was too hard to discuss some of the issues as they applied to both crashes.

For instance the latest NTSB press release talks about both - where should we have discussed that?

asdf wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

That wouldn't be the chart you would use if maneuvering in the terminal area, for an immediate return for landing.
.

i guess that was what they really wanted..

ET302 wouldn't have needed to use any of the charts anyways. They had good airspeed on the first officers side, and the standby IFDS. The checklist would have led them to suing the non failed indications eventually, if they had done it.

morrisond wrote:

aerolimani wrote:

The Ethiopian thread's last post was four months ago. The last post in the Lion Air thread was 6 months ago! If the context is the accident(s), then are those threads not the appropriate place?

If I remember correctly the mods locked those threads at the time and we are all told to post in the common grounding thread, as it was too hard to discuss some of the issues as they applied to both crashes.

For instance the latest NTSB press release talks about both - where should we have discussed that?

The Lion Air thread ends a bit abruptly, but the Ethiopian thread just sputters out organically. I’m fact, a mod posted in the Q3 grounding thread, with links to both accident threads.

I think it’s fair to say that times have changed. Some months ago, the problems with the aircraft were very little understood, but the preliminary reports were out, and we were discussing the validity of the grounding. Now, we are all much more aware of the aircraft’s shortcomings, and I don’t think anyone questions the validity of the grounding. So yes, I think it’s time for the bulk of the accident fault discussion to move back to the accident threads.

This thread is, of course, another discussion altogether. In my opinion, it’s debatable that it should have been part of the Ethiopian accident thread. Maybe a thread merge would be appropriate, and a good way to reawaken the long-neglected Ethiopian thread.

asdf wrote:

DualQual wrote:

asdf wrote:

checklists, this way:
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1432067&start=350#p21708437

btw i am not happy with discussing the ET flight and not only ET maintainance her
but i didnt start

this should all be about possible bad maintainance practice of ET because there is a whistle blower telling this
and about a chief engineer looking into - otherwise sealed - MX records
with this amount of information i would think this is a non issue
but well, maybe i am wrong ..

if a few posters always connect this to the fatal MAX flight to try to move a blame from boeing to ET one need to clarify

for now i dont see any connection to the accident

the maintainance in africa is for shure not on western level

and
way of live
salary
quality of enviroment
human rights
too

Again, no reputable or approved checklist will tell a pilot to change configuration with unreliable airspeed. Your premise is incorrect. Every Boeing airplane I’ve flown does not reference moving the flaps for either of these conditions. You. Are. Wrong.

should be pretty clear ...
posting.php?mode=quote&f=3&p=21713601

Neither link you’ve referenced shows me a checklist of any sort. So again, I’m going to default to the actual Boeing checklists that I have in my possession for multiple Boeing aircraft to include the 737. No checklist for airspeed unreliable and no checklist for AOA disagree commands a change in configuration or calls for full thrust. They call for a pitch and power which varies dependent on if the flaps are up or down. If the flaps are down, set the prescribed pitch and thrust for the flaps being extended and work the problem. You have no idea if a configuration change like raising flaps is going to make things worse because you don’t know your airspeed. So the checklist is not going to tell you to change flaps until you’ve established what airspeed source is functioning and can determine your speed.

AABusDrvr wrote:

PW100 wrote:

FrenchPotatoEye wrote:

Main things to the speeds is engine throttles.

The pilots did win the Macs and turned it off. But they did not slow the speeding and at the some point, they on the mcas again. The speeding did not get the slow.

Seems the dicesions from the pilots are factor in this trajedy.

Funny, my first (on second though it could be my second) flying lesson in a 172 the instructor told me above thinking works in the 2-D world (i.e. automobile).

And then he hammered me to forget the 2-D world, and learned that throttle controlls my rate of climb/descent, and elevator/trim controlls airspeed . . .

Hopefully he then brought it up that it’s not an absolute statement, only applies in certain phases of flight, and even then, both controls are still required to be used together, to achieve the desired flight path.

Of course:-)
The point was to let go of the familiar 2-D world and welcome me to the unfamiliar 3-D world.
Not that it helped that much. I never got any further than around 10 hrs total time . . .

DualQual wrote:

Neither link you’ve referenced shows me a checklist of any sort. So again, I’m going to default to the actual Boeing checklists that I have in my possession for multiple Boeing aircraft to include the 737. No checklist for airspeed unreliable and no checklist for AOA disagree commands a change in configuration or calls for full thrust. They call for a pitch and power which varies dependent on if the flaps are up or down. If the flaps are down, set the prescribed pitch and thrust for the flaps being extended and work the problem. You have no idea if a configuration change like raising flaps is going to make things worse because you don’t know your airspeed. So the checklist is not going to tell you to change flaps until you’ve established what airspeed source is functioning and can determine your speed.

As I dont have access to those chacklists, what happens next when you’ve established what airspeed source is functioning and determined your speed? Would that still stop the flaps from being retracted?

PW100 wrote:

DualQual wrote:

Neither link you’ve referenced shows me a checklist of any sort. So again, I’m going to default to the actual Boeing checklists that I have in my possession for multiple Boeing aircraft to include the 737. No checklist for airspeed unreliable and no checklist for AOA disagree commands a change in configuration or calls for full thrust. They call for a pitch and power which varies dependent on if the flaps are up or down. If the flaps are down, set the prescribed pitch and thrust for the flaps being extended and work the problem. You have no idea if a configuration change like raising flaps is going to make things worse because you don’t know your airspeed. So the checklist is not going to tell you to change flaps until you’ve established what airspeed source is functioning and can determine your speed.

As I dont have access to those chacklists, what happens next when you’ve established what airspeed source is functioning and determined your speed? Would that still stop the flaps from being retracted?

It’s not discussed in the checklist. If you’re not continuing the flight and coming back to land I don’t know a single pro pilot that would clean up the airplane fully. Especially since you are led to the pitch and power tables for the configuration you’re in. The initial pitch and power setting is simply to get you pointed away from the ground and keep the airplane flying while trying to stabilize the situation. Off the cuff if it’s a VFR day I think most would leave the flaps at the takeoff setting even after establishing the good airspeed source since odds are you are coming right back to land.

Revelation wrote:

ikramerica wrote:

That's some really fancy math there. It's not based on any statistical modeling methodology I ever studied, but it's fancy.

Yes, in particular no methodology I know of would let one compare rates when the denominators being used for the rates being compared represent different things.

In fact it's a classic way to mislead people using statistics.

It provides the illusion that the things are comparable because they have the same units, but they represent different things.

Topic: Failure Rate
Subtopic: Additivity
Text: Under certain engineering assumptions (e.g. besides the above assumptions for a constant failure rate, the assumption that the considered system has no relevant redundancies), the failure rate for a complex system is simply the sum of the individual failure rates of its components, as long as the units are consistent, e.g. failures per million hours. This permits testing of individual components or subsystems, whose failure rates are then added to obtain the total system failure rate.

That was Wikipedia level. If you like more symbols, read this:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0eaf/7 ... 8c1c4c.pdf

So it is perfectly valid to split the observed global failure rate (crash rate) into different contributing components to get a baseline (and define an expectation). Even wiki says, "this permits..." looking at the components. So I did that.

The definition of crash rate, that I used was: crashrate = crash per flight.

They show, that the MAX is the problem and contributed a 260 times higher failure rate, than to be expected. Fixing the MAX has the only meaningful leverage to bring back MAX operations back to the norm statistically.

If I take your statement "in particular no methodology I know of would let one compare rates when the denominators being used for the rates being compared represent different things."
The denominator I used is "flights". In all cases. "Flights" do not represent "different things". Hundred thousands of flights as denominator is a sufficient sample size.

rheinwaldner wrote:

Revelation wrote:

ikramerica wrote:

That's some really fancy math there. It's not based on any statistical modeling methodology I ever studied, but it's fancy.

Yes, in particular no methodology I know of would let one compare rates when the denominators being used for the rates being compared represent different things.

In fact it's a classic way to mislead people using statistics.

It provides the illusion that the things are comparable because they have the same units, but they represent different things.

Topic: Failure Rate
Subtopic: Additivity
Text: Under certain engineering assumptions (e.g. besides the above assumptions for a constant failure rate, the assumption that the considered system has no relevant redundancies), the failure rate for a complex system is simply the sum of the individual failure rates of its components, as long as the units are consistent, e.g. failures per million hours. This permits testing of individual components or subsystems, whose failure rates are then added to obtain the total system failure rate.

That was Wikipedia level. If you like more symbols, read this:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0eaf/7 ... 8c1c4c.pdf

So it is perfectly valid to split the observed global failure rate (crash rate) into different contributing components to get a baseline (and define an expectation). Even wiki says, "this permits..." looking at the components. So I did that.

The definition of crash rate, that I used was: crashrate = crash per flight.

They show, that the MAX is the problem and contributed a 260 times higher failure rate, than to be expected. Fixing the MAX has the only meaningful leverage to bring back MAX operations back to the norm statistically.

If I take your statement "in particular no methodology I know of would let one compare rates when the denominators being used for the rates being compared represent different things."
The denominator I used is "flights". In all cases. "Flights" do not represent "different things". Hundred thousands of flights as denominator is a sufficient sample size.

Thanks for your post BUT WHAT DOES IT HAVE TO DO WITH Ehiopian's chief engineer?

rheinwaldner wrote:

Topic: Failure Rate
Subtopic: Additivity
Text: Under certain engineering assumptions (e.g. besides the above assumptions for a constant failure rate, the assumption that the considered system has no relevant redundancies), the failure rate for a complex system is simply the sum of the individual failure rates of its components, as long as the units are consistent, e.g. failures per million hours. This permits testing of individual components or subsystems, whose failure rates are then added to obtain the total system failure rate.

That was Wikipedia level. If you like more symbols, read this:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0eaf/7 ... 8c1c4c.pdf

So it is perfectly valid to split the observed global failure rate (crash rate) into different contributing components to get a baseline (and define an expectation). Even wiki says, "this permits..." looking at the components. So I did that.

The definition of crash rate, that I used was: crashrate = crash per flight.

They show, that the MAX is the problem and contributed a 260 times higher failure rate, than to be expected. Fixing the MAX has the only meaningful leverage to bring back MAX operations back to the norm statistically.

If I take your statement "in particular no methodology I know of would let one compare rates when the denominators being used for the rates being compared represent different things."
The denominator I used is "flights". In all cases. "Flights" do not represent "different things". Hundred thousands of flights as denominator is a sufficient sample size.

I mostly agree with your calculations and methodology. For reason of better readability, I'd suggest to change your crash rate unit to events per million flights, which seems to be the industry standard for the moment.

rheinwaldner wrote:

If I take your statement "in particular no methodology I know of would let one compare rates when the denominators being used for the rates being compared represent different things."
The denominator I used is "flights". In all cases. "Flights" do not represent "different things". Hundred thousands of flights as denominator is a sufficient sample size.

Yet you do not wait for MAX to have hundreds of thousands of flights, so it is a different thing.
Again, we are back to trying to make meaningful judgements about the A320's safety the day after the Habsheim crash.
It flew, it had flights, but comparing it to the set of all flights done by mature aircraft would produce a nonsense conclusion.
The math is correct, the science is atrocious.

so we sit here at our terminals far from the action, blindly defending positions formed before any data was available, negating anything that disagrees with those assumptions, crying for sacrificial blood based on assumptions, theories, and "reasonable" guessing. one knows there is trouble when two people supposedly reading the same manuals can't find commonality. then we have people trying to support positions using statistics based on two data points.

what we know for sure is Boeing screwed up and heads have rolled
the FAA screwed up and have lost creditability
two 3rd world airlines screwed up and are paying the price.

so an engineer went into the record duplicates to see what could have been prevented or what could have been done better... good for him. I hope the airline doesn't shoot the messenger.

anything else right now is still blah blah ego defense.

glideslope wrote:

Revelation wrote:

SFOtoORD wrote:

Doesn’t absolve Boeing of anything at all, but it seems like Ethiopian needs a serious culture change.

Fear of absolution is a real thing here on a.net.

You nailed that one. The culture at ET contributed to the crash far more than most in here are willing to acknowledge. I'm not absolving Boeing of anything. However, one really must view JT 601 and ET 302 with different methodology.

I agree 100% and the same is true for the Lionair accident. When there was a flaw with the DC10 cargo door all DC10s were not grounded. When the L:auda Air 767 went into reverse thrust all 767s were not grounded. People were educated on the matter and no one raised an eyebrow. These guys are relying to much on the technology to fly them out of trouble when they should be relying on their flying skills to fly them out of harms way.

Revelation wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

If I take your statement "in particular no methodology I know of would let one compare rates when the denominators being used for the rates being compared represent different things."
The denominator I used is "flights". In all cases. "Flights" do not represent "different things". Hundred thousands of flights as denominator is a sufficient sample size.

Yet you do not wait for MAX to have hundreds of thousands of flights, so it is a different thing.
Again, we are back to trying to make meaningful judgements about the A320's safety the day after the Habsheim crash.
It flew, it had flights, but comparing it to the set of all flights done by mature aircraft would produce a nonsense conclusion.
The math is correct, the science is atrocious.

The MAX had hundreds of thousands of flights (250k as an educated guess).
Habsheim was completely different. It was a single case, it was not a system failure and it was not a wrongly designed system. You can only compare cases with the MAX, where the main contribution also come from failing systems. Habsheim does not qualify to do so.
So yes, the math is correct, the sample size is sufficient and the conclusion is correct (and devastating).

rheinwaldner wrote:

Revelation wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

If I take your statement "in particular no methodology I know of would let one compare rates when the denominators being used for the rates being compared represent different things."
The denominator I used is "flights". In all cases. "Flights" do not represent "different things". Hundred thousands of flights as denominator is a sufficient sample size.

Yet you do not wait for MAX to have hundreds of thousands of flights, so it is a different thing.
Again, we are back to trying to make meaningful judgements about the A320's safety the day after the Habsheim crash.
It flew, it had flights, but comparing it to the set of all flights done by mature aircraft would produce a nonsense conclusion.
The math is correct, the science is atrocious.

The MAX had hundreds of thousands of flights (250k as an educated guess).
Habsheim was completely different. It was a single case, it was not a system failure and it was not a wrongly designed system. You can only compare cases with the MAX, where the main contribution also come from failing systems. Habsheim does not qualify to do so.
So yes, the math is correct, the sample size is sufficient and the conclusion is correct (and devastating).

Your argument above was "Flights" do not represent "different things" yet now you assert that they do represent different things?!?
You are now arguing against yourself to try to disallow a case that "devastates" your argument.
The crashes themselves were devastating, your math to try to quantify such devastation is a non sense.

Revelation wrote:

Your argument above was "Flights" do not represent "different things" yet now you assert that they do represent different things?!?

A sufficient lot of flights are the denominator. They are not different.

Revelation wrote:

You are now arguing against yourself to try to disallow a case that "devastates" your argument.

What did I disallow? You must have misunderstood me. I feel you demonstrate very little effort to understand me.

Revelation wrote:

The crashes themselves were devastating, your math to try to quantify such devastation is a non sense.

Not at all.

B.t.w. how would your math look differently to quantify the devastation?

Do you disagree, that the global benchmark is about one crash every 33 million flights because of a system failure?
Or do you disagree, that the MAX until now had one crash every 0.125 million flights because of a system failure?

And please don't answer with the red herring, that ~250000 flights over two years by several hundred aircraft is a too small sample size.

dtw2hyd wrote:

Polot wrote:

...
This is a discussion on the allegations by ET’s former chief engineer. This is not a discussion on the direct cause of ET302.

I have to guess you haven't read the article other than the text posted here.

Let me post some selective tidbits from the same article to connect the dots.

The chief engineer is applying for US asylum, making him a reliable and neutral source of information.
ET is a state-owned airline, not necessarily a profit-motivated commercial entity.
MAX was referred at least 10 times in the article.

Hence the goal of this news article is at the least to deflect the attention.

You cannot be serious. It is the exact opposite: his asylum seeking creates a conflict of interest that entirely pulls every drop of his credibility rug right under his legs. Going down this route might help him get his green card if his sob-story gets sympathy with ICE (good luck with that) but Boeing will not go anywhere else but in a deeper ditch if they dare hang their MAX coats on an asylum con.

rheinwaldner wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Your argument above was "Flights" do not represent "different things" yet now you assert that they do represent different things?!?

A sufficient lot of flights are the denominator. They are not different.

Read what you wrote.

The logic reads as flights are flights, but Habsheim flights are different.

Raiden wrote:

You cannot be serious. It is the exact opposite: his asylum seeking creates a conflict of interest that entirely pulls every drop of his credibility rug right under his legs. Going down this route might help him get his green card if his sob-story gets sympathy with ICE (good luck with that) but Boeing will not go anywhere else but in a deeper ditch if they dare hang their MAX coats on an asylum con.

Interesting point of view yet we read the reason why the ex-employees ST and WaPo engage with are credible is because they aren't being paid by Boeing and don't have to lie to protect their career.

Seems there is truth in both points of view and we need to evaluate based on actual evidence the parties bring to the table rather than blanket decision to accept or deny based on employment or asylum status.

9w748capt wrote:

dtw2hyd wrote:

Polot wrote:

...
This is a discussion on the allegations by ET’s former chief engineer. This is not a discussion on the direct cause of ET302.

I have to guess you haven't read the article other than the text posted here.

Let me post some selective tidbits from the same article to connect the dots.

The chief engineer is applying for US asylum, making him a reliable and neutral source of information.

I'm not sure that adds to his case. Applying for US asylum definitely implies that there could be some ulterior motive at play. It's simply in his best interests to make Boeing look good and ET look bad. He has no choice but to dig in at this point.

Indeed.

His ulterior motive is already openly declared: a US green card. If he had been a pure hearted whistle-blower whose only motivation is to help assist the investigation then logic dictates he would have chosen for France (the place in charge of the crash investigation), not the US and especially not to Seattle of all places. That's a dubious choice.

Raiden wrote:

9w748capt wrote:

dtw2hyd wrote:

I have to guess you haven't read the article other than the text posted here.

Let me post some selective tidbits from the same article to connect the dots.

The chief engineer is applying for US asylum, making him a reliable and neutral source of information.

I'm not sure that adds to his case. Applying for US asylum definitely implies that there could be some ulterior motive at play. It's simply in his best interests to make Boeing look good and ET look bad. He has no choice but to dig in at this point.

Indeed.

His ulterior motive is already openly declared: a US green card. If he had been a pure hearted whistle-blower whose only motivation is to help assist the investigation then logic dictates he would have chosen for France (the place in charge of the crash investigation), not the US and especially not to Seattle of all places. That's a dubious choice.

Great point. France also may be a more attractive place to seek asylum relative to the US, for obvious reasons.

Revelation wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Your argument above was "Flights" do not represent "different things" yet now you assert that they do represent different things?!?

A sufficient lot of flights are the denominator. They are not different.

Read what you wrote.

The logic reads as flights are flights, but Habsheim flights are different.

Nobody called for MAX grounding after the first crash (although with hindsight that's exactly what should of course have happend). Why should the 320 have been grounded after Hapsheim?

The MAX grounding call came after the second crash. Was there a second Hapsheim?

Revelatiotn wrote:

Raiden wrote:

You cannot be serious. It is the exact opposite: his asylum seeking creates a conflict of interest that entirely pulls every drop of his credibility rug right under his legs. Going down this route might help him get his green card if his sob-story gets sympathy with ICE (good luck with that) but Boeing will not go anywhere else but in a deeper ditch if they dare hang their MAX coats on an asylum con.

Interesting point of view yet we read the reason why the ex-employees ST and WaPo engage with are credible is because they aren't being paid by Boeing and don't have to lie to protect their career..

If Boeing is paying any of these then they aren't getting their money's worth. No company, no airline is perfect and complaint free. But if Boeing hangs its coat on routine and frivolous complaints it better be more selective. Because so far all these complaints (both the latest asylum one as well as the earlier pre-crash complaint by pilots in WAPO), mention that the FAA were alerted or were busy conducting audits... but then that the same FAA closed these complaints within a month or something. That's pretty damning of the FAA if there is any merit in the complaints. So if Boeing's management strategy is to throw mud, spread and circulate the blame around in all directions hoping something sticks, then most of it will still end up landing and sticking on top of FAA's head. Not exactly something that helps Boeing's case... while it awaits FAA's mercy on its grounded fleet.