mjoelnir wrote:

... I really do not see much space left in a market above the A321XLR and below the 787/A330.

Exactly. Even if there is a niche market, a reborn 788 with derated engines would fit the bill.

That leaves Boeing with only one option, a highly innovative clean state small aircraft with maximum possible range and a pray that Airbus will keep drinking A321 kool-aid for too long.

Looking at cars, there used to be just the station wagon, vans, Broncos, and assorted heavy 4wd. Not much of a market for SUVs, because nobody made one. Now they are a huge percentage of the market. So you have the 767, A300, and A310, the only option for twin aisles were giant cargo clunkers. No one has made an ultralight 2-2-2, 2-3-2, or 2-4-2. The window is 100t to 250t. That's an empty center field, the barn door is wide open. If reports that Boeing has 1,000 people working on the NMA are close to true, I would imagine Airbus is hard at work on this too. 100t to 250t is space, the final frontier. There is only one question, who will get there first.

mjoelnir wrote:

really do not see much space left in a market above the A321XLR and below the 787/A330.

Are you joking?

With Airbus we go from 102t to 251t.
With Boeing we go from 90t up to 227t.

That is a 150% MTOW increase and is the largest gap in commercial airliner history.

A350 to 777W 11% increase
777W to 747-8 27% increase
747-8 to A380 28% increase

The MOM gap is 5 times greater than the next largest gap. Both manufacturers could fit a new aircraft family in that huge gap.

The models we had in that gap were:
757-200, 757-300, A310, 767-200, 767-300, A300, 767-400.

If anything we previously had an oversupply of aircraft models in the MOM space preventing large economy of scale. The biggest killer is that it makes it hard to justify fitting new engines. Had there been fewer models then the sales per model would be higher this would have allowed a NEO program to make sense.

Now that all the competition has gone a cleansheet positioned exactly half way between the 102t A321XLR and 227t 787-8 would absolutely dominate.

A300NEO would be dominating today on transatlantic, on short thick routes and with low cost carriers.

757NEO would have a range over 5000nm and would be opening new thin routes.

DenverTed wrote:

The window is 100t to 250t. That's an empty center field, the barn door is wide open.

RJMAZ wrote:

Now that all the competition has gone a cleansheet positioned exactly half way between the 102t A321XLR and 227t 787-8 would absolutely dominate.

Wow, I guess it's a no-brainer. So why hasn't it happened?

Why hasn't Boeing been able to close the business case on something they've been studying for years? What are you seeing that they've missed? By all accounts, they seem to be moving further away from closing the business case, not closer.

Airbus is apparently not interested and has concentrated on selling A321neos by the shedload.

Read Astuteman's posts on 'the gap'.

RJMAZ wrote:

A300NEO would be dominating today on transatlantic, on short thick routes and with low cost carriers.

757NEO would have a range over 5000nm and would be opening new thin routes.

Which non-existent engines would power these fantasy planes? The A300 was light because it was relatively short-ranged. 757neo would be heavy for the job. There are reasons those planes are no longer in production.

After Airbus success with the A321neo, it will be interesting to see how Boeing will respond. I for one believe that as soon as they have the 737MAX that Boeing will show it’s card. On a semi related note, I watched the movie Ford v Ferrari and I was thinking about the competition between Boeing 737max and Airbus A320neo. Right now Airbus have the upper hand with a more versatile airplane and Boeing’s plane is on the ground. This will be an epic decision. How will Boeing respond to Airbus current upper hand? Will they bet the company as Boeing did entering the jet age, or will they do the incremental improvement that its other predecessor McDonnell Douglas did? I hope we will see the respond sometime next year.

RJMAZ wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

really do not see much space left in a market above the A321XLR and below the 787/A330.

Are you joking?

With Airbus we go from 102t to 251t.
With Boeing we go from 90t up to 227t.

That is a 150% MTOW increase and is the largest gap in commercial airliner history.

A350 to 777W 11% increase
777W to 747-8 27% increase
747-8 to A380 28% increase

The MOM gap is 5 times greater than the next largest gap. Both manufacturers could fit a new aircraft family in that huge gap.

The models we had in that gap were:
757-200, 757-300, A310, 767-200, 767-300, A300, 767-400.

If anything we previously had an oversupply of aircraft models in the MOM space preventing large economy of scale. The biggest killer is that it makes it hard to justify fitting new engines. Had there been fewer models then the sales per model would be higher this would have allowed a NEO program to make sense.

Now that all the competition has gone a cleansheet positioned exactly half way between the 102t A321XLR and 227t 787-8 would absolutely dominate.

A300NEO would be dominating today on transatlantic, on short thick routes and with low cost carriers.

757NEO would have a range over 5000nm and would be opening new thin routes.

There is an economical and operational biggest single aisle frame and an economical and operational smallest dual aisle frame. Between them is the gap.
Counting up the models, you can throw out a few. The 757-200 is replaced, both in capacity and range.

Than we have the 757-300, 55 frames sold, the 767-200/200ER, 249 frames sold, the A310, 255 frames sold. the 767-300 managed 687 and the A300 has 561. The 767-400 had just 38 sales.
It is an impressive number of models, but apart from the 767-300 and A300, non of them a roaring success.
There is also the point, that quite a few frames counted up, do not fit the NMA narrative and were not bought to fill this gap. The example would be the 767-300ER, bought often for its range, before the A330-200 came around.
The only frame that seem to be designed to fit this gap, the A300, the pioneering first twin aisle wide body frame, a short to medium haul airliner, was perhaps designed without thinking about this gap. The A300 was constrained in size and range by the available engines.

So I have my big doubts for the feasibility for a clean sheet program in this gap.

mjoelnir wrote:

The only frame that seem to be designed to fit this gap, the A300, the pioneering first twin aisle wide body frame, a short to medium haul airliner, was perhaps designed without thinking about this gap. The A300 was constrained in size and range by the available engines.

So I have my big doubts for the feasibility for a clean sheet program in this gap.

We are in the same situation today - there is a lack of available engines for NMA. Any clean sheet project launched today can only expect the first aircraft to be delivered in about 8-10 years.

mjoelnir wrote:

RJMAZ wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

really do not see much space left in a market above the A321XLR and below the 787/A330.

Are you joking?

With Airbus we go from 102t to 251t.
With Boeing we go from 90t up to 227t.

That is a 150% MTOW increase and is the largest gap in commercial airliner history.

A350 to 777W 11% increase
777W to 747-8 27% increase
747-8 to A380 28% increase

The MOM gap is 5 times greater than the next largest gap. Both manufacturers could fit a new aircraft family in that huge gap.

The models we had in that gap were:
757-200, 757-300, A310, 767-200, 767-300, A300, 767-400.

If anything we previously had an oversupply of aircraft models in the MOM space preventing large economy of scale. The biggest killer is that it makes it hard to justify fitting new engines. Had there been fewer models then the sales per model would be higher this would have allowed a NEO program to make sense.

Now that all the competition has gone a cleansheet positioned exactly half way between the 102t A321XLR and 227t 787-8 would absolutely dominate.

A300NEO would be dominating today on transatlantic, on short thick routes and with low cost carriers.

757NEO would have a range over 5000nm and would be opening new thin routes.

There is an economical and operational biggest single aisle frame and an economical and operational smallest dual aisle frame. Between them is the gap.
Counting up the models, you can throw out a few. The 757-200 is replaced, both in capacity and range.

Than we have the 757-300, 55 frames sold, the 767-200/200ER, 249 frames sold, the A310, 255 frames sold. the 767-300 managed 687 and the A300 has 561. The 767-400 had just 38 sales.
It is an impressive number of models, but apart from the 767-300 and A300, non of them a roaring success.
There is also the point, that quite a few frames counted up, do not fit the NMA narrative and were not bought to fill this gap. The example would be the 767-300ER, bought often for its range, before the A330-200 came around.
The only frame that seem to be designed to fit this gap, the A300, the pioneering first twin aisle wide body frame, a short to medium haul airliner, was perhaps designed without thinking about this gap. The A300 was constrained in size and range by the available engines.

So I have my big doubts for the feasibility for a clean sheet program in this gap.

Very accuratepost. Nma need a businesscase on 1000 + frames to leave prsentation slide deck status and become real.

astuteman wrote:

Revelation wrote:

dtw2hyd wrote:

It is more difficult to build a capable small size aircraft than building a medium-size aircraft. Obviously Boeing will pick the latter. More seats, less CASM, you know the drill.

Also, they have to realize there is no money to be made in the VLA segment. With A380 withdrawal, Boeing may be feeling "we have arrived". At this point how many copies 77X will sell is less important, and to stop spending resources of any kind on the project is more important.

I think UA's order for 50 A321XLR is a good proof point that the A321 has won the 757 size segment and Boeing will need to go to the 762/763 size category to find a market.

If they try to compete head on with A321, Airbus will win on price and compatibility. If they go bigger, Airbus will have to invest to follow and still have a price advantage but Boeing can address that to a reasonable degree with new tech, growth potential, and 787 compatibility.

Thanks for the link to the article. I do have a reservation around his characterisation of the market segments.
I personally don't believe that the runaway success of the A321NEO is clear evidence that "NMA space is where the growth is".
Out of the 3 200 A321NEO sold, only 400 are XLR variants that can be said to sit at the bottom of NMA space.
The rest are cooking A321NEO's with a real world capacity and range well below that of the 757.
Why do I think this is important?
Because I believe that NMA is less a gap in the market, and more just a gap, full stop.
I believe it is a structural characteristic of the market between narrowbodys and widebodys that won't disappear.
I have always thought it was folly for Boeing to launch a dedicated all new model at the space.

So the only logic left is to "stretch" the narrowbodys into this space IMO.
The 737 won't go there, though - it struggles to be competitive in cooking A321NEO space.
All of which makes the A320NEO more appealing overall as a family.

The article linked upthread by Scrimbl was interesting.
No surprise that Boeing are floating FSA in front of airlines.
I bet Airbus are too - that's how they obtain market intelligence.
What fascinated me was the reasons attributed to Boeing - overordering by lessors and key airline customers.
Those are not good messages for the MAX IMO.

It has been pointed out that the MAX backlog is 4 500 aircraft, but it isn't really.
400 of those have already been built and parked up
The MAX will secure more orders, that I don't doubt. I have confidence that the IAG LOI will be realised, for example.
The worry I think is how many conversions or cancellations we might see, facilitated by Boeing being in breach of contract terms now.
we have already seen both outright cancellations and conversions to 787.
The 737 MAX backlog might not be as resilient as it might appear.
That's the context I think the "overordering by lessors and key airline customers" might be considered in.

FSA might not sound too adventurous, but properly executed, Boeing could do to the NEO what the NEO has done to the MAX, by giving it the flexibility to have bigger diameter engines and longer fuselages - e.g. longer landing gear, wider aisle, potential for folding wingtips.
A strategy of launching an initial FSA model that is, say, a tiny bit bigger than the A321, and thus slightly differentiated is a starting point, and I think would lead to volumes that NMA will never see.
This could be followed by a bigger model going further into NMA space than the A320NEO family is able to go.
The 737-8 could be left intact for now - it is easily the most popular MAX, and eventually replaced by a smaller FSA model at a time that is convenient to Boeing

This FSA would ultimately achieve the "commoditisation" that you rightly characterised some time ago, and would put the monkey back on Airbus.
Airbus would then have the choice of
a) the NEO becoming the new MAX
b) launching a new product

Just thoughts.
But I think there is a strategy route through for Boeing that can move them back onto the front foot.

Rgds

I agree 100% with this post.

There are 3 times as many A321neo ordered than 757s ever produced. And this is not counting the 2000 A321ceo that are already flying. I think this market is more about upgauging than filling an NMA void. The market in the NMA segment is likely rather narrow and specialized. Which is not easy to monetize, especially if the plan is to build an all new airliner for it.

The solution for Boeing is like you said, build a new FSA with future proofing in the wings, wingbox, gear and systems. Launch three models to begin with, where the largest sits on top of A321neo with slightly better range and capacity.

RJMAZ wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

really do not see much space left in a market above the A321XLR and below the 787/A330.

Are you joking?

With Airbus we go from 102t to 251t.
With Boeing we go from 90t up to 227t.

That is a 150% MTOW increase and is the largest gap in commercial airliner history.

A350 to 777W 11% increase
777W to 747-8 27% increase
747-8 to A380 28% increase

The MOM gap is 5 times greater than the next largest gap. Both manufacturers could fit a new aircraft family in that huge gap.

The models we had in that gap were:
757-200, 757-300, A310, 767-200, 767-300, A300, 767-400.

If anything we previously had an oversupply of aircraft models in the MOM space preventing large economy of scale. The biggest killer is that it makes it hard to justify fitting new engines. Had there been fewer models then the sales per model would be higher this would have allowed a NEO program to make sense.

Now that all the competition has gone a cleansheet positioned exactly half way between the 102t A321XLR and 227t 787-8 would absolutely dominate.

A300NEO would be dominating today on transatlantic, on short thick routes and with low cost carriers.

757NEO would have a range over 5000nm and would be opening new thin routes.

You're conflating a technical gap with a market gap. Just because there aren't any airliners in that segment today, doesn't mean there's a demand for them.

In fact, it might mean there's not a sizeable enough market to saturate with an all new airliner, purpose built for that very niche role.

People always forget one important part and that is fleet utilisation. If I need a 787 or A350 for a long route, I have those in the fleet and it is more effective to use them on a 4 hour flight that needs the capacity instead of having them sit idle on the tarmac and use an NMA instead. And if you use your 787 and above planes only on 8 hour+ routes, their fleet utilisation will look very bad very quickly.

JetBuddy wrote:

You're conflating a technical gap with a market gap. Just because there aren't any airliners in that segment today, doesn't mean there's a demand for them.

In fact, it might mean there's not a sizeable enough market to saturate with an all new airliner, purpose built for that very niche role.

It is shocking how many members here are thinking in black and white. That you can only have two groups of aircraft.

Group one: 3500-4500nm range narrowbodies with around 200 seats.

Group two: 7000-8000nm widebodies with around 300 seats.

To think route demand can only be satisfied by these two black and white groups is completely false. Only if there were only two small cities 3500nm apart and two large cities 7000nm apart could this be true. The market has evenly distributed routes in both size and range. It is far from black or white, any point is a shade of gray and has a market. So if the market requires 5000 small aircraft and 1000 large aircraft then market would also require 2000 medium aircraft. It would be linear.

If no medium aircraft exists it does not mean the market does not exist. Airlines would simply buy 6000 small and 1500 large aircraft to cover the lack of a medium aircraft. As soon as a medium sized aircraft becomes available demand would drop back to 5000 small and 1000 large aircraft.

To call an aircraft that is average in size and average in range a niche aircraft is extremely stupid. That should in theory make it the highest profit model as it can statistically cover the highest number of routes.

RJMAZ wrote:

To call an aircraft that is average in size and average in range a niche aircraft is extremely stupid. That should in theory make it the highest profit model as it can statistically cover the highest number of routes.

This is nonsense. Surely the longest range aircraft will statistically cover the highest number of routes. Talk about "extremely stupid"

seahawk wrote:

People always forget one important part and that is fleet utilisation. If I need a 787 or A350 for a long route, I have those in the fleet and it is more effective to use them on a 4 hour flight that needs the capacity instead of having them sit idle on the tarmac and use an NMA instead. And if you use your 787 and above planes only on 8 hour+ routes, their fleet utilisation will look very bad very quickly.

A 797 likewise must be able to go far more lightly loaded, and go 2500 miles loaded to the gills.

The nma market is not shut. Any nma will probably replace a lot of a330 and 787. It would probably kill off a330neo. But does Boeing want to build an aircraft that kills the lower end 787 market?

Also, it seems like two projects the size of nma and NSA are a lot of work to be done at same time. Its likely that working on one means the other one is pushed back. Is nma more important than NSA at this point.

JetBuddy wrote:

You're conflating a technical gap with a market gap.

There is no need to waste $$Billions on pursuing an imaginary niche market segment and leave the money-making narrow-body segment entirely to Airbus.

If some airline wants a plane to fill the MOM-gap as explained, a heavily discounted 788 with derated engines can close the deal. The loss on discount would be trivial compared to $$Billions wasted on developing a clean sheet MOM.

The MOM as explained is an H2H(JFK-LHR) aircraft while the TATL future traffic trends will be H2P or P2P(Anytown USA-Euroville)

RJMAZ wrote:

JetBuddy wrote:

You're conflating a technical gap with a market gap. Just because there aren't any airliners in that segment today, doesn't mean there's a demand for them.

In fact, it might mean there's not a sizeable enough market to saturate with an all new airliner, purpose built for that very niche role.

It is shocking how many members here are thinking in black and white. That you can only have two groups of aircraft.

Group one: 3500-4500nm range narrowbodies with around 200 seats.

Group two: 7000-8000nm widebodies with around 300 seats.

To think route demand can only be satisfied by these two black and white groups is completely false. Only if there were only two small cities 3500nm apart and two large cities 7000nm apart could this be true. The market has evenly distributed routes in both size and range. It is far from black or white, any point is a shade of gray and has a market. So if the market requires 5000 small aircraft and 1000 large aircraft then market would also require 2000 medium aircraft. It would be linear.

If no medium aircraft exists it does not mean the market does not exist. Airlines would simply buy 6000 small and 1500 large aircraft to cover the lack of a medium aircraft. As soon as a medium sized aircraft becomes available demand would drop back to 5000 small and 1000 large aircraft.

To call an aircraft that is average in size and average in range a niche aircraft is extremely stupid. That should in theory make it the highest profit model as it can statistically cover the highest number of routes.

I understand your reasoning.

However, an aircraft "average in size and average in range" is not going to be a one-for-all wonder plane. It would be an aircraft full of compromises.

There's no one aircraft that can do everything really well. That would truly be an engineering marvel.

The one who comes up with an aircraft that can do everything, but poorly is not going to sell any aircraft. There is no magic recipe for an aircraft of this type.

Now, I understand that your other argument is that there's no artificial limit to the segment market wise. That's a given. The problem is that this segment is not very large. Maybe there is a market for a 5500 nm 250 seat plane. Today these markets are either flown by a widebody (if it's profitable), or not at all.

There is one plane in production today that can do it - the 767. But that has not been selling in passenger variants for a long time. The easiest solution to the NMA would be to MAX the 767. It seems this is something Boeing has thought about, but so far they haven't decided to do it. Updating the 767 would not be a monumental task. Look at the A330 -> A330neo.

So ask yourself, why is that? Why is it Boeing has neither 1; updated their current product in the segment, or 2; developed an all new state of the art aircraft.

Even the cheapest, easiest quick-fix has not been attempted. So how much demand is there really?

With regards to an all new NMA, it seems to me that the delta between available engineering and demand for the product is too wide. Maybe with the 737 MAX issues behind them, they could look at it again.

majano wrote:

RJMAZ wrote:

To call an aircraft that is average in size and average in range a niche aircraft is extremely stupid. That should in theory make it the highest profit model as it can statistically cover the highest number of routes.

This is nonsense. Surely the longest range aircraft will statistically cover the highest number of routes. Talk about "extremely stupid"

If you ignore the size part which is 50% of my argument then sure the 777LR would cover the most routes. Now try and operate from a 6000ft runway. The high pavement loading will be cracking the pavement.

Let's see: We have one opinion saying NMA is "dead", another opinion saying thousands of engineers are now working on NMA and it will gain ATO some time in 2020.

This reminds me so much of classic a.net from a decade or so, and that's a good thing.

astuteman wrote:

I believe it is a structural characteristic of the market between narrowbodys and widebodys that won't disappear.
I have always thought it was folly for Boeing to launch a dedicated all new model at the space.

Thanks as always for the thoughtful post.

I guess that's the place where things get polarized. We've had dozens of posts arguing back and forth about the value proposition claimed by NMA, that one could build an ovoid tight mid range wide body and end up with production and trip costs closer to traditional narrow bodies rather than traditional wide bodies, that this would allow more routes to be opened, that Boeing could capture more life cycle profit to make the business case close, etc.

astuteman wrote:

FSA might not sound too adventurous, but properly executed, Boeing could do to the NEO what the NEO has done to the MAX, by giving it the flexibility to have bigger diameter engines and longer fuselages - e.g. longer landing gear, wider aisle, potential for folding wingtips.
A strategy of launching an initial FSA model that is, say, a tiny bit bigger than the A321, and thus slightly differentiated is a starting point, and I think would lead to volumes that NMA will never see.
This could be followed by a bigger model going further into NMA space than the A320NEO family is able to go.

I'm not sure the metric for FSA to chase is more sales volume than NMA. I would think it is to produce more value thus profit per sale.

I think the business case for the FSA is harder to close because it is at best an incremental improvement over current A321, and Airbus has all kinds of approaches to attacking that, be it through the tech we've read they're already developing ( CFRP wing box, CFRP wing, stretch ) not to mention simply undermining it by lowering prices.

astuteman wrote:

The 737-8 could be left intact for now - it is easily the most popular MAX, and eventually replaced by a smaller FSA model at a time that is convenient to Boeing

This FSA would ultimately achieve the "commoditisation" that you rightly characterised some time ago, and would put the monkey back on Airbus.
Airbus would then have the choice of
a) the NEO becoming the new MAX
b) launching a new product

Just thoughts.
But I think there is a strategy route through for Boeing that can move them back onto the front foot.

I think if your thoughts about the actual need for A321 being the core model rather than the XLR are correct then we should see 737-10 gain more traction after its EIS. I think 737-10 will be more successful than many here assume.

I don't see how spending non-incremental amounts of money to develop a clean sheet with incremental advantages to enter a market with a healthy incumbent with a strong desire to defend its turf is going to be a winning strategy. I don't see how aiming just a bit bigger than A321 provides enough of a differentiation to convince airlines that are already A321 operators to take in a whole new fleet type. I can see how NMA could make such an argument presuming it can produce much of the gains Boeing has claimed for it. For instance both DL and QF CEOs have been quoted supporting the NMA concept despite both having already purchased A321s. I doubt they'd be as supportive of FSA since it is almost completely overlapped by A321. I am dubious that NMA can produce the gains Boeing has claimed, but have not ruled that out to the degree some here have.

scbriml wrote:

Why hasn't Boeing been able to close the business case on something they've been studying for years? What are you seeing that they've missed? By all accounts, they seem to be moving further away from closing the business case, not closer.

Yes, that's the "inconvenient truth" for the NMA case. I suspect they are seeing they cannot squeeze the supply chain to the degree they thought they could ("Partnership for Success 2" is said to be dead) and the projected sales volume for NMA simply does not provide the kind of ROI they want. Add to that the MAX tragedy and the regime change (McAllister gone, Deal installed) and there definitely is a re-think going on, or if nothing else, simple procrastination since they are not getting the results they think they need.

Keep in mind RA's article also included the default "do nothing" clause. I think it's at least as viable as NMA and FSA.

Both A and B have said they don't see any compelling tech that would make them want to produce a new narrow body till 2030 or so. The fact that A321 has dominated its market segment has not changed that.

The worst case for Boeing is it could choose to spend big on FSA using 2020 era tech, hit the market in the late 2020s right as most airlines say we have all the A321-A322 sized airplanes we need thank you very much and finds itself having to spend big on a smaller narrow body because that is now the hot market.segment.

A "do nothing" approach would concede the A321 space for this generation, let the MAX make whatever sales it can make for a few more years, but then do a true 737 family replacement from 150-250 seats rather than focusing on 220 and above.

I know that conceding a market segment will strike some as absurd, but the reality is you can't be best of breed every where all the time, and spending big just to end up being late to the party may be the worst possible outcome.

mjoelnir wrote:

There is an economical and operational biggest single aisle frame and an economical and operational smallest dual aisle frame. Between them is the gap.
Counting up the models, you can throw out a few. The 757-200 is replaced, both in capacity and range.

Than we have the 757-300, 55 frames sold, the 767-200/200ER, 249 frames sold, the A310, 255 frames sold. the 767-300 managed 687 and the A300 has 561. The 767-400 had just 38 sales.
It is an impressive number of models, but apart from the 767-300 and A300, non of them a roaring success.
There is also the point, that quite a few frames counted up, do not fit the NMA narrative and were not bought to fill this gap. The example would be the 767-300ER, bought often for its range, before the A330-200 came around.
The only frame that seem to be designed to fit this gap, the A300, the pioneering first twin aisle wide body frame, a short to medium haul airliner, was perhaps designed without thinking about this gap. The A300 was constrained in size and range by the available engines.

So I have my big doubts for the feasibility for a clean sheet program in this gap.

I have my doubts for the feasibility for a clean sheet program in this gap but they don't come from looking at airliners that entered the market in the 70s/80s/90s. The past is not prologue.

The main questions I have are around the business case, as always. If you can say there is no gap for NMA due to A321, then you should also be able to say there is no gap for FSA due to A321. You have to skate to where the puck will be, not where it is right now. As above all three of the big US 3 have A321neo on order. Who is going to order a A321 sized FSA for EIS in 2028 or so when they can take the path of least risk and least cost and order more A321s? IMO at least NMA offers payload/range that A321 won't meet without a big spend from Airbus and gives Boeing a chance at a first mover's advantage.

Suppose FSA was to be offered by end 2020, a narrowbody product range covering 739-A322 sizes for EIS in 2028: Who is the launch customer, and how many launch orders does it get? What does it do to the existing MAX backlog due to customers demanding to move orders to the new plane?

flee wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

The only frame that seem to be designed to fit this gap, the A300, the pioneering first twin aisle wide body frame, a short to medium haul airliner, was perhaps designed without thinking about this gap. The A300 was constrained in size and range by the available engines.

So I have my big doubts for the feasibility for a clean sheet program in this gap.

We are in the same situation today - there is a lack of available engines for NMA. Any clean sheet project launched today can only expect the first aircraft to be delivered in about 8-10 years.

I don't know about that. The aviation media told us that all three engine vendors were interested in bidding on the NMA engine, Boeing accepted proposals at end 2019, RR dropped out but PW and CFM made proposals. I bet these are derivatives of GTF and LEAP respectively, so they won't be 8-10 year programs.

dtw2hyd wrote:

If some airline wants a plane to fill the MOM-gap as explained, a heavily discounted 788 with derated engines can close the deal. The loss on discount would be trivial compared to $$Billions wasted on developing a clean sheet MOM.

To me this reads like Airbus saying they could compete with 777 by selling heavily discounted A346 with compensation payments for excess fuel costs, which was a losing strategy.

I can't think of a time where this "square peg in round hole" approach has worked out, can you?

As above, this all comes down to how convinced you are that the ovoid NMA can or cannot produce production and per trip economics close to narrow bodies, which is the main premise for NMA.

Some here are convinced that it cannot thus NMA will never produce an economic advantage, others here are convinced otherwise, others sit on the fence.

I would have to say Boeing's reluctance to offer the product suggests it's more of a challenge than they originally thought.

RJMAZ wrote:

To call an aircraft that is average in size and average in range a niche aircraft is extremely stupid. That should in theory make it the highest profit model as it can statistically cover the highest number of routes.

Is this the same plane you think can make Boeing $40million profit a pop?

The biggest gap here seems to be between your imagination and reality. Your imagination is thousands of frames making ludicrous amounts of profit, whereas the reality is that NMA is a paper plane that seems to be further from launch than a year ago. How many posts did we see here from folks convinced Boeing would launch NMA at Paris? Then Dubai... Now it's Farnborough.

You make it sound so simple and obvious. Yet Boeing has been looking at it for years and not moved and Airbus doesn't seem at all interested. How can you 'close the business case', yet Boeing (despite having way more resources and information than any of us) can't. Explain that.

Revelation wrote:

dtw2hyd wrote:

If some airline wants a plane to fill the MOM-gap as explained, a heavily discounted 788 with derated engines can close the deal. The loss on discount would be trivial compared to $$Billions wasted on developing a clean sheet MOM.

To me this reads like Airbus saying they could compete with 777 by selling heavily discounted A346 with compensation payments for excess fuel costs, which was a losing strategy.

I can't think of a time where this "square peg in round hole" approach has worked out, can you?

As above, this all comes down to how convinced you are that the ovoid NMA can or cannot produce production and per trip economics close to narrow bodies, which is the main premise for NMA.

Some here are convinced that it cannot thus NMA will never produce an economic advantage, others here are convinced otherwise, others sit on the fence.

I would have to say Boeing's reluctance to offer the product suggests it's more of a challenge than they originally thought.

It is not about the economics of NMA, it is about the true existence of such perceived market.

Read my posts from 2012/13 on 777X. If Boeing wanted to snatch an EK A380 order from Airbus, one way to do IMHO was to sell 748i at $80 Mil. $100 Mil was going price. The $20 Mil loss per plane for 150 copies would cost less than 77X sunk cost. An airline that cares mainly about floor space and not much about fuel efficiency would have taken 748i at $80 Mil.

Fast forward to 2019, No one knows how many copies 77X will sell and the premium it will command over 77W would even cover the program cost. $3B write off on 748i discounts over 10 years without new investment is not a bad deal.

The same logic applies to NMA. Don't put the square peg in a lathe if there is no need for the round peg.

Whike everyone would rather see a FSA, NSA, whatever, I think that this would be a major mistake at this point in time.
The MAX backlog is plenty, the MAX is competitive and being built at a high rate with upward potential in the production volume.

We also have to consider that CFM and PW are just out with their newest engines and want to get as much out of that as possible.

So IMO, this is what Boeing can do asap:
Take the MAX10 fuselage and start building a MAX10XLR around it:
-A new 5000NM 110t MTOW wing, CFRP if it makes sense, optional folding wingtips, room for a taller landing gear
-A taller landing gear
-Same fuselage and systems as MAX10, a nose job if they want to make it look more modern, but not required. A stretch of that as a second option to 260 seats with less, but still TATL range.

Voila

dtw2hyd wrote:

It is not about the economics of NMA, it is about the true existence of such perceived market.

Read my posts from 2012/13 on 777X. If Boeing wanted to snatch an EK A380 order from Airbus, one way to do IMHO was to sell 748i at $80 Mil. $100 Mil was going price. The $20 Mil loss per plane for 150 copies would cost less than 77X sunk cost. An airline that cares mainly about floor space and not much about fuel efficiency would have taken 748i at $80 Mil.

Fast forward to 2019, No one knows how many copies 77X will sell and the premium it will command over 77W would even cover the program cost. $3B write off on 748i discounts over 10 years without new investment is not a bad deal.

The same logic applies to NMA. Don't put the square peg in a lathe if there is no need for the round peg.

Your suggestion of selling heavily discounted and de-rated 788s supports the idea that the NMA's market truly exists.

$3B write off on 748i discounts over 10 years without new investment is a bad idea.

77x is going to be a money making program, serious blue-chip airlines like LH, SQ and BA are all on board, more will join.

RJMAZ wrote:

It is shocking how many members here are thinking in black and white. That you can only have two groups of aircraft.

Group one: 3500-4500nm range narrowbodies with around 200 seats.

Group two: 7000-8000nm widebodies with around 300 seats.

And yet that is exactly what airlines are basing their fleets on today: they are buying narrowbodies that can cross continents and widebodys that can link every continent.

And they are doing so because an airframe is not efficient solely at design range. A 777-300ER flying 5700nm is not 25% less efficient because it is flying 25% below it's 7500nm design range. And most 777-300ERs are flying well below design range because at design range their payload is 50% of the rated maximum so they make more money flying shorter stage lengths thanks to higher payloads and lower fuel loads.

dtw2hyd wrote:

Read my posts from 2012/13 on 777X. If Boeing wanted to snatch an EK A380 order from Airbus, one way to do IMHO was to sell 748i at $80 Mil. $100 Mil was going price. The $20 Mil loss per plane for 150 copies would cost less than 77X sunk cost. An airline that cares mainly about floor space and not much about fuel efficiency would have taken 748i at $80 Mil.

I guess Emirates cared about fuel efficiency, then, since GECAS offered them 100 747-8 at very attractive lease rates to get them to flip on the A380-800 and Emirates instead doubled-down (again) on the A380.

Revelation wrote:

Let's see: We have one opinion saying NMA is "dead", another opinion saying thousands of engineers are now working on NMA and it will gain ATO some time in 2020.

This reminds me so much of classic a.net from a decade or so, and that's a good thing.

Revelation wrote:

I think the business case for the FSA is harder to close because it is at best an incremental improvement over current A321, and Airbus has all kinds of approaches to attacking that, be it through the tech we've read they're already developing ( CFRP wing box, CFRP wing, stretch ) not to mention simply undermining it by lowering prices.

NSA/FSA/737 Replacement needs to incorporate as much new technology (structural, propulsive and systems) as possible to allow it to stay even with Airbus improvements to the A320.

Essentially the flip of the 1980s - Boeing launches an all-new narrowbody optimized around the latest and greatest tech and Airbus "Next Gens" the A320 with a new wing and updated engines. The market is big enough both plans will succeed.

Revelation wrote:

I think if your thoughts about the actual need for A321 being the core model rather than the XLR are correct then we should see 737-10 gain more traction after its EIS. I think 737-10 will be more successful than many here assume.

It will be in the "local people mover" role ("local" being around 2000nm or less) and that will likely remain the bulk of sales. However, it cannot play with the A321 on TATL and "true regional" (~3000nm) missions and while it will not become the majority of missions, it is where the action is now and will grow. Even if it is only 15-20% of the eventual market, that is thousands of frames and Boeing is not going to want to abandon it to Airbus - especially as it gives airlines a reason to buy a family that can do those missions even if most of their frames won't (and will therefore be de-rated appropriately).

Revelation wrote:

I don't see how spending non-incremental amounts of money to develop a clean sheet with incremental advantages to enter a market with a healthy incumbent with a strong desire to defend its turf is going to be a winning strategy.

I agree, which is why Boeing cannot launch FSA now, but a decade from now when the advantages are no longer incremental.

Though Boeing will eventually have to move, regardless of the step changes available to them vis-a-vis the A320. They will need parity just to remain competitive as the 737 has reached its effective development end.

The 757 was supposed to be the clean sheet replacement for the 727. The 727-100 seated around 125 passengers, in the denser configurations common post-deregulation. (When AA introduced the 727-100, it was 22F and 66Y, for a total of 88 seats.) The 727-200 seated around 150 passengers.

But, Eastern talked Boeing into stretching the 757. So, the -200 variant seated between 180 and 190.

Boeing wound up creating the 737-300 and 737-400 as the replacements for both versions of the 727. The main difference was the replacement of the JT8D engines with the CFM56.

So, three times, Boeing has undertaken stretching, new engines, and/or improved wing design, in order to fill a need for a medium-size, single-aisle aircraft, the -300 and -400 (with the -500 to replace the -200), the NG, and the MAX.

Stitch wrote:

Revelation wrote:

I don't see how spending non-incremental amounts of money to develop a clean sheet with incremental advantages to enter a market with a healthy incumbent with a strong desire to defend its turf is going to be a winning strategy.

I agree, which is why Boeing cannot launch FSA now, but a decade from now when the advantages are no longer incremental.

Though Boeing will eventually have to move, regardless of the step changes available to them vis-a-vis the A320. They will need parity just to remain competitive as the 737 has reached its effective development end.

Thanks for your excellent post.

I'm not trying to put any words in your mouth, but is this a vote for "do nothing" till 2030 or so?

With regard to launching a new clean sheet in the near future (let's next 1-2 years), my guess on the odds is:
45% - Launch NMA
45% - Do Nothing
10% - Launch FSA

Of course I hope they launch something because that will be more exciting for us aviation nuts, but there's a strong chance they'll decide to hold off till they know more about what they can expect from MAX after RTS.

I'm sure Boeing internally knows a lot more about what projections they have for NMA, FSA and 737 prospects and costs so of course I could be very wrong on the odds.

The Airbus A321XLR range of 4,700 nautical miles.
The Airbus A321LR range of 4,100 nautical miles.
The standard Airbus A321neo range of 3,500 nautical miles.
The trade-off for the additional range of the LR and XLR variants is reduced seating capacity, with 240, 220 and 200 seats for the A321neo, A321LR and A321XLR respectively.

astuteman wrote:

Out of the 3 200 A321NEO sold, only 400 are XLR variants that can be said to sit at the bottom of NMA space.

When you say 400, is that a best guess or is their an official source of statistics?

American Airlines had signed for a total order of 50 Airbus A321XLRs.
Indigo Partners’ order of 50 Airbus A321XLRs matches the one placed by American Airlines, but the inventory will be split between the company’s three main airlines. Specifically, JetSmart will get 12, Frontier will get 18 and Wizz Air will get 20.
Qantas ordered a total of 36 Airbus A321XLRs, as well as 28 Airbus A321LRs.
A number of other airlines have placed smaller orders for the Airbus A321XLR. These include AirAsia with an order of 30 aircraft, JetBlue with an order of 13, as well as the launch customer, Middle East Airlines, with a total of four.
-----------
A321neo orders 30th November 2019 (Does not include UA order)
398 INDIGO INDIA
353 AIRASIA MALAYSIA MALAYSIA
206 WIZZ AIR HUNGARY
138 VIETJET AIR VIET NAM
126 AIR LEASE CORPORATION UNITED STATES
124 GECAS UNITED STATES
120 AMERICAN AIRLINES UNITED STATES
108 AERCAP NETHERLANDS
100 DELTA AIR LINES UNITED STATES
92 TURKISH AIRLINES TURKEY
85 JETBLUE AIRWAYS UNITED STATES
67 FRONTIER AIRLINES UNITED STATES
65 LION AIR INDONESIA
64 QANTAS AUSTRALIA
50 QATAR AIRWAYS QATAR
47 AIR ARABIA UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
43 PEGASUS AIRLINES TURKEY
43 VIVA AEROBUS MEXICO
41 AVOLON IRELAND
40 LUFTHANSA GERMANY
40 VOLARIS MEXICO
35 SAUDIA SAUDI ARABIA
35 SMBC AVIATION CAPITAL IRELAND
32 CATHAY PACIFIC AIRCRAFT SERVICES LIMITED HONG KONG
32 CEBU PACIFIC AIR PHILIPPINES
30 AIRASIA X MALAYSIA MALAYSIA
30 CDB LEASING CHINA
30 EASYJET UNITED KINGDOM
30 KOREAN AIR KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
30 NORWEGIAN NORWAY
28 AVIANCA COLOMBIA
26 AVIATION CAPITAL GROUP UNITED STATES
26 ETIHAD AIRWAYS UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
26 JETSMART CHILE
25 ASIANA AIRLINES KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
24 TAP AIR PORTUGAL PORTUGAL
22 ANA HOLDINGS JAPAN
21 BOC AVIATION SINGAPORE
21 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES PHILIPPINES
19 LATAM AIRLINES GROUP CHILE
17 GULF AIR BAHRAIN
16 HAWAIIAN AIRLINES UNITED STATES
15 IBERIA SPAIN
15 MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES LEBANON
15 SPRING AIRLINES CHINA
14 VUELING SPAIN
13 BRITISH AIRWAYS UNITED KINGDOM
13 ICBC CHINA
11 AIR NEW ZEALAND NEW ZEALAND
11 CALC CHINA
11 CHINA AIRLINES TAIWAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA
10 AEGEAN AIRLINES GREECE
10 ALAFCO KUWAIT
10 CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES CHINA
10 FLYNAS SAUDI ARABIA
8 SWISS SWITZERLAND
6 AER LINGUS IRELAND
6 AIR CHINA CHINA
6 SCOOT SINGAPORE
3 ARKIA ISRAEL
3 CSA - CZECH AIRLINES CZECH REPUBLIC
2 AZUL FINANCE LLC BRAZIL
2 NILE AIR EGYPT
2 PEACH JAPAN
2 SICHUAN AIRLINES CHINA
1 CIT LEASING UNITED STATES
97 UNDISCLOSED
3201

I don't think there will ever be a perfect moment to launch a FSA, it will always face the same issues against both the current model and the competition. So I would say that timing is not the biggest factor right now, meaning that you can't dismiss a quick launch of the FSA = early retirement of the MAX right now.

The biggest advantage that Airbus has right now in the NMA market that it can do an easy XLR upgrade of a very successful model. There's not a big risk involved for both Airbus and customers. If it turns out that the XLR does not do what Airbus has promised the production slots can easily be transferred back to regular A320/A321 models. And any delivered XLR models can always be used on shorter without issue. Boeing's NMA doesn't have that advantage, it has to work, there alternative role for such a plane. This is what makes it a very difficult project and why it will take time to get it right. And only when it right it will get enough customers on board to make it economically viable. The FSA will also not be without risk of course, but designing a new plane that should do what an 737 or an A320 can do should be much easier and there should more room to adapt to any changes in the market. Creating an NMA model based on a running FSA program should be an option that would work much better in the market. It will of course come much later to the market then the XLR, but without certainty that a new NMA model will be able to able to grab that same market instead there's also the risk that Boeing will stay behind anyway.

The whole MAX situation makes it all much more difficult, they really have to make sure first that they have everything under control again and that the mistakes that led to the crashes won't happen again. I would think that this will have the biggest influence on the timing of the launch date of any new program. The customers will not accept any rushed programs right now.

Revelation wrote:

I'm not sure the metric for FSA to chase is more sales volume than NMA. I would think it is to produce more value thus profit per sale.

It's not about a metric - it's about how you drive that economy of scale that leads to the "commoditisation" that I'm sure you were amongst the first to describe on here. Without that scale there is no profit and there is no programme. Not in my view.
If the last 5 years of the NMA fairytale have taught us anything, then surely it is that..
Boeing have been flogging this programme harder than anything else in their line-up for what feels like forever, with zero success from a business case viewpoint.

Revelation wrote:

I think if your thoughts about the actual need for A321 being the core model rather than the XLR are correct then we should see 737-10 gain more traction after its EIS. I think 737-10 will be more successful than many here assume.

I think Stitch described this quite well - the 737-10 should do ok, but is more operationally limited than the A321 both in terms of ultimate range, and field performance.

Revelation wrote:

I don't see how spending non-incremental amounts of money to develop a clean sheet with incremental advantages to enter a market with a healthy incumbent with a strong desire to defend its turf is going to be a winning strategy. I don't see how aiming just a bit bigger than A321 provides enough of a differentiation to convince airlines that are already A321 operators to take in a whole new fleet type.

This, for me, is a short term view. I'm talking about something that will grow to dominance over 2 or more generations and 30 years.
Parity in the first decade would be sufficient.

Revelation wrote:

I have my doubts for the feasibility for a clean sheet program in this gap but they don't come from looking at airliners that entered the market in the 70s/80s/90s. The past is not prologue.

I think it is. Every suitable candidate for the NMA segment has been available to be upgraded to fill it, but it has never happened.
I've lost count of the number of people who have said a 767-200NEO is the perfect NMA, but it has not happened. And neither manufacturer has shown the remotest inclination to do so.
The 767-200, 767-300, 767-400, 757-200, 757-300, A300 and A310 all have two things in common.
They have all populated this space.
And they have all disappeared from passenger new-build.
Meanwhile smaller narrowbodys have proliferated

"I am shocked" at how many people jump up and down about the "opportunity" in the gap without being able to stand back to consider what has caused the gap to appear in the first place. It is not a new phenomenon. It has been happening for the best part of 25 years.
Why? Without answering that, we can't know what the success criteria are.

I am equally "shocked" at how many people point at UA's 767 fleet as the argument for NMA, without recognising that without a manufacturer making a business case for a dedicated new airframe, UA will end up doing what has been done for the last 25 years - stretching narrowbodys , and abusing widebodys.
That's the significance of UA's 50 x A321XLR order. Not that they will replace the 767's. But that they are another nail in the coffin of the dedicated airframe that could.

Revelation wrote:

The main questions I have are around the business case, as always. If you can say there is no gap for NMA due to A321, then you should also be able to say there is no gap for FSA due to A321.

They are not even remotely the same thing, in my opinion, due to the commoditisation argument at the beginning of this post.
FSA can be commoditised - a dedicated NMA can't.

Rgds

Checklist787 wrote:

WayexTDI wrote:

lee757 wrote:

The 757 & 767 were developed alongside each other, shame Boeing didn't do this with the 787 and 7E7.

Boeing couldn't develop the 787 & 7E7 alongside each other since the 787 was originally known as the 7E7...

Yep!

The 7E7 of 2002 was looks like a 767 fuselage and doors with racked wingtip of the 767-400ER and the tailcone à la 777

https://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/a ... 031_lg.jpg

What was the 7E7? A twin aisle smaller than the 787 yet using the 787’s technology?

I think Boeing could launch a 757 size single aisle with an aluminum tube now, and still wait and see if a CFRP tube is the answer to a 738 replacement later. While the 737 MAX may not hold 40% of the market, combined with a 115t new single aisle, with folding wings for a 36m gate, Boeing should be able to be fairly competitive.

PacoMartin wrote:

The Airbus A321XLR range of 4,700 nautical miles.
The Airbus A321LR range of 4,100 nautical miles.
The standard Airbus A321neo range of 3,500 nautical miles.
The trade-off for the additional range of the LR and XLR variants is reduced seating capacity, with 240, 220 and 200 seats for the A321neo, A321LR and A321XLR respectively.

astuteman wrote:

Out of the 3 200 A321NEO sold, only 400 are XLR variants that can be said to sit at the bottom of NMA space.

When you say 400, is that a best guess or is their an official source of statistics?

I think on the 2019 orders thread, we got to 392 known orders plus however many of Indigo's 300 order were XLR's
213 of those 300 are on the books as A321's so the number of XLR's could be quite high.

So 400 is too low. 450-500 is probably nearer.
Bearing in mind that it has only been on sale for 6 months...
Prior to the Paris Air Show this year there were 2 327 A321NEO orders and there are now 3 200 of them, the XLR has been around 50% of A321NEO sales since its launch...

Hadn't looked at it like that before...
thanks for the prompt

Rgds

ckfred wrote:

The 757 was supposed to be the clean sheet replacement for the 727. The 727-100 seated around 125 passengers, in the denser configurations common post-deregulation. (When AA introduced the 727-100, it was 22F and 66Y, for a total of 88 seats.) The 727-200 seated around 150 passengers.

But, Eastern talked Boeing into stretching the 757. So, the -200 variant seated between 180 and 190.

That’s impressive. I could only find this seatmap from 1977 with 14F and 86Y.

https://frequentlyflying.boardingarea.com/vintage-airline-seat-map-american-airlines-boeing-727-100-from-1977/

By 1987, AA’s 727-100 Luxury Jet was configured with 10F and 108Y

https://frequentlyflying.boardingarea.com/vintage-airline-seat-map-american-airlines-boeing-727-100-from-1987/

scbriml wrote:

DenverTed wrote:

The window is 100t to 250t. That's an empty center field, the barn door is wide open.

RJMAZ wrote:

Now that all the competition has gone a cleansheet positioned exactly half way between the 102t A321XLR and 227t 787-8 would absolutely dominate.

Wow, I guess it's a no-brainer. So why hasn't it happened?

Why hasn't Boeing been able to close the business case on something they've been studying for years? What are you seeing that they've missed? By all accounts, they seem to be moving further away from closing the business case, not closer.

Airbus is apparently not interested and has concentrated on selling A321neos by the shedload.

Read Astuteman's posts on 'the gap'.

RJMAZ wrote:

A300NEO would be dominating today on transatlantic, on short thick routes and with low cost carriers.

757NEO would have a range over 5000nm and would be opening new thin routes.

Which non-existent engines would power these fantasy planes? The A300 was light because it was relatively short-ranged. 757neo would be heavy for the job. There are reasons those planes are no longer in production.

Are you suggesting that 757's are losing money for the airlines that operate them? The A321 has been around for three decades. Why didn't they get rid of the 757 a long time ago if they are such a burden?

One point to bring up where Boeing could have an edge compared to an A321neo XLR is speed. At 4100NM flight times will exceed 10 hours. If the new Boeing flies as fast as the 787 it can fly longer legs within the 24 hour rotation. Between 4000Nmand 5000nm you’re close the 24 hour rotation. Just a
Thought.

TTailedTiger wrote:

scbriml wrote:

DenverTed wrote:

The window is 100t to 250t. That's an empty center field, the barn door is wide open.

RJMAZ wrote:

Now that all the competition has gone a cleansheet positioned exactly half way between the 102t A321XLR and 227t 787-8 would absolutely dominate.

Wow, I guess it's a no-brainer. So why hasn't it happened?

Why hasn't Boeing been able to close the business case on something they've been studying for years? What are you seeing that they've missed? By all accounts, they seem to be moving further away from closing the business case, not closer.

Airbus is apparently not interested and has concentrated on selling A321neos by the shedload.

Read Astuteman's posts on 'the gap'.

RJMAZ wrote:

A300NEO would be dominating today on transatlantic, on short thick routes and with low cost carriers.

757NEO would have a range over 5000nm and would be opening new thin routes.

Which non-existent engines would power these fantasy planes? The A300 was light because it was relatively short-ranged. 757neo would be heavy for the job. There are reasons those planes are no longer in production.

Are you suggesting that 757's are losing money for the airlines that operate them? The A321 has been around for three decades. Why didn't they get rid of the 757 a long time ago if they are such a burden?

The bigger part of the passenger 757 have been retired or converted into freighters.

TTailedTiger wrote:

Are you suggesting that 757's are losing money for the airlines that operate them?

I'm really not sure how you reach that conclusion from what I said.

TTailedTiger wrote:

The A321 has been around for three decades. Why didn't they get rid of the 757 a long time ago if they are such a burden?

Where did I say they were a 'burden'?

The A321 entered service in 1994 and 757s were still in production until 2004. Today's A321 is significantly better than the ones that rolled off the line in 1994. We continue to see A321s replacing 757s all over the World. There are something like 600 757-200s left in service and over half of those are now freighters. So the numbers in passenger service are in rapid decline and the numbers of A321s in service and on order continues to rise. The A321 can now do everything a 757-200 can and do it significantly more efficiently. Airlines often keep less efficient aircraft in service because they've been paid for, but the end of 757s in passenger service is in sight.

astuteman wrote:

213 of those 300 are on the books as A321's so the number of XLR's could be quite high.

So 400 is too low. 450-500 is probably nearer.
Bearing in mind that it has only been on sale for 6 months...

I think that there will be over 1000 A321XLR's in the current order book.

The original A321NEO had a 93.5t MTOW but airlines are now effectively being forced to get the 97t as the production line was standardised. The A321LR is now just an extra ACT.

It is highly likely the larger XLR wingbox fuel tank will save a bit of weight compared to running multiple ACT's. It is highly likely that Airbus will again standardise the production line around the XLR. Existing orders will be given derated XLR's to the 97t MTOW and engine thrust levels.

It is often speculated that many A320 orders will convert to A321 and in 5years time that means they are getting the XLR. I would say as high as 2000 orders in the current order book will end up being XLR or derated XLR

Revelation wrote:

Your suggestion of selling heavily discounted and de-rated 788s supports the idea that the NMA's market truly exists.

$3B write off on 748i discounts over 10 years without new investment is a bad idea.

77x is going to be a money making program, serious blue-chip airlines like LH, SQ and BA are all on board, more will join.

No and No.
Both my suggestions are mere risk-mitigating measures without spending a dime.
Why throw valuable engineering resources at a sales problem.

Back in the 7E7 days, A.net was all atwitter how it was a horrible idea, Boeing won't / shouldn't do it, its too much bigger than the 767 and it will steal from the 777 (the 777-300ER seemed to sneak in the back door during that time). If it was really a bad idea, those same posters would have loved it, anything to see another Boeing #FAIL. What they didn't want is a success - but it seems like the 787 did a decent job positioning in the market and is around half of all wide bodies built today.

Elsewhere on A.net there has been a recent discussion about programs on tight schedules and programs on relaxed schedules, with the relaxed ones (the A350 was cited) doing much better getting the design right before production and staying on budget. Possibly the MOM is shifting and it will be be the initial plane of a new generation of airplanes. New factories, new methods, etc, although the MOM will be an evolved 787 architecture plane so nowhere near the intense R&D that went on with it.

It is very very hard in today's world to ramp up production from a new factory. The A220 first flight was in 2013, introduction into service 2016 but 3 years later has not had 100 produced yet, and is just passing rate 4 in its ramp up. Rate 10 will still be a few years from now. The 787 took many years to ramp up too. I think any model that sells 100/yr for a couple decades is a good option

JayinKitsap wrote:

Back in the 7E7 days, A.net was all atwitter how it was a horrible idea, Boeing won't / shouldn't do it, its too much bigger than the 767 and it will steal from the 777 (the 777-300ER seemed to sneak in the back door during that time). If it was really a bad idea, those same posters would have loved it, anything to see another Boeing #FAIL. What they didn't want is a success - but it seems like the 787 did a decent job positioning in the market and is around half of all wide bodies built today.

Elsewhere on A.net there has been a recent discussion about programs on tight schedules and programs on relaxed schedules, with the relaxed ones (the A350 was cited) doing much better getting the design right before production and staying on budget. Possibly the MOM is shifting and it will be be the initial plane of a new generation of airplanes. New factories, new methods, etc, although the MOM will be an evolved 787 architecture plane so nowhere near the intense R&D that went on with it.

It is very very hard in today's world to ramp up production from a new factory. The A220 first flight was in 2013, introduction into service 2016 but 3 years later has not had 100 produced yet, and is just passing rate 4 in its ramp up. Rate 10 will still be a few years from now. The 787 took many years to ramp up too. I think any model that sells 100/yr for a couple decades is a good option

The reality is 787 has eaten into 777 sales. And if 787/A350 didn't happen, 777 would still likely be half of all wide bodies built today. Sounds like all those points are correct.

mjoelnir wrote:

For most operators, low on belly freight, the A321LR does already the work of a 757-200WL. The XLR does go a step further in range, while impinging less on the capabilities for belly freight. We have also seen A321ceo replacing 757 on all but the 10% range dependent routes.
There are already around 1750 A321 ceo out there. But the A321neo brought the serious take off. Of the 3200 A321neo we can assume 500 LR and 500 XLR. I really do not see much space left in a market above the A321XLR and below the 787/A330.

I bet you would find that space in the event that Airbus announced an A310neo or A300neo to fill it.

Another thing to consider is that if Boeing does the NMA now and the FSA later (say 2030+ EIS) the 2 will be competitors if the FSA covers the 150-250 seat single aisle market. So if the MAX problems led to the decision at Boeing that they need a new single aisle design after 2030, it directly impacts the market case of the NMA, at least as long as the 2 overlap in capability and size, which they would need to if the NMA is to compete with the A321.
Sure they can go a lot bigger and longer ranged but do they really need another new plane to finally kill off the pesky A330 or should the 787 not be doing this?

seahawk wrote:

Another thing to consider is that if Boeing does the NMA now and the FSA later (say 2030+ EIS) the 2 will be competitors if the FSA covers the 150-250 seat single aisle market.

Not if the FSA is optimised for shorter range.

Optimising a FSA design with a MAX8 sized cabin to say 3000nm instead of 4000nm will reduce the MTOW by around 10t and the empty weight by 5t. Fuel burn per passenger would have a 5+% improvement.

Optimising the design for a mach 0.7 cruising speed instead of mach 0.8 would reduce per passenger fuel burn by another 5%. Less wing sweep would increasing the effective span inside the 36m box. No folding wingtips are required as 36m is plenty for a 70t MTOW.

Considering the average narrowbody flight is below 1000nm Boeing can get away with both of these thanks to the NMA.

The NMA can then be optimised for higher speed to get greater range out of a single crew shift.

If the FSA was designed as a hybrid with a single engine without ETOPs it will not compete with the NMA.

seahawk wrote:

Sure they can go a lot bigger and longer ranged but do they really need another new plane to finally kill off the pesky A330 or should the 787 not be doing this?

With the 787-9NEO gaining range, the 787-8 being discontinued and the FSA being optimised for shorter range it effectively doubles the MOM gap. The 797 will have a unique market. Killing off the A330NEO would be icing on the cake.

RJMAZ wrote:

seahawk wrote:

Another thing to consider is that if Boeing does the NMA now and the FSA later (say 2030+ EIS) the 2 will be competitors if the FSA covers the 150-250 seat single aisle market.

Not if the FSA is optimised for shorter range.

Optimising a FSA design with a MAX8 sized cabin to say 3000nm instead of 4000nm will reduce the MTOW by around 10t and the empty weight by 5t. Fuel burn per passenger would have a 5+% improvement.

Optimising the design for a mach 0.7 cruising speed instead of mach 0.8 would reduce per passenger fuel burn by another 5%. Less wing sweep would increasing the effective span inside the 36m box. No folding wingtips are required as 36m is plenty for a 70t MTOW.

Considering the average narrowbody flight is below 1000nm Boeing can get away with both of these thanks to the NMA.

The NMA can then be optimised for higher speed to get greater range out of a single crew shift.

If the FSA was designed as a hybrid with a single engine without ETOPs it will not compete with the NMA.

seahawk wrote:

Sure they can go a lot bigger and longer ranged but do they really need another new plane to finally kill off the pesky A330 or should the 787 not be doing this?

With the 787-9NEO gaining range, the 787-8 being discontinued and the FSA being optimised for shorter range it effectively doubles the MOM gap. The 797 will have a unique market. Killing off the A330NEO would be icing on the cake.

So you think Boeing will go with a medium range single aisle NMA and a short range single aisle FSA?

That would probably work very well especially if there is a great commonality for pilots and manufacturing.

Maybe a modern 150t 8ab A300 clone would work if it is a bigger product (twin aisle). Anything else is just to vulnerable.

Well, it would be a decision that would be a departure from current trends, where we see more and more P2P connections and more direct flying with single aisle planes doing increasingly longer routes.

RJMAZ wrote:

astuteman wrote:

213 of those 300 are on the books as A321's so the number of XLR's could be quite high.

So 400 is too low. 450-500 is probably nearer.
Bearing in mind that it has only been on sale for 6 months...

I think that there will be over 1000 A321XLR's in the current order book.

The original A321NEO had a 93.5t MTOW but airlines are now effectively being forced to get the 97t as the production line was standardised. The A321LR is now just an extra ACT.

It is highly likely the larger XLR wingbox fuel tank will save a bit of weight compared to running multiple ACT's. It is highly likely that Airbus will again standardise the production line around the XLR. Existing orders will be given derated XLR's to the 97t MTOW and engine thrust levels.

It is often speculated that many A320 orders will convert to A321 and in 5years time that means they are getting the XLR. I would say as high as 2000 orders in the current order book will end up being XLR or derated XLR

All this could well be true. There are only 352 currently declared, plus Indigo (I guess plus AirAsia after their conversion too) but as you say, this could grow a lot depending upon what Airbus retrofit across the range as standard.

For me though, this conversation doesn't emphasise the size of the market for NMA, based on the demand being seen for the XLR.
Quite the opposite in fact.

It emphasises just how low the barrier for entry was for Airbus to spend, what? $500M? $1Bn? To take a slice of that market that could end up being considerable. But more than that, it emphasises how much lower still is the barrier to entry for ANY airline that has A320NEO family in its fleet.

The XLR will virtually indistinguishable from a bog standard A321NEO from a user airlines viewpoint, except for the flexibility offered by its extra capability. Even more so if Airbus standardise more of its characteristics.
Need to discontinue a long thin route? De-rate XLR to 93.5 tonnes and have yourself a bog-standard A321. (albeit with space for 2 ACT's in the hold taken up by the RCT).

It might be me being short-sighted, but I just struggle to see how a $15Bn+ to develop dedicated airframe can compete with the very unsexy, but very powerful "bog standardness" of the XLR (or derivative derivative of any other volume narrowbody programme)

Rgds

FluidFlow wrote:

So you think Boeing will go with a medium range single aisle NMA and a short range single aisle FSA?

That would probably work very well especially if there is a great commonality for pilots and manufacturing.

Maybe a modern 150t 8ab A300 clone would work if it is a bigger product (twin aisle). Anything else is just to vulnerable.

NMA will definitely be a widebody and fit code D gates.

150-160t MTOW, 44-48m wingspan and 200m2 wing area. 500cm cabin width which is halfway between the 472cm 767 and the 528cm A330. This allows a tight 8ab with Boeing 17inch seats. Cabin length would be approx 32m and 38m making them exactly 767-200 and 767-300 in area. LD2 containers if circular cross section or an LD8-45 container if it has a reduced height lower lobe.

An A300NEO with its 188t MTOW and the latest engines and wingtips would probably have 5500nm range. It would also be larger and longer ranged than what the 797 is required to be. Putting the A300NEO plans in a photocopier and shrinking them by 5% would be very close. As weight is cubic that should bring the OEW down to 75-80t and the MTOW to 150-160t.