Calhoun said the company is not considering scrapping the MAX and expects it will continue to fly for a generation.
So they are stuck with the MAX for 20+ years? Or are they going to compete with themselves --
I'm sure that is the "plan of record" for now, there is no other viable path to follow in the near term.
I think it's pretty clear they will have to be pretty proactive about replacing MAX sooner than 20 years from now.
Clearly they are going to have to move to a much more automated cockpit than 737 has and doing so will mean no more common type rating.
Exactly when they chose to do so is going to be a big mystery for commercial reasons, but clearly it's sooner than 20 years from now.
Since the iPhone was invented in 2007 it's pretty clear we seeing new entrants who had smartphones as youngsters, and pretty soon it'll be ones who had one as toddlers.
It's not sensible to expect them to deal with cockpits with low levels of automation, training costs will be too high.
Scrubbing the checklists is all fine and well but if pilots won't use them then it's all for nothing.
That's why they are doing things such as line pilot evaluations to figure out what pilots actually do. In an ideal word this upcoming mandatory sim time would include an evaluation of the pilot's ability to incorporate what they learn.
That DM's strategy looks like an epic fail, we know by hindsight.
One year ago, he took a bet, kind of “betting the company”, that the “too big to fail” mantra, along with big friends, will save the Max from grounding or, if things go really wrong, will quickly allow its RTS no matter what.
I suppose he took such a bet based on internal knowledge and anticipation that once grounded for a long period fo time, the Max program will be badly badly toasted. Losing his bet would cost what, six additional months of agony? Not a huge difference in the big scheme of things. On the other side, winning his bet would have been the most genial and rewarding bluff in history (yet to remain secret).
There is no moral in economics. DM really assumed responsibility in corporate terms (which aren’t our armchair generals’ terms) and went to fight back trying to stop the monster at the company’s gate by continuing bluffing, trying one last trick to save the day. It didn’t work, but at least “he died trying” like his function required it. He was getting paid to do this and he deserved every million he got.
I consider what we saw after the two crashes as mostly bluffs, the real decision and action vectors being behind the curtain but easy to understand if we analyze the situation without emotions. Media is telling us emotional stories, not what's really happening.
It must be sorrowful to dearly hope that you are too big to fail, only to discover …
Otherwise, with time passing by, soon should arrive the final report of ET crash.
As I wrote earlier, I'm more inclined to believe he simply did not dig very deeply and preferred to defer to underlings. This is my impression after watching his Congressional testimony.
I know a CEO has to rely on underlings, but there are times where the CEO has to recognize that a situation presents a huge risk to the future of the company and do what it takes to get to the bottom of it.
Ironically he is a trained engineer so he should have had the skills and the instincts he needed, but it seems he was happy to sit in Chicago and delegate to others.