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Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 11:06 am

Seriously though. What the pilots did or didn't do or what any other pilots might or might not do really is irrelevant now.

I've no idea why we are stll discussing pilots or checklists

The Max is a totally discredited plane.

Boeing are entirely discredited for how they got it certified in the first place.

Boeing have become an organisation to be distrusted by the entire industry.

What some pilots in Ethiopia did or didnt do is so irrelevant in the bigger picture.

The Max itself may never be ungrounded.
Even if it's ungrounded it's a discredited plane that will only ever be bought due to lack of options elsewhere. Nobody will make a positive choice to order this plane now. Nobody will make a positive choice to fly in it.

They will fear it from now

Many who have got one on order will just take it as they have no choice.

Before this week Boeing's own surveys showed 40 per cent of the public didn't want to fly on this plane.

Wait til the new documentaries come out with all the new soundbytes in. Monkeys, clowns, turds, not safe enough for the Boeing employees themselves to trust putting family on!!

A plane that nobody really wants.

A plane that nobody wants to fly on.

I'm not sure Boeing really want it. They are stuck with it it seems.

It's a crying shame pilots, aircrew and passengers have died because of the horrendous behaviour at Boeing

Nothing is going to change that or excuse their behaviour now

Worst case of a trusted organisation going bad we will probably ever see to be honest

And very likely to turn criminal now. It not just bad design. It's bad CALCULATED design and CALCULATED cover ups to get it certified

Before this week we could have just blamed it on bad choices and engineering and software

This week has shown its far worse than we could have imagined. And so calculated its untrue.

No point wasting time talking about checklists any more. It's gone way beyond and past that. Checklist and pilots decisions and actions are a minor detail in a much bigger horrendous story of a broken organisation
 
MSPNWA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 11:19 am

oschkosch wrote:
Maybe you can point out where you believe he is misleading people then? That would definitely help! :smile:

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... d-on-cost/

Good idea. Let's go through some of what I saw. I'm largely not going to touch the overall tone and subjective beliefs. That's his. I have mine. I don't need to rely on his. I can formulate my own.

Members of the U.S. House of Representatives were particularly incensed by one document showing that, in order to avoid any need for additional pilot training, Boeing downplayed to the FAA the significance of the new flight control software on the MAX — known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) — that was implicated in the two crash flights.

House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee vice-chair Rep. Rick Larsen, D-Everett, said these “efforts to characterize the MCAS software as seemingly inconsequential were a serious mistake.”


Irrelevant/misleading. The messages show what we would expect from a manufacturer, that Boeing desired MCAS not to trigger additional training. What it does not say is that it's relevant to MCAS having a design flaw. That is the smoking gun that as of yet doesn't exist. What would they have trained in a sim for? An AOA-induced MCAS runaway flaw that no one (except maybe someone at Boeing) knew about? Or the benign "proper" function that is questionable to be of help? It seems like pilots don't even get sim time for issues like an AOA disagree, so expecting sim time to be the magic potion for a hidden issue is speculative at best. There needs to be a relevant, known connection here to potentially save the flights, and there isn't a known one.

The 737 MAX is described as “designed by clowns, who are in turn supervised by monkeys."


Gates needed to add the proper context that the surrounding dialogue was about their view of the FMC, not the plane as a whole. The lack of it is reckless.

“Would you put your family on a MAX-simulator trained aircraft?” one pilot asks, then answers himself: “I wouldn’t.” His colleague agreed.


More failure in providing the proper context. The dialogue surrounding this quote is about their apparent significant problems with the simulator development and TRU. It's pretty clear from the context that they are NOT talking about the real-life MAX. They're either talking about theoretical pilots that just went through the troublesome sim, and/or the virtual "plane" that the sim is portraying. It should be noted that this message chain was in February 2018, about 9 months after the MAX was in service. That also points strongly to their conversation being about the sims themselves, and not the plane actively flying that very moment. This entire context is missing from the news article, and the lack of it again paints a very poor picture of the author.

When Indonesian carrier Lion Air in 2017 asked for simulator training for its pilots, apparently at the suggestion of the country’s regulator, known as DGCA, Forkner scrambled to convince the airline that it shouldn’t do so.

He approached DGCA and argued that other regulators didn’t require sim training, so why should Indonesia.

This manipulation by Boeing of both its airline customer and a foreign regulator looks damning in hindsight, especially when the first crash was a Lion Air jet.


First, I'm not sure where he gets that apparently Indonesia's regulator suggested sim training. I've not garnered that in the multiple times I've read the messages. Either way Gates either fails to understand the honest business situation or simply doesn't consider that Lion Air is also in a position to be manipulative. He also doesn't mention the fact that further messages say that Lion Air didn't make this request for their subsidiary who was already flying the MAX. That raises questions as to what is really going on. Who was the one manipulating, or is anyone at all? Is this a rogue regulator? Is Lion Air simply off their rocker? We can't tell. Saying it's Boeing manipulation without proof is very reckless example of journalism. What Gates just told us could very well be wrong.

I could also go into pure speculation that a synthetic airspeed might have changed the story, but it's distracting from the relevant unknown if Boeing knew MCAS 1.0 would cause problems like it did. Adding more speculation isn't helpful. The plane didn't crash because of a lack of synthetic airspeed.

That all being said, I still don't understand Boeing's strategy in releasing this unless they were trying to get ahead of it. They had to know that the media wouldn't give it a fair shake.

I think best you can do with these messages is try to paint a picture of a executive culture that let cost-cutting get in the way, but that paint is shades of gray. It's not a black and white scenario, and we still don't have a definitive link to MCAS 1.0. Without that link, it's unwise speculation. There isn't a company out there that's not in the gray area. Smearing one without proof that it was a reason isn't right.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 11:22 am

You genuinely believe Boeing are being smeared?

They have brought every negative comment they are now facing entirely on themselves

Sorry
Last edited by Interested on Sat Jan 11, 2020 11:29 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 11:26 am

"There isn't a company out there that's not in the gray area."

If Boeing want to ever gain trust of the public and customers again they need to become one I'm afraid

Aviation has different standards that need to be attained

I've said before if I was at Airbus I would be watching all this and madly raising standards there as fast as possible to be as high as they possibly can

Be a shining light and contrast to what Boeing has become

Learn from their mistakes

This is a real eye opener for the entire industry to learn from. For Boeing it's going to cost them so heavily in so many ways

Airbus need to take note and take a different route

I assume and hope they've not been dragged down anywhere near to Boeing's level yet

But I imagine their board meetings are taking note of the debacle at Boeing and what can happen if you lose control

Airbus can afford to take the higher ground now with zero competition for several years whilst they do

Meanwhile Boeing have so many issues and problems to face just to get on an even keel again
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 1:36 pm

Interested wrote:
We all know NO pilots will never again have to face what they faced. It's irrelevant now.

...so the reason why we are focused on e-mails from 3 to 5 years ago rather than what is being done now to make or determine whether the a/c can be made safe is????
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 1:39 pm

Interested wrote:
Seriously though. What the pilots did or didn't do or what any other pilots might or might not do really is irrelevant now.

I've no idea why we are stll discussing pilots or checklists

The Max is a totally discredited plane.

Boeing are entirely discredited for how they got it certified in the first place.

Boeing have become an organisation to be distrusted by the entire industry.

What some pilots in Ethiopia did or didnt do is so irrelevant in the bigger picture.

The Max itself may never be ungrounded.
Even if it's ungrounded it's a discredited plane that will only ever be bought due to lack of options elsewhere. Nobody will make a positive choice to order this plane now. Nobody will make a positive choice to fly in it.

They will fear it from now

Many who have got one on order will just take it as they have no choice.

Before this week Boeing's own surveys showed 40 per cent of the public didn't want to fly on this plane.

Wait til the new documentaries come out with all the new soundbytes in. Monkeys, clowns, turds, not safe enough for the Boeing employees themselves to trust putting family on!!

A plane that nobody really wants.

A plane that nobody wants to fly on.

I'm not sure Boeing really want it. They are stuck with it it seems.

It's a crying shame pilots, aircrew and passengers have died because of the horrendous behaviour at Boeing

Nothing is going to change that or excuse their behaviour now

Worst case of a trusted organisation going bad we will probably ever see to be honest

And very likely to turn criminal now. It not just bad design. It's bad CALCULATED design and CALCULATED cover ups to get it certified

Before this week we could have just blamed it on bad choices and engineering and software

This week has shown its far worse than we could have imagined. And so calculated its untrue.

No point wasting time talking about checklists any more. It's gone way beyond and past that. Checklist and pilots decisions and actions are a minor detail in a much bigger horrendous story of a broken organisation

Seriously, can you please pack your sentences into paragraphs ?
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 1:49 pm

morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Yes - that's a good thing. More training is a good thing. But it will be on MCAS V2.0, and we don't know what that training is yet. It could be US style EET training.
I'm sure it will be something like if the plane does this - Run the Runaway trim NNC - which will still include disengage Autothrottle and control Airspeed Manually.
Runaway Trim NNC should have been part of normal NG and MAX training and recurrent training.

If . . .
* MCAS 2.0 is so much better than 1.0;
* and it should be, other wise the thing will never ever leave the ground with fare paying pax;
* and now Boeing realizes that even MCAS 2.0 require much better training, including sim sessions,
. . . how on earth can you continue your line that ET pilots should have been fully prepared to handle MCAS 1.0 runaway by just reading a memo???

Jedi mind boggling logic here . . .

We don't know what Boeing is recommending for training but based on the two crashes it could *simply* be how to run an NNC.


You seem to be using the word "simply" quit a lot, when it comes to what crews should have done.
I've learnt the hard way, when people try to convince you of something, and use words like "simply, or "just", then usually it is all but simply . . .

But in any case, to answer your straws, it all starts with the OEM coming up with proper NNC and checklists in the first place.

I wonder how they going call the NNC / check list for "SINGLE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATION & STALL WARNING & MASTER CAUTION ANTI-ICE WARNING & UNRELIABLE AIR SPEED & UNABLE TO TRIM ELEVATOR & EXCESSIVE ELEVATOR CONTROL COLUMN FORCES”. . . .
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 2:00 pm

PW100 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:
If . . .
* MCAS 2.0 is so much better than 1.0;
* and it should be, other wise the thing will never ever leave the ground with fare paying pax;
* and now Boeing realizes that even MCAS 2.0 require much better training, including sim sessions,
. . . how on earth can you continue your line that ET pilots should have been fully prepared to handle MCAS 1.0 runaway by just reading a memo???

Jedi mind boggling logic here . . .

We don't know what Boeing is recommending for training but based on the two crashes it could *simply* be how to run an NNC.


You seem to be using the word "simply" quit a lot, when it comes to what crews should have done.
I've learnt the hard way, when people try to convince you of something, and use words like "simply, or "just", then usually it is all but simply . . .

But in any case, to answer your straws, it all starts with the OEM coming up with proper NNC and checklists in the first place.

I wonder how they going call the NNC / check list for "SINGLE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATION & STALL WARNING & MASTER CAUTION ANTI-ICE WARNING & UNRELIABLE AIR SPEED & UNABLE TO TRIM ELEVATOR & EXCESSIVE ELEVATOR CONTROL COLUMN FORCES”. . . .


Please read 28-33 pages of the Pre-liminary report and then we can have a real conversation.

https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... ET-AVJ.pdf

The FCOM bulletins and information in ET's manual's quite simply say - if faced with with these issues run the Runaway Elevator NNC.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 2:06 pm

morrisond wrote:
I notice that no matter how many times I post ET's own procedures nobody is debating those - but just attacking me or trying to change the channel.

I agree Lionair was totally overwhelmed - but ET should not have been - it was a textbook MCAS failure as described in the ET training/procedure documentation.

If pilots are absolved from the responsibility of having to understand and follow something like that then you have to look at every emergency procedure on every commercial aircraft and potentially change the certification basis for all of them.

The AD is a joke. It is confusing and contradicting. It reveals, that this plane indeed was brought to the market by clowns and monkeys (per their own self declaration).

The AD lists 6 alarms, which in any combination could mean the trim was at fault, even though the trim stopped if countered by eletrical trim. But each of the 6 false alarms has an own procedure, with sometimes conflicting steps. Where to start? How to pick the real issue? Each of the six failure indications could be wrong or correct. How on earth should a pilot be able to quickly come to the right conclusion?

On the flight they had at least 4 false alarms. 3 positive and one negative. Result: they were startled and overwhelmed. The same reaction is reported from US pilots in the sim afterwards.

No, pilot training does not exists to keep planes flying, that were developed by clowns and monkeys (as they labeled themselves). No other aircraft seems to be designed as badly as the MAX since many decades.

If the MAX would be as save as all the other aircraft, its safety would be there:
Image

But the problem created by Boeing is this:
Image

The arrogance that bubbled to the surface in the reported messages underlines that the following eventually alway turns out true: pride comes before a fall...
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 2:17 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
I notice that no matter how many times I post ET's own procedures nobody is debating those - but just attacking me or trying to change the channel.

I agree Lionair was totally overwhelmed - but ET should not have been - it was a textbook MCAS failure as described in the ET training/procedure documentation.

If pilots are absolved from the responsibility of having to understand and follow something like that then you have to look at every emergency procedure on every commercial aircraft and potentially change the certification basis for all of them.

The AD is a joke. It is confusing and contradicting. It reveals, that this plane indeed was brought to the market by clowns and monkeys (per their own self declaration).

The AD lists 6 alarms, which in any combination could mean the trim was at fault, even though the trim stopped if countered by eletrical trim. But each of the 6 false alarms has an own procedure, with sometimes conflicting steps. Where to start? How to pick the real issue? Each of the six failure indications could be wrong or correct. How on earth should a pilot be able to quickly come to the right conclusion?

On the flight they had at least 4 false alarms. 3 positive and one negative. Result: they were startled and overwhelmed. The same reaction is reported from US pilots in the sim afterwards.

No, pilot training does not exists to keep planes flying, that were developed by clowns and monkeys (as they labeled themselves). No other aircraft seems to be designed as badly as the MAX since many decades.

If the MAX would be as save as all the other aircraft, its safety would be there:
Image

But the problem created by Boeing is this:
Image

The arrogance that bubbled to the surface in the reported messages underlines that the following eventually alway turns out true: pride comes before a fall...


Yes - the AD says if you face all those alarms run the Runaway Trim NNC - I take it you have not bothered to read pages either 28-33.

I am not debating that the MAX was not safe.

I am just trying to get through to many of you that Pilot training has to be looked at as well.

If we want the safest system improvements need to be made everywhere.

Most of the serious loss of life in the last 10-15 years has been because Pilots can't run a NNC - or even know where to find them. That is a problem. Pilots and Airlines seem to be assuming that Modern Airliners are so reliable that no attention has to be paid to this in training, but it is the common cause in most recent accidents.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 2:32 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
Maybe you can point out where you believe he is misleading people then? That would definitely help! :smile:

“Would you put your family on a MAX-simulator trained aircraft?” one pilot asks, then answers himself: “I wouldn’t.” His colleague agreed.


More failure in providing the proper context. The dialogue surrounding this quote is about their apparent significant problems with the simulator development and TRU. It's pretty clear from the context that they are NOT talking about the real-life MAX. They're either talking about theoretical pilots that just went through the troublesome sim, and/or the virtual "plane" that the sim is portraying. It should be noted that this message chain was in February 2018, about 9 months after the MAX was in service. That also points strongly to their conversation being about the sims themselves, and not the plane actively flying that very moment. This entire context is missing from the news article, and the lack of it again paints a very poor picture of the author.


You are answering this as if the initial remark was "Would you put your family on a MAX aircraft?"

But is wasn't.

While I can't exactly know what was meant by ". . . a MAX-simulator trained aircraft . . . ", I think reading it as " . . . an aircraft piloted by a crew trained in a MAX-simulator . . ." would be very plausible.
In which case, I don't see the mismatch in context you seem to be proclaiming.

To add to the disturbing nature of this exchange of messages. These are the people who could/should have understood the tricky nature of MCAS (and perhaps other stuff), so they of all should have understood the importance of getting the type-specific training right (lousy design coupled with lousy type-specific training usually is not a good combination).

And worst of all, they then go boosting how they met the company objectives by sending FAA, EASA, other aviation authorities and airline customers into the woods with respect to pilot training requirements.



The more I read this, the more I understand why Folkner choose to use his Fifth Amendment rights.
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 2:32 pm

Because whenever a new revelation comes out like yesterday - People come on here and say - "Look - the only issues are with Boeing" Nothing else matters. People need to be reminded.

Plus since RTS will include training - what the training could possibly entail is now definitely part of the discussion.
 
SteelChair
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 2:36 pm

morrisond wrote:
Because whenever a new revelation comes out like yesterday - People come on here and say - "Look - the only issues are with Boeing" Nothing else matters. People need to be reminded.

Plus since RTS will include training - what the training could possibly entail is now definitely part of the discussion.


ALL new airplane or existing airplane RTS involve training. That ain't new.

These continuing revelations on the other hand, are EARTH SHAKING. They are THE story. You keep throwing out straw men in an attempt to redirect the discussion, deflect the responsibility, and deflect the repercussions.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 2:42 pm

oschkosch wrote:
And Dominic Gates sums it up pretty good in his latest article: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... d-on-cost/

Yes, after reading the entire document dump and then reading Gate's article, I agree it is a good summary. He and his colleague were able to provide a lot of context I didn't have and piece together a lot of the sub-threads that I didn't after my one read through the dump.

I have to say this section, which is at the end of the article, is a real zinger.

After the document release Thursday, a Boeing official insisted that the company’s “overriding imperative in designing and developing the MAX was to ensure that the airplane design was safe.”

He said the objective to avoid simulator training “was subordinate to this safety imperative.”


Yet soon after the MAX was certified in 2018, when a series of internal emails addressed why the MAX simulator program had proved so troublesome and expensive, the employees in the conversation pointed to a “culture” that prioritized cost-cutting over everything else.

“We put ourselves in this position by picking the lowest cost supplier [a reference to TRU] and signing up to impossible schedules,” wrote a Boeing employee. “We have a senior leadership team that understand very little about the business and yet are driving us to certain objectives.”

“Time and time again, we are inundated with Boeing material specifying quality is key — this clearly is not the case in any of the decisions that are made,” wrote another. “Until an open and frank discussion takes place, the same errors, wasted opportunities, and financial losses will continually be absorbed.”

Apparently that Boeing Official didn't read the document dump, because if they had they would not have said that safety was the overriding imperative, clearly it wasn't in any sort of operational sense. Clearly the Boeing Employees in these messages are not acting as if safety was the overriding imperative, they are acting as if avoiding simulator training time mandates and meeting schedules is, regardless of safety or quality implications. At best, this Boeing Official is engaging in Corporate Doublespeak.

It seems to me that by saying such dubious things this Boeing Official is not acting in line with the new transparency mandate from the announcement of DM's resignation, and should either get in line with the new approach or be asked to resign like DM was.
Last edited by Revelation on Sat Jan 11, 2020 2:47 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 3:00 pm

SteelChair wrote:
What's truly ironic is that the training that will now be part of the RTS, Boeing did not want to do in their first place. They sold a marginally safe airplane to "third world" airlines, argued that minimal/no training was required, and then blamed the "third world" pilots when they crashed (through a coordinated smear campaign that some are apparently still intent on executing). They didn't know their customer, set their customer up for failure, then blamed their customer when the failure occurred. And Boeing continues to this very day with that strategy.

It will be very interesting to get details on the new training regime, if the FAA and EASA approve anything that mimics what is presently done for the NG I can see the explosions in the threads that will follow.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 3:13 pm

Seriously just discuss the topic without the side commentary about other users of which includes keeping the personal attacks out of the discussion. All users opinions are to be respected whether you agree with them or not, either engage in a civil manner without the personal comments in a constructive manner otherwise keep it to yourself and move on to the next topic. Those who continue not to follow the rules will find themselves on the end of a warning or ban
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SteelChair
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 3:22 pm

Isn't it ironic that the emails reveal the internal conflict about differences and simulator training? Boeing clearly didn't know their customer. They argued additional training was not required, then sold their marginally safe product to "third world" airlines, then blamed the "third world" pilots when they crashed, then tried to cover up the internal debate about the training that presaged the whole series of events. Despicable.

How about making a safe, stable, easy to fly airplane for "third world" customers?
 
MartijnNL
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 3:29 pm

pasen wrote:
I guess, this puts the whole discussion about those “badly trained 3rd world pilots” into different light.

:checkmark:

AeroplaneFreak wrote:
Not really, don't forget the crew the previous day handled the same situation quite differently.

Don't forget the Max has been grounded for almost a year now, for pretty good reasons. Why do you keep defending Boeing?
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 3:35 pm

MartijnNL wrote:
Why do you keep defending Boeing?

As just recently pointed out, discussing pilot training issues does not "defend Boeing", it shows they did not understood how their MCAS implementation behaved in the presence of a AoA sensor fault and put unacceptable workload onto the pilots, and highlights their profit based actions to avoid simulator training mandates.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 3:50 pm

morrisond wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
morrisond wrote:
I notice that no matter how many times I post ET's own procedures nobody is debating those - but just attacking me or trying to change the channel.

I agree Lionair was totally overwhelmed - but ET should not have been - it was a textbook MCAS failure as described in the ET training/procedure documentation.

If pilots are absolved from the responsibility of having to understand and follow something like that then you have to look at every emergency procedure on every commercial aircraft and potentially change the certification basis for all of them.

The AD is a joke. It is confusing and contradicting. It reveals, that this plane indeed was brought to the market by clowns and monkeys (per their own self declaration).

The AD lists 6 alarms, which in any combination could mean the trim was at fault, even though the trim stopped if countered by eletrical trim. But each of the 6 false alarms has an own procedure, with sometimes conflicting steps. Where to start? How to pick the real issue? Each of the six failure indications could be wrong or correct. How on earth should a pilot be able to quickly come to the right conclusion?

On the flight they had at least 4 false alarms. 3 positive and one negative. Result: they were startled and overwhelmed. The same reaction is reported from US pilots in the sim afterwards.

No, pilot training does not exists to keep planes flying, that were developed by clowns and monkeys (as they labeled themselves). No other aircraft seems to be designed as badly as the MAX since many decades.

If the MAX would be as save as all the other aircraft, its safety would be there:
Image

But the problem created by Boeing is this:
Image

The arrogance that bubbled to the surface in the reported messages underlines that the following eventually alway turns out true: pride comes before a fall...


Yes - the AD says if you face all those alarms run the Runaway Trim NNC - I take it you have not bothered to read pages either 28-33.

I am not debating that the MAX was not safe.

I am just trying to get through to many of you that Pilot training has to be looked at as well.

If we want the safest system improvements need to be made everywhere.

Most of the serious loss of life in the last 10-15 years has been because Pilots can't run a NNC - or even know where to find them. That is a problem. Pilots and Airlines seem to be assuming that Modern Airliners are so reliable that no attention has to be paid to this in training, but it is the common cause in most recent accidents.


Yes pilot training should be looked at, Boeing has to be stopped from discouraging airlines to train their pilots. It even seems they got the message.
 
MartijnNL
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 3:57 pm

Revelation wrote:
As just recently pointed out, discussing pilot training issues does not "defend Boeing", it shows they did not understood how their MCAS implementation behaved in the presence of a AoA sensor fault and put unacceptable workload onto the pilots, and highlights their profit based actions to avoid simulator training mandates.

Some users said the crashes happened, because of badly trained 3rd world pilots. Now we know these pilots asked for simulator training. The answer of Boeing? That's not necessary. I don't think this behaviour looks good on Boeing.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 3:59 pm

morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
We don't know what Boeing is recommending for training but based on the two crashes it could *simply* be how to run an NNC.


You seem to be using the word "simply" quit a lot, when it comes to what crews should have done.
I've learnt the hard way, when people try to convince you of something, and use words like "simply, or "just", then usually it is all but simply . . .

But in any case, to answer your straws, it all starts with the OEM coming up with proper NNC and checklists in the first place.

I wonder how they going call the NNC / check list for "SINGLE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATION & STALL WARNING & MASTER CAUTION ANTI-ICE WARNING & UNRELIABLE AIR SPEED & UNABLE TO TRIM ELEVATOR & EXCESSIVE ELEVATOR CONTROL COLUMN FORCES”. . . .


Please read 28-33 pages of the Pre-liminary report and then we can have a real conversation.

https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... ET-AVJ.pdf

The FCOM bulletins and information in ET's manual's quite simply say - if faced with with these issues run the Runaway Elevator NNC.

Fact is that the pilots have implemented the Runaway Elevator NNC with the exception of disabling the autothrottle. Now please go a bit forward and analyse with us why the pilots missed that point and what was the effect know to them at that time. I have re-read the page 28 to 33 of the ET302 preliminary report and I identified the "disable the autothrottle" only on the FCOM 9.1 on page 30. All the others documents that identify the erroneous AoA indications and effect instruct to use the stab trim cutout switch without telling anything about the autothrottle. Obviously Boeing did not understand at that time how critical the speed was to properly operate the trim wheels at high speed (a non conformity to longitudinal control at high speed up to Vd requirement), did not properly instruct the pilots about that issue, did not setup proper training to safely handle that issue. How can anyone expect the pilots to 100% reliably implement that point in this context, in addition to the stress and overload of the critical situation ? This expectation is completely out of the scope of the safety requirements that is designed to ensure flight safety even in case of small pilots error, the very reason why Vmo is a safety margin to Vd. Boeing failed to address the MCAS, failed to address the trim wheel at high speed, and failed to provide what was found to be the safest way to handle MCAS with erroneous AoA: set flap down. We now have some view on the total safety fiasco, active lies to the regulators, pressure on operators to not have training, and even strategic decision to install useless alert on the NG to minimize training on the MAX, that all count in thousand of mistakes made by Boeing that finally put the ET302 pilots in a near impossible situation, requiring to follow precisely a single interpretation of a single document contradicted by many others documents, under stress of immediate death and high workload.

Boeing obsession to avoid any MAX specific training is the cause of MCAS without redundancy, the cause of keeping incoherent procedures, the cause of lies to the regulators, the cause of pressure on the operators, the cause of pilots misinformed and not appropriately trained to survive the failure of the fatal junk design Boeing actively hidden to everyone. The EAD was absolutely criminal by putting the responsibility to the pilots instead of immediately ground the MAX and start fixing the Boeing historical safety mess as it is now obligated by all the majors regulators on the planet, ...and to setup a specific training for the MAX.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 4:38 pm

Another reliable poster suggested that simulator training may be related to issues other than just MCAS. He (and his sources) would not go further. But one could suspect the changes in the computer and something to do with the 3 second discussions. Again he did not say, but Roll difficulties may also be involved. All of this may also relate to my observation that when political winds were favorable, Boeing was often given the benefit of doubt on some issues. No more!
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 5:01 pm

oschkosch wrote:
And Dominic Gates sums it up pretty good in his latest article:
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... d-on-cost/

However, again to minimize differences, Boeing allowed RCAS to be retrofitted to the previous 737 NG model as well, and insisted that airlines taking the MAX do the retrofit on at least one earlier model 737 so that then they could say there’s no difference between the two models.


I find this particularly intriguing. It suggests a degree of collusion on the part of some airlines. I have previously wondered in this and earlier threads why these airlines have not come in for any criticism regarding their role in the MCAS disaster. This is particularly concerning given that apparently one of those infamous "third world" airlines (one that was a terrible victim of the MAX fiasco) wanted sim training for transition but got bullied out of it by Boeing so that the airlines insisting on no sim training wouldn't maybe take their business elsewhere.

I do realize that the airlines are the customers and the current prevailing mantra in the retailing business (BCA's business is retail sales of airliners) is that the customer is right 110% of the time, whether it's a McDonalds customer bitching about fries that aren't hot enough (or coffee that's too hot) or an airline saying "absolutely no sim training for transition to this new model." But it's never been a principle I agree with. Customers can be stupid too often.

Doing a token retrofit of RCAS to some NGs may have been an effective jedi mind trick to get the regulators to agree that RCAS was a feature that could be granfathered, and would not cause transition to the MAX to need sim training. I assume the NG pilots get their RCAS introduction during recurrent sim training. Very clever. Maybe a suitable punishment for airlines participating in this regulatory sleight of hand would be to tell them none of their NG pilots who have yet to see RCAS in the sim can be considered current on the airplane.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 5:10 pm

MartijnNL wrote:
Revelation wrote:
As just recently pointed out, discussing pilot training issues does not "defend Boeing", it shows they did not understood how their MCAS implementation behaved in the presence of a AoA sensor fault and put unacceptable workload onto the pilots, and highlights their profit based actions to avoid simulator training mandates.

Some users said the crashes happened, because of badly trained 3rd world pilots. Now we know these pilots asked for simulator training. The answer of Boeing? That's not necessary. I don't think this behaviour looks good on Boeing.


Boeing assumed Pilots would be familiar with the Runaway Trim NNC checklist and they would apply that when faced with a MCAS fault. The Runaway Trim NNC checklist is common to NG and MAX so their argument was that no additional training was needed. They didn't necessarily need a MAX simulator to practise that checklist.

They were wrong as Lionair did not know that the intermittent Trim Issue they were facing should have been treated as Runaway trim. Boeing was definitely in error for not informing there Customer training departments of this potential problem.

ET though knew if they had intermittent trim issues treat it as Runaway Trim and run the appropriate checklist - there is just a lot of debate of how well or did they even get that information to their pilots.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 5:24 pm

Now we know that many within Boeing had knowingly hidden MCAS and covered things up to get the plane certified is is not beyond belief that not only after the first crash involving MCAS but even after the second crash Boeing fought to NOT have the plane grounded

Did none of the people at Boeing have a conscience?? Or were they just all running scared at what they had been part of and created?

Do they sleep at night now?

Was the first crash alone not enough to make them realise the error of their ways and to come clean and do something about it?

Is the fact Boeing fought the grounding after both crashes not become simply unacceptable??
Last edited by Interested on Sat Jan 11, 2020 5:27 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
Jetty
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 5:25 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
The messages show what we would expect from a manufacturer, that Boeing desired MCAS not to trigger additional training.

:shock: What you would expect from a manufacturer maybe. Many others and myself expect from a manufacturer to insist on all additional training that is required for a safe handling of the airplane.

Saying it's Boeing manipulation without proof is very reckless example of journalism. What Gates just told us could very well be wrong.

Boeings chief pilot himself mentioned using 'Jedi mind tricks'. If that doesn't justify the claim that Boeing manipulated I don't know what does.

That all being said, I still don't understand Boeing's strategy in releasing this unless they were trying to get ahead of it. They had to know that the media wouldn't give it a fair shake.

Boeing didn't send these documents to the media but to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; I guess Boeing doesn't want to contempt Congress. https://transportation.house.gov/news/p ... faa-boeing
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 5:37 pm

Point noticed. But now move on please. Next point please.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 5:45 pm

morrisond wrote:
ET though knew if they had intermittent trim issues treat it as Runaway Trim and run the appropriate checklist - there is just a lot of debate of how well or did they even get that information to their pilots.


And yet we also know that those highly-trained and vastly-experienced first-world pilots struggled to even perform the correct procedures in a simulator. In a situation where they knew what to expect and weren't faced with death if they got it wrong. They still struggled to get it right, prompting Boeing's shift in position on simulator training for MAX.
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 6:12 pm

scbriml wrote:
morrisond wrote:
ET though knew if they had intermittent trim issues treat it as Runaway Trim and run the appropriate checklist - there is just a lot of debate of how well or did they even get that information to their pilots.


And yet we also know that those highly-trained and vastly-experienced first-world pilots struggled to even perform the correct procedures in a simulator. In a situation where they knew what to expect and weren't faced with death if they got it wrong. They still struggled to get it right, prompting Boeing's shift in position on simulator training for MAX.

Unless I am missing something, the switch to simulator training is after the deployment of MCAS 2.0, the line pilots testing it out in the simulator and all recovering the a/c but using different methods leading to the observation that the checklist were still confusing.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 6:19 pm

hivue wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
And Dominic Gates sums it up pretty good in his latest article:
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... d-on-cost/

However, again to minimize differences, Boeing allowed RCAS to be retrofitted to the previous 737 NG model as well, and insisted that airlines taking the MAX do the retrofit on at least one earlier model 737 so that then they could say there’s no difference between the two models.


I find this particularly intriguing. It suggests a degree of collusion on the part of some airlines. I have previously wondered in this and earlier threads why these airlines have not come in for any criticism regarding their role in the MCAS disaster. This is particularly concerning given that apparently one of those infamous "third world" airlines (one that was a terrible victim of the MAX fiasco) wanted sim training for transition but got bullied out of it by Boeing so that the airlines insisting on no sim training wouldn't maybe take their business elsewhere.

I do realize that the airlines are the customers and the current prevailing mantra in the retailing business (BCA's business is retail sales of airliners) is that the customer is right 110% of the time, whether it's a McDonalds customer bitching about fries that aren't hot enough (or coffee that's too hot) or an airline saying "absolutely no sim training for transition to this new model." But it's never been a principle I agree with. Customers can be stupid too often.

Doing a token retrofit of RCAS to some NGs may have been an effective jedi mind trick to get the regulators to agree that RCAS was a feature that could be granfathered, and would not cause transition to the MAX to need sim training. I assume the NG pilots get their RCAS introduction during recurrent sim training. Very clever. Maybe a suitable punishment for airlines participating in this regulatory sleight of hand would be to tell them none of their NG pilots who have yet to see RCAS in the sim can be considered current on the airplane.
RCAS is the new MCAS maybe? Definitely sounds like faked grandfathering by Boeing and airlines.

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smartplane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 6:49 pm

morrisond wrote:
Noshow wrote:
Boeing assumed Pilots would be familiar with the Runaway Trim NNC checklist and they would apply that when faced with a MCAS fault. The Runaway Trim NNC checklist is common to NG and MAX so their argument was that no additional training was needed. They didn't necessarily need a MAX simulator to practise that checklist.

They were wrong as Lionair did not know that the intermittent Trim Issue they were facing should have been treated as Runaway trim. Boeing was definitely in error for not informing there Customer training departments of this potential problem.

ET though knew if they had intermittent trim issues treat it as Runaway Trim and run the appropriate checklist - there is just a lot of debate of how well or did they even get that information to their pilots.



It feels almost like your daily prayer to read your narrative blaming the pilots over and over again. Must be hundreds of posts by now for sure. As everybody is aware of your point by now I'd like to find out why you keep repeating it like some dogma? Are you a private person thinking this way or is this some campaign sort of thing maybe?


I thought everyone knew by now that I'm paid by Boeing. I've been accused of it often enough.

Obviously not paid by Boeing, because even they have moved on with a new narrative, and probably wish their 'friends' ceased playing the Groundhog game.

Lets save some energy for the as yet to be 'discovered' (or published) senior management correspondence.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 6:53 pm

Training is NOT the issue here. Leave that for badly designed planes

The issue here is to improve on the safety of planes each time a new one is introduced

Max 737 took aircraft safety backwards to the dark ages
Last edited by Interested on Sat Jan 11, 2020 7:00 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 6:56 pm

scbriml wrote:
morrisond wrote:
ET though knew if they had intermittent trim issues treat it as Runaway Trim and run the appropriate checklist - there is just a lot of debate of how well or did they even get that information to their pilots.


And yet we also know that those highly-trained and vastly-experienced first-world pilots struggled to even perform the correct procedures in a simulator. In a situation where they knew what to expect and weren't faced with death if they got it wrong. They still struggled to get it right, prompting Boeing's shift in position on simulator training for MAX.


Because for 30 years without having Max to worry about - stuff they were asked to deal with they've forgotten how to do

It's never been needed to any level to save people's lives

No pilot or passenger should be asked to fly on any plane that has more chance of needing manual trim than the one it replaces

It's preposterous we've even got to this
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 6:57 pm

par13del wrote:
scbriml wrote:
morrisond wrote:
ET though knew if they had intermittent trim issues treat it as Runaway Trim and run the appropriate checklist - there is just a lot of debate of how well or did they even get that information to their pilots.


And yet we also know that those highly-trained and vastly-experienced first-world pilots struggled to even perform the correct procedures in a simulator. In a situation where they knew what to expect and weren't faced with death if they got it wrong. They still struggled to get it right, prompting Boeing's shift in position on simulator training for MAX.

Unless I am missing something, the switch to simulator training is after the deployment of MCAS 2.0, the line pilots testing it out in the simulator and all recovering the a/c but using different methods leading to the observation that the checklist were still confusing.


Yes, that's exactly what I was talking about. They struggled in a simulator while knowing exactly what to expect and not faced with imminent death if they got it wrong.
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TaromA380
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 6:57 pm

Interested wrote:
Now we know that many within Boeing had knowingly hidden MCAS and covered things up to get the plane certified is is not beyond belief that not only after the first crash involving MCAS but even after the second crash Boeing fought to NOT have the plane grounded

Did none of the people at Boeing have a conscience?? Or were they just all running scared at what they had been part of and created?

Do they sleep at night now?

Was the first crash alone not enough to make them realise the error of their ways and to come clean and do something about it?

Is the fact Boeing fought the grounding after both crashes not become simply unacceptable??

The grounding will cost virtually from $20bn to $50bn and beyond if the program gets canceled. DM was aware that the program is technically flawed and the world would discover unconceivable things and everything will blow up, if ever the Max gets grounded - because it will bring investigation !

No way a human being in command under those circumstance would have acted differently. The only option was to deny, deny, then deny again.

As we saw, Boeing had to be stopped by outside forces.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 7:02 pm

TaromA380 wrote:
Interested wrote:
Now we know that many within Boeing had knowingly hidden MCAS and covered things up to get the plane certified is is not beyond belief that not only after the first crash involving MCAS but even after the second crash Boeing fought to NOT have the plane grounded

Did none of the people at Boeing have a conscience?? Or were they just all running scared at what they had been part of and created?

Do they sleep at night now?

Was the first crash alone not enough to make them realise the error of their ways and to come clean and do something about it?

Is the fact Boeing fought the grounding after both crashes not become simply unacceptable??

The grounding will cost virtually from $20bn to $50bn and beyond if the program gets canceled. DM was aware that the program is technically flawed and the world would discover unconceivable things and everything will blow up, if ever the Max gets grounded - because it will bring investigation !

No way a human being in command under those circumstance would have acted differently. The only option was to deny, deny, then deny again.

As we saw, Boeing had to be stopped by outside forces.


How many lives were they prepared to sacrifice and crashes to divert blame and cover up?
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 7:08 pm

Anyone seen this one yet ?

In one email message from 2015, an employee who apparently is a test pilot wrote that he crashed the first few times he flew the Max in simulator testing. “You get decent at it after 3-4 tries, but the first few are ugly,”

You simply couldn't make it up??
 
SanDiegoLover
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 9:21 pm

Noshow wrote:
Boeing assumed Pilots would be familiar with the Runaway Trim NNC checklist and they would apply that when faced with a MCAS fault. The Runaway Trim NNC checklist is common to NG and MAX so their argument was that no additional training was needed. They didn't necessarily need a MAX simulator to practise that checklist.

They were wrong as Lionair did not know that the intermittent Trim Issue they were facing should have been treated as Runaway trim. Boeing was definitely in error for not informing there Customer training departments of this potential problem.

ET though knew if they had intermittent trim issues treat it as Runaway Trim and run the appropriate checklist - there is just a lot of debate of how well or did they even get that information to their pilots.



It feels almost like your daily prayer to read your narrative blaming the pilots over and over again. Must be hundreds of posts by now for sure. As everybody is aware of your point by now I'd like to find out why you keep repeating it like some dogma? Are you a private person thinking this way or is this some campaign sort of thing maybe?


Over 500 certainly. It’s clear Boeing has an agenda and has been paying spokespeople to flood all forms of media with counter narratives to sow confusion and doubt to try to deflect as much blame as possible, but Boeing has really screwed the pooch on this one. There are specialty firms out there that do this. Boeing has at least two of them on project that I’m aware of.

You’d think Boeing would have learned its lesson on the 787 development fiasco and that their lies of commission and omission spread by some of these very same “PR” agencies. Until Boeing reverses course and moves the company culture from “GOOD ENOUGH” to “SAFETY AT ALL COSTS” Boeing will continue to look like Chrysler, Ford, or GM of the mid-70s. The 737 MAX is the modern day Ford Pinto, Chevy Corvair and runaway Audi 5000 all rolled into one.
 
oschkosch
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 9:24 pm

Interested wrote:
Anyone seen this one yet ?

In one email message from 2015, an employee who apparently is a test pilot wrote that he crashed the first few times he flew the Max in simulator testing. “You get decent at it after 3-4 tries, but the first few are ugly,”

You simply couldn't make it up??
oh dear! It gets worse every day....

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SanDiegoLover
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 9:29 pm

Interested wrote:
How many lives were they prepared to sacrifice and crashes to divert blame and cover up?


Boeing tried to push its weight around as “TOO BIG TO FAIL” with that typical AMERICAN over-confidence in their below average skill sets. They were banking on finding an easy fix and to get regulators to sign off on keeping manufacturing going full tilt and for existing aircraft to keep flying.


https://www.ncsf.org/blog/115-us-profes ... -confident
 
SDL
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 9:52 pm

I dont think the max will fly again, i even think it might make Boeing go bancrupt either soon because of all they have to pay because of the max or after some years when they dont have Money for badly needed new models and cant compete with Airbus anymore.
If i was sitting in around the table of incompetense at Boeing (the board) i would say separate the military part asap and save as much as possible of the Company.
 
questions
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 9:53 pm

Revelation wrote:
Apparently that Boeing Official didn't read the document dump, because if they had they would not have said that safety was the overriding imperative, clearly it wasn't in any sort of operational sense. Clearly the Boeing Employees in these messages are not acting as if safety was the overriding imperative, they are acting as if avoiding simulator training time mandates and meeting schedules is, regardless of safety or quality implications. At best, this Boeing Official is engaging in Corporate Doublespeak.


The employees are acting as if they are “led” and pressured by managers who are: 1) protecting position; 2) climbing all over their peers to get on the next rung of the corporate ladder; and/or 3) driven by operational and financial targets that obscenely pad their bank accounts.
 
2175301
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 10:36 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
Another reliable poster suggested that simulator training may be related to issues other than just MCAS. He (and his sources) would not go further. But one could suspect the changes in the computer and something to do with the 3 second discussions. Again he did not say, but Roll difficulties may also be involved. All of this may also relate to my observation that when political winds were favorable, Boeing was often given the benefit of doubt on some issues. No more!


That might have been me; and the post itself was deleted as it was in the "news" thread.

It is my understanding that MCAS V2 is a fairly simple software change (a dozen or two lines of code); and if that was all that was needed that Boeing felt that there would be no need for simulator training.

But, the bit flip issue ended up in Boeing changing how key flight computers work and interact. A way more complicated change (and I have heard that most of the software documentation issue is now because all the flight control software in those computers has to be reviewed and documented to "current standards" - which was changed to international standards of different degrees"; which is a vastly larger task than just MACS V2).

It is my understanding that now that the computers operate differently (the old computers operated largely independently, and had certain self check features: The new computer structure checks each computer against that other looking for a difference, and at the same time simplified some things that the old computers did). That how the computers respond and how pilots have to react to a computer failure is different. I have heard that a "noticeable" portion of the confusion/errors of the international test pilots with the simulator in December was in fact to the difference in how the computers operate. Not just how MCAS operates.

As such, what I have heard is that simulator training may now be required more largely due to how the computers operate differently than from the computers in the previous generations of the 737s (which all the test pilots knew in detail from long experience).

My source rarely speaks up on things in the last year... and is mainly involved elsewhere (and I miss our previous level of discussion - they really feel constrained about what they can talk about and they are clearly frustrated); but, they do operate at a level where they get briefings on the 737 - and it sounds like they may have been at least consulted into how to reorganize some of the engineering department.

Have a great day,
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 10:40 pm

questions wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Apparently that Boeing Official didn't read the document dump, because if they had they would not have said that safety was the overriding imperative, clearly it wasn't in any sort of operational sense. Clearly the Boeing Employees in these messages are not acting as if safety was the overriding imperative, they are acting as if avoiding simulator training time mandates and meeting schedules is, regardless of safety or quality implications. At best, this Boeing Official is engaging in Corporate Doublespeak.


The employees are acting as if they are “led” and pressured by managers who are: 1) protecting position; 2) climbing all over their peers to get on the next rung of the corporate ladder; and/or 3) driven by operational and financial targets that obscenely pad their bank accounts.



That all makes sense

Just can't happen when peoples lives are at stake
 
SEU
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 11:09 pm

morrisond wrote:
Noshow wrote:
Boeing assumed Pilots would be familiar with the Runaway Trim NNC checklist and they would apply that when faced with a MCAS fault. The Runaway Trim NNC checklist is common to NG and MAX so their argument was that no additional training was needed. They didn't necessarily need a MAX simulator to practise that checklist.

They were wrong as Lionair did not know that the intermittent Trim Issue they were facing should have been treated as Runaway trim. Boeing was definitely in error for not informing there Customer training departments of this potential problem.

ET though knew if they had intermittent trim issues treat it as Runaway Trim and run the appropriate checklist - there is just a lot of debate of how well or did they even get that information to their pilots.



It feels almost like your daily prayer to read your narrative blaming the pilots over and over again. Must be hundreds of posts by now for sure. As everybody is aware of your point by now I'd like to find out why you keep repeating it like some dogma? Are you a private person thinking this way or is this some campaign sort of thing maybe?


Stop saying that I'm blaming the pilots - I'm blaming ET's training system - their is a very large difference. I'll keep posting as long as people keep insisting that there is no training issue.

I thought everyone knew by now that I'm paid by Boeing. I've been accused of it often enough. Personally I hope Boeing does a complete rethink of how they certify aircraft.

As Aircraft grow more complex and fewer people have less a grasp of the whole Aircraft systems have to be in place to ensure this never happens again. That becomes very difficult when thousand's of Engineers are working on a program and have no idea what the others are doing.


If its ETs 'training system' that's the issue, why did the whole world ban the max, FAA and boeing admit mistakes and now will require pilots to be trained on the max, instead of just grounding ET.
 
SEU
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 11:11 pm

oschkosch wrote:
Interested wrote:
Anyone seen this one yet ?

In one email message from 2015, an employee who apparently is a test pilot wrote that he crashed the first few times he flew the Max in simulator testing. “You get decent at it after 3-4 tries, but the first few are ugly,”

You simply couldn't make it up??
oh dear! It gets worse every day....

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It's the pilots and their airlines training at fault though haven't you heard????
 
889091
Posts: 219
Joined: Sat Apr 06, 2019 7:56 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 11:20 pm

Many have suggested that BCA may potentially have to re-open the NG line if this grounding drags on and on and on...

As it stands, there are over 400+ MAXs in storage. One of the reasons MCAS was introduced is because the larger LEAP engines had to be placed further forward of the wing due to its size.

Here's a potentially dumb question - what's stopping Boeing from whacking a standard NG pylon and the standard NG CFM56 on the existing stored frames and removing the need for MCAS altogether? Heck, they can even call it the NNG (New Next Generation) - sure, you're not going to get the improved fuel burn of the MAX, but at LEAST you have an airframe to carry your pax.....

Or is the limitation due to one engine out performance during take-off?
 
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scbriml
Posts: 19279
Joined: Wed Jul 02, 2003 10:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 11:30 pm

889091 wrote:
Many have suggested that BCA may potentially have to re-open the NG line if this grounding drags on and on and on...

As it stands, there are over 400+ MAXs in storage. One of the reasons MCAS was introduced is because the larger LEAP engines had to be placed further forward of the wing due to its size.

Here's a potentially dumb question - what's stopping Boeing from whacking a standard NG pylon and the standard NG CFM56 on the existing stored frames and removing the need for MCAS altogether? Heck, they can even call it the NNG (New Next Generation) - sure, you're not going to get the improved fuel burn of the MAX, but at LEAST you have an airframe to carry your pax.....

Or is the limitation due to one engine out performance during take-off?


Even if it were technically possible, Boeing would almost certainly end up paying the difference in fuel costs for the life of the plane. That would be an awful lot of money.
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
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757SanCam
Posts: 81
Joined: Sat Dec 14, 2013 10:32 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sat Jan 11, 2020 11:31 pm

Many posts here are from posters more informed than me, but as passenger who routinely flies around 50,000 miles a year mostly on UA, let me add my 2 cents to this discussion. All the revelations coming out of Boeing obviously show a rushed push money grabbing attempt to put "lipstick on a plane continually updated on a 50+year design". I realize driving in my car is far more hazardous than flying, but at least I have some control of that based on how I drive.

I have no control of a plane that I fly in and in light of the information that has been revealed, I have some reservations about flying in a MAX. At least on UA booking, they indicate what aircraft for the flights that you're reserving. Sure, pilots in the US will be trained for the handling nuances of the MAX, but until it's been proven that the fixes are successful and there are no incidents for 6 months to a year, if it's a MAX Boeing, I'm not going.

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