Strong signals Boeing is now resetting it's NB priorities, giving the 737MAX situation, continued runaway A321 success and inability to close the NMA business case. Plugging the NMA gap with a 767 upgrade to re-focus on the NB segment.

If a 767-X derivative was to replace the NMA in Boeing's product development plan, it could then potentially enable the US airframer to allocate its financial and engineering resources towards development of a "Future Small Airplane". This could allow more rapid development of an all-new single-aisle to succeed the 737 Max.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... pa-461386/

Another important aspect is the potential long-term impact that the 737 Max saga will have on Boeing product development. Does Boeing – and for that matter an engine manufacturer – really want to commit huge financial and engineering resources to deliver NMA, when a requirement for a “Future Small Aircraft” could suddenly become urgent?

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ma-461437/

It seems Boeing NMA and NSA is becoming FSA, "Future Small Airplane". I can see big airlines supporting this, when they neither want to put all their eggs in the 737MAX basket, for the next 30 years, nor paying list price for A321NEO's and create market imbalance & reduced competition (Ref. BA's 737 "commitment") .

Loyal Boeing customers are signalling they want to move on.
https://aviationweek.com/awincommercial/klm-ceo-boeing-737-replacement-not-priority
https://samchui.com/2019/09/23/delta-interested-in-ordering-up-to-200-boeing-797-aircraft/#.XaQlCUYzbcs
https://aviationnews.online/2018/03/02/united-to-make-major-fleet-decision-by-mid-year/


https://www.fs2000.org/2015/11/28/fsx-b ... 797-10-v5/

I think soon airlines can welcome Boeing 797 FSA proposals, special conversion deals for loyal 737MAX customers. No doubt a clean sheet, A320/21NEO beating specification

Theres always the risk here too that airbus will quickly respond with a stretch of the A321 with a bigger wing.
Think 753 size bird and bigger landing gear. I wonder if lightsaber knows if how much potential for growth the
PW geared turbofans have?

It looks like Boeing have got themselves into a bit of a sticky situation here. They can't let Airbus steal the narrow body
market at higher profit margins, and they could strategically step in and offer A330s dirt cheap to hurt Boeing
wide body products.

If they go ahead with any 767 update it needs to be minimal. Their focus has to be sorting out this narrow body mess.
I suspect they're going to need a lot more modifications than they've let on.

Basic starting points of a Boeing 797 FSA business case could be:

modular globalized production & assembly up to 120 a/c month (Embraer, China, Europe..) designed in.
ability to seemlessly adopt new engine technology (high BPR) in the next 30 years
10% lower OEW in 150-200 seats compared to NEO, uncompromised by extreme payload-range requirements.
a clear environmental footprint advantage (noise, pollution) over A320NEO and similar types.
superior redundancy and system robustness, alpha protection, setting new standards for flight safety
engine choice (partner Pratt/Raytheon Collins)
competitive container / cargo options (Asia)

the MAX backlog seems softer than ever before, forget the electric flying wings for now..

It could very well be, but when you are sitting on a backlog of 5000 orders, why spend the Bucks to put out something new.

I think that major innovation will come with the next single aisle generation.
However, it won't necessarily be a matter of bigger engines, cheaper production costs, but new ways to look at an aircraft, looking beyond inspiration from nature.
The industry isn't ready yet for this next leap.
I can see a launch 5 years from now for a 2030 EIS at the earliest.

In a first instance, new technologies will probably be retrofitted on existing designs anyway.

Yeah, well, talk about waking up late....

"In 1965, Joe Sutter was transferred from Boeing's 737 development team to manage the design studies for the new airliner, already assigned the model number 747"

Now Boeing need someone to do the same in reverse. The 747 was flying within 3 years. How can it take so long for a new NB to be designed and built, when they have been 'designing' it for years?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_74 ... r_proposal

Boeing wanted to do a 737 replacement instead of the MAX but wanted to launch it a few years from now. The NEO forced them to do the MAX as a stop gap. IIRC from articles back then, Boeing didn't want to launch the NSA until engine technology was available to be at least 15% more efficient than the NEO (when combined with airframe improvements).

It is also known that Boeing was hoping to use the NMA as a test bed for production improvements. They want to be able to produce the NSA at low enough cost that they can undercut whatever Airbus' offering is but maintain a healthy profit margin. This would allow Boeing to flip the narrowbody market share in their favor by approximately the same ratio as Airbus has achieved with NEO vs MAX.

Their problem is if they skip the NMA (and use the "767 MAX" as a stopgap), it will be difficult to get the production system right at the beginning. Assuming the report of the 737 MAX9-ER is accurate, launching that variant argues against the NSA being in service very soon.

planecane wrote:

Boeing wanted to do a 737 replacement instead of the MAX but wanted to launch it a few years from now. The NEO forced them to do the MAX as a stop gap. IIRC from articles back then, Boeing didn't want to launch the NSA until engine technology was available to be at least 15% more efficient than the NEO (when combined with airframe improvements).

It is also known that Boeing was hoping to use the NMA as a test bed for production improvements. They want to be able to produce the NSA at low enough cost that they can undercut whatever Airbus' offering is but maintain a healthy profit margin. This would allow Boeing to flip the narrowbody market share in their favor by approximately the same ratio as Airbus has achieved with NEO vs MAX.

Their problem is if they skip the NMA (and use the "767 MAX" as a stopgap), it will be difficult to get the production system right at the beginning. Assuming the report of the 737 MAX9-ER is accurate, launching that variant argues against the NSA being in service very soon.

I think many of the past strategies are build on the assumption, the 737 will be just fine, 737 customer will remain loyaly fly safe 737s and a comfy ~50% market share can be maintained based on a solid 5000 aircraft backlog. Big holes have been shot in those assumptions over the last few months.

The MAX has to be put back in service no matter what and airlines anticipate nothing else. The MAX will then be the safest aircraft in the skies.
https://www.businessinsider.nl/boeing-7 ... =true&r=US

Now cut the crap. The MAX (&NG) don't meet the latest safety requirements without rigorous upgrades, see last weeks JATR report. It meets dated grandfathered requirements, other were waived, specially for the MAX, https://www.heraldnet.com/business/boei ... uirements/ ). Fixing MCAS is not good enough. Nobody says so, but everybody knows.The arrows ( ) a few post above this one, reveal the 737MAX biggest weakspots. Big ones.

It's 2019. A 797 FSA is not a fresh opportunity, waiting to converted into success. It is quickly becoming a necessity. A plan combining the 737MAX backlog with better aircraft must IMO be created. Boeing has to make sure big customers don't step over to A320/A220/C919 in the coming decade. Some are close now. It seems waiting time is over.

planecane wrote:

Boeing wanted to do a 737 replacement instead of the MAX but wanted to launch it a few years from now. The NEO forced them to do the MAX as a stop gap. IIRC from articles back then, Boeing didn't want to launch the NSA until engine technology was available to be at least 15% more efficient than the NEO (when combined with airframe improvements).

It is also known that Boeing was hoping to use the NMA as a test bed for production improvements. They want to be able to produce the NSA at low enough cost that they can undercut whatever Airbus' offering is but maintain a healthy profit margin. This would allow Boeing to flip the narrowbody market share in their favor by approximately the same ratio as Airbus has achieved with NEO vs MAX.

Their problem is if they skip the NMA (and use the "767 MAX" as a stopgap), it will be difficult to get the production system right at the beginning. Assuming the report of the 737 MAX9-ER is accurate, launching that variant argues against the NSA being in service very soon.

Right up until the A320NEO launched, Boeing were adamant that all their customers wanted NSA, and that it would be in service by 2018 (which back in 2010 was a feasibility).
We should already have Boeing NSA now.
It would have had the same gen engines as the NEO.

I personally see this "proving the production improvements" argument for NMA a red herring.
NMA won't be produced in any bigger numbers than the 787 is IMO - certainly not remotely near the 60-80 per month NSA will need.
And given the current narrative on the 787 (how cheap and competitive the 14 per month manufacturing model has finally ended up), I'd argue Boeing have enough learning to be going on with.

Rgds

Pray tell, how does a NSA do better than current generation narrowbodies in fuel burn, per seat economics and passenger comfort while using engine and production system technology that can support a rate of 60 per month?

Until you can answer that question, your talk is cheap (and probably intended to troll).

planecane wrote:

Their problem is if they skip the NMA (and use the "767 MAX" as a stopgap), it will be difficult to get the production system right at the beginning.

Maybe the NMA/797X business case doesn't close.
Remember Boeing have says make a decision in 2019. It seems the time is up for that.
767-X seems also the viable solution for them.
I think there is a place to win the Middle Of Market

planecane wrote:

Assuming the report of the 737 MAX9-ER is accurate, launching that variant argues against the NSA being in service very soon.

There is possible to launch a NSA-8X with a restricted design range who will doesn't cannibalize this hypotesis 737MAX-9ERX.

Lufthansa wrote:

Theres always the risk here too that airbus will quickly respond with a stretch of the A321 with a bigger wing..

There will be no quick stretch and bigger wing for the A321 if Recommendations 1 and 2 from the JATR team gets implemented. The recommendations will modify the changed product rule, and result in significantly more certification work.

https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachme ... t_2019.pdf

Recommendation R1
Based on the JATR team’s observations and findings related to the application of the Changed Product Rule to the certification of the flight control system of the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA work with other civil aviation authorities to revise the harmonized approach to the certification of changed products. Changed Product Rules (e.g., 14 CFR §§ 21.19 & 21.101) and associated guidance (e.g., Advisory Circular 21.101-1B and FAA Orders 8110.4C and 8110.48A) should be revised to require a top-down approach whereby every change is evaluated from an integrated whole aircraft system perspective. These revisions should include criteria for determining when core attributes of an existing transport category aircraft design make it incapable of supporting the safety advancements introduced by the latest regulations and should drive a design change or a need for a new type certificate. The aircraft system includes the aircraft itself with all its subsystems, the flight crew, and the maintenance crew.
These Changed Product Rule revisions should take into consideration the following key principles:
• A comprehensive integrated system-level analysis recognizing that in this complex interactive system, every change could interact with other parts of the system.
• The assessment of proposed design changes on existing systems at the aircraft level includes using development assurance principles, system safety principles, and validation & verification techniques. The level of assessment should be proportional
to the impact of the change at the aircraft level.
• The consideration of training and qualification of flight and maintenance personnel,
as well as detailed explicit procedures for the safe operation of the aircraft.

Recommendation R2
Based on the JATR team’s observations and findings related to the regulations, policy, and compliance methods applied to the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA update regulations and guidance that are out of date and update certification procedures to ensure that the applied requirements, issue papers, means of compliance, and policies fully address the safety issues related to state-of-the-art designs employed on new projects. JATR team members also recommend that the FAA review its processes to ensure that regulations and guidance materials are kept up to date.

astuteman wrote:

Right up until the A320NEO launched, Boeing were adamant that all their customers wanted NSA, and that it would be in service by 2018 (which back in 2010 was a feasibility).
We should already have Boeing NSA now.
It would have had the same gen engines as the NEO.

They never said anything about the NSA being in service by 2018. If that was the case, ALL of the potential customers would have waited an extra year vs. the MAX. At the time they said that the engine technology needed for the NSA to make sense wouldn't be available until after 2025. Their customers weren't willing to wait 8-10 years to have the NSA vs. getting the MAX.

Checklist787 wrote:

planecane wrote:

Their problem is if they skip the NMA (and use the "767 MAX" as a stopgap), it will be difficult to get the production system right at the beginning.

Maybe the NMA/797X business case doesn't close.
Remember Boeing have says make a decision in 2019. It seems the time is up for that.
767-X seems also the viable solution for them.
I think there is a place to win the Middle Of Market

planecane wrote:

Assuming the report of the 737 MAX9-ER is accurate, launching that variant argues against the NSA being in service very soon.

There is possible to launch a NSA-8X with a restricted design range who will doesn't cannibalize this hypotesis 737MAX-9ERX.

NSA = New Small Aircraft (737 replacement). If they were going to launch that anytime soon then the 737 MAX9-ER (which would be a few years until EIS) would make no sense to launch.

This is increasingly sounding like Mcdonell Douglas' commercial range all over again but worse.
MD-11 needed a new wing. Bean counters said no... there was a proposal to stretch it to 747 size based
on the A340 wing. Had that have happened, there probably wouldn't be a 77W today. Instead an MD-11
that missed its performance targets was introduced.

MD90. Needed a new wing to give it transcend range. Well known at the time, A320 already had it as did
the 757. Again bean counters said no. Result? A320 boomed. Also got the best engine in the market at
the time and everything but simply couldn't do as much.

If they are going to recover from this and get BOTH the public and airlines confidence back in the
most important market segment they may very well have to go for broke on this one.

planecane wrote:

astuteman wrote:

Right up until the A320NEO launched, Boeing were adamant that all their customers wanted NSA, and that it would be in service by 2018 (which back in 2010 was a feasibility).
We should already have Boeing NSA now.
It would have had the same gen engines as the NEO.

They never said anything about the NSA being in service by 2018. If that was the case, ALL of the potential customers would have waited an extra year vs. the MAX. At the time they said that the engine technology needed for the NSA to make sense wouldn't be available until after 2025. Their customers weren't willing to wait 8-10 years to have the NSA vs. getting the MAX.

I can't find the 2018 quote at the moment - it preceded the one I'm about to link, and preceded the launch of the NEO.
However, Jim McNerney said this in Feb 2011, 3 months after the NEO launched..

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41517601/ns/b ... ne-replace

Boeing Chairman and CEO James McNerney told analysts on Thursday, "We're going to do a new airplane." He then seemed to backtrack a little, saying, "We're not done evaluating this whole situation yet, but our current bias ... is to move to a newer airplane, an all-new airplane, at the end of the decade, beginning of the next decade.

Backed by this ...

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ar-353056/

Boeing CEO Jim McNerney has given a rhetorical green light to replace the venerable 737, announcing the airframer intends to build a new aircraft to eclipse the re-engined Airbus A320neo, with a service entry around 2020.........Even though McNerney says entry into service could come earlier than 2020, the convergence of customer demand for a new aircraft, propulsion, systems and fuselage technology, as well as supply chain readiness, fits an end-of-decade first delivery

Rgds

The tendency is to blame Boeing here, but I think it should be noted that even if Boeing had leadership that wanted to move forward, that would be held back until the Embraer (Boeing Brazil) engineering talent was integrated, and right now that isn’t happening because...Euro regulators think it’s worth delaying until at least February. So the real cause in fact of present inaction at this time is both (a) the MAX grounding dragging on (due to Euro regulators mainly), and (b) Boeing Brazil on hold (due to Euro regulators), despite their swift approval of course of Airbus’ acquisition for a dollar of the A220 a couple years ago.

Airbus must be so glad they got A220 for essentially free. Now they already got the "Future Small Aircraft". Just need to add a A220-500 to complete the line. If Boeing doesn't end up doing NMA, airbus would need to do very little to continue capturing that top end of single aisle and in-between volume with A321.

Maybe the costs of the MAX grounding simply ate a large part of the MoM budget.

seahawk wrote:

Maybe the costs of the MAX grounding simply ate a large part of the MoM budget.

That might be how it would work in a small business or household budget. For a company like Boeing, if they needed funds for the MoM, they would either put some of the stock they have bought back on the market or offer bonds. Plus, when the finally get the MAX flying again, they will have an influx of cash flow from deliveries made of units which they have already paid to produce months ago.

If the business case is there for the MoM/NMA, they will launch it. If it isn't, then they will come up with some kind of PR spin and turn the project into the NSA like they turned the Sonic Cruiser into the 787.

Lufthansa wrote:

Theres always the risk here too that airbus will quickly respond with a stretch of the A321 with a bigger wing.
Think 753 size bird and bigger landing gear. I wonder if lightsaber knows if how much potential for growth the
PW geared turbofans have?

It looks like Boeing have got themselves into a bit of a sticky situation here. They can't let Airbus steal the narrow body
market at higher profit margins, and they could strategically step in and offer A330s dirt cheap to hurt Boeing
wide body products.

If they go ahead with any 767 update it needs to be minimal. Their focus has to be sorting out this narrow body mess.
I suspect they're going to need a lot more modifications than they've let on.

Just spit my Diet Coke on my keyboard, losing even more money on even lower priced A330's sounds like a really stupid strategy. From everything I have read here and elsewhere, Airbus is already selling A330 NEO's at Crazy Eddie pricing (Crazy Eddie, his prices are INSANE!). From all indications, Airbus is likely losing quite a bit of money on every A330 NEO delivered to Delta. They have already lost a lot of money on the A330 NEO trying to get enough volume to keep from having to slow the line. At some point, they will take the A380 route and stop throwing good money after bad, not try to hurt 787 profitability.

Jetport wrote:

Lufthansa wrote:

Theres always the risk here too that airbus will quickly respond with a stretch of the A321 with a bigger wing.
Think 753 size bird and bigger landing gear. I wonder if lightsaber knows if how much potential for growth the
PW geared turbofans have?

It looks like Boeing have got themselves into a bit of a sticky situation here. They can't let Airbus steal the narrow body
market at higher profit margins, and they could strategically step in and offer A330s dirt cheap to hurt Boeing
wide body products.

If they go ahead with any 767 update it needs to be minimal. Their focus has to be sorting out this narrow body mess.
I suspect they're going to need a lot more modifications than they've let on.

Just spit my Diet Coke on my keyboard, losing even more money on even lower priced A330's sound like a really stupid strategy. From everything I have read here and elsewhere, Airbus is already selling A330 NEO's at Crazy Eddie pricing (INSANE!). From all indications, Airbus is likely losing quite a bit of money on every A330 NEO delivered to Delta. They have already lost a lot of money on the A330 NEO trying to get enough volume to keep from having to slow the line. At some point, they will take the A380 route and stop throwing good money after bad, not try to hurt 787 profitability.

Airbus also can not deliver a 321NEO remotely in time given their failures in supply chain and production. That, plus the issues cited above with the 330NEO, and they’re it exactly winning. They’re simply losing not as badly with Boeing’s MAX issues.

Jetport wrote:

Lufthansa wrote:

Theres always the risk here too that airbus will quickly respond with a stretch of the A321 with a bigger wing.
Think 753 size bird and bigger landing gear. I wonder if lightsaber knows if how much potential for growth the
PW geared turbofans have?

It looks like Boeing have got themselves into a bit of a sticky situation here. They can't let Airbus steal the narrow body
market at higher profit margins, and they could strategically step in and offer A330s dirt cheap to hurt Boeing
wide body products.

If they go ahead with any 767 update it needs to be minimal. Their focus has to be sorting out this narrow body mess.
I suspect they're going to need a lot more modifications than they've let on.

Just spit my Diet Coke on my keyboard, losing even more money on even lower priced A330's sounds like a really stupid strategy. From everything I have read here and elsewhere, Airbus is already selling A330 NEO's at Crazy Eddie pricing (Crazy Eddie, his prices are INSANE!). From all indications, Airbus is likely losing quite a bit of money on every A330 NEO delivered to Delta. They have already lost a lot of money on the A330 NEO trying to get enough volume to keep from having to slow the line. At some point, they will take the A380 route and stop throwing good money after bad, not try to hurt 787 profitability.

To me it feels like Airbus's A350 is eating into the A330. Too close and the A350 appears more capable. The A330 is the odd plane out in their lineup.

Jetport wrote:

Lufthansa wrote:

Theres always the risk here too that airbus will quickly respond with a stretch of the A321 with a bigger wing.
Think 753 size bird and bigger landing gear. I wonder if lightsaber knows if how much potential for growth the
PW geared turbofans have?

It looks like Boeing have got themselves into a bit of a sticky situation here. They can't let Airbus steal the narrow body
market at higher profit margins, and they could strategically step in and offer A330s dirt cheap to hurt Boeing
wide body products.

If they go ahead with any 767 update it needs to be minimal. Their focus has to be sorting out this narrow body mess.
I suspect they're going to need a lot more modifications than they've let on.

Just spit my Diet Coke on my keyboard, losing even more money on even lower priced A330's sounds like a really stupid strategy. From everything I have read here and elsewhere, Airbus is already selling A330 NEO's at Crazy Eddie pricing (Crazy Eddie, his prices are INSANE!). From all indications, Airbus is likely losing quite a bit of money on every A330 NEO delivered to Delta. They have already lost a lot of money on the A330 NEO trying to get enough volume to keep from having to slow the line. At some point, they will take the A380 route and stop throwing good money after bad, not try to hurt 787 profitability.

Uh nice - I haven't read the standard narrative about Airbus selling below cost and only selling because dirt cheap bla bla bla for a long time.

And that topped by (not your) accusation of the mean EURO regulators to put obstacles in the way of Boeing,...this thread is going to develop hilariously comical.

texl1649 wrote:

(b) Boeing Brazil on hold (due to Euro regulators), despite their swift approval of course of Airbus’ acquisition for a dollar of the A220 a couple years ago.

Airbus isn't taking over control of Bombardier. Boeing is taking over control of Embraer. If Boeing just bought the E2 programme, that wouldn't have been big enough to warrant such an investigation. Embraer would still exist as another market player, just as Bombardier is right now although the latter is on a path to voluntarily wind down its aircraft business.

Same with engine OEMs. We have product lines that are the result of 2 major players collaborating together. But not anti-competitive, unless you have two of them merging to one single entity. That won't be allowed to happen.

Jetport wrote:

Lufthansa wrote:

Theres always the risk here too that airbus will quickly respond with a stretch of the A321 with a bigger wing.
Think 753 size bird and bigger landing gear. I wonder if lightsaber knows if how much potential for growth the
PW geared turbofans have?

It looks like Boeing have got themselves into a bit of a sticky situation here. They can't let Airbus steal the narrow body
market at higher profit margins, and they could strategically step in and offer A330s dirt cheap to hurt Boeing
wide body products.

If they go ahead with any 767 update it needs to be minimal. Their focus has to be sorting out this narrow body mess.
I suspect they're going to need a lot more modifications than they've let on.

Just spit my Diet Coke on my keyboard, losing even more money on even lower priced A330's sounds like a really stupid strategy. From everything I have read here and elsewhere, Airbus is already selling A330 NEO's at Crazy Eddie pricing (Crazy Eddie, his prices are INSANE!). From all indications, Airbus is likely losing quite a bit of money on every A330 NEO delivered to Delta. They have already lost a lot of money on the A330 NEO trying to get enough volume to keep from having to slow the line. At some point, they will take the A380 route and stop throwing good money after bad, not try to hurt 787 profitability.

Then you clearly haven't read everything here, and elsewhere....
As I point out in the 767 NEO thread, we know the A380 loses money.
We know the A350 production costs are a challenge to Airbus.
And yet in 2018 they made 10% EBIT margin across the entire portfolio.

If they are losing money on every A330, then the A320's are selling on an unimaginably high margin.

If you want to argue that Airbus make less margin on widebodys than Boeing I'll happily concede that (especially as Boeing CA has an EBIT margin of 13% compared to 10% at Airbus).

Besides, if Airbus had really tried to sell A330's to Delta below cost, then you can guarantee that Boeing would have played the dumping card.

Rgds

planecane wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Maybe the costs of the MAX grounding simply ate a large part of the MoM budget.

That might be how it would work in a small business or household budget. For a company like Boeing, if they needed funds for the MoM, they would either put some of the stock they have bought back on the market or offer bonds. Plus, when the finally get the MAX flying again, they will have an influx of cash flow from deliveries made of units which they have already paid to produce months ago.

If the business case is there for the MoM/NMA, they will launch it. If it isn't, then they will come up with some kind of PR spin and turn the project into the NSA like they turned the Sonic Cruiser into the 787.

Instances like the MAX grounding, or the 787 development spiral, will not hurt Boeing's other product development from a cash point of view. There is plenty of that to be had. Where they do hurt is in the are Boeing can't scale nearly as quickly, skilled personal. The MAX issue will have pulled engineers off other projects. The 787 ate engineers during its bad days and definitely effected what Boeing could do at the time.

Delta has already said they want 200 airplanes. How many requests does Boeing need to announce production?

planecane wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Maybe the costs of the MAX grounding simply ate a large part of the MoM budget.

That might be how it would work in a small business or household budget. For a company like Boeing, if they needed funds for the MoM, they would either put some of the stock they have bought back on the market or offer bonds. Plus, when the finally get the MAX flying again, they will have an influx of cash flow from deliveries made of units which they have already paid to produce months ago.

If the business case is there for the MoM/NMA, they will launch it. If it isn't, then they will come up with some kind of PR spin and turn the project into the NSA like they turned the Sonic Cruiser into the 787.

While they can get the cash easier, it still shows up in their results. And selling shares would drop the share price, something the management has not been to keen on yet.

Assuming Boeing can make a 'business case' for the FSA. I don't believe they have the capacity to convince themselves to launch a new aircraft. Hem and haw.

SELMER40 wrote:

Delta has already said they want 200 airplanes. How many requests does Boeing need to announce production?

At what price though? That probably determined the fate of MOM aircraft..

What would be the point of launching nsa when there's no new engine to mount on it? Ultrafan is currently a massive wb engine prototype. It would take some time to create a nb sized engine. And then there's the issue of being able to build enough carbon fuselages and wings for it.

Erebus wrote:

texl1649 wrote:

(b) Boeing Brazil on hold (due to Euro regulators), despite their swift approval of course of Airbus’ acquisition for a dollar of the A220 a couple years ago.

Airbus isn't taking over control of Bombardier. Boeing is taking over control of Embraer. If Boeing just bought the E2 programme, that wouldn't have been big enough to warrant such an investigation. Embraer would still exist as another market player, just as Bombardier is right now although the latter is on a path to voluntarily wind down its aircraft business.

This is a difference without a distinction. The C-series was the future/only option for BBD to continue to be a player in the commercial market. The legalese may matter in some courts, but the actual case is it is just gibberish vs. reality.

DenverTed wrote:

Assuming Boeing can make a 'business case' for the FSA. I don't believe they have the capacity to convince themselves to launch a new aircraft. Hem and haw.

this.

FSA looks further away than the NSA, if the name is anything to go by. I am confused by the flurry of acronyms coming out of Chicago

Boeing has bin 6 years trying to close the buisnesscase for the MOM, and it looks like the buisnesscase-gap is not getting any narrower.

Current narrowbody families 737/320 where never designed to be mass produced, and both companys spent a lot of money trying to implement automation to both platforms, so I guess that the engineering force Boeing has working on the 797 is busy trying to figure out how to design future production system in conjunction with the aircraft itself. Think modern car production line.

The real problem for Boeing when it comes to closing the buisness case for 737 successor is the time from certification until they reach desired production rate, lets say rate 60, can easily be 15 years. Designing the aircraft, getting it certified, and building this massive production system is going to cost a lot of money, and if "closing the buisnesscase" means closing it without the stock price taking long term hit, it is never going to close.

texl1649 wrote:

Erebus wrote:

texl1649 wrote:

(b) Boeing Brazil on hold (due to Euro regulators), despite their swift approval of course of Airbus’ acquisition for a dollar of the A220 a couple years ago.

Airbus isn't taking over control of Bombardier. Boeing is taking over control of Embraer. If Boeing just bought the E2 programme, that wouldn't have been big enough to warrant such an investigation. Embraer would still exist as another market player, just as Bombardier is right now although the latter is on a path to voluntarily wind down its aircraft business.

This is a difference without a distinction. The C-series was the future/only option for BBD to continue to be a player in the commercial market. The legalese may matter in some courts, but the actual case is it is just gibberish vs. reality.

I don't think you understand a very big distinction between the two cases.
One court case focused on Bombardier and Airbus in a JV for the C-Series, with Bombardier continuing to offer CRJ and Dash 8 in the regional market at that moment in time - Embraer and Boeing were legally and technically considered competitors.

The second case is looking at a Boeing and Embraer JV on both the E-Jet and E2 family and its effect on the regional passenger airliner market after the Airbus-Bombardier JV.

Courts cannot rule on what might happen in the future. The market following the Airbus JV and Bombardier's continued woes as a passenger aircraft manufacturer has dramatically altered the market, so as to warrant a Phase II (or full-scale) investigation in the eyes of the European Commission.

texl1649 wrote:

The C-series was the future/only option for BBD to continue to be a player in the commercial market.

Gibberish is if you thought BBD was in a position to continue with the CSeries by themselves. They were in no position to continue with that and going bust would have still reduced the number of options in the market.

astuteman wrote:

Right up until the A320NEO launched, Boeing were adamant that all their customers wanted NSA, and that it would be in service by 2018 (which back in 2010 was a feasibility).

planecane wrote:

They never said anything about the NSA being in service by 2018. If that was the case, ALL of the potential customers would have waited an extra year vs. the MAX. At the time they said that the engine technology needed for the NSA to make sense wouldn't be available until after 2025. Their customers weren't willing to wait 8-10 years to have the NSA vs. getting the MAX.

I believe Boeing was indeed shooting for an EIS of around 2018-2019, but potential customers didn't believe they could make that date based on how badly they screwed up the 787.

Also, NSA would have been fairly more expensive on a per unit basis than the A320neo while probably not offering much better economics or performance (since it would have used similar systems). Airbus marketing against launching an NRA (their A320 replacement) was a new airframe would cost an airline more across the board (more expensive frame, new training, new spares, etc.) than adopting a model with significantly more fuel efficient engines because at the time, fuel prices had spiked and were a significant amount of an airframe's trip costs. Airbus' argument was that a new airframe would not become cost-effective enough against a re-engine until the mid-to-late 2020s.

And frankly, I believe that is still the case today. NSA/FSA/797 would mimic the A320 pretty much across the board, but would cost more to build and sell to airlines who would pay more to add it into their fleets than sticking with the MAX until such time as the technology bases (engines, systems, materials, aerodynamics) have advanced enough to warrant an all-new airframe and engine design combination.

Therefore it still makes sense to do NMA in a tight light 7W and then resuse that Fuselage/nose for NSA once you have figured out how to build it cheaper than A320. Highly automated production that radically reduces the amount of labour.

Do it first on NMA which can be priced at a premium due to it's capabilities to offset low initial production volumes but amortize the development of the production system and barrel/nose/system design over both NMA/NSA so development cost per frame is quite low using program cost accounting. Assume say 10,000 frames total over 20 years between the two programs at $40 Billion total and that is only $4 million per frame. However it shouldn't be that expensive to do both - maybe $25-30B stretched over 10 years.

Boeing totally has the cashflow for that.

morrisond wrote:

Therefore it still makes sense to do NMA in a tight light 7W and then resuse that Fuselage/nose for NSA once you have figured out how to build it cheaper than A320. Highly automated production that radically reduces the amount of labour.

Do it first on NMA which can be priced at a premium due to it's capabilities to offset low initial production volumes but amortize the development of the production system and barrel/nose/system design over both NMA/NSA so development cost per frame is quite low using program cost accounting. Assume say 10,000 frames total over 20 years between the two programs at $40 Billion total and that is only $4 million per frame. However it shouldn't be that expensive to do both - maybe $25-30B stretched over 10 years.

Boeing totally has the cashflow for that.

I do not think Boeing can afford a dual-development (or only in the best case). Over the next years multiple risks are emerging and taking them into account will lead to lower risk options (767 re-engined, 737-9ER, etc.) to overcome the recent troubles:

possible global economical slowdown reduces investment from airlines --> slim chances to sell new aircraft (especially at premiums to get a return of investment), airlines would prefer established "cheap" models (737, 787, A320)
possible global economical slowdown reduces investment from airlines --> less orders of 787/777 push up the price of a single aircraft due to reduction of production and also pressure on accounting with the deferred production costs
years of liability's from the MAX grounding --> $8-9B costs already confirmed by Boeing (this number gets higher every month of the ongoing grounding)
years of liability's from the MAX grounding --> up to another $10B+ costs from court cases, settlements etc possbile
years of liability's from the MAX grounding --> compensations for airlines reduce profitability of the 737Max line (and other lines if compensations are shifted towards them)
changes in certification due to FAA/Boeing scandal regarding the 737Max certification --> possible delay of the 777X certification
changes in certification due to FAA/Boeing scandal regarding the 737Max certification --> increased certification times and efforts needed for any new aircraft (higher costs)
introducing new type (no commonality) --> increased costs for airlines pushes them to buy established models already in the fleet
lessons learned from the 787 development ($30B R&D costs for the aircraft and production system development) --> developments do not get cheaper due to additional complexity of modern frames
lessons learned from the 787 development ($30B R&D costs for the aircraft and production system development) --> a dual development would cost even more (probably $40B+)

There are a more risks but this are just the most obvious ones. Taking them into account to calculate possible returns, vs the expected return while doing nothing for the next 4-8 years, will give the board an indication how much the return per share would/could be hit and how likely this is. In my eyes any big investment/announcement will be pushed beyond 2020 into 2021 or further, to minimize the risks posed by the global economy.

Stitch wrote:

astuteman wrote:

Right up until the A320NEO launched, Boeing were adamant that all their customers wanted NSA, and that it would be in service by 2018 (which back in 2010 was a feasibility).

planecane wrote:

They never said anything about the NSA being in service by 2018. If that was the case, ALL of the potential customers would have waited an extra year vs. the MAX. At the time they said that the engine technology needed for the NSA to make sense wouldn't be available until after 2025. Their customers weren't willing to wait 8-10 years to have the NSA vs. getting the MAX.

I believe Boeing was indeed shooting for an EIS of around 2018-2019, but potential customers didn't believe they could make that date based on how badly they screwed up the 787.

Also, NSA would have been fairly more expensive on a per unit basis than the A320neo while probably not offering much better economics or performance (since it would have used similar systems). Airbus marketing against launching an NRA (their A320 replacement) was a new airframe would cost an airline more across the board (more expensive frame, new training, new spares, etc.) than adopting a model with significantly more fuel efficient engines because at the time, fuel prices had spiked and were a significant amount of an airframe's trip costs. Airbus' argument was that a new airframe would not become cost-effective enough against a re-engine until the mid-to-late 2020s.

And frankly, I believe that is still the case today. NSA/FSA/797 would mimic the A320 pretty much across the board, but would cost more to build and sell to airlines who would pay more to add it into their fleets than sticking with the MAX until such time as the technology bases (engines, systems, materials, aerodynamics) have advanced enough to warrant an all-new airframe and engine design combination.

Additionally, there were many doubts how quickly production could be ramped up to 30-40 units per month, let alone 50-60.

But I'm not sure if there is that much reason to believe an all new NB - with EIS in the 2nd half of the 20s - would still have such a difficult time competing with the A320neo. 10 years ago, it was said the gain would be 5% maximum IIRC. One would expect it technology would have made further improvements possible by now. The A220-300 has proven to be a success, look at how the sales compare since Airbus has taken over the program. With production getting leaner and cheaper, and the confidence about its future now with Airbus behind it, the A223 is starting the displace the A320neo. And it's first flight is already more than 5 years ago. AF ordering the A223 and skipping the A320neo says a lot IMO. A new Boeing NB would do even better.

FluidFlow wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Therefore it still makes sense to do NMA in a tight light 7W and then resuse that Fuselage/nose for NSA once you have figured out how to build it cheaper than A320. Highly automated production that radically reduces the amount of labour.

Do it first on NMA which can be priced at a premium due to it's capabilities to offset low initial production volumes but amortize the development of the production system and barrel/nose/system design over both NMA/NSA so development cost per frame is quite low using program cost accounting. Assume say 10,000 frames total over 20 years between the two programs at $40 Billion total and that is only $4 million per frame. However it shouldn't be that expensive to do both - maybe $25-30B stretched over 10 years.

Boeing totally has the cashflow for that.

I do not think Boeing can afford a dual-development (or only in the best case). Over the next years multiple risks are emerging and taking them into account will lead to lower risk options (767 re-engined, 737-9ER, etc.) to overcome the recent troubles:

possible global economical slowdown reduces investment from airlines --> slim chances to sell new aircraft (especially at premiums to get a return of investment), airlines would prefer established "cheap" models (737, 787, A320)
possible global economical slowdown reduces investment from airlines --> less orders of 787/777 push up the price of a single aircraft due to reduction of production and also pressure on accounting with the deferred production costs
years of liability's from the MAX grounding --> $8-9B costs already confirmed by Boeing (this number gets higher every month of the ongoing grounding)
years of liability's from the MAX grounding --> up to another $10B+ costs from court cases, settlements etc possbile
years of liability's from the MAX grounding --> compensations for airlines reduce profitability of the 737Max line (and other lines if compensations are shifted towards them)
changes in certification due to FAA/Boeing scandal regarding the 737Max certification --> possible delay of the 777X certification
changes in certification due to FAA/Boeing scandal regarding the 737Max certification --> increased certification times and efforts needed for any new aircraft (higher costs)
introducing new type (no commonality) --> increased costs for airlines pushes them to buy established models already in the fleet
lessons learned from the 787 development ($30B R&D costs for the aircraft and production system development) --> developments do not get cheaper due to additional complexity of modern frames
lessons learned from the 787 development ($30B R&D costs for the aircraft and production system development) --> a dual development would cost even more (probably $40B+)

There are a more risks but this are just the most obvious ones. Taking them into account to calculate possible returns, vs the expected return while doing nothing for the next 4-8 years, will give the board an indication how much the return per share would/could be hit and how likely this is. In my eyes any big investment/announcement will be pushed beyond 2020 into 2021 or further, to minimize the risks posed by the global economy.

By all reports NMA/NSA won't be incorporating much new tech - they will be based on 787/777x - it will just be the production system which is new - and those are probably just further refinements (albeit major) of 787/777x.

A lot of the 787 development cost (deferred production cost was $30 B - I'm not sure development cost was $30B) was that new tech.

NMA Wood most likely be the new fuselage/nose plus a shrink of the 777x wing.

It won't be that expensive - $40 billion for both is totally reasonable at least for NMA small and Large and NSA small and Large - maybe if they do NSA XL sometime 15 years from now that may take it over that number.

Just based on backlogs Boeing probably has a good $100B to spend. Unless the Max is permanently grounded total cost for the fiasco probably never goes past $15b which is just two years of share buybacks.

They can afford it.

764 re-engine for the freighter market (I highly doubt it will be for the passenger market - if people don't think MOM is good enough the economics on 764 will never work) and 739ER are minor derivative programs - maybe a billion or so for both.

They will tie up minimal resources.

By many reports NMA was ready to be launched this year - they are just waiting for MAX to fly again before announcing - it will make no sense to announce NSA anytime time soon.

They should do both a NSA and a NMA simultaneously, but they won't because they don't have the nerve.

I also doubt that they'll do a NSA because their masters at Southwest won't sanction it.

If Southwest would want to switch to the A220. How fast could Boeing deliver some NSA?

morrisond wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Therefore it still makes sense to do NMA in a tight light 7W and then resuse that Fuselage/nose for NSA once you have figured out how to build it cheaper than A320. Highly automated production that radically reduces the amount of labour.

Do it first on NMA which can be priced at a premium due to it's capabilities to offset low initial production volumes but amortize the development of the production system and barrel/nose/system design over both NMA/NSA so development cost per frame is quite low using program cost accounting. Assume say 10,000 frames total over 20 years between the two programs at $40 Billion total and that is only $4 million per frame. However it shouldn't be that expensive to do both - maybe $25-30B stretched over 10 years.

Boeing totally has the cashflow for that.

I do not think Boeing can afford a dual-development (or only in the best case). Over the next years multiple risks are emerging and taking them into account will lead to lower risk options (767 re-engined, 737-9ER, etc.) to overcome the recent troubles:

possible global economical slowdown reduces investment from airlines --> slim chances to sell new aircraft (especially at premiums to get a return of investment), airlines would prefer established "cheap" models (737, 787, A320)
possible global economical slowdown reduces investment from airlines --> less orders of 787/777 push up the price of a single aircraft due to reduction of production and also pressure on accounting with the deferred production costs
years of liability's from the MAX grounding --> $8-9B costs already confirmed by Boeing (this number gets higher every month of the ongoing grounding)
years of liability's from the MAX grounding --> up to another $10B+ costs from court cases, settlements etc possbile
years of liability's from the MAX grounding --> compensations for airlines reduce profitability of the 737Max line (and other lines if compensations are shifted towards them)
changes in certification due to FAA/Boeing scandal regarding the 737Max certification --> possible delay of the 777X certification
changes in certification due to FAA/Boeing scandal regarding the 737Max certification --> increased certification times and efforts needed for any new aircraft (higher costs)
introducing new type (no commonality) --> increased costs for airlines pushes them to buy established models already in the fleet
lessons learned from the 787 development ($30B R&D costs for the aircraft and production system development) --> developments do not get cheaper due to additional complexity of modern frames
lessons learned from the 787 development ($30B R&D costs for the aircraft and production system development) --> a dual development would cost even more (probably $40B+)

There are a more risks but this are just the most obvious ones. Taking them into account to calculate possible returns, vs the expected return while doing nothing for the next 4-8 years, will give the board an indication how much the return per share would/could be hit and how likely this is. In my eyes any big investment/announcement will be pushed beyond 2020 into 2021 or further, to minimize the risks posed by the global economy.

By all reports NMA/NSA won't be incorporating much new tech - they will be based on 787/777x - it will just be the production system which is new - and those are probably just further refinements (albeit major) of 787/777x.

That might be fine enough for a NMA for 2025 but in my opinion that launch window is gone and it will be up to 2027 until it would be out (probably change in certification, possible engine delays see 777X). For an NSA that would not be sufficient enough to produce an aircraft to compete, because if that is enough Boeing would have launched the NSA instead of the MAX with the possibility for a simple re-engine in 2030, but they did not so a new NSA has to be way more than a bit of new tech.

A lot of the 787 development cost (deferred production cost was $30 B - I'm not sure development cost was $30B) was that new tech.

Until 2011 Boeing invested $32B into development and production (that was before the first 787 was delivered): https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-celebrates-787-delivery-as-programs-costs-top-32-billion/
Also building the first 500 787 accumulated another $30B of losses: https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/01/21/boeing-cos-dreamliner-profitability-is-set-to-soar.aspx
As it is also stated the development of the aircraft alone was $15B, it can be assumed that overall costs till 2014 was $15B for the aircraft, $15B for the production and $15B for selling the aircraft under production costs.
So even if we assume that the 797 will be so expensive to avoid deferred production costs we can still assume it will cost around $30B, that is around $4B per year till 2027.

NMA Wood most likely be the new fuselage/nose plus a shrink of the 777x wing.

Shrinking the wing is not a good option, better develop a new one matching the new aircraft as it will anyway has to be fully certified as a new aircraft. You cannot simply shrink stuff in engineering.

It won't be that expensive - $40 billion for both is totally reasonable at least for NMA small and Large and NSA small and Large - maybe if they do NSA XL sometime 15 years from now that may take it over that number.

This is a really low estimate but if it does not include much new tech it is definitely possible but could be easily our surpassed by other manufacturers spending more on new tech an bring it to market a few years later.

Just based on backlogs Boeing probably has a good $100B to spend. Unless the Max is permanently grounded total cost for the fiasco probably never goes past $15b which is just two years of share buybacks.

Boeing sais its Backlog is worth $490B ($412B in commercial sector). If we assume that is taking full order books from Q1 2018 till Q4 2025, so 7 years, (a bit less with the 787 and a bit more with the 737) and a profit margin of 10% we have a profit of $49B or 6.12B per year. https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/01/30/boeing-brings-in-100-billion-in-2018-revenue/. Additional revenue brought the result up to $10B a year (2018). https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/01/30/boeing-brings-in-100-billion-in-2018-revenue/
So until Q4 2026 (first delivery of possible NMA) Boeing has about $70B to spend. This does not include costs from MAX crisis and compensations and possible cost overruns from the 777X. It also does not include the possibility of cut backs in 787 orders or heavy discounts to keep the line open.

They can afford it.

Taking into account above numbers: 70B to spend, 30B development costs, 15B Max related costs, 5B other R&D costs (737-9ER, 764 re-engine for fright purposes, 777X compensations and delays, NSA project launch in 2025) Boeing would still make $20B profit from Q12020-Q42026. Sounds good but that is a lousy $2.85B per year. This would push the share price down by a huge amount. On top of that, this estimate includes a healthy order book for the 787 also from 2022 onwards.
So yes Boeing can afford it but do they really want to? It is a risky investment and in the current economy might not be the best idea. Business risk analysts will also take into account a slowdown of the economy, weak orders and cost overruns. That could then quickly turn into heavy losses.

764 re-engine for the freighter market (I highly doubt it will be for the passenger market - if people don't think MOM is good enough the economics on 764 will never work) and 739ER are minor derivative programs - maybe a billion or so for both.

They will tie up minimal resources.

That is exactly why they are launched. No risk and still great return for the company. Thats the option I guess Boeing will go for the next 3-4 years. Slow investment and market observation to launch a great NAaircraft with EIS in 2030.

By many reports NMA was ready to be launched this year - they are just waiting for MAX to fly again before announcing - it will make no sense to announce NSA anytime time soon.

A lot of stuff in a lot of industries is ready to be launched, that does not mean it will be launched. If it has a big risk of not bringing money the thing will just gather dust in some execs drawer.

Stitch wrote:

astuteman wrote:

Right up until the A320NEO launched, Boeing were adamant that all their customers wanted NSA, and that it would be in service by 2018 (which back in 2010 was a feasibility).

planecane wrote:

They never said anything about the NSA being in service by 2018. If that was the case, ALL of the potential customers would have waited an extra year vs. the MAX. At the time they said that the engine technology needed for the NSA to make sense wouldn't be available until after 2025. Their customers weren't willing to wait 8-10 years to have the NSA vs. getting the MAX.

I believe Boeing was indeed shooting for an EIS of around 2018-2019, but potential customers didn't believe they could make that date based on how badly they screwed up the 787.

Also, NSA would have been fairly more expensive on a per unit basis than the A320neo while probably not offering much better economics or performance (since it would have used similar systems). Airbus marketing against launching an NRA (their A320 replacement) was a new airframe would cost an airline more across the board (more expensive frame, new training, new spares, etc.) than adopting a model with significantly more fuel efficient engines because at the time, fuel prices had spiked and were a significant amount of an airframe's trip costs. Airbus' argument was that a new airframe would not become cost-effective enough against a re-engine until the mid-to-late 2020s.

And frankly, I believe that is still the case today. NSA/FSA/797 would mimic the A320 pretty much across the board, but would cost more to build and sell to airlines who would pay more to add it into their fleets than sticking with the MAX until such time as the technology bases (engines, systems, materials, aerodynamics) have advanced enough to warrant an all-new airframe and engine design combination.

Cogent, as ever.

However "Devil's Advocate" time - the risk is that at some stage the MAX suddenly drops-out of contention entirely.
EG your scenario seems to necessitate the MAX going on - however surely upgraded massively.

Is this realistic?

The Boeing leadership seem suddenly to have walked into a dilemma.

Last year was a triumphant year for Boeing and the MAX especially. (747 total MAX sales IIRC).

Now suddenly BA is up to it's a** in alligators - and the future of the MAX is by no means clear.

I see a case for the NSA as not only the future in the mid-term - but increasingly as insurance for the nearer future.
This is very much as elucidated above (#36, I think) - maybe BA just have to take an "Asian" approach and think completely long-term.

(Amazon is another example of very very long-term investment aimed at future dominance).

Maybe BA should do the NSA and accept long-term lower returns- until the wheel turns, that is.


cheers

Wait - wait - OMG!!!
I am in danger of agreeing with keesje!!!

Well - you live long enough - all things are possible!

brindabella wrote:

However "Devil's Advocate" time - the risk is that at some stage the MAX suddenly drops-out of contention entirely. EG your scenario seems to necessitate the MAX going on - however surely upgraded massively. Is this realistic?

MAX needs to continue for the near-term because Boeing needs something to be competitive with Airbus and snarky comments by some aside about marketshare, MAX sold very well and once it has been cleared to return to revenue service, it should continue to sell well.

But the 737 design has reached its end, IMO, and Boeing will have no choice but to move onwards to an all-new design that will likely be wider and sit taller. Airlines seem very positive about using narrowbody planes on routes that were once traditionally the realm of widebodies and as long as the prices are right, passengers seem positive about them, as well. So Boeing needs a frame that can do those missions with better economics than the A320 family and that means something bigger and better than the 737.

I could see Boeing going with a fuselage diameter slightly larger than the A320 (say C919-size) to allow wider aisles at 18" seat widths (for quicker turnarounds) and to support wider long-haul premium cabin seating (like MINT). The higher ceilings would also a greater sense of spaciousness to help counter claustrophobia on long flights and allow larger overhead bins for better luggage storage. A greater diameter would also make stretching easier (less reinforcement per additional frame added) so we could see a family with lengths of perhaps 42m, 47m and 52m (roughy 737-900 to 757-300).

NSA becomes FSA and just kicks the can down the road farther....
Perhaps a 764NEO (I don't think it will be called MAX) and a 737-9ER/10 combo (It won't be called MAX either) are launched to counter A321-A330 in the NMA/MOM market. 737-8 may soldier on as the primary Boeing Single Aisle plane for 10 more years.

In the wake of the 737-Max crashes and subsequent PR nightmare facing Boeing, could it be feasible that the 797 be a clean slate "family" type aircraft?

Similar to the A320/321 where the 797-6, 797-7, 797-8 be clean slate 737 replacements (eliminating the MAX, and thus public mistrust, of that aircraft) and then the 797-9, 797-10 being the 757/767 replacement Boeing has been rumored to use the 797 designation on anyway?

This idea essentially kills 3 birds with one stone:

1. Eliminates the public mistrust or misconception of the "MAX" being a "bad" aircraft
2. Boeing gets a clean slate design for the replacement of the 737, 757 and 767 all in one family of new next gen aircraft
3. Boeing can get a refresh/reset in the PR department (which is badly needed regardless of what happens with the MAX)


Just a thought, Idea, concept