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morrisond
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Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:18 am

SEU wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Noshow wrote:


It feels almost like your daily prayer to read your narrative blaming the pilots over and over again. Must be hundreds of posts by now for sure. As everybody is aware of your point by now I'd like to find out why you keep repeating it like some dogma? Are you a private person thinking this way or is this some campaign sort of thing maybe?


Stop saying that I'm blaming the pilots - I'm blaming ET's training system - their is a very large difference. I'll keep posting as long as people keep insisting that there is no training issue.

I thought everyone knew by now that I'm paid by Boeing. I've been accused of it often enough. Personally I hope Boeing does a complete rethink of how they certify aircraft.

As Aircraft grow more complex and fewer people have less a grasp of the whole Aircraft systems have to be in place to ensure this never happens again. That becomes very difficult when thousand's of Engineers are working on a program and have no idea what the others are doing.


If its ETs 'training system' that's the issue, why did the whole world ban the max, FAA and boeing admit mistakes and now will require pilots to be trained on the max, instead of just grounding ET.


AS the MCAS 2.0 Simulator tests showed Pilots from other airlines in the west were having issues as well with running checklists.
 
asdf
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Joined: Tue Mar 18, 2014 12:03 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:58 am

889091 wrote:
Many have suggested that BCA may potentially have to re-open the NG line if this grounding drags on and on and on...

As it stands, there are over 400+ MAXs in storage. One of the reasons MCAS was introduced is because the larger LEAP engines had to be placed further forward of the wing due to its size.

Here's a potentially dumb question - what's stopping Boeing from whacking a standard NG pylon and the standard NG CFM56 on the existing stored frames and removing the need for MCAS altogether? Heck, they can even call it the NNG (New Next Generation) - sure, you're not going to get the improved fuel burn of the MAX, but at LEAST you have an airframe to carry your pax.....

Or is the limitation due to one engine out performance during take-off?


If i would have done that

But not retrofit the NG engines

Stay with the new big ones
But fix the aerodynamic and accept the economic disadvantage

The MAX would have been in the air again very soon
I am shure they have tested a lot a modifications but they couldnt apply them because of the higher fuel consumtion

Compensate the airlines for the fuel disadvantage based on flight hours for the time being
That would be a fraction of the costs for compensating the not delivery

So the MAX would be in the air (again)
It would be on same safety level as the NG

And during that boeings best engineers could
A) figure out how to get a better economic on the 737MAX without safety disadvantage
Or
B) develope the NSA and offer the 737MAX airlines a trade-in offer as soon as the NSA is aviable

Both versions give a better result as the actuall monkey circus
Yes, i know .... beancounter ..... anyway ..... its true
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:32 am

What's the vision, Boeing struggles or goes bankrupt, or Boeing outdelivers Airbus in 2021 and launches the NMA?
 
smartplane
Posts: 1507
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:53 am

Think this has been mentioned before, but perhaps not the dollar amount.

http://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/fa ... 01.article

Could the FAA's new operating mantra could be?
Bad boys, bad boys
Whatcha gonna do, whatcha gonna do
When they come for you

Anyone that has ever touched the 737, would be wise to confess anything less than 100% good, right now, because the FAA seems to be driving forward (X), backwards (NG, 787, 748) and sideways (suppliers and customers).
 
airhansa
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:57 am

DenverTed wrote:
What's the vision, Boeing struggles or goes bankrupt, or Boeing outdelivers Airbus in 2021 and launches the NMA?


Boeing borders on being a state-owned company with the amount of government contracts it receives (and I don't just mean US government contracts but even contracts from other countries such as Saudi Arabia). It's highly unlikely that the manufacturer would go under especially when ten years ago the government bailed out banks and insurance companies.

But it's also unlikely that Boeing will out-deliver Airbus in terms of civilian planes as the latter appears to have a far wider portfolio and is getting to the point where it's running out of capacity for new orders. It's however entirely possible that Boeing as a whole makes more money than Airbus since Boeing is a larger company in a wider number of sectors, whereas Airbus is basically a consortium focusing on aerospace.
 
Thunderbolt500
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:59 am

Maybe they should scrap the plane.
 
pasen
Posts: 24
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 4:25 am

DenverTed wrote:
What's the vision, Boeing struggles or goes bankrupt, or Boeing outdelivers Airbus in 2021 and launches the NMA?


Good question.

I personally don’t see the MAX ever fully recover from the horrible reputation it has now. I can’t imagine airlines who seriously care about their safety reputation order the MAX anymore in the next couple of years, except maybe to extend existing fleets by small numbers. Can anybody imagine an airline like QF that is so proud of their safety record, order a plane that Boeing employees describe as designed by clowns and monkeys?

Therefore, I do believe the NMA should be dropped and the NSA should be started ASAP. The challenge is, designing, building, and certifying the NSA, then sorting out initial teething issues, and get production up to the required numbers (50+ a month) might take ten years, considering Boeing also needs to sort out their cultural issues first and will be under increased scrutiny from regulators.

However, not making money in the single-aisle space for such a long time is simply not an option (unless Boeing decides to completely pull out of that market and downsize). So, the immediate plan can only be to get the MAX back into service, deliver the stored frames, and work through the remaining backlog.

Yes, Boeing is going to struggle for a quite a while, but I don't see them going bankrupt. They are simply too big to fail for the US economically and strategically.
 
MrBretz
Posts: 548
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 5:33 am

2175301 wrote:
frmrCapCadet wrote:
Another reliable poster suggested that simulator training may be related to issues other than just MCAS. He (and his sources) would not go further. But one could suspect the changes in the computer and something to do with the 3 second discussions. Again he did not say, but Roll difficulties may also be involved. All of this may also relate to my observation that when political winds were favorable, Boeing was often given the benefit of doubt on some issues. No more!


That might have been me; and the post itself was deleted as it was in the "news" thread.

It is my understanding that MCAS V2 is a fairly simple software change (a dozen or two lines of code); and if that was all that was needed that Boeing felt that there would be no need for simulator training.

But, the bit flip issue ended up in Boeing changing how key flight computers work and interact. A way more complicated change (and I have heard that most of the software documentation issue is now because all the flight control software in those computers has to be reviewed and documented to "current standards" - which was changed to international standards of different degrees"; which is a vastly larger task than just MACS V2).

It is my understanding that now that the computers operate differently (the old computers operated largely independently, and had certain self check features: The new computer structure checks each computer against that other looking for a difference, and at the same time simplified some things that the old computers did). That how the computers respond and how pilots have to react to a computer failure is different. I have heard that a "noticeable" portion of the confusion/errors of the international test pilots with the simulator in December was in fact to the difference in how the computers operate. Not just how MCAS operates.

As such, what I have heard is that simulator training may now be required more largely due to how the computers operate differently than from the computers in the previous generations of the 737s (which all the test pilots knew in detail from long experience).

My source rarely speaks up on things in the last year... and is mainly involved elsewhere (and I miss our previous level of discussion - they really feel constrained about what they can talk about and they are clearly frustrated); but, they do operate at a level where they get briefings on the 737 - and it sounds like they may have been at least consulted into how to reorganize some of the engineering department.

Have a great day,


I think you or your friend are correct. What happens when 2 computers are involved brings up a whole new set of failure scenarios. You would need practice on that and a few overheads won’t cut it.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 5:47 am

morrisond wrote:
MartijnNL wrote:
Revelation wrote:
As just recently pointed out, discussing pilot training issues does not "defend Boeing", it shows they did not understood how their MCAS implementation behaved in the presence of a AoA sensor fault and put unacceptable workload onto the pilots, and highlights their profit based actions to avoid simulator training mandates.

Some users said the crashes happened, because of badly trained 3rd world pilots. Now we know these pilots asked for simulator training. The answer of Boeing? That's not necessary. I don't think this behaviour looks good on Boeing.


Boeing assumed Pilots would be familiar with the Runaway Trim NNC checklist and they would apply that when faced with a MCAS fault. The Runaway Trim NNC checklist is common to NG and MAX so their argument was that no additional training was needed. They didn't necessarily need a MAX simulator to practise that checklist.

They were wrong as Lionair did not know that the intermittent Trim Issue they were facing should have been treated as Runaway trim. Boeing was definitely in error for not informing there Customer training departments of this potential problem.

ET though knew if they had intermittent trim issues treat it as Runaway Trim and run the appropriate checklist - there is just a lot of debate of how well or did they even get that information to their pilots.

Definitively NO: this is not "just a lot of debate" on "how well [ET] or did they even get that information to their pilots" !!!

The absolutely only way one can make a difference between JT610 and ET302 is the EAD, really there are absolutely nothing else that was know to the pilots. But the EAD was a Boeing document that was purposely redacted to criminally put all the responsibility to the operators and pilots, Boeing secretly knowing at that time that it have a flawed design, lied to the regulators, and refused training to the operators, instead of grounding the MAX as it was finally obligated. This EAD was a way for Boeing to avoid responsibility of future accident, knowing that it was statistically unavoidable, as a very official document presented at the hearing already determined. The EAD should have been a grounding if the regulators was knowing at that time all what Boeing did know at that time, and that we discover only now.

This criminal EAD is why I totally disagree about linking the ET operator and ET302 pilots to the 737-8/9 MAX grounding: this was the statically unavoidable consequence of Boeing wrong decision. The worldwide effort to raise the training level of the pilots is a important subject, but totally unrelated to the subject of this thread. The criminal safety deficiency of Boeing was a setup that will hit first the pilot that will miss a single point in a situation that tolerate nothing wrong under confusing alerts, high workload, and immediate death stress. And this is exactly was happened as predicted by the safety analysis.

Once you understand how criminal was that EAD, there is nothing left to blame ET or ET302.
:stirthepot: 737-8 MAX: "For all speeds higher than 220 Kts and trim set at a value of 2.5 units, the difficulity level of turning the manual trim wheel was level A (trim wheel not movable)." :stirthepot:
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 5:57 am

DenverTed wrote:
What's the vision, Boeing struggles or goes bankrupt, or Boeing outdelivers Airbus in 2021 and launches the NMA?


Boeing faces more than 1 battle now

The battle to get the plane ungrounded. Tough on its own as the scrutiny is huge and the design is flawed

A flying public that must be close to 50 per cent now who don't want to fly on the plane and bad PR that will continue (when Max was first grounded I understood when posters said the public will soon forget. I'm not sure they will soon forget now tbh)

Airlines who won't trust Max and/or Boeing and will be looking for alternatives they can trust (limited I realise) but in reality that's the only thing going for Boeing and Max right now. Lack of readily available alternatives. Which isn't saying a lot in terms of positives is it.

Boeing need a big push on safety first next decade to turn this round

Maybe they should pledge to design the safest plane ever and actually mean it. Win some pride and trust back
 
zhetenyi1973
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 5:59 am

Please, forgive me if this was discussed before.

If MCAS 2.0 detects a too much difference between the AOAs, does that mean MCAS 2.0 will turn itself off completely during the flight? I mean it is obviously not enough to just ignore the wrong AOA values since MCAS 2.0 would lose redundancy and would almost work like MCAS 1.0 in this case. However, AOS problems seem fairly common in which case wouldn't it be better not to have MCAS at all as that canadian guy suggested?
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 6:08 am

zhetenyi1973 wrote:
Please, forgive me if this was discussed before.

If MCAS 2.0 detects a too much difference between the AOAs, does that mean MCAS 2.0 will turn itself off completely during the flight? I mean it is obviously not enough to just ignore the wrong AOA values since MCAS 2.0 would lose redundancy and would almost work like MCAS 1.0 in this case. However, AOS problems seem fairly common in which case wouldn't it be better not to have MCAS at all as that canadian guy suggested?


The last part of your question can't be answered by anybody on here because nobody outside of Boeing and MAYBE the FAA knows what the flight characteristics are without MCAS.

As to the first part, yes, MCAS 2.0 becomes disabled if there is a disagreement of more than 5.5 degrees between the two AoA vanes. It will also (properly now) display the AoA disagree warning. I can only assume that there will be an updated AoA disagree checklist since the plane will be flying with no MCAS.
 
zhetenyi1973
Posts: 18
Joined: Thu Apr 04, 2019 7:08 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 6:11 am

planecane wrote:
zhetenyi1973 wrote:
Please, forgive me if this was discussed before.

If MCAS 2.0 detects a too much difference between the AOAs, does that mean MCAS 2.0 will turn itself off completely during the flight? I mean it is obviously not enough to just ignore the wrong AOA values since MCAS 2.0 would lose redundancy and would almost work like MCAS 1.0 in this case. However, AOS problems seem fairly common in which case wouldn't it be better not to have MCAS at all as that canadian guy suggested?


The last part of your question can't be answered by anybody on here because nobody outside of Boeing and MAYBE the FAA knows what the flight characteristics are without MCAS.

As to the first part, yes, MCAS 2.0 becomes disabled if there is a disagreement of more than 5.5 degrees between the two AoA vanes. It will also (properly now) display the AoA disagree warning. I can only assume that there will be an updated AoA disagree checklist since the plane will be flying with no MCAS.


Just to be sure about 'disabled'. So, even if the difference later become less than 5.5 degrees, MCAS 2.0 wll not take any action. Am I understand right?
 
planecane
Posts: 1570
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 6:15 am

zhetenyi1973 wrote:
planecane wrote:
zhetenyi1973 wrote:
Please, forgive me if this was discussed before.

If MCAS 2.0 detects a too much difference between the AOAs, does that mean MCAS 2.0 will turn itself off completely during the flight? I mean it is obviously not enough to just ignore the wrong AOA values since MCAS 2.0 would lose redundancy and would almost work like MCAS 1.0 in this case. However, AOS problems seem fairly common in which case wouldn't it be better not to have MCAS at all as that canadian guy suggested?


The last part of your question can't be answered by anybody on here because nobody outside of Boeing and MAYBE the FAA knows what the flight characteristics are without MCAS.

As to the first part, yes, MCAS 2.0 becomes disabled if there is a disagreement of more than 5.5 degrees between the two AoA vanes. It will also (properly now) display the AoA disagree warning. I can only assume that there will be an updated AoA disagree checklist since the plane will be flying with no MCAS.


Just to be sure about 'disabled'. So, even if the difference later become less than 5.5 degrees, MCAS 2.0 wll not take any action. Am I understand right?


I believe it would re-enable once the disagree condition doesn't exist anymore.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 6:20 am

planecane wrote:
zhetenyi1973 wrote:
planecane wrote:

The last part of your question can't be answered by anybody on here because nobody outside of Boeing and MAYBE the FAA knows what the flight characteristics are without MCAS.

As to the first part, yes, MCAS 2.0 becomes disabled if there is a disagreement of more than 5.5 degrees between the two AoA vanes. It will also (properly now) display the AoA disagree warning. I can only assume that there will be an updated AoA disagree checklist since the plane will be flying with no MCAS.


Just to be sure about 'disabled'. So, even if the difference later become less than 5.5 degrees, MCAS 2.0 wll not take any action. Am I understand right?


I believe it would re-enable once the disagree condition doesn't exist anymore.


Can anyone explain why we are even accepting that all the above needs to be dealt with??

If the plane is so badly designed we need all these complications why are we even persevering with it?

We don't owe Boeing any favours here?

Let's start again and move on from trying to polish a "turd"

Basically why on earth are we trying to fix something that's broken

We know it's calculated now rather than genuine mistakes that led to it. So let's just make Boeing start again and do it properly this time from start to finish?

They can afford anything apparently they are so big.
Last edited by Interested on Sun Jan 12, 2020 6:22 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
zhetenyi1973
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 6:21 am

planecane wrote:
zhetenyi1973 wrote:
planecane wrote:

The last part of your question can't be answered by anybody on here because nobody outside of Boeing and MAYBE the FAA knows what the flight characteristics are without MCAS.

As to the first part, yes, MCAS 2.0 becomes disabled if there is a disagreement of more than 5.5 degrees between the two AoA vanes. It will also (properly now) display the AoA disagree warning. I can only assume that there will be an updated AoA disagree checklist since the plane will be flying with no MCAS.


Just to be sure about 'disabled'. So, even if the difference later become less than 5.5 degrees, MCAS 2.0 wll not take any action. Am I understand right?


I believe it would re-enable once the disagree condition doesn't exist anymore.


Then that is not acceptable. What if one AOA stuck at eg. 10 and the other is eg. 3. Later the other is increasing for whatever reason and the difference reaches the 5.5 limit. In this case MCAS 2.0 would just behave like MCAS 1.0. I know there are other restrictions, but anyway, I think MCAS 2.0 should shut itself down completely at the first disagreement.
 
astuteman
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 6:28 am

DenverTed wrote:
What's the vision, Boeing struggles or goes bankrupt, or Boeing outdelivers Airbus in 2021 and launches the NMA?


There's actually an open thread for this very conversation, which might be worth utilising, rather than dilute the general discussion thread here....

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1437645

"Can Boeing make a great comeback in 2020?"

Rgds
 
planecane
Posts: 1570
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 7:35 am

zhetenyi1973 wrote:
planecane wrote:
zhetenyi1973 wrote:

Just to be sure about 'disabled'. So, even if the difference later become less than 5.5 degrees, MCAS 2.0 wll not take any action. Am I understand right?


I believe it would re-enable once the disagree condition doesn't exist anymore.


Then that is not acceptable. What if one AOA stuck at eg. 10 and the other is eg. 3. Later the other is increasing for whatever reason and the difference reaches the 5.5 limit. In this case MCAS 2.0 would just behave like MCAS 1.0. I know there are other restrictions, but anyway, I think MCAS 2.0 should shut itself down completely at the first disagreement.


We'll have to wait and see but I expect that the AoA disagree checklist for the max will include a land at nearest suitable airport instruction. If so, it won't really be an issue.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 7:56 am

planecane wrote:
zhetenyi1973 wrote:
planecane wrote:

I believe it would re-enable once the disagree condition doesn't exist anymore.


Then that is not acceptable. What if one AOA stuck at eg. 10 and the other is eg. 3. Later the other is increasing for whatever reason and the difference reaches the 5.5 limit. In this case MCAS 2.0 would just behave like MCAS 1.0. I know there are other restrictions, but anyway, I think MCAS 2.0 should shut itself down completely at the first disagreement.


We'll have to wait and see but I expect that the AoA disagree checklist for the max will include a land at nearest suitable airport instruction. If so, it won't really be an issue.


So is this safer or less safe than what we have on 737 NG?
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 8:12 am

More detail re "the Jedi mind trick conversation below:


The same individual is thought to have glossed over the existence of MCAS in an email to an airline, writing: “Once the engines are started, there is only one difference between NG and Max procedurally, and that is that there is no ‘off’ position of the gear handle.

“Boeing does not understand what is to be gained by a three-hour simulator session, when the procedures are essentially the same.”


When the airline accepted this assertion, the pilot wrote to a colleague: “Looks like my Jedi mind trick worked again!”

The colleague responded: “Haha, I’ll send you to negotiate peace in the Middle East next.”

(In the UK these guys would be on a similar level to second hand car salesmen or double glazing salesmen celebrating their latest scam on a customer together)
 
User avatar
AirlineCritic
Posts: 1765
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 11:08 am

morrisond wrote:
the issue was the Pilots couldn't follow a check list - that is the training issue.


Dennis, is it really you old buddy? I think you should take it easy and not be so involved in this saga any more. Peace, man. Enjoy the free time. :-)

Back on topic, as your employees have indicated (ref 1), there's a bit of problem with following the checklist:

"You get decent at it after 3-4 tries, but the first few are ugly," the employee wrote.


The problem is that since there is no simulator that accurately depicts how MCAS behaves (ref 2), you have to try it out in an actual aircraft. The problem being, of course, that if you go through even the first trial in an actual aircraft, the chances are that you are not decent enough to get it right. And well, then you are, uh, dead. In a burning hole made by your training 737 MAX aircraft. So it is a bit of a difficulty get those 3-4 repeats that you need to become decent.

So I guess we have finally understood what training problem you are referring to! I now fully agree, this is a big dilemma. Don't really know how to solve that. But you are right, we have a training problem!

Ref 1: https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing ... -1.5422623
Ref 2: https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/boe ... 46.article
 
AABusDrvr
Posts: 150
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 11:46 am

Interested wrote:
More detail re "the Jedi mind trick conversation below:


The same individual is thought to have glossed over the existence of MCAS in an email to an airline, writing: “Once the engines are started, there is only one difference between NG and Max procedurally, and that is that there is no ‘off’ position of the gear handle.

“Boeing does not understand what is to be gained by a three-hour simulator session, when the procedures are essentially the same.”


When the airline accepted this assertion, the pilot wrote to a colleague: “Looks like my Jedi mind trick worked again!”

The colleague responded: “Haha, I’ll send you to negotiate peace in the Middle East next.”

(In the UK these guys would be on a similar level to second hand car salesmen or double glazing salesmen celebrating their latest scam on a customer together)



The statement I bolded is factually correct, he was not lying about anything. Had the MCAS been classified differently, it would be a different story. He is talking about normal operations.



AirlineCritic wrote:
morrisond wrote:
the issue was the Pilots couldn't follow a check list - that is the training issue.


Dennis, is it really you old buddy? I think you should take it easy and not be so involved in this saga any more. Peace, man. Enjoy the free time. :-)

Back on topic, as your employees have indicated (ref 1), there's a bit of problem with following the checklist:

"You get decent at it after 3-4 tries, but the first few are ugly," the employee wrote.


The problem is that since there is no simulator that accurately depicts how MCAS behaves (ref 2), you have to try it out in an actual aircraft. The problem being, of course, that if you go through even the first trial in an actual aircraft, the chances are that you are not decent enough to get it right. And well, then you are, uh, dead. In a burning hole made by your training 737 MAX aircraft. So it is a bit of a difficulty get those 3-4 repeats that you need to become decent.

So I guess we have finally understood what training problem you are referring to! I now fully agree, this is a big dilemma. Don't really know how to solve that. But you are right, we have a training problem!

Ref 1: https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing ... -1.5422623
Ref 2: https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/boe ... 46.article



You do realize that the "but the first few are ugly" has nothing to do with the MCAS, right? He is talking about the simulator behavior, while using the direct lift control function of the electronic spoiler control, the "jammed elevator landing assist" function that's only on the MAX.
 
airhansa
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Joined: Wed Jan 08, 2020 3:18 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 12:34 pm

MCAS is basically a solution to a problem that shouldn't exist. The plane design itself should never have been compromised to the point that the aerodynamics couldn't fly the plane properly. A new plane is required or the engines (and whatever else) should be reduced.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 12:44 pm

zhetenyi1973 wrote:
Please, forgive me if this was discussed before.

If MCAS 2.0 detects a too much difference between the AOAs, does that mean MCAS 2.0 will turn itself off completely during the flight? I mean it is obviously not enough to just ignore the wrong AOA values since MCAS 2.0 would lose redundancy and would almost work like MCAS 1.0 in this case. However, AOS problems seem fairly common in which case wouldn't it be better not to have MCAS at all as that canadian guy suggested?

Yeah, some people do think that getting rid of MCAS - and MAX altogether - is a good idea. But if one stays, so does the other.
 
kalvado
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Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:01 pm

planecane wrote:
zhetenyi1973 wrote:
planecane wrote:

I believe it would re-enable once the disagree condition doesn't exist anymore.


Then that is not acceptable. What if one AOA stuck at eg. 10 and the other is eg. 3. Later the other is increasing for whatever reason and the difference reaches the 5.5 limit. In this case MCAS 2.0 would just behave like MCAS 1.0. I know there are other restrictions, but anyway, I think MCAS 2.0 should shut itself down completely at the first disagreement.


We'll have to wait and see but I expect that the AoA disagree checklist for the max will include a land at nearest suitable airport instruction. If so, it won't really be an issue.

No, it will have to be different. Landing in such a way that the possibility of excessive maneuvering is eliminated. 20+ mile separations and a full ground stop at the field may be part of it.
BA my regret their lifeline order once that happens at LHR
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:01 pm

Interested wrote:
planecane wrote:
zhetenyi1973 wrote:

Then that is not acceptable. What if one AOA stuck at eg. 10 and the other is eg. 3. Later the other is increasing for whatever reason and the difference reaches the 5.5 limit. In this case MCAS 2.0 would just behave like MCAS 1.0. I know there are other restrictions, but anyway, I think MCAS 2.0 should shut itself down completely at the first disagreement.


We'll have to wait and see but I expect that the AoA disagree checklist for the max will include a land at nearest suitable airport instruction. If so, it won't really be an issue.


So is this safer or less safe than what we have on 737 NG?


Equally? Will need a few years of service to know.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:03 pm

kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:
zhetenyi1973 wrote:

Then that is not acceptable. What if one AOA stuck at eg. 10 and the other is eg. 3. Later the other is increasing for whatever reason and the difference reaches the 5.5 limit. In this case MCAS 2.0 would just behave like MCAS 1.0. I know there are other restrictions, but anyway, I think MCAS 2.0 should shut itself down completely at the first disagreement.


We'll have to wait and see but I expect that the AoA disagree checklist for the max will include a land at nearest suitable airport instruction. If so, it won't really be an issue.

No, it will have to be different. Landing in such a way that the possibility of excessive maneuvering is eliminated. 20+ mile separations and a full ground stop at the field may be part of it.
BA my regret their lifeline order once that happens at LHR


Instead of ridiculous procedures how about just slowing to flaps speed so MCAS isn't needed aerodynamically?
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:09 pm

Thunderbolt500 wrote:
Maybe they should scrap the plane.


Better to just scrap MCAS and give all MAX pilots EET (US Extended Envelope Training).

Although as 2173501 says the lengthy grounding doesn't really seem to be about MCAS but the Bit Flip issue.

Given the extremely low probably of the bit flip issue happening I can't help but thinking of the Knights of Ni demanding a shrubbery every time I read about it.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:12 pm

planecane wrote:
Instead of ridiculous procedures how about just slowing to flaps speed so MCAS isn't needed aerodynamically?


Does the deployment of flaps preclude the possibility of entering the flight envelope region where MCAS was deemed to be required?
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:15 pm

morrisond wrote:
Although as 2173501 says the lengthy grounding doesn't really seem to be about MCAS but the Bit Flip issue.


I haven't seen or read anything that indicates MCAS 2.0 has been reviewed/approved by the certification authorities, but may have missed it in all the "Iranian excitement".
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:22 pm

planecane wrote:
kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:

We'll have to wait and see but I expect that the AoA disagree checklist for the max will include a land at nearest suitable airport instruction. If so, it won't really be an issue.

No, it will have to be different. Landing in such a way that the possibility of excessive maneuvering is eliminated. 20+ mile separations and a full ground stop at the field may be part of it.
BA my regret their lifeline order once that happens at LHR


Instead of ridiculous procedures how about just slowing to flaps speed so MCAS isn't needed aerodynamically?


That is a good suggestion. I'm all for making things simpler - and yes that would have made things simpler with MCAS V1.0. But then again keeping an aircraft away from the corners of the flight envelope is generally a good thing anyways.
 
AirwayBill
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:22 pm

You know what? I'd love the relevant authorities to require an entirely new and separate type rating for the MAX.

That would be a justified backlash, proportionate to the level of negligence and arrogance shown by Boeing at all levels during the whole certification process. :stirthepot:
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:23 pm

scbriml wrote:
planecane wrote:
Instead of ridiculous procedures how about just slowing to flaps speed so MCAS isn't needed aerodynamically?


Does the deployment of flaps preclude the possibility of entering the flight envelope region where MCAS was deemed to be required?


Flaps out changes the Aerodynamics of the wing so the controls never get too light so MCAS is not needed.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:45 pm

morrisond wrote:
scbriml wrote:
planecane wrote:
Instead of ridiculous procedures how about just slowing to flaps speed so MCAS isn't needed aerodynamically?


Does the deployment of flaps preclude the possibility of entering the flight envelope region where MCAS was deemed to be required?


Flaps out changes the Aerodynamics of the wing so the controls never get too light so MCAS is not needed.
So how come Boeing has not thought about this then? Obviously there must be more to mcas than we all know?

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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:47 pm

scbriml wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Although as 2173501 says the lengthy grounding doesn't really seem to be about MCAS but the Bit Flip issue.


I haven't seen or read anything that indicates MCAS 2.0 has been reviewed/approved by the certification authorities, but may have missed it in all the "Iranian excitement".

We had leaks of how MCAS 2.0 would operate and it was debated prior to the June submission, however during testing the FAA also decided to spring the bit flip test and away we went. We have all kinds of leaks about bit flip, the changes mandated for dual computer use and loads of other information, but strangely, all we know about MCAS 2.0 is that MCAS 1.0 caused the a/c to have fatal crashes.

Even when we debate one reason for bit flip was to see how MCAS 2.0 would respond no details, or when the pilots in the sim all recovered the a/c using various check list in various order, no details about how MCAS 2.0 performed, even with the leaks about simulator training, no leaks on how MCAS 2.0 performed which is strange since that is what the world knows caused the accidents, the lack of information provided to the pilots / clients is secondary, at least that is the general perception.

If I use my X-Files hat it is almost like we want to keep MCAS as the boogy man, which is strange since we have a lot of other stuff being revealed, maybe it is because that is the primary technical issue we can hang our hats on, most of the other stuff is administrative or personal versus technical faults that cannot be overcome.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:59 pm

morrisond wrote:
planecane wrote:
kalvado wrote:
No, it will have to be different. Landing in such a way that the possibility of excessive maneuvering is eliminated. 20+ mile separations and a full ground stop at the field may be part of it.
BA my regret their lifeline order once that happens at LHR


Instead of ridiculous procedures how about just slowing to flaps speed so MCAS isn't needed aerodynamically?


That is a good suggestion. I'm all for making things simpler - and yes that would have made things simpler with MCAS V1.0. But then again keeping an aircraft away from the corners of the flight envelope is generally a good thing anyways.


Yes both pilots pull elevator until speed is reduced to engage flaps.

But that would have needed to includ Boeing being open about MCAS. They would have had to explain how MCAS works and why. Boeing would have needed to put some thought into how pilots should handle a failure mode of MCAS.

But than the main aim of Boeing would have been shattered, to look at NG and MAX as handling the same way. Than Boeing would have had to accept serious difference training and would have had to promote that airlines should train their pilots on the MAX. What horror to just thing about it. Thing about added cost for airlines and lost sales for Boeing. :sarcastic:
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 1:59 pm

oschkosch wrote:
morrisond wrote:
scbriml wrote:

Does the deployment of flaps preclude the possibility of entering the flight envelope region where MCAS was deemed to be required?


Flaps out changes the Aerodynamics of the wing so the controls never get too light so MCAS is not needed.
So how come Boeing has not thought about this then? Obviously there must be more to mcas than we all know?

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I guess we have information overload, but the documents released from day one has stated that autopilot engaged and flaps down disables MCAS.
 
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TurboJet707
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:00 pm

Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant had an interesting story on the MAX fiasco yesterday:

https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achter ... ~bdb9f623/
(Dutch only, but Google/Bing Translate is your friend...)

The reporter spoke with Ed Pierson, a former assembly hall manager, who testified in Congress after resigning from Boeing, being fed up with the culture and the way his concerns were ignored (his words).

Here's one interesting excerpt that I ran through Google Translate:

(...) "That sensor was really not the only problem, says Ed Pierson, a former manager in the assembly hall of the 737 Max, who rang the bell at the management in the summer of 2018 because he saw problems everywhere. "The workload became much too high. Many parts were delayed, the work sequence started to mix, people were put to work in places other than where they actually worked. I knew for sure: that's how we're going to make mistakes. "

Pierson, who testified before Congress in December about his experiences on the shop floor, tells this Tuesday afternoon in his hometown of Bremerton, a place on a cove one hour's boat ride from Seattle, about how management's demands could have disastrous effects on quality of the aircraft that were built at the time.

"Due to delays in the supply of parts, we were already lagging behind our delivery schedule. The management then decided to catch up - we had to make 52 rather than 47 aircraft per month. That only made the chaos bigger. We rolled out planes that had no engines underneath, which sometimes lacked parts of the hull. They all had to be finished at a time and in a place that was not meant for that. Teams were pulled apart, people did odd jobs at places in the assembly line that were not meant for that at all. Supervision was difficult, safety was at stake, both for employees and future passengers. "

For example, a hastily manufactured angle sensor was installed in that hectic pace. "We don't know on which aircraft that sensor is all," says Pierson. "What I would like in any case is for the FAA to sound the alarm and check them all."

Management thought to have a solution for the delays. It abolished the usual work transfer between teams and instead started organizing two or three times a day shame meetings in which employees had to stand up in front of about a hundred colleagues and explain why they had not reached a certain milestone. "That only increased the pressure," says Pierson. "It only got worse. It was an unstable environment.

"In June 2018, he [Pierson] sent a first letter to Scott Campbell, the manager of the 737 Max program. "Sorry to say so," he wrote, "but for the first time in my life I hesitate to let my family fly into a Boeing." Pierson, a man who has flown with the navy for years, looks pained. "He let me come and I told him to stop the production line to put things in order. I said: I have seen operations in the navy being stopped for less. Then he said: yes, but the navy does not have to make a profit. "

Pierson was struck dumb, he says. "It was the worst thing he could say. He actually said: no matter how bad the situation is, money is more important. "

Pierson resigned a few weeks later. "I didn't want to be part of that anymore."

Two months later, the first 737 Max crashed, less than five weeks old. "I was sick when I heard it," says Pierson. When he got over the worst shock, he tried to get in touch with the Boeing experts who would help investigate the causes of the accident, to point out the problems in the assembly line. He sent an email to the highest boss, Muilenburg. He had a lawyer call back, but Pierson did not get in touch with the researchers. He sent his findings to all members of the Supervisory Board, all of them a printed package, but he received no reply. Then the second plane crashed.

All over the world the aviation authorities immediately said: that 737 Max is no longer allowed to fly. In the US, the FAA only came to that conclusion after three days. Then the device was finally grounded.

Pierson searched databases and discovered that the 737 Max had thirteen incidents in addition to the two fatalities in those first months of his flying existence. Problems with the hydraulics, a failed engine, the anti-ice system, the steering. "It's incredible that new planes have so many problems," he says.

He tried to raise his concerns with the NTSB accident council and the FAA regulator, but got zero there. Only after his testimony to Congress in December, the FAA promised to call him. "That hasn't happened yet," says Pierson.

In a statement, Boeing states that "the suggestion of a link between Mr. Pierson's concerns and recent accidents is completely unfounded" and that "none of the authorities investigating the accidents found anything to indicate that production conditions in the 737 plant contributed in any way to the accidents. "
(...)

Gives an impression of a corporate culture that has gone completely wrong. Appalling if you ask me.
Last edited by TurboJet707 on Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:04 pm, edited 2 times in total.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:01 pm

oschkosch wrote:
morrisond wrote:
scbriml wrote:

Does the deployment of flaps preclude the possibility of entering the flight envelope region where MCAS was deemed to be required?


Flaps out changes the Aerodynamics of the wing so the controls never get too light so MCAS is not needed.
So how come Boeing has not thought about this then? Obviously there must be more to mcas than we all know?

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Because that would change the drag characteristics of the wing causing more fuel to be burned. Which combined with lower speed may make it impossible to continue to the destination.

It was assumed that the Pilots would have the necessary skills to use Manual Trim and continue on as their Type rating assumes they can.

With MCAS V1.0 failure - there is nothing wrong with the Horizontal Stabilizer - it's a sensor failure. Once the electric trim is defeated it should be safe to continue on using Manual Trim alone.

On the NG and MAX there is nothing in there certification that that says you can't fly the whole flight with Manual trim if you choose too.

I suspect the procedure will be the same with MCAS V2.0 - but who knows - it may include an instruction to land at the nearest suitable airport.

If I were flying the plane I believe the safer choice - if the electric trim was acting up - rather than just lowering flaps would be to remove all power to the trim motor as it might be MCAS - it could be a short or something else and continue on using Manual trim - better safe than sorry.

If something is not acting correctly dumb the airplane down and be glad you have a backup manual trim as a fall back.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:06 pm

AirwayBill wrote:
You know what? I'd love the relevant authorities to require an entirely new and separate type rating for the MAX.

That would be a justified backlash, proportionate to the level of negligence and arrogance shown by Boeing at all levels during the whole certification process. :stirthepot:

So you are convinced that the fixes that Boeing submitted in Nov-2019 make the MAX a safe a/c to operate if the pilots are properly trained?
Its a question.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:10 pm

morrisond wrote:

On the NG and MAX there is nothing in there certification that that says you can't fly the whole flight with Manual trim if you choose too.

I suspect the procedure will be the same with MCAS V2.0 - but who knows - it may include an instruction to land at the nearest suitable airport.
.

Why continue on, its a question I had from the first Lion Air encounter with MCAS, once they resolved the issue and turned off the automation why continue the commercial flight, why did they not return to base? Is trim such a trivial issue for pax comfort that manual trim is seen as no big deal?
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:21 pm

planecane wrote:
kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:

We'll have to wait and see but I expect that the AoA disagree checklist for the max will include a land at nearest suitable airport instruction. If so, it won't really be an issue.

No, it will have to be different. Landing in such a way that the possibility of excessive maneuvering is eliminated. 20+ mile separations and a full ground stop at the field may be part of it.
BA my regret their lifeline order once that happens at LHR


Instead of ridiculous procedures how about just slowing to flaps speed so MCAS isn't needed aerodynamically?


Add change of go-around procedure: no full cleanup, thrust and climb limitation, more noise; add flying entire approach below flap extension speed. Generally the same effect - significant disturbance of traffic pattern - probably not a big deal in a smaller airport. Is there a smaller diversion airport anywhere near LHR?
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:24 pm

par13del wrote:
morrisond wrote:

On the NG and MAX there is nothing in there certification that that says you can't fly the whole flight with Manual trim if you choose too.

I suspect the procedure will be the same with MCAS V2.0 - but who knows - it may include an instruction to land at the nearest suitable airport.
.

Why continue on, its a question I had from the first Lion Air encounter with MCAS, once they resolved the issue and turned off the automation why continue the commercial flight, why did they not return to base? Is trim such a trivial issue for pax comfort that manual trim is seen as no big deal?


It shouldn't be that big of a deal. Assuming you stick to a normal flight profile - Manual trimming the aircraft to keep it in trim is totally doable and you can read reports on here and other forums of Pilots who do this routinely (Fly an entire flight with Manual Trim) to stay sharp. It's good airmanship.

The passengers would never know if the plane was in trim or out of trim - just whether or not it's descending or climbing.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:25 pm

kalvado wrote:
Add change of go-around procedure: no full cleanup, thrust and climb limitation, more noise; add flying entire approach below flap extension speed. Generally the same effect - significant disturbance of traffic pattern - probably not a big deal in a smaller airport. Is there a smaller diversion airport anywhere near LHR?

So would throwing the cut-off switches make the go around and landing more difficult than the noise and speed issue?
I take it we will now be regarding this as an emergency procedure?
 
hivue
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:30 pm

par13del wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Flaps out changes the Aerodynamics of the wing so the controls never get too light so MCAS is not needed.
So how come Boeing has not thought about this then? Obviously there must be more to mcas than we all know?

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I guess we have information overload, but the documents released from day one has stated that autopilot engaged and flaps down disables MCAS.


The reason for the existence of MCAS is to provide control column focres that meet the regulations in parts of the envelope where those forces get too light.in the MAX. The AP obviously doesn't need any particular "control column feel" so no need for MCAS when it is on.

Although changed aerodynamic forces from slats/flaps being deployed will change the control column feel, I have wondered from day 1 whether having MCAS disabled when flaps are out was a tacit admission by Boeing that MCAS activation might be dangerous at low altitude.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:32 pm

par13del wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Add change of go-around procedure: no full cleanup, thrust and climb limitation, more noise; add flying entire approach below flap extension speed. Generally the same effect - significant disturbance of traffic pattern - probably not a big deal in a smaller airport. Is there a smaller diversion airport anywhere near LHR?

So would throwing the cut-off switches make the go around and landing more difficult than the noise and speed issue?
I take it we will now be regarding this as an emergency procedure?


It would be slightly more difficult but should be well within the abilities of an 737 Type rated Pilot to do. It should not be regarded as an Emergency procedure.

It should be second nature to any 737 Pilot if they have the proper level of training in lesser types that rely on Manual trim.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:35 pm

hivue wrote:
par13del wrote:
oschkosch wrote:
So how come Boeing has not thought about this then? Obviously there must be more to mcas than we all know?

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I guess we have information overload, but the documents released from day one has stated that autopilot engaged and flaps down disables MCAS.


The reason for the existence of MCAS is to provide control column focres that meet the regulations in parts of the envelope where those forces get too light.in the MAX. The AP obviously doesn't need any particular "control column feel" so no need for MCAS when it is on.

Although changed aerodynamic forces from slats/flaps being deployed will change the control column feel, I have wondered from day 1 whether having MCAS disabled when flaps are out was a tacit admission by Boeing that MCAS activation might be dangerous at low altitude.


Normal MCAS activation would have just brought the AOA down - but you would still be climbing - MCAS failure uncorrected is what is dangerous at low altitudes as that could point you at the ground.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:43 pm

morrisond wrote:
par13del wrote:
morrisond wrote:

On the NG and MAX there is nothing in there certification that that says you can't fly the whole flight with Manual trim if you choose too.

I suspect the procedure will be the same with MCAS V2.0 - but who knows - it may include an instruction to land at the nearest suitable airport.
.

Why continue on, its a question I had from the first Lion Air encounter with MCAS, once they resolved the issue and turned off the automation why continue the commercial flight, why did they not return to base? Is trim such a trivial issue for pax comfort that manual trim is seen as no big deal?


It shouldn't be that big of a deal. Assuming you stick to a normal flight profile - Manual trimming the aircraft to keep it in trim is totally doable and you can read reports on here and other forums of Pilots who do this routinely (Fly an entire flight with Manual Trim) to stay sharp. It's good airmanship.

The passengers would never know if the plane was in trim or out of trim - just whether or not it's descending or climbing.


The moment the aircraft is significantly out of trim the manual trim wheel will not work. You will need the roller coaster approach. Known about since the 737 Jurassic. You will need height and space to do that.

It is well established that the manual trim wheel on the 737 does not work throughout the flight envelope. It was made worse in the NG with decreasing the diameter of the wheel. But it seems so conveniently to ignore this fact, does it not morrisond?
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 2:47 pm

par13del wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Add change of go-around procedure: no full cleanup, thrust and climb limitation, more noise; add flying entire approach below flap extension speed. Generally the same effect - significant disturbance of traffic pattern - probably not a big deal in a smaller airport. Is there a smaller diversion airport anywhere near LHR?

So would throwing the cut-off switches make the go around and landing more difficult than the noise and speed issue?
I take it we will now be regarding this as an emergency procedure?

I am not talking about emergency response, I am talking about handling situations when any of MCAS-related components develop problems, e.g. AoA disagree. These will stay with MAX until last of them retires to soda can plant.
In a situation like that, proactive procedures eliminating possibility of extreme AoA unstable flying are required. That should include:
- landing as soon as practical, with abnormal approach profile and abnormal go-around procedure. Would disturb traffic pattern at a busy airport.
-slow down and flaps out . Forget about ETOPS: an a situation like this, fuel burn goes up, so there will be no enough gas for HNL from mid-point, need to be close to the airport. This is not engine-out operation - ETOPS not affected strictly speaking, but somewhat similar as it dictates range to diversion airport, hence effectively caps ETOPS options.
Maybe something else?
Lack of ETOPS range is likely to trigger some interesting consequences, Hawaii and transatlantic ops come to mind...
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Sun Jan 12, 2020 3:01 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
morrisond wrote:
par13del wrote:
Why continue on, its a question I had from the first Lion Air encounter with MCAS, once they resolved the issue and turned off the automation why continue the commercial flight, why did they not return to base? Is trim such a trivial issue for pax comfort that manual trim is seen as no big deal?


It shouldn't be that big of a deal. Assuming you stick to a normal flight profile - Manual trimming the aircraft to keep it in trim is totally doable and you can read reports on here and other forums of Pilots who do this routinely (Fly an entire flight with Manual Trim) to stay sharp. It's good airmanship.

The passengers would never know if the plane was in trim or out of trim - just whether or not it's descending or climbing.


The moment the aircraft is significantly out of trim the manual trim wheel will not work. You will need the roller coaster approach. Known about since the 737 Jurassic. You will need height and space to do that.

It is well established that the manual trim wheel on the 737 does not work throughout the flight envelope. It was made worse in the NG with decreasing the diameter of the wheel. But it seems so conveniently to ignore this fact, does it not morrisond?


What does what we were talking about above have to do with the plane being significantly out of trim? We were talking about whether or not you could fly an 737 with Manual trim in the normal operating range and continue to destination.

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