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Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:01 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
Interested wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:

I can agree that Boeing should have hit the brakes after the first crash. And had they been informed about the persistent issue with the aircraft then they may have been able to intervene. Sadly that didn't happen. My issue is that people are excusing poor airmanship and maintenance practices. There is enough blame for all three parties. We know first hand that a skilled crew was able to overcome the trim issues and land safely. It's a shame they didn't send out a mass email on their company intranet. We also know that the Ethiopian crew didn't follow procedure. And even as just a general aviation pilot, if I wrote up a plane with a serious maintenance issue I am going to demand proof that the work was completed and a test flight was performed before I take it up again. Why Lion Air pilots continued to accept an aircraft that had been written up multiple times for the same issue is mind blowing. You can sit there and put all the blame on Boeing but you are doing an incredible disservice to the flying public when you ignore the other issues. Both Boeing and Airbus are concerned with the lack of proper training in some nations. Why doesn't that concern you?


The aftermath of poor maintenance and poor flying is such a minor part in the bigger picture though

And something that great plane design and planning is supposed to try to deal with and overcome

Poor flight maintenance and poor flying is something we have to accept and plan for sadly

Great plane design and great safety callbacks and features can do their best to negate it

We all accept that Max is the exact opposite of a great plane design in its present form

Even the Boeing personnel involved in designing it knew that from an early stage

So I'm not sure what we really gain by talking about maintenance of pilot decisions good or bad. As they are such a small part in this problem in comparison?


Oh ok. So bad pilots and bad maintenance are a fact of life we must deal with but it is unacceptable to have a flawed aircraft design. Got it.


Yes that's exactly what I am saying and I would expect the new CEO of Boeing to agree with me

They are facts of life you have to build safety fallbacks in to cover

Anything involving human intervention anywhere in the world is prone to error and mistakes

Boeing have shown that themselves internally multiple times with decisions they have taken

It's a fact of life humans are error prone no matter how well trained they are

So products have to be designed to account and negate human error. Not just for safety but for all manner of reasons.

Boeing should realise more than anyone right now that they cannot afford design flaws as the consequences are catastrophic for human lives AND their profits
 
flipdewaf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:05 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
Interested wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:

I can agree that Boeing should have hit the brakes after the first crash. And had they been informed about the persistent issue with the aircraft then they may have been able to intervene. Sadly that didn't happen. My issue is that people are excusing poor airmanship and maintenance practices. There is enough blame for all three parties. We know first hand that a skilled crew was able to overcome the trim issues and land safely. It's a shame they didn't send out a mass email on their company intranet. We also know that the Ethiopian crew didn't follow procedure. And even as just a general aviation pilot, if I wrote up a plane with a serious maintenance issue I am going to demand proof that the work was completed and a test flight was performed before I take it up again. Why Lion Air pilots continued to accept an aircraft that had been written up multiple times for the same issue is mind blowing. You can sit there and put all the blame on Boeing but you are doing an incredible disservice to the flying public when you ignore the other issues. Both Boeing and Airbus are concerned with the lack of proper training in some nations. Why doesn't that concern you?


The aftermath of poor maintenance and poor flying is such a minor part in the bigger picture though

And something that great plane design and planning is supposed to try to deal with and overcome

Poor flight maintenance and poor flying is something we have to accept and plan for sadly

Great plane design and great safety callbacks and features can do their best to negate it

We all accept that Max is the exact opposite of a great plane design in its present form

Even the Boeing personnel involved in designing it knew that from an early stage

So I'm not sure what we really gain by talking about maintenance of pilot decisions good or bad. As they are such a small part in this problem in comparison?


Oh ok. So bad pilots and bad maintenance are a fact of life we must deal with but it is unacceptable to have a flawed aircraft design. Got it.


No, that's a strawman. 'Bad' is an opinion with no measurable quantity implied which one could also describe and excellent but not quite perfect with the exact same level of truthfulness. All aircraft are also flawed but it is the level of flaws that we must assess and manage.

The aviation transport system as a whole (without the MAX) has a certain level of risk with the current maintenance and airmanship standards, with the addition of the max to the aviation transport system this level of risk has increased. If the increase in risk associated with the addition of the MAX to the aviation transport system can be mitigated by increasing the piloting and maintenance standards (at a cost) then why should the aviation transport system as a whole pay for that when those same available resources could have a higher impact on safety when placed elsewhere?

Unless of course you think that with a limited amount of resource available you don't want the safest system possible just to keep the MAX flying...which really would be an extreme view to take.

Fred
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:10 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
I'm not sure what else you expect them to say. The last Time Boeing's management dared excericse their first amendment rights and keep the public informed, Dickson went on a rant. So now, like anyone under duress, they will say whatever gets them them less beatings.


First amendment rights? Your default position always seems to be that everyone has got it in for Boeing.

Dickson asked Boeing to stop keep putting out fantasy RTS dates. Boeing is still putting out RTS guidance, but now it seems a bit more realistic, instead of "Next week." "Still next week." "Hopefully next week." "Meh, maybe the week after next?", we now have mid-summer 2020.

You seem to have missed answering the question - do you have any evidence the FAA is not doing a proper job now?
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TTailedTiger
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:15 am

flipdewaf wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Interested wrote:

The aftermath of poor maintenance and poor flying is such a minor part in the bigger picture though

And something that great plane design and planning is supposed to try to deal with and overcome

Poor flight maintenance and poor flying is something we have to accept and plan for sadly

Great plane design and great safety callbacks and features can do their best to negate it

We all accept that Max is the exact opposite of a great plane design in its present form

Even the Boeing personnel involved in designing it knew that from an early stage

So I'm not sure what we really gain by talking about maintenance of pilot decisions good or bad. As they are such a small part in this problem in comparison?


Oh ok. So bad pilots and bad maintenance are a fact of life we must deal with but it is unacceptable to have a flawed aircraft design. Got it.


No, that's a strawman. 'Bad' is an opinion with no measurable quantity implied which one could also describe and excellent but not quite perfect with the exact same level of truthfulness. All aircraft are also flawed but it is the level of flaws that we must assess and manage.

The aviation transport system as a whole (without the MAX) has a certain level of risk with the current maintenance and airmanship standards, with the addition of the max to the aviation transport system this level of risk has increased. If the increase in risk associated with the addition of the MAX to the aviation transport system can be mitigated by increasing the piloting and maintenance standards (at a cost) then why should the aviation transport system as a whole pay for that when those same available resources could have a higher impact on safety when placed elsewhere?

Unless of course you think that with a limited amount of resource available you don't want the safest system possible just to keep the MAX flying...which really would be an extreme view to take.

Fred


Of course I want the Max to be as safe as possible. But I also don't think poor pilot trainy and maintenance practices should be ignored. Someone who can't keep a C172 straight and level has no business in a passenger jet. Developing countries are experiencing huge booms in air travel demand and putting warm bodies with minimal training in a 737 or A320 is not a good idea. It takes years to develop a good pilot. Working your way up through single engine airplanes and ratings is the way to do it. Throwing a newbie into a simulator and then immediately to on the job training is a recipe for disaster.
 
TTailedTiger
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:18 am

scbriml wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
I'm not sure what else you expect them to say. The last Time Boeing's management dared excericse their first amendment rights and keep the public informed, Dickson went on a rant. So now, like anyone under duress, they will say whatever gets them them less beatings.


First amendment rights? Your default position always seems to be that everyone has got it in for Boeing.

Dickson asked Boeing to stop keep putting out fantasy RTS dates. Boeing is still putting out RTS guidance, but now it seems a bit more realistic, instead of "Next week." "Still next week." "Hopefully next week." "Meh, maybe the week after next?", we now have mid-summer 2020.

You seem to have missed answering the question - do you have any evidence the FAA is not doing a proper job now?


Yes I answered that. They are putting the needs of outside agencies ahead of US airlines, employees, and consumers. It's none of their business what the EASA does with the Max. Even if it were never to fly in the EU again, it's still not their concern. That's between Boeing and the EASA to figure out.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:27 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:

Oh ok. So bad pilots and bad maintenance are a fact of life we must deal with but it is unacceptable to have a flawed aircraft design. Got it.


No, that's a strawman. 'Bad' is an opinion with no measurable quantity implied which one could also describe and excellent but not quite perfect with the exact same level of truthfulness. All aircraft are also flawed but it is the level of flaws that we must assess and manage.

The aviation transport system as a whole (without the MAX) has a certain level of risk with the current maintenance and airmanship standards, with the addition of the max to the aviation transport system this level of risk has increased. If the increase in risk associated with the addition of the MAX to the aviation transport system can be mitigated by increasing the piloting and maintenance standards (at a cost) then why should the aviation transport system as a whole pay for that when those same available resources could have a higher impact on safety when placed elsewhere?

Unless of course you think that with a limited amount of resource available you don't want the safest system possible just to keep the MAX flying...which really would be an extreme view to take.

Fred


Of course I want the Max to be as safe as possible. But I also don't think poor pilot trainy and maintenance practices should be ignored. Someone who can't keep a C172 straight and level has no business in a passenger jet. Developing countries are experiencing huge booms in air travel demand and putting warm bodies with minimal training in a 737 or A320 is not a good idea. It takes years to develop a good pilot. Working your way up through single engine airplanes and ratings is the way to do it. Throwing a newbie into a simulator and then immediately to on the job training is a recipe for disaster.

You know what was the most entertaining fact on this forum for me, as an industry outsider, but still linked to high technology work?
It is number of people who pose - and are reasonably accepted - as experienced professional aviators from large companies, who, upon closer examination, struggle to find their ass using two upper limbs.
Looks like a lot of work to keep things going is not seen, and often not appreciated, by equipment operators, who still gladly collect the credit for smooth and safe operation.
 
flipdewaf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:30 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:

Oh ok. So bad pilots and bad maintenance are a fact of life we must deal with but it is unacceptable to have a flawed aircraft design. Got it.


No, that's a strawman. 'Bad' is an opinion with no measurable quantity implied which one could also describe and excellent but not quite perfect with the exact same level of truthfulness. All aircraft are also flawed but it is the level of flaws that we must assess and manage.

The aviation transport system as a whole (without the MAX) has a certain level of risk with the current maintenance and airmanship standards, with the addition of the max to the aviation transport system this level of risk has increased. If the increase in risk associated with the addition of the MAX to the aviation transport system can be mitigated by increasing the piloting and maintenance standards (at a cost) then why should the aviation transport system as a whole pay for that when those same available resources could have a higher impact on safety when placed elsewhere?

Unless of course you think that with a limited amount of resource available you don't want the safest system possible just to keep the MAX flying...which really would be an extreme view to take.

Fred


Of course I want the Max to be as safe as possible.

I ment the aviation transport system as a whole, not the MAX specifically.
TTailedTiger wrote:
But I also don't think poor pilot trainy and maintenance practices should be ignored.

Absolutely not, what bearing would this have for the increased level of risk for the MAX over other aircraft?

TTailedTiger wrote:
Someone who can't keep a C172 straight and level has no business in a passenger jet.

Do you have any evidence that that is the case or should we assume that is a lie opinion?
TTailedTiger wrote:
Developing countries are experiencing huge booms in air travel demand and putting warm bodies with minimal training in a 737 or A320 is not a good idea.

Reagardless, there is a significant difference in risk between the MAX and other aircraft, those minimally trained pilots seem not to have caused the deadly crash rate in other aircraft, are the only putting them in the MAX?

TTailedTiger wrote:
It takes years to develop a good pilot. Working your way up through single engine airplanes and ratings is the way to do it. Throwing a newbie into a simulator and then immediately to on the job training is a recipe for disaster.
Which of course you will either show evidence for the other aircraft having a similar crash rate to the MAX because of this, admit that you are wrong and that the MAX has a significant increase in the risk or redact the statements.

up to you...

Fred
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TTailedTiger
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:37 am

flipdewaf wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:

No, that's a strawman. 'Bad' is an opinion with no measurable quantity implied which one could also describe and excellent but not quite perfect with the exact same level of truthfulness. All aircraft are also flawed but it is the level of flaws that we must assess and manage.

The aviation transport system as a whole (without the MAX) has a certain level of risk with the current maintenance and airmanship standards, with the addition of the max to the aviation transport system this level of risk has increased. If the increase in risk associated with the addition of the MAX to the aviation transport system can be mitigated by increasing the piloting and maintenance standards (at a cost) then why should the aviation transport system as a whole pay for that when those same available resources could have a higher impact on safety when placed elsewhere?

Unless of course you think that with a limited amount of resource available you don't want the safest system possible just to keep the MAX flying...which really would be an extreme view to take.

Fred


Of course I want the Max to be as safe as possible.

I ment the aviation transport system as a whole, not the MAX specifically.
TTailedTiger wrote:
But I also don't think poor pilot trainy and maintenance practices should be ignored.

Absolutely not, what bearing would this have for the increased level of risk for the MAX over other aircraft?

TTailedTiger wrote:
Someone who can't keep a C172 straight and level has no business in a passenger jet.

Do you have any evidence that that is the case or should we assume that is a lie opinion?
TTailedTiger wrote:
Developing countries are experiencing huge booms in air travel demand and putting warm bodies with minimal training in a 737 or A320 is not a good idea.

Reagardless, there is a significant difference in risk between the MAX and other aircraft, those minimally trained pilots seem not to have caused the deadly crash rate in other aircraft, are the only putting them in the MAX?

TTailedTiger wrote:
It takes years to develop a good pilot. Working your way up through single engine airplanes and ratings is the way to do it. Throwing a newbie into a simulator and then immediately to on the job training is a recipe for disaster.
Which of course you will either show evidence for the other aircraft having a similar crash rate to the MAX because of this, admit that you are wrong and that the MAX has a significant increase in the risk or redact the statements.

up to you...

Fred


Evidence? India alone has a massive problem with pilot training. Hundreds of pilots were caught with falsified records and fake degrees. And no it's not just the Max. Lion Air has crashed the NG as well and Air Asia pilots crashed a perfectly good A320. A good pilot would know not to go around pulling circuit breakers when you have no idea what the outcome will be. Have you never heard the expression "they could tear up an anvil"?
 
Asiaflyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:37 am

virage wrote:
Chemist wrote:
This is going to make a hell of a Harvard Business Review Case Study series one day.


Yes, but it won't make an iota of difference so long as the Market rewards quarterly performance.

It is soon enough of bad stuff for a whole MBA program and its getting worse by the week.

Too easy to balme on quarterly performance only. Much of what has happened is due to poor decisions on multiple management levels and lack of internal transparency of processes and its roles in the bigger picture. Pressure and demand from Sales department to compete with competitors often has a significant impact on quality and design as well.
 
flipdewaf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:48 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:

Of course I want the Max to be as safe as possible.

I ment the aviation transport system as a whole, not the MAX specifically.
TTailedTiger wrote:
But I also don't think poor pilot trainy and maintenance practices should be ignored.

Absolutely not, what bearing would this have for the increased level of risk for the MAX over other aircraft?

TTailedTiger wrote:
Someone who can't keep a C172 straight and level has no business in a passenger jet.

Do you have any evidence that that is the case or should we assume that is a lie opinion?
TTailedTiger wrote:
Developing countries are experiencing huge booms in air travel demand and putting warm bodies with minimal training in a 737 or A320 is not a good idea.

Reagardless, there is a significant difference in risk between the MAX and other aircraft, those minimally trained pilots seem not to have caused the deadly crash rate in other aircraft, are the only putting them in the MAX?

TTailedTiger wrote:
It takes years to develop a good pilot. Working your way up through single engine airplanes and ratings is the way to do it. Throwing a newbie into a simulator and then immediately to on the job training is a recipe for disaster.
Which of course you will either show evidence for the other aircraft having a similar crash rate to the MAX because of this, admit that you are wrong and that the MAX has a significant increase in the risk or redact the statements.

up to you...

Fred


Evidence? India alone has a massive problem with pilot training. Hundreds of pilots were caught with falsified records and fake degrees. And no it's not just the Max. Lion Air has crashed the NG as well and Air Asia pilots crashed a perfectly good A320. A good pilot would know not to go around pulling circuit breakers when you have no idea what the outcome will be. Have you never heard the expression "they could tear up an anvil"?

You have shown evidence that there is scope in increases in pilot training, which of course there likely always will be, this however is not what I asked for evidence of, I feel you might know what I have asked for evidence of but you are evading providing it. The evidence requested was for the other aircraft having a similar crash rate to the MAX because of this. i.e. demonstrate that the MAX would see an increase in safety above that which the other aircraft would see and bring its crash record broadly in line with the current (Non Max) system.

Fred
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TTailedTiger
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 10:57 am

flipdewaf wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
I ment the aviation transport system as a whole, not the MAX specifically.

Absolutely not, what bearing would this have for the increased level of risk for the MAX over other aircraft?


Do you have any evidence that that is the case or should we assume that is a lie opinion?

Reagardless, there is a significant difference in risk between the MAX and other aircraft, those minimally trained pilots seem not to have caused the deadly crash rate in other aircraft, are the only putting them in the MAX?

Which of course you will either show evidence for the other aircraft having a similar crash rate to the MAX because of this, admit that you are wrong and that the MAX has a significant increase in the risk or redact the statements.

up to you...

Fred


Evidence? India alone has a massive problem with pilot training. Hundreds of pilots were caught with falsified records and fake degrees. And no it's not just the Max. Lion Air has crashed the NG as well and Air Asia pilots crashed a perfectly good A320. A good pilot would know not to go around pulling circuit breakers when you have no idea what the outcome will be. Have you never heard the expression "they could tear up an anvil"?

You have shown evidence that there is scope in increases in pilot training, which of course there likely always will be, this however is not what I asked for evidence of, I feel you might know what I have asked for evidence of but you are evading providing it. The evidence requested was for the other aircraft having a similar crash rate to the MAX because of this.

Fred


Ok I have no idea what you are getting at. I never claimed the Max wasn't flawed or had a higher crash rate. I made that very clear. I challenge you to find where I said there was nothing wrong with the Max. What I said was that putting all of the blame on the Max and not addressing shortcomings in pilot training and maintenance practices was doing a disservice to the public. If Airbus thinks there's a problem with pilot training, why don't you?
 
art
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 11:17 am

Interested wrote:
The real scary bit is the lengths Boeing went to to stop the groundings though not just after the first crash but even after the second crash

That's where you can't excuse some of what has happened surely?

And its why so few people in and out of the industry have any trust in Boeing right now


For me, Boeing's attempts to manipulate and to cover up the story behind two terrible air crashes have created a MAXgate saga. I no longer trust them to be open or honest if they perceive such behaviour to be to their disadvantage financially.

PS I am not too impressed by their financial acumen either - had Boeing come clean after the first crash, my guess is the company would have ended up tens of billions of dollars better off than they now will be.
 
cuban8
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 11:21 am

The latest developments makes me think that the MAX will RTS in a year or so. Now that it seems like Boeing pretty much missed the important summer season RTS, I think it will relieve some pressure from the workers for a rushed RTS. With that “extra” time, the engineers should bring a more mature and non-rushed solution for the MAX.
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planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 11:27 am

Ertro wrote:
hivue wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Why would Boeing design MCAS for a 10 second cycle duration, when you expect them to shut it down after three seconds (because that in Boeings mind would constitute to a trim runaway). Let alone design it for multiple 10 second cycles (MCAS 1.0 that is). By designing in the 10 second MCAS cycle, Boeing shot down their own rather ridiculous 3 second assumption. And with that their MCAS FMEA went totally down the drain.


I think what Boeing assumed was pilots would take 3 sec to recognize a runaway pitch trim situation. What makes you think Boeing, or anyone else, would consider 3 sec or less of trim activity to constitute runaway pitch trim?


For the original MCAS design to make any sense and achieve what is was built to do in the real intended activation situation Boeing would have had to assume pilots would not notice at all what is going on for at least 10 seconds or many multiples of the 10 seconds.


MCAS was never intended to operate for more than one cycle. The reset was one of the unintended behaviors. It was intended to reset after the event because under a normal activation a pilot wouldn't trim opposite because the stick forces wouldn't be getting stronger than normal.

Although there is a bit of a contradiction in recognizing a runaway in 3 seconds but allowing a 10 second cycle, you could make the case that, other than the trim wheel spinning, there is no adverse behavior during an intended activation.

Recognizing a runaway in 3 seconds is not necessarily the same thing as noticing the trim wheel moving for 3 seconds. I agree this could have/should have been clarified in the documentation. A runaway stabilizer will always involve a distinct change in control force required.
 
phollingsworth
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 11:34 am

Ertro wrote:
hivue wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Why would Boeing design MCAS for a 10 second cycle duration, when you expect them to shut it down after three seconds (because that in Boeings mind would constitute to a trim runaway). Let alone design it for multiple 10 second cycles (MCAS 1.0 that is). By designing in the 10 second MCAS cycle, Boeing shot down their own rather ridiculous 3 second assumption. And with that their MCAS FMEA went totally down the drain.


I think what Boeing assumed was pilots would take 3 sec to recognize a runaway pitch trim situation. What makes you think Boeing, or anyone else, would consider 3 sec or less of trim activity to constitute runaway pitch trim?


For the original MCAS design to make any sense and achieve what is was built to do in the real intended activation situation Boeing would have had to assume pilots would not notice at all what is going on for at least 10 seconds or many multiples of the 10 seconds.


I have read this thread a number of times and it seems that people have missed the purpose of MCAS, or Speed and Mach Trim in the first place. The idea is that these systems trim, in some cases counter to the pilots actions, for long periods of time, in perfectly normal operation. It is also expected that pilots will reasonably be able to identify fail active situations in these systems. Is this an acceptable design philosophy? That is a general question that has to be asked, but in general it can be and it may not be. If the fact that an aircraft trims against pilot controls in some situations to provide increased stability is unacceptable in the most basic sense you will need to ground the entire modern fleet.

The purpose of the original MCAS implementation was specifically to increase the effective manoeuvre stability of the 737MAX. This means it was to increase the effective control force per g in very specific high bank, high AoA turns. Hence why the system is called 'Manoeuvre Characteristics Augmentation System'. In this mode it runs at the flaps-up trim rates and is intermittent. I don't know why it is intermittent one reason may be that the flaps-up rates may actually be too high for what the system needs; therefore, continuous operation would kill the ability of the pilot to manoeuvre inside the Normal and Operational Flight Envelopes – not a good thing.

MCAS in the 1g scenario is a different beast. Why would you have it? It doesn't provide speed stability in any meaningful manner. The reason for this is that it is based on AoA and not airspeed, besides the Speed Trim System does this already and could easily have been modified using higher rates if necessary. It won't fix the issue that trimming nose-down reduces the average control force to speed gradient. This is what the elevator feel system is designed to do. It provides increased control forces as the speed changes from the trimmed speed. The basic idea is that as you slow down to approach stall, the system makes the yoke heavier for any given angle from 'centre' and the angle required from centre increases. The result is that as you slow if you release the controls the aircraft will go back to a faster speed than your started (at least initially), and it becomes harder to hold the current speed or slow it down even more. Adding high-rate MCAS inputs to this does nothing to help the situation.

MCAS @ 1g is all about the area between approach to stall, stall, and post-stall, but likely really about countering things in the latter two areas. In the approach to stall the CL to AoA relationship becomes non-linear. This means that the relationship between V and AoA also changes. Remember, as you slow down the required increase in CL to maintain 1g flight for a 1knot decreases increases. Once the CL to AoA slope starts to decrease the AoA increase happens even faster. This should help you avoid stall as you would have to pull back harder and harder to just get the next knot of speed decrease. Unfortunately, for all swept wing-body aircraft the slope of aircraft Cm (moment coefficient) goes from negative to positive at high AoAs. This means it actually becomes easier over time, ie bad. Further, since the CL to AoA of these wing bodies is often quite flat throughout stall it is quite possible to approach stall, loose the natural nose-down response at stall, and in the worst case make it quite easy for the pilot to either hold the aircraft in a stall or actually deepen it. If the aircraft is T-tail you run the risk of getting into a spot where you just can't get the nose down (true deep stall). Depending on the exact characteristics of the aircraft you either want to get no-where near stall or make it very easy for the pilot to know the aircraft is stalled and release back pressure. Ideally you want the pilot to push forward. It is even better if they cannot keep the nose up even when applying full back pressure. We have lost quite a few aircraft to pilots who don't 'let go'.

Speed Trim in the NGs is design to make it so that the aircraft will either want to nose down when the yoke is released, or automatically nose down even with back yoke. When this is combined with the elevator feel system (and a working radar altimeter). It is probably quite good at exiting a stall. If STS only fires in a situation where it is assumed the aircraft is 'stalled', based on V, g-loading, and AoA. Then you don't really worry about many fail active situations as these are well outside the normal and operational flight envelope. However, if by a design flaw or design feature it can activate inside the normal and operational flight envelope fail-safe operation is critical (see stick pusher). The question that isn't fully answered is is MCAS at 1g meant to be a more aggressive Stall ID like the NGs STS or a pseudo-stick pusher. Also, if STS was moved to higher rates and was continuous would pilots have been able to ID a runaway and counter in sufficient time?
 
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PITingres
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 11:48 am

I see we're back to the "In this thread, one must only talk about how bad the airplane is" meme. How tiresome.

I won't beat my head against that particular wall except to say that you people who seem to think that blame for the crashes must be an indivisible thing, are doing safety a grave disservice.
Fly, you fools! Fly!
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 12:02 pm

PITingres wrote:
I see we're back to the "In this thread, one must only talk about how bad the airplane is" meme. How tiresome.

I won't beat my head against that particular wall except to say that you people who seem to think that blame for the crashes must be an indivisible thing, are doing safety a grave disservice.

Of course. Pilots and maintenance are easy go-to targets. Deeper analysis shows training shortfall is significantly on Boeing and FAA, maintenance is significantly affected by the same.
At the end of the day, MCAS design is only a tip of an iceberg. It is not bad airplane, it is structural problem at Boeing. That's why fixing airplane proves so difficult - company needs to be fixed first
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 1:15 pm

TTailedTiger wrote:
scbriml wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Why isn't the FAA giving us any details? What are they hiding?


What makes you think they’re hiding something? You really think everyone’s got it in for Boeing, don’t you?

MSPNWA wrote:

Shhhh. Don't criticize the FAA. They are worthy of only our praise and respect. . .


The FAA were rightly criticised for their lack of oversight and acceptance of everything Boeing told them in respect of MAX certification. Now they’re doing a proper job. Why is that wrong?

MSPNWA wrote:

Smear it however you want. The potential is real, and it must be acknowledged. And it doesn't have to be about just DL. It could be about not liking Boeing.


Conspiracy and paranoia - why do you think everyone’s got it in for Boeing?


How do you know they are doing a proper job now? They've told us absolutely nothing. I have no confidence from an agency that cares about global perception. Their responsibility is to US citizens. The aviation authorities of other countries should take it upon themselves to certify the Max.


You are completely wrong in one point. The responsibility of the FAA is not to USA citizen, but to insure that Boeing designs and produces save frames.

With 10% of the production going to the USA, it would be catastrophic if the MAX would be certified by the FAA for the USA and the other agencies in the world will not accept that certification.
Boeing would drop like a stone, investors would leaf in droves and we would see Boeing in chapter 11.

If any thing, they FAA is desperately protecting Boeing and if they are quiet, it is because the unvarnished truth would be devastating for Boeing.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 1:42 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
asdf wrote:
but I am sure they found a few ways to ensure aerodynamic stability for the 737MAX during their test runs
but couldn't go that way because of the higher fuel burn

if this is true
this would be my way now

... I did not remember any story about a successful aerodynamic only approach to make the 737-8/9 MAX comply with the regulation, regardless of the efficiency. ....


we all do not know ANY approach to make the 737MAX comply, do we?

this informations are not public
so we only can suspect something

and I suspect that the largest airplane builder of the world is able to build a plane with flawless aerodynamics, even if the engines can not be mounted in the optimal COT, COG and else.

they only failed because additionally they wanted the very good economics and no training for the crew
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 1:57 pm

Jayafe wrote:

Bad pilots (which is not the case) dont crash planes.

Poor maintenance (which is not the case, not ideal as most) doesnt crash planes.

Flawed designs do crash planes. And it is indeed unacceptable.


Wait, what? ALL 3 of those things can, and have absolutely crashed planes in the past, unless I am totally misunderstanding what you are trying to say.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 2:03 pm

TTailedTiger wrote:
Yes I'm willing to admit I like Boeing. I know quite a few brilliant minds that work there and am good friends with a couple of them. Why won't you admit you are very biased against Boeing? I admit there needs to be changes and many improvements. You've never had one good thing to say about them and make numerous assumptions. Anyone who thinks Boeing set out to kill people cannot expect others to take them seriously.



Do you form your opinion on the FAA and the job their doing on your own or did you come to it on the back of conversations with your friends who are working at Boeing? I can understand that within Boeing there could be a siege mentality developing that everyone is out to get them, but much like others you fail to see that the responsibility lies only in one place for the MAX saga.


PITingres wrote:
I see we're back to the "In this thread, one must only talk about how bad the airplane is" meme. How tiresome.

I won't beat my head against that particular wall except to say that you people who seem to think that blame for the crashes must be an indivisible thing, are doing safety a grave disservice.


If Boeing cannot deliver a aircraft that sub standard pilots from 3rd world countries can operate at the same level of safety as either their own products or the competitors, then they shouldn't be in the business to begin with. We can look at the pilots all we want but the problem will always be, why isn't the A320 or the 737NG crashing every few months in those countries? Boeing set the standard for safety and they are struggling to be kept to their own standards. Trying to look for outside forces for blame for this is childish and makes we want to beat my head against a wall.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 2:05 pm

travelsonic wrote:
Jayafe wrote:

Bad pilots (which is not the case) dont crash planes.

Poor maintenance (which is not the case, not ideal as most) doesnt crash planes.

Flawed designs do crash planes. And it is indeed unacceptable.


Wait, what? ALL 3 of those things can, and have absolutely crashed planes in the past, unless I am totally misunderstanding what you are trying to say.



Bad pilots is a constant across the landscape, not specific for the max.
Poor maintenance is a constant across the landscape, not specific for the max.

Flawed designs is the one aspect specific to the max, the increased rate of failure vs other aircraft is 100% imputable to the max flawed design decisions. end of the story.

In absolute terms many factors contributed to the 2 crashes, pilots whether maintenance, etc, etc, etc. but all things being the same it only resulted in a crach with the MAX
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 2:15 pm

TTailedTiger wrote:
Yes I answered that. They are putting the needs of outside agencies ahead of US airlines, employees, and consumers. It's none of their business what the EASA does with the Max. Even if it were never to fly in the EU again, it's still not their concern. That's between Boeing and the EASA to figure out.


That isn't evidence that the FAA is not doing their job properly. :shakehead: Because the FAA isn't putting the needs of others ahead of anything. Their responsibility, in the light of their previous failings in certifying MAX, is to ensure that Boeing is able to produce a safe plane. The more we learn, the harder that job is looking.

A globally agreed RTS is actually significantly better for Boeing than a piecemeal one and it's an approach that Boeing seems to support. It makes everything much more straightforward for them, not least because US-based customers represent a minority of total MAX sales.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 2:33 pm

seahawk wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
SFOtoORD wrote:

Why should they? The plane poses no risk to the public on the ground. And it will be recertified when it’s been fully tested and accepted by the relevant authorities.


No, they are a public agency. We have the right to know what is going on. This isn't some military project. If they are just sitting on recertification then we need to know about it. Either the new MCAS works or it doesn't. They've had more than enough time to evaluate it. The NTSB does a much better job of being transparent.


You do not seem to get the 2 sides of a regulator.

1. the publice side

This is the side where it serves the direct interest of the public and full public disclosure has to be applied. That happend when they grounded the plane and happens every time when they confirm that they can not yet unground the plane.

2. the side working with the OEMs

This is the confidential side. Questions, noted problems or ideas shared between the 2 parties have to stay between those 2 parties.


Bears repeating. There's a lot of folks in here who don't see to understand whose side the FAA is on and should be on. They arguably strayed far from that when they certified the MAX. And apparently now simply acting as a regulator watching out for the public interest is so offensive to some. The last thing the FAA should be is a rubber stamp.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 3:55 pm

scbriml wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Yes I answered that. They are putting the needs of outside agencies ahead of US airlines, employees, and consumers. It's none of their business what the EASA does with the Max. Even if it were never to fly in the EU again, it's still not their concern. That's between Boeing and the EASA to figure out.


That isn't evidence that the FAA is not doing their job properly. :shakehead: Because the FAA isn't putting the needs of others ahead of anything. Their responsibility, in the light of their previous failings in certifying MAX, is to ensure that Boeing is able to produce a safe plane. The more we learn, the harder that job is looking.

A globally agreed RTS is actually significantly better for Boeing than a piecemeal one and it's an approach that Boeing seems to support. It makes everything much more straightforward for them, not least because US-based customers represent a minority of total MAX sales.


Strictly speaking the FAAs jurisdiction and area of interest only covers the US and those countries with which the US has certification/validation harmonisation bilaterals. Of course that is quite broad and includes the EU, Japan, Canada, and others.

Keep in mind that the increasing delegation and designation to Boeing and others over the last several years has been driven as much by politics external to the FAA as internal. The FAA does not charge separately for certification, unlike most foreign counterparts. Therefore, as a certification review/assessment requires more time it will either take much longer or the FAA has to farm it back to the people asking for it. The key in this, of course, is to maintain proper oversight. However, this is much easier said than done.

It is natural for a national aviation authority to cheerlead for those systems it has certified/agreed in principle to certify and the processes and tests these are based on. Every country does this to a greater or lesser extent. Once the FAA agreed in principle to the MAX certification programme, it would be an advocate of this programme externally.

As for why we are seeing such a long RTS process for the MAX. It will be down to several things, including:
1. The realisation that MCAS and similar systems are more hazardous than previously assessed. This means that the design of these must change.
2. The changes in MCAS are effecting other systems that in the original implementation were not effected, eg the bit flip issue in the FCCs and the resulting software rewrites
3. The FAA, and other regulators', lack of trust in Boeing – Things that were accepted in cert programmes in the past will get new looks
4. The pressure not to use designee's. This will greatly reduce the number of people that can review everything. Even if the FAA goes to hire new cert engineers they cannot be stood-up overnight
5. The FAAs unwillingness to accept things that other regulators don't accept. IF MCAS 1g is only about stall ID, then in the past the FAA wouldn't care that it's there. However EASA does
6. The possibility that the review has identified other weaknesses in aspects of the 737 design and training that in the past would have been fixed in service but now are needed for RTS

This will be compounded by things at Boeing and its suppliers. Especially around documentation of older/legacy systems. In some cases these have been reclassified based on the new FMA and hazard analyses or the changed driven by MCAS2.0
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 4:03 pm

Res Boeing predicting return to service. The recently announced date was required as they report financial results and disclosures of future expectations, and likely was done after discussion and with the approval of the FAA.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 4:47 pm

Let's please keep this thread on topic and please let's have a serious discussion. Conspiracy theories suggesting the FAA is purposely keeping the MAX grounded to benefit an airline that didn't purchase the aircraft are tinfoil hat nonsense and just serve to derail the discussion.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 4:54 pm

TTailedTiger wrote:
Why isn't the FAA giving us any details? What are they hiding?

Why do you assume that these details would make look Boeing better? Maybe the FAA does Boeing a favor by not publishing more details! Regarding the MAX grounding, anytime "more details" became apparent, Boeing´s brand got damaged more.

TTailedTiger wrote:
How do you know they are doing a proper job now?

From the evidence we have, we would have to ask how do you know the FAA is doing a bad job?

The evidence is, that the FAA is working differently than when the MAX was certified before EIS. That was a bad job and the evidence we now have says, that they are not repeating their mistakes again.
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 5:18 pm

TTailedTiger wrote:
Evidence? India alone has a massive problem with pilot training. Hundreds of pilots were caught with falsified records and fake degrees. And no it's not just the Max. Lion Air has crashed the NG as well and Air Asia pilots crashed a perfectly good A320. A good pilot would know not to go around pulling circuit breakers when you have no idea what the outcome will be. Have you never heard the expression "they could tear up an anvil"?


Nobody is claiming that training is perfect. Nobody is saying that India or Indonesia have top notch training systems.

What we are saying is that in general pilot training worldwide is at such levels that we have a deadly crash in the order of once every 10 - 100 million flight hours on 737NG, 320, 320neo, 777, 787, 350 etc. And that also applies to the not so top notch India and/or Indonesia

MCAS caused the Max to crash once every 0.1 million flight hours.

If you can't see the differences and resulting implications, and don't understand why we should not focus on general pilot training when (although Max type specific training/NG-conversion is a different matter), then I just don't know what to say any more . . . .

Pilot are not in the front end to compensate for inadequate design. That is your recipe for disaster.

Fellow member Astuteman remarked that not one single frame of any new type (nor new model of existing type) introduced since the year 2000 had a deadly crash.
Not one.
But the Max had already TWO deadly crashes within two years of operation since introduced mid 2017.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 5:41 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
Res Boeing predicting return to service. The recently announced date was required as they report financial results and disclosures of future expectations, and likely was done after discussion and with the approval of the FAA.

The wording I read does not lead me to believe this was the case, it sounded to me that Boeing was using an estimate and they decided to pad it out to the summer.
We already had leaks from the FAA and EASA about test flights in January and we know the creation of training manuals have to wait until approval of the software changes which will take another month or two, so Boeing's padding appears to be an educated guess.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 5:48 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Why would Boeing design MCAS for a 10 second cycle duration, when you expect them to shut it down after three seconds (because that in Boeings mind would constitute to a trim runaway). Let alone design it for multiple 10 second cycles (MCAS 1.0 that is). By designing in the 10 second MCAS cycle, Boeing shot down their own rather ridiculous 3 second assumption. And with that their MCAS FMEA went totally down the drain.


Even though it's a red herring, it needs to be debunked anyway. You're improperly mixing together normal and abnormal operations of MCAS and creating an invalid argument. A trim "runaway" isn't a normal operation of the trim. By definition, a runaway is out of control. From what we understand about MCAS, in the designed operation in certain flight envelopes, the trim movement is commanded and under control. The pilot may not even know the trim is moving, and the movement will be expected from a feel perspective. Stick feel - it's the whole point of the regulation requiring MCAS. The amount of time that is required to meet that regulation could very well be ~10 seconds and multiple activations if the situation persists.

If pilots were never told nor trained on MCAS, how would they be able to distinguish between "normal" STS trimming activities, "normal" commanded MCAS activation, and abnormal trimming? By definition, "normal" MCAS activation (as designed) should then be considered as abnormal trimming routine by the crew. See below . . .



On the other hand, the MCAS malfunctions were clearly not moving the stabilizer in an expected, commanded manner. It was working against the pilot's wishes and commands.

Which is a fairly accurate description of *normal* MCAS operation . . .



At this point it doesn't matter if it's software or hardware induced. The trim is "running away" out of control. It is expected at some point to identify that there's a problem with the trim and be able to use the required knowledge to correct it. We can debate whether that should be "3 seconds", but that is a totally separate debate. Either way that didn't happen in many minutes in two out of three flights.

I'm not going to hang on to the three seconds mantra. It could also be four, five or six seconds. The point is that the 10 second activation cycle was expected te be run for the the full duration by design intent (as long as required by flight conditions - unknown to pilots). As MCAS trimming is opposite to STS trimming, any MCAS activation would be contrary to normal NG pilot expectations. We even see this in the Lionair report were one of the pre-accident crews actually made a maintenance write-up that STS was running the wrong way.



I'm still hoping on your answer if you know the difference between "continually" and "continuously" without looking it up. I know I didn't.

I think I have an idea where you are leading to. It would be helpful if you would actually spell that out, to be sure that we are on the same page.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 5:50 pm

cuban8 wrote:
The latest developments makes me think that the MAX will RTS in a year or so. Now that it seems like Boeing pretty much missed the important summer season RTS, I think it will relieve some pressure from the workers for a rushed RTS. With that “extra” time, the engineers should bring a more mature and non-rushed solution for the MAX.

Except that after the November delivery the engineers were not working, it was the "paper pushers" who document the changes who were tasked with reformatting and ensuring everything was as the FAA expected.

Now in the past couple weeks, we had the issue of one of the alternate computers that must now run simultaneously not spinning up as fast as it should. I would say related to the
outcome of the bit flip testing.

The irony in all this is that MCAS 2.0 was delivered in June, we have heard nothing about its failure, we have progressed way beyond MCAS to other areas of the company and the aircraft yet all we still discuss is MCAS in relation to making the a/c safe to fly. The bit flip testing and the FAA and EASA recommendations as a result may eventually turn out to be a bigger boogie man in the RTS than the object which actually caused the fatal crashes.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding News and Reference Thread 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 5:53 pm

Dieuwer wrote:
"Boeing doesn’t expect regulators to sign off on 737 Max until June or July".


......which year ?

[I asked the same question last April].
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding News and Reference Thread 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 5:55 pm

Dieuwer wrote:
"Boeing doesn’t expect regulators to sign off on 737 Max until June or July".

SelseyBill wrote:
......which year ?


2020
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 5:56 pm

TObound wrote:
seahawk wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
No, they are a public agency. We have the right to know what is going on. This isn't some military project. If they are just sitting on recertification then we need to know about it. Either the new MCAS works or it doesn't. They've had more than enough time to evaluate it. The NTSB does a much better job of being transparent.

You do not seem to get the 2 sides of a regulator.
1. the publice side
This is the side where it serves the direct interest of the public and full public disclosure has to be applied. That happend when they grounded the plane and happens every time when they confirm that they can not yet unground the plane.
2. the side working with the OEMs
This is the confidential side. Questions, noted problems or ideas shared between the 2 parties have to stay between those 2 parties.

Bears repeating. There's a lot of folks in here who don't see to understand whose side the FAA is on and should be on. They arguably strayed far from that when they certified the MAX. And apparently now simply acting as a regulator watching out for the public interest is so offensive to some. The last thing the FAA should be is a rubber stamp.


Actually, the FAA wears three different hats at the same time, mostly conflicting each other at some level:
1) Regulator: making the rules (airworthiness, operations, maintenance - for airplanes, operators, airports, ATC, training standards etc);
2) Police and Judge: checking, validating if their own rules are being followed. Sending out punishment (penalties) in case of non-compliance;
3) PR and Marketing: promoting aviation industry.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 5:58 pm

The bit flip testing is a consequence of MCAS failure now having a catastrophic clasification. It is not a random new requirement.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 6:01 pm

seahawk wrote:
The bit flip testing is a consequence of MCAS failure now having a catastrophic clasification. It is not a random new requirement.

Except MCAS happened on two occasions with fatal results and the bit flip has happened...................
So yes, I still believe that at the end of the day, bit flip will be the one that delayed or prevented RTS.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 6:15 pm

par13del wrote:
seahawk wrote:
The bit flip testing is a consequence of MCAS failure now having a catastrophic clasification. It is not a random new requirement.

Except MCAS happened on two occasions with fatal results and the bit flip has happened...................
So yes, I still believe that at the end of the day, bit flip will be the one that delayed or prevented RTS.


No, the RTS is delayed by Boeing making very optimistic judgement calls when defining how critical a MCAS failure would be.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 6:42 pm

par13del wrote:
cuban8 wrote:
The latest developments makes me think that the MAX will RTS in a year or so. Now that it seems like Boeing pretty much missed the important summer season RTS, I think it will relieve some pressure from the workers for a rushed RTS. With that “extra” time, the engineers should bring a more mature and non-rushed solution for the MAX.

Except that after the November delivery the engineers were not working, it was the "paper pushers" who document the changes who were tasked with reformatting and ensuring everything was as the FAA expected.

Now in the past couple weeks, we had the issue of one of the alternate computers that must now run simultaneously not spinning up as fast as it should. I would say related to the
outcome of the bit flip testing.

The irony in all this is that MCAS 2.0 was delivered in June, we have heard nothing about its failure, we have progressed way beyond MCAS to other areas of the company and the aircraft yet all we still discuss is MCAS in relation to making the a/c safe to fly. The bit flip testing and the FAA and EASA recommendations as a result may eventually turn out to be a bigger boogie man in the RTS than the object which actually caused the fatal crashes.

Software 12.1 MCAS authority limit ineffective and therefore still categorised 'Catastrophic' as per Mr Markos leaked email November 6th.
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... m-737-max/

As you have been informed several times, bit flip only became a problem because of the catastrophic categorisation of MCAS and is not a separate problem and is not a new requirement.

Ray
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 6:43 pm

TTailedTiger wrote:
flipdewaf wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:

Evidence? India alone has a massive problem with pilot training. Hundreds of pilots were caught with falsified records and fake degrees. And no it's not just the Max. Lion Air has crashed the NG as well and Air Asia pilots crashed a perfectly good A320. A good pilot would know not to go around pulling circuit breakers when you have no idea what the outcome will be. Have you never heard the expression "they could tear up an anvil"?

You have shown evidence that there is scope in increases in pilot training, which of course there likely always will be, this however is not what I asked for evidence of, I feel you might know what I have asked for evidence of but you are evading providing it. The evidence requested was for the other aircraft having a similar crash rate to the MAX because of this.

Fred


Ok I have no idea what you are getting at. I never claimed the Max wasn't flawed or had a higher crash rate. I made that very clear. I challenge you to find where I said there was nothing wrong with the Max. What I said was that putting all of the blame on the Max and not addressing shortcomings in pilot training and maintenance practices was doing a disservice to the public. If Airbus thinks there's a problem with pilot training, why don't you?

I haven’t said there is no room for pilot improvement but seeing as this is a thread about the deficiencies in an aircraft and hence it’s grounding then this would be the place to discuss that. The non-aircraft specific training issues should surely have its own thread and you may start one of you feel inclined. Improvement of training standard across the board would surely lead to widespread improvement in safety standards but the MAX in its pre grounding condition would still have a higher risk due to its increased likelihood of entering the dangerous condition that was being specially trained for.

Fred


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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 6:49 pm

Trump calls Boeing a 'big, big disappointment'
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/articl ... Davos.html

It's not often that I agree with mister Trump but his judgement is spot on here, a big disappointment indeed. Time to ditch the monster from Seattle for good and make great airplanes again.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding News and Reference Thread 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 7:01 pm

I've seen and read (and don't disagree) a number of blog posts and other business press articles that are starting to suggest the 737-MAX will NEVER fly again. The plane has too many design flaws, there is too much brand and reputational risk, and a growing perception that the plane is simply unsound, nose to tail. Curious as to what others think here. At minimum, as others have point out, the MAX will need a re-branding.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 7:01 pm

par13del wrote:
Except that after the November delivery the engineers were not working, it was the "paper pushers" who document the changes who were tasked with reformatting and ensuring everything was as the FAA expected.

Now in the past couple weeks, we had the issue of one of the alternate computers that must now run simultaneously not spinning up as fast as it should. I would say related to the outcome of the bit flip testing.

From what I read this was found via the software audit held at Collins in Iowa.

par13del wrote:
The irony in all this is that MCAS 2.0 was delivered in June, we have heard nothing about its failure, we have progressed way beyond MCAS to other areas of the company and the aircraft yet all we still discuss is MCAS in relation to making the a/c safe to fly. The bit flip testing and the FAA and EASA recommendations as a result may eventually turn out to be a bigger boogie man in the RTS than the object which actually caused the fatal crashes.

It seems the very next item to be addressed in the milestone graphic we had earlier in this thread was the line pilot evaluation, which pointed out that line pilots were able to recover from a MCAS scenario but were using different approaches to doing so. This in essence was a failed test. It showed the training regime was not producing the desired outcome.

I presume this and the JOEB training requirements have driven the decision to require sim training, and along with that, a general scrubbing of the checklists. Sorting all this out is what I presume extended the time line out by several months. It's all very subjective and thus very hard to predict how long it will take, so they just bumped out the timeline several months with what I presume is a low degree of confidence in it finishing on any particular date.

We also have the issues rising from the FAA asking Boeing to change the 3 second reaction time to 15 seconds, namely the hypothetical short circuit forcing the stab to activate. Maybe this should be viewed as a new activity on the timeline?

Based on a lack of information otherwise, I presume the software audit also is in essence a failure because it found the issue with display state at startup that was not handled properly. Unfortunately none of the media reports really addressed the rest of the software audit so we don't know if they just found this one issue and stopped or if they kept working and found 0..N more issues. It also isn't represented by its own box on the timeline.

Every attempt to step forward seems to have resulted in a step sideways.

It seems if DM wasn't fired back in December due to FAA Administrator calling him on the carpet, he certainly would have been fired by now. The strategy he and his now retired corporate chief legal counsel decided to follow has now been shown to be financially and reputationally ruinous. The latest slip now shows the customers will get three different seasonal peaks in traffic with MAX grounded. They must be ready to burn DM in effigy.

For reference, here's the milestone/timeline diagram:

Image
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Agrajag
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 7:15 pm

Production may not re-start until 2021:

https://t.co/D7G4QcWt6I
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 7:20 pm

Jetty wrote:
Trump calls Boeing a 'big, big disappointment'
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/articl ... Davos.html

It's not often that I agree with mister Trump but his judgement is spot on here, a big disappointment indeed. Time to ditch the monster from Seattle for good and make great airplanes again.

Time to ditch the mantra that unbridled capitalism solves all problems, IMO.

This tragedy shows that corporations can't be expected to make trade offs between safety and profit without supervision.

They're strongly motivated to chose profit over safety and to use "jedi mind tricks" to make it look like they've addressed safety without actually doing so.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 7:23 pm

Revelation wrote:
It seems if DM wasn't fired back in December due to FAA Administrator calling him on the carpet, he certainly would have been fired by now. The strategy he and his now retired corporate chief legal counsel decided to follow has now been shown to be financially and reputationally ruinous. The latest slip now shows the customers will get three different seasonal peaks in traffic with MAX grounded. They must be ready to burn DM in effigy.


So if Muilenberg had been fired last Summer or early Fall the MAX would be back flying by now? I don't think so.

If Muilenberg had never even been CEO, JT and ET would not have happened? I don't think so.

The BoD let him go for specific cause, not to make him a scapegoat for this whole sorry mess. We shouldn't be looking for scapegoats either.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 7:28 pm

Agrajag wrote:
Production may not re-start until 2021:

https://t.co/D7G4QcWt6I

A quote:

It could well remain shut down through September, analysts say, and perhaps through the end of the year, following the company’s announcement that it doesn’t expect to receive approval from the FAA for its bestselling plane to return to service till the summer.

IMO the article is click bait: unnamed analysts are used, and even then lots of imprecise language is being used. Pretty much a fact free spitballing approach, IMO.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 7:35 pm

seahawk wrote:
par13del wrote:
seahawk wrote:
The bit flip testing is a consequence of MCAS failure now having a catastrophic clasification. It is not a random new requirement.

Except MCAS happened on two occasions with fatal results and the bit flip has happened...................
So yes, I still believe that at the end of the day, bit flip will be the one that delayed or prevented RTS.


No, the RTS is delayed by Boeing making very optimistic judgement calls when defining how critical a MCAS failure would be.

So you are confirming the thoughts of others that the FAA is acting in a spiteful manner?

The majority of us accept that the FAA is the only one who has the authority to RTS the a/c, that Boeing presented dates in September, October, November 2019 etc. based on their best guess is just that, at no time before or after the tenure of last CEO did Boeing ever have the authority to grant RTS, that has always been the domain of the FAA.
I guess this became an issue to the new head of the FAA that he thought he had to tell Boeing to Shut Up because it undermined his authority.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 7:38 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
As you have been informed several times, bit flip only became a problem because of the catastrophic categorisation of MCAS and is not a separate problem and is not a new requirement.

Ray

...and as I stated, my opinion is that the programming changes required to fix the issues bought about by the bit flip failure is what is keeping the a/c grounded and not the fixes to MCAS, at leasttechnically, if you want to delve into the content of the e-mails I will leave that one alone. I will review my post to see where I stated that bit flip was a new requirement, I don't recall that but....
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounding, General Discussion Thread, January 2020

Wed Jan 22, 2020 7:39 pm

hivue wrote:
So if Muilenberg had been fired last Summer or early Fall the MAX would be back flying by now? I don't think so.

If Muilenberg had never even been CEO, JT and ET would not have happened? I don't think so.

The BoD let him go for specific cause, not to make him a scapegoat for this whole sorry mess. We shouldn't be looking for scapegoats either.

My comments point out that DM was in charge of the strategy chosen to deal with both crashes.

I think it's fair speculation to suggest that if DM had taken a different approach after the first crash we could very well have had RTS pretty much when the MCAS 2.0 fix was ready which some suggest was just a few weeks after the 2nd crash in April 2019.

Why? Well if the fix was ready in April clearly someone within Boeing knew it was a serious problem. Clearly the JT data showed multiple MCAS activations and anyone understanding the ramifications would soon realize a single bad AoA sensor triggered a set of actions that the crew wasn't able to deal with. Sure, maybe another crew could have done better, but surely MCAS also should have been implemented better too.

It seems to me the decision to use bravado and evasion was made at the executive level right after the first crash, which little internal investigation as to how likely or unlikely it was that there was a serious problem.

His Congressional testimony showed little evidence that he understood the ramifications of the idea that his company had serious shortcomings with regard to how MCAS was categorized, designed, developed, implemented and tested.

It seemed he was happy to delegate, believe the best, and stay clear of the blowback.

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